



# Aviation Investigation Final Report

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<b>Location:</b>	Falmouth, Massachusetts	<b>Accident Number:</b>	ERA23FA077
<b>Date &amp; Time:</b>	December 2, 2022, 15:04 Local	<b>Registration:</b>	N3515H
<b>Aircraft:</b>	Mooney M20J	<b>Aircraft Damage:</b>	Substantial
<b>Defining Event:</b>	Collision during takeoff/land	<b>Injuries:</b>	1 Fatal, 1 Serious
<b>Flight Conducted Under:</b>	Part 91: General aviation - Personal		

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## Analysis

The pilot-rated passenger described the sun as “blinding” during the landing approach, but stated that she and the pilot were uncomfortable landing on the other runway due to the wind conditions. While on final approach, the passenger adjusted the pilot’s sun visor, then looked down to confirm that the airplane was properly configured for landing. When she looked up, she knew that the airplane was going to impact trees. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane impacted 75-ft-tall trees about 300 ft from the end of the runway, then subsequently impacted terrain. The passenger reported there were no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Review of published airport information revealed that trees were listed as an obstruction for both runways.

## Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

The pilot’s failure to maintain clearance from trees during the landing approach. Contributing to the accident was the sun glare, which impaired the pilot’s visibility and situational awareness.

## Findings

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<b>Environmental issues</b>	Glare - Effect on personnel
<b>Environmental issues</b>	Tree(s) - Contributed to outcome
<b>Aircraft</b>	Altitude - Not attained/maintained
<b>Personnel issues</b>	Aircraft control - Pilot

## Factual Information

### History of Flight

<b>Approach-VFR pattern final</b>	Collision during takeoff/land (Defining event)
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On December 2, 2022, about 1504 eastern standard time, a Mooney M20J, N3515H, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident at Falmouth Airpark (5B6), Falmouth, Massachusetts. The private pilot was fatally injured, and the pilot-rated passenger received serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 91 personal flight.

According to a friend of the pilot, earlier that day, he and three other aircraft, including the accident airplane, flew from 5B6 to Westfield-Barnes Regional Airport (BAF), Westfield/Springfield, Massachusetts, for lunch. He reported that, after having lunch, they all returned to 5B6. Before landing, he heard a female voice making radio calls from the accident airplane. She made an announcement as they were entering the downwind leg of the airport traffic pattern and then onto the final leg for runway 25. He continued his approach and while on short final, he spotted the crashed airplane at the approach end of runway 25.

In an interview with the pilot-rated passenger, she remembered flying to BAF, and said that the flight was uneventful. She was not pilot-in-command at the time of the accident but was double-checking everything during the flight. She reported that the sun was “blinding” during the approach to runway 25, but there was enough wind that they did not feel comfortable landing on runway 7. While on short final, she adjusted the pilot’s sun visor, looked down to check that the airplane was configured for landing, and when she looked up, she knew that the airplane was going to hit the trees. She believed that the pilot could not see because of the sun. She stated that the engine was running fine, and there were no flight control anomalies at the time of the accident.

## Pilot Information

<b>Certificate:</b>	Private	<b>Age:</b>	83, Male
<b>Airplane Rating(s):</b>	Single-engine land	<b>Seat Occupied:</b>	Left
<b>Other Aircraft Rating(s):</b>	None	<b>Restraint Used:</b>	3-point
<b>Instrument Rating(s):</b>	Airplane	<b>Second Pilot Present:</b>	Yes
<b>Instructor Rating(s):</b>	None	<b>Toxicology Performed:</b>	Yes
<b>Medical Certification:</b>	BasicMed	<b>Last FAA Medical Exam:</b>	October 1, 2021
<b>Occupational Pilot:</b>	No	<b>Last Flight Review or Equivalent:</b>	
<b>Flight Time:</b>	(Estimated) 2659 hours (Total, all aircraft), 2659 hours (Total, this make and model)		

## Pilot-rated passenger Information

<b>Certificate:</b>	Commercial; Flight instructor	<b>Age:</b>	70, Female
<b>Airplane Rating(s):</b>	Single-engine land	<b>Seat Occupied:</b>	Right
<b>Other Aircraft Rating(s):</b>	None	<b>Restraint Used:</b>	3-point
<b>Instrument Rating(s):</b>	Airplane	<b>Second Pilot Present:</b>	Yes
<b>Instructor Rating(s):</b>	Airplane single-engine; Instrument airplane	<b>Toxicology Performed:</b>	
<b>Medical Certification:</b>	Class 3 Without waivers/limitations	<b>Last FAA Medical Exam:</b>	April 1, 2021
<b>Occupational Pilot:</b>	No	<b>Last Flight Review or Equivalent:</b>	
<b>Flight Time:</b>	(Estimated) 2516 hours (Total, all aircraft)		

## Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

<b>Aircraft Make:</b>	Mooney	<b>Registration:</b>	N3515H
<b>Model/Series:</b>	M20J No Series Exists	<b>Aircraft Category:</b>	Airplane
<b>Year of Manufacture:</b>	1980	<b>Amateur Built:</b>	
<b>Airworthiness Certificate:</b>	Normal	<b>Serial Number:</b>	24-1034
<b>Landing Gear Type:</b>	Retractable - Tricycle	<b>Seats:</b>	4
<b>Date/Type of Last Inspection:</b>	July 24, 2022 Annual	<b>Certified Max Gross Wt.:</b>	2740 lbs
<b>Time Since Last Inspection:</b>	28.2 Hrs	<b>Engines:</b>	1 Reciprocating
<b>Airframe Total Time:</b>	2774.87 Hrs at time of accident	<b>Engine Manufacturer:</b>	Continental
<b>ELT:</b>	C91 installed, not activated	<b>Engine Model/Series:</b>	IO-550
<b>Registered Owner:</b>	On file	<b>Rated Power:</b>	300 Horsepower
<b>Operator:</b>	On file	<b>Operating Certificate(s) Held:</b>	None

## Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

<b>Conditions at Accident Site:</b>	Visual (VMC)	<b>Condition of Light:</b>	Day
<b>Observation Facility, Elevation:</b>	KFMH,130 ft msl	<b>Distance from Accident Site:</b>	4 Nautical Miles
<b>Observation Time:</b>	20:45 Local	<b>Direction from Accident Site:</b>	13°
<b>Lowest Cloud Condition:</b>	Clear	<b>Visibility</b>	10 miles
<b>Lowest Ceiling:</b>	None	<b>Visibility (RVR):</b>	
<b>Wind Speed/Gusts:</b>	8 knots /	<b>Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:</b>	None / None
<b>Wind Direction:</b>	190°	<b>Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:</b>	N/A / N/A
<b>Altimeter Setting:</b>	30.5 inches Hg	<b>Temperature/Dew Point:</b>	7°C / -1°C
<b>Precipitation and Obscuration:</b>	No Obscuration; No Precipitation		
<b>Departure Point:</b>	Westfield/Springfield, MA (BAF)	<b>Type of Flight Plan Filed:</b>	None
<b>Destination:</b>	Falmouth, MA	<b>Type of Clearance:</b>	None
<b>Departure Time:</b>	14:23 Local	<b>Type of Airspace:</b>	Class G

A review of the sun's azimuth/angle indicated that the sun was directly in front of the airplane during the approach.

## Airport Information

<b>Airport:</b>	Falmouth Airpark 5B6	<b>Runway Surface Type:</b>	Asphalt
<b>Airport Elevation:</b>	41 ft msl	<b>Runway Surface Condition:</b>	Dry
<b>Runway Used:</b>	25	<b>IFR Approach:</b>	None
<b>Runway Length/Width:</b>	2298 ft / 40 ft	<b>VFR Approach/Landing:</b>	Full stop

A review of the Airport Facility Directory for 5B6 indicated that trees were located 300 ft from the threshold of runway 25 and about 125 ft right of the runway centerline. A 4:1 approach glide slope was necessary to clear these trees. According to the airport manager, "MassDOT conducts annual inspections, which generally go well, but the trees are consistently noted as a concern. The trees have been trimmed back as much as possible within the property boundaries." The trees near runway 25 were predominantly pines and oaks, with heights ranging from 50 to 100 ft.

## Wreckage and Impact Information

<b>Crew Injuries:</b>	1 Fatal	<b>Aircraft Damage:</b>	Substantial
<b>Passenger Injuries:</b>	1 Serious	<b>Aircraft Fire:</b>	None
<b>Ground Injuries:</b>		<b>Aircraft Explosion:</b>	None
<b>Total Injuries:</b>	1 Fatal, 1 Serious	<b>Latitude, Longitude:</b>	41.5879,-70.536505(est)

The airplane impacted 75-ft-tall trees and came to rest 200 ft from the runway 25 threshold. Two impact craters were observed; both craters contained clear and green plexiglass, consistent with impact from the right wing. This was followed by a 10-ft ground scar that ended with a 2-ft-deep crater. All major components of the airplane were located at the accident site. The fuselage from the firewall to the empennage was crushed and impact damaged. The instrument panel and cockpit were destroyed by impact forces. Engine and propeller controls were full forward; the engine was partially separated from the firewall. Flight controls within cockpit were impact damaged but remained connected to the flight control push/pull tubes throughout the fuselage. Flight control continuity was established to all flight control surfaces. The empennage remained intact, and the horizontal stabilizers, elevators, vertical stabilizer, and rudder remained attached and were unremarkable.

## Flight recorders

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The airplane was equipped with an Appareo Stratus PRX V2, and its data were successfully downloaded by the NTSB Recorder Specialist using the manufacturer's procedures. The Appareo Stratus is a self-contained, battery-powered device that incorporates an internal attitude and heading reference system (AHRS), a GPS/WAAS receiver, and an ADS-B receiver. A review of the tabular data retrieved from the device indicated that the airplane was at an altitude about 100 ft mean sea level (msl) as it approached the trees, corresponding to about 59 ft above ground level.

## Medical and Pathological Information

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An autopsy of the pilot was performed by The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was blunt force injuries, and the manner of death was accident.

Toxicology testing performed at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory found no drugs of abuse. Tamsulosin was detected in the blood and urine and is a prescription medication commonly used to treat symptoms of an enlarged prostate. Tamsulosin is not generally considered impairing.

## Preventing Similar Accidents

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Stabilized Approaches Lead to Safe Landings (SA-077)

## The Problem

Failing to establish and maintain a stabilized approach, or continuing an unstabilized approach, could lead to landing too fast or too far down the runway, potentially resulting in a runway excursion, loss of control, or collision with terrain. Regardless of the type of aircraft, the level of pilot experience, or whether the flight is being conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, a stabilized approach is key to maintaining control of the aircraft and ensuring a safe landing.

## What can you do?

- Follow SOPs and industry best practices for stabilized approach criteria, including a normal glidepath, specified airspeed and descent rate, landing configuration (flaps, gear, etc.), appropriate power setting, landing checklists, and a heading that ensures only small changes are necessary to maintain runway alignment. Guidance and tips (see the “Interested in more information?” section) indicate that, in most cases, the approach should be stabilized by 1,000 ft in instrument conditions or 500 ft in visual conditions. If the approach becomes unstabilized at any time after that, go around.
- Practice go-arounds and missed approaches so that you are comfortable with the procedures when needed. Remember to establish personal minimums for all types of operations, including go-arounds and missed approaches.
- Use effective single-pilot resource management or crew resource management. A stabilized approach begins with an effective approach briefing. Ensure that you understand critical aspects of the approach, such as the minimum safe altitude, hazards, approach conditions, and missed approach procedures.
- Do not allow perceived operational pressures (for example, from air traffic controllers, passengers, etc.), continuation bias, or last-minute runway changes to influence your decision to execute a go-around; if your approach is not stabilized, go around.
- Never attempt to “save” an unstabilized approach. If the approach becomes unstabilized, conduct an immediate go-around. Remember, when two pilots are on duty, either crewmember may call for a go-around at any time.

See <https://www.nts.gov/Advocacy/safety-alerts/Documents/SA-077.pdf> for additional resources.

The NTSB presents this information to prevent recurrence of similar accidents. Note that this should not be considered guidance from the regulator, nor does this supersede existing FAA Regulations (FARs).



## Administrative Information

**Investigator In Charge (IIC):** Alleyne, Eric

**Additional Participating Persons:** Christi Cushing; FAA/FSDO; Burlington, MA  
Daniel J. Ballou; FAA/FSDO; Burlington, MA

**Original Publish Date:** December 5, 2024

**Last Revision Date:**

**Investigation Class:** [Class 3](#)

**Note:**

**Investigation Docket:** <https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=106405>

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable causes of the accidents and events we investigate, and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for each accident or event we investigate. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident; rather, as specified by NTSB regulation, “accident/incident investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties ... and are not conducted for the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person” (Title 49 *Code of Federal Regulations* section 831.4). Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB’s statutory mission to improve transportation safety by investigating accidents and incidents and issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report (Title 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b)). A factual report that may be admissible under 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b) is available [here](#).