



National Transportation Safety Board



Source: Eric Adams

Inadvertent Activation of Fuel Shutoff Lever and Subsequent Ditching

Liberty Helicopters Inc., AS350 B2, N350LH
New York, New York, March 11, 2018

Human Performance presentation

Relationship Between Liberty and NYONair

- NYONair contracted with Liberty to operate FlyNYON-branded flights
- Liberty responsible for maintaining operational control over its flights, but overlapping management and other factors blurred roles and responsibilities at the two companies
- Liberty allowed NYONair to influence core aspects of operational control, including safety management

Liberty's Safety Program

- Had ceased external safety audits
- Director of safety had resigned
- Safety officer had resigned, and new safety officer:
 - Was not trained
 - Was unfamiliar with company safety manual
 - Did not convene safety meetings
 - Did not provide quarterly briefings to top management

NYONair's Safety Program

- NYONair lacked:
 - Formal safety structure
 - Clear lines of accountability for safety management
 - Systematic processes for identifying hazards, prioritizing interventions, mitigating related risks
- NYONair-led joint pilot meetings not effective for addressing Liberty pilot safety concerns

Liberty Pilots Aware of Potential Hazards

- Entanglement of items with floor-mounted engine controls
- Partial float inflation
- Difficulty accessing passenger carabiners
- Ineffective cutting tools

Handling of Safety Concerns

- Liberty pilots expressed safety concerns about harness/tether system, urged improvements
- Liberty's CEO, COO, and DO were disengaged, did not advocate for pilots' concerns
- NYONair's CEO chastised Liberty pilots, deprioritized their concerns

Summary

- Ineffective safety management resulted in lack of prioritization and mitigation of foreseeable risks
- Implementation of an SMS requirement for air tour operators would be beneficial to safety



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