



# Aviation Investigation Final Report

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<b>Location:</b>	Tishomingo, Oklahoma	<b>Accident Number:</b>	CEN21LA057
<b>Date &amp; Time:</b>	October 24, 2020, 12:00 Local	<b>Registration:</b>	N183V
<b>Aircraft:</b>	Cirrus SR22	<b>Aircraft Damage:</b>	Substantial
<b>Defining Event:</b>	Loss of engine power (total)	<b>Injuries:</b>	4 Minor
<b>Flight Conducted Under:</b>	Part 91: General aviation - Personal		

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## Analysis

The private pilot and three passengers departed on a personal flight in visual conditions. As the airplane approached its destination while at an altitude of about 900 ft above ground level, the pilot received cockpit indications of erratic high engine oil temperature. About 5 seconds after the indications began, the pilot moved the throttle to idle power and likely adjusted the fuel-air mixture.

About 3 seconds after moving the throttle to idle power, the pilot advanced the throttle to a cruise power setting, but the fuel flow and engine power did not increase. The pilot made additional throttle movements, but the fuel flow and engine power did not correspond to throttle movements most likely because the pilot had adjusted the fuel-air mixture toward a lean setting. Thus, the pilot's actions in response to the high engine oil indications led to the loss of engine power. Without engine power, the airplane's airspeed decreased to about 85 knots, and the pilot successfully deployed the airplane's parachute system.

Postaccident examination revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal engine power. The oil temperature connector and back shell were damaged, with the back shell disconnected from the oil temperature connector. The accident flight was the first after maintenance work during which a crush gasket adjacent to the damaged oil temperature connector was replaced. The oil temperature connector was most likely damaged during this maintenance and resulted in erratic indications of high engine oil temperature during the accident flight.

## Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

The pilot's improper adjustment of the engine mixture control, which resulted in a total loss of engine power. Contributing to the accident was a disconnected oil temperature connector, which was likely damaged during maintenance before the accident flight and provided erratic indications during the flight.

## Findings

<b>Personnel issues</b>	Decision making/judgment - Pilot
<b>Aircraft</b>	Instrument wiring - Incorrect service/maintenance
<b>Personnel issues</b>	Understanding/comprehension - Pilot
<b>Personnel issues</b>	Identification/recognition - Pilot

## Factual Information

### History of Flight

#### Enroute-descent

Loss of engine power (total) (Defining event)

On October 24, 2020, about 1200 central daylight time, a Cirrus SR22 airplane, N183V, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Tishomingo, Oklahoma. The pilot and the three passengers sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 91 personal flight.

During a postaccident interview, the pilot recalled that, while the airplane was descending toward its destination (Atoka Municipal Airport, Atoka, Oklahoma), he was alerted to high oil temperature indications and noted a loss of engine power. The pilot stated that he attempted to restore engine power by adjusting the air-fuel mixture and throttle but was unable to do so. Download of the airplane's remote data module revealed that, while the airplane was approaching its destination at an altitude of about 900 ft above ground level, erratic high engine oil temperatures (from 314°C to 801°C) were recorded for 5 seconds. The engine oil temperature returned to normal for the next 7 seconds, which was followed by erratic high temperatures for the remainder of the flight. According to (source), engine oil temperatures greater than 240°C triggered a flashing red warning cockpit annunciator and an aural chime every 1.5 seconds.

The downloaded data from the remote data module also showed that, about 5 seconds after high oil temperatures began, decreases in fuel flow, manifold pressure, and engine rpm were recorded, which were consistent with throttle movement to idle power. About 3 seconds later, manifold pressure increased, consistent with a throttle increase, but fuel flow indications remained near 3 to 5 gallons per hour. The manifold pressure subsequently decreased and increased twice with no corresponding change in fuel flow.

The pilot then assessed the available locations for a forced landing and determined that the options were unsuitable. As a result, he activated the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System. The downloaded data showed that the parachute activation occurred about 45 seconds after the high oil temperatures began and that the airplane's airspeed at the time of activation was about 85 knots. The airplane descended under the parachute and impacted terrain, resulting in substantial damage to an airframe engine mount.

Postaccident examination of the engine revealed normal mechanical continuity. The fuel inlet filters were clear of debris, and no anomalies were noted with the ignition leads, spark plugs, magnetos, fuel servo, flow divider, or fuel injectors. The oil reservoir was empty, with the several holes in the oil pan due to impact damage.

The oil temperature connector and back shell were damaged, and the back shell was disconnected from the connector. The accident flight was the first flight after maintenance was performed to address high engine oil consumption during previous flights. The logbook entry for this maintenance included replacement of crush gaskets on the oil cooler housing. One of the crush gaskets that was replaced was adjacent to the damaged oil temperature connector.

According to a Federal Aviation Administration Safety Team (FAAST) publication:

General aviation accidents often result from inappropriate responses to unexpected events. Humans are subject to a “startle response” when they are faced with unexpected emergency situations and may delay action or initiate inappropriate action in response to the emergency. Training and preparation can reduce startle response time and promote more effective and timely responses.

### Pilot Information

<b>Certificate:</b>	Private	<b>Age:</b>	41, Male
<b>Airplane Rating(s):</b>	Single-engine land	<b>Seat Occupied:</b>	Left
<b>Other Aircraft Rating(s):</b>	None	<b>Restraint Used:</b>	4-point
<b>Instrument Rating(s):</b>	None	<b>Second Pilot Present:</b>	No
<b>Instructor Rating(s):</b>	None	<b>Toxicology Performed:</b>	
<b>Medical Certification:</b>	Class 3 None	<b>Last FAA Medical Exam:</b>	October 19, 2018
<b>Occupational Pilot:</b>	No	<b>Last Flight Review or Equivalent:</b>	November 1, 2018
<b>Flight Time:</b>	379 hours (Total, all aircraft), 296 hours (Total, this make and model), 368 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 19 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 12 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 0 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)		

### Passenger Information

<b>Certificate:</b>		<b>Age:</b>	41, Female
<b>Airplane Rating(s):</b>		<b>Seat Occupied:</b>	Right
<b>Other Aircraft Rating(s):</b>		<b>Restraint Used:</b>	4-point
<b>Instrument Rating(s):</b>		<b>Second Pilot Present:</b>	No
<b>Instructor Rating(s):</b>		<b>Toxicology Performed:</b>	
<b>Medical Certification:</b>		<b>Last FAA Medical Exam:</b>	
<b>Occupational Pilot:</b>	No	<b>Last Flight Review or Equivalent:</b>	
<b>Flight Time:</b>			

## Passenger Information

<b>Certificate:</b>		<b>Age:</b>	11,Female
<b>Airplane Rating(s):</b>		<b>Seat Occupied:</b>	Rear
<b>Other Aircraft Rating(s):</b>		<b>Restraint Used:</b>	4-point
<b>Instrument Rating(s):</b>		<b>Second Pilot Present:</b>	No
<b>Instructor Rating(s):</b>		<b>Toxicology Performed:</b>	
<b>Medical Certification:</b>		<b>Last FAA Medical Exam:</b>	
<b>Occupational Pilot:</b>	No	<b>Last Flight Review or Equivalent:</b>	
<b>Flight Time:</b>			

## Passenger Information

<b>Certificate:</b>		<b>Age:</b>	8,Male
<b>Airplane Rating(s):</b>		<b>Seat Occupied:</b>	Rear
<b>Other Aircraft Rating(s):</b>		<b>Restraint Used:</b>	4-point
<b>Instrument Rating(s):</b>		<b>Second Pilot Present:</b>	No
<b>Instructor Rating(s):</b>		<b>Toxicology Performed:</b>	
<b>Medical Certification:</b>		<b>Last FAA Medical Exam:</b>	
<b>Occupational Pilot:</b>	No	<b>Last Flight Review or Equivalent:</b>	
<b>Flight Time:</b>			

## Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

<b>Aircraft Make:</b>	Cirrus	<b>Registration:</b>	N183V
<b>Model/Series:</b>	SR22	<b>Aircraft Category:</b>	Airplane
<b>Year of Manufacture:</b>	2008	<b>Amateur Built:</b>	
<b>Airworthiness Certificate:</b>	Normal	<b>Serial Number:</b>	3125
<b>Landing Gear Type:</b>	Retractable - Tricycle	<b>Seats:</b>	4
<b>Date/Type of Last Inspection:</b>	January 25, 2020 Annual	<b>Certified Max Gross Wt.:</b>	3600 lbs
<b>Time Since Last Inspection:</b>	65 Hrs	<b>Engines:</b>	1 Reciprocating
<b>Airframe Total Time:</b>	1754 Hrs at time of accident	<b>Engine Manufacturer:</b>	Continental Motors
<b>ELT:</b>	Installed	<b>Engine Model/Series:</b>	IO-550-N
<b>Registered Owner:</b>	Leatherneck Oilfield Service Inc	<b>Rated Power:</b>	310 Horsepower
<b>Operator:</b>	Leatherneck Oilfield Service Inc	<b>Operating Certificate(s) Held:</b>	None

## Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

<b>Conditions at Accident Site:</b>	Visual (VMC)	<b>Condition of Light:</b>	Day
<b>Observation Facility, Elevation:</b>	KADM,725 ft msl	<b>Distance from Accident Site:</b>	15 Nautical Miles
<b>Observation Time:</b>	11:55 Local	<b>Direction from Accident Site:</b>	300°
<b>Lowest Cloud Condition:</b>	Clear	<b>Visibility</b>	10 miles
<b>Lowest Ceiling:</b>	None	<b>Visibility (RVR):</b>	
<b>Wind Speed/Gusts:</b>	/	<b>Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:</b>	None / None
<b>Wind Direction:</b>		<b>Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:</b>	N/A / N/A
<b>Altimeter Setting:</b>	30.17 inches Hg	<b>Temperature/Dew Point:</b>	10°C / 2°C
<b>Precipitation and Obscuration:</b>	No Obscuration; No Precipitation		
<b>Departure Point:</b>	Odessa, TX (KODO)	<b>Type of Flight Plan Filed:</b>	None
<b>Destination:</b>	Atoka, OK (KAQR)	<b>Type of Clearance:</b>	None
<b>Departure Time:</b>	10:05 Local	<b>Type of Airspace:</b>	Class G

## Wreckage and Impact Information

<b>Crew Injuries:</b>	1 Minor	<b>Aircraft Damage:</b>	Substantial
<b>Passenger Injuries:</b>	3 Minor	<b>Aircraft Fire:</b>	None
<b>Ground Injuries:</b>		<b>Aircraft Explosion:</b>	None
<b>Total Injuries:</b>	4 Minor	<b>Latitude, Longitude:</b>	34.19,-96.6(est)

## Administrative Information

<b>Investigator In Charge (IIC):</b>	Folkerts, Michael
<b>Additional Participating Persons:</b>	Melvin Devore; Federal Aviation Administration; Oklahoma City, OK Brad Miller; Cirrus Aircraft; Duluth, MN Richard Beach; Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association; Las Vegas, NV Kurt Gibson; Continental Aerospace Technologies; Mobile, AL
<b>Original Publish Date:</b>	July 7, 2022
<b>Last Revision Date:</b>	
<b>Investigation Class:</b>	<a href="#">Class 3</a>
<b>Note:</b>	The NTSB did not travel to the scene of this accident.
<b>Investigation Docket:</b>	<a href="https://data.nts.gov/Docket?ProjectID=102279">https://data.nts.gov/Docket?ProjectID=102279</a>

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable causes of the accidents and events we investigate, and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for each accident or event we investigate. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident; rather, as specified by NTSB regulation, “accident/incident investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties ... and are not conducted for the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person” (Title 49 *Code of Federal Regulations* section 831.4). Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB’s statutory mission to improve transportation safety by investigating accidents and incidents and issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report (Title 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b)). A factual report that may be admissible under 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b) is available [here](#).