



WITNESS INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

Structural Technologies/VSL

Miami, FL

HWY18MH009

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE COLLAPSE

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MIAMI, FLORIDA

* Accident No.: HWY18MH009

MARCH 15, 2018

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Interview of: RAMOY GOULBOURNE

VSL Structural Technology

Fort Lauderdale, Florida

Monday,
April 9, 2018

APPEARANCES:

KENNETH BRAGG, Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DAN WALSH, Senior Highway Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

REGGIE HOLT, Senior Bridge Engineer
Federal Highway Administration

PETER HERMAN, Attorney
Herman Law Group

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I N T E R V I E W

(2:05 p.m.)

MR. BRAGG: Today is Monday, April 9, 2018. It's about 2:05 p.m. We are in Fort Lauderdale, Florida near the offices of OSHA.

My name is Kenneth Bragg. I'm an investigator with the Office of Highway Safety, National Transportation Safety Board.

To my left --

MR. WALSH: Dan Walsh with the National Transportation Safety Board.

MR. HOLT: Reggie Holt, Federal Highway Administration.

MR. BRAGG: State your name. If you will, state and spell your first and last name, please.

MR. GOULBOURNE: Ramoy Goulbourne. It's R-A-M-O-Y, G-O-U-L-B-O-U-R-N-E.

MR. BRAGG: Okay. And counsel, if you will?

MR. HERMAN: My name is Peter Herman, H-E-R-M-A-N.

MR. BRAGG: What organization are you with?

MR. HERMAN: The Herman Law Group.

MR. BRAGG: Okay. Thanks.

INTERVIEW OF RAMOY GOULBOURNE

BY MR. BRAGG:

Q. So I'm going to start off just asking just a little bit about your background with the company. What's your current role with the company?

A. I'm Tech 1.

1 Q. You're Tech 1? Can you explain a little bit, just in
2 layman's terms, what that means?

3 A. It's basically like being a laborer. You know, we generally
4 do everything that the company does.

5 Q. Okay. And how long have you been with the company?

6 A. Seven months.

7 Q. Seven months? And what's the name of the company? What's
8 the name of the company?

9 A. VSL Structural Technology.

10 Q. Okay. And just describe some of the, some of the tasks that
11 you perform for this company.

12 A. I mean, we basically do most of like cable work, post-
13 tensioning. Most of the work that I've done for the company is
14 mostly just the repairing cables. I worked on bridges, you know,
15 numerous times with my previous supervisor, which is in the
16 hospital now. Most of those bridgeworks are out of town, like in
17 Orlando and stuff.

18 Q. And how long have you performed that function with this
19 company?

20 A. I've been doing it on and off. Because as I said, they do
21 mostly cable work, cable repair. So it's just like one specific
22 crew that does bridgework, which is, you know, us. Me, Kevin
23 (ph.), the guy that died and another guy from the company. It's
24 just a small group of us that normally works on the bridges.

25 Q. Okay. And so how long -- how many years -- how many months

1 have you done --

2 A. No, I just started with the company. Seven months I've been
3 doing it.

4 Q. Seven months? Had you worked for another company doing --

5 A. No.

6 Q. -- the same thing previously? Okay. And what did you do
7 before this?

8 A. I was a security -- in New York.

9 Q. Okay. And what type of training did you have for the job?

10 A. Job?

11 Q. Yeah, with this job.

12 A. In terms of --

13 Q. Did you go to a training program, an apprentice program?

14 A. No.

15 Q. No?

16 A. We basically do hands-on training on going on the jobs.

17 Q. Okay. And let's talk about the project, being the FIU
18 bridge. When did you become involved in that project?

19 A. I've been doing that project ever since I started with the
20 company. That's the first project I've -- that's the first field
21 project that I went on when I started with the company. When they
22 were doing the ductworks and all that.

23 Q. Okay.

24 MR. BRAGG: I'm going to let Mr. Walsh going ahead and --

25 MR. WALSH: Okay, thank you. Dan Walsh with NTSB.

1 BY MR. WALSH:

2 Q. Just describe -- did you do any of the calibration work --

3 A. No.

4 Q. -- for the restressing?

5 A. That's up to my supervisor. So we mostly -- we do the set-
6 ups and stuff, but that's up to my supervisor doing the stress
7 log, stress work. And, you know, he works a lot doing the stress
8 logs and stuff.

9 Q. Okay. So you don't actually do the calibration --

10 A. No.

11 Q. -- work. Okay. Can you describe specifically what you
12 generally do when you, when you help the seasoned --

13 A. I mean, we normally, like -- just, like, the pumps and the
14 rams and the gauges and stuff. We normally set up that until our
15 supervisor gets there. We don't move forward doing any stressing
16 or anything unless, you know, the supervisor is there, which -- he
17 does that part of the work. We just do the set-ups and stuff.
18 And you know, he moves on with the stressing.

19 Q. Can you describe in detail how you set up the pumps and
20 gauges?

21 A. I mean, the gauges that -- the pump has, like, two little
22 valve things where you hooked on those two hoses, along with the,
23 with the gauge. You hook that on to the, to the pump. The pump
24 has two little valves too where you hook it on to. And once you
25 do that, we get electricity from a generator, which -- you know,

1 any electricity source that could power the pump or whatever. And
2 then we had a remote that, you know, that's how you operate it,
3 the pump.

4 Q. Okay. So the electricity, is that -- how is that provided to
5 the gauges?

6 A. I mean, the electricity is from the generator. We normally
7 plug in, plug in an extension from the generator. We run it up
8 there. We hook it onto the pump. The pump has, like, a little --
9 it has a wire on it that we attach to the, to the extension. That
10 gives the power.

11 Q. Is it -- do you also look at the number that's on the gauge
12 to make sure that it's the correct gauge to that --

13 A. Yeah. Yeah.

14 Q. -- calibration? Is that, is that --

15 A. Yeah. You have to have the correct gauge for the correct
16 ram. Has the things that's BSR (ph.). It's 0-1-7. And that's --
17 the same thing applies for the, for the gauge. The gauge has to
18 be the same number, and the pump has to be the same number.

19 Q. Okay. Is that your responsibility?

20 A. No, that's not my responsibility. But we will often make
21 sure that it's accurate.

22 Q. Okay. Is it your responsibility to make sure the numbers are
23 correct --

24 A. From the gauge --

25 Q. -- and agree?

1 A. -- and the -- right.

2 Q. Okay. So you look at that.

3 A. Right.

4 Q. And is that your -- does the seasoned calibration individual,
5 does he double-check that?

6 A. Right. That's Kevin. He normally makes sure, like, if the
7 gauges that we bring out before we start anything, he'll make sure
8 that, you know, we have the right gauge for the right, for the
9 right ramp.

10 Q. Okay. I'm just going to ask you a few questions on the
11 initial tensioning that was done to the main span offsite, when
12 the falsework was underneath the bridge. Were you part of that
13 initial tensioning?

14 A. Before --

15 Q. Before it was moved.

16 A. Before it was moved?

17 Q. Yeah.

18 A. No, I wasn't there. That was done the -- yeah, I was a part
19 of all of the, all of the tensioning that was being done. But I
20 wasn't there when they detensioned it. When they move it across
21 the street and then detension it, I wasn't there that day. But I
22 was a part of all of the, all of the other ones that day. They
23 tensioned and grouted and stuff.

24 Q. Okay. So you were present during the initial tensioning that
25 was done offsite --

1 A. Right. Right, right.

2 Q. -- back in January and February --

3 A. Right, I --

4 Q. -- in 2018?

5 A. I don't remember the exact time, but yeah, I was a part of
6 all of the tension that done.

7 Q. Okay. And your -- what you described as your setting up the
8 pumps and gauges, you were -- you did, you did that.

9 A. Right. Right.

10 Q. Okay. After the initial tensioning that was done back in
11 January/February of 2018, did you notice any cracks --

12 A. No.

13 Q. -- on the main span --

14 A. No.

15 Q. -- after that was done?

16 A. Everything was fine. All the tension that we did was good.
17 We did grouting and everything after that. We didn't notice any
18 crack. Because there was other work going on after all the
19 tension that's been done. Because we tensioned everything, and
20 then after that, we grout. So during that grouting process and
21 everything, we didn't notice any crack. Everything was fine when
22 we tensioned everything.

23 Q. Okay. Okay. Were you, were you possibly on the site
24 February 24? It's a Saturday. Saturday, February 24.

25 A. I don't remember which --

1 Q. Don't remember. Okay. Do you remember being on the site
2 before the move when it was offsite and hearing any loud popping
3 --

4 A. No.

5 Q. -- noise whatsoever on the structure at any time?

6 A. No. Like I said, there was no crack on the bridge when it
7 was offsite.

8 Q. Okay. Did you observe any anomalies or anything that looked
9 peculiar to you --

10 A. No.

11 Q. -- on the structure when -- either on the -- offsite or after
12 it was moved?

13 A. I mean when it was moved, we noticed that it, you know, that
14 it was cracked when it was moved. And my supervisor even noticed
15 me that it was -- there was cracks in it, you know, before -- that
16 was the Saturday when he, when he destressed them. Because he was
17 up in Orlando, and he had to come down to destress them once it
18 moves across the street. And that's when he noticed that there
19 was cracks in it. So when he came back up that Monday, which he
20 was still in Orlando, he told us -- he showed us pictures that,
21 you know, there was a lot of cracks at the base of that same
22 column. So while working up there the following week, you know,
23 we heard that we had to come down and stress back those two bars,
24 you know, so --

25 Q. And he -- you were not on -- this was something that he

1 showed you photographs of, right?

2 A. The cracks?

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. Yeah. He did.

5 Q. He showed you photos. And who was that person?

6 A. That was my supervisor, Kevin Hansen (ph.).

7 Q. Kevin Hansen. Okay. So you were not part of the
8 destressing.

9 A. No. I was up in Orlando when the distress happened.

10 Q. Okay. But you were present for the restressing of --

11 A. Right. Right.

12 Q. -- number 11 PT bar on Thursday, March 15?

13 A. Right.

14 Q. And when did you observe the cracks on that day: before the
15 destressing or after the destressing?

16 A. I mean, when you say after the destressing, you mean --

17 Q. No, I'm sorry. Restressing number 11.

18 A. Right. Restressing.

19 Q. I'm sorry.

20 A. I noticed it the same day when, you know, we were trying to
21 get ready to start stressing them back up. There was a manlift,
22 green manlift, over on the side where we were going to work on.
23 And that manlift, it could only hold two people. So I was one of
24 the first person, with my supervisor, who went up in the manlift.
25 He dropped me off up there with the, with the pump and the gauges

1 and everything, with the hoses and everything that's going to hook
2 up, (indiscernible) hoses. And he came back down to pick up the
3 rest of, the rest of the guys, because there was five of us. So
4 he had to be going back and forth down there to get everyone.

5 So when I was going up there, he said, you know, I'm going to
6 show you the cracks that I was showing you in the pictures, you
7 know, when I came back to Orlando. And when he -- when I was
8 going up, he was showing me the cracks that was at the base. And
9 I was like, man, those are some huge cracks.

10 Q. And where were those located?

11 A. Those were located at the base of where -- of the same two
12 columns where the bars were inside of. I think that's number 11.

13 Q. Number 11.

14 A. Right.

15 Q. And how would you characterize the cracks that you saw?

16 A. They were, they were like right around it. Like a
17 semicircle. They were cracked, but you could -- they weren't,
18 like, burst. You could just see them. You know like when you
19 have a crack, but the concrete is not removed or anything. You
20 just see. The cracks were just right there. And you know, there
21 wasn't any difference with it. And there were just big cracks
22 going across that column.

23 Q. How wide would you characterize the cracks?

24 A. They weren't wide. They were just like a little bit open,
25 and that, and that was it.

1 Q. Did you observe any cracks after the restressing of number
2 11, or did you observe those cracks propagated or enlarged after
3 the restressing was done?

4 A. I mean --

5 Q. Did you see any change to the cracks?

6 A. What do you mean? When we were stressing them up?

7 Q. Right.

8 A. We couldn't notice any crack, because we was at the, we were
9 at the top. So you know, when we finished doing all the
10 stressing, we couldn't even take any notice of any crack because
11 we were on the top. And then everything just came down. We had
12 no idea if there was any crack or anything.

13 Q. Right. There was no opportunity to come down --

14 A. Come down and look at it.

15 Q. And come down and look at it.

16 A. But there was one person beneath the level that was, you
17 know, paying attention to what was going on or if there was any
18 significant change while we were doing the stressing. There was
19 one individual that was on the second level.

20 Q. Did he say anything --

21 A. No.

22 Q. -- to you?

23 A. He didn't get a chance to say anything.

24 Q. He didn't say anything.

25 A. No.

1 Q. He didn't have a chance to say anything or have a chance to
2 communicate with you whatsoever.

3 A. The stressing was completed when it fell down. Because we
4 were going back and forth on those two bars. Because they wanted
5 us to stress them small kips at a time, and we had 10 rounds to do
6 it. So we completed 10 rounds on the top bar, going around to the
7 second bar to complete the same -- the 10 rounds. As soon as we
8 finished to the stress log and I took off the ratchet -- because
9 you -- I use a ratchet to turn it. As I took off the ratchet, it
10 all came down.

11 Q. So where were you standing when the stressing was taking
12 place?

13 A. I was standing to the side from where you see that, where you
14 see that -- where the, where the bars are holding in place at the,
15 at the concrete, I was on the other side.

16 Q. And so you assisted -- who was actually doing the calibration
17 on this?

18 A. My supervisor.

19 Q. And what's his name?

20 A. Kevin Hansen.

21 Q. Kevin Hansen was actually doing the --

22 A. Right.

23 Q. -- calibration. And so you were assisting Kevin.

24 A. Right. So me -- every time he comes up with the, with the
25 remote, you got to time him. Every time he pulls on the bar, I

1 time him. Come up on the bar, I time him. So you know, I was
2 assisting with timing.

3 Q. And how long before -- after restressing do you think it
4 collapsed?

5 A. Right away.

6 Q. Immediately.

7 A. Right after I take off the ratchet.

8 Q. It collapsed.

9 A. It collapsed. Yeah. That's the last thing I remember,
10 taking off the ratchet.

11 Q. I'm just -- are you confident that, on the day of the
12 collapse, the gauge that was put on the calibration device was the
13 matching number?

14 A. Yeah. It was right.

15 Q. Okay. Okay.

16 A. Because I remember the number of the gauge, and I remember
17 the number of the ram.

18 Q. Okay. I'm just going to ask you, the maximum kip that was
19 applied was 280 kips.

20 A. I don't remember --

21 Q. You don't know.

22 A. No.

23 Q. Because that's not --

24 A. That's not --

25 Q. That's not part of your --

1 A. Yeah. No.

2 Q. Right. So you wouldn't know how much stress was put on the,
3 on the bar.

4 A. No.

5 Q. You wouldn't know that. Okay.

6 A. I just know we were going back and forth 10 times, you know,
7 on the bar.

8 Q. You would say approximately 10 times you went back, you went
9 back and forth?

10 A. We went back and forth. Right.

11 Q. Approximately 10 times.

12 A. It is 10 times.

13 Q. It is 10 times.

14 A. Right.

15 Q. Okay.

16 MR. WALSH: I have no further questions.

17 MR. BRAGG: Before we get to you, Reggie, I got a couple of
18 follow-up questions.

19 MR. HOLT: Sure.

20 BY MR. BRAGG:

21 Q. So just talk to me a little bit about the morning of the
22 collapse, and start with when you first got to work. Tell me what
23 happened that day.

24 A. I mean, we basically got to work the morning.

25 Q. About what time?

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sorry.

2 MR. GOULBOURNE: My supervisor, he got to work around after
3 9:00. Because he was leaving from Tampa. I got there in the
4 morning around 7:00. The other guy, which is Navarro, he came
5 down there around probably after 7:00 going on 8 o'clock. I don't
6 remember the exact time. But he had to pick up, like, the work
7 trucks and stuff to get the ram and all of that.

8 We parked over on the, on the side underneath the bridge,
9 because there was a lane closed off for us because we were going
10 to work there. It was one lane. So we parked in the lane
11 underneath the bridge.

12 BY MR. BRAGG:

13 Q. Who closed the lane?

14 A. I have no idea. The line was closed when we, when we got
15 there. So the crane was in, you know -- the operator was -- they
16 were waiting for us. We backed up the truck that Navarro was
17 driving, because he had the ram in the, in the back. We back it
18 up where the ram could get the -- where the crane could get the
19 ram. You know, they had to fly it up there, hooked onto the bar.

20 And we started getting everything ready. As I said, I was
21 the -- one of the first persons that was up on top. Because I was
22 getting everything set up until the other guy came up, which is
23 Navarro. So I was the first person up there with the, with the
24 equipment, then you know, Navarro came along to help me. And you
25 know, the other two inspectors came up, you know, after. Because

1 as I said, Kevin was going back and forth to get them.

2 You know, we get everything ready while the inspectors and,
3 you know, everybody was in place. We started, you know, moving on
4 with the stressing. They wanted us to do it in sequences, as I
5 said. They wanted us to go back and forth 10 times on it. We
6 stressed the first bar 10 times, you know, in small sequences.
7 Stressed the second bar, which was the last sequence to be 10.
8 And it came down.

9 Q. Okay. So you parked the pick-up truck underneath the bridge.

10 A. Right. The two trucks was under --

11 Q. Yeah, there were two trucks.

12 A. Right.

13 Q. So the one -- there was one in front of the manlift, right?

14 A. Right. That's the one that Navarro went for at the shop.

15 Q. Okay. So where were you in relationship to the truck? You
16 were, you were in the top canopy, correct?

17 A. Right, I was on top of it.

18 Q. But where? Were you closer to the truck?

19 A. More to the -- I was, I was away from the truck. So not to
20 the side where the truck was. I was on the other side. That was
21 on top.

22 Q. And where was Navarro?

23 A. He was standing beside me.

24 Q. He was standing beside you. And where was Kevin?

25 A. He was on the side to the truck.

1 Q. He was on the side with the truck?

2 A. He was on the side to the truck.

3 Q. To the truck.

4 A. Right.

5 Q. Was he on the canopy as well?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. He was on -- and where was, where was the last -- who was the
8 fourth worker?

9 A. It was three of us from the same company.

10 Q. Yeah, who was -- there was a fourth person from another
11 company. Where was, where was he standing?

12 A. He was standing on the other block, on the -- he was sitting.
13 He had the paper on the block. That's where he was taking all the
14 logs and stuff. And the other guy was on the opposite side facing
15 to the school.

16 Q. And Kevin operated the manlift?

17 A. Right.

18 Q. So before you got started mounting the bridge, did you guys
19 have a meeting and discuss, anything like that?

20 A. I mean, we didn't have a, we didn't have a discussion or
21 nothing about, you know, what we were going to do. Because we
22 basically know what's the procedure when we, when we got to work.

23 Q. Did anybody ever talk about closing the roadway? Did anyone
24 ever talk about closing the roadway?

25 A. No.

1 Q. No. And you said the roadway was already closed that
2 morning --

3 A. No, one lane. One lane.

4 Q. Yeah, I mean that one was already closed when you got there.

5 A. Right. Right.

6 Q. Were you present for the removal of the falsework?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Okay. Were you, were you present when it was originally
9 stressed?

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. And it -- so who was present for the first stressing that
12 wasn't present for the restressing?

13 A. I think it was, it was just two of us: me and Navarro. We
14 were the only ones that was up in Orlando when they destressed it.
15 My supervisor was the only one that came down here.

16 Q. Now I'm speaking of when it was originally stressed.

17 A. When it was originally stressed, it was me, Navarro and
18 Kevin.

19 Q. Okay. How about anyone from outside of VSL?

20 A. No.

21 Q. There was nobody else there.

22 A. It's just the inspectors are normally there when we, when we
23 doing the stress logs and stuff. When it's originally being
24 stressed.

25 Q. Was an, was an inspector there for the second time when they

1 restressed?

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. And who was that? Do you know?

4 A. It's normally the same inspectors that they normally use. I
5 think they're from -- I forgot the company that they are from, but
6 it's the same inspectors that's basically always there for the
7 job.

8 Q. Did you, did you feel anything before the collapse occurred?
9 Or did it just suddenly -- there wasn't --

10 A. There was no movement or anything, just --

11 Q. There was no warning, no sounds. Okay. And were you there
12 when the move took place?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Okay.

15 MR. WALSH: I don't have anything.

16 MR. BRAGG: Can I just add one follow-up?

17 MR. WALSH: Sure.

18 MR. BRAGG: Sorry.

19 BY MR. BRAGG:

20 Q. You mentioned in the initial stressing that there was an
21 inspector there --

22 A. Right.

23 Q. -- from either Bolton --

24 A. Right. I think that --

25 Q. -- Perez and -- or the Corranado [sic.] Group. They were

1 there during the initial stressing.

2 A. Right. They were always there.

3 Q. Right. And you don't know if they were there during the
4 destressing because you weren't there.

5 A. No, because I wasn't there. No.

6 Q. But was he there for the restressing --

7 A. Right.

8 Q. -- of number 11 on the day of the collapse?

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. There was someone?

11 A. There was an inspector on top of it.

12 Q. Do you know who the inspector was?

13 A. I don't remember, I don't remember who the inspector is. I
14 don't remember his name. I can't remember what company they're
15 from, but they're always there. They're always there whenever
16 we're doing any stressing.

17 Q. Okay. But you don't -- was he the same individual as the
18 initial stressing?

19 A. Right.

20 Q. He was the same individual?

21 A. It's always two inspectors that came there, but that day,
22 there was only one inspector that was on top of it.

23 Q. And you don't recall who that --

24 A. I don't remember --

25 Q. -- who that was?

1 A. -- who it is.

2 Q. Okay. Just, and the one follow-up question. On the
3 stressing that was done to number 11 on the day of the collapse,
4 was the stressing for the first bar, was that the top bar?

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. So that was done 10 times?

7 A. Right. That was completed.

8 Q. Okay. That was complete.

9 A. Right.

10 Q. And then the stressing to the second bar was done 10 times.

11 A. Was originally done 10 times, and then as soon as I took off
12 the ratchet, it came down.

13 Q. And that was to the bottom --

14 A. Right.

15 Q. -- the bottom bar. Okay.

16 MR. WALSH: I have no further questions.

17 MR. HOLT: Reggie Holt, Federal Highway.

18 BY MR. HOLT:

19 Q. So just to get the lay of the land here. So a stressing
20 team, it looks like it's made up typically of three people: a
21 supervisor, who was Kevin Hansen; yourself, which is a Tech 1 --

22 A. Right.

23 Q. And Navarro, was he a Tech 1 also, or a tech 2? Was there a,
24 is there another layer -- level in there?

25 A. He is, he is more experienced. He's been there for almost 5

1 years. So I'm -- he's kind of a lead guy to, you know --

2 Q. Okay. But he's a tech --

3 A. Right.

4 Q. -- like you?

5 A. Right.

6 Q. Okay. And that's a normal team for post-tensioning
7 operations --

8 A. Right. Right.

9 Q. -- a three-person -- you know, we talked about the gauges
10 quite a bit in the last couple questions. We noticed that, you
11 know, again, the BSR 017 was a random gauge that was used. But
12 there was a BSR 016 gauge on the deck --

13 A. Right.

14 Q. -- at that time? So it was a little confusing to see a --

15 A. I think the BSR 016, that was a gauge that was up there
16 before. And they called me and said I should check it. So when I
17 go ahead and I rechecked it, they had to send for another gauge.
18 That gauge, the BR 016, that was not the gauge that was used.
19 There was a BSR 017. Because they wanted to know the ram.
20 Because as I say, Kevin always checked it.

21 So when I -- when we came up, Navarro called me when I was up
22 on top of it and told me to look at the ram, what number is on it.
23 When I looked at it, it was BSR 017. So when I told him, Kevin
24 came up with the right gauge. Because then I think I had to send
25 a message to the -- I think I have it on my phone as well. When I

1 had to send a message to tell him that, you know, it's a different
2 gauge from a different ram. And they got the right gauge, which
3 is BSR 017.

4 Q. Okay. So is -- the BSR 016 that was on the deck was just
5 taken up mistakenly and --

6 A. Right, right.

7 Q. Because we noticed an 017 was on the ram that was used, but
8 we were just --

9 A. Right.

10 Q. -- wondering why an uncalibrated gauge was on the deck. You
11 mentioned somebody was below deck while you were stressing?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Who was that?

14 A. I think he's from the same inspector company. I've never
15 always see him. He's not always there. But I think he's one of
16 the inspectors also.

17 Q. And was he by the diagonal 11? Was he at the north end where
18 you were?

19 A. I'm not sure where he was while he was under there.

20 Q. Okay. You just knew he was down there --

21 A. Yeah, (indiscernible).

22 Q. -- but you didn't pay attention where he was.

23 A. Right.

24 Q. And just so we get a -- so typically there were two
25 inspectors at every stressing operation.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. You stated you were involved in all but the detensioning.

3 A. Right.

4 Q. But for this particular one, there was only one inspector.

5 A. Right. There was only one on top of it.

6 Q. On top of it.

7 A. Right. The only one that's at the second level, he's not

8 always there when we do the stressing of all the other ones.

9 Q. Right. Do you remember when you were first notified that you

10 had to go back and retention?

11 A. I think it's on the Wednesday. Because we drove down from

12 Orlando on Wednesday after work.

13 Q. So you were notified --

14 A. So we knew that we were notified the same day by our

15 supervisor, you know, that our boss and, you know -- said we got

16 to, you know, come down to stress back the bars.

17 Q. Was it Wednesday morning? Do you remember? Afternoon?

18 A. I think it probably was Wednesday midday.

19 Q. Your supervisor Kevin, I mean, did he say the first time he

20 was aware of the need to go down and restress was Wednesday

21 (indiscernible)?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. So he didn't -- he wasn't expecting to go down to --

24 A. No, we weren't expecting to go back down.

25 Q. So it came -- first notified Wednesday midday.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. Was the reason you drove all the way from Orlando to Miami
3 the next day --

4 A. And we had to go back up on Thursday after the stressing.

5 Q. Was there any, was there any justification given why it
6 needed to be done Thursday and why you couldn't come down after
7 you finished your work in Orlando?

8 A. I mean, they didn't tell us why we had to come down so quick
9 to do it, you know.

10 Q. But they said you needed to come down --

11 A. They said we needed to come down there and --

12 Q. -- you needed to come down quickly the next day to get this
13 done.

14 A. Right.

15 Q. Dan asked most of the questions, but I just, you know --
16 satisfied with the post-tensioning. I guess just a little more
17 information, if you can remember, on the cracking that you saw on
18 the day of retensioning, on the, on the 15th. So Kevin made a
19 point of pointing out the cracking --

20 A. Right.

21 Q. -- as you were going up on the manlift and you were on the
22 west side of the bridge as it (indiscernible).

23 A. I think that was the north side, to the river.

24 Q. Well, the north side, but the northwestern corner.

25 A. Right, right, right.

1 Q. The side with the truck.

2 A. Right.

3 Q. Did he -- what areas did he point out? Was it just at the
4 deck?

5 A. No, I mean --

6 Q. Did he look behind? Did he show anything underneath the
7 diaphragm? I mean, what areas --

8 A. No. While we were going up, it was just like on the second
9 level where you walk, could walk. The crack was just right around
10 where the column was at. The column that goes up on the diagonal.
11 It was just right around, right around that one that sticks up.

12 Q. You took the manlift to the soffit, right? The whole way?

13 A. Right, we took it --

14 Q. Take it up --

15 A. -- all the way up to the dock.

16 Q. So did -- you took the manlift up. Did he move it in to see
17 it?

18 A. No. We were just passing by and he was just showing me. It
19 was just physical. You could -- you didn't have to get close to
20 it to really see them.

21 Q. I was going to say. When you go up to the manlift, the
22 column -- the area that you were looking at was --

23 A. Right.

24 Q. -- it was 40 feet -- 20-some feet away.

25 A. Right.

1 Q. And you're half the bridge. So it was from here, you know,
2 the other side of this room, and you could see the cracking from
3 20 feet?

4 A. Right.

5 Q. Was there -- well I mean, were hunks of concrete missing? I
6 mean, how would you describe --

7 A. No, no. Cracks, but the concrete and everything was still
8 there. Nothing was moved. It was just like big, big cracks. But
9 there was no sign of any concrete that moves.

10 Q. Right, right. So you saw the, you saw the face of the
11 diagonal, but just going --

12 A. Right.

13 Q. You were looking straight at it. Did you look down at the
14 deck too when you were going up?

15 A. No.

16 Q. No. So you were just looking -- you were talking about the
17 cracking you see on the face of the diagonal as you were going up
18 20 feet away in the manlift.

19 A. Right.

20 Q. Okay.

21 MR. HOLT: I think that's all the questions I had.

22 MR. WALSH: I just got, I just got a further question.

23 BY MR. WALSH:

24 Q. What photos did you, did you take on your phone, and are they
25 still available?

1 A. Yeah, I think I still have them.

2 Q. And what are those? What are those photos of?

3 A. I took a photo the day when I was up there. I don't know
4 why, but I took a photo of the bridge face while the ram was still
5 sitting on the bar. And as I said, they wanted to know which ram
6 and which gauge was up there, so I had to take a picture of that
7 also to send down there to let them know which one was it. And I
8 think we have that --

9 Q. Perfect.

10 A. -- yes.

11 Q. Can we -- can you keep all those photos and --

12 MR. WALSH: We request that we, that we obtain those photos
13 from his phone, please. If we could have those, those would be,
14 those would be great. That that be --

15 MR. GOULBOURNE: Right. There's also messages on there too.

16 MR. WALSH: Yeah.

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How many do you have?

18 MR. GOULBOURNE: It's like three.

19 MR. WALSH: Okay. If we could get the messages --

20 MR. GOULBOURNE: All right.

21 MR. WALSH: -- and the photos, that would be terrific.

22 Please. If we could get that.

23 BY MR. WALSH:

24 Q. Was there any other communication that you had of
25 correspondence regarding this?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Besides the text messages on your phone and the photos, was
3 there any --

4 A. No, that was the only thing that, you know, was asked of me
5 that day, so -- because I was the first one up there. That's why
6 I was the one that --

7 Q. Right. Yeah. Was there any other photos or text messages or
8 correspondence before the day of the collapse --

9 A. No.

10 Q. -- that you, that you have? None whatsoever?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Okay. Okay. If we could get a copy of those, that would be,
13 that would be terrific, please. That'd be good.

14 MR. WALSH: I have no, I have no -- go ahead.

15 MR. HOLT: Reggie Holt. Just got one more question real --

16 BY MR. HOLT:

17 Q. You said that there was identifier on the ram, you know, BSR
18 016, 017. Whereabouts on the ram was that located?

19 A. On the ram itself was on the face of it.

20 Q. On the back, big cylinder?

21 A. Yeah. It's literally -- it's on the picture, so you -- but
22 it's like on the face part of it. The part that retracts out,
23 it's literally right around on the, on the face of it.

24 Q. On the fact, like, that retracts out of the piston?

25 A. Right.

1 MR. HOLT: That's all I have.

2 MR. BRAGG: Okay. Okay, the time is 2:44 p.m. We're going
3 to go ahead and conclude this portion of the interview. Thank you
4 for participating.

5 (Whereupon, at 2:44 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE COLLAPSE
MIAMI, FLORIDA
MARCH 15, 2018
Interview of Ramoy Goulbourne

ACCIDENT NO.: HWY18MH009

PLACE: Fort Lauderdale, Florida

DATE: April 9, 2018

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Eileen Gonzalez
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of:

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PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE COLLAPSE

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MIAMI, FLORIDA

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Accident No.: HWY18MH009

MARCH 15, 2018

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Interview of: SAMUEL NUNEZ, Project Manager
Structural Technologies VSL

Miami, Florida

Wednesday,
March 21, 2018

APPEARANCES:

KENNETH BRAGG, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DAN WALSH, Highway Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

REGGIE HOLT
Federal Highway Administration

COREY WRIGHT, Attorney
Wilson Elser
(On behalf of Mr. Nunez)

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By Unidentified Speaker	25

I N T E R V I E W

(3:04 p.m.)

1
2
3 MR. BRAGG: Today is Wednesday, March 21, 2018, 3:04 p.m.,
4 Eastern Daylight Time. And we are at the site of the FIU bridge
5 collapse in Miami, Florida. My name is Kenny Bragg. I'm an
6 investigator with the Office of Highway of Safety for the National
7 Transportation Safety Board.

8 And to my left I have --

9 MR. HOLT: Reggie Holt, Federal Highway.

10 MR. WRIGHT: Corey Wright with the law firm of Wilson Elser
11 representing Mr. Nunez for the purpose of this interview.

12 MR. BRAGG: Okay. And could you state and spell your name,
13 Mr. Nunez?

14 MR. NUNEZ: Samuel Nunez, S-a-m-u-e-l, N-u-u-n-e-z.

15 MR. BRAGG: And --

16 MR. NUNEZ: I am project manager with the Structural
17 Technologies VSL.

18 MR. BRAGG: Okay. And to my right I have --

19 MR. WALSH: Dan Walsh, highway factors investigator, National
20 Transportation Safety Board.

21 MR. BRAGG: Okay.

22 INTERVIEW OF SAMUEL NUNEZ

23 BY MR. BRAGG:

24 Q. So, Mr. Nunez, I'm going to start the interview off by just
25 kind of talking a little bit about your background. How long have

1 you been with Structural Technologies?

2 A. Over 10 years.

3 Q. Over 10 years. And what role do you currently serve?

4 A. Right now I am the project manager.

5 Q. And are you the project manager for just this particular
6 project or do you have other projects?

7 A. I have other projects.

8 Q. You have other projects?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And how long have you served in that role?

11 A. The transition to project manager was just recently. I was
12 construction manager prior. Kind of have the same
13 responsibilities.

14 Q. Okay. And how long did you perform that function?

15 A. I don't recall the exact amount of time. Over 3 years.

16 Q. Okay. And what other roles have you performed with
17 Structural Technologies?

18 A. I was a project engineer.

19 Q. Project engineer. Is that it?

20 A. For 6 years, I'd say, and an intern prior to that.

21 Q. And you said your current role is project manager?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. All right. And tell me what those duties involve.

24 A. I'm the one in charge of setting the field crew, establishing
25 the schedules for the crews, billing on projects, setting up

1 billings, going through the project documents with the crew so
2 that they have an understanding of what their tasks are.

3 Q. So how long have you been involved in this project at FIU?

4 A. It's been since we mobilized to the jobsite.

5 Q. So pretty much since you began working here, at your jobsite?

6 A. Since our scope began on the project, correct.

7 Q. Okay. And describe the --

8 A. In the field.

9 Q. In the field.

10 A. Yeah, (indiscernible).

11 Q. Okay. So describe for me in some detail what your daily
12 activities are. What do you do?

13 A. As I said, I schedule the crews. I send out the billings to
14 the clients. I do make site visits depending on meetings with --
15 subcontractor meetings, some of them. I review some of the safety
16 of the crew.

17 Q. At the time of the bridge collapse, how many crews did you
18 have working on the project?

19 A. On this project?

20 Q. Yes, sir.

21 A. One crew.

22 Q. One crew. And who did that crew consist of?

23 A. Three employees.

24 Q. And their names?

25 A. Kevin Hanson.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Navaro Brown, Ramoy Goldburn (ph.), R-a-m-o-y.

3 Q. And what function did Kevin Hanson perform?

4 A. Kevin was the field leader.

5 Q. Was the field leader?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And so field leader would be just -- he's in charge of the

8 crew basically?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. And Navaro Brown, what was his function?

11 A. A field tech.

12 Q. Field tech. And what particular function did he perform?

13 A. Basically assist Kevin with the operation, same as --

14 Q. And this is background. Dealing with -- working with cement,

15 working with metals? What, I mean, what does he --

16 A. Well, (indiscernible).

17 Q. (Indiscernible).

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And how about Mr. Goldburn what's his function?

20 A. Same.

21 Q. The same thing. Okay. So when your company became involved

22 with this project, describe what you did initially.

23 A. I guess during the bid phase of the project I think I might

24 have looked through the drawings a little bit. That's about it.

25 I wasn't too involved. I gave the project engineer that was

1 completing the submittals some guidance on how things are
2 installed just to give him an understanding. And then once we
3 mobilized to the jobsite -- or prior to our mobilization of the
4 jobsite, I met with my field leader to explain to him what was the
5 tasks to be done. We go through a JHA, which is job hazard
6 analysis, describing any type of hazard we see in the job, as is
7 the standard protocol for us. And we make a list of the items
8 that they need for the project, just material, equipment, whatnot.

9 Q. Okay. And let's talk about your company's involvement in the
10 move. How were you involved in moving the bridge from where it
11 was assembled to where --

12 A. We were not involved in the move.

13 Q. Not involved. Okay. So explain to me how your company was
14 involved in the whole process.

15 A. We are -- our scope is pretty much for the post tensioning --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- the supply and the installation.

18 Q. Okay. So what was the first function that you performed on
19 the bridge?

20 A. The install of the duct.

21 Q. Of the duct?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Which is the pipe.

25 Q. And I think some of my engineers are going to talk about that

1 in detail a bit later.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. And so once the bridge was in place, talk about that. What
4 happened when the bridge was finally put in place?

5 A. When the bridge was put in place?

6 Q. Um-hum.

7 A. We detensioned the members 2 and 11.

8 Q. So you detensioned it?

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. Okay. And did anything unusual occur during that time?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. And --

13 A. Well, there was cracking.

14 Q. There was cracking?

15 A. Of the deck, yes.

16 Q. And in your experience was that usual or unusual or --

17 A. Cracking happens in concrete.

18 Q. Okay. So did it cause you any alarm at that time?

19 A. Nothing out of normal, no.

20 Q. Okay. So what did you do when you observed the cracking?

21 A. I wasn't out here.

22 Q. You wasn't out --

23 A. During the cracking or during the detensioning. Kevin was
24 out there.

25 Q. Kevin was out here.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. And so did Kevin make you aware of the cracking?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And so what was your conversation then with Kevin about the
5 cracking?

6 A. It was via text message.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Sent pictures of it. And then one of my other employees told
9 me he showed it MCM, the pictures that he took --

10 Q. And --

11 A. -- on Saturday.

12 Q. And that was on Saturday?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And so what was your understanding how these cracks were to
15 be addressed?

16 A. My understanding -- well, we are not involved in the entire
17 process. So --

18 Q. Okay. Well, I'm not just asking, you know, what were you
19 going to do about it. What was your understanding of how these --
20 how they were going to deal with it? Were they going to do
21 anything? Were they going to --

22 A. The engineer of record would need to review the cracks.

23 Q. Did that occur?

24 A. From my knowledge, it did.

25 Q. It did?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And so what was the result of it? How did they address it?

3 A. The crack had no safety concern.

4 Q. Okay. So they weren't going to do anything?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. And so what was your crew doing the day of the bridge
7 collapse?

8 A. The crew was tensioning member 11, two bars of member 11.

9 Q. And how did they come to receive the task to do that?

10 A. I was -- I don't recall the exact sequence of events, but I
11 was called in a text from the project manager of MCM.

12 Q. And who is that?

13 A. Rodrigo Isaza.

14 Q. Okay. And he called and texted, and what did he say?

15 A. Regarding us to remobilize to come perform that task.

16 Q. And what was the reason for them to remobilize?

17 A. The engineer reviewed.

18 Q. But what was the --

19 A. The engineer requested that to be retensioned.

20 Q. Okay. And so then what happened?

21 A. I didn't have any crews or Kevin was not available. He was
22 the one I was going to bring out here for that. And prior to
23 that, that's -- obviously it wasn't part of our scope. So I told
24 him it's going to be additional. And also I sent him an email in
25 regards to the crack, and I questioned whether it needs to be

1 addressed or not, and he responded that the EOR had verified it.

2 Q. So when did he send you an email or text or call saying that
3 it needed to be --

4 A. I do not recall the exact day. I think it was Tuesday before
5 the incident.

6 Q. It was Tuesday?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. So it was Tuesday?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And you said you -- you said Kevin wasn't available, correct?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. And so, but eventually Kevin performed the task?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. And so how did that come to happen?

15 A. Well, after I sent the email to Rodrigo telling him to have
16 the engineer review, Rodrigo responded to it saying that there's
17 no safety concern per the engineer, and that we are to proceed to
18 stressing the bars at 50 kip increments.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And alternate.

21 Q. And so at some point we're going to request some documents,
22 and we'll get that to you. Those emails and maybe even those
23 photographs or those texts would be helpful.

24 A. Not a problem.

25 Q. Okay. Were you present when they began performing the task

1 of retensioning?

2 A. No, sir.

3 MR. BRAGG: And I'm going to let Dan kind of get into his
4 area.

5 MR. WALSH: Dan Walsh, NTSB.

6 BY MR. WALSH:

7 Q. I'm just going to ask you some general questions about the
8 detensioning and retensioning --

9 A. Okay.

10 Q. -- that was done. So when was the detensioning performed?

11 A. That was performed on Saturday.

12 Q. Okay. And what was involved? Can you describe the
13 detensioning process and how many kips were applied? Or what's
14 involved with detensioning?

15 A. Detensioning is just to take it up to the force that the bars
16 is -- was originally stressed to, and release the pressure.

17 Q. Okay. And how is that done? If you can just give a brief
18 explanation of how that is done.

19 A. Basically it's a null thread with a nut on the end of it. So
20 you extend it with a pull bar, what we call it. It's a bar with a
21 coupler, and then you apply pressure to the jack, extend it
22 slightly, and then keep moving the ratchet until it breaks loose.

23 Q. Okay. And was that done after the move or was that done
24 prior to the move?

25 A. After the move.

1 Q. That was done after the move --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- when the structure was put on piers?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. Correct? Okay. Were you given direction on how to perform
6 that de-stressing? Was there a direction given by the contractor
7 or the engineer on how to perform the de-stressing?

8 A. No. It was just to -- on the contract documents it says to
9 detension members 2 and 11.

10 Q. Two and 11?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. And when you noticed -- the VSL employee noticed the
13 cracking, he did take photographs of that cracking?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. On that day?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Is there -- can we obtain photographs or copies of those
18 photographs?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And I'm wondering if we can obtain them immediately, either
21 today or tomorrow. That would be great. We would like to see
22 those.

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. Was there any VSL employees on the bridge Sunday, Monday or
25 Tuesday?

1 A. No, sir.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Sunday, Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday.

4 Q. None?

5 A. None at all.

6 Q. None at all. Okay. We'd like to see the copies of that, of
7 those cracks, those photographs, if you could.

8 Okay. So in terms of the stressing, the restress that was
9 done on the day of the collapse, what direction were you given to
10 restress? The restress operation, what was -- were you given
11 specific direction from the engineer or the contractor?

12 A. The contractor sent an email.

13 Q. He sent an email?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. If we could get a copy of that email as quickly as possible
16 as well?

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible)

18 MR. WALSH: Okay.

19 BY MR. WALSH:

20 Q. And what were the content -- what was the context of that
21 email?

22 A. It had the -- it stated something about stressing the bars,
23 alternating at 50 kip intervals. I don't recall which one it said
24 to start with. It's in the email. Up to 280 kips, per the
25 drawing, per the structural drawing that he stated. I think it's

1 B69.

2 Q. Okay. When you, if you -- when you restress -- I'm trying to
3 get an understanding when you restress, how do you know that
4 you've reached the 280 kips maximum? What's the indication that
5 tells you that?

6 A. Okay. These rams are calibrated with a gauge, and the gauge
7 has the pressure. So with the load itself, you go in increments
8 to calibrate it, and it will show you what force is equivalent to
9 the gauge. And with that, it comes up with a linear line with an
10 equation, which you can plug in the pressures and get the force.

11 Q. Is there any scenario where you would go over the 280 kips?

12 A. There should not be any.

13 Q. Okay. To your knowledge, when you go in 50 kip increments,
14 why do you go in 50 kip increments?

15 A. That was the requirement per the --

16 Q. Right. Is there a specific reason why the engineer did that
17 or why you would do that?

18 A. I do not know.

19 Q. Okay. Just a general question. If you're looking at the
20 gauge, is there possibility that it -- the restressing operation
21 can exceed the 280 kips?

22 A. If you're looking at the gauge? No.

23 Q. Okay. Does the gauge go above 280 kips?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. It does?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. So you have to look at the gauge and be cognizant that
3 when you reach 280 kips you stop?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. Is that correct?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. Okay. All right.

8 A. You could also tell with, you know, location of the bar.

9 Q. Excuse me?

10 A. You could tell by the location of the bar.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. And with Kevin's knowledge, he's able to understand that.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: He's able to understand that?

14 MR. NUNEZ: Yes.

15 BY MR. WALSH:

16 Q. Just a general question again. So there is a possibility
17 that the restressing could exceed 280 kips, but these were
18 experienced senior level operators.

19 A. Kevin has got to be one of the most qualified people in the
20 Southeast United States.

21 MR. WALSH: I don't have any other questions.

22 MR. HOLT: Reggie Holt, Federal Highway.

23 BY MR. HOLT:

24 Q. I guess just a few questions on the direction to restress.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So the official notification was an email from the
2 contractor?

3 A. The official as in?

4 Q. To go perform this work.

5 A. I have phone calls and text messages, but he sent an email as
6 well.

7 Q. He sent an email.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And based on that email that was --

10 A. So official, yes.

11 Q. -- your, okay, now it's official, I need to go out there?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. Was the initial correspondence indicating that you would go
14 out or did it indicate that it was under consideration that you
15 might have to go out?

16 A. The initial correspondence from myself or from the --

17 Q. Well, you said there were texts and --

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. -- calls. Was it when they called you, said you need to come
20 out here or was it --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So it wasn't like, hey, we might need you, but -- no. When
23 you were first notified it was --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- we intend --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- to solicit you to come out?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. Okay. Thank you. So the email also included instructions on
5 the sequence --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- the 50 kip increments?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. To 280 kip target. Was that -- were those directions written
10 by the contractor or was it an attachment or a copy of an email
11 given by FIU? Do you remember?

12 A. That was written by the contractor.

13 Q. That was written by the contractor.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. The contractor outlined the procedures they wanted in this
16 restressing operation?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Okay. Thank you. Let's talk about the de-stressing
19 operation.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. So it's a fairly, I guess, unique application for prestress.
22 They use it, at least in the embedded case. Are your standard --
23 are your details, standard details altered in any way to
24 facilitate a de-stressing after initial stressing?

25 A. Could you repeat the question?

1 Q. Are your details altered in any way? Do you use -- would
2 that -- would you use different materials, anchorages, whatever,
3 to facilitate a de-stressing over a stressing and grouted
4 application?

5 A. In this case, we did not.

6 Q. You did not.

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. I didn't know whether it required any special details to
9 facilitate the restress.

10 A. The detail stated it had to be -- the bar had to be grouted.
11 So we ended up keeping the same detail for everything.

12 Q. Right. And that grouting was going to happen --

13 A. When the back span gets grouted.

14 Q. The span that hasn't been constructed?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. Are the tendons, other than the two tendons that were --
17 intended to be detensioned, 2 and 11, were they all grouted?

18 A. I'm --

19 Q. Were they all grouted?

20 A. Everything with the exception of 2 and 11 --

21 Q. 11.

22 A. -- were grouted, yes.

23 Q. And they were purposely ungrouted because with the
24 detensioning --

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. -- and you would grout when you grouted the back span.

2 A. Exactly.

3 Q. So in your experience, have you ever detensioned and
4 retensioned in an in-place application?

5 A. Not that I recall.

6 Q. It's fairly unique. I agree.

7 So let's get back -- I'd like to talk about the, just the
8 cracking that was observed. So you said that you saw pictures of
9 it on Saturday in an email.

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. Okay. You didn't have anybody out there -- well, who took
12 those pictures?

13 A. Kevin Hanson.

14 Q. Kevin. You said Kevin took those --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- Hanson took those. No VSL employees were on the bridge
17 till you went out to restress.

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. Was there any kind of documentation that the cracking got
20 worse, stayed the same?

21 A. No.

22 Q. No. I mean, based on, I guess, Kevin's experience that he
23 seemed confident in that all concrete cracks --

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. -- as they say. But if he would have saw something, he would

1 have probably noticed it if it was a significant change?

2 A. Correct. I believe that morning, he was like, man, it looks
3 bad -- it looked bad. But he didn't understand why.

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. And then --

6 Q. It looked --

7 A. It looked bad.

8 Q. Your pictures on Saturday looked bad.

9 A. Yeah. Yeah.

10 Q. Right. Which was -- that was right after release?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. So were you notified about the retensioning in that Saturday?

13 A. No.

14 Q. When was the first day?

15 A. I believe it was Tuesday.

16 Q. Tuesday.

17 A. Via phone call or text message from Rodrigo Isaza.

18 Q. That you needed to get -- essentially you knew you were going
19 to mobilize, so Tuesday. Do you remember if it was in the morning
20 or was it in the --

21 A. I do not remember.

22 MR. HOLT: That's it.

23 BY MR. BRAGG:

24 Q. I do have a couple more questions. So we've heard from some
25 of the other organizations there was a meeting held about

1 retension. Were you a part of that meeting?

2 A. No, sir.

3 Q. Did you have -- when you received the decision to reapply
4 tension, did that cause you any concern?

5 A. No, sir. The engineer -- I got the email saying that there
6 was no safety concern, engineer reviewed it.

7 Q. And is that a common practice?

8 A. The engineer to review the structure?

9 Q. No. I mean to reapply tension, is that a common practice?

10 A. Not that I'm aware of. Not that I've been involved in.

11 Q. The pictures that you received on Saturday, you said they
12 were bad. Did you see -- did you receive any other pictures later
13 in the week?

14 A. No.

15 Q. No. So the pictures on Saturday were the only time you
16 received pictures?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Did you have any conversations with Kevin on -- before the
19 reapplying tension began? Did he reassess the cracks prior to --

20 A. He said the cracks looked bad.

21 Q. But did he mention that they looked worse on Thursday than it
22 did on Tuesday or --

23 A. I don't recall. Than Saturday?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. He didn't see them Tuesday. He was in Orlando.

1 Q. Okay. Were there any discussions about shutting the roadway
2 down?

3 A. No, sir. No.

4 Q. No consideration with respect to that?

5 A. They had partial lane closure starting at 9.

6 Q. Okay. And whose decision would it have been to shut down the
7 roadway?

8 A. I do not know.

9 Q. Would it -- would you -- would it be outside of --

10 A. Outside of our scope, yes, sir.

11 MR. BRAGG: Any more questions?

12 MR. WALSH: Just -- yeah.

13 BY MR. WALSH:

14 Q. I'd like to follow up on my line of questioning just for my
15 own understanding.

16 A. Um-hum.

17 Q. Is it possible to retension a member, in this case, to exceed
18 the 280 kip amount; is it possible to do that? With the equipment
19 that you had on-site, is it possible that it could exceed 280
20 kips?

21 A. If you are trying to reach the 280 kips with a qualified
22 technician, no. If he's --

23 Q. But with the equipment and the testing device, is it possible
24 to exceed 280 kips?

25 A. Theoretically, if you're trying to exceed it, yes.

1 Q. You can. Okay. But in your professional opinion, the
2 employees that were there on the day of the collapse would have
3 applied the retension at 280 kips?

4 A. Yes.

5 MR. WALSH: Okay. Thank you.

6 BY MR. BRAGG:

7 Q. Have you talked to Kevin or --

8 A. Ramoy?

9 Q. Ramoy. Yeah. Since the collapse, day the collapse occurred?

10 A. Kevin's still an induced coma.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. I've not spoken to Ramoy.

13 Q. Did he relate to you what was going on when the collapse,
14 before the collapse happened?

15 A. I didn't speak to him too much. I spoke more to his
16 girlfriend than to him about his condition.

17 Q. So do you have an understanding of what happened, what they
18 were doing when the collapse occurred? At what specific point --

19 A. I don't know what stage they were at.

20 MR. BRAGG: I don't have any further questions.

21 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

22 Q. Just one more, just a general question. So the initial
23 stressing, to your knowledge it went fine?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. It did? So you have the records with the force elongations,

1 and all --

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. -- kind of stuff?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. I think we'd like to see those just to verify that there was
6 no anomaly with the initial stressing of these.

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Actually for (indiscernible) we would like to see the other
9 ones also, member 2.

10 A. It's probably going to be included with the whole --

11 Q. All in the same package.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 A. (Indiscernible).

15 Q. Okay. For which --

16 A. Stress (indiscernible).

17 Q. Okay. Thank you.

18 MR. BRAGG: Time is 3:35 p.m., and we're going to close the
19 interview.

20 Thank you very much for your participation.

21 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

22

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE COLLAPSE
MIAMI, FLORIDA
MARCH 15, 2018
Interview of Samuel Nunez

ACCIDENT NO.: HWY18MH009

PLACE: Miami, Florida

DATE: March 21, 2018

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Katherine Motley
Transcriber