



# **Aviation Investigation Final Report**

Location:	Ashland, Oregon	Accident Number:	WPR16LA081
Date & Time:	February 5, 2016, 14:30 Local	Registration:	N745BW
Aircraft:	McDonnell Douglas Helicopter 600N	Aircraft Damage:	Substantial
Defining Event:	Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)	Injuries:	1 None
Flight Conducted Under:	Part 91: General aviation - Positioning		

# Analysis

The commercial pilot reported that, during a cross-country helicopter flight, the main rotor blades seemed minimally out of track. After departing on the last leg of the flight, he noticed a slight "hop" as he made an ascending 180° right turn, but later stated that he had experienced worse with gusting winds and door-off operations. In straight and level flight, the blade track appeared to be no different than on the previous legs. During the descent toward the destination, he noticed that the hop became more apparent when the blades were unloaded. Maintenance personnel subsequently found a crack in one main rotor blade from the trailing edge forward to the spar at a point midspan near the beginning of the trim tab.

Examination revealed a visible crack on the top skin, with an opposing crack on the bottom skin. The crack surfaces were flat and light grey with features indicative of fatigue cracking from the trailing edges of the upper and lower skins forward to an internal "C" channel. No gross mechanical damage was visible, and abrasions visible after stripping paint from the blade appeared to be too small to initiate the fatigue crack. The blade had been in service for about 2/3 of its service hour life and more than half of its cycle life at the time of discovery. The reason for crack initiation could not be determined.

# **Probable Cause and Findings**

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

Fatigue cracking of a main rotor blade for reasons that could not be determined based on the available information.

Findings	
Aircraft	Main rotor blade system - Fatigue/wear/corrosion
Not determined	(general) - Unknown/Not determined

### **Factual Information**

#### **History of Flight**

Enroute-cruise

Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) (Defining event)

On February 5, 2016, about 1430 Pacific daylight time, a McDonnell Douglas Helicopter (MDHI) 600N, N745BW, experienced a cracked main rotor blade at Ashland, Oregon. The commercial pilot was not injured; the helicopter sustained substantial damage to a main rotor blade. Brim Aviation was operating the helicopter under the provisions of 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 91. Visual instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed. The cross-country positioning flight departed Alturas, California, about 1340 and was destined for Ashland.

The pilot reported that he was in one helicopter, while another pilot flew in another helicopter for the ferry flight to Ashland. Three intermediate stops were planned along the route of flight. All flight operations and characteristics had been normal, but he noted that the main rotor blades seemed minimally out of track. After departure from Alturas, he noticed a slight hop as he made an ascending 180° right turn out but stated that he had experienced worse with gusting winds and door off operations. In straight and level flight, blade track appeared to be no different than on the previous legs. During the descent into Ashland, he noticed that the hop had become more apparent when the blades were unloaded. He asked the trailing pilot to look at the rotor system for any abnormalities in flight, and the trail pilot indicated that they looked out of track. After landing, the pilot informed maintenance that the track and balance of both helicopters needed to be checked prior to the next operation. Maintenance personnel reported that there was a crack in one main rotor blade from the trailing edge forward to the spar at a point midspan near the beginning of the trim tab.

After the operator discovered the crack, the blade was initially sent to Helicopter Technology Company for examination. The damage to the rotor blade was reported to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on March 9, 2016.

#### **Pilot Information**

Certificate:	Commercial	Age:	53,Male
Airplane Rating(s):	Single-engine land	Seat Occupied:	Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s):	Helicopter	Restraint Used:	4-point
Instrument Rating(s):	None	Second Pilot Present:	No
Instructor Rating(s):	None	Toxicology Performed:	No
Medical Certification:	Class 2 Without waivers/limitations	Last FAA Medical Exam:	December 21, 2015
Occupational Pilot:	Yes	Last Flight Review or Equivalent:	March 1, 2016
Flight Time:	9400 hours (Total, all aircraft), 3000 hours (Total, this make and model), 9400 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 115 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 55 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 2 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)		

### Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make:	McDonnell Douglas Helicopter	Registration:	N745BW
Model/Series:	600N	Aircraft Category:	Helicopter
Year of Manufacture:	1998	Amateur Built:	
Airworthiness Certificate:	Normal	Serial Number:	RN045
Landing Gear Type:	N/A; Skid	Seats:	
Date/Type of Last Inspection:	March 7, 2016 100 hour	Certified Max Gross Wt.:	4500 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:		Engines:	1 Turbo shaft
Airframe Total Time:	4672 Hrs as of last inspection	Engine Manufacturer:	ALLISON
ELT:	C126 installed, not activated	Engine Model/Series:	250-M47
Registered Owner:	On file	Rated Power:	808 Horsepower
Operator:	On file	Operating Certificate(s) Held:	None

#### Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site:	Visual (VMC)	Condition of Light:	Day
<b>Observation Facility, Elevation:</b>	KMIR	Distance from Accident Site:	
Observation Time:	13:53 Local	Direction from Accident Site:	
Lowest Cloud Condition:	Scattered / 5500 ft AGL	Visibility	10 miles
Lowest Ceiling:	None	Visibility (RVR):	
Wind Speed/Gusts:	/	Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:	/
Wind Direction:		Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:	/
Altimeter Setting:	30.21 inches Hg	Temperature/Dew Point:	16°C / 6°C
Precipitation and Obscuration:	No Obscuration; No Precipitation		
Departure Point:	Alturas, CA (KAAT)	Type of Flight Plan Filed:	None
Destination:	Ashland, OR (S03 )	Type of Clearance:	None
Departure Time:	13:40 Local	Type of Airspace:	

### **Airport Information**

Airport:	Ashland S03	Runway Surface Type:	Asphalt
Airport Elevation:	1885 ft msl	Runway Surface Condition:	Dry
Runway Used:	30	IFR Approach:	None
Runway Length/Width:	3603 ft / 75 ft	VFR Approach/Landing:	Full stop

# Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries:	1 None	Aircraft Damage:	Substantial
Passenger Injuries:		Aircraft Fire:	None
Ground Injuries:	N/A	Aircraft Explosion:	None
Total Injuries:	1 None	Latitude, Longitude:	42.189998,-122.660552(est)

#### **Tests and Research**

The damaged blade was examined by the NTSB Material's Laboratory. The blade had a time in service (TIS) of 2,013.4 hours, 11,065 torque events, and a retirement index number (RIN) of 587,640. The blade's published service life is 3,200 hours or 1 million RIN.

Visual examination revealed a visible crack on the top skin with an opposed crack on the bottom skin. The crack surfaces were flat and light grey with features indicative of fatigue cracking from the trailing edges of the upper and lower skins forward to an internal "C" channel.

Examination using a scanning electron microscope showed striations and other fracture features within the fatigue crack region. The initial area of origin was in the area of the trailing edge of the upper skin, and striation orientations pointed to the vicinity of the upper corner of the skin.

From the origin, the fatigue crack propagated forward in the upper skin to just past the "C" channel. At the "V" strip, the fatigue crack reinitiated at the upper aft corner of the strip and propagated forward in the upper leg of the "V" and down and forward through the lower leg of the "V." In the lower skin crack surface, additional fatigue crack propagation initiated adjacent to the lower aft corner of the "V" strip then propagated forward and aft in the skin. Two additional fatigue crack paths were discovered in the "C" channel. The complete Material Laboratory Report can be found in the public docket.

The other five main rotor blades were sent to the manufacturer for examination, and no anomalies were detected.

#### **Administrative Information**

Investigator In Charge (IIC):	Plagens, Howard
Additional Participating Persons:	Tom Leonetti; Portland FAA-FSDO; Hillsboro, OR Burl Brim; Brim Aviation; Ashland, OR Joan Gregoire; MDHI; Mesa, AZ Gary Burdoff; HTC; Los Angeles, CA
Original Publish Date:	July 16, 2018
Last Revision Date:	
Investigation Class:	<u>Class</u>
Note:	The NTSB did not travel to the scene of this accident.
Investigation Docket:	https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=92822

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