



# Aviation Investigation Final Report

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<b>Location:</b>	Nunica, Michigan	<b>Accident Number:</b>	CEN11LA651
<b>Date &amp; Time:</b>	September 17, 2011, 18:07 Local	<b>Registration:</b>	N217RK
<b>Aircraft:</b>	North American AT-6	<b>Aircraft Damage:</b>	Substantial
<b>Defining Event:</b>	Loss of engine power (total)	<b>Injuries:</b>	1 Serious
<b>Flight Conducted Under:</b>	Part 91: General aviation - Personal		

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## Analysis

According to the pilot, the airplane had been refueled to its full capacity prior to the flight to the accident airport. The pilot indicated that the "flight to the accident airport required 50 minutes, which would have burned, with start-up, taxi, and flight time, 29 gallons." The pilot then departed the accident airport and stated that he applied full takeoff power. On climbout, the low fuel pressure light illuminated just before gear retraction, the fuel pressure then dropped to zero, and the engine abruptly lost power. A video taken at the airport where the accident occurred revealed that the airplane lost power during takeoff, impacted a tree on the left side of the departure runway, and subsequently impacted terrain. The airplane's engine monitor data revealed no recorded engine anomalies and fuel flow monitor data indicated 32.5 gallons of fuel used up to the time of the accident, and 77.1 gallons remaining. The pilot stated that he verified the fuel prior to departure at the accident airport by visual reference of fuel gauges and airplane fuel flow meter. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the right fuel tank was full. No anomalies were detected during the examination of the engine-driven fuel pump, gascolator, and the wobble pump. The fuel selector was found selected to the reserve position, which feeds from the reserve fuel retained within the standpipe and any additional left tank fuel above that retained reserve amount. The left main and reserve standpipes and screens were installed correctly and were free of obstructions. The left fuel tank contained about four gallons of fuel when it was defueled. The pilot did not visually check the level of the fuel tank's contents prior to departure; had he done so, he would have recognized that the left tank's fuel level was below what was expected. Fuel usage figures provided by both the pilot and the engine monitor data indicated there should have been over 20 gallons of fuel remaining in the left tank at the time of the accident. The reason for the discrepancy between the expected and actual fuel amounts could not be determined.

## Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The loss of engine power due to fuel starvation during climbout for undetermined reasons, because postaccident examination of the fuel system did not reveal any discrepancies that would have precluded normal engine operation. Contributing to the accident was the pilot not visually checking the fuel level prior to departure.

### Findings

<b>Aircraft</b>	Fuel - Fluid level
<b>Personnel issues</b>	Preflight inspection - Pilot

## Factual Information

### History of Flight

<b>Takeoff</b>	Loss of engine power (total) (Defining event)
<b>Takeoff</b>	Fuel starvation
<b>Takeoff</b>	Collision during takeoff/land

On September 17, 2011, about 1807 eastern daylight time, a North American AT-6, N217RK, impacted a tree and terrain after a loss of engine power during takeoff from runway 8 (3,600 feet by 100 feet, dry turf) at the Hat Field Airport (5N7), near Nunica, Michigan. The commercial pilot received serious injuries. The airplane sustained substantial firewall, fuselage, and wing damage. The airplane was registered to Tailwinds Inc. and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Day visual flight rules (VFR) conditions prevailed for the flight, which was not operated on a VFR flight rules flight plan. The flight was originating at the time of the accident and was destined for the Mason Jewett Field Airport, near Mason, Michigan.

Review of a video taken at 5N7 revealed that the airplane was the fourth airplane in a flight of multiple airplanes to depart the airport. The video revealed that the accident airplane lost power during its takeoff, impacted a tree on the left side of the departure runway, and subsequently impacted terrain.

The pilot's accident report indicated that the airplane was "ground checked" and each aircraft took off as briefed in a single-ship sequence leaving nine seconds between each departure, which allowed any departing aircraft time to abort its takeoff roll. The pilot indicated that he applied full takeoff power. As the airplane passed about two-thirds of the runway's length, the airplane had a positive rate of climb. The low fuel pressure light illuminated just before gear retraction, the fuel pressure dropped to zero, and the engine abruptly quit. The pilot lowered the airplane's nose and impacted a tree during the forced descent. The impact turned the plane, causing it to hit the ground at a vertical angle tearing the engine and propeller from the plane.

According to the pilot, the airplane had been refueled prior to flying to the accident airport to its full capacity of 110 gallons, of which, 106 gallons is usable. The airplane had two 55-gallon fuel tanks, one in each wing. The fuel selector has four positions; right tank on, left tank on, left tank reserve, and off. The pilot indicated that the "flight to the accident airport required 50 minutes, which would have burned, with start-up, taxi and flight time, 29 gallons. This was verified prior to departure at the accident airport by visual reference of fuel gauges and aircraft fuel flow meter." However, the pilot did not visually check the level of the fuel tank's contents.

A Federal Aviation Administration inspector examined the wreckage. The inspector indicated

he observed that the right fuel tank was full. The gascolator contained a cup of fuel and the screen was clean. The engine driven fuel pump was removed from the engine and the pump produced suction when rotated by hand. The fuel selector was found set to the reserve position. The wobble pump was able to pump fluid and produced pressure at its output port. The left main and reserve standpipes and screens were installed correctly and were free of obstructions. The left fuel tank contained about four gallons of fuel. The airplane's engine monitor and fuel flow monitor were shipped to the National Transportation Safety Board Recorder Laboratory for downloading.

The airplane was equipped with a J. P. Instruments EDM-700 panel mounted engine monitor gauge. The gauge monitored and recorded exhaust gas temperature, cylinder head temperature, and battery voltage. The gauge was in good condition and its data was extracted normally from the device. The download contained approximately 11 hours of data over 18 power cycles. The data from the accident flight and the flight prior to it were plotted. The plot of the flight prior to the accident, on September 17, 2011, covered a time period from 14:24:00 to 15:28:12. The accident flight plot covered a time period from 17:58:46 to 18:07:10 and no recorded engine anomalies were detected in the plot.

The airplane was also equipped with a Shadin Avionics Miniflo-L fuel flow monitor gauge, which was a digital fuel management system, designed to provide fuel management information under real time flight conditions to the pilot. The unit does not interface with an airplane's fuel quantity indicating system. The unit required the pilot to enter the initial fuel on board the aircraft. All calculations and data provided by the unit were based on fuel flow. The fuel flow indicator unit was received in good condition and it reported a value of "good" when it self-tested as power was applied. Its data indicated 32.5 gallons of fuel used and 77.1 gallons remaining.

The pilot's safety recommendation, in part, stated:

I do know that wearing my seat belt with shoulder harness and aviation flight helmet likely saved my life. When flying these types of planes, please always wear your safety gear. You can't choose when an accident may occur, but you can be prepared when it does.

## Pilot Information

<b>Certificate:</b>	Commercial	<b>Age:</b>	62, Male
<b>Airplane Rating(s):</b>	Single-engine land; Single-engine sea; Multi-engine land	<b>Seat Occupied:</b>	Front
<b>Other Aircraft Rating(s):</b>	None	<b>Restraint Used:</b>	
<b>Instrument Rating(s):</b>	Airplane	<b>Second Pilot Present:</b>	No
<b>Instructor Rating(s):</b>	None	<b>Toxicology Performed:</b>	No
<b>Medical Certification:</b>	Class 2 With waivers/limitations	<b>Last FAA Medical Exam:</b>	August 9, 2011
<b>Occupational Pilot:</b>	No	<b>Last Flight Review or Equivalent:</b>	August 7, 2010
<b>Flight Time:</b>	4496 hours (Total, all aircraft), 1209 hours (Total, this make and model), 4397 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 96 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 27 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 2 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)		

## Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

<b>Aircraft Make:</b>	North American	<b>Registration:</b>	N217RK
<b>Model/Series:</b>	AT-6	<b>Aircraft Category:</b>	Airplane
<b>Year of Manufacture:</b>		<b>Amateur Built:</b>	
<b>Airworthiness Certificate:</b>	Normal	<b>Serial Number:</b>	43942
<b>Landing Gear Type:</b>	Retractable - Tailwheel	<b>Seats:</b>	2
<b>Date/Type of Last Inspection:</b>	February 15, 2011 Annual	<b>Certified Max Gross Wt.:</b>	
<b>Time Since Last Inspection:</b>		<b>Engines:</b>	1 Reciprocating
<b>Airframe Total Time:</b>	10073 Hrs at time of accident	<b>Engine Manufacturer:</b>	Pratt & Whitney
<b>ELT:</b>	Installed, activated, did not aid in locating accident	<b>Engine Model/Series:</b>	R-1340-AN1
<b>Registered Owner:</b>	On file	<b>Rated Power:</b>	600 Horsepower
<b>Operator:</b>	On file	<b>Operating Certificate(s) Held:</b>	None

## Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

<b>Conditions at Accident Site:</b>	Visual (VMC)	<b>Condition of Light:</b>	Day
<b>Observation Facility, Elevation:</b>	MKG,629 ft msl	<b>Distance from Accident Site:</b>	8 Nautical Miles
<b>Observation Time:</b>	17:55 Local	<b>Direction from Accident Site:</b>	305°
<b>Lowest Cloud Condition:</b>	Clear	<b>Visibility</b>	10 miles
<b>Lowest Ceiling:</b>	None	<b>Visibility (RVR):</b>	
<b>Wind Speed/Gusts:</b>	9 knots /	<b>Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:</b>	/
<b>Wind Direction:</b>	130°	<b>Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:</b>	/
<b>Altimeter Setting:</b>	30.29 inches Hg	<b>Temperature/Dew Point:</b>	20°C / 6°C
<b>Precipitation and Obscuration:</b>	No Obscuration; No Precipitation		
<b>Departure Point:</b>	Nunica, MI (5N7 )	<b>Type of Flight Plan Filed:</b>	None
<b>Destination:</b>	Mason, MI (TEW )	<b>Type of Clearance:</b>	None
<b>Departure Time:</b>	18:07 Local	<b>Type of Airspace:</b>	

## Airport Information

<b>Airport:</b>	Hat Field Airport 5N7	<b>Runway Surface Type:</b>	Grass/turf
<b>Airport Elevation:</b>	625 ft msl	<b>Runway Surface Condition:</b>	Dry
<b>Runway Used:</b>	08	<b>IFR Approach:</b>	None
<b>Runway Length/Width:</b>	3600 ft / 100 ft	<b>VFR Approach/Landing:</b>	Forced landing

## Wreckage and Impact Information

<b>Crew Injuries:</b>	1 Serious	<b>Aircraft Damage:</b>	Substantial
<b>Passenger Injuries:</b>		<b>Aircraft Fire:</b>	None
<b>Ground Injuries:</b>	N/A	<b>Aircraft Explosion:</b>	None
<b>Total Injuries:</b>	1 Serious	<b>Latitude, Longitude:</b>	43.097221,-86.094444(est)

## Administrative Information

<b>Investigator In Charge (IIC):</b>	Malinowski, Edward
<b>Additional Participating Persons:</b>	James Gotha; Federal Aviation Administration; Grand Rapids, MI
<b>Original Publish Date:</b>	February 27, 2013
<b>Last Revision Date:</b>	
<b>Investigation Class:</b>	<a href="#">Class</a>
<b>Note:</b>	
<b>Investigation Docket:</b>	<a href="https://data.nts.gov/Docket?ProjectID=81838">https://data.nts.gov/Docket?ProjectID=81838</a>

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable causes of the accidents and events we investigate, and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for each accident or event we investigate. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident; rather, as specified by NTSB regulation, “accident/incident investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties ... and are not conducted for the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person” (Title 49 *Code of Federal Regulations* section 831.4). Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB’s statutory mission to improve transportation safety by investigating accidents and incidents and issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report (Title 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b)). A factual report that may be admissible under 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b) is available [here](#).