

Aviation Investigation Final Report

Location: Jasper, Georgia Accident Number: ERA16LA159

Date & Time: April 15, 2016, 19:55 Local Registration: N561AM

Aircraft: EUROCOPTER FRANCE AS350 Aircraft Damage: Substantial

Defining Event: Settling with power/vortex ring state Injuries: 4 None

Flight Conducted Under: Part 135: Air taxi & commuter - Non-scheduled - Air Medical (Medical emergency)

Analysis

The helicopter was approaching the helipad with a direct 11-knot tailwind gusting to 16 knots. About 250 ft above ground level, the commercial pilot lost tail rotor and cyclic authority, and the helicopter pitched forward and accelerated toward the ground. The pilot recognized the onset of vortex ring state, reduced engine power, and attempted to initiate a go-around; however, insufficient altitude remained to complete the maneuver, and the helicopter landed hard, resulting in a partial separation of the tailboom. The operator reported and postaccident examination confirmed that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter before the accident.

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

The pilot's loss of helicopter control due to vortex ring state, which resulted in a hard landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to conduct the landing approach with a tailwind.

Findings

Aircraft Descent rate - Not attained/maintained

Personnel issues Incorrect action performance - Pilot

Personnel issues Aircraft control - Pilot

Environmental issues Tailwind - Decision related to condition

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Factual Information

History of Flight

Landing	Settling with power/vortex ring state (Defining event)
Landing	Hard landing

On April 15, 2016, about 1955 eastern daylight time, a Eurocopter France AS350B2, N561AM, operated by Air Methods Corporation, was substantially damaged during collision with terrain near Jasper, Georgia. The commercial pilot and three medical flight crewmembers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The helicopter was operating on a company visual flight rules flight plan from Lanier Park Hospital Heliport (38GA), Gainesville, Georgia, to a helipad at Piedmont Mountainside Hospital, Jasper, Georgia. The helicopter emergency medical service flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.

According to a witness, the helicopter performed a circuit over the hospital prior to approaching the helipad to land. The helicopter began to descend, then about 110 ft above ground level (agl), the helicopter "bobbled up and down" and then it started to "fall quickly toward the ground."

According to the operator and the pilot, the helicopter completed an orbit over the hospital helipad about 800 ft agl prior to beginning a descent for landing. The pilot initiated a downwind approach to the helipad over high tension power lines, about 250 ft agl, and then turned onto the final leg of the approach, which was on a 300° heading. He said the tail rotor became "difficult to control," and the helicopter pitched forward uncommanded, and then began a "rapid descent with forward airspeed."

Believing he "might be in a vortex ring state condition," the pilot reduced the power and initiated a goaround but lacked sufficient altitude to complete the maneuver. The pilot maintained forward airspeed and raised the nose but landed hard, bounced three times, and came to rest upright. The pilot and three medical crew members then exited the helicopter without injury or assistance.

The weather reported at Pickens County Airport (JZP), Jasper, Georgia, about a half-mile northwest of the accident location included wind from 120° at 11 knots, gusting to 16 knots, with 10 miles visibility. The temperature was 18° C, the dew point was -8° C, and the altimeter setting was 30.24 inches of mercury.

Examination of the helicopter revealed substantial damage due to a partial separation of the taiboom. The operator reported, and examination confirmed, that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures prior to the accident.

According to representatives from Airbus Helicopters, the maximum allowable engine torque setting was for the helicopter was 100 percent continuous. The Vehicle Engine Multifunction Display (VEMD) was reviewed under federal supervision and the data indicated overtorque events at 107 percent for 2 seconds and 113 percent for 1 second.

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According to the FAA Rotorcraft Flying Handbook, "vortex ring state" (or "settling with power") describes an aerodynamic condition where a helicopter may be in a vertical (with regard to the air mass) descent with up to maximum engine power applied, and little or no cyclic authority. The term "settling with power" comes from the fact that a helicopter keeps settling, even though full engine power is applied. However, when the helicopter begins to descend vertically, it settles into its own downwash, which greatly enlarges the main rotor blade tip vortices. In this vortex ring state, most of the power developed by the engine is wasted in accelerating the air in a doughnut pattern around the rotor.

A vortex ring state may be entered during any maneuver that places the main rotor in a condition of high upflow and low forward airspeed, including near-vertical descents of at least 300 ft per minute, and a horizontal velocity slower than that for effective translational lift. A fully developed vortex ring state can be "characterized by an unstable condition in which the helicopter experiences uncommanded pitch and roll oscillations."

The handbook also noted that "when recovering from a settling with power condition, the tendency on the part of the pilot is to first try to stop the descent by increasing collective pitch. However, this only results in increasing the stalled area of the rotor, thus increasing the rate of descent. Recovery is accomplished by increasing forward speed, and/or partially lowering collective pitch." With sufficient altitude, temporary entrance into an autorotation will also enable safe exit from the vortex ring state.

Pilot Information

Certificate:	Commercial	Age:	52,Male
Airplane Rating(s):	None	Seat Occupied:	Front
Other Aircraft Rating(s):	Helicopter	Restraint Used:	4-point
Instrument Rating(s):	Helicopter	Second Pilot Present:	No
Instructor Rating(s):	None	Toxicology Performed:	No
Medical Certification:	Class 2 With waivers/limitations	Last FAA Medical Exam:	June 16, 2015
Occupational Pilot:	Yes	Last Flight Review or Equivalent:	October 7, 2015
Flight Time:	4214 hours (Total, all aircraft), 1620 hours (Total, this make and model), 4214 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 30 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 10 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 2 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)		

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Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

EUROCOPTER FRANCE	Registration:	N561AM
AS350 B2	Aircraft Category:	Helicopter
2007	Amateur Built:	
Normal	Serial Number:	4381
Skid	Seats:	4
April 7, 2016 Continuous airworthiness	Certified Max Gross Wt.:	4630 lbs
57 Hrs	Engines:	1 Turbo shaft
3386 Hrs as of last inspection	Engine Manufacturer:	Turbomeca
C126 installed, not activated	Engine Model/Series:	Arriel 1D1
TD AVIATION FINANCE LLC	Rated Power:	681 Horsepower
AirMethods Corporation	Operating Certificate(s) Held:	On-demand air taxi (135)
	Operator Designator Code:	QMLA
	AS350 B2 2007 Normal Skid April 7, 2016 Continuous airworthiness 57 Hrs 3386 Hrs as of last inspection C126 installed, not activated TD AVIATION FINANCE LLC	AS350 B2 Aircraft Category: Amateur Built: Normal Serial Number: Skid Seats: April 7, 2016 Continuous airworthiness 57 Hrs Engines: 3386 Hrs as of last inspection C126 installed, not activated TD AVIATION FINANCE LLC AirMethods Corporation Aircraft Category: Amateur Built: Certified Max Gross Wt.: Engine Max Gross Wt.: Engine Manufacturer: Engine Model/Series: TD AVIATION FINANCE LLC AirMethods Corporation Operating Certificate(s) Held:

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site:	Visual (VMC)	Condition of Light:	Dusk
Observation Facility, Elevation:	JZP,1535 ft msl	Distance from Accident Site:	0 Nautical Miles
Observation Time:	19:55 Local	Direction from Accident Site:	
Lowest Cloud Condition:	Clear	Visibility	10 miles
Lowest Ceiling:	None	Visibility (RVR):	
Wind Speed/Gusts:	11 knots / 16 knots	Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:	/
Wind Direction:	120°	Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:	/
Altimeter Setting:	30.23 inches Hg	Temperature/Dew Point:	18°C / -8°C
Precipitation and Obscuration:	No Obscuration; No Precipit	ation	
Departure Point:	GAINESVILLE, GA (38GA)	Type of Flight Plan Filed:	Company VFR
Destination:	Jasper, GA (NONE)	Type of Clearance:	None
Departure Time:	19:38 Local	Type of Airspace:	

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Airport Information

Airport:	Hospital Helipad NONE	Runway Surface Type:	
Airport Elevation:	1535 ft msl	Runway Surface Condition:	
Runway Used:		IFR Approach:	None
Runway Length/Width:		VFR Approach/Landing:	Forced landing

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries:	4 None	Aircraft Damage:	Substantial
Passenger Injuries:		Aircraft Fire:	None
Ground Injuries:	N/A	Aircraft Explosion:	None
Total Injuries:	4 None	Latitude, Longitude:	34.445556,-84.445831(est)

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Administrative Information

Investigator In Charge (IIC): Kemner, Heidi

Additional Participating Persons: Danny Cox; FAA/FSDO; Atlanta, GA
Jason Quisling; Air Methods Corporation; Englewood, CO

Original Publish Date: July 16, 2018

Last Revision Date:
Investigation Class: Class

Note: The NTSB did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Investigation Docket: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=93018

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable causes of the accidents and events we investigate, and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for each accident or event we investigate. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident; rather, as specified by NTSB regulation, "accident/incident investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties ... and are not conducted for the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person" (Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations section 831.4). Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB's statutory mission to improve transportation safety by investigating accidents and incidents and issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report (Title 49 United States Code section 1154(b)). A factual report that may be admissible under 49 United States Code section 1154(b) is available here.

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