



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Aviation Safety
Washington, D.C. 20594

April 6, 2020

Maintenance Records – Factual

NTSB No: WPR19MA177

A. ACCIDENT

Location: Mokuleia, HI (Dillingham Airfield)
Date: June 21, 2019
Operator: Oahu Parachute Center
Time: 1822 Hawaiian Standard Time
Aircraft: Beech King Air 65-A90, Registration N256TA

B. MAINTENANCE RECORDS

Gregory Borsari
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C.

C. SUMMARY

On June 21, 2019, at 1822 Hawaii-Aleutian standard time, a Beech 65-A90, N256TA, collided with terrain after takeoff from Dillingham Airfield (HDH), Mokuleia, Hawaii. The commercial pilot and ten passengers sustained fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was owned by N80896 LLC and was being operated by Oahu Parachute Center (OPC) under the provisions of Title 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 91 as a local sky-diving flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. ACCIDENT.....	1
B. MAINTENANCE RECORDS	1
C. SUMMARY	1
D. DEATAILS OF THE INVESTIGATION	3
1.0 AIRRAFT INFORMATION	3
2.0 TYPE CERTIFICATE DATA SHEET	4
3.0 MAINTENANCE INSPECTION PROGRAM	4
4.0 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES	8

5.0	LOGBOOK REVIEW	9
6.0	FERRY FLIGHT EQUIPMENT	11
7.0	WEIGHT & BALANCE	11
8.0	SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPROTS	12
9.0	MAJOR REPAIRS AND ALTERATIONS	12
10.0	FAA AIRCRAFT RAMP INSPECTION	13
11.0	METHOD OF RECORD KEEPING	13
12.0	RECORD OF CONVERSATION	13

LIST OF ACRONYMS

A&P	AIRFRAME AND POWERPLANT
AD	AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
AMM	AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL
BL	BUTTOCK LINE
CFR	CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATION
DER	DESIGNATED ENGINEERING REPRESENTATIVE
DME	DISTANCE MEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT
FAA	FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
FAR	FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATION
FS	FUSELAGE STATION
HF	HIGH FREQUENCY
IA	INSPECTION AUTHORIZATION
IAW	IN ACCORDANCE WITH
LH	LEFT HAND
LLC	LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
LMLG	LEFT MAIN LANDING GEAR
MLG	MAIN LANDING GEAR
NDI	NON DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION
NDT	NON DESTRUCTIVE TEST
NLG	NOSE LANDING GEAR
NTSB	NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
OPC	OAHU PARACHUTE CENTER
P&W	PRATT & WHITNEY
RDO	REPAIR DESIGN OFFICE
RH	RIGHT HAND
RMLG	RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR
SDR	SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORT
SIRM	STRUCTURAL INSPECTION REPAIR MANUAL
SSB	SINGLE SIDE BAND
TC	TYPE CERTIFICATE
TSO	TECHNICAL STANDARD ORDER
TSO	TIME SINCE OVERHAUL
WPR	WESTERN REGION

D. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

1.0 Aircraft Information

Aircraft N256TA, serial number LJ-256 was originally manufactured by Beechcraft Aircraft Corporation and the FAA issued a standard airworthiness certificate on March 2, 1967. According to the registration issued May 3, 2012, N80896 LLC is the registered owner. The airplane had 15,103.5 total flight hours and 24,569 flight cycles on September 27, 2018 the most recent logbook entry that included flight hour and flight cycle data.

The airplane was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-20 engines and two Hartzell Propellers. The engines and propellers as listed in table one had accumulated the following operating times as of September 27, 2018, the most recent logbook entry.

Table 1 - Engine and Propeller Information

	No.1 Engine	No.2 Engine
Manufacturer	P&W Canada	P&W Canada
Model Number	PT6A-20	PT6A-20
Serial Number	PCE22452	PCE24046
Time Since New	14,205.9 ¹	15,708.8
Date of Overhaul	October 9, 1982	April 6, 2007
Total Time at Overhaul	6,313.65	13,179.32
Total Cycles at Overhaul	5,787	18,405
Time Since Overhaul	8,355.9	2,529.6
Time since Hot Section Inspection	559.6	922.0
	No.1 Propeller	No.2 Propeller
Manufacturer	Hartzell	Hartzell
Model Number	HC-B3TN-3B	HC-B3TN-3B
Serial Number	BUA23247	BUA22605
Date of Overhaul	October 10, 2008	October 9, 2008

¹ Total time at overhaul plus time since overhaul equals 14,666.55

Table 1 continued - Engine and Propeller Information

	No.1 Propeller	No.2 Propeller
Time Since Overhaul	2,042.5	2,042.5

2.0 Type Certificate Data Sheet

The Type Certificate Data Sheet (3A20) prescribes conditions and limitations under which the product for which the Type Certificate (TC) was issued meets the airworthiness requirements of the Federal Aviation Regulations. According to the document, Textron Aviation Inc. is the holder of the TC.

3.0 Beechcraft King Air A90 Series Maintenance Inspection Program

Oahu Parachute Center, LLC is responsible for all maintenance, preventive maintenance, rebuilding, and alteration of any of the aircraft, airframe, aircraft engines, appliances, and component parts of such aircraft in accordance with 14 CFR Parts 43 and 91. This includes all life-limited parts that are removed from a type certificated product, segregated and controlled as defined in 14 CFR §43.10.

Oahu Parachute Center, LLC must comply with the aircraft Manufacturer's Maintenance Inspection Program, as revised, in accordance with the provisions of 14 CFR § 91.409(f)(3). The Manufacturer's Maintenance Program is one which is contained in the current Aircraft Maintenance Manual, Chapter 5. All maintenance, preventive maintenance, and alteration to the aircraft, engines, and appliances will be performed in accordance with current Federal Aviation Administration Regulations, manufacturer recommendations and specifications, Manufacturer Mandatory Service Bulletins, Mandatory Service Letters, Airworthiness Directives (AD's), Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA's) and good maintenance practices, as appropriate.

The manufacturer's inspection program for the King Air 90 series airplanes is contained in Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Chapter 5. The inspection program is divided into four 200-hour phase inspections with each consecutive 200-hour inspection after the previous one. A complete inspection cycle is 800 hours or 24 calendar months. To facilitate scheduling inspection, the manufacturer also authorizes \pm 20-hour inspection interval tolerance. Each phase inspection must be completed within 20 hours of the prescribed time.

A complete inspection cycle is as follows:

- Inspection Phase 1: 200 hours and every 800 hours thereafter.
- Inspection Phase 2: 400 hours and every 800 hours thereafter.
- Inspection Phase 3: 600 hours and every 800 hours thereafter.
- Inspection Phase 4: 800 hours and every 800 hours thereafter.

NOTE: All four Phase inspections must be completed each 24 calendar months. The manufacturer requires that no airplane exceed 12 months without completion of at least one Phase inspection.

Chapter 5 of the AMM has a Biennial Inspection Program for operators flying less than 200 hours in 24 months.

Each phase inspection is as follows:

- Phase 1 – 200 Hours - Nose Landing Gear Area, Nose Gear, Pilot’s Compartment, Cabin Section, Rear Fuselage and Empennage, Wings, Main Gear Area, Engines, Landing Gear Retraction, Operational Inspection, Post Inspection.
- Phase 2 – 400 Hours - Nose Section, Nose Avionics Compartment, Nose Landing Gear Area, Nose Gear, Pilot’s Compartment, Cabin Section, Rear Fuselage and Empennage, Wings, Main Landing Gear Area, Engines, Landing Gear Retraction, Operational Inspection, Post Inspections.
- Phase 3 – 600 Hours - Nose Landing Gear Area, Nose Gear, Pilot’s Compartment, Cabin Section, Rear Fuselage and Empennage, Wings, Main Landing Gear Area, Engines, Landing Gear Retraction, Operational Inspection, Post Inspections.
- Phase 4 – 800 Hours - Nose Section, Nose Avionics Compartment, Nose Landing Gear Area, Nose Gear, Pilot’s Compartment, Cabin Section, Rear Fuselage and Empennage, Wings, Main Landing Gear Area, Engines, Landing Gear Retraction, Operational Inspection, Post Inspection.
- After the “Phase 4” inspection is completed, the inspection sequence is repeated.

A records review of the available logbooks was conducted. Tables 2 through Table 5 shows the most recent completed inspections for the airframe, engines and propellers on the accident airplane.

Table 2 – Airframe Inspection Phase Checks

Inspection(s)	Date of most recent Inspection	Total Time	Total Landings
Phase 1 ²	December 8, 2017	14,833.6	Not Recorded
Phase 2	April 4, 2018	14,932.6	24,086

² The typed logbook entry states complied with 100-hour inspection on this airframe IAW FAR 43 Appendix D. Hand-written was “Phase 1” above the paragraph.

Table 2 continued – Airframe Inspection Phase Checks

Phase 3	September 27, 2018	15,103.5	24,569
Phase 4	May 18, 2017	14,732.8	23,963

Table 3 – Engine Number 1 Inspection Phase Checks

Inspection(s)	Date of most recent Inspection	Time Since New	Time Since Overhaul	Time Since Hot Section Inspection
Phase 1 ³	December 8, 2017	14,206.0	8,086.0	289.7
Phase 2	April 4, 2018	14,085.0	8,185.0	388.7
Phase 3	September 27, 2018	14,205.9	8,355.9	559.6
Phase 4	May 18, 2017	14,105.2	7,985.2	188.9

Table 4 – Engine Number 2 Inspection Phase Checks

Inspection(s)	Date of most recent Inspection	Time Since New	Time Since Overhaul	Time Since Hot Section Inspection
Phase 1 ³	December 8, 2017	15,438.9	2,259.7	616.1
Phase 2	April 4, 2018	15,537.9	2,358.7	751.1
Phase 3	September 27, 2018	15,708.8	2,529.6	922.0
Phase 4	May 18, 2017	15,388.1	2,158.9	575.3

³ The typed logbook entry states, “100-hour inspection”. Hand printed across - Phase 1.

Table 5 – Propeller Inspection Phase Checks

Inspection(s)	Date of most recent Inspection	Left Propeller Time Since Overhaul	Right Propeller Time Since Overhaul
Phase 1	December 8, 2017	1,772.6	1772.6
Phase 2	April 4, 2018	1,871.6	1871.6
Phase 3	September 27, 2018	2,042.5	2,042.5
Phase 4	May 18, 2017	1,671.8	1,671.8

Chapter 5 of the maintenance manual also contains tasks associated with unscheduled maintenance checks (i.e. lightning strikes, hard landings etc.). Further, additional engine tasks such as daily Engine Motoring Compressor washes for operating in salty atmosphere and/or ingestion of air pollution deposits are recommended in accordance with the manufacturer engine maintenance manual.

A review of the Phase 3 inspection completed September 27, 2018 was conducted and the following are noted.:

- Flight control cable tension – Inspect and record elevator, elevator tab, rudder and rudder tab cable tension. Cable tension measured in pounds. Elevator cable tension recorded as 8 pounds for both up and down at a temperature of 72 degrees. According to the AMM the average of the elevator cables tensions should be about 27 to 36 pounds at 72 degrees. No record for the elevator tab cable tension was recorded. Rudder cable tension left and right was recorded as 8 pounds. According to the AMM the average of the rudder cables tensions should be about 75-91 pounds at 72 degrees. No record for rudder tab cable tension. The item was not signed off as being completed.
- Flight control cable tension – Inspect and record aileron and aileron tab cable tension. The aileron cable tension was recorded as 52 pounds (temperature not recorded). AMM range of about 42 to 48 pounds at 72 degrees. Aileron tab cable tension was also recorded as 52 pounds at 72 degrees. AMM range of about 9 to 16 pounds at 72 degrees. The item was not signed off as being completed.
- Flight control cable tension – Inspect and record aileron control column interconnect cable tension. The tension was recorded as 28 pounds at 72 degrees for both left and right. According to the AMM range of 43 to 48 pounds at 72 degrees. The item was not signed off as being completed.
- Fuel Probes – Inspect for leaks at points of attachment. Item not signed off as being completed.

4.0 Airworthiness Directives (AD)⁴

An airframe, engine and propeller logbook review for AD compliance was conducted. The review concentrated on the flight controls and flight control systems, flight instruments, fuel system as well as the engines and propellers. The following AD's are noted, see table 6.

Table 6 – Airworthiness Directives

AD Number	Description
69-06-06	Rudder Spar – Inspect rudder spar web for cracks in the area and adjacent to the upper and center hinge attach points.
69-23-06	Engines equipped with Pesco Model 024-800 fuel pumps. To prevent disengagement of the fuel pump input coupling from the engine gearbox.
70-16-01	To prevent uncontrolled propeller feathering.
77-22-01	Structural integrity, fuselage to horizontal tail rear spar attachment
78-22-05	To prevent partial loss of elevator control due to failure of the elevator control push rods.
82-23-02	To prevent elevator spar failures and possible loss of elevator control.
85-25-01	Structural integrity of outer wing attachment
87-04-24	To preclude malfunction of the elevator trim cable system.
88-04-07	Lower forward wing spar attachment.
89-25-10	Fatigue cracking of the wing main spar lower cap.
97-06-06	Pilot, Co-Pilot seat locking pins to ensure full engagement.
99-10-07	Detect and correct elevator control cable breaks, interference with wire harnesses, stainless steel clamps and other equipment under the cockpit.
2005-01-04	To prevent fuel flow interruption due to fuel hose delamination.
2014-11-05	Installation of a reinforcement liner to the power turbine containment ring.

AD 77-22-01 to inspect the aft bulkhead and horizontal stabilizer aft spars was completed on January 30, 2012 at an aircraft total time of 13,420.9 hours. Next due was noted as being 14,020.9 hours (600-hour repeat interval). The next logbook entry for the AD was dated May 18, 2017 with an aircraft total time of 14,732.8 hours. According to the records the AD was 711.9 hours overdue when it was complied with on May 18, 2017.

AD 85-25-01 to assure structural integrity of attachment of outer wing panels to the wing center section use magnetic particle inspection methods to inspect for cracks. This AD was not applicable as Inconel nuts and bolts were installed.

AD 97-06-06 to inspect the pilot and copilot chair locking pins to ensure full engagement within 150 flight hours in order to prevent inadvertent movement of the pilot or copilot chair, which could result in loss of control. Previously complied with May 16, 1997 and again on

⁴ Airworthiness Directive (AD) is a regulatory notice sent out by the FAA informing the operator of an action that must be taken for the aircraft to maintain its airworthiness status.

February 25, 2010 on the captain's seat. No record of compliance on the rear facing co-pilot seat that had been reinstalled in the aircraft at an unknown time.

5.0 Logbook Review

Aircraft, engine and propeller logbooks were reviewed from August 26, 1994 thru May 21, 2019 (most recent entry). The review focused on routine tasks as well as any special inspections and/or operational discrepancies on the airplane. The following items are noted.

- **August 26, 1994** - Aircraft damaged on landing with gear up. Aircraft jacked, gear extended, bolted and braced down in preparation for ferry. Propellers replaced, engine chip detectors and oil filters checked for metal, no traces found.
- **November 10, 1995** – Completed structural repairs and inspections. Removed, NDT'd, overhauled and re-installed three landing gear assemblies. Overhauled and re-installed MLG and NLG actuators, removed, NDT'd and refurbished and re-installed three each drag braces. Removed and installed overhauled landing gear motor. Landing gear actuating system links, splines, chains, sprocket assemblies replaced. Installed overhauled flap gear motor, left and right-hand flap actuators (all positions), elevators repaired and re-installed. Replaced all wing attach hardware except lower forward left hand and right hand. Installed PT6A-20 engines, SN 22151 left position (TSO 8043.8) and SN 20040 right position (TSO 7433.1). Install propeller HC-B3TN-3B SN BU4321 left position, SN BU7066 right position. TSO 0.0 hours both propellers.
- **February 18, 2009** – Installed overhauled NLG shock strut, NLG drag brace, LH and RH MLG shock struts, MLG drag brace assemblies (LH & RH), replaced NLG steering components (links, hardware, bushings, shimmy damper, rod ends and fittings), installed overhauled NLG LMLG & RMLG actuators, replaced left and right hand cockpit side windows, aileron and elevator hinge bearings replaced, elevator cables replaced, rudder cables replaced, aileron cables replaced, elevator trim tab cables replaced, elevator trim tab actuators replaced, replaced LH aileron mounting plate, replaced RH aileron trim arm, replaced inboard flap roller attach bracket on RH outboard flap, complete phase 1 thru 4 inspections, replaced left and right hand fuel boost pumps and transfer pump, replaced LH I/B and O/B flap assemblies, replaced RH elevator, replaced LH & RH elevator attach hardware, replaced left and right hand ailerons, replaced upper & lower and LH & RH forward and aft wing attach bolts, rigged elevators, elevator trim system and ailerons, flap system rigged and checked, carried out weight and balance check.
- **June 11, 2009** – Left and right-hand elevator trim tabs replaced with serviceable used elevator trim tabs.
- **April 13, 2011** – Conducted phase 1, 2, 3, and 4 inspections. Replaced nose landing gear steering collar. Replaced rudder attach hinge brackets, bearings and hardware. Replace right elevator hinge bearings and hardware. Replaced rudder tube assembly. Repaired lower fuselage at station 132.80. Repaired right and left-hand center sections at station 158. Replaced rudder main spar and lower rib. Inspected lower left- and right-wing lower spar structure, inboard and outboard wing attachment fittings. Replaced horizontal stab rear spar attachment hardware. Inspected and reinstalled

right-hand elevator. Replaced left-hand and right-hand forward lower wing bolts. Replaced control column aileron primary control cables.

- **February 15, 2014** – Removed right wing and replaced upper outboard aft wing attach fitting. Reamed right-wing lower spar cap hole at BL 87.5 to 0.199 inch and installed NAS2903-9 bolt, reference SIRM 57-13-01 and RDO letter dated January 29, 2014. Reamed right-wing lower spar cap hole at BL 88.5 to 0.1875 inch and installed NAS464P3A9 bolt, reference SIRM 57-13-01 and RDO letter dated January 29, 2014. Reamed left-wing lower spar cap hole at BL 87.5 to 0.213 inch and installed NAS3003-9 bolt, reference SIRM 57-13-01 and RDO letter dated January 29, 2014.
- **April 16, 2016** – Installed left engine hot section components repaired by Turbines Inc. in accordance with P&W manual 3011403 R22. Complied with AD 2014-11-05 by installing containment ring part number 3109595-01. All ground runs and leak checks complied with.
- **July 23, 2016** - reference NTSB investigation WPR16LA150 failure of the right horizontal stabilizer which occurred in-flight during stall / spin recovery. The following work was completed May 18, 2017. Removed left and right elevators and horizontal stabilizers. Removed rudder and vertical stabilizer. Inspected empennage for damage. Inspected stabilizer attach areas and bolt holes for damage. Complied with flight through turbulent air inspection. Removed aft bulkhead, FS 380.0 and replaced with serviceable assembly from LJ-87. Reinstalled left horizontal and vertical stabilizers and replaced right horizontal stabilizer with serviceable assembly from LJ-87⁵ using new hardware.

Note: Reference Textron Empennage installation drawing 50-600001 the original right horizontal stabilizer and elevator installed on LJ-87 (50-600001-10) was not an approved replacement for LJ-256 (50-600001-14).

Complied with AD 77-22-01 by inspection of left and right horizontal stabilizer aft spar attach points. No defects noted. Complied with AD 82-23-02 by inspection of left and right elevator outboard hinge points. No defects noted. Reinstalled left elevator and rudder and replaced right elevator with serviceable assembly from LJ-87 using new hardware. Rigged elevator control and trim control cables and stops/limits. Rigged rudder control and rudder trim tab control cables and stops/limits. Removed and replaced left wing aft inboard fuel cell. Dressed propeller nicks on both left-hand and right-hand propellers. Removed left and right engine fuel nozzles. Cleaned and flow checked by Yubba Aviation. Reinstalled fuel nozzles.

- **April 18, 2018** – Tested aircraft transponders per FAR 43 appendix F. Aircraft complies with FAR 91.413.
- **May 21, 2019** – Removed and replaced left nacelle fuel bladder with overhauled fuel bladder.

⁵ Reference the manufacturer's illustrated parts catalogue does not show the horizontal stabilizer originally installed on serial number LJ-87 as being applicable for installation on LJ-256.

The owner provided billing messages between himself and the maintenance provider for recent work performed. The work listed below was not documented in the aircraft logbooks. See record of conversation, attachment one.

- April 4, 2019 – Phase 4 inspection.
- June 4, 2019 – Corrosion wing spar lower.
- June 12, 2019 – Number one inverter installation.

No logbook entries were found documenting engine compressor wash due to operations in salty atmosphere.

6.0 Ferry Flight Equipment Installation and Removal

The FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Certificate for the purpose of operations in excess of maximum takeoff weight. Date of issue June 16, 2017, valid until July 17, 2017. Three major alterations were installed in order to ferry the aircraft from the North Las Vegas Airport to the Honolulu International Airport.

- A. Installation of a high frequency long range communication system. The installation consisted of an ICOM ICM 818 HF SSB Transceiver, Alinco 28/14 volt power supply, ICOM antenna coupler and HF long wire.
- B. Installation of two permanent bulkhead fittings in the left and right sidewall of the fuselage at station 185 for the purpose of providing ferry fuel system access to the left and right fuel pump drain fittings.
- C. Installation of a single 529 gallon temporary extended range fuel bladder limited to 480 gallons, four fuel selector valves, 28 volt fuel pump and associated ferry fuel feed lines.

No logbook entries were found documenting the installation and removal of the temporary equipment installations for the ferry flight as required by the FAA 337 major alteration forms submitted to the FAA.

7.0 Weight and Balance

The aircraft was last weighed February 7, 2009 at the Springbank Airport, Alberta, Canada. According to the weight and balance record, the aircraft was weighed in sky diving configuration with fourteen floor mounted seat belts and only the captain's seat installed. The aircraft basic empty weight and balance figures as recorded on the form:

Basic Empty Weight:	5,130.0	pounds
Arm:	150.9	inches
Moment:	773,967.6	lb-inches

Note: No adjusted weight and balance documentation for the rear facing co-pilot seat being re-installed was found during the record review. Seat assembly weighs 28 pounds, location arm is 131.

8.0 Service Difficulty Reports (SDR)⁶

A query of the FAA SDR database was conducted for N256TA from January 1, 2015 to July 6, 2019. There were no SDR found on file for the accident aircraft. While not required for general aviation, reporting a service difficulty is recommended.

9.0 Major Alterations and Major Repairs

A records review of the FAA Airworthiness file for N256TA showed there were 18 major alterations (not including the temporary ferry flight equipment) and 9 major repairs on file for the accident airplane. The following major alterations and repairs are noted.

- February 22, 1994 – Installed transparent roll-up door per engineering report No.4301, dated October 24, 1990 of Shulze Engineering Co.
- April 26, 1996 – Removal of the co-pilot seat and cabin interior. The aircraft has been reconfigured for parachute jumping to accommodate 14 skydivers. Fourteen seat belts were installed on the copilot seat tracks and cabin seat/cargo tracks using 20-inch spacing. Each skydiver will sit on the cabin floor, with a seat belt located at each skydiver position.
- February 18, 2009 (amended July 14, 2009) – Repaired cabin floor above elevator cable pulley bracket, Sta. 235.43. Doubler repair installed IAW SRM 20-10-00 on right hand wing upper skin at Sta. 99.61. Installed doubler repair on fuselage at right hand upper aft empennage area Sta. 340 IAW SRM 20-10-15. Removed and replaced left hand inboard and outboard flap tracks. Removed and replaced right hand inboard flap track. Replaced right hand inboard and outboard flap roller attach brackets IAW SRM20-50-03. Repaired nose landing gear right wheel well web chain area IAW SRM 20-10-16. Repaired nose wheel well web area at right hand nose landing gear actuator attachment IAW SRM 54-00-03. Replaced left and right-hand elevator trim tab arms with made repair parts IAW SRM 20-10-00.
- September 10, 2010 – A review was conducted documenting all optional removed equipment, passenger and co-pilot seat removals, co-pilot's control yoke assembly, cabin heater and associated equipment, removal of optional surface and propeller deicer equipment, plumbing and deice boots, removal of the freon air-conditioning system, pressurization system components, and cabin lighting, installation of replacement seat track mounted seat belts, in accordance with DER approved report 100716 dated July 26, 2010 – Optional Airframe Equipment Removal.
- September 10, 2010 – In addition, a review was conducted documenting the optional removed avionics equipment, radar system, DME system, Marker Beacon system, ADF system, right hand gyro horizon, right hand airspeed indicator, right hand altimeter, right hand vertical speed indicator, right hand directional indicator, right hand radio magnetic indicator, right hand navigational indicator, and all associated components in accordance with DER approved report 100715 dated July 26, 2010 – Optional Avionics and Instrument Removal.

⁶ A Service Difficulty Report (SDR) is a report of the occurrence or detection of each failure, malfunctions, or defects as recommended by AC 20-109A for general aviation.

10.0 FAA Aircraft Ramp Inspection

On December 7, 2017 a FAA inspector performed a ramp inspection of the aircraft. Aircraft ramp inspection contents are contained in Flight Standards Information Management System 8900.1. The maintenance activity number 3627 contains the following for inspecting an aircraft.

- Determine the general airworthiness of the aircraft by inspecting for items such as cracks, damage, loose or missing fasteners, or other deficiencies that may affect the safety of flight.
- Inspect seats and seat belts for proper installation and condition.
- If applicable, determine if the operator has performed a current very high frequency omni-directional range (VOR) equipment check.
- Determine if an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) is installed. Check the expiration date of the battery.
- Determine that the aircraft identification plate exists and is secured to the aircraft fuselage exterior (refer to 14 CFR part 45, § 45.11 (a)).
- Inspect to determine that all required placards are present and legible.

The inspection activity was closed as being satisfactory.

11.0 Method of Record Keeping

Per CFR Parts 43 and 91, Operators may use aircraft, engine and propeller logbooks to document maintenance records for the aircraft.

12.0 Record of Conversation

- A. Mr. Patrick Garcia the owner of the accident aircraft was interviewed on August 28, 2019. See attachment one for the record of conversation.
- B. Mr. Robert Seladis, a mechanic that performed maintenance on the accident aircraft was interviewed on June 27, 2019. The interview was recorded and transcribed. See attachment two for the interview transcription.
- C. A review of FAA records conducted on Mr. Robert Seladis shows that both his Airframe & Powerplant (A&P) and his Inspection Authorization (IA) certificates were revoked February 8, 2005 due to falsification of records on two aircraft. He was later allowed to be reexamined and a new A&P certificate was issued July 27, 2015. Most recent IA issued March 27, 2017.
- D. Calls to Mr. Robert Seladis for a follow up interview were not returned. A letter sent to his last known address requesting a follow up interview was returned as no longer at this address.

Attachment 1

Record of Conversation



Record of Conversation

Date/Time: August 28, 2019 at about 12:00 EDT

Mr. Patrick Garcia, Owner N256TA

Location: Telephone

Participants: NTSB, Elliott Simpson IIC; NTSB, Gregory Borsari; NTSB, Captain David Lawrence; NTSB, Scott Warren; NTSB, Robert Swain; NTSB

Representation: Mr. Michael Dworkin

NTSB Accident Number – WPR19MA177, Beech King Air 65-A90, Registration N256TA, Mokuleia, HI. (Dillingham Airfield)

On August 28, 2019, beginning at about 12:00 EDT, Mr. Garcia agreed to speak via telephone and to have notes taken, which follow. These notes are not a verbatim transcript. In attendance was William (Rocky) Garcia, Patrick's father.

After introductions were completed and a brief explanation about the NTSB investigative role, Patrick was asked if he could tell us when and why he purchased the airplane and then walk us through the history of the airplane up until the accident. Patrick said he purchased the aircraft approximately the beginning of 2011. He purchased it because he owns a company called Sky Dive Sacramento. He owned a Cessna 182 and was increasing the business. He purchased N256TA from someone in Canada. The Canadian seller flew the airplane down to California and Patrick started utilizing it for skydiving flights at his company. After a few years he leased the airplane out to a different sky diving company in the hopes of increasing the number of aircraft he owns. There was an incident in Byron, and after repair, he leased it to Oahu Parachute Center (OPC) in Hawaii. He leased it out with the intention of purchasing a Cessna Caravan.

Asked if he recalled what month in 2011, he purchased the aircraft, he responded not exactly sure of the month. He remembered negotiating through the winter and trying to get the airplane flown down with the winter weather in from Canada to California. Asked if he still had the 182, Patrick said he that did.

Asked if N256TA was a direct lease, he told us there were no intermediary parties involved. He added that he thought we had a copy of the lease, which Captain Lawrence confirmed during the interview that the (NTSB) does have a copy.

Prior to leasing to OPC, he leased the airplane to DBA (doing business as) Bay Area Sky diving. He thought the actual company name was Aero Sport, Inc.

He told us that OPC contacted him about 2.5 years ago (October, November timeframe). Asked who the point of contact at OPC he told us George Rivera. Asked how he determined that OPC would be okay to lease the aircraft to, Patrick said that George Rivera is well known in the sky

diving industry. He's been working as a parachute rigger and sky diver as long as Patrick has been in the industry (about 12 years) and has been a pilot and skydiver for about 25 years.

Asked if he has ever been over to Hawaii to visit OPC he said yes, he has been there about five or six times. Asked if he had any concerns with OPC regarding the airplane while there, he said no.

Asked if he had any other financial connection with OPC beyond the aircraft lease, he said no.

Patrick was asked who was responsible for setting up the ferry flight from the mainland to Hawaii, and he told us that it was George Rivera. Asked if he (Patrick) was responsible for configuring the airplane for the ferry flight, he told us, no that a ferry flight company took care of that.

Asked if he could summarize any maintenance requirements that were in the lease, he stated that he would have to look at the lease for details, but he knew OPC was in charge of the maintenance on the airplane. Including finding and using an A&P and IA for that maintenance.

OPC was responsible for all the maintenance while the airplane was leased to OPC using the Beech Phase Inspection program, the aircraft manufacturer's maintenance program.

Asked if he was satisfied with OPC's selection of the mechanic he said yes. He said his point of contact for the maintenance was Robert (Bobby) Seladis. Patrick did not know Bobby prior to him working on the accident airplane. He did meet Bobby. Asked about where Bobby worked prior to OPC, he said he thought he worked on another King Air 90 at another sky diving operation on the field, but he could not remember the name of the outfit. Asked if he knew why Bobby left the previous company, he told us no that he did not know why.

Asked how the upcoming maintenance was being tracked and if he managed what needed to be done on the aircraft, he told us that Bobby would send him text messages with the times and flight cycles on the airplane. Asked if Bobby was tracking maintenance coming due, he added that yes, either phone calls or text messages which the NTSB was provided copies of.

Asked if he knew if anybody else worked on the airplane besides Bobby, he said that George typically assigned mechanics, but as far as he knew, George was not a mechanic. Asked if he was not a mechanic how was George involved, he told us that he would relay information or what was needed by Bobby for the maintenance.

Asked if he knew what the other people's capabilities were who worked on the airplane, or if he knew if they were licensed or unlicensed, he said, Bobby has the IA and it this should be on file.

With regard to the previous event when the N256TA experienced an inflight loss of the right-hand horizontal stabilizer, he stated that he did not acquire N98B (the airplane donor parts were taken from) as an airworthy aircraft, but only for parts, and explained that he only purchased the airplane for the parts needed to repair N256TA. He added that N98B had a gear up landing, and was located at the same airport.

Asked if he knew how they determined the parts from N98B were in a serviceable condition. He said that he did know whether the NDT, NDI inspection was performed on N256TA before it was returned to service. He added that he did not remember who performed the inspection. Asked if he knew who removed the tail components from the donor aircraft, he told us that he knew two IA's that were working on it. The signatures are in the logbook and he provided the names. Asked if he knew who verified that the stabilizer was interchangeable with the accident aircraft, he said it would be those two mechanics.

Asked if he knew if there were any differences in the parts used from the donor airplane versus the parts on his airplane, he said he did not know of any differences or similarities for that matter. He added that everything looked the same to him, but he was not an IA, not a mechanic.

It was explained to Patrick that the left upper wing skins of N256TA looked to be wrinkled outboard of the engine as a result of the event when the horizontal stabilizer departed. When asked if he knew anything about it, he stated that he thinks that is incorrect and he reviewed two NDT NDI reports, and that wrinkles were brought to his attention at the first inspection, and he was told that is typical for an older aircraft.

Asked to clarify where the two NDT, NDI reports were from, he told us that he understood they needed to be done every 36 months.

Asked if he had any knowledge of one of the wings upper skin, main spar attach area where it appears to be puckered at the joint. He talked about his understanding of the NDT, NDI inspections of the main spar where the wing is supported, and all the attaching hardware is removed, and the inspections are done. One was done do to the 36-month requirement and the other for the Byron event.

When asked if he was aware when flying the airplane of the need to use full aileron trim and some rudder trim in order to fly straight and level, he said that he had many hours of flight experience in N256TA and it liked trim. Asked to elaborate, he told us that once the aileron trim was set it was fine, and he added he remembered that the trim would normally be biased to one side or the other but could not remember which side.

Asked if the trim bias condition existed before or after the loss of the horizontal stab, he said it was only before, because he did not fly the airplane after the horizontal stabilizer incident. He added that he only flew the airplane when it was at his sky diving center in Lincoln. He also added that the trim was like that ever since he owned it.

When asked if he knew that the airplane had a gear up landing prior to his ownership, he said no, he did not know that, but it would not surprise him. He added that most of the airplanes he looked at for purchase that have retractable gear seem to have had something like that happen in the past.

Asked how long the airplane sat after the horizontal stabilizer repair work and the leasing it to OPC, he said about one year.

When asked if the horizontal stabilizer was repaired specifically for him, he said it was. Asked if he selected who did the repair work, he said yes, based on the advice of his IA. Asked if he was familiar with the company that performed the work, he said yes, he was.

Asked about the engineering review that was conducted in 2010 for the conversion of the aircraft for parachute jumping and removal of the optional equipment not needed for parachute operations, he stated that he believed Rocky Mountain performed the work, and he was told that they were a very reputable company. He described the work they performed as incredible and of high quality, and prior to purchase he reviewed the entire aircraft and made sure everything was correct. The reputation of Rocky Mountain was one of the reasons he decided to purchase the airplane.

When asked who maintains the aircraft records, he said that Bobby had them last. It was his understanding that Bobby had them under “lock and key” in his apartment office. Asked if he maintained any copies of the records, he replied, that he did not.

Asked if he had any of the engine overhaul records, he said they would be in the logbooks. Asked if he had any older logbooks, specifically for the left engine (as the logbook we have only goes back to the hot section inspection and not the overhaul), he said he has a box of older records back in his hangar. (After some discussion as to whether to search for what was asked for, the group felt it was best just to send the entire box to the NTSB, and Patrick agreed.)

When asked if OPC ever sent any maintenance records to him, he said he had some pictures sent to him of the invoice and the logbook entry.

Asked if he talked to Bobby since the accident, he replied, no. He added that he reached out to him several times but has not heard anything. Prior to the accident he would hear from him about once a week, sometimes more often.

The group discussed the Beech phase check maintenance program, and asked why one of the first items Bobby put in the logbook was for a 100-hour inspection per the advisory circular in chapter 43, and that it was changed to a phase check. When asked if he had anything to do with that, Patrick said that when he saw that entry, he showed it to the IA he works with in Lincoln, and was told that it was inaccurate and inappropriate for that airplane. It is not on a 100-hour inspection, that it is on the Beech phase inspections. The IA explained the difference between the phase inspections and 100-hour inspections like on his Cessna. He added that he contacted George and Bobby to get it corrected.

Asked if Bobby corrected the entry to his satisfaction, and if he went back and did any additional work, he told us yes, and there is an invoice for the additional work that had to be done for the phase inspection. He added he could not recall which phase it was, and that he needed more time to get the extra items completed and that he sent Bobby additional money after that work was done.

Asked if he provided Bobby with the phase inspection program, he said he understood it was in the Beech manual. He had his IA make copies of the Phase inspections so that they had copies of the items a check list. All four phase inspections were copied into his own binder.

When asked how Bobby tracked when maintenance requirements were coming due, he said that he was advised that Bobby worked on the airplane every week. Tuesday was the day set aside for maintenance, no flying Tuesday so they could keep up with any needed maintenance. He added he used the Hobbs time for tracking.

Asked if he knew anything about the need for daily engine wash requirements due to operating in a salty environment, he asked if we were talking about the engine compressor washes. The group clarified the question about internal engine washes due to operations in a salty environment, and he said he was told that they were done, and that they were done very often because of the environment. That was something he noticed that was different from flying the aircraft in California versus in Hawaii.

Asked if he was billed for the engine washes, he said he would have to look. He does not remember specifically for washes, rather he is typically just billed for time. He added he knows he was shown a tool that was made specifically for washes, and that it looked almost like a pressure washer type of attachment. He added, he never saw washes being performed, but reiterated that he was told that they were performed regularly.

Asked if he had to approve of any of the maintenance ahead of time that needed to be done, he said he always was, but never stopped them from doing the work. He was always notified what was done the previous week. Added that if a phase inspection was coming due that he would know several weeks before that started.

Asked if the FAA ever contacted him about the airplane and why, he stated yes, they did an onsite inspection and they had a concern with some of the seatbelts, specifically that some of their labels were difficult to read. So, he purchased brand new hooker harnesses and sent the new seatbelts to OPC. That was the only item. The squawk did not require grounding the aircraft labels were just difficult to read. He added that they probably were in the OPC mailbox about the time of the accident, and unlikely to have been installed. The FAA inspection was recent, maybe about a month to six weeks before the accident. It took about one month for Hooker Harness to build the belts, he added that he thought the inspector was from the Honolulu FSDO. The Hooker Harnesses were single point harness specifically for the Beech, for use by the skydivers.

Asked specifically how he knew George, or got to know him, he said that George came to him and that he was looking for an aircraft to lease.

Asked if the billing is just done by text messaging, he said there maybe one or two in his email, but text messages seemed to be the quickest. Any formal billing would be with George at OPC, and he has a photo or picture of what the invoice looked like. Everything was supposed to go through George.

When asked that it was his understanding the puckers in the wing were there prior to the horizontal stab separation, he said that, yes it was. The first time it was shown to him was from the NDT, NDI inspector.

Patrick was asked to clarify the aileron trim condition, and stated that he never flew the airplane straight and level, because he flew sky divers, and such a flight profile is never used. He was not sure how to answer the question as it was not a commuter airplane, and just went up and down. He added that he never needed to adjust the aileron trim, except after maintenance, or when it was adjusted by another pilot. During one of the phase inspections they would go through the full range of motion and the trim, but once he had it set, he never had to adjust it again during flight.

Asked if he had any photos of the skydivers seating and the harnesses, he said he would have to look and see. However, there are literally thousands of skydiver photos out there.

He was asked if he had any photos from the past that would show the characteristics of the top of the wing, such as the wrinkles that were discussed earlier. He responded that he never went out of his way to take photos aimed that way. Being in the skydiving business, he thinks there are thousands of photos available, but he offered to look, although nothing unusual was ever brought to his attention. The wrinkle that he was aware of was very minor, and could only be seen when the airplane was in a hangar. He reiterated that he was concerned, but was told by mechanics that this was very common for King Air airplanes of that vintage. He went to say why they do the NDT, NDI inspections of the spar, and the spars support the wing and during those inspections they pull every bolt out of the spar and inspect it. He added that he flew the airplane for three years. Asked about getting copies the NDT, NDI reports he said they would be in the logbooks, which is where he saw them last.

Patrick was asked if he recalled hearing about any engine issues while the airplane was being operated in Hawaii, such as power loss, un-commanded power excursions, either up or down, or un-commanded throttle movements. He said the simple answer is no, and added that he did talk to one of the pilots when he first got there that was moving the throttles all the way forward to the stops, and concerned that the engine power was fluctuating at those high levels. It was Patrick's understanding there was a wastegate that would open up at those levels, creating the functions. When he found out the pilot was advancing the throttles to the stops, he asked him not to do so as, he was concerned because his training experience led him to believe that this was not appropriate for a high-performance engine. That was the only issue the pilots came to him with. He was aware that Bobby was working on the rigging the engine controls to get them to match each other. Most pilots want the throttle handles to match up. Again, that did not stem from a problem, it was from the pilots wanting the throttles to match up. Asked when they were doing that rigging, he said it was about a year ago.

He was asked who else performed work on the aircraft besides Bobby for clarification. He stated that he believed there was another mechanic before Bobby came in and he wasn't sure if he was an AI, but he may have done the first phase inspection. He thinks Bobby showed up shortly after the airplane got there but cannot be certain. But he does know Bobby was not the first person to put his hands on the airplane. He was the one that I discussed all the maintenance on was with

him after I met Bobby. He seemed to know a lot about the plane. Asked if he was the only one doing the maintenance, he said him and anyone under his direction.

Asked for further detail on when he first saw that a 100-hour inspection was done instead of the phase inspection, what was it that alerted him to this? He stated that he showed the entry to an IA that he has worked with in the past, and he told him that was inappropriate for the King Air, which needed phase checks. He added that the photo of the logbook entry showing the 100 inspection was showed to his IA in California. Asked if that was routine to get pictures of the logbook entries, he stated no, and he thinks that is the only one he has.

Patrick was not sure how weight and balance calculations were being performed by OPC, but the weight and balance was in the airplane with the flight manual. He also believes a copy may be in the logbooks, and the box of additional records he has. When asked how weight and balance was performed in Skydiving, with the multiple combination of parachute jumpers and equipment, he stated that it will differ between the type of airplane you are flying, but with regards to the N256TA it also depends on which direction the co-pilot seat is facing. As a rule of thumb when he was flying N256TA, he would look back to make sure no one was aft of the door opening and that the majority of occupants were either forward of the wing or on top of it. And that as a pilot that is really easy to look over your shoulder and make sure that is happening. He stated that at the very aft of the King Air is a toilet, and no one should be back there. There is also a red piece of tape on the floor as a marker to not go behind the red tape. He would not allow a jumper to sit back there. The seat belts do not go back there so no one is allowed that far back.

With regards to the position of the red tape, when asked if it is based on weight and balance calculations, he stated that he believes so, and thinks the last weight and balance work was done by Rocky Mountain. He recalled that a maximum of fourteen jumpers were allowed with the right seat turned around. He added that if he could remember, that the further forward the weight was, the better.

With regards to when the airplane was coming out of Byron, he stated that it was flown to Lincoln prior to being picked up by the ferry company. He does not recall the specific name of the pilot that flew it to Hawaii, but he was aware that the pilot had many hours of flight experience in the type. The work performed in Lincoln consisted of a flight through turbulent air inspection, which may have also included the NDT, NDI inspection (he stated that this was not when he was shown the left wing wrinkles, they were revealed on the first inspection shortly after he purchased the airplane).

Patrick recalled that Heath Hall made copies of the phase inspection checklist. Pat provided them to Bobby I handed it to him. Okay, where did you get it from? I handed him a binder that all of the Beechcraft phase inspections that I had copied. He got them from Heath the other IA. So, he printed them out in California? Yes. And that was one of the times you visited OPC? Yes.

Patrick did not remember anything specific regarding the regularity of tires changes, he had seen both new and worn tires in the garage where work was performed, and it was his understanding that Bobby was the mechanic who replaced them.

When asked, Patrick stated that he was aware of a series of videos of the horizontal stabilizer separation accident, and he had seen those videos.

When asked about the location of an occupant who was singing a chant in a video onboard N256TA taken just before rolling open the door up who was leading a chant, he stated that he was forward of the red tape. (subsequent review of this video during the interview revealed that this was correct). He stated that nobody sits aft of the red tape, although during egress there are moments when the tape can be momentarily crossed. This is common for egress from all jump airplanes.

When asked if he knew anything about the airplane having surging problems or bleed valves that might be opening/closing, he stated that he would have to look at his notes but doesn't believe there are any such issues.

Asked if the name of Mike Martin is familiar, Mr. Garcia stated that he had not heard of his name. He was aware of Tony Skinner, who was the original OPC pilot, and he stated that he was a really good pilot, and good person, who ultimately left OPC to fly cargo in a King Air between the islands. Asked if Mr. Skinner ever did any work on the airplane, or if he had any mechanic ratings, he said he likely did regular pilot "maintenance" such as preflight work, and he had never paid him to perform mechanic duties.

With regards to payment for work performed on the airplane, Mr. Garcia would pay either George or Bobby, but if George paid for the work, then his lease check would be reduced by that amount. Typically, money is wired between accounts. Patrick did not pay by check. Although George had stated in the past that he needed money so that he could pay his, "guys" Mr. Garcia was never aware of specifically who they were. All messages on this subject are included in the text messages that Mr. Garcia provided.

The last time he visited OPC was February 2019. He did not have any specific reason or concern with the operation that would force him to go and would often like to do unannounced visits. Each time he went he found the airplane was being well maintained and kept in an overall clean condition. He is not an IA, so could not do an informed check, but checked from the perspective of a pilot doing a preflight inspection, such as confirming the landing gear fittings were well lubricated. The last time he visited he had limited range of motion due to a broken arm. Prior to the February visit he was there in September. He has a friend who is a commercial pilot, so he is able to fly there from California on a "buddy" pass, with space available, and often at the last minute.

Asked if he knew Rick Rogers, he said, no, the name does not sound familiar. He does not think he met the accident pilot formally but may have met him briefly in passing.

He had observed landings and takeoffs on his visits and did not see anything untoward. The airplane always sounded good, and appeared to be operated appropriately, and no different than any other skydiving operation he has been involved with.

He observed Runway 8 takeoffs, and the airplane would always turn out toward the ocean and be over the water before reaching the landing zone to the east. None of the operators ever took

intersection departures, always using the full runway length, which e found interesting because the runway was very long and this was unlike his airport in California, where intersection departures were common. He never saw any pilot of N256TA perform aggressive takeoff maneuvers, nor had he been informed that it was ever being flown in a dangerous manner.

He was aware of other co-owners of OPC, but George was the only partner he had contact with or has ever met. He had been told by George that the other partners were just investors.

The question was asked that in the lease there is a clause that says no aerobatics will be performed with the aircraft, there is an additional clause that states as the owner, you have the option to prevent certain pilots that you identify from not being allowed to fly the aircraft. Mr. Garcia was asked how he would know who the actual pilot was, so that he could exercise that clause. Mr. Garcia responded that he would observe the pilot flying on his visits and use that as an opportunity to exercise the option. He would not tolerate anyone mistreating the airplane. He added the clause based on his experience operating in Byron California.

Asked about the recent FAA inspection and if he knew the two FAA inspectors, Mr. Garcia stated no, but the text messages from George should detail the interactions further. It is his understanding that inspections at Dillingham are common, and a regular occurrence.

Mr. Garcia is a commercially rated pilot and has five to six thousand hours of flight experience in multiple aircraft types. He has flown many skydiving flights.

With regard to the airplane's aileron trim, it appeared to be biased to one side or the other, doesn't remember which side, he did recall that it was maybe 2/3rd to one side of neutral to fly straight and level, but it had come that was when he bought the airplane from Canada, and prior to the 2016 accident. Once the aileron trim was set, he did not ever have to touch until either another pilot flew it or during phase inspections where the trim would be moved as part of the inspection.

This was the only airplane he had flown or owned that had aileron trim, so he has no basis to compare the airplane with. He had many questions about the airplane over the years that he owned it, he does not recall if the trim was ever a concern, but he always felt comfortable flying the airplane, and always felt discrepancies were addressed. During the time he had owned the airplane, he had performed slow flight tests, abut no stall practice. He did not encounter any stability issues with the airplane during slow flight.

Following up on the wrinkles in the left wing, Mr. Garcia reiterated that after discussing with multiple mechanics, that stated that this was normal for a King Air of this vintage, and that the NDT, NDI inspection results gave him a high degree of confidence in the structural integrity of the wing. Specifically, the wrinkle was in the skin, and not the spar.

He had confidence in OPC's ability to make money, although cash flow was an issue. Mr. Garcia's primary concern was that he was sent checks from OPC in time, and there were times when he would be frustrated when the payments from OPC did not arrive on time. He

understood Mr. Garcia's frustration, as he was often awaiting payment from outside groups, but he often felt like he was, "third in line" to get paid.

It was his understanding that there were plans for OPC to expand his business, and the King Air was chosen because it had lots of capacity should they need to expand.

With regards to weight and balance, it was brought to the attention of Mr. Garcia that the most current weight and balance was from 2009. Mr. Garcia stated that it is possible that there was a more recent record, but it also seems plausible that it was 2009, as this was when Rocky Mountain Aircraft worked on it.

Back on the subject of him inspecting the airplane at OPC, he reiterated that he had inspected the airplane about five to six times since it went to Hawaii, and he was especially vigilant because it was his main source of income. He would like to have got out to see it more often.

Conversation concluded at about 1:50 PM EDT

Attachment 2

Interview Transcription



Interview Transcription

Date/Time: June 27, 2019

Mr. Robert “Bobby” Seladis

Location: Mokuleia, Hawaii

Participants: NTSB, Robert Swain; NTSB, James Hookey; NTSB, Captain David

Lawrence; Textron, Peter Basile

Representation: None

NTSB Accident Number – WPR19MA177, Beech King Air 65-A90, Registration N256TA, Mokuleia, HI. (Dillingham Airfield)

On June 27, 2019, Mr. Seladis agreed to speak to the investigators. The interview was recorded and sent out for transcription. The transcription follows.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of: *

*

OAHU PARACHUTE CENTER *

BEECH A90 PARACHUTE ACCIDENT * Accident No.: WPR19MA177

JUNE 21, 2019 *

MOKULEIA, HAWAII *

*

Interview of: ROBERT "BOBBY" PEREZ SELADIS

Mechanic

Ala Moana Center
Honolulu, Hawaii

Thursday,
June 27, 2019

APPEARANCES:

ROBERT SWAIM, Senior Aviation Safety Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

JAMES HOOKEY, Senior Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DAVID LAWRENCE, Senior Aviation Safety Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

PETE BASILE, Senior Air Safety Investigator
Textron Aviation

I N T E R V I E W

(10:05 a.m.)

MR. SWAIM: All right. It is June 27th at 10:05 a.m., and this is an interview with Robert Perez Seladis, Bobby, and he is an A&P mechanic.

And Mr. Seladis, do you object, have any problem to recording this?

MR. SELADIS: No, I have no problem.

MR. SWAIM: Okay. Thank you. In the room, I am Robert Swaim, Bob Swaim, with the NTSB. I'm an airworthiness investigator. And?

MR. HOOKEY: Jim Hookey, powerplant investigator with NTSB.

MR. BASILE: And Peter Basile, air safety investigator for Textron Aviation.

MR. SELADIS: And I'm Robert Perez Seladis.

MR. SWAIM: Okay. Great. And I'll just give you this back. We just photographed your certificates. And Bobby -- oh, I already asked if you have any concerns, so -- all right. You and I spoke the other day, 2 days ago, and I took some notes. So I just haven't gotten a chance to type them up yet and send them to you --

MR. SELADIS: Okay.

MR. SWAIM: -- for your review, if that's okay with you?

MR. SELADIS: Sure.

MR. SWAIM: Okay. Cool. And since I've already talked to you quite a bit, I thought that we might start off with Jim Hookey and go from there.

INTERVIEW OF ROBERT "BOBBY" PEREZ SELADIS

BY MR. HOOKEY:

Q. Okay. I'm the engine investigator on this job. And since we have been here, we have heard a lot of stuff about engines surging and power fluctuations. And then there was one event, or two events, one on May 11th and then there was apparently an event earlier than that. But I'd like to go with the May -- start with the May 11th event and the one that was apparently similar to that. Are you familiar with the May 11th event? There was apparently a major power rollback?

A. That was way back. I don't really recall, you know, that incident. In the past, we have had -- you know, I, you know, recommended a power recovery wash because of sticky bleed valves.

Q. The -- okay, you had a power recovery wash for the sticky bleed valve. Do you recall what was the power loss?

A. I guess it was torque being limited to around 800, and then all of the sudden, you know, as he climbed altitude and powered back, then all of the sudden it would jump. For me, you know, it's usually an indication that you got a bleed valve that's sticking. That's going by my experience with the PT6.

Q. When you would do these power recovery washes, on a subsequent flight, was the -- did the problem go away?

A. I believe so, yeah, because I wasn't there to do the power recovery, okay? Number one, I do limited maintenance on the airplane. I do maintenance as required, you know, if the pilot reports an issue. I'm not an employee, so, you know, I'm just going by what they're telling me what the issue is. I make recommendation, you know, because they do the compressor rinses and they do the recovery wash; I'm usually not there for that. Later on, they would give me -- you know, they would tell me whether that took care of the problem or not.

Q. Okay. Well, I guess I jumped ahead of myself here. You said that you worked on the airplane but you don't do the engine maintenance; is that what I just heard?

A. The recovery washes and the compressor rinses, usually the pilot and his helper does that.

Q. Who is the helper?

A. That I think might have been Jerome. Well, Jerome is a pilot, and it might have been Wilbur. I don't know Wilbur's last name or Jerome's. I just know them by first name.

Q. Okay. No problem. You know they do the washers and the recovery washes. What maintenance, specific maintenance do you do on the engines?

A. Like, on the engines, like when the engine inspections are due, I do the inspection, the filter changes, the run-ups after -- run-up, leak check, and power checks. And as far as, you know, maintenance go, it's as required, as reported to me.

Q. Okay. You just segued right into my next question, man. You're just saving me.

A. Right.

Q. When you say as it's reported to you, how do you find out if the pilot had an issue?

A. Well, the pilot would get ahold of me and let me know what the issues are. Okay. In this case, on Friday --

Q. Hold on. Okay.

MR. LAWRENCE: Sorry.

MR. SWAIM: Dave is our operations, the pilot investigator. And this is Bobby Seladis.

MR. LAWRENCE: Hi, I'm Dave Lawrence. Nice to meet you. Hi, Bobby.

MR. HOOKEY: I just -- I didn't know who was walking in. I heard the door and --

MR. SWAIM: Yeah. Yup.

BY MR. HOOKEY:

Q. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but --

A. Well, for instance, on Friday, they came in and I asked them, you guys are done for the day? Yeah, we're done for the day. Okay. So I would do most -- you know, more or less a post-flight, look the airplane over, and pointed out to me that there was some nicks in the propeller, you know, from rocks, gravel.

So they told me they were going to come back and wash the airplane. So I told them, okay, well, I'll go take care of that. You know, I'll dress the prop, take out those nicks. And reminded them that on usually Tuesdays is a non-flying day, so that's the day that, you know, I would look the airplane over good and do what's necessary.

The routine thing for me, on Tuesday, because of the environment in Dillingham is, you know, corrosion. So I would work on corrosion. Very rarely touched the powerplant unless I needed to. And if I did, it would be just like a weekly pop the cowling off, lube linkages, you know, the beta controls, the cam box and engine rods, and so forth, and give the engine more or less a good look over, because like I said, I don't do routine maintenance. I'm just doing --

(Interruption at the door.)

MR. SWAIM: Sorry.

MR. SELADIS: So usually Tuesday is my routine to look the airplane over good and address whatever issues there are. Like, I think it was back in May, I did a left nacelle bladder replacement. That's the only major thing, more or less, I did on the aircraft. Did a leak check and an ops check on the -

- you know, making sure boost pump worked, everything.

And then later on they put fuel in it and -- because I told them put fuel; we need to leak check it, everything. So that's what they did. And then I did look at it the next day. There was a slight leak, and I ended up replacing the boost pump gasket because the ones that were supplied with the tank, for some reason -- they might have been old cork gaskets, but they didn't hold up. So I ended up installing another gasket to take care of that leak.

BY MR. HOOKEY:

Q. Okay. Okay.

A. And after that, everything was fine.

Q. So when you said the pilot contacted you if he had any issues, how would he do that? Was there just, like, a logbook -- or not a logbook; that's not the word I want to use.

A. No, it's -- everything is verbal.

Q. A crew book. Well, okay, I mean, so he would just see you down at the ramp there, or something?

A. Yeah. He --

Q. Or leave a message on your voicemail?

A. Usually when they come in, I would go up to them and talk to them about issues, whatever they had, and that's the form of communication.

Q. You doing okay?

A. Sure.

Q. Okay, okay.

MR. SWAIM: By the way, there's water back there if you need --

MR. SELADIS: Yeah.

BY MR. HOOKEY:

Q. Or I can get you some.

A. No, no, no. I'm fine.

Q. No? You sure?

A. Yeah, I'm fine.

Q. Okay. Okay. Do you know how often they were doing -- would they do the water washes on their own or were you saying it needs to be done?

A. No. Usually I'm gone by the end of the day.

Q. Okay.

A. And it's like standard operating procedures. You know, they're supposed to do it every day after the flight because of the weather, the salt conditions up at Dillingham. Now, whether they did it every day or every other day, that I don't know.

Q. Okay.

A. Like I said, you know, there's no log. I'm doing just, you know, contract maintenance, not like it's a full-time job for me. If it was, then I would be doing it. Because, you know, it was a cost issue. You know, you got somebody full-time 8 hours a day, you know, that's a lot of money. That's why, you know, a lot of the operators, you know, that I do work for, I'm on contract. I do maintenance as

required. I also work -- you know, do maintenance for the tool plate operation over there.

Q. Really?

A. And I take care of their equipment as required. It's the same thing. Maybe Monday, Wednesday, Friday, work on the stuff that's flying, or I'm currently building up another L-19 for that outfit. So I'm on the ramp. So I would interact with, you know, OPC's operation mainly on Tuesdays only.

Q. You said you do contract work for other operators. What other type airplanes are you working on?

A. Well, it was just OPC.

Q. Okay.

A. And their glider operation, which is a L-19, and their gliders. That's it. Prior to that, I think it was back in 2010, my last full-time job was with Alpine Air. They had the mail contract in Honolulu for 5, 6 years.

Q. What type airplanes did they have?

A. That was Beech 99s and Beech 1900s. And I was the director of maintenance, and I was the one responsible for doing all the hot sections.

Q. When you said that you would do the HSIs at Alpine, did they do them in the shop or did they do them on wing?

A. I did them on the wing. What they would do, they would send me a hot section kit that's already cut, everything, and I would remove and replace, do the run-ups. I think, in this instance -- you know, I spoke to Pat Garcia a couple months ago, and we were discussing a hot section, because I think

one of the engines were coming due for a hot section. And what we discussed was whether I was going to take the engine off and send it to him, or he asked me if I knew how to do it. I told him, yes, I do; just send me another mechanic that he has from the mainland over here, and we can go ahead and do the hot section over here.

Q. And what was that individual's name, the one you were talking about doing the HSI?

A. Pat Garcia.

Q. Pat Garcia?

A. He's the owner of the aircraft.

Q. Do you remember which engine that was?

A. I really can't recollect which engine we're talking about, but we were planning on sometime in October of this year, you know, probably need to get done.

Q. And was there anything specific that was driving this discussion to do an HSI or was it just because it was like --

A. Well, you know, this --

Q. -- it was time, I mean --

A. This was maintenance that we discussed and planned for later on this year. So that's the only other major thing I can think of that needed to be done on the aircraft.

MR. HOOKEY: Okay. Somebody want to --

MR. SWAIM: Take over? Or go next?

MR. HOOKEY: Take over, yeah.

MR. SWAIM: Go next, you mean?

MR. HOOKEY: Yeah, go next.

MR. SWAIM: You left that hanging there.

MR. HOOKEY: Well, I feel like I was hogging the whole show here.

MR. SWAIM: No, no, take your time.

MR. HOOKEY: No, I'm -- what I'm now saying is I ran out of questions for the minute.

MR. SWAIM: Ah, in that case -- again, I already spoke to you at length.

MR. SELADIS: Right.

MR. SWAIM: So I'm going to let Pete ask some questions.

MR. BASILE: Sure.

BY MR. BASILE:

Q. How much experience did you have working on King Airs?

A. King Airs, I go back quite far.

Q. That's fine.

A. I've worked on the PT6s since 1980.

Q. Okay.

A. So as far as Beech products go, I used to work on the Beech 18s, King Air, Beech 99s, 1900s, and basically, a Beech product is a Beech product. PT6s, you got small, medium, and large, you know, versions of the PT6. And I've worked on the small, medium, and large, up to the 67Rs.

Q. Okay. You kind of specialize in powerplants?

A. I specialize in everything, you know. So, you know, airframe, powerplant, electrical. You know, I'm more or less pretty much well-rounded in regards to aircraft.

Q. Okay. You talked about the way you communicated with these guys was typically through just verbal communications with the pilots?

A. Verbal communications, yeah.

Q. They didn't have, like, a squawk box or sheets that they would bring back --

A. No.

Q. -- to the owner of OPC?

A. Nothing like that.

Q. No? So --

A. You know, it was a bare-bones part 91 operation.

Q. Okay. When they would tell you about squawks and things like that, would you write them down? Do you have any records of these?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Okay. Can you recall --

A. Like I said, it was all bare bones. If it was a major issue, you know, I'd make note of it.

Q. Is that something that you keep? How do you run your business as a contract maintenance, like, your recordkeeping?

A. Well, whatever -- like, for instance, the only major thing I did on the aircraft was back in May 21 doing the nacelle bladder tank replacement, and I signed it off in the logbook.

Q. Okay.

A. And that's it. I mean, you know, communication, like I said, you know, it would be really limited. You know, if they saw me, they would let me know, and if I saw them, I would usually ask them. There would be times when I wouldn't have any communication with them for maybe over a week or so.

And you know, like I said, you know, I leave it up to them, trust them that they're doing the compressor rinses, and they told me that at least once a month they do a power recovery wash. And the only thing I told them was, you know, make sure you rinse it out good, you know? You need to let the soap sit in there for at least, at least 15 to 30 minutes, and then you're going to have to rinse it out a couple times.

Q. And this is the compressor washes, you're saying they were doing this daily?

A. That I really couldn't tell you if they did it daily because I wasn't there. Usually they do a late afternoon on the aircraft. Either they did it the next morning or they did it when they come back, but I figured it would be the next morning because you got to let the engine cool down, and by then, everybody wants to go.

Q. So --

MR. HOOKEY: Can I just throw in a question? You said that there was a soap. Do you know what product they were putting in there for the cleaning? I'm sorry.

MR. SELADIS: I think it was the standard -- I think it's RCM.

MR. HOOKEY: Okay. I'll have to --

MR. SELADIS: Yeah. And that came already pre-mixed, and they would pick that soap up from Gold Wings Aircraft Supply down at the airport.

MR. HOOKEY: When you say airport?

MR. SELADIS: Honolulu International --

MR. HOOKEY: Honolulu, okay.

MR. SELADIS: Yeah.

MR. HOOKEY: Okay. Sorry about that.

MR. BASILE: No, that's fine. No problem.

BY MR. BASILE:

Q. So kind of back to the records, I mean, I've seen the logbooks, I've got some photographs of them, and I see your entry in there for the nacelle tank. In addition to that, how do you get billed, then? How do you -- what kind of records do you keep or do you go back to the company to get paid? Do you have --

A. Well, I would usually let Pat Garcia know the hours that I've put in, and he would pay me, you know, by electronic deposit to my bank account.

Q. Your billing and stuff is just verbal? You just say, hey, I did this and you owe me this much?

A. I would usually text it to them.

Q. Okay. We talked about maintenance on demand as requested by these guys. In the logbooks I see entries for the phase inspections, looks like, since the airplane got over here.

A. Right. The last major phase was I think back in October or November last year.

Q. Yeah.

A. And that was a phase 3.

Q. Do you recall what you did during that phase 3?

A. Well, in accordance with the Beech phase checklist.

Q. Okay. Did you use the checklist or keep a paper copy?

A. Just whatever is in the log.

Q. Okay.

MR. SWAIM: We have it?

BY MR. BASILE:

Q. Yeah, can we pull it out? Is --

A. Sure.

Q. Sorry. So that's your paperwork? You produced this paperwork when you did the phase inspections?

A. Yeah. I have --

Q. Okay.

A. This is the inspection checklist.

Q. Okay.

A. So what I would do is I would make a copy of whatever phase is due and do it in accordance with what's required in the phase.

Q. Excellent. Okay.

A. At one point, I guess, when George first got the aircraft, I was on the assumption they were on 100-hour inspections, but later on, I was told by Pat Garcia, no, use the Beech inspection format.

Q. Yeah, that's great. Do you recall anything out of the ordinary when you did --

A. No.

Q. -- like the phase 1, 2, 3, since you've been working on this pretty all --

A. It's all routine, changing filters, you know, and stuff like that, lubing linkages, and inspecting. Now since that aircraft was configured for skydive, a lot of the systems were deactivated like, you know, the environmental bleeds, stuff like that. They were capped off. And whatever wasn't required was removed from the aircraft for weight.

Q. Okay.

A. And all that stuff that had to do with the conversion -- like, Bob asked me, you know, you guys found something in the aircraft that had 337s or something, and I told him that was the required AFM that needed to be in the aircraft.

Q. Okay. Did you have access to these logs, then? I mean, you put the paperwork in there. Did you --

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So had you --

A. I got access to the logbooks mainly because at one point they were leaving it anywhere, you know? They would leave it in the, you know, the little shed that they kept their stuff in. And you know, for me it was like, no, you don't do that; you lose the logs, you're in big trouble. So that's why, you

know, more or less, you know, I kept an eye on them.

Q. Okay. Were they in your possession or you just keep them over at OPC and lock them up?

A. No. They're in my possession.

Q. Gotcha. So had you had an opportunity to reference the history of the aircraft? Were you familiar with --

A. Oh, yeah, I'm pretty -- you know, I know the history of the aircraft. I know they had issues with it on the mainland, you know, major issues to the point where it did crash a couple times. You know, I heard stories about, you know, the tail coming off. You know, they had to do major work on the tail section.

And it's all more or less documented in the airframe log what was done. So, yeah, I'm familiar with issues they had on the mainland with the aircraft.

Q. Okay.

A. Besides, you know, when the aircraft came over here, there was already talk about it, you know, that, oh, you know, that airplane; yeah, I know that airplane, stuff like that. But, you know, as long as it was repaired, taken care of, you know, I have no issues with that.

Q. Okay. So that's kind of where I was going. I was interested if you were familiar with the tail repair. And clearly, you have access to the logbooks; you've talked to Pat, you know, about the tail.

A. Right.

Q. You mentioned a couple of other crashes on the mainland. What's the --

A. Yeah, there was a couple of issues --

Q. -- stories that you've heard of? What --

A. Well, issues that on takeoff, they had a problem with the boost pump. So I think the aircraft more or less bellied in. You know, I can't confirm that, but that's stories that I heard. And then another issue where the tail came apart, the tail section, and I looked in the log, and I guess that was repaired on the mainland.

Q. Okay.

A. So as far as history of the aircraft goes, it's all hearsay, more or less, and whatever is in the aircraft logs.

Q. Um-hum. So that was just the only hearsay story was the boost pump issue on takeoff? Was there anything else? I'm just curious --

A. Other than that, that's all I've heard. I don't know what other issues contributed to that.

Q. Okay. The repair that was done to the tail, are you familiar with -- had you had an opportunity to look over the entire aircraft? Did you see anything else on there?

A. I couldn't see any structural defects on the back side of the aircraft.

Q. Okay.

A. You know, everything was structurally sound.

Q. Did you inspect the tail?

A. I inspected the tail.

Q. Okay. And you didn't see anything wrong with the tail?

A. No.

Q. Did you --

A. And then I do -- you know, like I said, usually on Tuesdays, it would be lubing flight controls and greasing the landing gear, and at least, you know, look it over real good in general. That's it.

The aircraft FSDO, local FSDO, did more or less a base inspection back in -- I believe it might have been April -- and where they came out, inspected the aircraft and, you know, noted -- you know, went through the aircraft logs, everything, aircraft times, and the only major issue that came out of it was, okay, the transponder check was out-of-date. So about a week later, the aircraft went to Honolulu to the avionics shop and had the transponder checked on.

And then the other issue was the seatbelt TSO tags were illegible. So I made note to Pat Garcia that that was a deficiency that needed to be taken care of. And to my knowledge, he spoke with Ed Lee, that he was ordering up brand-new seatbelts from Hooker Harness. And I was just waiting for them to come in to install in the aircraft.

Q. Okay. Just kind of a follow-up to that, so with the seatbelt issue, you contacted Pat? Did you --

A. Pat Garcia. He's the owner of the aircraft.

Q. Did you work the maintenance issues usually through Pat or did you work them through the operator at OPC?

A. I went through Pat.

Q. Was it always through Pat?

A. Yeah. I went through -- if I needed something, I went through Pat.

Q. Okay. You said you had a chance to inspect the tail; everything looked good. Did you inspect the left wing at all?

A. The whole airplane in general, yeah.

Q. Yeah. Did you ever notice any wrinkling anywhere else on the airplane?

A. No.

Q. And talking to the pilots, did they ever have any issues with any of the flight controls in the way that this aircraft operated?

A. No issues.

Q. No issues? Did you ever do any rigging of the flight control surfaces?

A. All I did was cable tension checks, which were always in limits; satisfactory.

Q. Okay. Are they noted in here for tensions?

A. Yeah.

MR. SWAIM: Yeah, I'm pretty sure I saw them.

BY MR. BASILE:

Q. With the engines, Jim was kind of talking about surging or rollbacks. Any issues with the friction lock on the aircraft?

A. Not to my knowledge. You know, I checked the frictions. Frictions all worked. You know, I checked the forward cushions, where you need at least half-inch cushion, you know, instead of it, you know, bottoming out on the pedestal, right? So, you know, make sure there's cushion there to let you know that, you know, the controls are on the stops, you know, the high stops forward.

Q. Good movement on everything?

A. Good movement. No binding, nothing.

Q. Okay. I think I had heard that when the aircraft was ferried over here to the island, the seats,

the benches had been removed. Did you reinstall them?

A. No. The benches were more or less like foam cushions with Velcro. So more or less, I guess, when they ferried it over, they put the tanks in, and then I guess they threw the foam seats, you know, the benches, on top of the tanks. I wasn't here when it came, you know, so I don't know what the configuration was. I wasn't there for the de-tanking. You know, all I know is one day I showed up at the airport and it was there.

Q. The benches were reinstalled and tanks had been removed?

A. Yeah.

Q. Any idea who might have done that work?

A. I couldn't tell you.

Q. Okay.

A. Because I didn't get involved with that aircraft until way later.

Q. Do you have any photographs of the aircraft that you may have taken during the times you've done maintenance on this thing?

A. No, no photos.

MR. BASILE: Okay. Looks like I've been through most of my questions here. Pass it over to you?

MR. SWAIM: Okay. Let me just finish trying to catch up to you.

MR. SELADIS: I mean, you know --

MR. HOOKEY: Is that pen, pen over typing --

MR. SWAIM: Yeah. Yeah, my hand is --

MR. SELADIS: For -- you know, this is coming from me.

MR. SWAIM: Yeah.

MR. SELADIS: That aircraft, you know, for its age, it was in pretty good airworthy condition, you know, aside from it being here, the salt getting on it, and now you got, you know, you got surface corrosion. You know, there was no major exfoliation type of corrosion on the bird. That's why, you know, I told them you got at least wash the aircraft once a week, you know, wash it with soap. Plus, you know, cosmetically, you know, the exhaust trails, you know, when it builds up, it doesn't look good.

But other than that, you know, that's the -- never had any major issues with the aircraft other than, you know, as-required maintenance to do on it. Airplane, as far as I'm concerned, it ran well. It ran well.

MR. SWAIM: Okay. That's good to hear.

MR. SELADIS: There was other -- you know, there was another mechanic down at the airport. He wanted to do maintenance on it, and his experience on the PT6 wasn't that good. And you know, I always worried about that. And besides, you know, he only had a A license. He didn't have a powerplant license. So that was one of my concerns. That's why, you know, I made note to George and Pat, nobody touches that bird but me, you know, for those reasons.

BY MR. BASILE:

Q. Do you recall who is it you're speaking of?

A. Scott Blakely (ph.). He does the fueling.

Q. Okay. Blakely?

A. Yeah. Scott.

Q. Okay.

A. He's got the fueling concession for the jet A on the field. So that was one of my concerns. If somebody didn't know what they were doing, don't mess with it.

Q. Did anybody help you when you were doing those kinds of maintenance, the phase inspections?

A. Every now and then, you know, the guys would come around to take panels off, you know, de-panel the aircraft so I can take a look-see inside. But most of the time, it was -- I was by myself to do it.

Q. Okay. You don't have an apprentice?

A. They're hard to come by, hard to come by. I mean, you can get anybody and give them a screwdriver and open these panels, you know, that type of deal, if somebody was around.

Q. So you're out at the airport pretty often? I think --

MR. SWAIM: Four days --

BY MR. BASILE:

Q. Yeah, aside from the maintenance --

A. Sometimes I am.

Q. Yeah, aside from the maintenance stuff, you must see them operate on a regular basis?

A. I watch them --

Q. Can you tell me anything about --

A. -- take off and land.

Q. What can you tell me about their operations? What do you see when you're out there?

A. Oh, you know, they were fairly new, you know? They didn't have all that business because, you know, there's big competition between the other two outfits. And you know, the other two outfits was wanting George to fail. That way, you know, they got the monopoly.

So, you know, that's why inspections are, you know, far in between because, you know, there are times when they were lucky to maybe fly maybe 2, 3 hours a week, whereas the other operators, you know, they're flying at least 8 hours a day, you know, 7 days a week. So, you know, business for the operation, you know, it was sporadic. You know, they have their good days and they have the days where it was hardly nothing.

So as far as I could see, within the last month or so, it seemed like their business was picking up. And you know, I was just like good. You know, at least they're moving along from where they were before.

Q. You mentioned Jerome early on, the pilot for this aircraft. Did you know him fairly well?

A. Yeah. I took a liking to him. You know, he was young. You know, he had years way ahead of him, you know? I'm 63, and I've been in aviation for over 45 years. And I've seen a lot of young pilots come and go, you know?

So, you know, as far as losing people, I've been there. You know, I worked for Transair. And this was back in -- I think it was '87, '88. He had his first fatality on the Big Island. And that pilot I knew quite well, too. He was only 27 years old. And you know, to see something like that happen, right, you know, it's hard for me. It's really hard.

Q. I understand.

A. Like, you know, people ask me, I tell them I'm holding my own. This is where it's at. I've seen it before and, you know, to see it again, you know, it really hurts.

Q. Was he the only one flying this aircraft regularly?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you see anything unusual about the way he flew the aircraft?

A. As far as I'm concerned, he was a pretty good stick. You know, he was knowledgeable. From what I hear, he was from Florida and he flew, I guess, King Airs over there. I don't know for what company but, you know, he had experience in the King Air.

MR. BASILE: Okay.

BY MR. SWAIM:

Q. Okay. Continuing on with that thought, just let me -- as far as Jerome and his flying, can you describe what's going on with the displaced threshold? And I understand these guys try and turn toward the ocean to get out from over the houses. Can you describe how they're doing their takeoffs and landings?

A. Okay. Usually they would do their takeoff, you know, not only -- you know, there are times when people would be in a hurry. You know, I'm not saying OPC, but the other outfits. And they would do a downwind takeoff, which, you know, for me, that's a no-no. You will taxi to the end. Because you can get into a lot of trouble when you do something like that.

But other than that, they followed the rules. The takeoffs were normal. Usually about from what I could see -- I went down there, you know, where I saw by the fence. Usually they would do their turnout in that area after they'd takeoff. They would do their turnout over the ocean.

Q. OPC?

A. Yeah, OPC and all the other operators.

Q. Okay.

A. That's standard. So more or less, it was a standoff takeoff procedures as far as I could see.

Q. Okay.

A. They're always doing a left turnout.

Q. Always doing a left turnout toward the ocean?

A. Towards the ocean especially if the drop zone is active. You don't want to be nowhere near the drop zone because the other operators could be dropping already. So, you know, they would, as soon as possible, do the turnout over the ocean.

Q. Okay. That initial turn, were any of them more -- I don't know -- sharp or steeply banked or aggressive than any others?

A. Usually they would do a gradual turn.

Q. When you say "they," which "they"? I'm sorry.

A. OPC.

Q. Okay.

A. They would do a gradual turnout and head out over the ocean. And a lot of the other operators are the same way. You know, they would do a gradual turnout to keep away from the drop zone.

Q. Okay. You mentioned other accidents that you've been involved with. What about accidents at Dillingham?

A. That's the first one.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. All of the other ones was, you know, related to operator companies that I worked for, you know, on the south ramp at Honolulu International like Transair, Alpine Air.

Q. Okay. Sorry. I don't write that fast. Alpine Air and Transair, are you saying?

A. Alpine Air, they're a outfit --

Q. No, no, the other accidents were with Alpine Air and --

A. Alpine Air we had one, and the other company I worked for, Transair.

Q. Okay.

A. You know, they had one also.

Q. Okay. All right. And you already told me that when you were working with Alpine Air -- and as far as director of maintenance, how many employees did you have or how many did the airline have?

A. I had at least 22 mechanics --

Q. Oh.

A. -- that worked under me. And I more or less trained them about aircraft systems on the Beech 99s, 1900s. A lot of them already had PT6 experience because the majority of them were part-time mechanics. I maybe had, well, maybe six full-time mechanics. But the part-time would do the swing shift, and then I had a grave shift, because the operation was more or less 24 hours. So that's why I needed three shifts.

Q. That makes sense. Okay. Do you remember how many airplanes you had then, that you had --

A. Let me see. I had 14.

Q. Okay.

A. Which would be seven 99, Beech 99s, and seven Beech 1900s.

Q. Okay. You've already -- between our prior talk and what you've said with these guys, you've already got through most of my questions. One from when we were talking the other day that I had was, you know, when I look at the log, I don't see a whole lot that's in there. There's -- well, let's open it. What the heck?

A. Yeah, it was very limited, like I said, you know, as far as doing maintenance other than the inspection that was due, you know. That was it.

Q. So -- right. Okay, you've answered one of my questions, why there's 100-hour and then phases.

A. Yeah, because I was told by Pat Garcia to do the Beech maintenance program.

Q. Yeah.

A. Inspection program.

Q. Yeah. You had me confused as to why --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- there was 100-hour thrown in there.

A. Right.

Q. So you got it. Cool. And then, so what I don't see in here, especially if this is a part 91 airplane, is anything as far as continually, like, oil changes, oil inspections. You mentioned dressing the prop and lubricating?

A. Right.

Q. So where would those be?

A. The --

Q. Oil changes and so forth?

A. Like, oil changes?

Q. Yeah.

A. Other than filter changes, never have done an oil change.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. I recommended that we do an oil change, but you know, it's one of those things.

Q. So you never did an oil change in this plane. Okay. But you did do filters?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. Fuel filter and oil filter on the aircraft, on the engines.

Q. Okay. I'm pretty sure I know the answer to this, but I'm going to ask it. So where are those documented? Those are documented --

A. In the inspection sheet.

Q. That's what I was expecting you to say. Okay. The sheets. All right. And what about minor stuff like dressing the props, lubricating or --

A. Usually, you know, that was like a routine thing. There were times when the, I guess, you know, the helpers -- you know, there were skydivers over there. There are times when they would take care of that, you know, lubing, you know, greasing the landing gear, stuff like that.

As I was saying, I was mainly there to do more or less the heavier maintenance stuff. The small stuff like that, compressor rinses, you know, the greasing, you know, they would do it every so often. But usually even if they did it the week before, if I had the aircraft on Tuesday, I would go ahead and do it again.

Q. Okay.

A. So that was part of their procedure, more or less.

Q. Okay. But it doesn't sound like you actually needed to work on this airplane every Tuesday?

A. No, not every Tuesday did I work on it.

Q. Oh, okay. See, originally, I was under the impression you worked on this airplane every Tuesday.

A. No.

Q. It was your chance to go through it.

A. You know, if I could work on it on Tuesday, I would work on it on Tuesday. Sometimes, you know, I wouldn't work on it, was because of weather. And basically, you know, we're talking about rain, stuff like that. We didn't have a hangar, you know, to put it in. You know, everything was done on the ramp.

Q. Okay. So when you work on the airplane, do you drive up with your truck with tools in the back, or car, whatever?

A. I would hand-carry the tools, you know, my tools, because where the aircraft parked you have a hangar in front of there, then there's another hangar in the back that belongs to Honolulu Soaring Club.

Q. Okay.

A. And that's where I keep all my equipment.

Q. Okay.

A. So it's just a short walk out to the aircraft.

Q. Oh, okay. That's what I was wondering, is if you just kept your stuff in your truck or car and drove from your house?

A. No, no, no, no, no. You know, what I do down at the Oahu's, you know, the soaring club, you know, like I said, I'm building an L-19 up for them.

Q. Right.

A. And that's where I keep all of my tools.

Q. At Honolulu Soaring Club or Oahu Soaring Club?

A. Honolulu.

Q. Okay. All right.

A. That's the glider outfit over there.

Q. Okay.

A. So all my tools are there, and it's a short walk out to the aircraft.

Q. Yeah. There are a couple of broke L-19s out behind the tower.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Is one of those the ones you're building up?

A. Well, no, there's one in the hangar.

Q. Oh, there's a third one?

A. Yeah. There's a third one, and usually all those L-19s, you know, they got all banged up because the ground moved --

Q. Right.

A. -- or flipped over, and stuff like that.

MR. HOOKEY: Yeah, there's one, like, at the very end of the T-hangars that's, like, the camel green? Is that the one that you're rebuilding?

MR. SELADIS: No. This one is in the hangar.

MR. HOOKEY: Oh, yeah, this is -- it's inside a T-hangar, but the door is open.

MR. SELADIS: Oh, no, no, no.

MR. HOOKEY: Oh, okay.

MR. SELADIS: No.

MR. SWAIM: You might be --

MR. SELADIS: That --

MR. SWAIM: I think you're thinking of the J3.

MR. SELADIS: That's a Piper. I know which one you're talking about.

MR. HOOKEY: Okay.

MR. SELADIS: Yeah.

MR. SWAIM: It's a J3 -- actually, an L whatever it was.

MR. SELADIS: Yeah.

MR. SWAIM: Yeah, I was looking at it; drooling at it.

BY MR. SWAIM:

Q. Okay. So the two broken ones sitting out behind the tower, those are parts planes?

A. They're due for disposal. They need to be cut up.

Q. Okay.

A. You know, there's no way you're going to put that back together, you know; whereas the other one that I'm working on, you know, it's in the hangar, and you know, there's -- you know, I just installed an engine on it that was overhauled, and basically, you know, putting it back together as time permits.

Q. Okay.

A. There are times that I don't work on -- like, say, at OPC, it's contract maintenance that I'm doing, other than my tools are there. There are times when I'm not there, you know, maybe for a week, you know, and I'm not working on their stuff. Same thing goes with OPC, you know? There are times when I don't get to them -- get to it for maybe a week or so, or maybe 2 weeks.

Q. Okay. Try and wrap this up. I don't have much left myself. So as far as this stuff -- this stuff -- what defines -- how do you define what goes in the log and what doesn't, dressing the props, you know, et cetera?

A. Well, dressing the props and the routine lubrication, flight controls, you know, landing gear, if I did put that in the log, that would be a lot of pages, you know.

Q. Okay.

A. However, if it was a 135 operation, that's a whole different ballgame, where everything is, you know, transcribed in the log for whatever you do on the aircraft. A lot of the operators at that field, you

know, part 91, it's like what do you mean I need to overhaul my engine? I'm part 91, you know, everything on condition, you know, that kind of stuff, but --

However, I didn't look at it that way with something that's, you know, complex, meaning, you know, like a turbine engine aircraft. I look at that as complex. Now when it comes to the L-19, you know, a lot of the operators, you know, say part 91, you know, we don't need to do that. Oh, okay, okay.

Q. Okay.

A. As far as 100-hour inspections go, you know, they usually tell me, oh, no, we just do annuals, you know, yearly annuals.

Q. On the L-19?

A. On the L-19s or, you know, a lot of the other operators, because a lot of times -- like that green plane you see out there, you know, he's lucky if he flies it maybe 2 hours a year.

Q. Wow.

A. Not flown that often.

Q. That's too bad. Okay. Pete asked you a minute ago about the pilots and trimming the airplane, the pilots flying the airplane coming back.

A. Um-hum.

Q. And I just wanted to go back to the trim for the rudder and the aileron.

A. Okay.

Q. And just, again, did the pilots -- did this airplane really fly nicely straight or did it normally fly with a little bit of trim? It was an old dog.

A. Depends, you know? Depending on weather conditions and whatever their loads were, you know, they would use a certain amount of trim. There was never an issue with flight controls, especially in the inspections. When I did the rig check and the stop checks on the flight controls and the trim checks, everything worked smoothly. There was no autopilot, so it was strictly manual trim on the aircraft. There was no electric trim. Everything was manual.

Q. Right. But as far as when you saw the airplane, was the trim -- you know, were the two knobs centered when you got the airplane or were they sometimes, you know, left one way or the other?

A. I can't recollect, but you know, there are times when they come in they might have a little bit of rudder trim cranked in. But I would think, you know, when they take off, right, procedure is to center the trims, you know, and then trim as necessary, you know, as you start climbing out.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. So as far as I could see, you know, there was no trim issues or flight control issues on the aircraft. That's another reason for keeping it lubricated, especially being left out in the open, salt. You wash the airplane, now you're washing all the lubricant off.

Q. Yeah.

A. And so forth.

Q. All right. Receipts for the parts. When you did get parts, filters, and such, did you -- what did you do with the receipts?

A. Those, you know, usually -- you know, George had an account down at the airport with that Gold Wing Aircraft Supply, and usually one of the guys would go down there and pick up the parts, you know. And it was just lately that I would go down to pick up hardware, because, you know, there was a lot of rusted hardware on the aircraft, meaning screws and stuff.

So last time I went there, I went to pick up screws and stuff, and 100-hour kits for the PT6, which is what they carried. You know, I made mention to them that, you know, I need to keep spares. You know, that way, if I need them, I had them, you know, and I didn't have to go down there.

But prior to me doing that last pick-up for filters -- filters, grease, hardware, screws, you know, some of the other guys down at OPC would go down there and pick up the stuff. If I recollect, I don't know who it was went down to Gold Wing and picked up the aircraft soap for the recovery wash.

Q. Okay. Last thing I was curious about, we understand there is a fellow who lives there on the airport somewhere, maybe behind the tower, who was helping. Do you know anything about him?

A. Behind the tower?

Q. Well, somewhere there in the airport, we understand there is a fellow who is staying there in the airport or living on the airport, and he would help as far as whatever needed to be done. I was wondering if that --

A. On the King Air?

Q. I believe so.

A. I don't know of nobody that lives on the airport because --

Q. Okay.

A. -- you can't live on the airport.

Q. Okay. It was -- you know what? We have heard so many rumors and gotten so many emails from the Ether from, you know --

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. You can guess.

A. You know, that's why I told you --

Q. You can guess.

A. That's why I told you, you know, this morning, since this incident happened, I'm keeping sterile. I'm keeping away from everybody, you know, because, you know, I know what it's like. Everybody is talking. Everybody is pointing fingers, you know, especially with the other outfits, you know, skydiving outfits. Everybody is talking. Everybody is -- rumors are flying all over the place.

Q. I'll bet.

A. And no, I've seen it happen before you, you know, on that field. Everybody talks about everybody, you know, and it's like people can't seem to just mind their own business. They'll do whatever they can to put you out of business, you know, by spreading malicious rumors. That's what it's like over there. That's why I usually keep to myself. You know, I stay out of company politics. You know, I just do what I'm supposed to do; that's it.

MR. SWAIM: Okay.

MR. HOOKEY: Can I ask a couple follow-ups if you're done?

MR. SWAIM: By all means. I'm done. I'm run out. My hand is run out.

MR. HOOKEY: I usually keep a cup of water --

MR. SWAIM: Yeah.

MR. HOOKEY: -- by the pen. If someone starts to go over temp, then I just --

MR. SWAIM: Yeah.

BY MR. HOOKEY:

Q. Where does this airplane spend the night? Is it down --

A. Right there out on the ramp.

Q. In front of OPC or is it down, down by the --

A. No, it's down by the tower.

Q. By the tower? Okay.

A. In the tie-down area. Nobody has a hangar to put their airplane in. Only the general aviation people, you know, they got hangars. There's nowhere to put up, you know, a Cessna Caravan or King Air in a hangar over there. The only one is that big hangar, you know, on the side of the tower, and he's got stuff in there. That's his hangar. But other than that, you know, there's no other covered hangar to hangar something that big.

Q. I was wondering about the no doors and all those T-hangars being so close to the ocean.

A. Well, some of them have doors.

Q. Some do, but not many.

A. Some don't.

Q. Yeah.

A. So yeah, you know, they -- everything is exposed to the elements. And, you know, changing hardware, you know, rusted screws, even if you paint them, they rust.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know, that's more or less a routine thing, changing out hardware.

Q. Yeah. You said that Gold Wing --

A. Gold Wing Aircraft Supply.

Q. Okay.

A. They're located right next to FSDO, right across the street from Flight Standards District Office.

Q. Does OPC have an account? Or is it listed under OPC or is it listed under George?

A. I think it's under Oahu -- yeah, it's under Oahu Parachute Center.

Q. Okay. Let me check here.

A. In fact, they're the only parts place on the airport.

BY MR. SWAIM:

Q. While he's looking, my first intro to the NTSB was when I watched somebody die in an airplane I worked on. And I didn't know -- I worked at Van Nuys (ph.) as a kid then. I was a fairly fresh A&P. This is like '76 maybe. I didn't know till years later what had happened to the guy. And so there was a lot of soul searching.

So the one thing I've always, you know, taken out of that one was when I'm doing a talk with somebody like you, to say are there any questions we can answer for you at this point? We can't tell you what we're seeing or finding, but as far as process or, you know, how this is going, is there anything we can answer for you to help you?

A. Pretty much, you know, I know what your jobs are, you know, to investigate and come to a conclusion.

Q. Yup.

A. You know, what caused it, to make recommendations so that it doesn't happen again. You know, I've worked with NTSB before, you know, when I was working on big equipment, you know, like

DC-4s, DC-3s.

Q. Oh, wow.

A. We had one go in a cane field and, you know, it was like how can a four-engine aircraft 5 miles short of the runway in Maui end up in a cane field?

Q. Yeah.

A. Well, the crew screwed up. Instead of going to auto-rich for the approach, they went to idle cutoff and shut down all four engines. And NTSB came down, and I had to take the props apart, and it was pretty interesting how you guys do your jobs.

Q. Okay.

A. Because they could tell more or less the propeller, when I split it together, you know, the shim plates, you know, when the prop hit, it would leave a gouge in it. So that would more or less tell them this was the prop pitch, you know? So that was back in the day, I mean, you know. No fatalities, but, you know, NTSB was there. So, you know, I've worked with you guys before.

Q. Okay.

A. So, you know --

Q. All right. Well, you have my contact?

A. Um-hum. Sure.

Q. Yeah. As you probably know, it's going to take a year for the report to come out on this.

A. I realize that. I do.

Q. Okay.

A. And, you know, I just -- you know, I'm feeling the tragedy, man, because, you know, I'm just like another one, man, you know? I've seen too many. You know, I've lost a lot of friends, you know, in aviation for one reason or another and, you know, this really doesn't sit well with me.

Q. Right.

A. That's why as much as possible, you know, I make sure the aircraft is airworthy. You know, if it's not, I don't care what you say, it ain't going.

Q. Okay.

A. So, you know, I don't know what happened, other than I mentioned to you the other day weather wasn't all that good, you know. And from what I can see, you know, he was doing a normal takeoff, aside from the left turnout. Now whether he had an engine problem -- if he got an engine problem, especially in the twin, go straight. You roll it to the dead engine, you're going to stall out and you're going to crash. Now I don't know just by looking at that, I don't know what transpired.

Q. Well, okay. Curious, then. You know where this accident -- where the airplane wound up, right, where it wound up along the fence?

A. I saw it. I saw it.

Q. Okay. So if he normally turns --

A. Left.

Q. Left? And they try and go over that beach area, any thoughts why the airplane is where it is?

A. Well, other than that, other than -- like I said, I don't know what the weather conditions were. The winds were all over the place that day. That's why the glider outfit shut down. And --

Q. Okay.

A. I don't know whether the other skydive outfits, you know, called it a day because of the winds. I can only guess. Like I said, when I left around maybe 1:30 in the afternoon, 1:30, 2 o'clock -- you know, the glider operation, they shut down around 10:30 because of the winds. Okay.

OPC, they did a couple loads, and so did the other operators. And then they got down around maybe 10:30, 11 o'clock, and parked the airplane, told me they were going to wash it later on after they come back from lunch. And when I left the field, I saw them down at the wash rack washing the aircraft. And that's the last I saw. And as far as I'm concerned, you know, they were done for the day.

Q. You just made another question. I want to finish -- they were at the wash rack.

A. That's in front of that big hangar.

Q. Okay. You've talked about the bleed valve sticking and doing their wash --

A. Usually a recovery wash took care of that.

Q. Right.

A. But when I had that happen before, you know, I did a couple -- well, one or two recovery washes, and usually that took care of the problem.

Q. Okay.

A. But, you know, last time I did that was last year.

Q. Okay. Here's where my concern is, or my wonder -- that's a better word -- my wonder. So the folks there at OPC who were there that day, none of them were mechanics, right?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. No, only one, you know, that had any documentation was the pilot, Jerome.

Q. Okay. Oh, okay, okay.

A. But he wasn't a mechanic. But a lot of the outfits that I know before, you know, doing skydive operations or even had a PT6, you know, aircraft with a PT6, they would delegate that responsibility to the pilot to do the compressor rinses and the compressor washes with the soap.

Q. Okay. I have not heard that one. Where I was going with my thought -- that was excellent, by the way -- where I was going with my thought was, so if none of these folks were pilots, what could they do in a rinse to screw up the engine?

A. Well, basically, this is -- you know, the pilot, you know, usually they put the wash ring on, and then, you know, they got the water rinse rig, which is more or less like a fire bottle, you know, a water fire bottle, you know, adapted with an air hose. So you know, that's how they would inject the water or the soap.

So the pilot would get in the aircraft and motor the engine for 30 seconds. And then he'd motor it again to blow it out. Okay. Now, what's recommended -- and I don't know whether they did this -- is after you do the rinse or the recovery wash and you're rinsing, you're supposed to start the engine up, you know, to make sure you dry it out. Now whether they did that, I don't know.

Q. Now you have a lot -- a lot more than me -- of PT6 experience. If they did not start the engine, if they did not rinse it well enough after the soap, how would that go?

A. Well, I mean, you know, you need to get all the soap out, because if you don't, you know, the soap, being a little bit more denser than water, you know, the bleed valve is right there in the engine inlet. On this model, on the Dash 20, the bleed valve is inside the inlet. You got the inlet screen and then you got the compressor section. The bleed valve is mounted inside.

The other PT6s, usually the bleed valves are external, you know, on the side of the engine or on the bottom of the engine. This particular bleed valve is in the compressor inlet. To get to it, you need to pull the screen, the inlet screen. That's why it's very important.

Like I told, like I told them, right, I told them you keep on rinsing it until you got -- you can't see any more soap coming out. But by all means, don't exceed the duty cycle of the starter, because you can burn the starter out, especially if you got to rinse about four or five times to make sure you got no soap. Other than that, they would have to pull the -- in order to do the rinse, you have a wash ring that goes over the screen, and then you have another PT6 fixture that hooks up to everything.

Q. Yup.

A. You got to pull the inboard -- on the left engine, it's the inboard igniter. On the right engine, it's the outboard igniter, igniter plug --

Q. Wait, why do you have to pull the igniters?

A. You got to pull the igniter plug because that fixture goes in to wash the T-wheel.

Q. Oh, I'm with you now.

A. Yeah.

Q. Yeah.

A. The other fixture is for the compressor blades. So, you know, both units are shooting either soap or water into the engine. Other than that, you know, once you're done with that, you do the blow-out, put the igniter plug back in and hook up the high-tension lead.

MR. SWAIM: Okay. I don't have any more questions. Do you guys?

MR. HOOKEY: Well, I figured you were reading my notes here because you asked my questions.

MR. SWAIM: Hey, I had a whole bunch, too, and you know, I mean, so between the other day and today, I'm good.

MR. SELADIS: With me, I'm pretty extensive on the PT6. It's a bulletproof engine.

MR. SWAIM: Yeah.

MR. SELADIS: You know?

BY MR. SWAIM:

Q. Well, that's why I was asking --

A. And, you know, my thought is could we have been coming up on a premature hot section? I don't know. But, you know, like I said, me and the owner discussed it -- when was that -- several months ago about whether I can do it on wing. And I told him, yeah, I've done them on the wing before. I just need the, you know, the hot section kit, the tools to do it, because I did them before. And I told him send me one of your mechanics from the mainland to help me with this. Other than that, that's what was discussed several months ago with the owner/operator. That's the only thing I can think of, you know. Airplane ran good.

Q. How did you know George? How did George get to know you?

A. Well, George used to work for Pacific Skydiving.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. You know, the next-door outfit that they --

Q. Yeah.

A. They had a parting out, George and Guy Banal. You know, they had a parting out, and then George quit, and then 2 years later, George decided he's going to open up another drop zone. And a

year later, I guess, you know, he found this King Air, leased it; you know, they brought it over, and he proceeded to start operations.

Q. Okay. Does George have other flight business over on the mainland?

A. No, he doesn't.

Q. Okay. So you must have met him when he was working at Pacific?

A. Yeah, Pacific Skydiving Center.

Q. Ah, okay.

A. See, I was doing contract maintenance for them also.

Q. Yeah, you mentioned --

A. And at one point, the owner, Guy Banal, he had a King Air. He had a King Air 100.

Q. Oh.

A. And I did maintenance on that aircraft.

Q. Okay.

A. And then later on, it wasn't cost effective, so he went out and bought the, you know, Texas Turbine Conversion Caravans, you know, with the Garretts on them.

Q. Yeah. All right.

MR. SWAIM: While he's scribbling, you have any thoughts? No? All right.

BY MR. SWAIM:

Q. You live right up there by the airport, right, Dillingham?

A. No. I live by this airport.

Q. Oh, so that's a drive.

A. You know, the main airport.

Q. Yeah.

A. I drive 34 miles one way.

Q. Yup.

A. Or 68 miles round trip when I go up to Dillingham. That's why, you know, with the price of fuel and with what I'm driving, right, that's a pretty good chunk of change every month, you know, when you got to fill up your car every week. So --

Q. Yeah.

A. You know, that's why I do contract maintenance. Like I said, I'm not there all the time, you know? If I'm needed, I'm there; if not, you know, I'm not.

Q. Got it. Got it.

MR. SWAIM: I'm done.

MR. HOOKEY: I'm done.

MR. BASILE: Finished.

MR. SWAIM: Cool. Are you done?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm done.

MR. SELADIS: But other than that, you know --

BY MR. SWAIM:

Q. Okay.

A. A lot of these outfits on that side of the, you know, on that side of the island, skydive, you know?

Q. Yup.

A. And even some of the general aviation people, they're bare bones, you know? They're not going to spend any more than they have to.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know, as far as, you know, I see some owner/operators, they're not mechanics, you know, and they're working on their airplanes because, you know, it's an expense that, you know, they don't want to shell out having somebody work on their stuff.

So, you know, I'm not trying to -- you know, saying that, you know, George or any of the other operators are cutting costs, but you know, that's their problem. That's why I only do contract maintenance as required; that's it. Because you know, they're looking at expenses, you know. And, you know, twin-engine airplane, that's a big expense. You got fuel.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know? And you got your labor force, you know, your employees to pay. That's why I'm not an employee.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know, I would have loved to have been full-time, you know, for the outfit, but he couldn't pay me a full-time wage.

Q. Just curious -- you know, I don't want to keep dragging this on, but --

A. No.

Q. Would George and his operation be typical or different in some way?

A. Typical.

Q. George is typical for a jump operation?

A. Typical jump operation, you know. I would say the only one that really has a good operation going on over there that hangars their airplane every day is Skydive Hawaii, because they have hangar -- you know, the airplanes don't park down at Dillingham Field. Every day it goes back to Honolulu.

Q. Oh, really?

A. And it's hangared. It's in the hangar. But yeah, I mean, you know, it's a typical skydive operation. And like I said, you know, George has tried to make it work, you know, despite not having all that much business. But for the last month or two, it seemed like business was picking up for him and, you know, it's, you know, real tragic that this happened because I would have loved to have seen George make it.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know.

Q. All right. Well, I can't thank you enough for driving over and visiting with us.

A. Oh, that's no problem. I mean, you know, I want to know what happened also.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know? Everybody is speculating. You know, everywhere I go where people are watching

the news, you know, they're speculating, and I just like -- you don't know who you're sitting next to.

Q. Right.

A. But, you know, I just -- hey, you're open to speculation. Okay. Fine. But that's why I'm here, you know. You're interviewing me. I'm telling you more or less, right?

Q. Yup.

A. I don't want to see this happen again either, you know.

Q. Absolutely.

A. It's a great loss, you know. They were good people, you know, the crew, you know, they were good.

Q. Yeah.

A. And you know -- I don't know. Maybe after this, it's time for me to really retire. I have no idea. You know, I've just seen too much --

Q. Yeah, I hear you.

A. -- in my career.

Q. I hear you. Yup.

A. You know?

Q. Yeah, all right. Well, you have my contact information.

A. Um-hum.

Q. And we have yours.

A. Right.

Q. Hopefully, there won't be another need to talk to you, but you never know.

A. Okay. Well, you know, you got my number, so --

Q. I sure do.

A. -- just give me a call.

Q. Yup.

A. And --

Q. Don't lose your phone this time.

A. No. My other phone, I did a fishing/camping, and I was out on the reef, and I had my phone and it fell on the reef. And I was just like, oh, okay. Well, I'm not going to go all the way home to get my other phone.

Q. Yeah.

A. So, you know, being fishing/camping on the other side of the island, I didn't know what was going on until I got back Sunday night, and I was just, like --

Q. Oh, man.

A. I was stunned, you know?

Q. Yeah.

A. And my other phone, you know, it's practically destroyed. I can't retrieve, you know, messages, you know, missed phone calls. You know, that's why luckily I had a backup phone at home. And then, you know, I went down to the field on Monday. The field was under a lockdown and, you know, I was

just like -- I know the routine. So I went straight to FSDO and dropped off the logs.

Q. Thanks for doing that.

A. Because that's what everybody is looking for, the logs. That's why -- I know the routine, you know? I went straight to FSDO.

Q. Yup. Absolutely. No, we appreciate it, because we were, you know, wondering.

A. Yeah, you know, everybody -- you know, I can't imagine, you know, something like this happened -- like I said, I know the routine. You know, when I was with Transair we had an incident up in Kamuela, where -- it's pitch black out there. The pilot let the loader fly, because the loaders there could build time, and it was a Cessna 402.

And that night, they took off. I could already tell Merlin had the Bird, right? So as soon as he took off, brought the gear up, cut the landing lights, landing lights retracted back in the tip tanks, and he gave the Bird to the loader. And the loader banked it over hard because they were empty.

Q. At night?

A. And it hit the mound right by the VOR. He was in a right turn. Took the tank off, the tip tank. All he felt, I can imagine, was a shudder, and he's at takeoff power. He got no reference outside whatsoever, and he went into a flat spin, and at least, I would say, four or five times before the aircraft came to a rest backwards.

And, you know, that was the first fatality that this company ever experienced. I had it happen before, so -- you know, another company. So, you know, that was a lesson learned, and that was the only incident that company has ever had. And, you know, that was a bare-bones operation, too, but you know, that was years ago. Now, you know, you look at Transair --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- down at ramp, he's flying jet equipment. So, you know, he's come a long ways. And I helped build that company. But you know, that was his first tragedy.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know? And you know, it was, you know, it was an eye-opener for him. So it was like this is what you don't do, you know? The loader is not supposed to be flying that airplane because, number one, the pilot is the only one that's got all the --

Q. Flight instruments.

A. -- flight instruments, right?

Q. Yup.

A. That other panel has nothing.

Q. Right.

A. Right? So, you know, it's one of those things, lessons learned, but you know, a lot of outfits lose lives because of that.

Q. Yup.

A. You know, another one was a couple years ago was Skydive Kauai. You know, he was operating 182 --

Q. Okay.

A. -- and 206s for jump, and they had an incident where the airplane took off and caught fire and crashed. So, you know, that's another one, you know? I used to work for the owner over there at, you know, Skydive Kauai, you know, about 2 years prior to that happening. And, you know, that was another bare-bones operation that, you know, just maintenance required; that's it. Don't do anything

else.

So, you know, owner/operators, you know, they need to come up to speed, you know, as far as really maintaining their equipment.

MR. HOOKEY: And I think everybody believes it's not going to happen to them until it happens to them.

MR. SELADIS: Until it happens to them. And you know, it's one of those things, you know. That's why, you know, with the guy that I work for, contract work, Honolulu Soaring Club, right, it's like -- you know, he's like, no, you don't need to do that. I tell him, no, you need to. You know, you need to do oil changes. You know, you need to let me pull the filters, right? This, that, you know, we need to look at the airplane hardware, you know, corrosion, you know, all kinds of stuff. So, you know, I keep them flying, make sure his equipment is airworthy; that's it.

MR. SWAIM: Well, we appreciate, you know, that sentiment. We've seen enough, too, all three of us, so -- cool.

MR. SELADIS: So anyway, yeah.

MR. SWAIM: Thanks.

MR. SELADIS: You know, if you guys need me again, just -- you got my number. Give me a call.

MR. SWAIM: We do. We do.

MR. SELADIS: For now --

MR. SWAIM: Thanks, man.

MR. HOOKEY: Thank you very much.

MR. SWAIM: Yeah.

Danielle VanRiper

Transcriber