



Aviation Investigation Final Report

Location:	Jupiter, Florida	Accident Number:	ERA21LA261
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Date & Time:	June 18, 2021, 18:32 Local	Registration:	N2797E
Aircraft:	Cessna 172	Aircraft Damage:	Substantial
Defining Event:	Loss of engine power (total)	Injuries:	1 Serious, 1 Minor
Flight Conducted Under:	Part 91: General aviation - Instructional		

Analysis

During a local instructional flight, about 2,700 ft above ground level, the engine lost total power. The instructor was unable to restart the engine and attempted to land on a grass field; however, the airplane overflew the field and collided with a fence and trees before coming to rest nose-down in a creek. Review of flight track data revealed that the airplane overflew several fields, ranging in length from approximately 1,500 ft to 2,500 ft before the collision.

Examination of the wreckage revealed that the single-drive, dual output magneto had separated from the rear accessory section of the engine. The nuts, clamps, and lock washers that secured the magneto to the studs were not recovered and the studs did not exhibit any stripping or damage of the threads. Cuts in the magneto housing were consistent with the magneto vibrating over time, possibly due to tightening at an angle between the two studs. The magneto was removed and reinstalled as part of an inspection completed about 3 months (215 hours) before the accident. The mechanic who completed the inspection and reinstalled the magneto stated that the reinstallation included clamps and nuts that were used, but serviceable, and new lock washers. The mechanic added that there were no defects noted at the time of the inspection.

An annual inspection of the airplane was completed about 1 month (74 flight hours) before the accident. The mechanic that completed the annual inspection stated he followed the *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 43 checklist, which does not specifically include magnetos; however, he checked with his hand (by trying to wiggle all the accessories) that the magneto was secure.

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

The flight instructor's failure to obtain the proper touchdown point during a forced landing. Contributing to the accident was the improper service and subsequent inadequate inspection of the single-drive, dual magneto, which resulted in a total loss of engine power.

Findings	
Personnel issues	Incorrect action performance - Pilot
Aircraft	Descent/approach/glide path - Incorrect use/operation
Personnel issues	Installation - Maintenance personnel
Personnel issues	Scheduled/routine maintenance - Maintenance personnel
Aircraft	Magneto/distributor - Incorrect service/maintenance

Factual Information

History of Flight	
Initial climb	Loss of engine power (total) (Defining event)
Emergency descent	Off-field or emergency landing
Emergency descent	Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)

On June 18, 2021, about 1832 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 172N, N2797E, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Jupiter, Florida. The flight instructor sustained serious injuries and the student pilot sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 *Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)* Part 91 instructional flight.

Due to his injuries, the instructor was unable to provide a statement. Attempts to contact the student pilot were unsuccessful. According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, about 10 minutes after takeoff, at 2,700 ft mean sea level, the airplane experienced a total loss of engine power. The instructor was unable to restart the engine and attempted to land on a grass field; however, the airplane overflew the field and collided with a fence and trees before coming to rest nose-down in a creek. Review of automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) data revealed that the airplane overflew several fields, ranging in length from approximately 1,500 ft to 2,500 ft, before the collision.

Examination of the wreckage by an FAA inspector and representative from the airframe manufacturer revealed oil streaks along the fuselage. Further examination revealed that the single-drive, dual output magneto had separated from the rear accessory section of the engine. The nuts, clamps, and lock washers that secured the magneto to the studs were not recovered and the studs did not exhibit any stripping or damage of the threads. Additionally, cuts in the magneto housing were consistent with the magneto vibrating over time, possibly due to tightening at an angle between the two studs.

Review of maintenance records revealed that the magneto was serviced on March 4, 2021, and the airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on May 17, 2021. The airplane had been operated about 215 hours and 74 hours since those dates, respectively. Additionally, a 100-hr inspection was performed on April 9, 2021.

The mechanic that serviced the magneto on March 4 stated that he did so as part of a pre-buy inspection. The mechanic had advised the seller that Airworthiness Directive (AD) 96-12-07 was superseded by AD 2005-12-06, which was not applicable to the model and serial number magneto; however, the mechanic was requested to perform the original AD anyway, to satisfy the buyer. The original AD was a 500-hr inspection of the magneto impulse couplings. The

mechanic removed and reinstalled the magneto as part of the AD. The reinstallation included clamps and nuts that were used, but serviceable, and new lock washers. The mechanic added that there were no defects noted at the time of the inspection.

The mechanic who performed the subsequent annual inspection on May 17, 2021, stated that, when the magneto was previously removed and replaced, that mechanic (using a torque wrench) would tighten its two steel nuts and each nut has a star lock washer. The mechanic added that during the annual inspection he followed the CFR Part 43 checklist, which does not specifically include magnetos; however, he checked with his hand (by trying to wiggle all the accessories) that the magneto was secure. The Cessna checklist includes magnetos, but it is up to the operator to request that checklist be used, as it results in more labor during inspections and thus more cost for the inspection.

Flight instructor Information

Certificate:	Commercial	Age:	22,Male
Airplane Rating(s):	Single-engine land	Seat Occupied:	Right
Other Aircraft Rating(s):	None	Restraint Used:	3-point
Instrument Rating(s):	Airplane	Second Pilot Present:	Yes
Instructor Rating(s):	Airplane single-engine; Instrument airplane	Toxicology Performed:	
Medical Certification:	Class 1 With waivers/limitations	Last FAA Medical Exam:	June 9, 2021
Occupational Pilot:	Yes	Last Flight Review or Equivalent:	February 1, 2021
Flight Time:	(Estimated) 1000 hours (Total, all aircraft)		

Student pilot Information

Certificate:	None	Age:	23,Male
Airplane Rating(s):	None	Seat Occupied:	Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s):	None	Restraint Used:	3-point
Instrument Rating(s):		Second Pilot Present:	Yes
Instructor Rating(s):	None	Toxicology Performed:	
Medical Certification:	None	Last FAA Medical Exam:	
Occupational Pilot:	No	Last Flight Review or Equivalent:	
Flight Time:	3 hours (Total, all aircraft), 3 hours (Total, this make and model), 3 hours (Last 90 days, all		

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Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make:	Cessna	Registration:	N2797E
Model/Series:	172 N	Aircraft Category:	Airplane
Year of Manufacture:	1978	Amateur Built:	
Airworthiness Certificate:	Normal	Serial Number:	17271324
Landing Gear Type:	Tricycle	Seats:	4
Date/Type of Last Inspection:	May 17, 2021 Annual	Certified Max Gross Wt.:	2300 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:	74 Hrs	Engines:	1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time:	13164 Hrs as of last inspection	Engine Manufacturer:	Lycoming
ELT:	C91 installed, activated, did not aid in locating accident	Engine Model/Series:	0-320
Registered Owner:	Palm Beach Flyers	Rated Power:	160 Horsepower
Operator:	Aamro Aviation	Operating Certificate(s) Held:	Pilot school (141)

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site:	Visual (VMC)	Condition of Light:	Day
Observation Facility, Elevation:	KPBI,19 ft msl	Distance from Accident Site:	17 Nautical Miles
Observation Time:	18:53 Local	Direction from Accident Site:	170°
Lowest Cloud Condition:		Visibility	10 miles
Lowest Ceiling:	Broken / 19000 ft AGL	Visibility (RVR):	
Wind Speed/Gusts:	7 knots /	Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:	None / None
Wind Direction:	90°	Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:	N/A / N/A
Altimeter Setting:	30.06 inches Hg	Temperature/Dew Point:	29°C / 23°C
Precipitation and Obscuration:	No Obscuration; No Precipita	ition	
Departure Point:	West Palm Beach, FL (F45)	Type of Flight Plan Filed:	None
Destination:	West Palm Beach, FL (F45)	Type of Clearance:	None
Departure Time:	18:20 Local	Type of Airspace:	Class G

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries:	1 Serious, 1 Minor	Aircraft Damage:	Substantial
Passenger Injuries:		Aircraft Fire:	None
Ground Injuries:		Aircraft Explosion:	None
Total Injuries:	1 Serious, 1 Minor	Latitude, Longitude:	26.9675,-80.154722

Administrative Information

Investigator In Charge (IIC):	Gretz, Robert
Additional Participating Persons:	Juan Garcia; FAA/FSDO; Miramar, FL Casey Love; Textron Aviation; Wichita, KS James Childers; Lycoming; Williamsport, PA
Original Publish Date:	February 24, 2023
Last Revision Date:	
Investigation Class:	Class 3
Note:	The NTSB did not travel to the scene of this accident.
Investigation Docket:	https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=103301

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable causes of the accidents and events we investigate, and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for each accident or event we investigate. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident; rather, as specified by NTSB regulation, "accident/incident investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties ... and are not conducted for the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person" (Title 49 *Code of Federal Regulations* section 831.4). Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB's statutory mission to improve transportation safety by investigating accidents and incidents and issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report (Title 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b)). A factual report that may be admissible under 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b) is available here.