



# Aviation Investigation Final Report

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<b>Location:</b>	ST. ELMO, Alabama	<b>Accident Number:</b>	MIA00LA044
<b>Date &amp; Time:</b>	December 8, 1999, 17:00 Local	<b>Registration:</b>	N5864L
<b>Aircraft:</b>	American AA-5	<b>Aircraft Damage:</b>	Substantial
<b>Defining Event:</b>		<b>Injuries:</b>	1 Serious, 1 None
<b>Flight Conducted Under:</b>	Part 91: General aviation - Personal		

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## Analysis

During preflight, slight amount of water noted in right wing and sump tanks. No water noted in left wing or sump tanks. Engine start/run-up, uneventful. After takeoff about 300 feet agl near the departure end of the runway, the engine began to 'sputter.' Attempts to restore engine power were unsuccessful. While maneuvering for a forced landing, the airplane pitched nose down and impacted a cotton field. Water was found in the carburetor bowl. An incorrect fuel drain valve by part number and design was installed in the right wing fuel tank; no determination made when the valve was installed. Testing on a same make and model airplane using an exemplar of the fuel drain valve found installed in the right fuel tank revealed .99 pound of fuel remained in the tank and could not be drained. All fuel could be drained with the airplane manufacturer specified drain valve installed. The airplane sat for a couple of months before the accident date with the right tank not topped; the left tank was full. The airplane was out of annual inspection. Additionally, the pilot's medical certificate was expired, and he could not produce the date of his last biennial flight review.

## Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The failure of the pilot to maintain airspeed resulting in the in-flight loss of control while maneuvering for a forced landing in a field after the loss of engine power. Contributing factors were the loss of engine power due to water-contaminated fuel.

## Findings

Occurrence #1: LOSS OF ENGINE POWER(PARTIAL) - NONMECHANICAL  
Phase of Operation: TAKEOFF - INITIAL CLIMB

### Findings

1. (F) FUEL SYSTEM,DRAIN - INCORRECT
2. MAINTENANCE,INSTALLATION - IMPROPER - UNKNOWN
3. (F) FLUID,FUEL - CONTAMINATION,WATER
4. (F) AIRCRAFT PREFLIGHT - NOT POSSIBLE - PILOT IN COMMAND

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Occurrence #2: LOSS OF CONTROL - IN FLIGHT  
Phase of Operation: EMERGENCY DESCENT/LANDING

### Findings

5. (C) AIRSPEED - NOT MAINTAINED - PILOT IN COMMAND

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Occurrence #3: IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH TERRAIN/WATER  
Phase of Operation: DESCENT - UNCONTROLLED

### Findings

6. TERRAIN CONDITION - GROUND

## Factual Information

On December 8, 1999, about 1700 central standard time, an American AA-5, N5864L, listed in the FAA registry as "registration pending", experienced an in-flight loss of control following a loss of engine power shortly after takeoff from St. Elmo Airport, St. Elmo, Alabama. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The private-rated pilot sustained serious injuries and a passenger was not injured. The flight originated about 1 minute earlier.

The pilot stated that "...The individual that was with me that day was my IA [mechanic with inspection authorization] and I was on a test flight to see how the 'mags' were performing...." The airplane had sat for a couple of months before the accident flight date with the left fuel tank full and the right fuel tank not topped. During his aircraft preflight, he checked both wing and sump tank drains of each wing for water 4 or 5 times each and only discovered a small amount of water on the first check of the right wing fuel tank and right wing sump tank. He did not detect water in the left wing tank or sump tanks. He completed the preflight and after starting the engine, taxied to a hangar to put air in the tires. After doing so, he taxied to runway 06, performed an engine run-up checking the magnetos and carburetor heat; noting that each magneto drop was in tolerance. He positioned the airplane on the runway, applied power to takeoff, and while climbing near the departure end of the runway about 300 feet above ground level, the engine began to "sputter." He switched the fuel selector valve two times and pumped the throttle to restore engine power with no response. He maneuvered the airplane to the left, touched down in a cotton field, and the airplane nosed over after touchdown. The pilot broke his back in three places and later reported when asked that he noted that the left wing fuel tank drain valve was different than the "rest." He also stated that he has owned the airplane since 1991 or 1992, and since then to his knowledge, no fuel drain valves have been replaced.

The passenger who is a student pilot stated that the airplane became airborne about 1/3 down the runway and the pilot initiated a climb but he noticed that the pilot was "fiddling" with the primer. The pilot then banked to the left changing the aircraft heading 90 degrees then rolled wings level. He then noticed that the nose of the airplane pitched down approximately 45 degrees; the airplane impacted the ground in that attitude and nosed over.

An FAA inspector examined the airplane at the accident site. The nose wheel assembly was separated and damage to the left wing was noted. Examination of the magnetos revealed no discrepancies. Examination of the engine by an FAA certificated airframe and powerplant mechanic revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. Thumb compression was noted from each cylinder. Fuel samples were taken from each wing fuel tank and from the carburetor bowl. No water was detected in each wing fuel tank but water was detected in the carburetor bowl. Examination of the airplane revealed that the left and right sump tank fuel drain valves were determined to be part number (CAV-110); the airplane parts catalog lists the

part number as (F391-187). The right fuel tank fuel drain valve was determined to be part number (CAV-170), and the left fuel tank fuel drain valve was determined to be part number (F391-53S). The airplane parts catalog lists the wing tank fuel drain valve as part number (F391-53S).

Examination of an exemplar of the wing tank fuel drain valve specified by the airplane manufacturer part number (F391-53S), and of an exemplar of the wing tank fuel drain valve which was installed in the right fuel tank of the accident airplane part number (CAV-170), revealed that the fuel drain port of the installed fuel drain valve is located approximately 1/4 inch higher along the length of the valve than the drain port of the fuel drain valve specified by the manufacturer.

Testing of an exemplar of the fuel drain valve found installed in the right fuel tank of the accident airplane and of an exemplar of the fuel drain valve listed in the parts catalog was performed on the same make and model airplane as the accident airplane. The tests which were witnessed by an FAA inspector revealed that with the airplane parts catalog specified wing tank fuel drain valve installed, all fuel by weight that was placed in the tank could be drained through the drain valve. With an exemplar of the wing tank fuel drain valve that was installed in the accident airplane installed in the test airplane, .99 pound of fuel remained in the wing fuel tank which could not be drained through the drain valve. Testing of an exemplar of the sump tank fuel drain valve found installed in the left and right sump tanks of the accident airplane versus an exemplar of the sump tank drain valve specified by the airplane manufacturer was also accomplished. Both valves were able to drain through them approximately all fuel by weight added to the sump tank.

Review of the airplane maintenance records by the facility that purchased the salvage of the airplane revealed no entry which indicates that the right wing fuel drain valve was replaced. Further review of the maintenance records revealed that the last recorded annual inspection occurred on October 23, 1998. Title 14 CFR Part 91.409 indicates in part, "...no person may operate an aircraft unless, within the preceding 12 calendar months, it has had-(1) An annual inspection in accordance with Part 43 of this chapter and has been approved for return to service...."

The pilot could not determine the date of his last biennial flight review. Additionally, FAA personnel stated that the pilot's medical certificate was expired at the time of the accident.

## Pilot Information

<b>Certificate:</b>	Private	<b>Age:</b>	56, Male
<b>Airplane Rating(s):</b>	Single-engine land	<b>Seat Occupied:</b>	Left
<b>Other Aircraft Rating(s):</b>	None	<b>Restraint Used:</b>	
<b>Instrument Rating(s):</b>	None	<b>Second Pilot Present:</b>	No
<b>Instructor Rating(s):</b>	None	<b>Toxicology Performed:</b>	No
<b>Medical Certification:</b>	Class 3 Expired	<b>Last FAA Medical Exam:</b>	March 21, 1996
<b>Occupational Pilot:</b>	UNK	<b>Last Flight Review or Equivalent:</b>	
<b>Flight Time:</b>			

## Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

<b>Aircraft Make:</b>	American	<b>Registration:</b>	N5864L
<b>Model/Series:</b>	AA-5 AA-5	<b>Aircraft Category:</b>	Airplane
<b>Year of Manufacture:</b>		<b>Amateur Built:</b>	
<b>Airworthiness Certificate:</b>	Normal; Utility	<b>Serial Number:</b>	AA5-0064
<b>Landing Gear Type:</b>	Tricycle	<b>Seats:</b>	4
<b>Date/Type of Last Inspection:</b>	October 23, 1998 Annual	<b>Certified Max Gross Wt.:</b>	2200 lbs
<b>Time Since Last Inspection:</b>	10 Hrs	<b>Engines:</b>	1 Reciprocating
<b>Airframe Total Time:</b>	2894 Hrs	<b>Engine Manufacturer:</b>	Lycoming
<b>ELT:</b>	Installed, activated	<b>Engine Model/Series:</b>	O-320-E2G
<b>Registered Owner:</b>	REGISTRATION PENDING	<b>Rated Power:</b>	150 Horsepower
<b>Operator:</b>	JAMES R. SULLENS	<b>Operating Certificate(s) Held:</b>	None
<b>Operator Does Business As:</b>		<b>Operator Designator Code:</b>	

## Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

<b>Conditions at Accident Site:</b>	Visual (VMC)	<b>Condition of Light:</b>	Dusk
<b>Observation Facility, Elevation:</b>	BFM ,26 ft msl	<b>Distance from Accident Site:</b>	12 Nautical Miles
<b>Observation Time:</b>	16:53 Local	<b>Direction from Accident Site:</b>	57°
<b>Lowest Cloud Condition:</b>	Scattered / 6500 ft AGL	<b>Visibility</b>	8 miles
<b>Lowest Ceiling:</b>	None	<b>Visibility (RVR):</b>	
<b>Wind Speed/Gusts:</b>	6 knots /	<b>Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:</b>	/
<b>Wind Direction:</b>	80°	<b>Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:</b>	/
<b>Altimeter Setting:</b>	30 inches Hg	<b>Temperature/Dew Point:</b>	14°C / 13°C
<b>Precipitation and Obscuration:</b>	No Obscuration; No Precipitation		
<b>Departure Point:</b>	(2R5 )	<b>Type of Flight Plan Filed:</b>	None
<b>Destination:</b>		<b>Type of Clearance:</b>	None
<b>Departure Time:</b>	16:59 Local	<b>Type of Airspace:</b>	Class G

## Airport Information

<b>Airport:</b>	ST. ELMO 2R5	<b>Runway Surface Type:</b>	
<b>Airport Elevation:</b>	133 ft msl	<b>Runway Surface Condition:</b>	Dry
<b>Runway Used:</b>	0	<b>IFR Approach:</b>	
<b>Runway Length/Width:</b>		<b>VFR Approach/Landing:</b>	Forced landing

## Wreckage and Impact Information

<b>Crew Injuries:</b>	1 Serious	<b>Aircraft Damage:</b>	Substantial
<b>Passenger Injuries:</b>	1 None	<b>Aircraft Fire:</b>	None
<b>Ground Injuries:</b>	N/A	<b>Aircraft Explosion:</b>	None
<b>Total Injuries:</b>	1 Serious, 1 None	<b>Latitude, Longitude:</b>	30.50966,-88.26918(est)

## Administrative Information

<b>Investigator In Charge (IIC):</b>	Monville, Timothy
<b>Additional Participating Persons:</b>	MIKE MITCHELL; BIRMINGHAM , AL DAVID H MILLER; HOUSTON , TX
<b>Original Publish Date:</b>	March 2, 2001
<b>Last Revision Date:</b>	
<b>Investigation Class:</b>	<a href="#">Class</a>
<b>Note:</b>	
<b>Investigation Docket:</b>	<a href="https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=47891">https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=47891</a>

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable causes of the accidents and events we investigate, and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for each accident or event we investigate. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident; rather, as specified by NTSB regulation, “accident/incident investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties ... and are not conducted for the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person” (Title 49 *Code of Federal Regulations* section 831.4). Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB’s statutory mission to improve transportation safety by investigating accidents and incidents and issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report (Title 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b)). A factual report that may be admissible under 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b) is available [here](#).