On March 24, 2023, around 4:55 p.m., natural gas, which was transported through a UGI Corporation–owned pipeline, leaked into and accumulated in the basement of an R.M. Palmer Company candy factory building in West Reading, Pennsylvania. The gas ignited, causing an explosion and fire that killed 7 Palmer employees, injured 10 people, and destroyed the building. Another Palmer building, as well as an adjacent apartment building, were also severely damaged. Three families were displaced from the apartment building.
Safety issues included degradation of a retired service tee, insufficient consideration of threats to pipeline integrity, the risk associated with unmarked private pipeline assets crossing public rights-of-way (for example, a public street), delayed evacuation of Building 2 despite detection of natural gas, natural gas safety messaging that may not reach certain members of the public, insufficient guidance on gas leak emergency procedures, absence of natural gas detection alarms in commercial buildings, and insufficient accessibility of gas distribution line valves.
We determined that the probable cause of the explosion was degradation of a retired 1982 Aldyl A polyethylene service tee with a Delrin polyacetal insert that allowed natural gas to leak and migrate underground into the R.M. Palmer Company candy factory buildings, where it was ignited by an unknown source.
Contributing to the degradation of the service tee and insert were significantly elevated ground temperatures from steam escaping R.M. Palmer Company’s corroded underground steam pipe, located near the service tee, that had been unmarked and cracked. Contributing to the steam pipe crack was soil movement and R.M. Palmer Company’s lack of awareness of the pipe’s corroded state. Contributing to the natural gas leak was UGI Corporation’s lack of awareness of the nearby steam pipe, which led to an incomplete integrity management program evaluation that did not consider or manage the risk posed by the steam pipe.
Contributing to the accident’s severity was R.M. Palmer Company’s insufficient emergency response procedures and training of its employees, who did not understand the hazard and did not evacuate the buildings before the explosion.
As part of this investigation, we issued recommendations to:
- the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
- the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
- 50 states along with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia,
- the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
- the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,
- the American Gas Association,
- the American Petroleum Institute,
- the Gas Piping Technology Committee,
- the Common Ground Alliance,
- the International Code Council,
- the National Fire Protection Association,
- UGI Corporation, and
- R.M. Palmer Company.
Read the complete list of
recommendations.
