



Aviation Investigation Final Report

Location:	ATLANTA, Georgia	Incident Number:	ATL97IA035
Date & Time:	January 31, 1997, 16:10 Local	Registration:	N611DL
Aircraft:	Boeing 757-232	Aircraft Damage:	Minor
Defining Event:		Injuries:	168 None
Flight Conducted Under:	Part 121: Air carrier - Scheduled		

Analysis

After takeoff, the left engine experienced an uncontained failure of the Stage 1 High Pressure Turbine (HPT). The airplane returned safely and made a precautionary landing. After further examination of the engine, it was determined that the 'HPT disk blade retention lug had separated because of a low cycle fatigue fracture'. Both a Service Bulletin, PW2000 A72-592, and an Airworthiness Directive, TAD 97-11-51T, were issued to address this problem in this and other Pratt and Whitney engines.

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident to be: failure of the Stage 1 High Pressure Turbine due to a fatigue fracture in a disk blade retention lug.

Findings

Occurrence #1: LOSS OF ENGINE POWER(PARTIAL) - MECH FAILURE/MALF
Phase of Operation: CLIMB

Findings

1. 1 ENGINE
2. (C) TURBINE ASSEMBLY - FATIGUE
3. MISC,ENGINE UNCONTAINED FAILURE - FAILURE,TOTAL

Factual Information

On January 31, 1997, about 1610 eastern standard time, a Boeing 757, N611DL, experienced an uncontained failure of the number one (left) engine during climb, near Atlanta, Georgia. The airplane, Flight 602, was operated by Delta Air Lines under instrument flight rules, and the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 121, as a scheduled, domestic, passenger flight. An instrument flight plan was activated. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. There were no injuries to the two flight crewmembers, the five flight attendants, and the 161 passengers, and the airplane incurred minor damage. Origination of the flight was Atlanta, Georgia, about 1600 on the same day. The flight was destined for Dallas, Texas.

According to the captain, the airplane was climbing through about 15,000 feet when "the engine failed abruptly". The cockpit and aft cabin filled partially with smoke which cleared quickly. The captain requested an immediate return to Atlanta's William B. Hartsfield International Airport. The landing was uneventful. After being visually inspected for fire, the airplane was able to taxi back to the gate without further incident.

The left engine was a Pratt and Whitney PW2037 turbofan, serial number 716582. Delta's records indicate the engine had accumulated 19,243 hours total time and 9,823 cycles since new. The engine had operated 3,518 hours and 1,719 cycles since its last heavy maintenance visit on September 26, 1996.

An examination by Delta, Pratt and Whitney, and the Powerplants Group of the National Transportation Safety Board revealed the Stage 1 high pressure turbine (HPT) disk, Part Number 1B3621, had fractured and was missing the lug between two blade root slots. According to the report by the Powerplants Group, this rupture liberated one Stage 1 lug and two Stage 1 HPT blades. One blade was recovered from the cowling and determined to be "battered and fractured transversely across the airfoil adjacent to the blade root platform".

A visual examination showed the fracture surface was "smooth and had a purple discoloration from the front side that faded to a gold color towards the rear" of the disk. According to the Powerplants Group report, the "fir tree serrations on the adjacent lugs were intact." At the time of separation, according to Delta's records, the Stage 1 HPT disk had accumulated 9,825 cycles since new, and 1,719 cycles since the last heavy maintenance. Part Number 1B3621 Stage 1 HPT disks are life limited to 15,000 cycles.

The remaining rotating parts of the HPT were intact, with impact damage on the blades. The low pressure turbine (LPT) was intact. Its vanes and blades both had "nicks and dents". The remainder of the engine appeared normal and was not disassembled.

A metallurgical examination was completed by Pratt and Whitney's material laboratory

in February, 1997. The examination showed that the "HPT disk blade retention lug had separated because of a low cycle fatigue (LCF) fracture that had initiated from multiple origins along the front sideplate snap radius and propagated axially rearward. The origins of the fatigue fracture were parallel to circumferential machining marks that were just inboard of the snap radius".

After this and other similar HPT failures, Pratt and Whitney produced an Alert Service Bulletin (ASB). This bulletin, PW2000 A72-592, described a modification of the HPT disk assembly for all PW2037, PW2037(M), PW2040, PW2240, and PW2337 engines. This Service Bulletin attempted to prevent further blade attachment lug liberations by enlarging the front and rear sideplate snap radii. This modification was designed to reduce the stresses and eliminate the cracking in the radii which was allowing the blades to be liberated.

From Pratt and Whitney's Alert Service Bulletin, the FAA produced a Telegraphic Airworthiness Directive (TAD) 97-11-51T, which required serviceable disks to be operated in accordance with Pratt and Whitney's ASB No. PW2000 A72-592.

Pilot Information

Certificate:	Airline transport	Age:	58, Male
Airplane Rating(s):	Multi-engine land	Seat Occupied:	Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s):	None	Restraint Used:	
Instrument Rating(s):	Airplane	Second Pilot Present:	Yes
Instructor Rating(s):	None	Toxicology Performed:	No
Medical Certification:	Class 1 Valid Medical--no waivers/lim.	Last FAA Medical Exam:	November 8, 1996
Occupational Pilot:	Yes	Last Flight Review or Equivalent:	
Flight Time:	15000 hours (Total, all aircraft), 2751 hours (Total, this make and model), 225 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft)		

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make:	Boeing	Registration:	N611DL
Model/Series:	757-232 757-232	Aircraft Category:	Airplane
Year of Manufacture:		Amateur Built:	
Airworthiness Certificate:	Transport	Serial Number:	22818
Landing Gear Type:	Retractable - Tricycle	Seats:	190
Date/Type of Last Inspection:	January 20, 1997 Continuous airworthiness	Certified Max Gross Wt.:	223800 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:	106 Hrs	Engines:	2 Turbo fan
Airframe Total Time:	37395 Hrs	Engine Manufacturer:	P&W
ELT:	Not installed	Engine Model/Series:	PW2037
Registered Owner:	DELTA AIR LINES	Rated Power:	37530 Lbs thrust
Operator:		Operating Certificate(s) Held:	Flag carrier (121)
Operator Does Business As:		Operator Designator Code:	DALA

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site:	Visual (VMC)	Condition of Light:	Day
Observation Facility, Elevation:	ATL ,1026 ft msl	Distance from Accident Site:	35 Nautical Miles
Observation Time:	15:56 Local	Direction from Accident Site:	270°
Lowest Cloud Condition:	Unknown	Visibility	10 miles
Lowest Ceiling:	Broken / 25000 ft AGL	Visibility (RVR):	
Wind Speed/Gusts:	11 knots / 15 knots	Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:	/
Wind Direction:	260°	Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:	/
Altimeter Setting:	29 inches Hg	Temperature/Dew Point:	15°C / -1°C
Precipitation and Obscuration:	No Obscuration; No Precipitation		
Departure Point:	(ATL)	Type of Flight Plan Filed:	IFR
Destination:	DALLAS , TX (DFW)	Type of Clearance:	IFR
Departure Time:	16:00 Local	Type of Airspace:	Class B

Airport Information

Airport:	HARTSFIELD INTERNATIONAL ATL	Runway Surface Type:	Concrete
Airport Elevation:	1026 ft msl	Runway Surface Condition:	Dry
Runway Used:	27L	IFR Approach:	None
Runway Length/Width:	11889 ft / 150 ft	VFR Approach/Landing:	Precautionary landing

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries:	7 None	Aircraft Damage:	Minor
Passenger Injuries:	161 None	Aircraft Fire:	None
Ground Injuries:	N/A	Aircraft Explosion:	None
Total Injuries:	168 None	Latitude, Longitude:	

Administrative Information

Investigator In Charge (IIC):	Hicks, Preston
Additional Participating Persons:	FRAN DEJOSEPH; REGAN H CAMPBELL;
Original Publish Date:	April 24, 1998
Last Revision Date:	
Investigation Class:	Class
Note:	
Investigation Docket:	https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=3787

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable causes of the accidents and events we investigate, and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for each accident or event we investigate. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident; rather, as specified by NTSB regulation, “accident/incident investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties ... and are not conducted for the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person” (Title 49 *Code of Federal Regulations* section 831.4). Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB’s statutory mission to improve transportation safety by investigating accidents and incidents and issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report (Title 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b)). A factual report that may be admissible under 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b) is available [here](#).