Survival Factors Emergency Response and Communications

Attachment 5 : Emergency Responder Interviews

DuPont, Washington

RRD18MR001

(323 pages)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *
*
AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, *
WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 * Accident No.: RRD18MR001
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Interview of: CHRISTOPHER BARNARD, SR.
Assistant Chief

Fire Department Headquarters
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington

Saturday,
December 23, 2017

APPEARANCES:

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National Transportation Safety Board

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1 I N T E R V I E W

2 (10:09 a.m.)

3 MS. Harley: All right. So we can get started now. It's
4 Saturday, December 23rd, it's 2017. It's 10:09 a.m. And we are
5 here interviewing Assistant Chief Christopher Barnard; is that
6 correct?

7 MR. BARNARD: That's correct.

8 MS. HARLEY: And just to make sure that I've got this
9 straight, we are actually still on the base, part of the base?

10 MR. BARNARD: Yes, that's correct.

11 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right. I am Sheryl Harley. I am
12 with the National Transportation Safety Board and this interview
13 is being conducted with you and actually the other first
14 responders as part of an investigation into what we call survival
15 factors.

16 MR. BARNARD: Uh-huh.

17 MS. HARLEY: Survival factors is simply how we look at the
18 survivability issues that occurred in the crash. We look at the
19 train or the vehicle that's involved, what happened to the
20 passengers or occupants. We also ask to speak to the first
21 responders because you guys were there; you saw what was going on.
22 You saw if there were some issues that needed to be addressed, and
23 we look for you to give us some ideas if there's some
24 recommendations that we can make --

25 MR. BARNARD: Uh-huh.

1 MS. HARLEY: -- in regards to safety. If we cannot only
2 prevent someone from being killed, reduce the severity of the
3 injury, but also, make your job easier.
4 MR. BARNARD: Uh-huh.
5 MS. HARLEY: For example, if you find that you had a hard
6 time in extricating a passenger because of a certain piece of
7 equipment that you may need, then that is something certainly we
8 look at and certainly can suggest that maybe this is what fire
9 departments across the country are going to need --
10 MR. BARNARD: Sure.
11 MS. HARLEY: -- in order to be able to deal with these
12 situations. By the way, our recommendations are not only specific
13 to you, but also nationwide. So what we are looking at is all
14 fire rescue. We look at all police departments around the country
15 at the same time.
16 Before I start I'd also like the other individuals in the
17 room to identify themselves please.
18 MR. DAY: Larry Day. I'm with the Federal Railroad
19 Administration. Lead forensics investigator as well as passenger
20 rail safety specialist. Our job here is -- there are certain
21 requirements that Amtrak is required to provide training as well
22 as equipment orientation and those types of things to fire
23 personnel, emergency responders throughout the nation. Our goal
24 within this investigation is to assist the NTSB but also to ensure
25 that Amtrak was complying with 239 requirements as well.

1 MR. BARNARD: Okay.
2 MS. KLUTE: And my name is Elizabeth Klute. I'm with Amtrak.
3 I'm the regional emergency manager and I'm here supporting the
4 NTSB as well as, in compliance with 239, to make sure that I
5 capture if there are things that you remember, things that you
6 brought up that maybe we could incorporate in our training or
7 modify or that support the training.
8 MR. MARTINEZ: Paul Martinez. I'm with the FRA, part of the
9 forensic team.
10 MR. STEWART: I'm Jeff Stewart. I'm also FRA, part of the
11 forensics team.
12 MR. BARNARD: Okay.
13 MR. GALLEGOS: Mark Gallegos, chief inspector out of Region
14 7. I'm part of the forensic team.
15 MR. LANGE: Mike Lange, with the Passenger Rail Division,
16 FRA, part of the forensics.
17 MR. BARNARD: Okay.
18 INTERVIEW OF CHRISTOPHER BARNARD, SR.
19 BY MS. HARLEY:
20 Q. So, I tell you what, Chief, what I'm going to ask you to do,
21 if you don't mind, we are going to kind of start. I'm just going
22 to ask you to just run through the incident. So I guess my first
23 -- let's start with how were you notified and approximately what
24 time was that?
25 A. According to our records, I was notified at 7:37. We came

1 through -- it came through our automated dispatch center. We get
2 -- here it's two, we get two levels of communication. We get the
3 initial notification digitally from our emergency communication
4 center, which is actually behind me, and then after the digital
5 notification -- by digital I mean it just comes across
6 automatically. And then after that, they come voice.
7 So the dispatcher came over the radio. They notified us in
8 an unusual manner as far as like the number of resources. So you
9 know, they came in and had all six of our initial engines being
10 dispatched, our on-duty engines being dispatched. So quickly
11 after that initial dispatch she came over and said, this is not an
12 exercise, you know, mass casualty incident involving a passenger
13 rail train, something to that effect.
14 So I was not on the initial dispatch, but as a chief officer
15 I'm given the latitude to self-dispatch to all incidents. Given
16 the gravity of the initial incident, I self-dispatched and
17 responded.
18 I got on the air. Continued from there. We had six initial
19 engines being sent and several chief officers being sent, medical
20 services officer; special operations officer; myself, assistant
21 chief; and then the deputy fire chief all coming. And then we
22 were told en route that all the local area PSAPs, the dispatch
23 centers were being notified and they were getting as many
24 resources as possible to come to the scene.
25 I got stopped -- I was in the very, very front. I was the

first guy on scene. And so, the traffic was stopped -- all three lanes of traffic with all the vehicles were completely stopped about 300 yards out from the incident. People had gotten out of their vehicles and walked to the scene and left their cars unoccupied and no keys running in it. So that had an initial delay for us.

I had to park my vehicle at that point and start walking forward and had given the clearance to our initial engines -- I assume you want me to just keep going?

Q. Yes, keep going.

A. Okay. I had given the initial clearance to my engines that were right behind me to go ahead and push vehicles out of the way if they needed to with force. And I gave -- I told them to give me 45 seconds to get to the front of the incident to let everybody know that we were going to be pushing their vehicles out of the way.

So as I was walking with haste down the freeway, I was letting -- I was yelling at people, letting them know that we were going to be pushing their vehicles out of the way. Some of the people were standing off to the side of the freeway observing the incident, they quickly started moving back. And then there was a large percentage of people that were helping bystanders on the scene and they were not wanting to move back, but I had them to -- I needed them to move back and make a way. Fortunately, with all that, I don't believe our engines had to do any serious damage to

1 any vehicles. They were able to make a pathway.
2 And so, I gave the initial size-up of the incident, and took
3 command. You know, the initial size-up was pretty bland,
4 passenger rail train on the freeway, you know, there were victims
5 pretty much everywhere in the initial vicinity of probably 100
6 feet circle around the incident. There were bystanders pretty
7 much everywhere that were helping out extricating victims.
8 So I turn around after I establish command and my medical
9 officer was behind me, so I established -- pushed her off to the
10 roundabout there that we had established for triage and had her
11 establish triage transport, and she became my medical group
12 supervisor off to the left in that median area.
13 I had my battalion chief, who is actually here today, become
14 my operations branch and he started working on getting his units
15 to do initial triage and removal from the scene to go to
16 transport.
17 And then at that point, Lacey Fire District 3, their
18 battalion chief, Battalion Chief Fox, had come through the
19 roundabout and we wanted to set up a unified command. We had two
20 different -- you know, we have two different operating frequencies
21 for radios. So for us to be unified command is really the only
22 logical way to handle it.
23 My vehicle was pinned down, you know, 300 yards back. So we
24 stopped in his vehicle, moved slightly forward from the
25 roundabouts, we weren't in the way, and we set up command right

1 there next to that roundabout. Wasn't able to do a full 360 of
2 the incident because of the number of people that were there and I
3 didn't want to get trapped into doing patient care or something.
4 So I maintained my position and had my OPS chief do the 360 the
5 best he could and advise of what the conditions were. And then at
6 that point resources were just pouring in. So I had to just keep
7 keeping resources moving downrange to assist him and his operation
8 and then keep resources going towards the medical group so that
9 they could keep their operation going.
10 We had realized that on the south of the incident, so down
11 towards Mounts Road, was very, very clear. So we made the
12 notification to all the incoming units from there to come the
13 wrong way on I-5. So come northbound in southbound lanes, and we
14 at that point geographically divided the incident into two
15 geographic locations. We have south and north. And that was
16 pretty much the way we had set up with the departments.
17 So we had Thurston County Units who were on their own
18 frequency operating on the south. And then JBLM and Pierce County
19 units operating on our frequencies, operating on the north. Chief
20 Raynard maintained north operations and then I do not know the
21 specifics for all the south operations. Battalion Chief Fox was
22 the one who managed that.
23 So together, we ended up operating on scene with pretty much
24 our operational divisions, which worked pretty smooth or seemed to
25 work fairly smooth, and we just maintained our operational goals

1 to be consistent as we operated through the scene. He
2 communicated with his people and I communicated with ours.
3 Q. Okay. All right. So let's start. Okay, 7:37 is when you
4 got the notification. Do you have an estimated time you think you
5 actually got on the scene?
6 A. It didn't take me -- I don't have that time in my head. It
7 didn't take me long. We were really fortunate that there was an
8 extra lane being paved on that section of I-5 that was closed down
9 for normal traffic. So while en route, we were able to engage
10 that lane right here at 119, and I notified all the incoming units
11 to make sure they moved all the way to the left and engaged that
12 lane all the way down. And that lane took us to right where the
13 freeway had stopped. So our guys had pretty much direct travel
14 for the first 10 minutes right down to the scene. So it didn't
15 take me hardly any time at all.
16 Q. Okay. You said that there were several chief officers. You
17 had -- there was a deputy chief.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Who was that?
20 A. James Elways (ph.). Special Operations Chief Kent Garrison,
21 and he was assigned with me. He was basically my scribe. And
22 then we had our medical services officer, Nicole McCollough, and
23 she was our medical branch officer. Is that all of them -- that's
24 all the ones that we sent.
25 Q. Okay. So explain to me what your medical services officer

1 does?
2 A. So in the Pierce County and out here on JBLM we follow Pierce
3 County patient care protocols and then the Pierce County MCI plan.
4 And once we get into these mass casualty incidents the goal is to
5 set up a structure, a chain of command structure, that support
6 mostly the operations of getting people off the scene as fast as
7 possible because that's what they need.
8 And so, we set up a medical branch officer who then will have
9 a treatment officer, a triage officer and a transport officer as
10 they see that's fit. Otherwise, all three roles will fall under
11 the medical branch officer. So I assign her to the medical branch
12 officer and her obligation at that point is to treat, transport
13 and -- triage, treat, and transport all the patients coming off
14 the scene and/or delegate the roles as she needs to with
15 additional personnel, which I believe she did.
16 Q. Okay. Are you aware of anyone who actually was assisting
17 her?
18 A. Yeah. I had -- I am aware. So I know that she had a
19 transport officer, which was Paul Moore from Madigan Ambulance.
20 She had a triage officer, which was Paul Smith from us. And then
21 I don't know if she had a treatment officer. I know that she did
22 have additional personnel with her. I think she had a full engine
23 company with her, that I remember assigning.
24 Q. Okay. So you assigned an engine company to her?
25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. Okay. Okay. So explain to me how your communications work.
2 JBLM is on one separate channel?
3 A. Yeah.
4 Q. Thurston County is on another separate channel?
5 A. Yep.
6 Q. And Pierce is on another channel?
7 A. Frequencies, not channels.
8 Q. I mean frequencies.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Excuse me. So how exactly does that work when you're talking
11 about communications in this type of incident?
12 A. It can get really complicated. So we are on three totally
13 different frequencies, which is a known issue for us as far as
14 when we go into these multi-agency responders that it can be a
15 hurdle for us to overcome.
16 Usually, if we have the ability to, we will try to do what's
17 called a patch and we will -- because not a single one of our
18 agencies has a radio with all three frequencies on it so there's
19 no way for us all to move to the same channel. So we'll try to do
20 a patch, where the PSAPs, the communications centers, will take
21 two channels because they have that ability, and they will try to
22 merge them together. The patches are really complicated and often
23 they don't work. And I don't understand the specific technical
24 reasons why they don't work, but they don't work very well.
25 So in this circumstance, because I didn't know who I had

1 coming and where they were coming from, I did not request any
2 patch until I knew what I had for resources. And then when
3 Thurston County came on the scene and we established that unified
4 command, I didn't have a need to establish a patch because he
5 maintained his operation south and we maintained our operations
6 north. And then we segregated our scene a little bit for the
7 different tactical challenge.
8 Q. Okay. Then how did you communicate with the Pierce County?
9 A. There was a chief that was with us that was from Dupont,
10 Battalion Chief of 25, which is Larry Creekmoor. And he was
11 available to me on scene as I had people coming in. When we had
12 those few units I did have come in and I assigned roles to, I gave
13 them our radios and had them operate off our frequencies.
14 Q. Who did you give radios to? I'm sorry.
15 A. The -- it was two -- there was a battalion chief, Summerlin,
16 from West Pierce and his captain, which I do not know his name.
17 And at the time I needed them to do staging, so I had them set up
18 a north and a south staging area, two exits, you know, outside of
19 our immediate area. And I moved them to our tactical operation
20 channel 3, and they were communicating with Chief Garrison as we
21 had units coming in for staging.
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. And I had medical assigned to tactical operation 2, channel
24 2, and then our operations stayed on tactical operation channel 1.
25 Q. All right. Do your units have radios for either Pierce

1 County or Thurston County Fire Department?
2 A. No, not all of them. Some of them do. Engine 1, this
3 particular station here, does maintain one mutual aid radio, is
4 what we call it, that has the capability of communicating with
5 Pierce County. We do -- our radios do have some of the old radio
6 communication channels for Pierce County and Thurston County on
7 them, but they are on old frequency numbers. So they work as far
8 as listening but not as well as far as talking.
9 Q. Okay. So can you tell me how long it took before Battalion
10 Chief Summerlin and I believe it was Captain Wagner --
11 A. That sounds correct.
12 Q. -- arrived on the scene?
13 A. I cannot. Because I don't remember, okay.
14 Q. Okay. Do you know if Pierce County units arrived on the
15 scene prior to them getting there?
16 A. I was not -- Dupont was on the scene and they are a Pierce
17 County unit.
18 Q. Right. Okay.
19 A. And so, Dupont were on the scene. They were our -- probably
20 our second engine in, because there was Engine 1, you know, and
21 then Dupont Engine 25 came rolling right behind that, and I had
22 them spot their apparatus out of the way and bring equipment and
23 personnel forward.
24 Q. Okay. Okay. So my understanding is, is that you had the
25 Thurston County units were basically operating on the south side

1 of this. And you had Pierce and your units were operating the
2 north side of this?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. Okay. And you were with Battalion Chief Fox, who is from the
5 Lacey Fire department, which would be on the same frequency as the
6 Thurston County?
7 A. Yep.
8 Q. Is that correct?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. Okay. All right. Okay. And we talked about your medical
11 officers. Did you have any contact with, as far as any of the
12 victims, the train crew -- let me. Let's start from the
13 beginning.
14 Did you actually go up to the train itself?
15 A. Negative.
16 Q. Okay. Where did you set up your command post?
17 A. Geographical area, if you know where that U was at. We used
18 the traffic roundabout. I was just south of that. So that would
19 have been right behind my vehicle.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. Or the vehicle I as in, not my vehicle. It was actually
22 Battalion 31 from Lacey --
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. -- because my vehicle was stuck 300 yards back.
25 Q. Got it. Okay. All righty. When you arrived on the scene,

1 could you tell if the train was running?
2 A. So when we initially arrived on the scene, I didn't want to
3 get too far into it because I was worried about getting stuck --
4 I'm a paramedic. So mentally, you know, for me to get into that
5 close I would have gone triage mode and I would never have gotten
6 out. So I didn't go up to it.
7 We had smoke and steam coming from the train, and so my
8 initial officers that were going in were going to confirm that the
9 train wasn't on fire. And then the Battalion Chief Raynard, who
10 ends up being my north operations chief, did the 360 and advised
11 me that there were cars on the back end of the accident.
12 And I made contact with the -- I believe the conductor of the
13 train. He came to me and identified himself as -- I don't
14 remember if he said conductor or operator or engineer, but he said
15 he was with the train. So I asked him how many souls you got on
16 board and if there was any hazardous material cargo. He advised
17 me he had 77 souls on board and there was no hazardous material.
18 And then the train as far as going running, to specifically
19 answer your question, it ended up being running for a duration of
20 the incident, where we ended up having one of the crews that were
21 -- because he, the conductor had identified that there was like 19
22 patients or 17 patients on the hill. And that they were not a
23 critical nature, that they could wait just for a little bit longer
24 because we had people that were more critical down in the train
25 area, on the freeway.

1 So I asked him to go up there with them and stay with them
2 for now and then advise us if anything had changed. So when the
3 crews eventually made it to that top hill area, they advised the
4 train was running. Then at that point he was actually in the area
5 of me, so I identified with him and asked him to go up and help
6 assist shutting down the train, because I was not aware it was
7 still running.
8 Q. Okay.
9 A. Sorry that was a real long answer to your question.
10 Q. Oh, it's actually perfect, thank you. Could you tell if
11 there were any lights on in the train when you arrived?
12 A. I don't remember.
13 Q. From your vantage point could you see anyone that was ejected
14 or partially ejected from the train?
15 A. Depends on if I were to assume or not. There was quite a few
16 people that were down on the ground right in front of that -- on
17 the, you know, the -- they seemed to be on the north side right at
18 the base of the hanger, is what we call it, the one car that was
19 hanging down on top of the other car. So if I were to assume that
20 they would have been taken out of the train, ejected or some form
21 or fashion.
22 Q. Okay. Does JBLM train with the local fire departments in the
23 area?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Okay. When was the last time you had a training exercise

1 with the locals?
2 A. In general?
3 Q. In general.
4 A. The week prior. We had just got done doing multi-company
5 operations at one of our intel buildings back here that was being
6 demolitioned.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. So we try to train with them as frequent as possible.
9 Q. Do you know what agencies were there?
10 A. Yeah. West Pierce, Dupont, Gig Harbor, JBLM, and I think
11 that's it, I believe. Our training branch will have more
12 information on that.
13 Q. Okay. And during these training operations how do you handle
14 communication?
15 A. So we try to test our communication systems to put us through
16 real-world situations. So at that -- that particular multi-
17 company operation that we had was structural in nature, but that
18 was the whole point, was actually for us to test it. And that's
19 how we kind of identified -- we do normal operations, you know,
20 regular-day emergencies where we try to operate off of the patches
21 and the communications and we understand we have a difficulty.
22 But when you try to do it with 10 operating units, it's a
23 different picture, or even more.
24 So at that one there we had done several different tests of
25 different configurations where we did patching or we did switching

1 of radios and stuff like that. That's really where we identified
2 that the physically handoff of another department's radio is the
3 best way to handle it.
4 Q. Okay. So the decision was made with various agencies that
5 everyone would basically provide radios on --
6 A. The best of our ability, yeah. I mean, that wasn't -- I
7 don't want to say that's a unilateral decision, but that is
8 definitely we recognize as right now being one of the best ways to
9 make the communications happen.
10 Q. Okay. Can you explain to me the emergency operations of JBLM
11 as far as your operating procedure? You are actually part of the
12 EMS, the regular civilian EMS system; is that correct, as far as
13 responding to incidents off base?
14 A. Yeah. I think so. I think based on your question. So we
15 have out here -- are you just looking for like a general out --
16 like operations?
17 Q. Yeah.
18 A. So we have six operational stations in the department here,
19 three battalion chiefs that are on duty usually every day and then
20 an assistant chief of operations. I'm the assistant chief of
21 operations. And so, we're divided into three geographical
22 battalions and there's two stations per battalion. Each station
23 has at least one engine company. And then we have two stations
24 that have air fields, so they have crash companies. And then we
25 have special missions assigned throughout the department.

1 Our personnel are utilizing the Pierce County EMS patient
2 care protocols and they are Washington State certified personnel.
3 We have a medical director on post who is a federal physician,
4 Dr. Misner, out of Madigan hospital.
5 Q. I'm sorry. Dr. Misner?
6 A. Yes, that's correct.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. And then we have the -- he basically helps our medical
9 services officer coordinate personnel operations for federal end
10 of things, and then we all -- because we're state certified, fall
11 under Dr. Waffle for Pierce County certification or patient care
12 protocols. And that allows us at that point to be able to operate
13 within state guidelines while on installation and off
14 installation.
15 Q. Got it.
16 A. Does that answer your question?
17 Q. Yes, it actually does. Okay. So moving forward with that,
18 is it -- would it be correct to say, then, that it is not unusual
19 for you to receive a call from Pierce County, for example, to
20 assist them?
21 A. Not at all.
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. Now we -- so we have mutual aid agreements, automatic aid
24 agreements with all of our surrounding departments, both Pierce
25 County and Thurston County.

1 Q. Okay.
2 A. We regularly get those agreements exercised through Dupont,
3 you know, assisting them, and then also through Roy. Occasionally
4 with West Pierce and occasionally with Central Pierce.
5 Q. Okay. Roy, West Pierce and Central Pierce.
6 A. Yep.
7 Q. And Dupont?
8 A. Yep.
9 Q. Okay. How long has this mutual agreement been in place; do
10 you know?
11 A. I don't.
12 Q. Okay.
13 A. I know they get updated regularly.
14 Q. Okay. Do you know how long JBLM has been operating off base
15 as far as assisting --
16 A. Since I have been employed here. So at least that long, 15
17 years, 16 years.
18 Q. Fifteen years? Okay.
19 A. It's been that way since I have been here.
20 Q. Okay. Now you operate according to the Washington state
21 protocol as for as the patient care protocol. Are you familiar
22 with that protocol?
23 A. It's actually not Washington State. We're Washington state
24 certified EMS providers operating under Pierce County EMS
25 protocol.

1 Q. I'm sorry. Pierce County is what I'm saying. Pierce County
2 EMS protocols. Are you familiar with the protocol?
3 A. I am.
4 Q. Okay. So explain to me exactly how the DMCCs are actually
5 put together.
6 A. Okay. So so the DMCCs are Disaster Medical Control Centers.
7 The intent behind that is that when we have a mass casualty
8 incident, and the mass casualty incident is defined for us as
9 three red patients or five of any color. And color triage is red,
10 yellow, green. And so any time that we have more than three
11 patients, we are supposed to be contacting -- more than three red
12 patients, we are supposed to be contacting the DMCC to give us
13 transport destinations to make sure that the hospitals receiving
14 patients are aware of how many patients they are going to get and
15 the patient load gets balanced appropriately.
16 Our Primary DMCC is Good Sam Hospital out of Spanaway, and
17 then our secondary is Madigan, and that's a backup in case
18 something goes wrong.
19 So then the transport officer gets established or the medical
20 group supervisor, if it doesn't get established, that transport
21 officer makes contact with the DMCC, establishes that we have a
22 mass casualty incident, this is the number of patients I have, and
23 I need transport destinations for them. And the DMCC nurse on the
24 line will give them, you know, you can send so many reds here, so
25 many yellows here, and so many here, and they basically divvy it

1 out. And that's an ongoing communication process that'll continue
2 throughout the entire incident.
3 Q. Okay. All right. Primary is Good Sam --
4 A. Yep.
5 Q. -- and Madigan is the second. Do you know exactly how many
6 DMCCs were actually stood up in this incident?
7 A. I don't.
8 Q. Okay.
9 A. That would have been the responsibility of the medical groups
10 supervisor.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. I know for sure one.
13 Q. And that one was?
14 A. Good Sam.
15 Q. Okay. So I guess my question then would be your medical
16 officer Nicole McCollough -- is that it?
17 A. Yep. McCollough.
18 Q. Is there a way for me to contact her?
19 A. I could certainly pass on her cell phone information.
20 Q. Or I think you have my cell phone.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Please feel free to give it to her and just ask her to --
23 A. Certainly.
24 Q. -- I just wanted to ask her a question.
25 A. Okay.

1 Q. Okay.
2 MS. HARLEY: Right now, while I'm thinking about some
3 additional questions, would you like to ask a question?
4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.
5 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
6 Q. Your engine company staffing --
7 A. Our minimum staffing is -- I'm writing a note before I
8 forget.
9 Q. Oh, no problem.
10 A. I'll forget that by the time we are all done. Our minimum
11 company staffing is four.
12 Q. And are those paramedic engines or ALS?
13 A. There are several. So the way we have it set up, this
14 station -- so Station 101 and Station 106 are ALS stations, where
15 they have ALS engines.
16 Q. Uh-huh.
17 A. Station 104 is part-time ALS, so if the staffing is
18 sufficient then they'll have it, and then the rest are all BLS.
19 MS. KLUTE: You said 104?
20 MR. BARNARD: Yes, 101 and 106 are all the time; 104 is
21 second -- part time. Sorry. Stumbling.
22 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
23 Q. Okay. And then do you want to explain what type of training
24 or any type of training the department has received regarding
25 railroads?

1 A. Sure. And I can't give you specifics.
2 Q. Yeah, that's fine.
3 A. Our training branch can provide that. But just in the last
4 few months actually as we were spinning up for this rail extension
5 up here, our guys have been doing training with Amtrak to help
6 them identify -- unfortunately, I wasn't able to attend any of
7 that training myself because I was off duty or actually had a hand
8 injury the prevented me from coming. But we had, as far as I
9 know, at least 3 full day training operations that were set up
10 where we had people rotating through and getting training, if not
11 more.
12 Q. Were there any materials that was left behind for folks like
13 you who didn't attend?
14 A. I received a lot of materials via email.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. And actually, I have one in my inbox I still haven't read yet
17 because I didn't have a chance. I got it that morning.
18 Q. Any feedback from the engine companies regarding, you know,
19 after the fact, now that they've been to an accident, did the
20 training help them?
21 A. Oh, yeah. Yeah. You know, I talked -- so far, I've only had
22 an opportunity to exchange with some of the engine companies, but
23 the guys that were there were -- I mean, it was like, geez, didn't
24 realize we were going to have to use that training so quickly.
25 And then I had one that I was talking to yesterday that was

1 remembering the shutdown procedures, that there was a specific
2 button that they could push in order to shut down the engine, and
3 he was actually the one who did it. You know, so that kind of
4 stuff, they pull right back into.
5 Q. Great. Thank you. And, of course, work with Liz, after you
6 get debriefed and definitely talk to her about what worked, what
7 didn't on the training.
8 A. Yeah. I know like when we were talking about out there, she
9 had talked about, you know, certain things to do or not to do and
10 try to get these guys to understand how heavy the windows were
11 going to be when they had to kick them out. And they now realize
12 that she wasn't kidding, that they are really heavy window when
13 they come out. And that was something that they were mentally
14 prepared for too. It was pretty cool.
15 Q. Any difficulties opening doors or windows or anything like
16 that that you heard of?
17 A. Not that I heard of yet. So I know that some of our engine
18 companies used spreaders on some of the doors to get them open.
19 But, you know, when you looked at the configuration of cars, you
20 know, it doesn't surprise me something had to be forced.
21 Q. Right.
22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You guys expecting anybody from
23 Amtrak? I've got two gentlemen out here from Amtrak.
24 MS. KLUTE: I'll be right back.
25 BY MS. HARLEY:

1 Q. So can I ask you, first of all, can you tell me all the units
2 from JBLM that actually responded? I know you had six engine
3 companies. Did you have anybody else?
4 A. I actually had more than that. So we had Engine 1 through 6
5 that showed up, and then Engine 1031, which is actually a
6 secondary engine, had staffed with off-duty personnel. And then
7 we had another engine 1081 that came on, another reserve rig that
8 had come with additional personnel.
9 In total, we had a lot -- because for us, I don't know if I
10 said it or not, it actually a shift change day. So I had an
11 entire company -- our entire 42 people on duty that were already
12 here and then 42 that were incoming. And so, when the call came
13 out, a lot of the guys who were incoming came on rigs and we had
14 companies coming in with five and six, not four. You know, we had
15 companies come in doubling down. So that's one of the reasons why
16 we had such a big response from our own agency.
17 Q. Okay. Can you tell me -- and, again, this is probably
18 something I'm going to have to get from your communications. Can
19 you estimate when the last patient was transported from the scene?
20 A. I can't -- I could estimate, because I know that in my head
21 and what I said to people, we got 95 patients off the scene in 90
22 minutes, was about what we estimated everything at. And that was
23 when everything had slowed down and we were taking the 19 people
24 that were designated uninjured and put them on a bus and
25 transferred them over to Dupont City Hall for reunification and

1 secondary evaluation. So bout 90 minutes.
2 Q. Okay.
3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You said 95 in --
4 MR. BARNARD: 95 off in 90 minutes was our final count. So
5 yeah, those are the only numbers that we had hard were, from us,
6 95 patients were evaluated on the scene; 19 of them were
7 designated noninjured and transported by bus; and then the 3
8 fatalities.
9 BY MS. HARLEY:
10 Q. Okay. All right. If I wanted to get a copy of your radio
11 runs and your CAD printouts from your communications, who do I
12 talk to?
13 A. Its Jeff Rodeman, and he's the director of the dispatch
14 center.
15 Q. Is that R-o-d-e-man?
16 A. Yep. Just as it sounds.
17 Q. Okay. And he's the director of dispatch?
18 A. Yep.
19 MS. KLUTE: Do you have a number for him?
20 MR. BARNARD: I do. Let's see what I got -- I think I only
21 have his cell, but 253-376-2016.
22 BY MS. HARLEY:
23 Q. After action reports. Will you be generating an after-action
24 report?
25 A. Right now, I have been asked to -- that's not my

1 responsibility. Someone else has been tasked to start working the
2 after actions. I don't know who specifically and what their
3 responsibility is. I know that the deputy chief asked me to step
4 out for mental health.
5 Q. Okay. And the other thing would be a post-incident
6 debriefing with the agencies that are involved. Will that also
7 take place?
8 A. Our goal is to, yes, absolutely.
9 Q. And will that also include all of the agencies that were
10 involved?
11 A. That would be our goal.
12 Q. Okay.
13 A. Right now, with the last few days have been strictly on the
14 incident stress debriefing and --
15 Q. Absolutely.
16 A. -- I got to get through that.
17 Q. That's the most important thing. Okay.
18 MS. KLUTE: Could you call when you come on the 10th?
19 MR. BARNARD: I'm sure you could. I'm sure we'd want you
20 there.
21 MS. KLUTE: Because we'll be having the 230 -- 239 debrief as
22 well.
23 MR. BARNARD: Yeah.
24 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Do you have --
25 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

1 Q. Yes. We talked about previous drills, familiarization. Has
2 any of your crew ever been on the equipment, this type?
3 A. On the trains themselves?
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. I can't speak to that unfortunately.
6 Q. More broad questions. Challenges being blocked cars,
7 vehicles, different frequencies, possibly entering in the cars --
8 any other challenges?
9 A. Those were the big ones, and that was really it. You know, I
10 can't -- I mean, other than that, our crews did a really good job
11 with what they had, in my opinion.
12 Q. Okay. So going to advantages, an open lane to the site,
13 shift change you had additional resources.
14 A. Yep.
15 Q. Any more advantages there?
16 A. So open lanes to that -- well, and then the geographical
17 location, as weird as it sounds, because of where it happened and
18 Thurston County being at the south end and us being at the north
19 end, actually allowed for a lot of resources to converge on that
20 scene. If it would have been -- I was talking about it with the
21 guys -- maybe a few hundred feet down is actually a radio
22 communications dead zone and all the radio communications stop
23 because of the way the hill. For both agencies there's no
24 repeater down there, and so we would actually have been unable to
25 do any radio calls. So if it would have been too much farther

1 down, it would have been in a really bad spot.
2 Q. Any other discussion from any of the firefighters entering
3 the cars; did you hear any as far as challenges from those folks
4 or advantages or --
5 A. Not necessarily specifically. I mean, we had a lot of heavy
6 extrications that were done. I can't specifically tell you what
7 they were doing. I just know that I had guys requesting heavy
8 extrication equipment. We do know -- I'm sure we all know about
9 the one truck that was pinned underneath there, which was going to
10 present its own issue if we couldn't get the people out, which is
11 the reason why we had requested cranes. The initial incident
12 commanders actually had two cranes inbound, and they were within
13 the vicinity of the incident when we finally deemed everybody out.
14 So we were actually able to get heavy duty cranes on its way,
15 which would have been -- if we needed them, we had them.
16 Q. Great. One last question. Any firefighters injured or --
17 A. I am aware of one individual who injured his knee. He was
18 from Madigan Ambulance. I believe it was just in the, you know,
19 hustle and bustle of getting patients. I'm not aware of any other
20 injuries.
21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Mark.
22 BY MR. GALLEGOS:
23 Q. So I understand that the county line, Pierce County and
24 Thurston County, do you include -- you have the tri-counties up
25 here, right? Or there's five counties that you work with up here

1 during the disaster preparedness?
2 A. I'm not sure if I understand.
3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You mean jurisdiction of the five
4 counties.
5 BY MR. GALLEGOS:
6 Q. The jurisdiction.
7 A. Okay.
8 Q. So, being that the county line being so close, do you ever
9 communicate with like Thurston County?
10 A. Yeah. We don't do as much joint training with Thurston
11 County as we do with like Dupont and Pierce County. But we do
12 have -- because the line is actually like right at the base of the
13 hill down there. So we actually frequently end up rolling out on
14 responses and both agencies getting on scene and us having
15 communications with each other. But the training wise, it's
16 probably -- we do it annually but not quite as frequently as we do
17 with Dupont.
18 Q. And then the other question I had is: After the victims are
19 separated to red, yellow, green --
20 A. Uh-huh.
21 Q. -- does somebody do an accounting of the patients that were
22 sent to this hospital, to this hospital, to this hospital?
23 A. Yeah. That's the transport --
24 Q. And then to stand-down the hospitals that are not going to
25 receive patients?

1 A. So to answer both your questions, the transport individual,
2 transport officer is the one who's got the responsibility to say
3 this patient went there and keep that log. And that's the only
4 person who keeps a log. Because of the number of patients, we
5 don't have anybody else keeping logs. They tag, they move, then
6 they eventually get transported. When they get transported, they
7 get numbered and then they get logged.
8 And then as far as the standing down, once the disaster
9 medical plan is set up, our guys do not communicate with any
10 hospitals. They are told specifically not to. And the DMCC does
11 all communication with all hospitals, so that way our transport
12 units are not trying to communicate with hospitals that are
13 inundated with communications. So it would be the DMCC that would
14 have to stand people down.
15 Q. Okay. Thank you.
16 A. Yeah.
17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No questions.
18 MR. BARNARD: Okay. He said no.
19 MS. HARLEY: Okay. I just want to make sure.
20 MS. KLUTE: Can I ask a question?
21 MS. HARLEY: Oh, absolutely. Oh, I'm sorry.
22 MS. KLUTE: That's okay.
23 MS. HARLEY: Skipped right over you. I'm sorry.
24 BY MS. KLUTE:
25 Q. I just really needed to know did you get all your equipment

1 back?
2 A. I'm tracking right now, that Lacey is the last one that
3 sounds like they may have gotten some stuff that -- the stokes.
4 Q. Got the stokes, portable stokes.
5 A. Did they get ahold of you?
6 Q. They did not, but I heard it from Chief Garrison.
7 A. Yeah, I asked them to get ahold of you.
8 Q. If you can ask them again to get ahold of me or give me the
9 contact.
10 A. Yeah, I'll give you the contact information. That's probably
11 best.
12 Q. And have you guys done an accounting of your resources?
13 A. As far as equipment or --
14 Q. Utilization.
15 A. Utilization, you mean like number of engines and stuff like
16 that or --
17 Q. No. I mean like blankets and anything that you basically
18 used up that you're going to want to talk to us about.
19 A. I don't think we have anything else that we need as far as
20 things that -- we went through and accounted for everything and
21 we're -- just the two batteries which we found, and then the
22 stokes were the only things that were absolutely used up.
23 Q. Okay. Great. Are you guys the one that put up the big white
24 tent, the ground white tent?
25 A. I don't know. Oh, no, you talking about that -- no, that was

1 somebody else. I think that was the IMT team that had that put up
2 for warmth.
3 Q. Okay. And I guess my last question is, and I probably know
4 the answer, would you be willing to have the rest of your
5 firefighters receive training, including yourself --
6 A. Absolutely.
7 Q. -- go through the training?
8 A. Yeah, they actually spoke highly of that training, and now
9 they want it more.
10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is that training on the Talgo
11 equipment or is that training on --
12 MS. KLUTE: I train on Talgo equipment, the Cascades
13 equipment, because that would go through you too. We also cover
14 freight, and we also cover Sound Transit. Because eventually
15 Sound Transit will be going to Olympia. So when we do the
16 training, I'm pretty comprehensive about it and, if they're
17 available, I'll bring Sound Transit in. We'll bring Operation
18 Lifesaver in. We'll bring BNSF in. So -- and they'll do little
19 components of it.
20 And then we also work with Justin Piper out of BNSF for
21 hazmat training. And then they also, Amtrak police and BNSF
22 jointly do accident investigation training for law enforcement.
23 So that's one that we haven't done yet here, I don't think. You
24 may have had some law enforcement guys go to the recent training
25 that Amtrak and BNSF put on, but put that on your list.

1 A. Okay.
2 Q. They do accident investigation training. We'll include your
3 MPs in if they'd like to attend.
4 A. Yeah. Our training branch --
5 MS. HARLEY: And Paul has a question.
6 BY MR. MARTINEZ:
7 Q. Yeah. I do have a question. As far as you guys coupling up,
8 is this your first train incident you guys were ever out on?
9 A. No. We -- I can't remember specifically when, but it was a
10 few years ago I had a derailment of a cargo train down on Mounts
11 Road, just a little bit further down the same line. And that
12 was --
13 Q. This would be the first passenger train?
14 A. First passenger train, that's correct.
15 Q. So you did have a little experience with --
16 A. Trains in general?
17 Q. Yeah.
18 A. But this would have been the first passenger train. And that
19 one down there, it was almost nonsignificant, other than just the
20 gravity of the fact the train left the tracks. There was no
21 injuries and it was just, you know --
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. We'll watch actually this big ass train go down the road,
24 but --
25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That was the one that sort of ended up

1 down on the road?
2 MS. HARLEY: Yeah.
3 MS. KLUTE: Yeah, on its side.
4 MR. BARNARD: Yep. And I'll make you crazy, no injuries.
5 So --
6 MS. KLUTE: Yeah, not even on the freeway. That was lucky.
7 BY MS. HARLEY:
8 Q. Okay. Well, the fun part of this is, this is where I always
9 ask people is there anything you think I should have asked you and
10 I didn't?
11 A. I don't think so. I think we covered things pretty well,
12 actually.
13 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So you have my card.
14 MR. BARNARD: Thank you.
15 MS. HARLEY: What I'm going to ask you to do for me, please,
16 is that if you think of anything, even if you think it's
17 insignificant, please give me a call, just let me know. The cell
18 number is 24 hours.
19 MR. BARNARD: Okay.
20 MS. HARLEY: Again, thank you very much. What we hope to get
21 out of this is to take a look at the whole operation, looking at
22 it as far as all the counties that are involved and all the
23 agencies are involved, and maybe we can see if there's anything we
24 can do to make it safer for you or make it go a lot smoother if,
25 God forbid, it happens again.

1 MR. BARNARD: Uh-huh.
2 MS. HARLEY: So any last?
3 (No response.)
4 MS. HARLEY: Thank you very much. And I guess that's it.
5 MR. BARNARD: Okay.
6 MS. HARLEY: So it's 10:56.
7 (Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 Interview of Christopher Barnard, Sr.
ACCIDENT NO:	RRD18MR001
PLACE:	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington
DATE:	December 23, 2017

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Letha J. Wheeler
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *
*
AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, *
WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 * Accident No.: RRD18MR001
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Interview of: DAVID RAYNARD
Assistant Chief

Fire Department Headquarters
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington

Saturday,
December 23, 2017

APPEARANCES:

SHERYL HARLEY, Survival Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

JEFFREY STEWART, Investigative Analyst
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

ELIZABETH KLUTE, Emergency Manager
Northwest Region
Amtrak

LARRY DAY, Lead forensics investigator/Passenger Rail
Safety Specialist
Federal Railroad Administration

MICHAEL LANGE
Federal Railroad Administration

PAUL MARTINEZ
Federal Railroad Administration

MARK GALLEGOS, Chief Inspector
Federal Railroad Administration, Region 7

I N D E X

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1 I N T E R V I E W

2 (10:59 a.m.)

3 MS. Harley: So, first of all, I'm Sheryl Harley and I guess
4 I need to ask you, number one, do you have any problem if I record
5 this?

6 MR. RAYNARD: No, you can record.

7 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Just want to make sure.

8 I am with the NTSB and the reason why we are here, of course,
9 is we want to talk about the train derailment, talk about your
10 response and what you saw and get your expertise; tell us what
11 went on, what worked, what didn't work, how we can make it better
12 for you.

13 And before I get started I guess I need to say that today is
14 Saturday, December 23rd; it's 2017. And it is 10:59 a.m.

15 INTERVIEW OF DAVID RAYNARD

16 BY MS. HARLEY:

17 Q. And I'm sorry, sir, your name?

18 A. My name is David Raynard. I'm a battalion chief with Joint
19 Base Lewis-McChord. I was assigned as the operations chief
20 officer for the incident.

21 I arrived in shortly after Chief Barnard did and initiated
22 command, and I had made contact with him and so I was assigned for
23 the operational period for the incident. And then at that point I
24 immediately went into the hazard area and completed a three-side
25 view of the accident just to get a size-up of it. I didn't walk

1 back through the wooded area on the southwest side to where a lot
2 of the cars had been overturned into that area because there was
3 heavy access issues in there and I just needed to get visual on
4 the total area, size of where things were at.
5 At that point the front locomotive conductor-engineer had
6 been extricated, removed. He had quite a bit of facial trauma.
7 He was alert and oriented. He was being cared for by bystanders
8 there. We had additional units that were still coming, so we were
9 assigning them as they were coming in. I was getting the overall
10 size-up so I could start putting in a priority list on making
11 those assignments.
12 The second individual that was in the lead locomotive, he was
13 also being extricated, and he had a leg injury, but, again, alert
14 and oriented there. And so we -- there was a locomotive that was
15 on the south side on I-5 that was impact with the tractor-trailer,
16 semi-truck. There was also a pickup truck that was involved
17 underneath. There were two passenger vehicles, motor vehicles
18 that were on I-5 that had been impacted.
19 I did notice that there was a large wheel section that was
20 underneath I-5. One of the passenger cars was underneath the
21 overpass with the windows had all been busted out. It looked
22 relatively intact as far as structurally goes. I know that they
23 are built very rigorous. So it was just really the interior
24 contents that had just been dislodged and moved around, but there
25 was nobody in that one.

1 The next car was the one that was hanging and it had been
2 supported by the one that it was on top of, of the passenger car
3 that was on I-5. And then it was -- appeared to be kind of like
4 wedged or pushed against, back, by the passenger car that was
5 still on the tracks overhanging from the bridge. And then the
6 rear locomotive was attached to that.
7 So I had a lot of bystanders on scene that were assisting
8 people that were ambulatory, able to remove themselves. And so we
9 are just directing those to continue to move as we established the
10 treatment area and triage and transport on that emergency bypass
11 road between I-5 South and I-5 North at that Mounts Road rail
12 bridge.
13 I was assigning units for search, rescue, triage and patient
14 movements in various locations, just kind of making it
15 geographically known for the north side, the north top, which was
16 on the hill, the south, and then the southwest, which was the
17 wooded area. And the units were coming on scene and given those
18 assignments for those search, recues, triage and patient
19 movements.
20 I became aware that the rear locomotive engineer-conductor
21 had made his way to the incident commander and given his statement
22 and information to him, notifying that there were an amount of
23 ambulatory patients that were up on the hill as well. And, so,
24 moving those down to the treatment triage area.
25 Some of the things that ended up being, I guess, a hindrance

1 would have been accessibility for some of the passenger cars, and
2 if there was a need for heavy extrication, the required tools and
3 equipment wouldn't have been really available. Because we have
4 standard hydraulic and electric cutters and spreaders that are
5 manufactured by Hurst, and those are fantastic tools, but because
6 of the very strong structural integrity of the passenger cars, I
7 don't know if they would have done much damage to them. I kind of
8 look at it in the same realm as an aircraft. We are not going to
9 be cutting through really any components there. Sure, the skin of
10 it we can cut. Aircrafts will have designated "cut here"
11 instances, and so -- especially military wise. I mean, they don't
12 really care about how pretty it looks. It's all functional at
13 that point.
14 That may have been helpful, maybe a little bit more sits on
15 the functional rather than the appearance side of it. You know, a
16 well-designated, you know, this is a soft spot here; you could
17 definitely take this entire panel of this side of this passenger
18 car to be able to take out some victims and patients, that when we
19 package them they're in a very large container and they don't fit
20 through those doors. They don't fit through those aisles.
21 The Sounder Transit Line, I've ridden that, and that one has
22 very wide aisles going through that. But with the Amtrak
23 passenger cars there, they were very narrow.
24 Let's see. The communications. When there were crews that
25 were interior of the passenger cars, they had hard time actually

1 getting the transmissions in them, and then getting the
2 transmissions out, it kind of came in and out a little bit broken.
3 And so, I don't know if it has something to do with the material
4 that the railcar is made out of. So, there was that.
5 Having a lot of different agencies on scene, we all operate
6 here on a few different bands. I don't believe it's a fault to
7 the agencies. It's just those are what we have available to us,
8 you know. In the government, we're operating on our bandwidth and
9 so we don't have the funding to really add a whole other system on
10 top of it. It just doesn't happen.
11 But the benefit was when we got those additional departments'
12 chief officers on scene, they all made their way into the unified
13 command and so you had contact with the different agencies through
14 command to each operational division that we had set up. And so,
15 I -- the only communication I could get from the opposite
16 operational division was doing a face-to-face with them and just
17 say, okay, this is where I'm at; this is what we are doing right
18 now. And he would say, yep, this is where we're at and this is
19 what we're doing right now. And we continued doing that back and
20 forth with each other. But command had the full picture after we
21 would give our conditions, actions, and needs that we were
22 completing, they were getting that from all sides of the
23 communication. And so, you know, they would get the full picture
24 on that side.
25 Yeah, continuing with the search and the triage and the

1 patient movement over to treatment and transport, continued on
2 through their finding the victims that we did have to triage as
3 black or obviously dead. We had completed that, and after we had
4 had the complete initial primary and secondary searches done, we
5 completed a full accountability in par of all the first responders
6 that were on scene. And then getting with a whole separate team
7 that hadn't been in the areas yet to do a final all-clear through
8 everywhere. And that way it's just a -- it's a good practice for
9 us when we can do that all-clear side with somebody that can say,
10 you know, I haven't seen anything yet, and they're going to look
11 everywhere to get those maybe final victims.
12 Q. So my question to you -- let's talk about accountability of
13 personnel.
14 A. Uh-huh.
15 Q. So you have all these individuals that are coming to the
16 scene. You've got your on-duty personnel. You've got off-duty
17 personnel who are coming in to assist. You have members of the
18 base that came out to assist. You have all these various agencies
19 coming out. Explain to me how the accounting system is
20 specifically right now for the firefighters.
21 A. So for accountability of bystanders or of those good
22 Samaritans out there, really that portion just comes down to
23 acknowledging that they're there and then start removing them from
24 the area. Saying like, okay, you know, thank you; you know, if
25 you can help somebody here right now, continue moving these people

1 out. And so, you know, that is just that on the spot and their
2 being removed from the scene.
3 For accountability in JBLM fire and emergency services, we
4 have a pass accountability system and we have individual tags for
5 the people and they keep those with the units. And we also have a
6 printout of the shift through our staffing roster. So we have a
7 good number of who is on duty in there.
8 This was special in the fact that it happened on a day of an
9 operational change in between shifts. Right at -- our shift
10 changes at 8:00 in the morning. And so, we have some people that
11 will be in 7, 7:30, already doing their pass-on with each other.
12 And so, you could have a complement of two complete crews at the
13 station at that time. In some instances, that's what we had. We
14 had an entire off-duty operational crew and an entire on-duty
15 crew. And when the call came in, some of them did, both off-going
16 and on, come to the scene.
17 And so, at that point, it's -- you know, when they're
18 reporting into the scene, they get assigned to their area. And
19 then when they get there, they're checking in there. And so I had
20 radio coms with some that were coming in, and when they came into
21 report I would give their assignments there. So I had
22 accountability of those that were coming in being assigned to the
23 operational side.
24 Q. So my question is: How do you account for the individuals
25 that are coming from, for example, Pierce County and for Thurston

1 County? How do their pass -- who do they give their pass to? Who
2 accounts for them?
3 A. It would be for the division that they are being assigned
4 into. So they were coming in through incident command and they
5 may be assigned to the south operations. And so the chief officer
6 that was there would then account for them on that portion there.
7 As far as any units that were coming in that weren't assigned to
8 me, I didn't have their accountability of. And then the overall
9 is with the incident commander as well.
10 Q. Okay. So the chief officer that they're -- so, let's back
11 up.
12 A. Okay.
13 Q. So let's say, for example, I am from West Pierce Fire
14 Department.
15 A. Uh-huh.
16 Q. I respond to the scene and at this particular point I'm just
17 told to respond. So I get on the scene and now I have no
18 communication with JBLM. Okay.
19 A. Uh-huh.
20 Q. And where do I go? So I go to who? Who is giving me my
21 instructions and then who is responsible for me?
22 A. Right.
23 Q. Who do I give my pass to?
24 A. So the incident commander will get the notification of the
25 units that are responding, hopefully. If we don't have coms, like

1 you're saying, if it is Pierce County that's coming in and we
2 don't have in that unified command yet a Pierce County
3 representative and we don't have anybody there that has coms with
4 them, they could essentially get to scene and then, without them
5 physically coming up and saying this is where I'm coming in from,
6 this is who I have, at that point you would have the visual
7 accountability of them coming on scene. But without having the
8 radio communications, you may not know until they get there.
9 Q. Got it. I understand. Okay. So let's start from the
10 beginning. Where were you when the call came in?
11 A. I was at Station 104 on Lewis North, Building 11565.
12 Q. And approximately what time did you receive the call?
13 A. Approximately like 7:40 time frame in the morning. It was
14 right around 7:40, 7:45.
15 Q. Okay. All right. And you responded from 104 with what
16 pieces of apparatus?
17 A. Just the Battalion 101 Ford pickup command vehicle.
18 Q. Okay. All right. And approximately how long did it take you
19 to arrive on the scene?
20 A. There was heavy traffic on I-5 southbound when I had made
21 access at 120. It was slow going until I got to -- the benefit,
22 the construction that has almost completed on that extra shoulder,
23 lane, whatever it's going to be -- I don't know yet -- and so that
24 was still coned off but it was wide enough for our vehicles to
25 access and then we were shooting down from there.

1 So until we could get to there and then when that ended, it
2 was gridlock because people were all out of their vehicles already
3 so nobody was there to move vehicles. So I had to actually walk
4 up to the scene a few hundred feet from my vehicle because the
5 passenger vehicles on I-5 had been abandoned. Some of those
6 people were coming back to move their vehicles so our apparatus
7 could make their way through.
8 I would -- without actually looking at the timestamps, it
9 would just be a guess what my actual response time was.
10 Q. Okay. Do you know how many JBLM units were on the scene
11 prior to your arrival?
12 A. There was one structural engine and then three chief
13 officers.
14 Q. Okay. All right. So let's talk about the train. When you
15 arrived on the scene, do you know if the train was still running?
16 A. It didn't sound like the train had been running. But while
17 we were doing our searches and -- the train was confirmed shut
18 down. The lead locomotive was not running.
19 Q. Okay. Did you go inside the train car?
20 A. I did not.
21 Q. Okay. And you said you spoke to a member of the crew?
22 A. No. I did not speak to a member of the crew.
23 Q. Okay. Did you see anyone from the crew?
24 A. Yes. I saw the two that were in the lead locomotive that
25 were being treated and then we were transferring them to triage

1 and transport.
2 Q. Okay. I see. You just saw that. You didn't actually speak
3 to them. Okay.
4 Okay. When you arrived on the scene, do you know if there
5 were any lights on inside of the train?
6 A. I cannot recall if there were lights on inside the train.
7 Q. Did you see any victims that were ejected or partially
8 ejected when you were walking to the scene?
9 A. When I was walking to the scene I did not see anybody that
10 appeared to be ejected.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. Just walking wounded.
13 Q. Okay. So you've got -- my understanding was you were able to
14 do at least a three-sided view of the scene --
15 A. Right.
16 Q. -- that you did not go up on the hill or into the woods, the
17 wooded area?
18 A. I was up on the top of the hill. I did not go down the back
19 side of the hill on either side into the woods.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. But I was up on the north side tracks on the hill and then
22 around all the way to the southbound I-5 where the locomotive had
23 come back over the guardrail. I just didn't venture into the
24 woods.
25 Q. Okay. Got it. So a lot of your communication on the scene

1 was face-to-face with various chiefs from different agencies that
2 were there?
3 A. Well, there was the communication I had with some of the on-
4 coming chief officers. I had radio coms with all of the JBLM
5 units that were on scene.
6 Q. Correct. Okay. All right.
7 MS. HARLEY: I tell you what, why don't you ask questions
8 while I remember my other questions.
9 MR. DAY: Okay. No problem.
10 BY MR. DAY:
11 Q. I'm Larry Day with the Federal Railroad Administration. A
12 quick -- now was there any issues with your communications with
13 staging when you would request resources from them?
14 A. I requested any resources through the incident command.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. I didn't request anything from a staging because the staging
17 would report to the incident command.
18 Q. Okay. Did you hear of anybody having to use any Hurst tools
19 or any extrication equipment on passenger cars themselves?
20 A. We were using it for trying to gain access into one of the
21 latrines that was in the hanging locomotive, and it had -- it was
22 a unique situation and they were able to gain access by basically
23 forcing the jam with some hand tools as well. But I did not get a
24 report they physically had to do any cutting of the components of
25 the actual passenger cars.

1 Q. Any issues where they tried to open doors using emergency
2 handles or --
3 A. I didn't get any reports that there were any issues with the
4 emergency doors.
5 Q. Or widows or anything like --
6 A. I did get reports those windows were heavy. It was two or
7 more people to move some of those windows. One of the access
8 issues in the hanging railcar was a window that was in the path of
9 travel that they had to move so that they could continue with the
10 search and then a removal of a victim there.
11 Q. Switching gears to any training you had received regarding
12 passenger trains recently?
13 A. We had the representatives come out for the initial training
14 for the start of this rail line to JBLM, and so we had had that
15 scheduled for the department. I did not -- be able to attend it.
16 I was not on duty.
17 Q. Have you heard from folks whether that helped them or
18 provided more --
19 A. It was good basis to have that. Possibly, maybe, a follow-on
20 of it instead of just the one shot, you know, here it is. I guess
21 on a reoccurring would have been a beneficial portion.
22 MR. DAY: Thank you.
23 That's all I have, Sheryl.
24 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Liz, I'll start with you first.
25 MS. KLUTE: He just got one of my questions answered.

1 BY MS. KLUTE:
2 Q. If we come out and offer the training again, which we intend
3 to, would you attend the training?
4 A. Oh, of course. I would have attended it in the first round
5 if it wasn't for my duty status and leave. I was traveling.
6 Q. Hopefully we will get everyone trained.
7 A. Uh-huh.
8 Q. Because we did a pretty good shot with (indiscernible) --
9 A. Yeah. No, there was a large -- and we have that. It's just
10 a nature of our work schedules.
11 Q. Right. So your radios, are they two channel or three
12 channel?
13 A. So we have basically two frequency bands --
14 Q. Two frequency.
15 A. -- but within them we have multiple channels and multiple
16 banks.
17 Q. So I guess that was my question. So they're two frequency,
18 not three frequency?
19 A. Two.
20 Q. And how new are your radios?
21 A. Fairly new. Within 5 years. I guess in the overall scheme
22 of things new.
23 Q. When you ordered them, do you know if you asked for three-
24 channel radios?
25 A. I don't have any information for the procurement.

1 Q. Okay. I keep saying channel. I mean frequency.
2 MS. KLUTE: That's all I have.
3 MS. HARLEY: Mike.
4 BY MR. LANGE:
5 Q. Just to follow up a little bit on Larry's question, the
6 bathroom you said you had to get in.
7 A. Uh-huh.
8 Q. Did they bring anybody out of the bathroom?
9 A. Yes. There was a father and a child.
10 Q. It was?
11 A. They were I believe in the bathroom at the time of the
12 accident and then unable to self-extricate because of the door.
13 Q. Status of their injuries?
14 A. I don't have a follow-up status.
15 Q. Okay. So we talked about challenges/advantages. Definitely
16 challenges: blocked cars, different frequencies, entering the
17 cars, tools. Any other challenges broadly thinking of?
18 A. I guess no, just that accessibility side.
19 Q. Okay. Advantages: open lane to site, additional resources.
20 A. I think -- well, the location of the derailment for an actual
21 geographical spot did give us assistance. I think if it would
22 have been any further south it would have been a much harder scene
23 just for the side of communication. Because we travel any further
24 south we lose our repeaters completely, and so when we try and
25 talk to dispatch to get resources, we get nothing. We almost have

1 to put a follow-on person farther -- closer to the repeater so
2 they can catch us, and then they can relay that information. And
3 then you're playing that telephone game, are they giving that full
4 picture that you intended to? So just the sheer location of where
5 our repeater was and the derailment itself was a benefit.
6 Having the emergency bypass installed right there from the
7 construction, that was a benefit to us because it was a great site
8 for a large treatment triage area and then a turnaround for
9 transporting agencies to get onto northbound and gone. And then
10 the county line with Thurston, they were -- no southbound traffic
11 was traveling so they had access right that all right Nisqually
12 114 and they just traveled northbound on southbound I-5.
13 So that just took a moment before we could basically relay
14 that or oncoming units could realize there's nobody traveling
15 anymore down the freeway.
16 MR. LANGE: Okay. Thank you. That's all.
17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No questions at this time.
18 MS. HARLEY: No? I've got one question.
19 BY MS. HARLEY:
20 Q. Do you have a sense of when the last patient was actually
21 extricated from the train or transported from the scene?
22 A. The last two patients that we were extricating were the
23 heavier entrapped. One was in the passenger pickup vehicle, motor
24 vehicle that was down on I-5 kind of sandwiched in between the
25 passenger railcar and the semi. That just took additional tools

1 and resources to remove the equipment around that person.
2 And then the other one was back on the southwest side in the
3 wooded area in one of the passenger railcars that just access into
4 it and out of it was very limited. They had to make access
5 through a window and then they had to do some packaging and then
6 back out the window through a ladder. It's kind of like a slide
7 for that.
8 Those were the last two. Timewise, I want to say it was
9 right within an hour.
10 Q. Okay. And just to make sure I'm clear. We were talking
11 about the accessibility and the standard Hurst tools that you're
12 using and I just wanted to clarify some things. Are you saying
13 that it would be better if there are more access points --
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. -- where there's signage which says, this is the area here
16 you want to cut --
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. -- in order to gain more access?
19 A. Yep.
20 Q. So that's what you're looking at?
21 A. That's what I was referring to there.
22 Q. Okay. All right.
23 A. Just the visual indicators.
24 Q. A little bit more visual indication as to the best way of
25 getting in. Okay. Great. Out of curiosity, do you know how the

1 -- do you know the Pierce County emergency EMS protocol? Do you
2 know anything about that?
3 A. Our triage?
4 Q. Yeah.
5 A. Yeah, we follow Pierce County protocol for our medical
6 evaluation and triage.
7 Q. Do you know how your DMCCs are set up?
8 A. Our DMCCs are set up?
9 Q. Yeah.
10 A. The DMCC was set up through the EMS branch and triage on the
11 scene there.
12 Q. Okay.
13 A. So we contact through the DMCC and they coordinate with the
14 triage officer on scene to make the numbers on acceptability of
15 where they can take certain numbers of category patients.
16 Q. Do you have some sense as to which hospital was the DMCC?
17 A. I wasn't running the triage.
18 Q. Okay. All right. Okay. So I guess my question to you now
19 would be is there any question you think I should have asked you
20 and I failed to do so?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Is there anything else that you think we need to go over, we
23 need to discuss?
24 A. No. I don't believe there is.
25 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Assistant Chief Barnard has my phone

1 number. There is a cell number on it, and what I always tell
2 people is, if later on after you think about this and you think of
3 something, even if you think it's insignificant, please feel free
4 to give me a call. The cell number is a 24-hour number.
5 Okay. And that will be it. And thank you very much, sir, I
6 appreciate you taking the time to talk to us.
7 MR. RAYNARD: Oh, thank you for coming out and taking your
8 times as well.
9 MS. HARLEY: And my understanding is your crews did a really
10 good job, so --
11 MR. RAYNARD: I'm very proud of them, yes.
12 MS. HARLEY: Absolutely. Thank you, sir. Merry Christmas.
13 MR. RAYNARD: Merry Christmas.
14 MS. HARLEY: And it's 11:32.
15 (Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 Interview of David Raynard
ACCIDENT NO:	RRD18MR001
PLACE:	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington
DATE:	December 23, 2017

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

Letha J. Wheeler
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *
*
AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, *
WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 * Accident No.: RRD18MR001
*
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Interview of: RICHARD SCOTT
Firefighter

Fire Department Headquarters
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington

Saturday,
December 23, 2017

APPEARANCES:

SHERYL HARLEY, Survival Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

JEFFREY STEWART, Investigative Analyst
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

ELIZABETH KLUTE, Emergency Manager
Northwest Region
Amtrak

LARRY DAY, Lead forensics investigator/Passenger Rail
Safety Specialist
Federal Railroad Administration

MICHAEL LANGE
Federal Railroad Administration

PAUL MARTINEZ
Federal Railroad Administration

MARK GALLEGOS, Chief Inspector
Federal Railroad Administration, Region 7

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1 I N T E R V I E W

2 (11:36 a.m.)

3 MS. Harley: So let me start off. First of all, it is
4 Saturday, December 23rd -- I don't know why I have to keep looking
5 at the date -- 2017. And it is now 11:36 a.m.
6 My name is Sheryl Harley. I am an investigator with the
7 National Transportation Safety Board. My area that I am looking
8 into is what we call survival factors. This is where we talk to
9 the first responders who were on the scene. We find out what went
10 on. We find out if they encountered any difficulties in doing
11 their jobs. We will ask you about the victims and if there was
12 something -- essentially what we're looking at is survivability
13 issues both for the victim at the time of the crash and the victim
14 after the crash. And the other thing that we look at is, is there
15 anything that we can suggest that would make your life easier,
16 make it safer, possibly, if we can't prevent something like this
17 from happening again, if we can reduce the number of people who
18 are killed or we can lessen the severity. That's basically it.
19 Okay?
20 MR. SCOTT: Okay.
21 INTERVIEW OF RICHARD SCOTT
22 BY MS. HARLEY:
23 Q. So, I guess first I need to know who you are, sir.
24 A. I'm Richard Scott. I'm here at Station 101. And we were the
25 first engine on scene.

1 Q. Okay. Richard Scott. And by the way, just for the record,
2 what was your role on the engine?
3 A. On the engine, I was actually in the MSO vehicle behind the
4 engine. I was coming on duty that morning. So I was just here
5 early and it was an all-hands call. So we went out with our
6 medical safety officer in their vehicle right behind the engine.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. But I'm a firefighter EMT.
9 Q. You are a firefighter EMT. Great. Okay.
10 MS. HARLEY: And I'll just have, real quick, the people in
11 the room introduce themselves.
12 MR. DAY: Sure. I'm Larry Day with the Federal Railroad
13 Administration. Our role is to support the NTSB in this
14 investigation as well as we're also looking for Amtrak, the
15 railroad that operated the trains, their compliance with the
16 regulation called 49 CFR 239, which requires them to reach out to
17 the various fire departments, first responders, to provide
18 training and equipment orientation on the equipment so when you
19 get to something like this it's not your first time seeing it, you
20 kind of have a little bit of an idea of where the hazards are,
21 where the different things are that you need to watch out for.
22 Mike.
23 MR. LANGE: My name is Michael Lange. I'm with the Federal
24 Railroad Administration. I'm part of the FRA too, survival
25 factors. I'm here in support with the NTSB.

1 MR. SCOTT: Okay.
2 MR. GALLEGOS: Mark Gallegos, chief inspector Region 7. On
3 the forensics team with FRA to support Ms. Harley here.
4 MR. STEWART: I'm Jeff Stewart, also FRA, on the passenger
5 forensics team.
6 MR. SCOTT: Okay.
7 MR. MARTINEZ: Paul Martinez with the FRA forensic passenger
8 team.
9 MS. KLUTE: Elizabeth Klute, regional emergency manager for
10 Amtrak, and I'm here to support the NTSB on the interviews but
11 also to capture anything that you can provide as input as far as
12 what went well or what we can add to the exercising and training.
13 BY MS. HARLEY:
14 Q. Okay. So I tell you what, Richard, let's start from the
15 beginning. Approximately what time did you get the call and do
16 you remember what it was for?
17 A. It as around 7:30, somewhere around that time frame. The
18 tones went out for -- you know, we got a little ticker board so it
19 just kind of said like a motor vehicle accident or something to
20 that extent, I-5. But then it responded like "all the engines,"
21 so it kind of perked us up a little bit.
22 Dispatch came on and they said train derailment onto I-5 and,
23 which was kind of nice for them, they said -- because we had been
24 working on this for a while, like training to do this. And they
25 came through and said right at the end, not a drill. So, I mean,

1 that really stuck out. So that's what it came in as.
2 Q. Okay. All right. So you got in the truck. So just take me
3 through it.
4 A. Just take me through it.
5 Q. Uh-huh.
6 A. So the other crew had already started to get on the engine
7 because it was their response area no matter what it was. As soon
8 as we knew it was a passenger train, and they did state it was an
9 Amtrak train too so we knew it wasn't a freight train, so -- which
10 is a different scenario for us. So it was kind of nice to know
11 that. And we knew the new rail was running, that this was the
12 first day. You know, we worked up to it.
13 So they got on the engine. Me and a fellow firefighter who
14 is a paramedic that was coming on that day with me, we were both
15 at the table. Once we heard it was a derailment, we got with the
16 MSO officer. That office is right there next to the kitchen.
17 She's like I'm going too. So we went with that chief officer.
18 Got in the truck with her and bunked out on our gear and just
19 followed the engine out.
20 So I arrived on scene. Of course, getting to it was tough.
21 Luckily, I-5, they're doing construction or whatever so there was
22 a lane that they had closed off for construction, which saved us I
23 don't know how much time on that. So we actually got to go into
24 that construction lane and go all the way down to pretty close to
25 the scene. Then at that point we hit just a wall of cars and

1 people outside their vehicles taking pictures, just -- they were
2 in shock too and a lot of them, they didn't know what to do. So
3 we started just yelling and getting people in their vehicles and
4 pushing it. We had issues of vehicles where people went to go
5 help and they abandoned their vehicles and took their keys with
6 them. So we couldn't even physically move it.
7 So we had to work our way into it. Got on scene and
8 processed what we were seeing. It felt like I had a pause -- I
9 know it wasn't nearly as long as what it is in my head, but just
10 taking everything in, you know, victims on the ground, people
11 around victims. You know, the severe injury ones we could tell,
12 but the walking wounded, it was hard to tell if they were walking
13 wounded or if they were people helping the walking wounded or
14 what. So that part was kind of difficult to tell. The yellows or
15 the greens were a little harder to tell at first.
16 Then an officer tells me, kind of snapped me out of it real
17 quick, was like -- because I didn't know where to start. I mean,
18 you come up on something like that and all the training you have,
19 but once you see that many people, it takes a second like where do
20 I start on this? And he was just like, hey, check that green Kia
21 that was sitting there that was smashed.
22 So I went over there and, surprisingly, she had back pain.
23 No entrapment, just back pain. So triaged that and went on.
24 There was a nurse with her, and I said somebody else will be there
25 to take care of her, but we have to move on to the more severe.

1 Then once I took that first bite, then it just starts rolling
2 after that.
3 Then our crew moved -- at the time I was checking them I
4 think they were pulling the ladder off the engine to get on top of
5 the railcar that was flipped upside down. It surprised me that --
6 I figured I'd see fatalities once I got there, just seeing that
7 railcar upside down like that. So I was pretty surprised on that.
8 They threw it, some people started coming down the ladder,
9 and as they were coming down they started yelling that there was a
10 child stuck in a bathroom, that they couldn't get to him. So I
11 kind of stopped the people from coming down the ladder so we could
12 get our guys up there, because as soon as that ladder touched they
13 were pouring out. So it took a little bit to stop them. Then
14 hard part is everybody thinks their injury is the worst injury.
15 So trying to process that and let people know that, that's kind of
16 tough.
17 Got there, we had a baby and a father in the bathroom. Once
18 we pulled everybody out of the train -- because it was that
19 dangling car is where the baby was in. So we had to pull
20 everybody out just so I can get in, because it's so narrow where
21 that bathroom is. It just narrows off so much. So once we pulled
22 them out, I banged on the door, talked to the father, asked him
23 how they were. He couldn't really see in there because it was all
24 dark, but he says, you know, I'm doing fine; it seems like the
25 baby is doing fine.

1 So at this point I'm yelling down at the same time to get
2 tools up so we can start doing this. Then I pushed forward and
3 passed on to the next person as soon as he told me he was okay. I
4 saw two other people on the ground further up in that railcar, so
5 I pushed forward from there and passed that off to my captain off
6 of Engine 101 and another firefighter.
7 Made contact with a patient on the ground, had a -- looked to
8 be a tib-fib fracture, really apparent. Then her husband was
9 with, with a very apparent fractured arm. We kind of got bottled
10 up there as far as the ability to push forward on that car, so we
11 kind of stayed there, extricated the child out. And at the same
12 time, I was working on the rescue plan for getting this tib-fib
13 fracture out. Which training was great for that, but until it's
14 an actual incident and you get a car that's, you know, practically
15 vertical, then it's not just vertical, now it's leaning too. So
16 you're trying to walk on the sides of the seats, almost where the
17 base of the seats meet the ground, and that's kind of where your
18 step points are and, you know, luggage in there.
19 It actually bent in a section of the train where, thank
20 goodness, nobody was sitting there. But just this huge piece of
21 steel that came down and it literally crushed another seat that
22 went across the floor so you couldn't walk completely in the
23 aisleway. So, luckily, we got that -- used spreaders and trying
24 to bend that up just barely enough to where we could move that
25 seat out to help us take the patient out.

1 The windows. I remember that, how unbelievably heavy because
2 that one window blew out. Or I don't know how that window came
3 out, but there was no window in that top car, but it was sitting
4 inside and we were possibly taking a ladder to go get this lady in
5 a stokes basket and out the window on a ladder on a stokes basket,
6 is what our primary plan was because we were so backed up
7 underneath with the child. So we got a ladder up to it, and right
8 there on the seats was that window. And I went to pick that up
9 and I couldn't pick that thing up by myself, not without hurting
10 myself. So it took two of us to try to move that window over. So
11 that's something that stuck out is how heavy those windows were.
12 Got it up there and it was just -- the angle at it and it was
13 just high enough that the ladder was a little too steep to take a
14 stokes down off of it. And just kind of how it was tilted and
15 stuff, I abandoned that plan of taking it out the window. And got
16 down -- by this point the child was out of the bathroom. The
17 Engine 101 captain and another firefighter leapfrogged me because
18 we got reports through the window of a 12-year-old missing. They
19 hadn't found this 12-year-old and they were asking if we had it.
20 But we haven't searched the next car up, so those two guys bumped
21 ahead while I finished that.
22 Then it was another captain from Station 104 that was at the
23 entrance there that I was feeding my information of my needs and
24 how we were going to get these people out. And I told him that
25 primary plan is not going to work, we can't get it. And the other

1 issue we had was the stokes, you know. I don't know if you guys
2 know what I'm talking about, a stokes basket. So the stokes
3 basket, those aisles are so narrow. We can sit the stokes up on
4 the seat but we didn't know, and she was a heavier lady, how we
5 were going to get her up into that stokes basket to get out
6 anyways.
7 Then with the damage and the stuff, I don't even know if I
8 could have laid a backboard down on that ground and tried to slide
9 her out. I mean, that was our secondary plan. Because I was
10 like, I don't know how we are going to get her in the stokes
11 basket, and if we do, we're not going to get her through that
12 little door. We'd have to tip her sideways or on the side, then
13 take her out, which we could. I mean, those are made that we
14 could do that. So that was our second plan.
15 Then our third was going to go with the backboard. And at
16 that point the other -- two other firefighters were up there with
17 the patient and talking to her and trying to get her into the
18 process: Well, we're going to have to stand up. No matter what,
19 we're going to have to stand up before. So we got her to stand
20 and she's like, do you think I could try just to walk out? And
21 we're like, yes, please, if you can do that.
22 So, I mean, it was hairy, you know, little bites at a time.
23 But got her out on top of the upside-down railcar. Got her in a
24 stokes basket at that point, then took her down and the husband
25 just self-walked himself out. Husband wouldn't leave the wife,

1 which is understandable. But that's another work that we had to
2 do.
3 But then I came out of that. Once we cleared that car, came
4 out, and then went around, and that's when the truck was -- the
5 person that was stuck in the truck that was in between those
6 railcars and the semi, they started working on -- another crew is
7 extricating them. We came around the corner just to do some more
8 searches and met up with the person in charge of that and they
9 like, hey, I'm looking on a route where we can take this patient
10 out. And they were trying to take him out at first in between
11 those railcars on the south side of the trestle, so -- but there
12 was like trees down where the engine had -- the locomotives had
13 literally taken out all those trees.
14 So one of the guys I had with me, I was like, I know you're
15 good on a saw. I'm like, go get the saw and start bucking this up
16 so if we need to come out this way, we can have another egress.
17 So I sent him off to start bucking up. Then went around onto the
18 back side of the south, and that's when they pulled the two other
19 patients out on a backboard and I just kind of a helped levered
20 the backboards to the woods there.
21 Then it was done. I mean as far as we had to round up our
22 gear and, you know, we're going to do another search through, but,
23 I mean -- they say it was an hour and a half but it didn't -- it
24 seemed a lot quicker than that at points. But then at points it
25 felt like I was inside that engine for -- or inside that one car

1 forever, too, with those two patients.
2 Q. Okay. So let's start from when you arrived on the scene.
3 A. Uh-huh.
4 Q. So you arrived on the scene, you're looking at the train. Do
5 you have some sense whether the train was actually running or not?
6 A. No. No, I didn't. There were no lights on any of the cars.
7 I saw that. Everything was dark. Everything was dark inside the
8 cars.
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. So I didn't notice it.
11 Q. Okay. Did you have any contact with the train crew?
12 A. I physically did not, no.
13 Q. Okay. Okay. So the car that you entered was the car that
14 was actually hanging down?
15 A. Dangling one.
16 Q. Okay, it was the hanging car. And that was the one where the
17 father and child were trapped in the bathroom?
18 A. Bathroom, yeah, and it was on the lower end where it's making
19 contact with that car that was upside down. So it's as we
20 entered.
21 Q. Okay. And you entered from -- okay. All right. I'm trying
22 to -- in my head I'm looking at the car trying to figure out. So
23 I tell you what, the bathroom in the car, would the bathroom be
24 closer to the highway or closer to --
25 A. To the highway. So this is the upside-down railcar.

1 Q. Uh-huh.
2 A. It's sitting on here like this. We entered in on the upside-
3 down, in there, and the bathroom is right there on the left.
4 Q. Got you. All right. Now I know where you are. Thank you.
5 A. Okay.
6 MS. KLUTE: That's how I understood it, too.
7 MR. SCOTT: That's how you understood it, yeah. I figured
8 the visual a little, a visual would help.
9 BY MS. HARLEY:
10 Q. Yep. Visual aids, they always work.
11 A. Then the other two were probably two-thirds of the way up
12 there. If you look at pictures there, you can see where that
13 window was popped out on the top end, so the opposite of the
14 bathroom on the trestle side.
15 Q. Okay.
16 MS. KLUTE: On the -- that's what I was going to ask you. On
17 the trestle side.
18 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, on the trestle side. They were probably
19 two-thirds of the way up that railcar, just maybe two seats, two
20 rows down from that window that was out, two or three rows down
21 from that point where that window was out.
22 BY MS. HARLEY:
23 Q. So, when you say the window was out, you talking about the
24 window was intact but it was completely gone?
25 A. Completely out of the -- and when I arrived on scene that

1 window was gone.
2 Q. It was already gone when you got there?
3 A. Yeah.
4 Q. Okay.
5 MS. KLUTE: So, which window did you remove, this one?
6 MR. SCOTT: So, we actually ended up not removing any. I
7 just had to -- so the one up on the trestle side where that window
8 was popped out, on the trestle side it was sitting on the seats
9 right below where that window -- or where the window frame is. So
10 we had to -- because that's where we were taking the patient
11 out --
12 MS. HARLEY: So you just had to lift and move the window?
13 MR. SCOTT: -- so physically had to move it and try to get it
14 up out of our way.
15 MS. HARLEY: Got it.
16 MS. KLUTE: So it popped in; it didn't pop out?
17 MR. SCOTT: It popped in.
18 MS. HARLEY: Right. No, it popped into the train.
19 MR. SCOTT: Yeah. It was inside the train.
20 MS. HARLEY: Got you. Okay.
21 MR. SCOTT: It was inside the train.
22 BY MS. HARLEY:
23 Q. Okay. And then you say about -- and then you say two rows up
24 from that were two other people?
25 A. No. So there was a total of -- that couldn't self-extricate

1 themselves --
2 Q. Correct.
3 A. -- okay, it was husband and wife that's probably three rows
4 behind that window down towards street level.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. Then the father and child that was in the bathroom.
7 Q. Okay. All right. So those were the only four occupants that
8 were left in that train --
9 A. That could not self- --
10 Q. -- that could not extricate. So, okay. Okay. All right.
11 Did you by any chance enter any other railcars?
12 A. No. I didn't fully enter, no.
13 Q. Okay. Did you look into any other railcars and found people
14 who were unable to self-extricate?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. My primaries were that bottom one, which you could see, you
18 didn't have to enter because all the windows were out. The one
19 that was flipped upside-down, all the windows were out. You could
20 just look and see the whole inside of that one. Then the other
21 vertical railcar.
22 Q. Okay. When you looked at the one that was completely flipped
23 upside down, did you see anyone trapped inside of that one?
24 A. No, not that I noticed. I looked down there -- because I was
25 surprised. That's why I remember it so much. I was surprised

1 that we didn't have a fatality or somebody who was stuck in there
2 that we had to extricate.
3 Q. Okay. All right. Are you aware of any other unit that had
4 to break out a window in order to gain access into the train?
5 A. I know -- I said I had to -- my captain from 101 and a fellow
6 firefighter, I had them leapfrog into that next train so they --
7 that one that was half on the trestle, kind of half off -- or two-
8 thirds on the trestle, then a third off, they hopped into that
9 one, looked through that. Then that's when they hit the -- and
10 this is stories that he told me afterwards. That they went
11 through there; they tunneled their way through to get all the way
12 up to the engine, which they said was running. They got with the
13 other conductor, the one that had his arm -- I guess he was
14 deadheading or was assistant conductor or something on it. He was
15 the one that just his arm was bandaged up and he was walking
16 around. They got with him to verify shutting off that locomotive
17 all the way.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. Then they said they ended up at another railcar, I don't know
20 which one, somewhere on the south side of the trestle. And there
21 was a police officer that was inside and they couldn't -- they
22 were trying to explain to him how to pull the tabs and get the
23 window out and he couldn't hear them through it, and that's when
24 they just -- they busted the window so they could communicate.
25 Then took that window out.

1 Q. How did they break the window open, break the window?
2 A. Firefighter tools.
3 Q. Firefighter tools.
4 A. I don't know how again, ax or something. They had -- I'm not
5 a hundred percent on what tool they used to bust it, but they
6 knocked out the -- but it was still the emergency window but the
7 police officer didn't realize that there's a tab that allows you
8 to take that window out because he kept saying there was somebody
9 inside, somebody inside.
10 Q. Okay. Got it.
11 MS. KLUTE: And that was a state patrol?
12 MR. SCOTT: I don't know what police officer was inside.
13 BY MS. HARLEY:
14 Q. All righty. So you said when you arrived on the scene an
15 officer came up to you and asked you to check on a woman in a
16 green Kia.
17 A. No. Not -- I'm sorry. When I say officer, my captain.
18 Q. Your captain?
19 A. Yeah.
20 Q. Okay. Okay. Your captain.
21 A. One of our guys was like, hey, you check here while we work
22 this area.
23 Q. Okay. Was she trapped in the car?
24 A. No.
25 Q. No? Okay.

1 A. She told me -- I went up there. There was a nurse working on
2 her. She was kind of slumped over the wheel. She was talking to
3 me. So I was like what's wrong? She was like, my back. And I
4 was like, okay; I was like, is your feet entangled? Can you -- if
5 you had to get out, could you get out? And she said, yes. And
6 then I was like, okay.
7 Then I told the nurse, I was like, I'll be back. You know, I
8 had her write on her head what she was. I don't know what she
9 wrote. I had a Sharpie I gave to her, because at that point I
10 didn't have any tape on me because I was coming off the MSO
11 vehicle. But kind of make due, just write what she is so the next
12 person up didn't have to re-triage her. And I continued on.
13 Yeah. Most of the damage -- I mean, it was all the damage
14 was in front, but as far as intrusion into the cab was more on the
15 passenger side.
16 Q. Okay. So you were talking about one of the railcars where
17 you said there was a section of metal that actually had penetrated
18 the car.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And had actually crushed one of the seats.
21 A. Uh-huh.
22 Q. Which railcar are you looking at?
23 A. So that's that -- so we got the bathroom, right, we know that
24 location now.
25 Q. Yes.

1 A. So the bathroom, I think it's the next row up from the
2 bathroom.
3 Q. The next row up from the bathroom --
4 A. Yeah.
5 Q. -- is where --
6 A. It was like -- so I can tell you -- well, so you got the
7 window frame?
8 Q. Yes.
9 A. Then it was like -- so it was the half-moon shape of the
10 window, that was -- so you got the oval. If you put a line across
11 this way --
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. -- then there's this piece of metal just bent down. And it
14 bent down so much that that's what took down that seat.
15 Q. It was the frame of window?
16 A. Yeah. Frame of the window, but it was the frame of the
17 window plus the whole body. It went all the way down.
18 MS. KLUTE: Like the bulkhead?
19 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, yeah, the bulkhead. There you go. I was
20 never a sailor so -- yeah, so that bent all the way down so much
21 that it crushed that seat and broke it off the base. So we didn't
22 have to cut that off the base; we just kind of manhandled it,
23 getting it underneath -- getting it out from underneath that piece
24 of metal. But it was thick. I mean, there was no -- I tried to
25 just kind of pry up on it. I was like, well, that's not going to

1 happen. Then we moved that seat and just threw it to the side so
2 it opened up that aisle.
3 MS. KLUTE: Did you put the helmet cam or vest cam?
4 MR. SCOTT: No.
5 BY MS. HARLEY:
6 Q. All right. let's see.
7 A. That would have been on the left side of the train as you're
8 walking in from the bathroom, but not the left side, the bathroom
9 side.
10 Q. That was all left side?
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. Okay. While you were in the train, did you have any problem
13 communicating over your radios with other firefighters?
14 A. Yes. So that's one of the bigger things, I would say, and
15 it's an issue. If we would have been 200 yards further south, we
16 probably would have had no coms at all. We've got just a dead
17 zone right there by the Nisqually.
18 That, then we, you know, we border Thurston County and we
19 don't have the ability to contact Thurston County or other
20 departments. We have a dual-band radio and we need a tri-band
21 radio to be able to contact those people. So to have direct
22 communications with them, we couldn't, even if he's on one end of
23 the car and it was a Thurston County, say, a Lacey, Olympia
24 firefighter, and I'm on the other end of the car, I couldn't call
25 him on the radio and tell him something. It either had to be word

1 of mouth or I'd have to go through command; then command would
2 have to yell at their command, then back down.
3 Q. Do you know of any problems with communications that you guys
4 experienced between each other?
5 A. I reduced my radio traffic. I mean, because there was enough
6 on it. So for me to talk to people, like our plans that we're
7 coming up with -- I still had one bystander -- I still had a
8 bystander in the train that kind of got sucked up in the whole --
9 once we started extricating, they were -- actually it was two.
10 They were sucked up in there. There was no way out. They were
11 staying with the victims. I didn't know if they were victims too.
12 Once we got up there I realized they were just helpers. But at
13 that point we had already started trying to get the child out of
14 there, so they were in there with us.
15 So one was like an officer or colonel or something. I had
16 him -- he was my relay. So I used him a lot. So talking to the
17 people on the end, coming up with a plan, I just relayed a lot to
18 him, because trying to yell the whole length of a train is just
19 hard. So he was -- I would say something; he would relay it down
20 to them and back and forth. So --
21 MS. HARLEY: I'm sorry. Liz, you said you had a question?
22 BY MS. KLUTE:
23 Q. I was just wondering, do you know, the father and the child,
24 were they like down in the bottom of the bathroom or were they
25 hanging in the bathroom?

1 A. I think they were standing once we get there. He was kind of
2 leaning against the wall, because when I banged on the door he's
3 like, we're good, but I'm against the wall, so if you're going to
4 cut, I wanted to let you know where I was. And I was like, we
5 will let you know when we cut, but that's our last, last resort.
6 I mean, that's not --
7 Q. So he wasn't separated from the child? He actually had ahold
8 of the child?
9 A. They were both -- he had the child, yeah. Yeah, they were
10 together. And there was no -- other than the door not being able
11 to open, they weren't entrapped any other way inside the bathroom.
12 It was just that the door wouldn't open.
13 BY MS. HARLEY:
14 Q. Okay. So you were talking about now you were trying to
15 extricate the guy out of the pickup truck.
16 A. Uh-huh.
17 Q. And you said that the train had actually taken out a couple
18 of trees.
19 A. Yeah.
20 Q. You guys used the saw -- you were the ones that sawed the
21 trees after they were down?
22 A. Chain sawed them, yes.
23 Q. Okay. All right. We were just wondering. Someone was
24 talking --
25 A. You were wondering. Did you see that it was all chain-sawed

1 up, that --
2 Q. A lot of people were talking about hearing saws and that
3 there were a lot of tree stumps around, and we were trying to
4 figure out why there were tree stumps.
5 A. Yeah. So we were making -- that's exactly what it was.
6 Q. Got it.
7 A. We started bucking that up. I had a guy start doing it,
8 yeah.
9 Q. I understand now. Thank you. Okay. So that explains the
10 trees. All righty.
11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How did you get the bathroom door
12 open?
13 MR. SCOTT: Now that's a whole other -- so we had these --
14 which are amazing. We had these tools, which, you know, we're
15 going to get reached out by a lot of fire departments after this
16 incident as far as lessons learned. What do we need to get in
17 case a scenario like this? And one of the biggest things is e-
18 hydraulics. The battery-operated hydraulics were, in this
19 scenario -- I mean, there are scenarios where, you know, the cable
20 ones are better, and there's limitations to both and good things
21 about both. But in this scenario, those e-hydraulics is all we
22 used. You don't have -- if you guys -- are you guys familiar with
23 what they are?
24 MS. HARLEY: Yeah, I've seen them.
25 MR. SCOTT: So, they're battery operated hydraulics. So just

1 things like the Jaws of Life, where they used to have like cables,
2 the hose, the high-pressure hydraulic hoses, that's completely
3 gone. It's a battery, a lithium ion battery pack that goes in the
4 back and that's it. There's no cables. There's no base of power
5 or nothing. So we didn't have to worry about dragging cables into
6 the cars or nothing.
7 BY MS. HARLEY:
8 Q. You didn't need a generator nearby?
9 A. No generator nearby, no nothing.
10 Q. Got you.
11 A. We burnt through some batteries, you know, but there were
12 other surrounding departments that had them too. So I'm out -- my
13 battery is out; you got one? We were exchanging batteries and, I
14 mean -- so that worked really good.
15 So we got one of the spreaders up there to see if we can get
16 it. There's just not that much room. We couldn't get it to
17 penetrate and pill open that door, with just the angle of how
18 narrow that is. So we went back to just old school firefighting
19 with the Halligan and an axe, and which still had its limitations.
20 How we normally would pry a door, we couldn't. The glass door,
21 the sliding glass door was getting in the way of how we usually
22 pry. So we actually pried backwards of the way we normally do,
23 and they just attacked the door more than the frame and they got
24 it with the set of Halligans.
25 Q. Okay. And you said it was approximately an hour and a half

1 till all the extrication was completed and the victims were
2 removed?
3 A. Yeah. And the only reason I know that time is we know that
4 time now. You know, at the time, I had no clue. It felt like we
5 were -- at some points it felt like I was there forever, but then
6 at some points I'm like -- okay, this is --
7 MS. KLUTE: It's not dark anymore.
8 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, it's not dark anymore.
9 MS. HARLEY: Yeah, it's not dark anymore.
10 MR. SCOTT: And that was another thing, how dark those trains
11 were. So dark. So dark to get in there and see the patients. It
12 just -- it was really dark. Luckily, you know, we have helmets
13 and our lights and stuff, but you got into that railcar and it was
14 dark.
15 MS. HARLEY: Mike?
16 BY MR. LANGE:
17 Q. So, building on that, what was the ambient light out -- what
18 was the weather like when you entered the car?
19 A. Washington weather is like that overcast --
20 Q. Light outside though?
21 A. Early a.m. So, like, for here it was so --
22 Q. Cloudy, foggy.
23 A. Foggy, 7:30. So, in winter, you know, we don't get daylight,
24 full daylight until after 8.
25 Q. Sunrise is about 8 or so.

1 A. Yeah, a little after 8.
2 Q. So, heavy windows in the car.
3 A. Yeah.
4 Q. Aisleway was too narrow to move the stokes?
5 A. Too narrow.
6 Q. Any issues with the drapes on the windows?
7 A. I ripped them down.
8 Q. Any issues with relying on the seats to keep your balance and
9 the seat would turn on you?
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. Would you lose your balance?
12 A. I locked it in. I lost my balance one time in there.
13 Q. And why was that? You were leaning on the seats or --
14 A. I just think it was -- I couldn't even tell you. It was even
15 when the ambient light came out, okay -- well, I don't know what
16 time, from what time to what time, I was in that car, so that's
17 what's so hard. But by the time I extricated, it still wasn't
18 light in there. It was still I needed a flashlight in there. Not
19 completely dark where I couldn't see everything, but like my
20 footing and stuff. So I couldn't tell you. I just kind of was
21 going from the top of the car down to the bottom to come up with a
22 secondary rescue plan and fell.
23 Q. Did you notice see any glowing --
24 A. No. Nothing.
25 Q. -- sticks or low-level lighting --

1 A. There's nothing.
2 Q. -- markers or --
3 A. None of that.
4 Q. Did you rely on any of that?
5 A. It was -- like if it was a train car just sitting out
6 attached to nothing, just complete darkness. No like emergency
7 exit lighting or anything like that. Nothing. Nothing on the
8 ground that I realized or anything like that.
9 And I looked straight down because right there was her ankle.
10 Her ankle was actually -- which kind of made it hard, so she was
11 kind of V'd between the seat. So the seat in front of her, so
12 that first post of the seat, her legs were kind of V'd over it.
13 So the broken leg was on the outside kind of leaning against,
14 which made it really hard to walk to get by her, because that's
15 where you're trying to walk. So and that's where I kind of --
16 because I kind of hit her ankle because I couldn't see it. Then I
17 kind of just fell over and into a seat, and then had to get myself
18 back up and go at it again.
19 But we did have one pivot. The spinning seats are nice. We
20 did use that to try and open up some more room. So we did spin
21 one set of sets to try to open that up a little bit more.
22 BY MS. KLUTE:
23 Q. And how did you know to do that?
24 A. I remember you saying that the seats spin.
25 Q. Through the training?

1 A. Yeah. Because of the training, yeah. I mean, the training
2 helped a lot. There was -- the training, and I know we kind of
3 talked about when you came by that night some of the key things
4 that just really stuck out on the training, was make sure the rail
5 was shut down, which command was doing that. The conductor had
6 everything. The conductor knew how. If we have anything, that
7 the conductor would stay on scene if he, you know, medically can,
8 but he'll stay -- it's like a captain with a ship, he'll be there
9 during the whole incident. So, which really helped later on when
10 we were trying to make sure that engine was shut down correctly.
11 The railcar numbering is great, in theory, when it's going
12 down the rail track. But when it derails, so hard to see those.
13 So hard to get to them.
14 Q. You talking about the markers?
15 A. No. The actual like --
16 Q. Numbering on the cars?
17 A. -- on the cars itself. They're small. Especially in a low
18 light situation, and that's if they are sitting up it's great.
19 But when they're on their side and stuff, if they had like
20 markers, almost like our fire engines do, cop cars, you know,
21 where you see the aerial views and you look down and it says what
22 their number is on the roof.
23 Q. So on the roof?
24 MS. HARLEY: So you can identify units.
25 MR. SCOTT: If there were roof numbers on both ends of that

1 car, it would have made it so much easier. And I think easier for
2 command, like railcar -- this railcar, and you can look up and see
3 that railcar. Because most of the time on the derailments they're
4 going to be on their side.
5 BY MS. KLUTE:
6 Q. And how did you organize your response as far as, you know,
7 did you separate it by branch, you know, for individual cars?
8 A. You know what, I'm not a hundred percent sure. Truthfully.
9 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
10 Q. How did they end up eventually identifying cars? Were they
11 given numbers, letter, alphas or just --
12 A. That's a command, that's a command question. Because
13 truthfully at that point -- I mean, because maybe the incoming
14 engines were there, you know, the other ones coming in, but being
15 first on, it was just start harvesting people --
16 Q. Yeah.
17 A. -- which sounds horrible, harvesting people out to triage.
18 So that's what our whole role is, just harvest, get as many of the
19 people that we can get out without needing more work to get them
20 out. So -- and that's kind of where it was. So we just -- I just
21 picked the first car, just worked it from there. Because so much,
22 do not know where to start.
23 Q. So you kept your engine number designation then.
24 A. Yeah.
25 Q. So when you were in the hanging car, you just --

1 A. Yeah. I was just engine -- we were Engine 101.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. So -- and the captain, you know -- because each firefighter
4 trying to communicate on the same frequency that command is trying
5 to run on and all that stuff is just -- it's too much. So
6 everything I had to, I was saying to him, then he was relaying to
7 command. Like I'd tell him, I have two yellows up here. He got
8 on command to let them know.
9 Then some of it was mouth-to-mouth. Like one of the
10 paramedics down there, I was like, okay, we're getting ready to
11 extricate; you know, we have two yellows up here and I told him
12 exactly what the injuries were and stuff. And that was from me, I
13 was literally yelling down from there, from the window down at
14 him, just to try to ease up that traffic. Because just on a
15 structural fire, you know, it can get built up pretty big, let
16 alone the amount of agencies we had there.
17 BY MS. HARLEY:
18 Q. So going back to the communication with the police officer.
19 A. Uh-huh.
20 Q. So you have this police officer who is in this railcar.
21 Which railcar was he in?
22 A. I'm not a hundred percent sure.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. It was one on the south side of the trestle.
25 Q. Okay. So, and the police officer actually did not know how

1 the emergency windows worked?
2 A. Um-hum.
3 Q. Our of curiosity, when you were in the cars -- I understand
4 it was dark, but when you were shining a flashlight on these
5 windows, were there placards to kind of explain to people how the
6 windows actually worked?
7 A. Yeah. I mean, and we saw it. I mean, that was our other
8 option was to -- so we had the one that went out up front. Then
9 down at the, you know, the bottom of the railcar that's touching
10 the road, you know, we looked straight at that, like we can pop
11 this window if we need to and try to go out this window. So that
12 was another option and that's the option we were looking. But I
13 could visibly see it, you know, it has the two tabs that say exit,
14 exit on it.
15 Q. Okay. All right. Thank you.
16 MS. HARLEY: Gentlemen?
17 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
18 Q. Do you remember if the handle or the signage was reflective,
19 so if you shined your light on it was it reflective?
20 A. I couldn't a hundred percent tell you that.
21 Q. Okay. Because I noticed that some of the cars on the
22 outside, it said for fireman pick ax corner, you know.
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. But then the other ones didn't have that. So I was
25 wondering, you know, about the signage --

1 A. Inside it was, but I couldn't tell you if it was reflective
2 or not. I mean, I just can't remember that.
3 Q. Right. I understand. Oh, no, I --
4 A. And I don't want to give you a hundred percent answer. But I
5 know it's visible. I remember visibly seeing that it says "Fire"
6 on it -- or no, "Exit" on it. Exit, Exit, on the actual two
7 little tabs on the upper thing. And I think maybe because of the
8 training we knew where those were, too. So, I mean, we
9 automatically knew how to take those windows and -- if we needed
10 to. And I mean, we did quite a bit of preparation for this up and
11 coming -- for this exact scenario. Well, not exact, exact.
12 Q. But I guess --
13 A. Pretty close to it though.
14 Q. Were you ever physically on the equipment then prior to the
15 derailment?
16 A. I was not physically on the equipment itself. It was just
17 classroom.
18 Q. Just classroom. Okay.
19 MS. KLUTE: That was next month.
20 MR. SCOTT: Yeah. So never physically, but with the
21 PowerPoints and stuff like that and the classes we had.
22 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
23 Q. Did you ever find the 12-year-old?
24 A. Yeah. You know what, eventually they did say. They said
25 they came off and they were united with the family.

1 Q. Okay. How about any people that appeared as if they were
2 ejected from the car? Did you see any that looked like they might
3 have been ejected?
4 A. I don't know if ejected. I mean, it was so hard to tell if
5 that. There was people that were unresponsive on the ground, you
6 know, that were just down on the ground. So I don't know if it
7 was ejection purposes or what, but there were -- you know, when we
8 got up on scene, it was just people everywhere. People on the
9 ground. People on -- and it's all -- you got to think everything
10 I'm saying is all northbound, okay. So I can't tell you what the
11 southbound looked like.
12 Q. Right. Right.
13 A. But where that car was flipped under that had -- there was
14 just, there was people all around on the ground there. And to
15 know what it was, you know, our paramedic eventually just started
16 yelling, you know, everybody start going to triage. If you can
17 walk, walk this way. And it took a lot to get people to start
18 walking, but as soon as he said -- it seemed like after he got
19 about five people moving, then they all, that could move, started
20 moving. So then at that point they just started triaging the reds
21 and stuff out of that.
22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. Thanks.
23 MS. HARLEY: Anything else?
24 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
25 Q. So you did go through the classroom portion of training that

1 Amtrak provides?
2 A. Yes. Yes.
3 Q. Okay. Anything, now that you've actually gone through an
4 incident, any recommendations or suggestions for the training that
5 might have been missed that would've been nice to know on scene?
6 A. No. I mean, we can do as much training as we can to make it
7 as realistic as we can, but like, when I was talking to her,
8 there's no training that you can do for a car that's vertical and
9 tilted. I mean, to try to get a railcar like that, you can't.
10 And these amounts of debris that's in there and stuff like that.
11 So a situation like that, but I mean for the training we got, it
12 helped.
13 Some of the training was -- which is good, I think, for a
14 derailment of a train that just lays over, knowing which car is
15 which is nice. In a mess like that, where it's just everything is
16 everywhere, I remember the class to learn which car was which, but
17 it mattered nothing for the most part. It's just -- because
18 there's just so much and everything's not in its normal spot and
19 at that point so it was just systematically searching. I mean, I
20 remember like the luggage car, you know, the weird bubble one,
21 that one, but other than the bubble one, all of them -- I didn't
22 care if it was a dinning car or anything else like that. And
23 it's, you know, it's not one of the double-deckers or anything
24 like that either, you know, it's just a single straight across.
25 So, that aspect really didn't matter to us in that scenario.

1 I think if it's a different derailment where they're just laying
2 over, you know, they derailed and lay over, then the knowing what
3 specifically each car was would be nice. But in that situation,
4 that didn't --
5 MS. KLUTE: Do you know what fire department or what crew
6 extricated the Talgo technician from the cabinet behind the
7 engine?
8 MR. SCOTT: I'm not a hundred percent sure on that. No. I
9 know what you're talking about, but yeah, I'm not a hundred
10 percent sure because that would've been on the south side.
11 MS. HARLEY: Anything else?
12 (No response.)
13 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Well, this the point where you get to ask
14 me questions. Is there anything you think I should've asked you
15 and I failed to do so?
16 MR. SCOTT: No, I don't think so.
17 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Your chief, Chief Barnard, actually has
18 my phone number.
19 MR. SCOTT: Okay.
20 MS. HARLEY: If you think of something, no matter if it's --
21 even if you think it's insignificant --
22 MR. SCOTT: Okay.
23 MS. HARLEY: -- please give me a call on my cell phone.
24 Don't worry about the time. Just call. It's a 24-hour number.
25 Don't worry about it.

1 MR. SCOTT: Okay.
2 MS. HARLEY: Thank you very much. I appreciate all of your
3 help.
4 MR. SCOTT: Thank you.
5 MS. HARLEY: Thank you for your service and Merry Christmas.
6 Bye-bye.
7 MS. KLUTE: And I'll be back.
8 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.
9 MS. HARLEY: It's 12:20.
10 (Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 Interview of Richard Scott
ACCIDENT NO:	RRD18MR001
PLACE:	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington
DATE:	December 23, 2017

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

Letha J. Wheeler
Transcriber

PIERCE COUNTY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *
*
AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, *
WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 * Accident No.: RRD18MR001
*

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Interview of: ANDREW DOUGLAS and
LYNDA HENDERSON-WASMUND

West Pierce Fire Department
10928 Pacific Highway
Lakewood, Washington

Wednesday,
December 20, 2017

APPEARANCES:

SHERYL HARLEY, Survival Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MICHAEL LANGE
Passenger Rail Division
Federal Railroad Administration

PAUL MARTINEZ
Federal Railroad Administration

PAUL TINSLEY, Chief
West Pierce Fire Department

I N D E X

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1 I N T E R V I E W

2 (3:02 p.m.)

3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So I'll start off and just kind of sort
4 of give you an idea of why we're here and what's going on, and I
5 just want to walk you through what happened the day of the
6 derailment and then maybe ask some questions. And then after
7 that, at the end of the interview, you get to ask me questions, so
8 -- it's only fair.

9 So I'm going to start. It is Wednesday, December the 20th.
10 It is 3:02 p.m. local time. I'm here at the West Pierce Fire
11 Department, located at 10928 Pacific Highway, Southwest, in
12 Lakewood. I am Sheryl Harley. I am with the National
13 Transportation Safety Board. I am an investigator. My job is to
14 look at what we call the survival factors that went on in regards
15 to the derailment. With me -- I'll let them introduce themselves.

16 MR. MARTINEZ: Paul Martinez, of the Federal Railroad
17 Administration.

18 MR. LANGE: And my name is Mike Lange, with the Federal
19 Railroad Administration, Passenger Division, and we're an agency
20 that actually hands out or prescribes regulations for the
21 railroads. We oversee them. Basically, FAA over the airlines'
22 we're over the railroads. We're here in support of the NTSB.

23 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And just for the record, you are?

24 MR. DOUGLAS: Andrew Douglas.

25 MS. HARLEY: And?

1 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Lynda Henderson-Wasmund. Lynda with
2 a Y.
3 MS. HARLEY: Lynda with a Y. Henderson --
4 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: S-O-N. W-A-S-M-U-N-D. Hyphen.
5 MS. HARLEY: The last name, the last part of your name?
6 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: W-A-S, as in Sam, M-U-N-D.
7 MS. HARLEY: Got it, Wasmund.
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Uh-huh.
9 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And?
10 CHIEF TINSLEY: And Paul Tinsley.
11 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
12 CHIEF TINSLEY: T-I-N-S-L-E-Y.
13 INTERVIEW OF ANDREW DOUGLAS AND LYNDA HENDERSON-WASMUND
14 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Okay. So again, what -- the reason I'm
15 here is that we talk to all of the first responders. And what
16 we're looking for is, when you got notified of the incident, how
17 you got there, and as you approached the scene what you saw; if
18 there were any problems that you encountered, and the people you
19 actually came in contact with. So let's start from, I guess, the
20 beginning. And why don't you kind of walk me through it? When
21 were you actually notified in regards to the derailment?
22 MR. DOUGLAS: I think it was about, what, 7:40, 7:45-ish. I
23 honestly don't recall -- I was just getting on shift -- exact
24 time. Myself, Lynda and Tyler Newton, my partner, were both on
25 Medic 20 that day. So we got notified. Lynda, I believe, got in

1 the Suburban, and we hooked up our MCI trailer, which is -- has,
2 you know, backboards, first aid gear, a heater, water, you know,
3 blankets. And kind of our assignment was to go down there and
4 assist in whatever the command needed at that point.
5 We loaded up, went down I-5, where there's a bunch of traffic
6 and so it kind of slowed us down a little bit. We got there. We
7 arrived. Checked in with north staging, which was Chief
8 Summerlin. And he had directed us to -- there was -- I don't know
9 how you would describe it. What is that, like a turnaround? I
10 don't know how you describe that on the -- in between the north
11 and southbound lanes. To set up a trailer up there, and work with
12 the treatment area for whatever they needed.
13 Arriving, obviously we saw what everybody else saw. I mean,
14 there was rescues in progress. There was -- you know, I didn't
15 see anything out of the ordinary. It looked, you know, fairly
16 organized. And all the emergency crews doing their job, and we
17 went up and assisted treatment. That was basically it on my part.
18 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So let me back up a little bit. So
19 sometime between 7:40 and 7:45 this station was told to respond.
20 MR. DOUGLAS: Correct.
21 MS. HARLEY: How long do you think it took you to get there?
22 MR. DOUGLAS: Oh, gosh. Honestly, I -- without making up
23 something, I don't know exactly how long it took us to get there.
24 I would have to --
25 MS. HARLEY: Lynda, do you have any sense of that?

1 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I want to say it took us about 35
2 minutes.
3 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
4 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: From the time we left Station 21 --
5 CHIEF TINSLEY: Yeah. To clarify too, they left -- they did
6 not leave from this station.
7 MS. HARLEY: Oh, they did not?
8 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah.
9 MS. HARLEY: I'm sorry. Which --
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: We left from 5000 Steilacoom
11 Boulevard.
12 MR. DOUGLAS: Yes.
13 MS. HARLEY: Can you spell that name of the street? I'm
14 sorry.
15 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: S-T-E-I-L-A-C-O-O-M.
16 MS. HARLEY: Steilacoom. Yes. Okay. All right.
17 CHIEF TINSLEY: And that's our Station 21.
18 MS. HARLEY: All right. Station 21.
19 MR. DOUGLAS: Uh-huh.
20 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Is that normally where -- what is it --
21 Medic 22 is stationed out of?
22 MR. DOUGLAS: We were Medic 21 --
23 MS. HARLEY: You were Medic 21?
24 MR. DOUGLAS: -- that day, and then we went from Medic 21 out
25 of service to MCI 21.

1 MS. HARLEY: To MCI --
2 MR. DOUGLAS: Which is where Lynda joined Tyler and myself.
3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Okay. So you had the medic unit with you
4 and you also had the MCI trailer; is that correct?
5 MR. DOUGLAS: We went out of service in the medic unit --
6 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
7 MR. DOUGLAS: -- and then just took the MCI trailer and a
8 Suburban.
9 MR. DOUGLAS: Okay.
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: So my story is a little bit
11 different.
12 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So why don't you tell me?
13 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: At -- because I have it clocked on my
14 phone. At 7:57, I got a phone call from my husband asking me if
15 we were going to the train derailment. And I said, what are you
16 talking about? Anyways, long story short, I went looking for
17 Chief Summerlin and Captain Wagner, because they had both been in
18 the station, looking for them and couldn't find them. One of the
19 gentlemen turned on their radio and right about that time I heard
20 Battalion 25 calling for West Pierce MCI unit. I went out, got
21 the keys, got the Suburban, and I was going to take the MCI unit.
22 I had contacted my supervisor, Chief Barber, and told him I've
23 taken the MCI unit down to the train derailment. And that's when
24 I met up with Douglas and Newton outside.
25 MS. HARLEY: Okay.

1 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And they informed me that they had
2 been given orders to dump their medic unit and take the MCI
3 trailer.
4 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Were you -- either one of you involved in
5 patient care at all?
6 MR. DOUGLAS: I was not.
7 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I assisted one, two, three, four,
8 five patients. Two of the last two patients -- I can't remember
9 their names, but they were the elderly couple that was featured on
10 the news, that it was -- they wanted to be the first ones to ride
11 the train. It was a husband and wife team. And I walked them up
12 the hill from -- two officers had escorted them, and I walked them
13 up the hill and took them into triage.
14 MS. HARLEY: What kind of injuries did they have? Do you
15 know?
16 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: The woman described to me that she
17 had hit her head. And she had a -- about an inch and a half
18 laceration to the left side of the back of her head, posterior.
19 And she had multiple cuts about her face, with blood down her
20 face. She only had one shoe on. And she was complaining of chest
21 pain and some shortness of breath.
22 MS. HARLEY: Did she tell you that the chest pain and the
23 shortness of breath was related to hitting something, or was she
24 having --
25 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No.

1 MS. HARLEY: -- some kind of cardiac event?
2 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No. I asked her, I asked her do you
3 hurt anywhere; are you having any trouble breathing? She said I
4 -- it hurts to take a deep breath. And I said okay, where else
5 are you hurting? She says my chest. And she pointed to her right
6 breast area.
7 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And how about the male?
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: The male, he had blood down his face
9 and a limp. And he was soaking wet. That's just all I remember.
10 I didn't really -- he was right behind his wife. And I just
11 remember turning around and taking a look at him, and seeing the
12 blood on his face. And with his age -- the age of both of them, I
13 turned and looked at the triage officer and I said these are both
14 yellows, she might be a red.
15 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
16 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And I believe they were -- for the
17 next ambulance that came up, they were the next group. They were
18 in the next group to be transported.
19 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
20 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And then there was a young gal -- I
21 would say she was in her 30s -- with a baby, who had been
22 determined to be -- the baby had been determined to be a yellow.
23 And I noticed that she was shivering with her, and I put a blanket
24 around her and asked her if she was doing okay, if the baby was
25 okay. She said the baby seemed to be fine, but had hit her head.

1 I checked out the baby's head. I couldn't find any lacerations on
2 her. Took a pulse. The pulse rate was about 110. And I said if
3 anything changes with the baby's level of consciousness, if she
4 suddenly gets tired, you need to tell that person. And I pointed
5 to the gentleman that was wearing a blue vest. And then I
6 assisted the two of them into Medic 22 when Medic 22 got there,
7 and buckled the baby into the carseat. And at that point, the
8 baby was acting appropriately. Mom was shook up.
9 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Is Medic 22 another West Pierce --
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yes.
11 MS. HARLEY: Okay. What station is that out of?
12 CHIEF TINSLEY: Station 22, which is -- let's see, the
13 address of it -- 86 --
14 MR. DOUGLAS: 87 -- is it --
15 CHIEF TINSLEY: Is it 87?
16 MR. DOUGLAS: Actually, no, that's -- I think it's 8709.
17 CHIEF TINSLEY: Washington Boulevard.
18 MR. DOUGLAS: Washington Boulevard.
19 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
20 MR. DOUGLAS: I'm going to be tested on that here shortly,
21 too. Now I'm panicking, now that I'm thinking about it.
22 MS. HARLEY: No pressure. No pressure.
23 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: From what I understand, they actually
24 had just dropped off a patient at Madigan when they got
25 dispatched.

1 CHIEF TINSLEY: Medic 22.
2 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Medic 22.
3 CHIEF TINSLEY: Not a patient from the train.
4 MS. HARLEY: Got it.
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No. A separate patient.
6 MS. HARLEY: Understood. Okay. How far is -- well, I guess
7 I'll have to talk to someone from 22. I was wondering, were they
8 at the hospital when they got the call or were they back at the
9 quarters?
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Pull it up on CAD.
11 CHIEF TINSLEY: You will interview Vi Diamond, who was
12 firefighter/paramedic on that, on Friday.
13 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
14 CHIEF TINSLEY: But if you need that information now, I can
15 pull that up on the CAD.
16 MS. HARLEY: I can wait until Friday. We'll get it all on
17 Friday. That's fine.
18 Okay. All right. So I'm going to go back a little bit. The
19 five people that you assisted, were they in the train or were they
20 out of the train when you approached them?
21 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: They were out of the train.
22 MS. HARLEY: They were all out of the train. Okay. All
23 right.
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: There was another gentleman who very
25 nicely -- who couldn't remember which car he was in; he did say it

1 was one of the cars up on top of the hill. He only complained of
2 right knee pain and was able to walk okay up the hill. He had
3 somebody with him, and I asked the other gentleman what car were
4 you in, and he said he wasn't in the accident, that he's just
5 carrying this other gentleman's bag. And I left it at that,
6 didn't ask any further questions.
7 MS. HARLEY: All right. Okay. So back to you Andrew.
8 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah.
9 MS. HARLEY: What was the job of MCI 21?
10 MR. DOUGLAS: So the orders I was given were to create a
11 supply cache for the treatment area. Myself -- Lynda and Tyler
12 and I got out backboards, BLS kits, set up heaters for the three
13 different areas. Provided blankets, a box of blankets to the
14 treatment area. And at that point I didn't get any further orders
15 so I just stood by the MCI trailer and kind of stood guard and,
16 you know, kind of assisted as needed, if anybody needed anything.
17 And that was basically my orders and what I did.
18 MS. HARLEY: Okay. As far as the dissemination of the
19 supplies, did you find that you were adequately stocked for that?
20 Or was there a time where someone actually had to restock or
21 resupply from somewhere else?
22 MR. DOUGLAS: So we were adequately stocked. One other
23 thing, I did supply -- we did supply water to crews, as well.
24 Yeah, we actually didn't use any of our BLS equipment. Really, we
25 only went through water and blankets. That was our two main

1 things. But we still had plenty of backup. We probably had a
2 hundred plus blankets left over, or more. And there was plenty of
3 backboards. We didn't use any of those. And so I felt like we
4 were adequately, you know, supplied and stocked.
5 MS. HARLEY: During all of this, what was the weather like?
6 Was it actively raining?
7 MR. DOUGLAS: No. No, it was overcast. I don't believe it
8 rained at all in the entire time we were there.
9 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No.
10 MR. DOUGLAS: No. Yeah.
11 MS. HARLEY: Do you know approximately how cold it was? We
12 can look it up on the weather. I was just --
13 MR. DOUGLAS: Oh, no, it was --
14 MS. HARLEY: Was it cold?
15 MR. DOUGLAS: -- it was chilly.
16 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: It felt like 43, 40-ish.
17 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah. I was going to 40 to 43.
18 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
19 MR. DOUGLAS: You know, that sounds good.
20 MS. HARLEY: You said that the male that you encountered was
21 soaking wet. Did he ever tell you how he got soaking wet?
22 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No.
23 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: He was wearing a big -- like a winter
25 type coat, that was soaked.

1 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right. So tell me the units from
2 West Pierce that you know were on the scene with you.
3 MR. DOUGLAS: Units wise, it was West Pierce MCI 21, West
4 Pierce Medic 22, our battalion chief, Jay Summerlin, and our
5 training captain, Matt Wagner. And they were -- Jay Summerlin was
6 the north staging and Matt Wagner was the southern staging area.
7 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
8 MR. DOUGLAS: And --
9 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And their call signs are Chief 316
10 and 320, I believe.
11 MS. HARLEY: And 320 for the Captain Wagner?
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yes.
13 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right. All right. So how does
14 patient transport work here in your jurisdiction? Do you have
15 fire department transport units or are they transported all by
16 contract ambulance?
17 MR. DOUGLAS: So we -- it's a mix of both. Typically on --
18 for ALS calls, we're always going to have a West Pierce medic unit
19 respond. And then on BLS calls, at times, if available, we'll
20 have Falck, which is a private organization that will respond. Or
21 other times, a West Pierce medic unit will transport the BLS call
22 if there's no Falck available.
23 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: But there is no contractual --
24 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, no --
25 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: -- agreement.

1 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah.
2 MS. HARLEY: Oh.
3 MR. DOUGLAS: There's -- they come if they're available,
4 basically.
5 MS. HARLEY: There's no agreement for that?
6 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: There's no signed contract.
7 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So then, I guess -- so, I guess my
8 question is, then, do they have a radio? Do they monitor your
9 calls?
10 MR. DOUGLAS: Chief maybe you can -- I don't know exactly how
11 that goes on my end, so --
12 CHIEF TINSLEY: They, they are on --
13 MR. DOUGLAS: -- maybe he can speak more to it.
14 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- they have the ability to work on our radio
15 system.
16 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
17 CHIEF TINSLEY: I'm not exactly sure what they have, and I'm
18 not exactly sure if they monitor the calls or they wait until
19 they're notified before they respond.
20 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
21 CHIEF TINSLEY: I'm not sure of their procedure.
22 MS. HARLEY: So does your -- so you don't know if your
23 communications actually dispatches them?
24 CHIEF TINSLEY: If a private is requested or required, our
25 dispatch agency will call the private ambulance company via

1 landline and make that request.
2 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
3 CHIEF TINSLEY: And then the company will dispatch their own
4 units.
5 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Is Falck the only private company that's
6 used here?
7 CHIEF TINSLEY: They're our main company. There is another
8 company -- AMR is available at times. I believe that's the two --
9 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Uh-huh.
10 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- right now.
11 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right.
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: They have -- they generally use an
13 800 radio for their communications between each other. And then
14 they have a separate radio for communications with Fire.
15 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So speaking about Fire, so you're on the
16 scene of this major incident, and you have both EMS units and fire
17 department units. Do you have a common fire ground channel where
18 they both talk to each other?
19 MR. DOUGLAS: Yes and no. You know, that -- we were talking
20 about that, communication. For me, we were instructed to go on
21 Bravo 4, which is our -- you know, what we use for like motor
22 vehicle accidents, you know, cardiac arrest, stuff like that. So
23 we were told to go to Bravo 4. And we stayed where we were told.
24 But there was no -- we didn't have the ability to -- we basically
25 had like, what was it, Lacey battalion chief, I'm wanting to say

1 he was, was kind of our communications liaison. That was really
2 our only communications we had, was through them, because we --
3 nobody was working on our frequency.
4 So you got basically three different jurisdictions that have
5 three different -- we were -- Chief and I were talking about this
6 at one point. There's JBLM Fire has their own radio system.
7 Thurston County has their own. We have our own. And there's
8 ability, I guess, to patch it together, you were saying. But I'm
9 not --
10 CHIEF TINSLEY: I don't believe they did that.
11 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah.
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No.
13 CHIEF TINSLEY: That would be a question of -- I assume
14 you're going to do some interviews with Lacey Fire and --
15 MS. HARLEY: Uh-huh.
16 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- JBLM.
17 MS. HARLEY: Uh-huh.
18 CHIEF TINSLEY: They might be able to give a little bit more
19 information on that since they were more in the command function.
20 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Thurston County, what fire agencies are
21 in Thurston County?
22 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Lacey, Olympia, Yelm --
23 MR. DOUGLAS: Tumwater.
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: -- Tumwater. And then there's some
25 county --

1 MR. DOUGLAS: There's a couple -- there's East Olympia Fire.
2 There's --
3 CHIEF TINSLEY: South Bay -- is it South Bay?
4 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, South Bay, Southeast Thurston Regional
5 Fire Authority, West Thurston Regional Fire Authority.
6 MS. HARLEY: So there's a lot.
7 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, there's quite a few.
8 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Okay.
9 MR. DOUGLAS: Sorry, I can't rattle them all off for you.
10 MS. HARLEY: Right. Yeah.
11 MR. DOUGLAS: I think -- there's a couple small ones, but
12 those are the main ones.
13 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So in addition to West Pierce, Lacey,
14 JBLM, what other fire department units were there?
15 MR. DOUGLAS: Olympia, Tumwater, Yelm.
16 MS. HARLEY: Yelm.
17 MR. DOUGLAS: I saw a South Bay chief. I don't know if -- I
18 didn't see any other South Bay people.
19 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: West Olympia.
20 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, West Olympia.
21 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Thurston County Sheriff's Special
22 Operations Team.
23 MS. HARLEY: What do they do?
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: They're a high angle, confined space,
25 water rescue. I think they do water. High angle, confined space.

1 Urban -- search and rescue for wilderness. I don't believe they
2 do structural or heavy machinery rescue because they don't have
3 bunker gear.
4 MS. HARLEY: Got you. Okay. So --
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And I also saw one of the fire
6 department's special rescue teams.
7 MS. HARLEY: Do you remember which one?
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No. I couldn't tell you.
9 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So outside of the communications issue,
10 did you find that there was any other problem with what was going
11 on at the scene?
12 MR. DOUGLAS: I mean, it's as good as it can get in an
13 incident like that. You know, I think -- personally, I think it
14 went fairly smooth, from my observing point. I don't know what
15 Lynda will say, but I -- you know, I think besides communication
16 -- you know, you can never have enough transporting ambulances.
17 But other than that, I didn't see anything that --
18 MS. HARLEY: From the time that you got there -- well, let me
19 ask you a -- let me ask you this question first. Were you there
20 during the entire incident or were you put back in service prior?
21 MR. DOUGLAS: We were put back in service at probably, what,
22 11, 11:30? Maybe Lynda has the exact time. But it was sometime
23 around there. So we didn't stay -- basically all the patients had
24 been taken away. All the patients that were noninjured were
25 transported via bus to Dupont -- I don't know if it was city hall

1 or the -- I think it was the fire station, I'm wanting to say,
2 Station 25. And then basically, we were given orders, hey, you're
3 clear to go. And so we packed up and left at that point.
4 MS. HARLEY: Do you have some sense of when the last patient
5 left?
6 MR. DOUGLAS: I honestly couldn't give you a good time.
7 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
8 MR. DOUGLAS: I don't want to just make up a number.
9 MS. HARLEY: Got it. And who provided the bus that
10 transported the noninjured?
11 MR. DOUGLAS: I'm not sure exactly who it was.
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Pierce Country Transit.
13 MR. DOUGLAS: There you go.
14 MS. HARLEY: Oh. Okay.
15 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Two of them.
16 MS. HARLEY: Pierce County Transit?
17 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Uh-huh.
18 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
19 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Because I watched them turn around.
20 I thought, oh, how are they going to turn -- oh, they did.
21 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
22 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: We were out of there by 10:57.
23 MS. HARLEY: 10:57?
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Uh-huh.
25 MR. DOUGLAS: I was close on that one.

1 MS. HARLEY: Yeah, you were. Not bad. Okay.
2 MR. DOUGLAS: My first time was a little off, I guess.
3 MS. HARLEY: Do you have some sense of how long from -- that
4 the last patient, how long it took for the last patient to leave?
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: We left after the last patient was
6 gone. So the greens were walking down the hill and the buses were
7 driving away when we left. We had a small snafu with our vehicle
8 so we were delayed --
9 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Uh-huh.
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: -- leaving the scene.
11 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: So it's easy to armchair quarterback
13 when everything is said and done. There were some mistakes that
14 were made. I think they were honest mistakes, and I think they
15 were mistakes that -- not because the people weren't good at their
16 job, but maybe they just hadn't trained well enough. We do a good
17 job of training MCIs every year and putting our people through it.
18 They had no canopies, so they had no -- no designated signs of
19 where their trauma -- where their treatment and triage were. We
20 put up our canopies, our colored canopies. There -- they really
21 didn't track their patients. There were three DMCCs set up, where
22 Pierce County -- I could see there being two DMCCs, one for
23 Thurston County, because technically the other triage and
24 treatment area was on the other side of the trellis.
25 MS. HARLEY: Uh-huh.

1 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: So I -- they were more Thurston
2 County. So I could see them contacting St. Pete's and setting up
3 a DMCC for St. Pete's. Madigan and Good Sam were contacted.
4 Madigan -- the treatment triage area was being run by Madigan
5 ambulance people, so I gather that's why DMCC was set up through
6 Madigan. But for Pierce County, the DMCC is Good Samaritan
7 Hospital. Allenmore Hospital got four patients and St. Clare got
8 none. St. Clare is a hospital here in Lakewood, which I'm sure
9 would have been more than capable of handling at least the greens,
10 and some of the yellows.
11 MS. HARLEY: So Allenwood [sic] got how many?
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Allenmore got four.
13 MS. HARLEY: Allenmore. I'm sorry.
14 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Four.
15 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
16 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: So basically their -- they had no
17 tracking. They didn't take names. They didn't give patients
18 numbers. They didn't document what cars they were in. And, you
19 know, I guess when you're faced with a bunch of red patients --
20 generally, our policy is dictated through our Pierce County
21 protocols, is you're not supposed to take more than one to two
22 reds because you've only got one to two people in the back taking
23 care of them and if you have more reds, somebody suffers. And the
24 first vehicles out were taking five and six reds at a time. At
25 least that's what they were communicating over the air.

1 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
2 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And when -- you'd have to verify this
3 with Vi and Kyle Clark, but I don't believe that the DMCC was set
4 up when they started transporting. Because the way an MCI works
5 in Pierce County is the trauma -- or the treatment triage officer
6 says you are going to Good Sam, they've already been contacted,
7 go. And there's no more -- no further radio communication. You
8 go, and that's where you head to. And you -- you know, unless you
9 need to do something out of the ordinary, which most of the time
10 our protocols open up when we have an MCI so it's more loosely
11 interpreted.
12 MS. HARLEY: So who was the transport officer that was
13 coordinating the ambulances, the patients and where they went to?
14 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: A Madigan.
15 MS. HARLEY: It was -- that was Madigan?
16 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Madigan ambulance person.
17 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And when you say Madigan ambulance,
18 you're not talking about a private ambulance; you're talking about
19 Madigan fire department?
20 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: They are civil service. And they
21 work out of Madigan hospital.
22 MS. HARLEY: Oh, I see what you're saying. Okay.
23 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: So they're hospital-based civil
24 service.
25 MS. HARLEY: Okay.

1 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I'm trying to think. Some of them
2 are maybe active duty, some of the EMTs.
3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Okay. All right. All right. So --
4 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: The only other thing that I can think
5 of that really kind of stood out was, like any MCI, there were way
6 too many police officers parked way too close.
7 MR. DOUGLAS: Oh, I'll second that.
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Where fire department units could not
9 get access very easily. I mean, they were double-parked all along
10 the Jersey barrier. That's the only thing I --
11 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Very frustrating.
13 MS. HARLEY: All right. So going back to something that you
14 said -- so at one particular point what you basically had was
15 three different areas that were deciding in three different
16 locations what patients got transported and where they went to,
17 and didn't communicate with one another as far as how many
18 patients were going to which hospital? I'm --
19 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No. There were definitely two areas.
20 I don't know how Good Sam's, Good Samaritan Hospital's DMC was set
21 up. I'm -- I couldn't be positive, but I -- the assumption is
22 being made that the Madigan ambulance transport and treatment
23 officer set up Madigan's DMCC.
24 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
25 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: So I don't know where Good Sams came

1 into this. And I'm only assuming that the south division -- or
2 the south treatment triage area set up St. Pete's. So yes, there
3 are two different agencies, two different counties, with two
4 different treatment triage areas.
5 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So we have one, which was Madigan, which
6 is the military.
7 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Uh-huh.
8 MS. HARLEY: You had another one, which was --
9 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Good Sam.
10 MS. HARLEY: -- Good Sam. Okay. And who was in charge of
11 that one?
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I don't know.
13 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And then you had -- you said one south
14 division, which was St. Pete?
15 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.
16 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
17 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And from what I understand, that was
18 run by -- it was initially set up by two Lacey firefighters.
19 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Okay. But we don't have any idea about
20 the one for the -- that was set up for Good Samaritan.
21 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Uh-uh.
22 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So in addition to Madigan, Good
23 Samaritan, St. Pete's, Allenmore, the other hospitals that were
24 involved were?
25 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: St. Joseph's.

1 MS. HARLEY: Uh-huh.
2 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And Tacoma General.
3 MS. HARLEY: And Tacoma General. Generally speaking, are
4 these the closest hospitals to the incident?
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: These -- St. Joseph's and Tacoma
6 General are the trauma hospitals.
7 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: They're the level 4 trauma hospitals.
9 MS. HARLEY: Level 4?
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Or, I'm sorry, level 2 trauma
11 hospitals.
12 MS. HARLEY: They're level 2 traumas?
13 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah. And they --
14 MS. HARLEY: Do you have any level 1 traumas here?
15 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Madigan and --
16 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
17 MR. DOUGLAS: No, Madigan is a 2 still.
18 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No? Is it still a 2? Okay.
19 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah.
20 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Harborview.
21 MR. DOUGLAS: Harborview is the only one.
22 MS. HARLEY: Harborview. Did anyone go to Harborview?
23 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Two patients were flown to
24 Harborview, and I don't know which hospital they were flown out
25 of.

1 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right.
2 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I would guess it would have been
3 Madigan.
4 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And Madigan is a trauma 2. Okay. And
5 the other hospital that you were speaking about, which was
6 St. Clare, was St. Clare within that same general vicinity of all
7 these other hospitals?
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No. St. Clare is about a mile that
9 direction and half a mile west.
10 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
11 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: So they're at 112th and -- or 108th
12 -- 108th?
13 CHIEF TINSLEY: 112th.
14 MR. DOUGLAS: 112th.
15 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: -- 112th and Bridgeport.
16 MS. HARLEY: Were any patients sent to a hospital that was
17 farther away than that hospital? And I'm not talking about those
18 sent to any -- the level 1 trauma center.
19 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Allenmore. Allenmore is on Union
20 Street, 19th and Union.
21 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
22 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Is that what you --
23 CHIEF TINSLEY: So the -- where the incident was, Madigan
24 would have been the closest hospital.
25 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Right.

1 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.
2 CHIEF TINSLEY: Which is on JBLM.
3 MS. HARLEY: Right.
4 CHIEF TINSLEY: St. Clare, which is this hospital that she's
5 speaking --
6 MS. HARLEY: Uh-huh.
7 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- I would assume that that's closer than
8 St. Pete to the incident, or pretty close.
9 MR. DOUGLAS: I think it's half --
10 CHIEF TINSLEY: So very close.
11 MR. DOUGLAS: Either way you go, I think it's pretty close.
12 CHIEF TINSLEY: So maybe St. Pete going south, St. Clare
13 coming north would have been pretty close.
14 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
15 CHIEF TINSLEY: And then St. Joe -- St. Joe and Tacoma
16 General are down in the city of Tacoma, which is this way.
17 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
18 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Exit 132 on I-5.
19 CHIEF TINSLEY: Yeah.
20 MS. HARLEY: And do we have any idea or a sense of what
21 patients went to St. Joseph's and Tacoma General? Do you know
22 what is the trauma level for St. Clare?
23 MR. DOUGLAS: I think they're a 4.
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah. I think they're --
25 MS. HARLEY: They're a 4?

1 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I can pull it up.
2 MR. DOUGLAS: I'm not a hundred percent. I'm pretty sure
3 they are, though.
4 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right. So just go back over -- just
5 a moment. Okay. So initially the two of you, just to be clear,
6 were at Station 21.
7 MR. DOUGLAS: Uh-huh.
8 MS. HARLEY: Which is at 5000 Steilacoom --
9 MR. DOUGLAS: Boulevard.
10 MS. HARLEY: -- screwed that one up.
11 MR. DOUGLAS: It's on tape.
12 MS. HARLEY: Yeah, that one. Boulevard. Okay. And Lynda,
13 you got a phone call at 7:57, which gives us an idea of when the
14 incident actually started. Okay. Time to arrive on the scene,
15 once everything was said and done, was about 30 minutes. Is that
16 just about --
17 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Uh-huh.
18 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right.
19 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Because we had to load the trailer up
20 and get it hooked up to the tow and all.
21 MR. DOUGLAS: Zig-zag through traffic.
22 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And upon arrival, you then went to, I
23 guess, the command post that was where --
24 MR. DOUGLAS: Staging area.
25 MS. HARLEY: Staging area. Where Chief Summerlin was?

1 MR. DOUGLAS: Yes, ma'am.
2 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And then at that particular point, that
3 was when you received your instructions.
4 MR. DOUGLAS: Uh-huh.
5 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Let me see. So you had no contact with
6 patients. Did you have any contact with any members of the crew?
7 MR. DOUGLAS: No. Nope.
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Of the train crew?
9 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah. No, not the train crew.
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No.
11 MR. DOUGLAS: I met one of the managers of --
12 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
13 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: We talked --
14 MR. DOUGLAS: -- DOT, but --
15 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah, we talked to DOT.
16 MR. DOUGLAS: -- nobody in the crew.
17 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And then we talked -- I talked to a
18 gentleman from the railroad.
19 MR. DOUGLAS: Actually --
20 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I don't think he was Amtrak. I'm
21 not --
22 MR. DOUGLAS: I did talk to the conductor. Remember him,
23 with the shoulder pain?
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Oh, that's right.
25 MR. DOUGLAS: He said he was the conductor. And -- because

1 he was kind of wandering around. I was like, hey -- and he had a
2 sling on. I'm like, have you been checked out? Sorry. I didn't
3 take this as patient care or anything, and now I'm just flashing
4 back. And I was like, hey, you need to go get checked out over
5 there, and just sent him over to the treatment area where they
6 triaged him. And I don't know what happened. Yeah, he didn't --
7 all he told me is I have shoulder pain, and that's it.
8 MS. HARLEY: Which shoulder? Do you remember? No?
9 MR. DOUGLAS: I don't recall.
10 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
11 MR. DOUGLAS: I had minimal --
12 MS. HARLEY: Didn't -- yeah.
13 MR. DOUGLAS: -- you know, contact with him. So --
14 MS. HARLEY: I understand. And you didn't see a nametag or a
15 name tape on him?
16 MR. DOUGLAS: No.
17 MS. HARLEY: So you didn't know his name. Okay. Can you
18 describe him to me?
19 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah. He kind of had like a longer dark hair.
20 Probably about 5'10, a hundred and --
21 MS. HARLEY: Black or white male?
22 MR. DOUGLAS: White male.
23 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
24 MR. DOUGLAS: About like -- probably like 170 pounds.
25 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And he was standing in --

1 MR. DOUGLAS: Didn't have any facial hair or any scars,
2 tattoos that I remember, either.
3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. No facial hair, scars, tattoos.
4 MR. DOUGLAS: And he was -- had a sling on. And I forget
5 which arm. Sorry. There's a lot of visuals in my head from that
6 whole day. And then I can't recall which arm he had a sling on.
7 But he already had a sling on; I remember that. He was just kind
8 of walking around aimlessly.
9 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: So here's the designation of trauma
11 facilities. Good Sam is a level 3. Madigan is a level 2.
12 St. Clare is a level 4. St. Joe's and Tacoma General are level 2.
13 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So St. Joe and Tacoma are level 2. Okay.
14 All right. And do you know who provided the helicopters to fly
15 people out?
16 MR. DOUGLAS: Airlift Northwest. That's it.
17 MS. HARLEY: Huh?
18 MR. DOUGLAS: Airlift Northwest, probably. That's the only
19 -- I don't think they would bring anybody from --
20 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: They're the only --
21 MR. DOUGLAS: -- south.
22 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: They're from the --
23 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah. It's got to be. Because there's one --
24 I don't see why they wouldn't have anybody but Airlift Northwest
25 in this area. Yeah.

1 CHIEF TINSLEY: That's our only that's our only private
2 transport. Now I can't speak about the military, whether they
3 got --
4 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah.
5 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- involved at all in this.
6 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
7 CHIEF TINSLEY: You know, that would be --
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I think their birds are too big to
9 land on the LZ at Harborview.
10 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
11 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Their Hueys are --
12 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
13 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I don't know if they would --
14 CHIEF TINSLEY: I don't know. Yeah.
15 MS. HARLEY: All right. So let me see. Okay.
16 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I think Airlift comes from Sun Field,
17 again. Yeah, Olympia.
18 CHIEF TINSLEY: I'm not sure of that either.
19 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So the units from West Pierce were MCI
20 21, Medic 22, Chief 316, Chief 320.
21 CHIEF TINSLEY: Actually, the 320, his designation is
22 actually Fire 320.
23 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah, Fire --
24 MS. HARLEY: Fire 320?
25 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.

1 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Fire 320.
2 CHIEF TINSLEY: Yep.
3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Falck was the private ambulance that was
4 on the scene. And AMR.
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No, I don't think Falck --
6 MR. DOUGLAS: I don't believe Falck was there.
7 MS. HARLEY: Falck was not there?
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: We never saw --
9 MR. DOUGLAS: That's just who we use as a --
10 MS. HARLEY: Okay. That's who you normally use.
11 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah.
12 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
13 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, I didn't see any Falck there.
14 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No.
15 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
16 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I saw Dupont, Lacey, Madigan, West
17 Pierce.
18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Transport units?
19 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Uh-huh.
20 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, there's -- I saw Olympic ambulances
21 there, too. They're -- I saw they were carrying a gurney, patient
22 out on a gurney.
23 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Oh, that's right. Towards the end.
24 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah. And they're out -- based out of Lacey,
25 like Olympia area. And then there was also an AMR private

1 ambulance transporting patients too.
2 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right.
3 MR. DOUGLAS: Those were our private transports.
4 MS. HARLEY: So going back to talking about the communication
5 frequency. The ambulances are on the 800 megahertz, and they talk
6 among themselves, but that is not to the fire department units; is
7 that correct?
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: They have a separate -- generally,
9 they have a separate radio for that.
10 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They have the ability to talk.
12 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah.
13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In Pierce County, they have the
14 ability to talk to Pierce County --
15 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.
16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- Fire Department.
17 MR. DOUGLAS: And that's the same with Thurston County too.
18 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
19 MR. DOUGLAS: Their private ambulances, when they're
20 dispatched -- I don't know how they're dispatched, or what -- but
21 they get onto our -- just like Falck gets onto our frequency when
22 they get dispatched with us --
23 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
24 MR. DOUGLAS: -- same thing with Thurston County too.
25 MS. HARLEY: Okay.

1 MR. DOUGLAS: For Olympic Ambulance. So --
2 MS. HARLEY: All right. So when you arrived on the scene,
3 all five of the patients that you dealt with were actually
4 conscious, alert, up walking, talking. Is that correct?
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Correct.
6 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Did you see anyone who could be
7 classified as critical or did you see any other -- let me back up.
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No.
9 MS. HARLEY: Did you see any of the other passengers? Let's
10 do it that way.
11 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No, I -- even in the treatment triage
12 area, I didn't see anybody who I would classify as a red.
13 MS. HARLEY: So when you came down, you would've come down,
14 and you'd be on the north side of the roadway?
15 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: We were on the north side of the
16 trellis, in the median.
17 MS. HARLEY: Uh-huh. In the median.
18 MR. DOUGLAS: Uh-huh.
19 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
20 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, it was that gravel hillside. And there
21 was like a retention pond. And there was like a turnaround where
22 the rigs would go through. And we were kind of off to the -- what
23 was that, the -- you know, west side of that gravel road there.
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Southbound side.
25 MS. HARLEY: Okay.

1 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, on the southbound side. Kind of tucked
2 off the side.
3 MS. HARLEY: When you arrived on the scene, was there anyone
4 still trapped on the train?
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yes.
6 MR. DOUGLAS: I don't know.
7 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And --
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: At least, that's what we heard on the
9 radio.
10 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And do you know what unit was actively
11 doing extrication for that?
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No, I do not. JBLM, their truck
13 company pulled out before we left, so it had to be somebody from
14 the south side of the incident that was doing the extrication.
15 You could hear the saws going in the background.
16 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right.
17 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And then at one point before we left
18 we heard that there were four -- four more patients, and I want to
19 say they said two blacks and one needs to be extricated. And
20 that's what I overheard by the Lacey gentleman that was standing
21 there, from the -- one of the Lacey trucks.
22 MS. HARLEY: So all this came over Lacey's air. Is it fair
23 to say that the majority of the communications was actually on
24 that radio frequency?
25 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah, that and JBLM.

1 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
2 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: There was very little radio traffic
3 on --
4 MR. DOUGLAS: And honestly, I couldn't tell you, maybe that
5 -- what we were hearing, too, was JBLM, you know, if they were
6 working together. I don't know. But it was all Lacey folks that
7 -- the radios that were working, between command and the, you
8 know, officer in charge of the treatment triage area was all done
9 by Lacey Fire. So I don't know if they were -- you know, they had
10 combined channels together somehow, but we just didn't have that.
11 MS. HARLEY: Is this something that you frequently encounter,
12 not being able to talk to other agencies on your radio?
13 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No. Because we mostly --
14 MR. DOUGLAS: Not really.
15 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: -- work within Pierce County, and
16 everybody in Pierce County has the same radio, except JBLM.
17 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
18 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And JBLM, we knew that there were
19 issues because we had just drilled with them over the last 2 or 3
20 weeks at a large office building. It used to be Intel. And we
21 discovered that there were issues with the patches, what -- they
22 call it a patch when they hook into our frequency.
23 MS. HARLEY: Right.
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And the patch that was supposed to
25 work was not a good patch. We knew that. And if you -- talking

1 to our -- the gentleman on our department that's in charge of
2 radios, it was -- had been discussed that if there ever was an
3 incident between the two agencies, that we had a cache of extra
4 radios and we would bring those radios to the incident so that we
5 could all function on the same frequency.
6 MS. HARLEY: Uh-huh.
7 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And I know that that cache was
8 standing by --
9 CHIEF TINSLEY: Uh-huh. It was ready to go down if it was
10 requested.
11 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.
12 CHIEF TINSLEY: But it was never requested.
13 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Is it fair to say, then, that the
14 majority of people that were on the scene were not Pierce County?
15 MR. DOUGLAS: Yes.
16 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yes.
17 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, it was like Thurston County dominant, by
18 far. Or at least for where we were at.
19 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: For -- yeah, from our vantage point.
20 MR. DOUGLAS: Because every single person I knew there from
21 previous, you know, fire experience was Thurston County. I didn't
22 see anybody from Pierce County besides ourselves.
23 CHIEF TINSLEY: From what I understand, the Thurston -- one
24 of the Thurston County units, I don't know if it was in the
25 unified command, but they called an MCI through their dispatch.

1 So most of the additional resources came from the south, Thurston
2 County.
3 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Uh-huh.
4 CHIEF TINSLEY: That's when it got into Olympia, Tumwater,
5 South Bay. Pulled resources from the south, because they
6 initiated the MCI to their dispatch center.
7 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right. I'm all out of questions.
8 Gentlemen?
9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah. So you arrived there around
10 8:00. 7:53 you said? Was it --
11 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No, that's when I got a phone call
12 from my husband telling me that there was a train derailment.
13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Was it -- it was overcast. How close
14 to the cars were you, if you're in the median on the south side?
15 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I have pictures.
16 MR. DOUGLAS: Pretty close. It was probably -- what do you
17 think, 100 feet away?
18 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Maybe.
19 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, we were pretty close.
20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Did you notice any interior lights --
21 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No.
22 MR. DOUGLAS: No.
23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- in the equipment?
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No. There was no -- we didn't see
25 any lights.

1 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, no power. Yeah, I didn't -- because I
2 remember seeing firefighters in some of the trains with
3 flashlights on, which led me to believe there was no, you know,
4 power. Because we were talking about that, how, you know, how
5 would we get somebody out of this dangling train? You know, if
6 this was us and we were first on scene --
7 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: With wires. With the --
8 MR. DOUGLAS: -- and we were concerned about the high-powered
9 wires --
10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Uh-huh.
11 MR. DOUGLAS: -- you know, are they still live. They weren't
12 -- we didn't see any arcing or sparking, and there was no lights
13 inside, which led us to believe there was no power to the train at
14 that point.
15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Was there anybody that said that they
16 did have all the power cut from the train?
17 MR. DOUGLAS: Not that I'm aware of.
18 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Never, never heard it broadcasted.
19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Not that you heard on the radios? Did
20 you notice anybody with a helmet cam on, any of the firefighters?
21 MR. DOUGLAS: No.
22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is it normal? Do you have folks up
23 here that wear them?
24 CHIEF TINSLEY: We have a select few that have helmet cams.
25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sure.

1 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Jay has some pretty good pictures.
2 He was -- he has pictures of ladders up into the railcar that was
3 down on top of the other one.
4 CHIEF TINSLEY: That's Battalion Chief Summerlin.
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.
6 MS. HARLEY: Right. Yeah.
7 CHIEF TINSLEY: I don't know if you spoke with him yet. I
8 know he --
9 MS. HARLEY: I spoke to -- yeah, I spoke to him earlier. I
10 didn't know about the pictures. I'll ask him if we can just take
11 a look at those.
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And his are a little different. You
13 can definitely tell that the lighting was different. The sun
14 hadn't a hundred percent risen. Because of the lighting in the
15 pictures, I mean, it looks like it's almost up but it's not quite.
16 So the pictures look a little bit darker, so you might be able to
17 see if there's lights on in the train then.
18 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
19 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I know we didn't see any lights.
20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Did you notice a lot of windows out of
21 the cars?
22 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yes.
23 MR. DOUGLAS: Every single one. Pretty much, that I saw.
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: The upside-down car didn't have any
25 windows left intact. The car that was still attached but on top

1 of the upside-down one, had one window taken out, and I believe
2 that was the window that initially had a ladder up to it.
3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Have you ever trained with this
4 equipment? Have you ever been familiarized or been involved in
5 any drills with Amtrak or Sounder?
6 MR. DOUGLAS: No.
7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Tabletops?
8 MR. DOUGLAS: Not myself.
9 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I have with Tacoma Rail. Our tech
10 rescue team drills, had drilled down there, had had a couple
11 drills with Tacoma Rail. They let us use their cars for a drill.
12 And then we had -- prior to the merger, we had the derailment of
13 BNSF down at Chambers Bay.
14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Have you ever received any information
15 from the railroads regarding their equipment or their emergency
16 response? Phone numbers, or anything like that?
17 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: The last time was prior to the
18 merger, University Place had a BNSF gentleman come in and give us,
19 each shift, an informational session, I want to say. The drill
20 was -- the class was probably 4 hours long talking about the
21 electricity and knowing when -- because we had -- University Place
22 has a good portion, from Sunnyside all the way up to 19th Street,
23 that rail, running along the water, and we have a neighborhood
24 that's on the other side of that rail. So we had done our due
25 diligence and gotten numbers to be able to stop the train, and

1 where to stop the train, and where to place people to stop the
2 train if we have hoses going across it or cars that are stuck on
3 the rails.
4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How long ago was that training?
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: The train derailment was right before
6 we merged.
7 CHIEF TINSLEY: The training.
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Oh, the training.
9 CHIEF TINSLEY: The training.
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Did we merge --
11 CHIEF TINSLEY: 2010, or 2011.
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: 2011?
13 CHIEF TINSLEY: 2011.
14 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I want to say it was, it was 2009-
15 ish.
16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And you -- as far as the railroads
17 that do operate through your territory here, is it just this
18 railroad here or is there other railroads than this?
19 CHIEF TINSLEY: In West Pierce, we cover all the way to Puget
20 Sound, which there is two tracks that run along the water through
21 the cities of University Place and the town of Steilacoom. So
22 that is our response area.
23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So that's BNSF and Sounder, too, or --
24 CHIEF TINSLEY: I don't believe the Sounder travels those --
25 that line. I think the Sounders is this line that comes through

1 Lakewood.
2 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah, the Sounder doesn't travel
3 there.
4 CHIEF TINSLEY: Right.
5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I encourage you to reach out to the
6 railroads and ask them to come, because they are very good about
7 that.
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.
9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You know, as far as --
10 CHIEF TINSLEY: Yeah, we've had a -- some of our hazmat
11 technicians have done quite a bit of training with the railroad
12 regarding the hazmat portion --
13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sure.
14 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- of the rail. They've sent us to Pueblo,
15 Colorado for training, and the railroad has paid for that. But I
16 would say that the Amtrak -- you know, the passenger-type training
17 would be something that we would want to look at in the future,
18 for sure. Absolutely.
19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.
20 MS. HARLEY: One other question. When you arrived on the
21 scene, do you know if the locomotive was still running? Did you
22 hear it?
23 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: The rear one we were told was not
24 under -- I can't remember who told me. One of the other
25 firefighters there told me that the rear one was not under power.

1 But I don't remember -- frankly, there was just so much noise
2 going on that --
3 MR. DOUGLAS: I feel like -- well, I've heard trains. I feel
4 like I would have heard it, and I definitely did not.
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And you do know that there was a
6 droid flying around?
7 CHIEF TINSLEY: A drone.
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: There was a -- drone, I mean.
9 MS. HARLEY: A drone. Yeah.
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: A drone. Okay.
11 MS. HARLEY: Yeah.
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I heard that it was Lakewood PD's
13 drone.
14 MS. HARLEY: Yeah. It was.
15 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And there were a couple of stingers
16 [sic] there.
17 MS. HARLEY: A couple of what?
18 MR. DOUGLAS: Stringers.
19 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Stringers.
20 MS. HARLEY: Oh, stringers. Okay.
21 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.
22 MR. DOUGLAS: We got that term from a Netflix show we both
23 talked about, we saw it, so --
24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Stringers?
25 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah. It's a new documentary. It's about like

1 -- they, they're like -- I don't know, either freelance
2 journalists or --
3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, okay.
4 MS. HARLEY: Yeah.
5 MR. DOUGLAS: And so they'll go into like, you know, crime
6 scenes and stuff, and take pictures and videos and --
7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is that the one that just came out on
8 Netflix?
9 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.
10 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, it's actually really good.
11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: He watched that guy get rear-ended on
12 the freeway.
13 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah. But he actually went and rescued him, so
14 that was good.
15 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
16 MR. DOUGLAS: Sorry. I digress.
17 MS. HARLEY: So anything else?
18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No.
19 MS. HARLEY: So the one -- the couple questions I always ask
20 at the end is, is there anything you think I should have asked you
21 and I failed to ask.
22 MR. DOUGLAS: No, ma'am.
23 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No.
24 MS. HARLEY: Is there any other statement about the incident
25 that you want to make in regards to it?

1 MR. DOUGLAS: No, ma'am.
2 MS. HARLEY: Don't call me ma'am.
3 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No. I don't think so.
4 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So again, what all this comes out to is
5 we look at it -- as the NTSB, the only thing we're able to do is
6 make recommendations on how to make something safer. We're
7 looking at what was going on at the time of the incident as far as
8 inside the train, but also what happened after the crash occurred,
9 and now the first responders respond -- are coming to the scene,
10 and now you have to do your job. What it is that we can suggest
11 to make your job safer, make it a lot easier, that if this happens
12 again, either we can prevent loss of life, decrease the kind of
13 severity of the injuries and, again, or make your life easier.
14 And that's one of the reasons why we actually do talk to all the
15 first responders, to see if there's anything that -- any kind of
16 suggestion we could make. But safety related.
17 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Uh-huh.
18 MS. HARLEY: Again, we can only make recommendations. We
19 can't actually -- we don't have the ability -- we're not an
20 enforcement agency. So the only thing that we can say is is that,
21 you know, maybe you need to look at this, this is something we
22 think would make it better. One of the things I will give you --
23 I think I ran out of cards, so I will write it down -- is my name
24 and my phone number. If you think of anything later on, I don't
25 care how minor you think it is, please give me a call. I don't

1 care. All right.
2 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Okay. I -- now that you said that,
3 the elderly couple that I helped, they did say that they were on
4 the car that was up against -- that was on the hill, that was up
5 against the tree.
6 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
7 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: They couldn't remember the number of
8 the car, but it was up against a tree up above. I guess a pretty
9 significant sized tree, for them to mention the tree. That was --
10 MS. HARLEY: So it was at the top of the hill, and it was
11 against a tree.
12 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yes.
13 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
14 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And I have no idea why they -- it
15 took them so long to get them down. I do know this. When we got
16 there, looking up on the knoll up there, you could see that there
17 were a tremendous amount of people. And I don't know whether they
18 had somebody up there triaging the patients, but only -- at one
19 point, you could see the number of people up there, and then it
20 just kind of dwindled down where it was like an investigation,
21 more or less, and no more victims or no more passengers.
22 MS. HARLEY: Uh-huh.
23 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: But they came from -- like I said,
24 they came from up the knoll and came down, and -- to the treatment
25 triage area.

1 MS. HARLEY: One of the other things I'm going to ask you is
2 about the police -- outside of the cars. Were they able to assist
3 you as far as directing traffic or did you still have a problem
4 with vehicles or unwanted people wandering into your scene while
5 you were trying to do your jobs?
6 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: There was no directing traffic.
7 MR. DOUGLAS: Uh-uh. And there was no -- eventually, they
8 started to kind of corral people. But that was the other problem,
9 is they were just kind of wandering around and -- it was kind of
10 confusing of who's --
11 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Who is actually doing something.
12 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, doing something versus just kind of
13 wandering around, when it went to the law enforcement side, for
14 me. You know, obviously I don't know -- I mean, my brother-in-law
15 is an officer so I kind of know how cops are pretty independent as
16 -- you know, it's a little bit different than us. So, I mean,
17 they probably had a job they were doing. That's kind of what I
18 assume. But it was just kind of weird how they were kind of --
19 MS. HARLEY: Did you have a problem identifying --
20 MR. DOUGLAS: -- all over the place.
21 MS. HARLEY: -- the people in the train from other people who
22 were there --
23 MR. DOUGLAS: Yes.
24 MS. HARLEY: -- walking around?
25 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah. Like --

1 MR. DOUGLAS: There was a lot of good Samaritans.
2 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Uh-huh.
3 MR. DOUGLAS: Which were trying to help out, which actually,
4 for me, was -- I was thinking we had more patients but they were
5 just good Samaritans helping out. So that kind of made it
6 confusing, because you couldn't identify. You know, because there
7 was a lot of military people that were helping out, that were --
8 you know, so you could tell them. They were in their PT clothes,
9 some of them. But then there was some plainclothes people, which
10 made it kind of seem like there was more people than there really
11 were that were potential victims of the incident.
12 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And finally, Chief, do you have any
13 questions for me or anything you want to say?
14 CHIEF TINSLEY: Regarding the incident, no, because I was not
15 personally there. I guess I -- I'll just communicate how you want
16 to work the next investigation timing, what works for you and the
17 phone calls that need to be made to you.
18 MS. HARLEY: As I said, it's up to you how you want to work
19 Friday, when he is available, and --
20 CHIEF TINSLEY: Do you have a good time for you?
21 MS. HARLEY: My good time is your good time.
22 CHIEF TINSLEY: Because --
23 MS. HARLEY: We are -- I am here for you. You guys are
24 helping me out.
25 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- he'll arrive at work at 8:00, for duty.

1 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
2 CHIEF TINSLEY: And he's here for 24 hours. So --
3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. If --
4 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- whatever works.
5 MS. HARLEY: If 9:00 in the morning is fine, that's fine.
6 But again, I -- this -- you guys are helping me out.
7 CHIEF TINSLEY: Let's --
8 MS. HARLEY: Whatever time is good for you --
9 CHIEF TINSLEY: Let's plan on 9.
10 MS. HARLEY: -- let's deal with that. Okay.
11 CHIEF TINSLEY: Let's plan on 9, right here.
12 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Plan on 9.
13 CHIEF TINSLEY: And what I'm going to try to do, if this
14 works for you -- the other two individuals that aren't back for
15 duty, the ones I mentioned --
16 MS. HARLEY: Right.
17 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- for quite some time, I'll call them to see
18 if Friday morning is a good time to make that phone call.
19 MS. HARLEY: Yeah. That's --
20 CHIEF TINSLEY: And then maybe we can knock them all out --
21 MS. HARLEY: All out at one time?
22 CHIEF TINSLEY: Yeah.
23 MS. HARLEY: That sounds like a plan. Thank you very much.
24 CHIEF TINSLEY: That sound like it might work?
25 MS. HARLEY: I certainly do appreciate everything you've

1 done. Thank you very much for taking your time. I think somebody
2 was supposed to get off and I think I made you late. I'm sorry
3 about that.
4 CHIEF TINSLEY: That would be Lynda, at 4.
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Oh.
6 CHIEF TINSLEY: She's good. She's easy.
7 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I'm never off at 4.
8 MR. DOUGLAS: I got till 8 a.m., so I -- let's stay all
9 night, that's fine.
10 MS. HARLEY: Oh, okay. I think your partner would say --
11 MR. DOUGLAS: We got a lot of soup up there, if you need
12 some.
13 MS. HARLEY: Oh. Well, thank you. Again, thank you very
14 much. And I want to give you my phone number. Unfortunately, I'm
15 going to have to write it for you. I meant what I said, if you
16 think of something later on that just bothers you, or something
17 you forgot, please feel free to call. Okay. Honestly, it won't
18 bother me. I will give you my cell phone number. Don't worry
19 about time differences or changes, whatever, just call. Okay.
20 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Okay.
21 MS. HARLEY: Thank you.
22 CHIEF TINSLEY: I have your cell phone number and your name.
23 I'll text it to both of these --
24 MS. HARLEY: Wonderful.
25 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- so they have it.

1 MR. DOUGLAS: Okay.
2 MS. HARLEY: And, as a matter of fact, give it to everyone,
3 and that way that will be done.
4 CHIEF TINSLEY: Okay. I'll do it.
5 MS. HARLEY: Thank you. All righty.
6 MR. DOUGLAS: Sure.
7 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: How long --
8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Here is one of her cards. I printed
9 that up. I can --
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: How long do you think this
11 investigation will take?
12 MS. HARLEY: Well, I'll tell you what happens with us. We
13 have a lot of parts we're looking at. And I am -- I normally do
14 highway crashes. So the basic investigation is we look at
15 survival. We look at what we call human performance, what the
16 people who were in control of the vehicle were doing, as -- in
17 this case it's a train, you know, we would do it. In my case,
18 normally, it's someone driving a bus or a tractor trailer or
19 something like that. Then we also look at -- we look at the
20 environment. We look -- they're going to look at the tracks.
21 We're going to look at the signals and all that. As a result,
22 this investigation takes months.
23 But what we normally do is, because we are required by law to
24 be out front and public with everything, everything -- every part
25 of our investigation we put on a public website so that you

1 actually get to see what we're writing and what's going on. It
2 will be a couple of months. There will normally -- there's
3 normally what we call a preliminary report, and it just basically
4 gives people the preliminary information. But it will take months
5 before we're actually finished with the investigation. We've got
6 a lot of stuff that has to be done. We've got to check on whether
7 there was some kind of mechanical issue. We've got to check on
8 whether the signals were working. We check on to see if the
9 track, if there was any problem with the track. We also have to
10 check on whether something inside of each of these cars failed,
11 some kind of equipment failure that resulted in these people being
12 hurt. So it takes months to do.
13 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.
14 MS. HARLEY: But what happens is, when we are done there --
15 two things will happen. We'll either write a very large report
16 and then it will be put on our website. Or there's a report and
17 what we call a board meeting, which is a public forum where you
18 can -- where they actually talk about the investigation. And it's
19 webcast and people can actually look at it live. Or you can -- or
20 it's streamed live or you can go in and you can look at a video of
21 it. But it will take -- it will literally take months for this.
22 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Okay.
23 MS. HARLEY: And the other thing is, of course, as you can
24 imagine, we have to look at every person who is injured, including
25 those who died, and figure out how it happened, how they got

1 injured and how they were killed, and what did it. Outside of
2 just saying, well, they were involved in a crash and they died.
3 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Right.
4 MS. HARLEY: So --
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Have you spoken to the gentleman that
6 was in the truck underneath the upside-down railcar?
7 MS. HARLEY: I have not yet. But I -- but we have
8 investigators that are trying to reach out to all of the victims
9 and speak to them.
10 Did you talk to that gentleman? Did you see him?
11 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: No, I saw -- or I heard that he got
12 out and he --
13 MR. DOUGLAS: I'm going to have to go. Is it --
14 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
15 MR. DOUGLAS: -- am I good to go?
16 MS. HARLEY: Yeah, yeah, yeah. No, no, you can go.
17 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.
18 MS. HARLEY: Go, go.
19 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I had hear that all they had to do
20 was pop the door -- and by say pop the door, it's -- you have a
21 big hinge at your -- where your door comes closed, and all they
22 had to do was pop that and they were able to get him out. He was
23 in a survivable space --
24 MS. HARLEY: Oh, okay.
25 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: -- that he didn't get crushed.

1 MS. HARLEY: Oh, okay.
2 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And other than being full of blood,
3 he did not have any immediate life-threatening injuries.
4 MS. HARLEY: Oh.
5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Was that the pickup? The Ford? Or
6 the truck?
7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, that was pretty impressive.
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I'm not sure which one.
9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There was a semi and that silver
10 pickup.
11 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yes. It was a semi and the silver
12 pickup. So it was the silver pickup.
13 MS. HARLEY: It was the silver pickup?
14 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And when we first got there, the
15 pickup truck -- I don't believe the door was open. And then
16 after, I heard the Lacey gentleman telling me that -- giving me
17 the story, I looked over and you could see that the door was open.
18 And it was fully intact.
19 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
20 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I was like wow.
21 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, it seems like nowadays you can -- you
22 know, you walk up to these car crashes and you're like, oh,
23 there's nobody alive, and they're totally fine, you know. Or, I
24 remember, you know, you can see these -- both cars that will have
25 barely any damage and there's like multiple fatalities. It's

1 like, how does this happen? Technology is crazy.
2 MS. HARLEY: Yeah.
3 MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah, that was crazy how he --
4 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah.
5 MS. HARLEY: Yeah, that's amazing.
6 MR. DOUGLAS: -- got out of that. Yeah.
7 MS. HARLEY: Lucky man. Thank you. Appreciate it.
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I hope your --
9 MS. HARLEY: All right.
10 MR. DOUGLAS: Sure you don't want some dinner?
11 MS. HARLEY: And have a wonderful holiday. Oh, you know --
12 MR. DOUGLAS: All right.
13 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: I hope the investigation goes at
14 least this smoothly.
15 MS. HARLEY: -- what, I -- yes. Best food around was in the
16 fire department.
17 MR. DOUGLAS: Oh, yeah.
18 MS. HARLEY: I will say that.
19 MR. DOUGLAS: Well, thanks for your service. Thank you.
20 MS. HARLEY: All righty.
21 MR. DOUGLAS: Nice to meet you.
22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you for your service.
23 MS. HARLEY: It's nice meeting you, Lynda. Thank you --
24 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Thank you.
25 MS. HARLEY: -- very, very much.

1 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Thank you so much.
2 MS. HARLEY: Have a happy holiday, okay.
3 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: You do too.
4 MS. HARLEY: All right.
5 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And I hope you get to go home for
6 holiday.
7 MS. HARLEY: Yeah.
8 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: And if you have to come back.
9 MS. HARLEY: Yeah. Well, we'll see how that works.
10 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: West Coast isn't so bad.
11 Washington's not bad.
12 MS. HARLEY: Yeah. Yeah.
13 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: We had a sunny day today. Enjoy it.
14 It may not happen again.
15 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm from California. There's been no
17 rain, so I got some rain while I was here.
18 MS. HARLEY: All righty.
19 MS. HENDERSON-WASMUND: Yeah, you just have a lot of sun down
20 there.
21 MS. HARLEY: And it's 4:08.
22 (Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m. the interview was concluded.)
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017
Interview of Andrew Douglas and Lynda Henderson-Wasmund

ACCIDENT NO.: RRD18MR001

PLACE: Lakewood, Washington

DATE: December 20, 2017

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

Jane W. Gilliam
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:                 *
                                  *
AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT,      *  Accident No.:  RRD18MR001
WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017   *
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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Interview of: TYLER NEWTON, Firefighter/EMT
KYLE CLARK, Firefighter/EMT
VI DIAMOND, Firefighter/PMIC

West Pierce Fire Department
10928 Pacific Highway
Lakewood, Washington

Friday,
December 22, 2017

APPEARANCES:

SHERYL HARLEY, Survival Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

JEFFREY STEWART, Investigative Analyst
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

ELIZABETH KLUTE, Emergency Manager
Northwest Region
Amtrak

CHIEF PAUL TINSLEY
West Pierce Fire Department
Lakewood, Washington

I N D E X

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1 I N T E R V I E W

2 (9:03 a.m.)

3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So it's Friday, December 22nd of 2017,
4 and it's 9:03 a.m. And, we're here at the West Pierce Fire
5 Department.

6 My name is Sheryl Harley. I'm with the NTSB, and we're here
7 to interview individuals that took part in the rescue operations
8 involving the train derailment. So if you don't mind, I'm going
9 to ask you to introduce yourselves to me.

10 MR. NEWTON: I'm Tyler Newton, firefighter/paramedic, Station
11 21.

12 MS. HARLEY: Okay.

13 MR. CLARK: My name is Kyle Clark, firefighter/EMT.

14 MR. DIAMOND: And Vi Diamond, firefighter/paramedic.

15 MS. KLUTE: What is your first name?

16 MR. DIAMOND: Vi, spelled V-i.

17 MS. HARLEY: V-i Diamond. And you're a
18 firefighter/paramedic?

19 MR. DIAMOND: Correct.

20 MR. STEWART: And what's your name?

21 MR. CLARK: Kyle Clark.

22 MR. STEWART: Thank you.

23 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And everyone here is out of Station 21 or
24 not?

25 MR. CLARK: So I'm a floater firefighter, so I fill

1 vacancies.

2 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And Vi?

3 MR. DIAMOND: I'm normally on Engine 32 but that day, that

4 morning, I was on Medic 22.

5 MS. HARLEY: All right. And, Chief, I know you, but can you

6 identify yourself one more time for the tape please?

7 CHIEF TINSLEY: Paul Tinsley, Operations Chief.

8 MS. HARLEY: And also with me we have? Liz.

9 MS. KLUTE: Elizabeth Klute. I'm the regional emergency

10 manager for Amtrak.

11 MR. STEWART: And I'm Jeff Stewart. I am a grade crossing

12 inspector with the Federal Railroad investigation, currently tied

13 to the passenger forensics team out of the FRA.

14 MS. HARLEY: So we'll start by explaining why we're here.

15 One of the things that we do when we look at an investigation and

16 part of my responsibility is what we call survival factors. We

17 look at the survivability issues. We look at what happened inside

18 the train with the occupants, how we can make it safer so it's

19 more survivable or that they will sustain less injury.

20 We also talk to the first responders. You were there. You

21 saw the victims. You also are aware of any problems that occurred

22 during the operation. You are the group that we look to when we

23 ask what happened, what did you see, where can we improve safety

24 and the issues. And that's basically why we're here.

25 So what I'm going to ask you to do is to kind of walk me

1 through what happened that day starting from when you were first
2 notified of the incident. I'm just going to ask you to go ahead
3 and walk through, and I'm going to have a whole bunch of questions
4 at the end, but just to be fair, at the end of all this, you get
5 to ask me questions right back. So -- all right.
6 INTERVIEW OF TYLER NEWTON, KYLE CLARK AND VI DIAMOND
7 MS. HARLEY: So let's start with where you all were at the
8 time -- were you at the same station? No. Okay. So, Tyler, what
9 station were you at?
10 MR. NEWTON: I was just arriving to Station 21.
11 MS. HARLEY: So you were just arriving at 21?
12 MR. NEWTON: Yeah.
13 MS. HARLEY: Kyle?
14 MR. CLARK: So we were clearing a transport up at Madigan
15 Army Medical Center, which means we were just in the bay there,
16 outside of the ER, and that's when we were first notified. But I
17 was on Medic 22 with Vi.
18 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So you and Vi were together then. Okay.
19 So how did the call come out?
20 MR. CLARK: So for us, there was an EMT at Madigan that was
21 pretty excited and he came out of the ER and he pointed at me and
22 said, a train just derailed, we might need you guys' help. I kind
23 of heard it, wasn't sure what to make of it, went in the front
24 seat, Vi, hey, this guy just said that a train derailed; so I'm
25 going to put us in service at Madigan and see if Firecom needs us

1 to respond.
2 So cleared us, put us in service. Firecom sure enough said,
3 yeah, we need you guys to head that way. And then the call came
4 out.
5 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Do you know approximately what time that
6 was?
7 MR. DIAMOND: 7:39-ish I believe. 7:40-ish, somewhere in
8 there.
9 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right. Tyler, how did you get
10 notified?
11 MR. NEWTON: I was just coming into work, basically walked in
12 the station, saying hi to the guys. Our phone started ringing and
13 our acting captain for the day came to me and said, hey, we need
14 you guys to take the MCI trailer to Dupont for a train derailment.
15 And I was like, okay, is it a drill or what, and it wasn't a
16 drill.
17 So we got our gear as quickly together as we could. There's
18 a tow vehicle that sits at the station. So we had to go get the
19 tow vehicle, and when I walked outside, Lynda Henderson was
20 actually trying to get the trailer hooked up. So we got that
21 hooked up and basically left with me -- myself, Andrew Douglas and
22 Lynda Henderson in the Suburban there. So that's kind of how we
23 were notified.
24 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So walk me through -- I'll tell you what.
25 Let's do it in two parts. Let's start with Medic 22. Why don't

1 you guys walk me through when you got on scene.
2 MR. DIAMOND: Okay. So we had pulled in -- I believe we
3 pulled in right behind a JBLM engine, maybe 5 minutes after the
4 initial engine had done its size-up. We were -- then we arrived.
5 We jumped out of the rig, found our bunker gear, because we were
6 in the rig when the call came out so we didn't have our bunker
7 gear on. We put it on there at the scene. We grabbed our MCI
8 bags thinking that we were going to go start triaging people. We
9 helped JBLM carry their extrication equipment to the scene. We
10 walked up, set their equipment down right at the car that was
11 laying on the freeway. We were parked probably a good 50 yards
12 back.
13 There were people scattered everywhere. A lot of bystanders
14 doing first aid. Several firefighters, and I'm not sure if they
15 were from JBLM, Dupont or Lacey. We were all converging on the
16 scene about the same time. Several firefighters, different
17 firefighters had come up to us and, you know, told us, you know,
18 that these people right here are reds, so take two of these reds
19 and you guys can head out. And at that point I was grabbed by a
20 civilian and pulled around to the other side of -- to the other
21 side of the freeway, basically the outside edge, the shoulder, and
22 I was told that we had two minors with severe head injuries, and I
23 went ahead and assessed those patients and decided that those were
24 the two we were going to take, the two kids, a 12-year-old and a
25 17-year-old.

1 MS. HARLEY: So the -- so in your unit, you took the 12-year-
2 old and 17-year-old?
3 MR. DIAMOND: Yeah.
4 MS. HARLEY: And you assessed them to be what?
5 MR. DIAMOND: Red.
6 MS. HARLEY: Reds. Okay. And again, what kind of injury did
7 they have?
8 MR. DIAMOND: Head injuries, bleeding from multiple places.
9 The 17-year-old girl, pretty substantial blunt force trauma to the
10 face.
11 MS. HARLEY: And do you know if they were from the train or
12 from the vehicles?
13 MR. DIAMOND: Actually I don't know. I would assume the
14 train.
15 MS. HARLEY: All right. Kyle, do you have anything to add to
16 that?
17 MR. CLARK: Yeah, like when we came on scene, what Vi said,
18 we were bunked up. We had the extrication gear. We were helping
19 JBLM kind of get up next to the train cars. One train was -- you
20 know, you've seen it. It was sitting in the middle by 5. There
21 was a diagonal train, and I was just trying to figure out what our
22 role was in all this, if we were going to be going into the
23 trains, starting to extricate people. There were multiple people
24 inside the diagonal train. We weren't sure how stable it was, if
25 it was going to be coming down. And so, you know, there was a

1 little bit of just trying to figure out where we fit in.
2 You know, big picture, our medic unit was parked in the
3 middle of the freeway. We were the first ALS unit on scene. So
4 we kind of pumped the brakes and said, you know, we were going to
5 transport people, that was what our role played in this scene,
6 right.
7 But, yeah, that train, that diagonal train, there were people
8 still coming in and out of it, and there was a ladder being thrown
9 on that train on the freeway so people could access and get up in
10 there. Like with what Vi said, there was a lot of walking
11 wounded, you know, people just asking us for help, kind of pulling
12 us in all directions.
13 At one point I think I said to Vi, you know, we've got our
14 radios on but we weren't sure who was in charge. So we didn't
15 know who command was or who was doing triage transport, you know,
16 the whole MCI, how it shakes out. So there was a little bit of
17 confusion there obviously.
18 But ultimately what Vi said is, yeah, we took the 12 and 17-
19 year-olds based on their injuries and where we fit in the big
20 picture of things.
21 MS. HARLEY: And where did you transport them?
22 MR. DIAMOND: They both went to Madigan.
23 MS. HARLEY: Madigan.
24 MR. DIAMOND: So we had one on the gurney. As I was
25 assessing the 12-year-old on the gurney, Kyle and I believe a few

1 civilians C-collared and backboarded the 17-year-old, and they
2 brought her in and we put her on the bench seat. I asked the
3 civilian to hop in the rig and go to Madigan with us and he agreed
4 to do that.
5 MR. CLARK: Yeah, there's a little bit of time there where
6 when we initially rolled up, extrication equipment, the triage
7 bags and the trauma bag that we had, that was the initial stuff
8 that we grabbed. We had to run back the 50 yards, grab the
9 gurney, run back 50 yards, load up the 12-year-old, take the
10 gurney back 50 yards, grab the backboard and the straps, ran back
11 the 50 yards, grabbed the 17-year-old girl, and that's when
12 multiple civilians assisted me carrying her back to the medic unit
13 to put her up and load her on the bench seat, and then we went to
14 the hospital from there.
15 And the construction access road that was right there in the
16 middle, I mean, it couldn't have worked out any better to get us
17 turned around on that freeway. So we were fortunate there.
18 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So after you got to Madigan with those
19 two patients, what did you do?
20 MR. CLARK: Did a quick clean-up and headed back. We still
21 had a civilian that we needed to drop off. His car was there on
22 the freeway. And, you know, we knew that there was a lot more
23 patients to be transported, so we headed back.
24 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And then did you transport other patients
25 once you got there?

1 MR. DIAMOND: Well, when we got back, all the tents were up
2 and they had already set up medical and transport stations and it
3 was very smooth at that point. We pulled in and I believe we were
4 fourth in line to pull more people out, and when it was our turn,
5 we transported two more -- two yellows and five greens to the same
6 hospital, Madigan.
7 MS. HARLEY: And who actually was in charge of the transport?
8 Who were you getting your instructions from as far as which
9 patients you took and where you went?
10 MR. DIAMOND: From the transport section of the MCI.
11 MR. CLARK: So when we pulled up in the medic unit, there was
12 a guy with a red helmet, blue jacket on. I don't know his name,
13 but he was saying, when you do take your patients, let me know how
14 many you're taking and what colors they were. It was a little bit
15 of dealer's choice as far as, hey, I want you to take a couple
16 yellows and then pack as many greens in there as possible. So
17 while Vi was taking -- it was an infant and the grandmother --
18 MR. DIAMOND: Grandmother.
19 MR. CLARK: -- that were the two yellows, I went over to the
20 greens and just asked if anybody was traveling in a large group.
21 It just so happened that the two yellows were related to the
22 greens that we took, plus one additional green that wasn't
23 related. So it made sense to take them all together, so that way
24 we didn't separate families.
25 MS. HARLEY: And this gentleman, you don't know who he

1 represented, which fire department he was from?
2 MR. DIAMOND: I didn't find out.
3 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
4 MR. CLARK: I believe he was with Madigan.
5 MS. HARLEY: Okay. And he was -- was he taking patient names
6 or was he looking at the triage tags or simply he was just
7 counting how many yellows, greens and reds?
8 MR. CLARK: And he was on the phone with what sounded to be
9 multiple hospitals. So at one point he was saying, you know, I
10 overheard him saying, hey, I understand that, but this is what my
11 situation is right now, and we have to send them to your location;
12 you know, the next round, I'll take care of that. So you could
13 tell he was on the phone with multiple hospitals.
14 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
15 MR. CLARK: And Dupont Ambulance 25 was in front of us and
16 they had received their orders from the same person. So it seemed
17 like he was in charge, he had his ducks in a row and he had just
18 ordered them to do something. So we just fell in line.
19 MS. HARLEY: Okay. How many transports did you do from the
20 scene?
21 MR. DIAMOND: Two transports, nine patients.
22 MS. HARLEY: Okay. After your second transport, were you
23 released from the scene or did you go back and there was no other
24 patients to go?
25 MR. DIAMOND: We didn't go back to the scene. I contacted

1 our dispatched center, let them know that we were going to Station
2 22. We had to change out manpower and get the rig all stocked up.
3 And at that point I let Firecom know that if they still needed us,
4 that I would relay to the relieving crew that they needed to head
5 back down. Station 22 is about a mile and a half, 2 miles from I-
6 5, the Gravelly Lake exit.
7 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
8 MR. CLARK: That second round that we were there, all of our
9 backboards, all of our C-collars, all of our MCI tags, it was all
10 grabbed off the rig and taken. So we were pretty depleted.
11 MS. HARLEY: Do you know if they had set up a restocking
12 station as far as where they were bringing in additional supplies
13 and they were warehousing them on the scene?
14 MR. DIAMOND: If they did, I didn't know about it.
15 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
16 MR. DIAMOND: It was part of our job when we arrived.
17 MS. HARLEY: Oh, okay.
18 MR. DIAMOND: But I don't know if it was -- you guys, by the
19 time we got there --
20 MR. NEWTON: We were taking off with the same load.
21 MR. DIAMOND: Yeah, you -- we didn't --
22 MR. NEWTON: I saw you for a brief moment.
23 MR. DIAMOND: Yeah.
24 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So I guess, Tyler, we'll start with you
25 now.

1 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So you arrived on the scene and?
2 MR. NEWTON: So as we're -- it took a while to get there.
3 There was quite a few vehicles in the way and they were still
4 actually trying to clear traffic. They were turning it around on
5 the freeway and sending it back up onto the exit to try to clear
6 the way for more emergency vehicles. The only person that we --
7 as we were approaching, the only person that we could get ahold of
8 on the radio was Jay Summerlin. He was, at that point, assigned
9 to north staging, I believe it was.
10 So as we approached, he came to our window and said, hey,
11 hold on one second, we'll find a place for you guys to go, and
12 then a couple of moments later, he assigned us to that
13 construction turnaround area that they spoke of earlier.
14 And so, as we approached that way, we had to park our vehicle
15 and trailer off to the side as much as we could, and then we were
16 approached by a battalion chief from Olympia, I believe it was.
17 I'm not sure what his role was, but he said, hey, we need to get
18 this stuff unloaded and have a cache of supplies here to use.
19 At that point it appeared that the scene was starting to slow
20 down a little bit. It wasn't as many people coming into the
21 treatment center, but that's when we set up -- we were basically
22 just running back and forth from the trailer, grabbing tents,
23 trying to shelter some people. We grabbed a big -- we have a
24 bunch of blankets we were handing out to folks to keep them warm.
25 We had a big cache of just little aid bags that we had piled up in

1 a pile and then we had a bunch of backboards that we were laying
2 out. And I don't think that you guys had known obviously that
3 those were there, but a lot of those backboards didn't get used
4 because they were still pulling backboards from the Madigan MCI
5 truck that was down a little bit lower, and so that's what they
6 were -- I believe that's what they were using to put patients on
7 backboards and then send them in transport units.
8 As far as our role there, we were basically just a supply
9 closet. So we were unloading things. Luckily there was a Sani-
10 Can so we didn't have to, you know, deal with bathroom facilities
11 or anything like that. It just happened to be a Sani-Can right
12 there from the construction. So we had portable heaters. We set
13 up heaters for folks to try to warm up and handed out blankets.
14 At one point, we did have these carts that were basically
15 just a backboard with wheels, and they -- at that point I believe
16 they weren't having any more rigs come down from the north, and
17 that all the transports were coming from the south end. And so
18 they were bringing people with gurneys basically kind of through
19 the scene and up this little road, loading them up on a gurney and
20 taking them back down. And so I said, hey, we've got these
21 transport buggies that we can just take these patients -- you
22 know, we had three of them. We can take three at a time down to
23 that area. It was discussed.
24 We were basically waiting to load on a patient, onto one, and
25 then it was just not used for whatever reason. I believe the 825

1 actually did come back and I'm not sure if they had transported
2 another group at that point but we didn't end up using those. So
3 as that happened, there was only maybe two people left and they
4 got transferred via the gurneys back to the south. And so with no
5 patients and no incoming patients to where we were, we
6 disassembled our stuff and put it back on the trailer at that
7 time, and then went back in service.
8 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right. So -- okay. Let me just
9 start from the beginning here. So somewhere around 7:39, 7:40,
10 you believe, you were notified of the incident. How long do you
11 think it took you to arrive there?
12 MR. NEWTON: Between 10 and 12 minutes.
13 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Do you have some sense when you -- the
14 time when you found out about the incident?
15 MR. CLARK: It took us probably more -- 25, 20 minutes.
16 There was quite a bit of traffic to weave through, plus we had to
17 load up the trailer and people. So maybe more like 30 minutes.
18 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Do you remember when you guys were
19 notified initially of this, the initial time for you?
20 MR. NEWTON: Our tones actually never went off at the
21 station. It was something that was coming over the phone from our
22 BC, I believe, who was calling the station. I never actually
23 talked to him. I was just approached by my acting captain who
24 said, hey, I need you and Douglas -- he was my partner on the
25 medic team that day -- to take the MCI trailer. And at that point

1 we were given -- we have a computer system in our F bay where we
2 can look up calls, and we saw that they were on it, and so we were
3 able to pull it up and get a location and that kind of a thing.
4 And then we left. I had only been at the station for a few
5 minutes. I think we finally left right at 8:00.
6 MR. CLARK: I heard the MCI trailer being asked for or being
7 dispatched when we were en route to Madigan the first time.
8 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
9 MR. CLARK: So we had just left. We had just left the scene.
10 We had been on scene maybe maximum 15 minutes.
11 MR. NEWTON: We passed you guys on the freeway.
12 MR. CLARK: It was definitely a max of 15.
13 MR. NEWTON: As you were coming up towards Madigan, we saw
14 you before you got off on the exit there.
15 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Was most of the communications that was
16 going on over your operating frequency?
17 MR. CLARK: I would say no. There was very little. We were
18 assigned to Bravo 4. There was very little radio traffic on that.
19 MR. DIAMOND: I don't think I heard any.
20 MR. CLARK: Yeah, most of it was just from us trying to call
21 a command or call -- we ended up getting assigned to staging. So
22 we knew that Jay was down there, and he made contact with us over
23 the radio, but that was the last time we used our radios, when we
24 were pulling up to the scene. Everything else was done face-to-
25 face.

1 MS. HARLEY: Do you have the ability to talk to Dupont on
2 like a major incident on their fire ground channel?
3 MR. DIAMOND: Yes.
4 MR. NEWTON: Yes.
5 MR. CLARK: Yes.
6 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
7 MR. CLARK: I believe Dupont was on a different frequency
8 because they were as a command talking with other units, and so I
9 just don't know if they were not monitoring or what, but --
10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: When we were on our way in, it sounded
11 like Dupont's command wanted to get together with JBLM and a
12 couple of other chiefs and try to create some sort of an overhead
13 team and, you know, while we were still at the scene, we hadn't
14 heard what they had established or who exactly that was, but we
15 knew that they were working together to create a unified command
16 together.
17 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So in Pierce County, you have West
18 Pierce. Where is Central Pierce?
19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Out more towards Puyallup.
20 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just east of us.
22 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Let's -- what is the next closest fire
23 station to here?
24 MR. NEWTON: Station 21.
25 MS. HARLEY: Well, let me repeat that. What is the next

1 closest fire company that's not part of West Pierce that's closest
2 to here?
3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Tacoma Fire Department is to the
4 north.
5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Central Pierce in the east and Dupont
6 to the south.
7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And JBLM is across the freeway there.
8 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Did you ultimately find out who was in
9 command of the scene?
10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No, I can't say that I did.
11 MS. HARLEY: When you arrived on the scene, because, as Medic
12 22, you were closest to the train, do you know if the train was
13 running? Did you hear engine sounds from either of the
14 locomotives?
15 MR. DIAMOND: I didn't hear anything as far as a running
16 train goes.
17 MS. HARLEY: When you looked at the train -- inside the train
18 cars and you could see people, were the lights on inside the cars?
19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We never -- I never got close enough
20 to look into the train.
21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I did, and I believe they were on.
22 MS. HARLEY: And the train car that you were looking at, you
23 said that was the one that you saw that was diagonal down the
24 hill; is that correct?
25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Diagonal up, going up towards the

1 ridge. So there was the one on I-5 and then there was the one up
2 towards --
3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That was hanging?
4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, the hanging train, diagonal.
5 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And there were people inside of there.
7 MS. HARLEY: Okay. When you first arrived on the scene, is
8 it correct to say that initially people were able to self-
9 extricate themselves?
10 MR. DIAMOND: I'm not sure how all the reds got grouped up on
11 the side of the road next to the Jersey barrier, but when we
12 arrived, there was a group of about 8, maybe 10 patients that were
13 red, that were considered reds at that point. I don't know if
14 they self-extricated or if they were helped out.
15 MR. CLARK: That's what, you know, what -- kind of what I was
16 talking about earlier is big picture, where do we fit in, right,
17 because I saw there were people still in the train diagonal that I
18 believed were being removed, whether that was by themselves or by
19 the firefighters. We saw the reds sitting next to the Jersey
20 barrier. So I wasn't sure -- you know, at that point we're trying
21 to prioritize -- they're red, but what I learned from this whole
22 thing was that there's a spectrum of red, right. There could be
23 worse inside the train or there could be the guys on the
24 guardrails could be worse. So how long do you wait to figure out
25 if they need us more or if the people on the guardrails need us

1 more. So that's what the internal battle was, why we were kind of
2 kicking around trying to figure out who we were gong to transport,
3 you know.
4 MS. HARLEY: Did you see anyone that looked like they were
5 ejected from the train?
6 MR. DIAMOND: I can't say that I -- no.
7 MS. HARLEY: So by the time you got there, there were fire
8 department personnel inside the train assisting the passengers?
9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There was fire department, state
10 patrol. There was GIs in their VDUs that were kicking in windows,
11 pulling people out, kind of all that stuff was kind of happening
12 as we approached.
13 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The people -- the fire department in
15 front of us was just throwing that initial ladder on the side
16 right when we got there.
17 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Just a moment please. Was your only
18 communication on the scene with Chief Summerlin?
19 MR. NEWTON: So we were assigned to that north triage area
20 and so we had some face-to-face contact with the Olympia battalion
21 chief. He basically just said create a cache of supplies and that
22 was pretty much our only task at the scene.
23 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
24 MR. NEWTON: We handed out water to whoever would have it.
25 And so we staged some water, put up the tents and basically handed

1 out blankets and that kind of thing.
2 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Do you have some sense -- I know you guys
3 went back to swap out crews and resupply. So I guess I'm talking
4 to you. Do you have some sense of when the last victim was
5 extricated out of the train?
6 MR. NEWTON: I hadn't looked at a clock since -- basically
7 since we left. So I couldn't tell you a time or anything like
8 that. I could tell that, you know, things were starting to slow
9 down. As we were pulling up, they were still, you know, assisting
10 people down the hill. Basically patients were walking up that
11 access road with cops and, you know, people were getting escorted
12 up that hill there, but I don't have a sense of time when, you
13 know, because I didn't hear anything on the radio as far as, you
14 know, this person's been extricated. It sounded like the
15 battalion chief from Olympia, when he was talking on the radio,
16 basically he was getting information that there was no more
17 patients coming to our area, because it did sound like they did
18 also have a south triage area. And so I was still kind of
19 confused as to that kind of a thing. So I was pretty out of the
20 loop on that. We just kind of did our little job there.
21 MS. HARLEY: What time did you get back to the firehouse from
22 the scene?
23 MR. NEWTON: It wasn't -- we got back probably around 11:15,
24 11:30.
25 MS. HARLEY: And when you left the scene were all the victims

1 transported, both the train and the vehicles, from the scene
2 before you left, do you know?
3 MR. NEWTON: From our treatment area, yes, there was no more
4 patients there. We were actually there for 10 or 15 minutes
5 because our rig had a dead battery. So we had to get a jump to
6 leave. So we were there dealing with that for a couple of
7 minutes. But I hadn't heard any more because, like I said, they
8 had another treatment area in the south, and I hadn't heard
9 whether they were still transporting patients or not. I believe
10 that they were all off the scene.
11 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So explain to me how your Firecom works.
12 What agencies are actually on your channel?
13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There's a few agencies. You've got,
14 you know, pretty much everybody.
15 CHIEF TINSLEY: I may be able to answer that a little bit
16 better.
17 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
18 CHIEF TINSLEY: Firecom is the PSAP for all of Pierce County
19 with the exception of the City of Tacoma. They have their own
20 PSAP for dispatching.
21 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
22 CHIEF TINSLEY: They all fall under -- City of Tacoma and
23 Firecom fall under the umbrella of South Sound 9-1-1. However,
24 they're separate PSAPs. So any Pierce County agency can talk to
25 another Pierce County agency pretty freely depending on what

1 channel they put their radio on or what bank. So that's how it's
2 kind of laid out in Pierce County.
3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So I just want to make sure I've got
4 this. So Firecom is all of Pierce County except for the City of
5 Tacoma, and all of that is part of South Sound 9-1-1.
6 CHIEF TINSLEY: Under the umbrella of South Sound 9-1-1.
7 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right.
8 CHIEF TINSLEY: To include law enforcement of Pierce County
9 and sheriff --
10 MS. HARLEY: All right.
11 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- and municipal departments.
12 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
13 MR. CLARK: I have some exact times if you --
14 MS. HARLEY: Absolutely.
15 MR. CLARK: I called Madigan ER on our way to the -- from the
16 first one, the first transport, I called Madigan at 8:12 to let
17 them know that I had two reds coming, priority.
18 MS. HARLEY: All right.
19 MR. CLARK: And then I called Firecom -- when we got back to
20 Station 22 after the second transport, we cleared Madigan, and
21 switch out personnel and load up their rig. We got back to
22 Station 22 at 9:41. That's when I left Firecom know that we would
23 head back if they needed us.
24 MS. HARLEY: I'm sorry. You said 9:22?
25 MR. CLARK: 9:41.

1 MS. HARLEY: 9:41.
2 MR. CLARK: Yeah.
3 MS. KLUTE: Station 22.
4 MS. HARLEY: At Station 22.
5 MR. CLARK: At that point they said we don't need you at the
6 scene anymore but we do need you to backfill Station 25, be on
7 call at Station 25.
8 MS. HARLEY: Got it.
9 MR. CLARK: So I relayed that to the two guys relieving us
10 and then they headed to Dupont to backfill the station.
11 MS. HARLEY: All right. So in addition to West Pierce,
12 Lacey, Dupont, JBLM, what other fire departments were on scene?
13 MR. NEWTON: I noticed that Olympia battalion chief. I'm not
14 sure if there was any other Olympia rigs there, but his helmet
15 said Olympia on it.
16 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Anybody else?
17 MR. DIAMOND: The few people that I talked to, they didn't
18 have helmet shields on, and so I didn't know.
19 MS. HARLEY: Were there any contract ambulances on the scene?
20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I believe Thurston County. I didn't
21 actually look at their patch, but they were wearing sweatshirts
22 and they weren't wearing any bunker gear or anything like that,
23 but I believe they were just potentially private ambulance from
24 Thurston County.
25 MS. HARLEY: And just to verify this, there was no one that

1 was actually flown directly from the scene; is that correct?
2 MR. DIAMOND: Not that I know of.
3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Jeff, any questions?
4 MR. STEWART: No, I think you covered it. Thank you.
5 MS. HARLEY: Liz?
6 MS. KLUTE: I just have two. Was the big white tent that was
7 set up, was that your tent?
8 MR. NEWTON: No. So we had a yellow, a green and a red tent,
9 and they're quite large pop-ups. I never saw a white tent.
10 MS. KLUTE: Okay. And did you get all your equipment back?
11 MR. NEWTON: Other than the blankets that we handed out, I
12 believe that we got everything else back.
13 MS. KLUTE: Were those base blankets or --
14 MR. NEWTON: They were wool blankets.
15 MS. KLUTE: Any idea how many you used?
16 MR. NEWTON: A few -- quite a few; 50, 60 maybe.
17 CHIEF TINSLEY: And that's something that we're going to
18 inventory the trailer and see what -- see if we can get to pretty
19 close what was utilized both in the trailer and medic units, those
20 kinds of things, and kind of come up with a list.
21 MR. DIAMOND: Our two triage bags that we brought out
22 initially, when we figured out that we weren't going to be part of
23 that role and we were going to transport, we gave our two triage
24 bags to, I believe, Lacy Byron.
25 MS. HARLEY: Did you get them back?

1 MR. DIAMOND: I'm not sure. No.
2 MR. CLARK: We got one of them back when we left the scene.
3 Somebody gave them to us but --
4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Was it used at all?
5 MR. CLARK: Yeah, it was pretty beat up.
6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's good.
7 MS. HARLEY: That was to Lacy?
8 MR. DIAMOND: I believe so.
9 MS. HARLEY: So, Chief, my question is actually to you. How
10 do -- how were you planning to deal with the after action as far
11 as, I guess, internally for the West Pierce group and also as far
12 as Pierce County?
13 CHIEF TINSLEY: I got notification yesterday that Pierce
14 County IMT, Incident Maintenance Team, was activated for this
15 incident. West Pierce have five members -- four -- five members
16 that are part of that team along with many other Pierce County
17 agencies. So I got word yesterday that the IMT is going to manage
18 the after action, and I don't know if it's going to encompass --
19 what that means, if it's just Pierce County or if it's going to
20 encompass Thurston County units, Madigan, JBLM, I'm not sure. But
21 Battalion Chief Summerlin, I saw his name as being the potential
22 lead to put that together. So he would be a good contact --
23 MS. HARLEY: Great.
24 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- for you.
25 MS. KLUTE: You said Chief Summerlin?

1 CHIEF TINSLEY: Yes. I assume you have his contact
2 information?
3 MS. HARLEY: Yes, I do. Thank you. Okay. Well, as
4 promised, you get to ask me questions, but first, is there
5 anything you think I should have asked you and I failed to ask
6 you?
7 MR. CLARK: If there was any kind of documentation on our
8 end, I do have a helmet cam of the whole incident.
9 MS. HARLEY: Oh, you do have a helmet cam. Oh, you're the
10 first person who's had one.
11 MR. CLARK: I haven't watched it. I haven't reviewed it. I
12 figured it would be pretty much federal property at this point.
13 So --
14 MS. HARLEY: So, Chief, how does that work?
15 CHIEF TINSLEY: You have that with you?
16 MR. CLARK: Yes, in the F Bay right now.
17 CHIEF TINSLEY: Typically with the helmet cam, we have --
18 like I mentioned in the first meeting, we have a number of
19 individuals that have helmet cams. When they record video on the
20 scene, they transfer it to our training division which is
21 typically Chief Summerlin.
22 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
23 CHIEF TINSLEY: He downloads that; he files it appropriately.
24 So that's typically the channel of the way it's handled. So what
25 I'll do is I'll get that from Kyle today. You said you have it

1 here today?
2 MR. CLARK: Yeah.
3 CHIEF TINSLEY: I'll get that from Kyle today, I'll get it to
4 Chief Summerlin to download, and then however you want to receive
5 that, we can get that to you.
6 MS. HARLEY: Great. We have a way of -- where you can
7 transfer it electronically through a secured government site.
8 CHIEF TINSLEY: Okay.
9 MS. HARLEY: So -- and just to let you know, we do not
10 release -- we cannot, by law, release video to the public. So it
11 will not -- it will be only seen by those specific investigators
12 that are in this -- that's part of this crash investigation, are
13 the only ones actually in my Agency who could see it, and we
14 cannot release it to anyone. So I just wanted to make sure you
15 understand that.
16 CHIEF TINSLEY: So what I'll do is I'll communicate with him
17 after the meeting, and let him know what we need to do, and then
18 I'll have -- communicate directly with you on how to get that
19 passed on.
20 MS. HARLEY: That's absolutely awesome. Thank you.
21 MR. CLARK: Sorry to throw a -- sorry to have another speed
22 bump. I figured you guys owned it at this point.
23 CHIEF TINSLEY: You know what's interesting is when you asked
24 that question the other day, I knew that Kyle was one of the ones
25 that had it, but I forget to think about that today whether he had

1 it on that day.
2 MS. HARLEY: Yeah.
3 CHIEF TINSLEY: So thanks for --
4 MR. CLARK: I figured we would discuss it. But -- yeah.
5 MS. HARLEY: Thank you. Well, I'm thrilled.
6 MR. CLARK: Right. Yeah. I didn't want that to end up on
7 YouTube or something.
8 MS. HARLEY: No, no.
9 CHIEF TINSLEY: And we're very strict with the use of that,
10 those helmet --
11 MS. HARLEY: Yeah.
12 CHIEF TINSLEY: -- video as well. So it's not going to be
13 something that --
14 MS. HARLEY: Not a problem.
15 MR. CLARK: The only other thing that I would mention is we
16 were talking about radios and communication, whatnot. We have
17 some pretty high (indiscernible) systems. I mean, we upgraded it
18 recently in the last few years and so we have the ability to
19 change zones and change channels and whatnot. It's just we
20 weren't giving a channel -- weren't given a channel to go to. So
21 it's pretty hard to -- I mean, that radio has hundreds of channels
22 to go to and, you know, without -- you know, you can't really
23 scroll through and listen to figure out which one is which. So
24 that was just something I was going to mention. The radio has the
25 capability to go to a different channel and talk to different

1 agencies and whatnot, except for JBLM. But -- yeah.
2 MS. HARLEY: And that is also one of the things that we look
3 at, because anything that we can suggest that will help make your
4 life easier on these scenes is very important to us, and it's very
5 important to you. And clearly, you guys have got to be able to
6 communicate with each other, especially if you're on the scene and
7 you're on one side and then something is bad going wrong on the
8 other side. There has to be a way for you guys to communicate
9 with one another. So thank you very much. That is very, very
10 important to us. Anything else?
11 MR. DIAMOND: To tack onto the decision not to go back for
12 the third time --
13 MS. HARLEY: Um-hum.
14 MR. DIAMOND: When I was transporting out the seven patients,
15 the two yellows and the five greens, somebody on the radio came
16 across and said that they had enough resources at some point, and
17 I heard that and I think it factored into our decision why not to
18 head back, too. So --
19 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right. And, Chief, do you have any
20 questions?
21 CHIEF TINSLEY: No, I have a card here that I'll give you.
22 If you have any further questions of any of these folks, just give
23 me a call and I'll make arrangements to contact them.
24 MS. HARLEY: I certainly will. Thank you very much,
25 gentlemen, and again, I'm sorry you came in on your day off.

1 All right. Okay. It's 9:51. Thank you.
2 (Whereupon, at 9:51 a.m., the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 Interview of Tyler Newton, Kyle Clark and Vi Diamond
ACCIDENT NUMBER:	RRD18MR001
PLACE:	Lakewood, Washington
DATE:	December 22, 2017

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Kathryn A. Mirfin
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *
*
AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, *
WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 * Accident No.: RRD18MR001
*
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Interview of: ZACK HOWARD

Dupont Fire Department
1780 Civic Drive
Dupont, Washington

Friday,
December 22, 2017

APPEARANCES:

SHERYL HARLEY, Survival Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

JEFFREY STEWART, Investigative Analyst
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

ELIZABETH KLUTE, Emergency Manager
Northwest Region
Amtrak

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1 I N T E R V I E W

2 (10:53 a.m.)

3 MS. Harley: So all right. So we're going to get started.
4 So here we are. It is Friday, December 22nd, 2017. It is 10:53
5 a.m. We are located at the Dupont Fire Department and we are
6 interviewing -- can I have your name?

7 MR. HOWARD: Zack Howard.

8 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Zack Howard.

9 For the record, Zack, my name is Sheryl Harley. I'm with the
10 National Transportation Safety Board. And as I've explained to
11 you, we are here investigating the train derailment, and one of
12 the things that you're going to be helping us with is figuring out
13 what we call survival factors. So one of the things we do is we
14 interview all the first responders and get their sense of what
15 happened.

16 Also, in the room with me is?

17 MR. STEWART: Jeffrey Stewart with the FRA, Federal Railroad
18 Administration, Region 8. I'm part of -- attached to the
19 passenger forensic team right now kind of also looking at
20 survivability factors.

21 MS. KLUTE: And I'm Elizabeth Klute, the regional emergency
22 manager for Amtrak. I provided the passenger train emergency
23 response training for Dupont Fire and the other agencies and I'm
24 here supporting the NTSB.

25 MS. HARLEY: As a matter of fact, he identified you as the

1 person who gave him his training class.
2 MS. KLUTE: Yes, I remember you.
3 MR. HOWARD: I saw you not too long ago.
4 MS. KLUTE: Yes.
5 MS. HARLEY: Okay. That's good. By the way, when did you
6 take that training?
7 MR. HOWARD: A few months ago.
8 MS. KLUTE: August.
9 MR. HOWARD: August.
10 INTERVIEW OF ZACK HOWARD
11 BY MS. HARLEY:
12 Q. Okay. So let's go back to train derailment. Start from when
13 you were notified and approximately what time that was.
14 A. 7:30 or 7:40 in the morning, I think. We were dispatched
15 for, I think, passenger train derailment onto the freeway with
16 fire or something like that. So we started running down the
17 stairs out to the rig to get bunked up, and I was trying to
18 process that -- those are a lot of large incidents individually
19 and for them to have stacked that many of them, I was kind of
20 thinking -- trying to imagine what I was going to picture.
21 We got en route. Our chief pulled out right in front of us.
22 So we were kind of following him all the way through town and then
23 onto the freeway. And I think there was one JBLM rig that got
24 there a little bit before us. My chief was trying to kind of
25 snake through the path they had created on I-5. We were following

1 him.

2 So as we started to get a little closer on I-5, weaving

3 through traffic, I could see obviously numerous train cars

4 derailed and one hanging off of an overpass. Kind of a scene out

5 of a movie, it looked like.

6 The first thing I kind of remember once we had pulled up and

7 stopped and I got out, or as we were pulling up and getting out,

8 thinking there was a lot of young military looking guys out

9 helping walk people away. So I figured with the time of day, that

10 it was just lucky, I guess you could say, that there was a lot of

11 young guys who have all had some trauma training that are stuck on

12 the freeway right there heading to the base.

13 So got out. I was the acting officer for the day. My

14 captain was off. I ran around to a couple chiefs that I saw,

15 trying to figure out who was taking command at that point and who

16 I needed to give my passports to. I couldn't find anybody who had

17 established command. I ran around for a minute right there. Then

18 I ran over to my two other guys, John and Jason, and grabbed them

19 and we decided we'd just go start triaging people and trying to

20 find patients to help.

21 I talked to a few people that were up and walking and told

22 them just to make their way a little further away. And there was

23 a lot of people gathering in what ended up, I think, being like

24 the triage area. So we were telling people to just go that way.

25 And then John and Jason made patient contact with someone in a

1 little green car, like a Kia Soul or something, I think. I'm not
2 sure exactly what it was. But the back driver tire of that was up
3 on the guardrail and she was kind of leaning forward over the
4 steering wheel. John said she -- he was pretty concerned that she
5 was fairly injured and needed immediate help, so they were
6 starting to provide patient care to her. At that point I was
7 directed to have them leave her, get back in our ambulance, Aid
8 25, pull that up to the triage area.
9 So they pulled it up there. I ran over there. We loaded
10 eight patients into the ambulance for that first trip, I think one
11 in the front passenger seat and then seven in the back. John
12 Roberts was driving it and Jason Leck (ph.) was in back with the
13 patients. And they transported them to Madigan that time.
14 They left. At that point I teamed up with some JBLM guys, a
15 crew of them that were right there trying to find more backboards
16 to go over and get more patients.
17 Do I need to slow down? You're all writing quickly and I'm
18 like --
19 MS. KLUTE: Huh-uh. No.
20 MS. HARLEY: No, you're doing fine.
21 MR. STEWART: No.
22 MR. HOWARD: So I teamed up with some of those guys. We
23 grabbed -- I grabbed two backboards and a C-collar bag. He
24 grabbed two more backboards. We made our way underneath the train
25 trestle and then kind of up the side of the hill on the back side

1 of it. There was a bunch of guys up there pulling people out from
2 kind of underneath a train car down there, so we slid a backboard
3 in down there. They put somebody on it and we pulled it back up
4 out. Got them strapped down to the board, carried them out. And
5 then went up over a little further into the woods where kind of a
6 locomotive had gone through and we were on the back side of the
7 trestle there on that hillside. There were a few patients in
8 there that were being taken out of train cars there.
9 So we got one of those guys down, got him back boarded.
10 Walked up to the top of the trestle and then down the steep
11 hillside there that goes down to I-5. There were, you know, six
12 of us probably on that backboard, a couple police with us. We
13 carried that guy down. Somebody brought a stretcher over. We sat
14 that person on that stretcher.
15 We went back up the hillside. Went over and helped get one
16 more person there. And then they had enough people standing there
17 at that point and they walked him actually out south, to the south
18 end of it there and I guess put him in an ambulance there.
19 And then we all kind of formed back up on the north of the
20 train trestle, a little ways back from where the car was hanging
21 and all that. It seemed like at that point they didn't -- talking
22 the group, big group of firefighters there, 20 guys or something
23 standing around, that it seemed like most patients that everybody
24 was aware of were now taken out. And at that point everything
25 kind of slowed down a lot, and stood around, then just kind of ran

1 back and forth for a little bit trying to pick up some of my gear.
2 Somewhere in there, my ambulance came back. They loaded, I think,
3 eight more people into it and transported them to Good Samaritan
4 Hospital, Puyallup.
5 Then from there, I just kind of checked in with my chief a
6 couple times asking if there was anything else I could do for him
7 and trying to pick some of our gear up. I noticed somebody had
8 taken both the ladders off our engine at that point so I started
9 looking for those. And then just kind of a lot of standing around
10 after that.
11 Q. Okay. So I'm going to start you a little ways back again.
12 A. Okay.
13 Q. So between 7:30, 7:40, approximately, is when you got the
14 dispatch. And you left this station?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And the two pieces of equipment that went with you were?
17 A. Engine 25 and Aid 25.
18 Q. Okay. So Engine and A-25.
19 A. And out chief was directly in front of us in his command
20 vehicle.
21 Q. Who was the chief?
22 A. Larry Creekmore.
23 Q. Okay. So you arrived on the scene and who was in charge when
24 you first arrived?
25 A. Of just us or the whole thing?

1 Q. Of everything.
2 A. I'm not sure.
3 Q. Okay.
4 A. That's what I kind of ran around for a minute trying to --
5 with my passports in hand like, do you want them; do you want
6 these? And I don't know if command hadn't been established yet or
7 if I just wasn't finding the right person, but I did that for what
8 seemed like probably longer, but it was probably only 60 seconds,
9 maybe, and then just met up with John and Jason and said let's
10 start getting patients.
11 Q. Okay. So at one particular point John and Jason go over to
12 this green car. There's a woman trapped inside. And at that
13 point who gives you instructions to tell them to leave her and
14 have them man the A-25?
15 A. I believe that was my chief, called me over the radio. And
16 at that point I think there was a JBLM chief and maybe a Lacey
17 chief who had formed like a unified command. That might have
18 happened just after -- I can't remember exactly the order of
19 everything. It's kind of a blur of stuff, as far as stuff I
20 wasn't -- I remember everything I was directly doing, but as far
21 as when people were doing stuff like forming unified command and
22 all that, I wasn't paying that close of attention.
23 And there's also my radio is on Bravo 4. JBLM was operating
24 on a different frequency and I don't have that. So there's a lot
25 of radio traffic that I was missing. That's been something that

1 has been talked about numerous times, that we have a hard time
2 communicating with each other because of the different radio
3 systems we use.
4 Q. Outside of Dupont Fire Department, do you know if there was
5 any other fire department on Bravo 4?
6 A. I believe there were West Pierce people on Bravo 4. Other
7 than that, I can't remember anyone that would have been on it.
8 Q. Okay. All right. So all right. So at that particular point
9 you left the lady in the vehicle. Did Firefighter Roberts, did he
10 have an issue with leaving the woman in the car?
11 A. He was concerned that she was not doing well and that the way
12 she was -- her car, the back of her car was up. She was leaning
13 over the steering wheel. And he said that he was worried she
14 wouldn't be able to support herself sitting in that position for
15 very long.
16 Q. Okay. So what was done about that?
17 A. As we -- they went and got the ambulance. Pulled it up the
18 dirt road in between the freeway in the middle there. I told
19 someone else -- there was another crew of people, and I had told
20 them that there was a red patient in that car that needed help. I
21 do not for the life of me remember who it was, but --
22 Q. Not a problem. All right. So at that particular point then
23 John and Jason, in A-25, they loaded up eight patients. Do you
24 know where they got the eight patients from? Did they just pick
25 eight patients or did someone give --

1 A. No. There was a lady who I believe is with JBLM who was
2 getting the triage area there. And then another guy that she was
3 working with -- I don't know who he was with, they were giving us
4 patients.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. And then as we would help them -- John, Jason and I were all
7 kind of helping people into the back of the ambulance, and as we
8 would put them in we would turn the tag around on them and call
9 out to the guy -- he had a clipboard, and we'd call out tag Bravo
10 24561 or whatever the number was. And he'd write it down and then
11 -- so he was tracking patients.
12 Q. Okay. Was he tracking them only by the tag number or were
13 you calling out tag number and condition as far as red, yellow,
14 green?
15 A. I think we were saying condition as well. We weren't doing
16 any name --
17 Q. Right.
18 A. -- or date of birth, nothing like that was --
19 Q. Got it. All right. Did you have a moment where you actually
20 interacted with any of the patients that were -- that went in the
21 ambulance?
22 A. Other than -- I mean, I was like grabbing underneath people's
23 arms and helping them step up into the aid unit, stuff like that.
24 But I wasn't really talking to anybody about their injuries or
25 anything like that.

1 Q. Okay. Do you know where these patients came from? Do you
2 know if they were from the train or if they were from vehicles?
3 A. No, I don't. I just knew that they were in that staging
4 triage area in the middle.
5 Q. When you arrived on the scene, did you see any of the
6 passengers self-evacuate from the train?
7 A. I don't remember physically seeing anyone get out of a train
8 car, but there were large -- there was a large number of people
9 moving away from the train. And like I said initially, a lot of
10 them looked like young army guys, just based on the short hair and
11 looking non-injured, helping kind of walk people away. So I --
12 some combination of that, but I don't remember actually seeing
13 anyone climb out of a train car.
14 There was a ladder put up to the one that was hanging and
15 there was a different group of firefighters helping people down
16 that ladder. So I guess I do remember seeing a few people getting
17 out that way.
18 Q. Okay. When you arrived on the scene did you hear the train
19 running?
20 A. Not that I remember. But when I got out of my rig, we had --
21 there was an engine in front of me running, my engine was running,
22 there was our ambulance behind us. So I don't think I'd have
23 heard anything -- the locomotives running just standing next to
24 multiple big diesel motors.
25 Q. Uh-huh. When you looked at the train did you see any lights

1 inside of the train cars?
2 A. I don't recall.
3 Q. Okay. All right. Did you have any interaction with any of
4 the train crew?
5 A. Not personally. There was a guy when we were down on the
6 back side of the trestle, kind of on the hill where the locomotive
7 had gone through, that at that point had his arm in a sling. He
8 was trying to answer some questions about patient numbers and
9 stuff like that for some other people, but that was just -- I was
10 overhearing that as we were strapping a guy on to a backboard and
11 getting ready to leave or to carry him out. And then I gave that
12 guy a bottle of water later, but that's about it.
13 Q. You said his arm was in a sling. Was it like one of the
14 slings that a rescuer had put on or was it like a regular hospital
15 sling?
16 A. It was just one of the regular slings like we carry in the
17 ambulances, a triangle bandage that --
18 Q. A triangle bandage?
19 A. I think that's what it was in.
20 Q. Okay. All right. Could you estimate how long it took you to
21 get to the scene?
22 A. I would guess 7 or 8 minutes. We didn't have any traffic
23 from here all the way to the freeway, and then once we got to the
24 freeway, obviously, we were slowed down considerably in trying to
25 weave in and out of traffic without hitting any of the cars.

1 Q. Okay. What time were you put in service on the scene to
2 return here?
3 A. Probably around noon, I guess, because I left here at 1:00
4 that day, I think, to go home.
5 Q. At the time you were put in service, did you believe that all
6 the patients had been transported from the scene?
7 A. Yes. But I had seen -- for quite a while before that, I
8 hadn't seen any patients because, like I said, we had been kind of
9 just standing around for a while. And by then, there was a lot of
10 who -- we were seeing train people. I don't know if it was Amtrak
11 or NTSB. A lot of people in hard hats and vests out there with
12 what looked like surveying equipment and all that measuring things
13 and --
14 Q. At the time who was in charge of the scene?
15 A. At that point they had a command center set up at the, I
16 think, Eagle's Pride Golf Course is what it's called, the McChord-
17 Lewis golf course or JBLM golf course. So I don't know who was
18 actually there running it, but they were in the golf course
19 building.
20 Q. Okay.
21 MR. STEWART: So it was right at the end that you noticed
22 that there was a command center?
23 MR. HOWARD: No. I remember at one point that -- seeing the
24 JBLM chief and I believe a Lacey chief sitting in a SUV together
25 with the windows up and they were running command. And that was,

1 I think, still fairly early into it, but it wasn't when we first
2 pulled up and I was looking for somebody to try and tag in with
3 and get direction from.
4 MS. KLUTE: You said that was JBLM and Lacey?
5 MR. HOWARD: I believe it was a Lacey chief and a JBLM chief.
6 BY MS. HARLEY:
7 Q. Okay. You were not on the same radio frequency as Lacey, are
8 you?
9 A. No.
10 Q. No. Okay. All right.
11 A. Sure seems like something that should get addressed since
12 this is not the first time we have run large incidents with JBLM.
13 Q. I'm just seeing if anything --
14 A. Yep.
15 Q. Okay. So okay.
16 MS. HARLEY: Tell you what, Jeff, do you have any other
17 questions while I'm looking through this real quick?
18 BY MR. STEWART:
19 Q. You said you noticed military folks helping out. Any number
20 -- I mean, we've talked to at least a couple guys that were good
21 Samaritan help at the scene, and did -- any ballpark estimate of
22 how many military guys you saw? I know it's hard to tell whether
23 you're seeing different guys --
24 A. Yeah, 10 or 15. I mean, I feel like I definitely saw a
25 number of people that I just assumed were young army guys that

1 were --
2 Q. Okay. And one last --
3 A. And also, some women that were in -- one lady in scrubs that
4 was with the lady in the green car.
5 Q. Okay. And did you see anyone who looked like they had been
6 ejected from the -- one of the passenger cars?
7 A. There was somebody in the very front of the incident. So
8 just north of the trestle on the ground when we first -- or pretty
9 soon after we first arrived, there was somebody laying there that
10 was covered.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. And then on the back side -- the trestle kind of runs here
13 and the locomotive came down, and those trains that derailed, the
14 passenger cars that were here, we were underneath kind of one car
15 there and I believe there were two guys down there that were
16 ejected, obviously, because they were below one of the cars and
17 all the tree debris, and we were moving living patients out past
18 them.
19 Q. Okay. And they appeared to be living also?
20 A. No. There was a body that by the time I got in to that spot
21 was laying and kind of just covered up and we were -- I was
22 stepping over and around him as we were --
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. -- carrying people on backboards.
25 BY MS. HARLEY:

1 Q. The two that were under the train that you were saying that
2 they were in the debris, they were deceased also or were they
3 living?
4 A. I believe there were two people dead just down in the woods
5 where the locomotive had gone by there, because there was one set
6 of legs sticking out and there were some firefighters down in
7 there that passed some living people up to us and then we walked
8 away with the backboards.
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. And after I finished carrying that backboard down and went
11 back up, they said there was nobody else in that area. And
12 because those train cars were precariously placed and I didn't
13 want to get crushed by one, I didn't feel the need to go back in
14 there. So I definitely thought of some of the stuff from your
15 training class after, about some of the dangerous stuff and that
16 we definitely were in some bad spots, but there's nothing you can
17 do about it. So --
18 Q. By the way, were you there when the -- the medical examiner's
19 office arrived on the scene, correct?
20 A. I don't --
21 Q. You don't --
22 A. I would assume so, but I didn't never talk to them or seen
23 them.
24 Q. Were you gone by the time they got there?
25 A. I don't know. I didn't see them.

1 Q. Okay. All right. So the person that you saw that was lying
2 on the ground, you said that was north of the trestle, that you
3 had seen?
4 A. Yeah. I think it -- so if this is the trestle and we came
5 south on I-5 and stopped here, I think they were somewhere right
6 up in that area is where I --
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. I'm pretty sure that's where I stopped.
9 MR. STEWART: Would you mind if I showed him the picture?
10 MS. HARLEY: No. Absolutely, that would be great.
11 MR. STEWART: Let me dig it up again.
12 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
13 BY MS. HARLEY:
14 Q. And while he's doing that, did you see anyone that was
15 partially ejected and still pinned in the train when you arrived?
16 A. Partially, like hanging out of a window or something?
17 Q. Like hanging out of any portion of the train.
18 A. The only thing I think that would be that, would be the
19 people that were -- eventually came down that ladder.
20 Q. Right.
21 A. But I don't think they were stuck in that spot.
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. I think they were just in that car and helped to be brought
24 down.
25 Q. Okay.

1 BY MR. STEWART:
2 Q. Here's a picture of the scene. Let's see. I believe this is
3 north.
4 A. Yeah. So we were parked somewhere right here.
5 Q. Over there.
6 MS. KLUTE: Where were you parked?
7 MR. HOWARD: Because we came south. So we stopped, I think,
8 somewhere right in here. That green car is right down here. I
9 think they were somewhere up in that area. There was a lot more
10 rigs and people and stuff there because there were still civilian
11 cars parked there that hadn't been moved, and so the kind of
12 picture I have in my head looks a lot different than this because
13 there was so much stuff there. But I thought it was right up in
14 this area that there was somebody laying and covered.
15 BY MR. STEWART:
16 Q. This was the one that was dangling and then there's the one
17 that's --
18 A. Upside down.
19 Q. -- underneath on the ground.
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. And then there's this one on its side and then these are kind
22 of in line with the locomotive.
23 A. So these are the ones that I was saying we were kind of
24 climbing in between and underneath.
25 Q. Uh-huh.

1 A. And then we ended up going around and coming up to them from
2 this side --
3 Q. Yeah.
4 A. -- and taking a patient out, down, carrying them this way,
5 and then the second patient we took out they loaded and they
6 carried south through the woods.
7 Q. Okay. But you saw the people that looked like they were
8 ejected in this area over here?
9 A. I thought I saw one person up here and then two people that
10 were underneath back over in here.
11 BY MS. HARLEY:
12 Q. These two here. Okay. So back up in here?
13 A. Yeah, I would say on the bottom of these two.
14 Q. Two. Okay, I see.
15 A. There was another train car below them right there, I
16 believe.
17 Q. Okay. All right. And then the one you saw was down here?
18 A. I think so, yeah.
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. I'm guessing you guys aren't allowed to talk about that, but
21 I'm wondering if my -- seems like my story is maybe not the same
22 because you guys are not saying, yeah, they found somebody right
23 there or something.
24 Q. Well, the problem is that everyone focuses on different
25 things.

1 A. Sure.
2 Q. So one of the issues that we do find is, is that what you
3 remember is --
4 A. Is not always --
5 Q. -- it's not wrong, you remember what you focused on.
6 A. Sure.
7 Q. And someone else is focusing on something else. And what we
8 do is we put them together --
9 A. Yeah.
10 Q. -- to figure out is, okay, if you two are in the same general
11 vicinity and you're looking at one thing and they're looking at
12 another thing, how close are you together --
13 A. Sure.
14 Q. -- and if we can put it together and make one picture out of
15 it.
16 A. Sure.
17 Q. So ultimately, the one thing I will say that we are looking
18 at is communications; how you guys communicate with one another,
19 your ability to communicate with one another, and if maybe that's
20 something that needs to be addressed by the various counties --
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. -- Thurston County and Pierce County together, figure out,
23 and then JBLM, how you guys communicate when you get on a
24 situation -- in a situation when you get in this large kind of
25 mutual aid, multi-jurisdictional quagmire that you guys ultimately

1 need to speak to each other.
2 A. That's absolutely something needs to be addressed. And so
3 far, the only thing that's been done about it is that a couple of
4 the JBLM rigs have one of our radios on them so that their officer
5 is able to talk to us. But I think at a minimum now we need to
6 get at least one JBLM radio so that if the call is on their
7 frequency we are not in the dark as to what's going on.
8 Q. Okay. So the JBLM rigs, to your knowledge, at least have one
9 radio on them --
10 A. A couple of them. Not all of them.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. Only two or three of their rigs have one of our radios on
13 them.
14 Q. Okay. So the other thing is that, while you were there, did
15 you happen to see any of the extrication, outside of the people
16 that are coming down off the ladders, the need to actually cut
17 people out of the train?
18 A. I didn't.
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. I saw somebody banging a tool -- I don't remember what it
21 was -- onto a window, and I remember thinking that that's -- I'm
22 sure if you hit something hard enough you can break it, but I
23 don't think that's how they are designed to be pulled out. So I
24 don't know if they couldn't get inside to pull the stuff off and
25 pull it out or what the issue was. And maybe they had tried and

1 it didn't work, but I remember thinking there's got to be a better
2 way to take that window out than just banging something on it
3 because I'm guessing those are pretty strong windows.
4 Q. The people that you helped to pull out of the train, did you
5 have to do any kind of forceful entry to get to them?
6 A. The people down on the back side of the hill, the window was
7 out. They had a ladder up to it and I was at the bottom, and they
8 got the person slid down it and then --
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. So I didn't actually help get anyone out of a train car.
11 MS. HARLEY: I'm sorry. Liz, you were going to say
12 something?
13 MS. KLUTE: No. Uh-uh.
14 MS. HARLEY: Oh.
15 MS. KLUTE: I had a couple of questions but not regarding --
16 MS. HARLEY: Oh, yeah. Well, go ahead.
17 BY MS. KLUTE:
18 Q. Do you know who put up the big white tent?
19 A. Which one? No, I don't know. But I think there were a few.
20 Q. Okay. And did you guys get all your equipment back?
21 A. We are missing a roof ladder. We have the one from our
22 backup engine on our rig right now.
23 Q. With the foldable one --
24 A. Yeah, the little hooks that fold out.
25 Q. Anything remarkable about it? You got tape around the

1 handles or --
2 MS. HARLEY: Is it stenciled with --
3 MR. HOWARD: I think it's got like a Dupont Fire tag on it
4 somewhere. It's got little red arrows on it that line up with the
5 locks that hold it on, so that when you go to put it on you're not
6 trying to figure out which -- because we have -- there's an
7 extension ladder and the two of them fit in together and they have
8 to be lined up perfect to fit. So --
9 BY MS. KLUTE:
10 Q. But did you guys put the arrows on or is that from the
11 manufacturer?
12 A. I think we did. There's little stickers.
13 Q. Okay. Are they red?
14 A. Vinyl stickers, yeah.
15 Q. And are the hooks taped? Are they yellow-taped or anything
16 like that?
17 A. No. They're just stainless steel metal hooks. I don't think
18 there's anything on them.
19 MS. KLUTE: That's all I have.
20 BY MS. HARLEY:
21 Q. Okay. So as promised, you get to ask me questions. So I
22 guess we'll start with is there anything that you think I should
23 have asked you and I failed to ask you about this incident?
24 A. No. I think with what it sounds like your -- the purpose of
25 your investigation is, is to try and find out how this stuff can

1 go better in the future. And I think the biggest frustration that
2 sounds like John maybe talked to you a little bit about it and
3 that we had was the lack of initial structure, which I know it's
4 really difficult to try and show up and immediately take control
5 of something like that. But that was pretty frustrating and that
6 was why when I came back from getting those people loaded in the
7 ambulance, in A-25 the first time. There were a couple of JBLM
8 guys asking if I had more backboards. So I grabbed the ones off
9 my engine and I just went with them instead of trying to go find
10 somebody to give my passports to and seemed like a better use of
11 my time to just get back into helping people.
12 So that's not the correct thing to do, but I had already
13 spent more time than I thought I needed trying to find somebody to
14 give my tags to and go that route. So --
15 Q. Understood.
16 A. And the communication of the radios is also pretty
17 frustrating. I don't know that that would have made too much of a
18 difference for what I was personally doing, but I can't see how it
19 would have hurt anything for everyone to be able to talk better.
20 So --
21 Q. One thing I did want to ask, does the Dupont Fire Department
22 have the helmet cameras?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Okay.
25 MS. KLUTE: Do you know if any of the other response team

1 departments do?
2 MR. HOWARD: I know some people have them in general. I
3 don't remember seeing anybody that had one, but I definitely know
4 some people have like GoPro cameras and stuff that they put on
5 their helmets. None of our guys have them and I think that's
6 sometimes a slippery slope depending on which department you're
7 with as to whether or not you're allowed to do that. But I don't
8 recall seeing anybody that had one on.
9 Q. Okay.
10 MS. HARLEY: All right. Anything else?
11 MR. STEWART: I'm good.
12 BY MS. HARLEY:
13 Q. Okay. So as I said before, we -- this takes a long time.
14 A. Sure.
15 Q. But my understanding is there's going to be an after action.
16 I'm not quite sure. Do you have any idea how your department is
17 going to handle the after action with this?
18 A. The last time we had a call that was close to this magnitude,
19 which happened to be in the exact same spot, and it was us and
20 JBLM and I think some Lacey people as well, we had a huge after
21 action with -- down at JBLM with state patrol and DOT and all the
22 people involved, and I think it was at least a few weeks later.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. So I'm just assuming, based on that, that it will be kind of
25 the same thing.

1 Q. Okay.
2 MS. KLUTE: And we will be doing the debrief again like we
3 did at Steilacoom. I'll talk to the chiefs, but tentatively
4 that's somewhere between the 25th and the 31st of the month of
5 January.
6 MS. HARLEY: Anything else?
7 MR. HOWARD: I don't think so.
8 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Well, thank you very much for your time
9 and, again, I do appreciate it. It's 11:29 and I guess you're
10 free.
11 MR. HOWARD: Okay.
12 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Thank you.
13 (Whereupon, at 11:29 a.m., the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 Interview of Zack Howard
ACCIDENT NO:	RRD18MR001
PLACE:	Dupont, Washington
DATE:	December 22, 2017

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

Letha J. Wheeler
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *
*
AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, *
WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 * Accident No.: RRD18MR001
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Interview of: JOHN ROBERTS
Firefighter

Dupont Fire Dept.
1780 Civic Drive
Dupont, Washington

Thursday,
December 21, 2017

APPEARANCES:

SHERYL HARLEY, Survival Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

JEFFREY STEWART, Investigative Analyst
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

ELIZABETH KLUTE, Emergency Manager
Northwest Region
Amtrak

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1 I N T E R V I E W

2 (9:18 a.m.)

3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So to start off with, today is Thursday,
4 December 21st, 2017. It's 9:18 a.m. I'm located at the Dupont
5 Fire Station located at 1780 Civic Drive in Dupont, Washington. I
6 am Sheryl Harley. I'm with the National Transportation Safety
7 Board. Also with me, if you don't mind?

8 MR. STEWART: Yes. I'm Jeff Stewart with the Federal
9 Railroad Administration.

10 MS. HARLEY: And you are Mr. John Roberts?

11 MR. ROBERTS: Yes.

12 MS. HARLEY: Did I get that correct?

13 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, ma'am.

14 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right. So let's start with what or
15 why I'm here. One of the things that we do is we look at what we
16 call survivability factors, and we ask the first responders what
17 they saw. One of the things that we're looking for is how you
18 responded to the scene, did you have any difficulty, did you have
19 any problems with notification, did you have any problems
20 coordinating on the scene, what you saw, your encounters with
21 either the victims or bystanders that were on the scene.

22 Also, what we ask you to do is to tell us any kind of
23 problems that you encountered. Especially when you're talking
24 about a train and you're doing things, we're talking like
25 extraction and things, there are little extra problems associated

1 with that. And one of the things that we look at is what we can
2 do or what we can suggest to be done to make your life as a first
3 responder easier so that if this has to happen again, number one,
4 we can either prevent someone from dying, we can lessen the
5 severity of their injuries, or we can certainly, at the very
6 least, suggest something that makes your job a little easier.
7 So that's why we're here. And I guess we'll start from
8 the beginning.
9 INTERVIEW OF JOHN ROBERTS
10 BY MS. HARLEY:
11 Q. So John, do you mind if I call you John?
12 A. Yep.
13 Q. Okay. John, what exactly was your role in the incident?
14 A. So I was the driver on Engine 25 that day. And so, when we
15 got dispatched, we jumped in the rig and I drove the engine to the
16 scene.
17 MS. HARLEY: And, Liz, do you want to just introduce yourself
18 for the tape?
19 MS. KLUTE: Sure. I'm Elizabeth Klute. I'm the northwest
20 regional emergency manager for Amtrak.
21 MS. HARLEY: Okay. We just started.
22 BY MS. HARLEY:
23 Q. So you're the driver of Engine 25?
24 A. Yep.
25 Q. Okay. Go ahead.

1 A. So as far as getting there, you know, we dealt with the
2 traffic, and that was really the only challenge of getting on
3 scene. And then once we pulled on scene, you know, as you're
4 approaching you can immediately see the scene and, you know, the
5 severity of it and the magnitude of it.
6 So when we pulled on, initially we got directed to reposition
7 our engine over to the side. And when I pulled on to the scene,
8 the route that I took was because I thought we were going to be
9 fighting fire. So I was trying to position the engine to be able
10 to pull lines and fight fire, because our dispatch said train
11 derailment with fire. And so that was the first thing going
12 through my head as far as getting to the scene.
13 When we got there, like I said, we were directed to
14 reposition our engine behind the JBLM engine. So we kind of
15 backed up, and as we were doing that, I believe that's when the
16 JBLM rescue rig, Rescue 1-1, showed up. So they pulled in. So
17 then myself and my officer got out of Engine 25, met up with our
18 driver of Aid 25, which arrived with us. And I think the greatest
19 challenge at that point was trying to find out who was in command,
20 who was in control and who was our check-in at that point.
21 As far as what I saw, obviously the train -- you know, the
22 whole picture we have with the train and then there's just pretty
23 much people everywhere. We didn't get direction right away as far
24 as what to do, so we took initiative and just started to look for
25 patients. And like I said, there was people lined up on the side

1 of I-5 and people still walking around.
2 And our first thing that we did was went to the little green
3 car that was up on the guardrail. That was our first patient that
4 we went to. As we were approaching that car, there were people
5 coming to us asking for help. For some reason, we got keyed in on
6 that little green car. And just from the severity of the damage
7 to that car, you just got a, you know, a gut feeling that
8 something was going to be bad inside that car, so that's where we
9 went.
10 We found one passenger in that car. We started to try to
11 create a plan for extricating that person. There was a -- I
12 believe it was an off-duty nurse who was there with her, kind of
13 holding that person up. The way that car was positioned, the
14 driver was kind of propped against the steering wheel and towards
15 the middle of the car, so she was holding herself in position and
16 she was getting tired fast. She was getting fatigued, so the
17 Samaritan was just kind of holding her in place.
18 So we went up, we did a quick assessment on her. I kind of
19 built some patient rapport with her, then we started to create a
20 plan to get her out. She felt like her back was broken, so we
21 were going to C-collar and backboard her. And then at that point,
22 pretty much right when we were getting ready to start taking
23 action, we got pulled off of that car and we got assigned to
24 transport.
25 And at that point I went directly to my chief and told him, I

1 said -- I let him know that that person in that car needed to get
2 out because I felt like she was going downhill. And I know they
3 were triaging patients before then, and you could see, you know,
4 people wearing triage tags and stuff. And I told him that she was
5 a red patient and she needed to get out of that car and if she
6 didn't, I felt like something bad was going to happen to her if
7 she didn't get out quick.
8 So that car was -- as we kind of replayed it, the front of
9 that car was smashed, and in front of that car was one of the
10 axles to one of the train cars. And so we kind of guessed that
11 maybe when that axle came down it hit the front of that car. Just
12 as a guess; don't know that for sure. But when you saw the damage
13 to that car and then the axle there, you kind of had this --
14 there's a first miracle feeling that that lady was actually still
15 alive, you know.
16 So from there, we went over, my partner and I -- Jason Leck
17 was driving the Aid 25 that day. So I met up with him and we took
18 the aid unit up to the triage staging area, which was that little
19 gravel area where they had the tents. And from there, we checked
20 in with the person in control, in command there, and we started
21 getting patients. We got -- the first trip, we had eight patients
22 in our ambulance. We had one in the front seat, front passenger,
23 and then seven in the back, and I was the driver on that trip.
24 I don't know how -- do you want to know about each patient?
25 Q. Yes, please.

1 A. Okay. So the patient that I had in the front passenger seat
2 was a younger lady. Don't know her name anymore, don't know her
3 age, just younger. I'd say early 30s at the oldest. And she was
4 holding her jaw. She had some facial abrasions. And honestly,
5 her memory was shot. She didn't know -- she kept asking who she
6 was. I'd ask her who she was, she'd be able to recall who she was
7 at one point, and then she'd forget it. She kept asking -- she
8 was on the phone, trying to talk to a couple different people, and
9 she kept asking are my kids on the train, were my kids -- why was
10 I on the train?
11 MR. STEWART: Is she an Asian lady?
12 MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Yeah. She could not place who she was.
13 MR. STEWART: We spoke to her yesterday.
14 MR. ROBERTS: Okay.
15 MR. STEWART: Do you have any idea what car she came out of?
16 MR. ROBERTS: I don't.
17 BY MS. HARLEY:
18 Q. Yeah. Okay.
19 A. Yeah, I don't. I'm sorry.
20 Q. Okay. Go ahead.
21 A. Mainly, like I said, she was -- her jaw, and then facial and
22 head trauma. And then in the back we had a mid-40s lady, I would
23 guess, Samoan, Indian nationality. Again, not sure. You know, we
24 didn't have time to ask a whole bunch of questions. A little bit
25 larger gal. I actually helped load her, get her into the back of

1 Aid 25, and she had leg, hip, abdominal. We basically had to lift
2 her in. She was also in some -- when we initially loaded her, she
3 was in kind of some minor respiratory distress. So she had some
4 chest issues going on. Jason informed me that on the way there
5 her respiratory issues got worse, and then when we got her out of
6 Aid 25, in the chair that she was sitting in, she had left a pool
7 of blood. So she, I think, had some abdominal injuries going on.
8 We had a blond-haired lady, again middle-aged. She had a
9 dislocated -- most likely dislocated or separated right shoulder,
10 I believe. And again, hip, pelvis, abdominal area complaints. We
11 had an elderly lady who was pretty stable. She had some facial
12 abrasions. And out of all those patients, those are the one that
13 I can remember.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. And again, we didn't -- we really didn't have time to do
16 vitals. It was kind of load -- we took that group to Madigan,
17 turned around, came right back. The biggest challenge coming back
18 was the traffic. In the future, I think what would help is if
19 they know that there's a number of patients, making sure there is
20 a lane cleared way back for ambulances to get back to the scene.
21 We drove on the shoulder, between the barrier and cars most of the
22 way back. And so there was a delay in getting back.
23 We again drove right back to the triage area. The next
24 biggest frustration was just the delay in getting new patients
25 assigned to us. And I understand there's a process there but,

1 yeah, it just seemed like it took too long to get a new batch of
2 patients, and then once we got them, getting directions as far as
3 what hospital we were going to. And I know they were on the
4 phones and there was a lot going on.
5 At first, they tried to send us to St. Pete's, and it was
6 like there's no way we're getting to St. Pete's; we can't get
7 through from this side. So then we had -- that group went to Good
8 Sam. Again, we had eight patients. This time, I rode in the
9 back.
10 So in the back, on that ride, I had two patients that were C-
11 collared and backboard, Angela and Nathan Ward, mother and son,
12 both with some minor head trauma, both complaining of back and
13 neck pain. The son was pretty stable. The mother, she was in a
14 lot of pain and she was, I believe, in 8/9 out of 10 pain in her
15 neck and back. She had a bump on her head. Her abdomen and hip
16 area, and then it was either the right arm and left leg or left
17 arm and right leg.
18 Stepping back to the first load of patients, we also had a
19 patient in there, a lady, and I can't remember which one it was.
20 She had a full thickness -- I guess you call it an avulsion.
21 Something hit the front of her leg and it tore everything back
22 down to the bone on, I believe it was the lower left. It was the
23 shin of one of her -- whether it was left or right, I can't
24 remember now.
25 So back to the second group --

1 Q. Did you say in the second group there were seven in the back?
2 A. Seven in the back, yep, and one in the front again. So we
3 did two trips of eight patients. Then I had two, again maybe 30s
4 females, a blond and a dark-haired lady. They were both pretty
5 stable. The blond maybe seemed to be in a little bit of shock.
6 She was in one of the cars, also, that got hit by a train, one of
7 the train cars. And the dark-haired -- and I remember these two
8 because they were communicating back and forth a little bit. And
9 I tried to build rapport with everybody and I was asking who was
10 where.
11 And so the blond said she was driving and she saw sparks and
12 the train hit her car. And again, I looked at her and I was like
13 there's my second miracle of the day, because that is amazing.
14 And she's like, yeah. She was having issues with her memory, too.
15 I think it was just shock. I don't think she was -- she didn't
16 seem to have an injury, she was more just shocky. And she said,
17 yeah, I don't think my car is drivable. And then the dark-haired
18 lady was like, no, your car is destroyed. And they were asking a
19 lot about what the process was going to be for getting their stuff
20 back out of their cars and stuff. So she was -- I don't know if
21 it was that little black car, but it sounded like her car was
22 pretty much destroyed. So they were pretty stable.
23 And then I had three younger, maybe early 20s females.
24 Again, all three of them sounded like they were in the train. I
25 don't know what car, but they were on the train. And minor

1 injuries again. Nothing serious with those three.
2 During that ride, my primary thing was both of my patients on
3 the backboard were stating they were going to start throwing up.
4 So I started recruiting the other people, okay, here's what we're
5 going to do; if one of these throw up, we're going to have to tip
6 the backboard and everything. So I was primarily dealing with
7 those two, and then monitoring the blond-haired lady who, like I
8 said, she seemed to be in shock. So I was worried that, you know,
9 she was going to start going downhill pretty quick.
10 So again we took them to Good Sam. Good Sam did a pretty
11 good job of taking all of our greens to triage at the hospital,
12 and we took our other two right into a room, the two that were on
13 backboards.
14 Madigan did a great job. When we pulled up, of course we
15 had -- right behind us there was another ambulance with two red
16 patients, so they went to them first.
17 I think in our -- both of our rides, I'd say by the time we
18 got there -- when we left the scene, they were all greens and
19 yellow patients, and when we got there our yellow had turned to a
20 red and -- on both rides I think we would have classified at least
21 one of them as red patients.
22 Then we left Good Sam, came back to the scene. By that time,
23 it was fairly well under control. They had gotten most of all the
24 walking wounded, per se, over here to city hall. And then we
25 just, we reported back to command and we were looking to offer up

1 more help.
2 From that point, we did kind of a walk-around looking for
3 equipment and just double-checking, making sure we hadn't missed
4 anything. Seeing if, you know, there was anybody else who had
5 just been missed, and then like I said, just gathering up
6 equipment. And I believe we got back here at the station just
7 before 12 o'clock.
8 Q. Okay. All right. So now we're going to go back. So do you
9 have some sense of when the first callout came, when you were
10 first notified?
11 A. Yeah. So we were up at the breakfast table, the three of us:
12 myself, Jason Leck and Zack Howard -- Zack Howard was the acting
13 officer for the day -- and Chief, Chief Creekmore, were actually
14 up at the table. And we got dispatched, I'd say, approximately
15 7:30, 7:40, 7:45, right in that time frame.
16 I was still in my workout clothes. I was going to -- I was
17 assigned to work that day. I was on the day before and I was
18 assigned to work that day, so I was going to do a morning workout.
19 So I was still in my workout clothes. Jason Leck was assigned to
20 work that day, and Zack Howard was supposed to get off that day,
21 and then Chief just happened to come in and check with us when we
22 were up at the table.
23 Q. Okay. So on that day, the entire crew was you, Zack, Jason
24 and Chief Creekmore?
25 A. Correct.

1 Q. Okay. All right.
2 A. And I know in past history, whenever we have events on I-5 we
3 get dispatched after JBLM, which, honestly, is a breakdown in the
4 system, because we can get there faster.
5 Q. Okay. All right. So who actually does the dispatching for
6 your --
7 A. Firecom?
8 Q. Yes.
9 A. Yeah. And I don't -- whoever's on at Firecom that day sends
10 the dispatch into us. I don't know how it gets routed as far
11 as -- and I've been involved in some conversations with this.
12 Technically, JBLM covers I-5, but it just doesn't make sense
13 because we're closer.
14 Q. All right. Your fire communications is? What do you call
15 it?
16 A. We call it Firecom.
17 Q. You just call it Firecom?
18 A. Um-hum.
19 Q. Where is it located?
20 A. In Lakewood.
21 Q. It's in Lakewood?
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. Okay.
24 MS. KLUTE: Is that different than South Zone 9-1-1?
25 MR. ROBERTS: Yes.

1 MS. KLUTE: Okay.
2 MS. HARLEY: Okay.
3 MR. ROBERTS: Well, until -- we're in that transition.
4 There's a transition going on, so I may be misspeaking there.
5 MS. KLUTE: Okay.
6 MR. ROBERTS: We call it Firecom, and the last I understood
7 it's still out of Lakewood. I know there's the South Zone 9-1-1,
8 but ours has always been Firecom.
9 BY MS. HARLEY:
10 Q. Firecom?
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. Okay. All right. Okay. So when you arrived on the scene,
13 you said you pulled behind a JBLM engine?
14 A. Yeah, initially we pulled up next to them because, again, I
15 thought we were going to be pulling lines. You could see that the
16 JBLM guys were out, already on the scene, and so my first thought
17 was -- and our dispatch said train derailment with fire. And so
18 my initial plan on arrival was to position the rig somewhere where
19 we can pull lines, and that's why I initially pulled up next to
20 them. And then we got directed to move back.
21 Q. Okay. Who was in -- so I know that -- at that particular
22 point when you got off the piece, who was in charge? What was
23 your understanding of who was in charge?
24 A. No idea.
25 Q. Okay.

1 A. To be honest.
2 Q. All right. Did you ultimately find someone who said they
3 were in charge?
4 A. Yes. When we got off, our chief was communicating with, I
5 believe, one of the JBLM chiefs, and our assumption was that at
6 that point they had basically created a unified command and were
7 working together.
8 Q. Okay. All right. Let's see. All righty. So you self-
9 initiated action. You went to the, what you said, the little
10 green car, which was up against the guardrail, and you said that
11 there were victims walking around.
12 A. Yep.
13 Q. Okay. Did you see any victims laying on the ground at that
14 time?
15 A. Yes. Yeah. And I didn't realize it at the time, but when we
16 came back Jason had made a comment to me about, you saw the guy
17 under the yellow blanket? And I said, well, I saw the yellow
18 blanket. He said, yep, pretty sure that guy was already dead.
19 And I don't know why, you know, I guess in the chaos of everything
20 you get locked on I'm going to go help right here. After he said
21 it, it was like, oh yeah, I didn't even realize that when we
22 walked by that person, whoever it was. Male, female, I don't
23 know. I just remember seeing that yellow blanket already overtop
24 of somebody.
25 Q. Okay.

1 A. And then as we were going in again, we were trying to -- at
2 that point, we really hadn't had direct communication with
3 anybody, so we were trying to take in the scene and see where the
4 steps were at. It seemed like the majority of the JBLM guys were
5 over towards the west side of I-5, creating -- what it looked like
6 was creating a plan for rescue, of getting into those cars.
7 In my opinion, I got frustrated because I saw a lot of
8 patients that needed care and I just felt like we should have been
9 doing -- and I know there was more patients on there, so it's kind
10 of that, you know, when you get caught in the role of triaging,
11 you have to pass up people to triage. And that was really hard
12 for me. That was the hard part, and that's where we finally just
13 said, we're going to find somebody to help. And that's when we
14 went to that car.
15 Q. Okay. The woman that you found that was trapped in a car --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- where was she? Was she in the front of the car, the rear,
18 or --
19 A. The driver's seat. Yeah, driver's seat. The back of the car
20 was up on the guardrail. The front hood smashed in. So it
21 propped at a downward angle, and so she was, like I said, kind of
22 holding herself from falling forward on the steering wheel. And
23 built some rapport with her and she said, my back hurts, I think
24 it's broke and it hurts. And, you know, she was -- I think the --
25 like I said, the hardest part of this is that we left her. And I

1 was very upset that we got ordered off of her. It's hard when you
2 look at somebody and tell them we're going to help you, we're
3 going to get you out of this car, you're going to be okay, and
4 then we got pulled off of her. So --
5 MS. KLUTE: Who ordered you to leave?
6 MR. ROBERTS: So my officer, Zack Howard, who was acting
7 officer, said that he got orders from command that we were being
8 assigned to transport. And I think that's because they just
9 realized that we were one of the few ambulances available on
10 scene. And it makes sense, but still, it was really hard to --
11 BY MS. HARLEY:
12 Q. Did any of the first responders stay with her?
13 A. So what I heard was, after we left, they came and extricated
14 her out. She had to be extricated out. I believe they removed
15 the door. I'm not 100-percent positive on that, but that's kind
16 of what I gathered. And I was told that they got her out pretty
17 quick. Because like I said, I went straight to my chief and
18 said -- I told the guys, before we go up to transport, I'm making
19 sure that she -- that somebody knows that she needs to get out of
20 that car. So I went right up to our chief, face to face, and said
21 she needs to get out. And then from that point, that's when we
22 went directly to the aid car and drove up to the triage area.
23 Q. Okay. So you drove up to the triage area and the eight
24 patients were loaded in?
25 A. So they had the tents set up, green, yellow and red. And we

1 met up with -- I don't know who he was. He was taking down names.
2 Not names; he was taking down tag numbers, triage tag numbers, and
3 assigning patients to us. And before we left, he again double-
4 checked to make sure he had all the tag numbers of everybody in
5 our rig, and then gave us a destination. And that's when we took
6 off.
7 Q. Okay. Do you know who this person worked for?
8 A. I believe it was JBLM. I'm not 100-percent positive. I
9 believe that's who it was. When we came back the second time,
10 there were more people there. And again, it started to seem like
11 it got bogged down a little bit, because it seemed like there were
12 multiple people in control now. And so it was kind of a -- and
13 then, also, the process of finding hospitals that were available.
14 Because now the first rounds had been delivered, so trying to find
15 hospitals that still had room slowed the process down.
16 Q. So the JBLM gentleman, or person you thought was with JBLM --
17 A. Yep.
18 Q. -- was taking down the triage tag numbers and gave the
19 destinations?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. So you got the destination to go to Madigan?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Did you speak to Madigan on the way there?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Okay.

1 A. I called Madigan. Or I did not. My partner in the back
2 called Madigan. I called Firecom on the radio, told Firecom we
3 were en route with eight patients. And then the way we do it is
4 whoever's in the back calls the hospital on the phone, whoever's
5 in the front calls Firecom.
6 Q. Got you. All right. Okay. So we talked that you had eight
7 patients, one in the front and seven in the back, and we kind of
8 went over their injuries. At the time, how many of those patients
9 would you classify as red?
10 A. I think when we left none of our patients were red, but at
11 least one, the Samoan, Indian, we would have classified her as red
12 by the time we got there.
13 Q. Okay.
14 A. Like I said, she started having more serious respiratory
15 issues and seemed to have some kind of internal bleeding going on.
16 Q. Okay. All right.
17 A. And then same on the second trip, none of our patients were
18 red when we left, but the mom on the backboard, the way that she
19 was displaying probably would have -- she started to go into some
20 convulsions, pretty serious shaking by the time we got there. She
21 seemed to be going downhill. I probably would have classified her
22 as red.
23 Q. Do you know who actually did the initial triage on all these
24 patients?
25 A. I don't. I assumed that when -- since they were first on --

1 when we arrived, JBLM, I don't know which rig it was, but their
2 rig was the first on scene, and then we came in. So they had
3 personnel out on the scene, so I assume that they were going
4 through and doing triage.
5 Q. Okay. All right. So when you went to Madigan, and also when
6 you went to Good Sam, the hospitals were prepared for you and the
7 arrival of your patients?
8 A. Yes. Madigan, I think was great. The only complaint, and I
9 don't know if it's a complaint, with Good Sam was when we arrived,
10 they only had one personnel there. So it would have been nice --
11 knowing that we had eight patients in the rig, it would have been
12 nice to have a couple more people, maybe one person to take all of
13 our greens, and then one person to help guide us with our patients
14 that were on backboards. Yet, it was still smooth.
15 Q. Okay. And then you said right behind you were two ambulances
16 with reds?
17 A. So on the first trip, going to Madigan, there was one
18 ambulance with two reds.
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. And they pulled in right behind us. And so, when we actually
21 pulled into Madigan, they directed us to pull farther ahead so
22 that the ambulance behind us could get in closer with the red
23 patients.
24 Q. Okay. All right.
25 A. And then at Good Sam, I don't know if they were -- as we were

1 leaving Good Sam, there was another ambulance coming in that I
2 believe was coming from the scene.
3 Q. Okay. So talk to me at this particular point about your
4 communications. Do you have the ability to communicate with JBLM
5 directly?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Do you have an ability to do like what they call a temporary
8 patch, where you can patch in to one another?
9 A. They have to get one of our radios, or we have to get one of
10 their radios, or -- yeah, you have to go through Firecom and there
11 has to be a patch. For those of us who are just firefighters on a
12 day, we don't do that. So our chief would do that. I know that
13 speaking with Zack, who was the acting officer -- he remained at
14 the scene. There was a time where they were calling for pars and
15 he had to ask for a radio from JBLM or somebody from JBLM to relay
16 that we had par.
17 Q. What is pars, please?
18 A. Basically everybody has been accounted for. Everybody on
19 your team has been accounted for.
20 Q. Got it.
21 A. Yeah.
22 Q. Understood. Okay.
23 A. So yeah, that is a challenge, and it would be great if it was
24 fixed.
25 Q. Okay. Have you ever done any coordinated drills with JBLM?

1 A. Yes. Yeah, we actually, just the week before, had done
2 training over at the intel building here in town. And it was a
3 few months ago we did a low-angle rescue over at the gravel mine
4 with them.
5 Q. All right.
6 A. And we do work fairly well with each other outside of the
7 communication challenge we have. You know, when we have
8 simultaneous calls in town, they'll come in. When we don't have
9 medics available, they'll send a medic to us. We rarely will
10 respond to the base to help them, but I'd say it's definitely not
11 rare that they come into town and help us. And, yeah, we end up
12 communicating through Firecom with them. So we get on and tell
13 Firecom here's where we're at, can you let JBLM know, and then it
14 goes that way.
15 Q. Okay. So is -- just because I'm not from that area --
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. -- Dupont is actually part of Pierce County?
18 A. So we're Pierce County, yes, ma'am.
19 Q. Okay. Can you estimate how many departments from Pierce
20 County were actually on the scene?
21 A. So I saw -- I can give you Pierce County and Thurston County
22 from what I saw.
23 Q. Okay. All right.
24 A. So all the different agencies that I saw -- us, JBLM and West
25 Pierce, I saw those units. I saw Thurston County, South Bay,

1 Tukwila, Olympia.
2 Q. Okay, South Bay.
3 A. Yeah.
4 Q. Okay.
5 A. Tumwater. Not Tukwila, sorry. Tumwater.
6 Q. Tumwater?
7 A. Yeah. Lacey, Olympia.
8 Q. So South Bay, Tumwater, Lacey and Olympia, are they out of
9 Thurston County?
10 A. Yeah. So they were all on the south side of the incident.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. And then after kind of the incident was under control and we
13 were doing more cleanup, that's when I started to see -- that was
14 my first chance of seeing the other side and where everybody was
15 at on the other side.
16 Q. Okay. How far -- which one of the Thurston County units is
17 the farthest away?
18 A. I don't know where South Bay is at, to be honest with you,
19 but I saw their tag on a bumper here. I don't know where they're
20 at.
21 Q. So outside of West Pierce and Dupont, are there other fire
22 departments closer locally in Pierce County?
23 A. Central Pierce would have been next. And I was actually
24 surprised that we didn't get any of them. And then, actually,
25 when we were at Good Sam, there was a Central Pierce ambulance

1 there on their own transport and they were surprised -- we spoke
2 with them and they were surprised they didn't get toned to it as
3 well.
4 Q. Did you find any contracted ambulance services on the scene?
5 A. Yes. The Madigan ambulance was there, and I believe both
6 Falck and AMR were there. I know Falck was in town. We had a
7 Falck unit -- two Falck units staged in town for a while, and I
8 believe they were on scene, as well, and then AMR.
9 Q. And AMR?
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. Okay. Madigan's ambulances are staffed by who?
12 A. Oh. Well, I'm not sure how they do that.
13 Q. Are they civilian?
14 A. No, I believe they're still military.
15 Q. They're still military?
16 A. Or retired military. I'm not honestly sure how they staff
17 that.
18 Q. Okay. All right. All right. Okay. So did you by any
19 chance -- you did not go into the train at all?
20 A. No, ma'am.
21 Q. Okay. Did you pass any of the railcars on the scene?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Okay. Did you notice if there were any lights, if you could
24 see in, if there were any lights on, on the train?
25 A. I don't recall. I'm sorry.

1 Q. All right. Could you tell if the locomotive was still
2 operating, if it was still running?
3 A. Everything that I got from it, it was not. Of course, I --
4 the cars that I could see were the rear engine -- or I'm probably
5 not using the right terminology.
6 Q. That's fine.
7 A. And then the car that was hanging off the rail and the car
8 that it was up against or propped against, and from there back to
9 the rear engine, those were the cars that I could see.
10 Q. So you saw the rear engine?
11 A. Right.
12 Q. There was a car that was hanging off the side?
13 A. Um-hum. And there was one, I think there was one in
14 between -- or two in between -- from the rear engine working
15 forward, I think there was one that was kind of off the side, and
16 then there was one that was hanging at an angle, completely off,
17 that was suspended and propped on the other car below it. And
18 then that's pretty much where my field of view was blocked.
19 Q. Okay. All right. So did you have any interaction with any
20 of the railroad personnel?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Okay. Did any of the patients describe to you what happened
23 inside the train?
24 A. So on the, it would have been the second trip, because I was
25 in the back, I just remember listening to the three girls saying

1 stuff was just flying by them. They got bounced around. Nothing
2 real specific, just kind of talking amongst each other about
3 getting tossed around a little bit.
4 Q. And did they tell you which car they were in?
5 A. They didn't.
6 Q. And all three of these young ladies had minor injuries?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Okay.
9 A. And then on the first drive, when I was driving and I had the
10 passenger in the front seat, she couldn't recall enough of
11 anything to be able to -- you know, she couldn't even remember
12 being on the train and why she was on the train and where she was
13 going.
14 Q. Okay. So just to be clear, the first trip you transported
15 eight patients to Madigan?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. The second trip was eight patients to Good Sam?
18 A. Um-hum. I was the driver on the first trip, and then the
19 second trip I was in the back.
20 Q. Okay. Do you know St. Clare Hospital?
21 A. Um-hum.
22 Q. Okay. Do you know if any patients were sent to St. Clare?
23 A. I don't.
24 Q. Okay.
25 A. And I don't -- I thought -- I don't know if I -- I assumed

1 that they had been sending patients there. When they sent us to
2 Good Sam, you know, that's one of the farther hospitals away for
3 us. We primarily go St. Pete's, Madigan and St. Clare. And I
4 know there had been at least one ambulance leave before us, before
5 our first trip, so maybe they went to St. Clare. I don't know.
6 Q. Okay. All right. Let me just make sure I've got -- all
7 right. So somewhere between 7:30, you said, 7:40, 7:45 is when
8 you initially got the dispatch?
9 A. Um-hum.
10 Q. And that came in for the derailment plus a fire?
11 A. Yes. It was not -- I can't tell you word for word, but it
12 was train derailment with fire and approximately, I believe they
13 said approximately 15 injured. And whether that was on the
14 initial dispatch or en route, those were basically the things we
15 heard. And so that kind of got us going. So that was grossly
16 understated.
17 Q. Right. So when you got on the scene, did it look like any
18 part of the train had been on fire?
19 A. No. We didn't see any smoke. I didn't notice any smoke or
20 anything, or it didn't look like they had to put out a fire.
21 Q. Okay. The two that you put on the -- that were put on the
22 backboard, the mother and the son --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. -- were they on the train or were they in a car, do you know?
25 A. I believe they were on the train. And they were -- we didn't

1 put them on -- they were already on the backboard in the triage
2 area.
3 Q. They were just loaded on?
4 A. Yeah. From what I heard, I think the son was released pretty
5 quick, but the mom was -- she had some more issues, from what I
6 heard.
7 Q. Okay. On your fire radio, are there any other agencies
8 outside of Dupont Fire?
9 A. Yes. So we'll hear them all. In our zone, our bank, we get
10 West Pierce, Central Pierce, East Pierce, and us. We also get
11 Anderson Island. And then if you go to scan, then you'll get ones
12 out farther. So we, primarily, on our bank, we get, like I said,
13 West Pierce, Central Pierce, us, Anderson Island.
14 MS. KLUTE: Do you get Gig Harbor?
15 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, and we'll get Gig Harbor.
16 BY MS. HARLEY:
17 Q. Oh, Gig Harbor too?
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. Oh, okay. Okay. All right.
20 A. And Orting. I may be missing something there, but --
21 Q. No problem.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. I'm just trying to get a sense of communications. Do you
24 have a common, I'm going to call it a fire ground channel, but do
25 you have a common incident channel where you have multiple

1 jurisdictions from different counties will be on one channel?
2 A. So we, on our bank, we start off on channel 1. Usually, when
3 we go to what I would classify as low-level calls, we get switched
4 to channel 2. And this one, we got switched to channel 4.
5 Q. Okay. So you guys were on channel 4. Does that allow you to
6 speak to the Thurston County guys?
7 A. I believe we were all -- if we all got switched to channel 4,
8 everybody on that scene then would be able to --
9 Q. Okay. Except for JBLM?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. Has there ever been any talk in regards to the communications
12 issue between the other fire department and JBLM?
13 A. Yeah. I know the challenge seems to be the federal versus
14 municipal.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. And if nothing else comes out of this than fixing that,
17 that's a huge thing for us.
18 Q. Okay. And you got back to the firehouse around 12?
19 A. I'd say 11:30 and 12, yes, ma'am.
20 Q. Okay. All right. And do you have a sense of when the last
21 patient left the scene?
22 A. I don't.
23 Q. Did you leave before the last patient left the scene?
24 A. I don't believe so.
25 Q. When we returned, we hung around for quite a while looking to

1 see if there was anything we could do to help. We checked in with
2 command a couple times. I'm not sure who it was, who he was
3 working for, he eventually came back and gave us our passports
4 back. And at that point, it sounded like they were basically
5 separating command for Pierce County and Thurston County. And
6 then we still stayed on scene longer. And State Patrol had
7 started setting up, doing their survey, research, investigation
8 stuff. So I believe -- I'd be surprised if there were any
9 patients left by the time we left.
10 Q. So one last question. There was some difficulty with
11 traffic, of course, as a result of this.
12 A. Yeah.
13 Q. When you got on the scene, did you see any kind of traffic
14 control from the police agency?
15 A. Yes. In retrospect, it just would have been nicer if it was
16 set up, extended farther back on I-5, because there was a few
17 miles of all lanes being full and for ambulances to get back to
18 the scene, it was on the shoulder. At one point we actually had a
19 state patrol get in front of us and start clearing the lane for us
20 to get back to the scene.
21 Yeah, I don't know how many ambulances did multiple trips
22 like we did, and so I don't know if anybody else had that
23 challenge. I believe there was one ambulance that -- the
24 ambulance that went to Madigan behind us, I believe, followed us
25 back. So they came back with us. Outside of that, I don't know

1 how many ambulances did multiple trips. But that trip coming back
2 was -- yeah, it could have been -- if they would have extended
3 that back, of clearing the lane for us at least a couple miles, it
4 would have made a difference. But I don't know if they had the
5 resources or what their protocols are for that, so --
6 MS. HARLEY: Okay. All right. Liz, do you have any other
7 questions?
8 MS. KLUTE: Let me just backtrack, because I had something in
9 the beginning.
10 No, I think you answered them.
11 MR. ROBERTS: Okay.
12 MS. HARLEY: Jeff?
13 BY MR. STEWART:
14 Q. Yeah, you mentioned seeing at least one person that was on
15 the ground as if they'd been ejected from the train; is that
16 correct?
17 A. I wouldn't necessarily say they were ejected. They might
18 have walked out and collapsed or they might have been moved there.
19 Q. Okay. Did you see anyone who it appeared, you know, that had
20 been ejected from the train?
21 A. Too hard to tell, to be honest with you, because there were
22 so many people who had facial injuries. I remember seeing a
23 window busted out on that train that was hanging over, on that car
24 that was hanging down. So I wouldn't rule it out, but without
25 actually talking with each one, you know, that mechanism to be

able to say they were ejected, I --

Q. Yeah. One last question.

A. Yeah.

Q. There was also a car that was kind of upside down on the surface of I-5, and I think there might have been some people ejected from that car. Did you go further on down towards that area?

A. No. Initially, like I said, I went right to that little green car. And I remember looking over and seeing a black car that was pretty scrunched. And that was about it, because from there I focused on the patient in the green car and then got pulled back to do transport. So it wasn't until everything was pretty much under control and the patients were gone that I walked around to the other side when we were looking for equipment. So yeah, the south side, when we finally got over there, seemed to be more, a lot more debris and more of a tangled mess, I guess, you know, compared to the north side. So there might have been -- I don't remember seeing that upside-down car.

Q. Okay. Thank you.

A. Yeah. Yeah.

MS. KLUTE: Can I --

MS. HARLEY: Yeah, go ahead.

MR. ROBERTS: Yeah.

BY MS. KLUTE:

Q. Yeah, a couple questions.

1 A. Sure.
2 Q. Was everyone, basically, that could self-evacuate evacuated
3 from the train, or were they still evacuating as you got there?
4 A. When we pulled up, there were still people milling and kind
5 of walking across and towards the side of I-5, yeah.
6 Q. But could you see them climbing out of the train?
7 A. I did not. I didn't see people climbing out. I saw people
8 who were on the hill where the JBLM guys were at that seemed like
9 they were still -- and I don't know who they were, but they were
10 on the side of I-5. There were still quite a few people in those
11 two lanes kind of milling around, patients.
12 Q. And did you guys pick up or end up with any personal effects?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. Yeah.
16 BY MS. HARLEY:
17 Q. So I'm going to ask you a question, just something that Liz
18 just said.
19 A. Yeah.
20 Q. When you got -- how long do you think it took you to get to
21 the scene?
22 A. Too long, honestly. When we got dispatched, our en route
23 time, I think, was pretty good. We got to them, we got -- we were
24 hustling, got out of the station quick, and I think we got to the
25 scene pretty quick. I'm trying to think how -- with everything

1 that was going on, I was surprised how many people had already
2 been triaged and how far along -- so I think the JBLM guys did a
3 really good job of starting that process, but it still seemed very
4 new, still in the initial stages. So still people being triaged,
5 still people who hadn't been triaged.
6 Q. So when you got on the scene, did you by any chance hear any
7 equipment running, like for extrication? Anybody using any saws,
8 anybody using the Jaws of Life? Do you remember that?
9 A. I don't recall, to be honest with you. I remember hearing
10 the engines running, sirens.
11 Q. Did you hear anyone come over the radio saying that they were
12 extricating people out of the train?
13 A. I don't.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. I do not remember hearing that.
16 Q. Okay. And then one little question just for my own -- the
17 second trip, the blond-haired young lady you said was in a car.
18 The dark-haired young lady, was she also in a car or was she part
19 of the -- was she on the train?
20 A. I don't know. Yeah, I just know that at some point they had
21 met up and she had seen the blond-haired lady's car and knew that
22 it was, you know --
23 Q. So this is the part of the interview where you get to ask me
24 questions.
25 A. Oh.

1 Q. Is there any question you want to ask of me?
2 A. You know, I think for us, I had mentioned it would be nice to
3 know at some point if all the patients that were transported to
4 hospitals, if they all survived. I know right now the fatality
5 count is fairly low. From the stuff that I was hearing, it seemed
6 like it's lower than what it should be. So that's a big one. You
7 always like to get a follow up of, you know, all the people that
8 you came in contact with, how they're doing, if they survived.
9 That's the biggest thing for me. And then just like anybody else,
10 we're always curious as far as, you know, what was really the
11 cause and what happened.
12 Q. So will you and all the fire departments that were there get
13 together and talk about it?
14 A. Yeah.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. Yeah, we've had some --
17 Q. Do you have that planned yet?
18 A. So we have some guys here today. We're actually -- one of
19 the other guys that was on is supposed to be coming in today, so
20 it might be a chance, actually, for you to meet with him at work.
21 Jason Leck is supposed to be coming in this morning. We're
22 meeting with Pierce Port. We met with -- after the call, we came
23 back, the chaplain came and sat with us. So we've had some
24 opportunities to talk through it.
25 Q. Will you have a chance to -- the Dupont Fire Department have

1 a chance to sit down with West Pierce --
2 A. I believe so.
3 Q. -- JBLM, Lacey, Olympia and talk about it?
4 A. Ooh, I don't know. What I've heard is that we're going to
5 try to meet with JBLM guys. I don't know about as far as Lacey
6 and everybody down south.
7 Q. Okay. All right. So is there anything that I should have
8 asked you and I failed to ask you that you want to --
9 A. No, I think that's it. No, I don't -- I didn't feel like I
10 had that critical of a role. You know, like I said, I didn't get
11 into the trains and didn't get up real close with the cars and
12 stuff, so I don't have a whole bunch to offer there, so --
13 Q. Well, actually, you helped out a lot. I appreciate it.
14 A. Sure.
15 Q. What I always tell everyone is you have my card. There's a
16 cell phone number on it that's 24 hours. If for any reason you
17 think of something, even if you think it's not that important,
18 please give me a call and just let me know.
19 A. Okay.
20 Q. It may not seem important, but it may actually be important
21 to me.
22 A. Okay.
23 Q. Thank you very much. And once again, I'm sorry we brought
24 you in on your day off.
25 A. That's okay.

1 Q. All right. Thank you.
2 A. Thank you.
3 Q. Bye-bye.
4 MS. KLUTE: Thank you, sir.
5 MR. ROBERTS: Good luck with everything.
6 MS. KLUTE: See you later.
7 (Whereupon, at 10:15 a.m., the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 Interview of John Roberts
ACCIDENT NO:	RRD18MR001
PLACE:	Dupont, Washington
DATE:	December 21, 2017

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Lisa Fuerstenberg
Transcriber

THURSTON COUNTY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *
*
AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, *
WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 * Accident No.: RRD18MR001
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Interview of: RYAN FOX
Battalion Chief
Lacey Fire Department

Lacey Fire Department
1231 Franz Street
Lacey, Washington

Thursday,
March 8, 2018

APPEARANCES:

SHERYL HARLEY, Survival Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

I N D E X

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1 I N T E R V I E W

2 (4:56 p.m.)

3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. So my name is Sheryl Harley. I am an
4 investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board.
5 Before we get started, I do want to give you one of my cards.
6 MR. FOX: Oh, yeah.
7 MS. HARLEY: That way you'll always have that.
8 MR. FOX: Thank you.
9 MS. HARLEY: Okay, and it is March the 8th 2018. It is
10 approximately 4:56 p.m. and I'm at the Lacey Fire Department.
11 This is Station 3?
12 MR. FOX: Station 31.
13 MS. HARLEY: Station 31, and this is on Fronz?
14 MR. FOX: 1231 Franz Street.
15 MS. HARLEY: Frenz?
16 MR. FOX: Franz.
17 MS. HARLEY: Franz, okay, Franz Street. Okay. Okay, so
18 let's start. And so kind of explain what's going on, so part of
19 what the NTSB does when we arrive on the scene, we do what we call
20 survival factors. So this is where we actually talk to the first
21 responders.
22 MR. FOX: Right.
23 MS. HARLEY: You guys are first on the scene, you see
24 everything the way it is. So one of the things that we look at is
25 for you to tell us what you saw; if there was anything unusual, if

1 you encountered any unusual problems, anything strikes you as odd,
2 especially odd. You'll be surprised how many -- some things just
3 don't sit right with people --
4 MR. FOX: Sure.
5 MS. HARLEY: -- or something is wrong, and it leads us to a
6 good indication of what's going on in a crash.
7 MR. FOX: Right.
8 MS. HARLEY: One of the things we also look at is what you
9 think could have been done to improve, to make your job easier.
10 In other words, if there was something you saw where a different
11 design of a train car could make it easier for firefighters to get
12 in and out of the train car, for example.
13 MR. FOX: Right.
14 MS. HARLEY: That's what we're kind of looking for. We also
15 look for if there were any problems, communications problems. We
16 also look at training as well. So the issues we're going to look
17 at are going to be your agency and the local fire departments
18 around exposure to things like training to deal with --
19 MR. FOX: Right.
20 MS. HARLEY: -- emergencies that occur on railroads. We're
21 also going to look at how well you guys work with each other and
22 how well the railroad coordinated with you on the scene. Okay?
23 INTERVIEW OF RYAN FOX
24 BY MS. HARLEY:
25 Q. So to start off with, I guess, the easiest way to do this,

1 from -- why don't you tell me what you remember about this from,
2 give me an approximate time that you got toned out for this --
3 A. Sure, sure.
4 Q. -- and walk me through it.
5 A. Yeah, I believe it was about 7:38 a.m. for us, which is we
6 start shift at 7:30. We were just having our shift meeting, and
7 we got toned out just as a general mutual aid tone out to the
8 Pierce County line for a train derailment. So that's not a tone
9 out that we hear every day, and it was not rig specific. It was
10 just kind of a general broadcast. So at that time, you know, we
11 got up and went to the apparatus bay to look further into it.
12 By the time that, you know, minute or so went by, our
13 dispatch center then had upgraded it to a Level 1 MCI, so we knew
14 that we had a significant incident to go help at. I got in my
15 vehicle and just read down -- I've got a mobile computer in there,
16 and just upon reading it I actually upped it to a Level 2 MCI,
17 which is pretty much anybody on duty in Thurston County to start
18 heading that way.
19 We were told by our dispatch center to head northbound in the
20 southbound lanes, and that JBLM was needing help on the south of
21 that bridge. But by the time we got that traffic, I mean, we were
22 past our last cutoff, which ended up working very well for us
23 because there was a lot of units coming. I mean, we had 40-
24 something units coming up from Thurston County and about 100
25 people.

1 And folks just kind of surrounded it. Myself and a group of
2 folks went northbound in the northbound lane; some folks did get
3 the cutoff in time and went north in the south, and then some went
4 around Mounts Road and came down. And then on arrival, I had
5 everybody Level 1, stage in their rigs, and went and checked in at
6 the command post.
7 And you know, they had quite the traffic responding to that,
8 which we did not coming from the opposite direction, so we arrived
9 fairly similar to -- a couple minutes behind them, but --
10 So on my arrival, Chief Barnard from JBLM and a couple of the
11 other chiefs were standing in the freeway. And I went down, and I
12 just touched base with them real quick and asked them where the
13 command post was, and they didn't have a point to bring their
14 battalion cars that far to the scene, you know. So I had mine and
15 offered it up just for a mobile unified command post.
16 So pulled that to a spot with good visibility to the bridge
17 and the wreckage, at least the north side of it, and then -- bye
18 Kari --
19 KARI: See you guys.
20 MR. FOX: And then at that point, you know, really just began
21 to draw up the structure of an MCI for us. Which, you know, we're
22 drawing up the bones for really kind of a strategical level
23 management of the scene. So we started to do that. And then as
24 we drew up the bones to it, just put units into play and, you
25 know, they begin working the incident.

1 So I don't know how detailed you want me to go as far as that
2 is concerned.
3 Q. Okay. So I'll tell you what. So first of all, I need to
4 make sure I got you right. You're a battalion chief here; is that
5 correct?
6 A. Correct, yeah.
7 Q. Chief Fox? And -- Ryan Fox, okay. All right. So you get the
8 tone out, you start heading that way, and then by that time your
9 communications has already upgraded it? Is that correct?
10 A. Yeah. Correct.
11 Q. Okay, so that's what you call a Level 1 MCI?
12 A. Right.
13 Q. Okay, and you upgraded it to a Level 2?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. Okay, and then at that particular point every unit in
16 Thurston County just goes ahead and responds?
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. Yeah, okay. So how many fire stations are we talking about?
19 A. Oh, gosh, I'd have to get the run.
20 Q. I mean, approximate. I'm not going to --
21 A. Well, all of ours. We have four staffed stations and, you
22 know, like I mentioned, there was I want to say 45 or 47 units,
23 and some of those are chief cars.
24 Q. Right.
25 A. Just all up from Thurston County. Our MCI plan is a tiered

1 response, so, you know, Level 1 is just designed for somewhere in
2 the neighborhood of 7 to 14 patients or something like that. A
3 Level 2 is double that or a little more, and then really our Level
4 3 resources start coming from outside of the county. And knowing
5 that we were responding outside of the county, that was kind of a
6 mute request, so I just kept it at a 2.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. At least that was my thought process.
9 Q. Okay. All right. So tell me what you saw when you first got
10 on the scene.
11 A. Yeah. So since I went northbound I actually pulled my
12 vehicle up into the gravel area of the median, the kind of higher
13 median? I'm sure remember what I'm talking about.
14 And, you know, I didn't have appreciation for the south side
15 of the bridge since I was on the north side. So on the north
16 side, you know, I saw the dangling railcar and then saw the cars
17 at least immediately underneath that, and saw the vehicles that
18 were involved, and then the cars that were on the rail behind the
19 one dangling. That's mostly what I saw.
20 And then just really a sea of people. And I mean my job is
21 especially to not get in at the task level or even the tactical
22 level really. So I didn't pay a lot of attention to patients or
23 people and knew that the success of the incident would be, you
24 know, upon the structure that we set up. So I really didn't get
25 down into the nitty-gritty of it.

1 Q. Absolutely. So your role in this incident was?
2 A. I was an incident commander in the unified command post with
3 Chief Barnard. He and I -- I was in the driver's seat of the
4 vehicle, and he was in the passenger seat.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. So kind of a Thurston County IC.
7 Q. Okay. So this was in Pierce County.
8 A. Right.
9 Q. Who was with you in Pierce?
10 A. In the vehicle?
11 Q. Who was the Pierce County representative?
12 A. Chief Barnard --
13 Q. Chief Barnard.
14 A -- JBLM.
15 Q. Okay. Okay. Okay, so at this particular point you've got a
16 series of units coming from Thurston County.
17 A. Right.
18 Q. Do you have units also coming from Pierce County as well?
19 A. Well, I knew they had units coming. I didn't know how many
20 or what they had coming. And, you know, when I walked up to meet
21 those guys and unify command, I didn't ask them what they had, but
22 I told them, hey, you know, I'm BC Fox from Lacey Fire. I said,
23 I've got Level 2 MCI heading our way, and we should probably
24 unify. Where's your command car?
25 And he said, it's back there. I didn't have appreciation for

1 where it was, but it was trapped behind passenger vehicles because
2 the freeway was stopped, right? So that's when I grabbed my
3 vehicle. So I never asked him what he had coming and we never --
4 Q. Okay. Who was the he? I'm sorry. Who are we talk about?
5 A. Chief Barnard.
6 Q. Oh, Chief Barnard.
7 A. Yeah.
8 Q. Okay, from JBLM.
9 A. Yeah, yeah.
10 Q. Okay.
11 A. And so we never talked about turning anyone around. I mean,
12 the magnitude of the incident felt large, you know, when we got
13 there. And so, you know, it was never a thought to -- I mean, I
14 had called everybody that I could and my assumption was that they
15 had as well. They hadn't -- which we came to find out later, I
16 think there was a bit of a glitch in requesting an MCI from the
17 Pierce County side.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. It ended up that we still were able to have enough resources
20 to handle the incident. Most of those resources did come from the
21 Thurston County side from the Level 2 that I called.
22 Q. Okay. So talk to me about communications.
23 A. Right.
24 Q. How did the communications work?
25 A. It's a challenge, but then also worked okay. So our Thurston

1 County units were operating on our frequency, and, you know, we
2 get dispatched on one channel, and then we've got a tactical
3 frequency that we work on. But JBLM they're separate; we can't
4 communicate with them over our radios.
5 And I didn't know it at the time, but they can't communicate
6 with their neighbors either, even on the Pierce County side, with
7 their radios. So, you know, there was no radio communication
8 prior to arrival. So that was a challenge, but, you know, all of
9 us getting into the same vehicle to run the incident, since I was,
10 you know, essentially in charge on the Thurston side.
11 Q. Right.
12 A. And then it ended up being fine that, you know, I didn't need
13 to talk to their units and they didn't need to talk to mine. So
14 face-to-face communication in the command post was good, and
15 talking to at least our -- you know, my guys on the ground, their
16 face to face communication with Pierce County units was good.
17 But, you know, I mean it was obviously a little bit of a
18 hindrance, but once again, with like Thurston County had the -- we
19 had the numbers. We had a lot of folks there, so it ended up
20 being okay. But definitely in an ideal world we'd be able to
21 speak to each other on the radio.
22 Q. Okay. So explain to me how does Thurston County deal with
23 accountability of personnel on the scene. Do you have like a
24 passport system or a ring tag system or how do you guys do that?
25 A. Yeah, well, so we do, and I imagine -- I can't speak to

1 anybody else. So Thurston County, we've got a passport
2 accountability system, whereas the incident commander or the
3 battalion car holds passports for assigned units. And then each
4 unit has a tag, and the tag will have the unit at the top and the
5 people that are on it at the bottom, and the driver of that unit's
6 flipped upside down so you can tell the driver.
7 You know, as an incident grows in complexity, and let's say a
8 fire, for example, and there are forward tactical managers or,
9 like we'll call them division of group sups or branch manager,
10 those branch managers or division of group sups are going to
11 control the passports for the people working in the hot zone. Do
12 you understand what I'm saying?
13 Q. Yeah.
14 A. And so how we work fires and, you know, on this with this
15 many people on this incident, it was really up to -- so on our, on
16 the Thurston County side, I had a medical branch director with,
17 under her, she had a triage, treatment, and transport groups. And
18 so she knew who triage was, who treatment, who transport was and
19 they ran their accountability for their groups.
20 Then I also had a rescue group sup, which was a captain out
21 of this headquarters. And he was the rescue group sup and had two
22 or three rescue groups working under him that were actually
23 members of our SORT, our Special Operation Rescue Team. And it
24 was those guys that went, you know, car to car.
25 So for this incident it was unlike -- you know, if I'm going

1 to run a small -- a house fire, I'm going hold those passports,
2 you know.
3 Q. Right.
4 A. But an incident to this magnitude, the tactical leaders had
5 control. And you know, I can't answer if -- I don't know if they
6 actually had passports, but they had accountability of who was
7 working for them and knew where they were and whatnot.
8 Q. Okay.
9 A. Does that answer your question?
10 Q. It certainly does. So talk to me about the rescue. First of
11 all, you arrive on the scene and what you see is you see the car
12 that is hanging from the bridge, and you also see the car that's
13 on the highway.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Do you see any lights inside? Is it dark?
16 A. The only thing that I saw on arrival was, I saw the dangling
17 car, I saw a ladder; there was a fire department ground ladder to
18 it, and there was people crawling around it, which I don't even --
19 I assume it was JBLM guys. I know it wasn't our guys because they
20 were there when I pulled up.
21 And I don't know if I saw lights, but I saw fire crews
22 working on and around that car specifically, but I can't tell you
23 if there were lights or, you know.
24 Q. All right. And I'm not trying to -- estimate-wise --
25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. -- how long do you think from the time that you arrived on
2 the scene --
3 A. Yeah.
4 Q. -- to the time that the last patient left the scene,
5 approximately how long do you think that was?
6 A. Well, I mean, I've heard numbers that it was like around 90
7 people in 95 minutes arrived to the hospitals.
8 Q. Okay.
9 A. And I just -- I think it was around that 90, 90 number.
10 Q. Okay. Did you by any chance have any contact with anyone
11 from the railroad, either the crew that was on the train or
12 representatives from the railroad --
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. -- during the incident?
15 A. Yeah, a gentleman -- well, myself personally, no. But I know
16 while I was in the driver's seat, and a gentleman came up to the
17 passenger window where Chief Barnard was, and he told me that it
18 was the conductor. So we asked him for numbers, you know, just to
19 get an approximate count. And he said a number, I don't remember
20 what he said, and then I asked him if he had any sort of manifest
21 or anything, and he did not.
22 And that's pretty much all the dialogue that I had with him.
23 And I can't even tell you if he -- I don't even remember if he
24 stayed there or -- there was tons of people around the command
25 car, so you had to have a little bit of selective hearing and shut

1 folks out or not answer them. So I know he was there, but I don't
2 know if he stuck around or not.
3 Q. Do you -- at any time did you finally get a manifest?
4 A. I didn't.
5 Q. Do you know if Chief Barnard finally got a manifest?
6 A. I do not know the answer to that.
7 Q. Okay. All right.
8 A. I'm going to guess, no, because I would have seen it. I know
9 it was difficult because we must have heard four different sets of
10 numbers: Oh, there's 87. Oh, there's 100. Oh, there's, you
11 know, there's this many, there's that many. So you know, from a
12 rescue standpoint, that's tough.
13 Q. That's a problem.
14 A. Yeah.
15 Q. Yeah, it is.
16 A. Especially with -- I mean, there was, and I'm sure you deal
17 with this all the time, it's just -- you know, there's citizens
18 trying to effect rescue and then there was walking wounded and
19 then there was wounded and there's a few deceased, and it was just
20 chaos, man, as far as just the sea of people.
21 And we were, you know, trying to be efficient and having some
22 folks go to the south treatment area and the north treatment area,
23 which you know is just -- having a solid number from someone or a
24 manifest would have been helpful, especially with the wooded area,
25 you know. I mean, we weren't sure if we were looking for extra

1 people or not, you know.
2 Q. I understand. So you had a north treatment area and then you
3 had a south treatment area.
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. Do you know who manned these areas?
6 A. I can tell you who I put into play on the Thurston County
7 side. So medical branch director was Lieutenant Cherie Leyva or
8 Lieutenant Leyva, L-E-Y-V-A.
9 Q. Y-V-A.
10 A. Yeah, the triage group supervisor that I assigned was
11 paramedic, PMFF Frank.
12 Q. Okay.
13 A. I assigned a treatment north of BC Carson from Olympia Fire.
14 Q. Battalion Chief Carson, Olympia.
15 A. Yeah.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. I assigned a treatment south of Chief Brooks from Lacey.
18 Q. And Chief Brooks, okay.
19 A. And then it was actually Lieutenant Leyva as the medical
20 branch director that assigned the transport groups too. And I
21 believe it was her Paramedic Lieutenant Slossen from Olympia Fire.
22 Q. Did you say Slossen?
23 A. S-L-O-S-S, and I think it's E-N.
24 Q. E-N.
25 A. And then I had a rescue group supervisor, Captain Cox from

1 Lacey Fire.
2 Q. Okay. Are you aware of any special problems that any of
3 these command officers experienced during the incident?
4 A. You mean challenges? Oh, man, how much time you got?
5 Q. I mean, you're right, but outside of the fact that someone
6 has just dumped a train onto an interstate in the middle of
7 morning rush hour, anything unusual? For example, how did the
8 transports to the hospital go? How do you stand up your DMCCs?
9 How do you figure out who was going where? That kind of
10 situation.
11 A. Yeah, yeah. So -- and that was thing that, you know, I don't
12 even know if it's a problem, but we've gotten together and talked
13 about it, you know. So when I called that Level 2 MCI on the
14 Thurston side?
15 Q. Yeah.
16 A. All of Thurston stands up like we've got the MCI, right?
17 Q. Got it.
18 A. So they actually stood up too, and it wasn't until later that
19 through them talking to each other that they're like, wait a
20 minute; so this is in Pierce and the MCI that got stood up in
21 Thurston was responding. You know, so it kind of -- that could
22 maybe be on me. Actually, it ended up working out all right
23 because everybody was on board and all the hospitals and whatnot.
24 So, you know, in our MCI plan, our first arriving medic
25 officer is supposed to take that medical branch director position,

1 and so Lieutenant Leyva and I, we talked about that over the radio
2 on our way there. And, you know, I was trying to be somewhat
3 sensitive about the fact that we were responding to someone else's
4 incident but then also wanted to be efficient if when we got on
5 scene things weren't set up. So I told her when we get on scene
6 to assume the medical branch director role until we hear
7 otherwise. And so hearing that, she got on the phone and started
8 calling the hospitals and whatnot just because that's what we'd do
9 if we owned it anyway.
10 Q. Sure.
11 A. And so she did that.
12 Q. Got it.
13 A. At that point, you know, when things get set up further down
14 the road and we're talking transports, that transport group sup
15 should be on the phone making some phone calls and determinations
16 with the docs about who goes where and what level injuries and
17 whatnot, and that should be happening on both north and south, you
18 know.
19 Q. Got it. All right. So tell me about the railroad. Has
20 Thurston County ever been offered training by the railroad to what
21 to do in responding to emergencies involving the railroad?
22 A. I don't have an answer to that question. I mean, that's a
23 pretty broad question that I don't have an answer to that one. I
24 know that I personally have not been involved in any, but I don't
25 know if they have ever offered Thurston County training.

1 Q. So let me explain why I'm asking that question.
2 A. Yeah.
3 Q. So back in July of 2013, a little town called Lac-Mégantic in
4 Quebec, Canada a train derailed and blew up. Took out about 4
5 miles of town and killed 47 people.
6 A. Did it really? What year is this?
7 Q. 2013.
8 A. I'll have to look that up.
9 Q. In July. And one of the things -- as a matter of fact,
10 several fire departments from the United States had to respond in
11 to assist. One of the things that the Transportation Safety Board
12 in Canada and the Transportation Safety Board, us here, realized
13 is that, number one, first responders aren't given the training
14 that they need to understand how to deal with an emergency
15 involving the railroad as far as what's safe to do, how you work
16 around a locomotive, when you can shut it off --
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. -- what's dangerous, what you don't want to touch, what you
19 don't want to do in that kind of situation. So from that point
20 forward what went on was that the railroads got together and said,
21 okay, and what we need to do is now -- and this was also with the
22 Federal Railroad Administration got together and said, you will
23 now start offering this kind of training --
24 A. Sure.
25 Q. -- to the first responders so that they know what to do.

1 A. Right.
2 Q. Because they can't sit around and wait for somebody from the
3 railroad to show up and say, oh, you don't want to touch that
4 or --
5 A. It's too late.
6 Q. -- need to do it this way. That's correct. So one of the
7 things we check on when we talk to people is, have they ever
8 received it? Is it a matter of it's not offered enough times --
9 A. Sure.
10 Q. -- is it available, have they been approached by the
11 railroad? And one of the things that I always say to people is,
12 number one, in this area Amtrak and BNSF, I do know, both offer
13 the training. And my understanding is it's pretty good training
14 but I also -- the Federal Railroad Administration, one of their
15 investigators was also a former police officer. I'm a former paid
16 fireman and --
17 A. Nice.
18 Q. -- I'm also a former police officer, retired as a police
19 officer --
20 A. Oh, okay.
21 Q. -- from D.C.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. So one of the things that he did was he actually made up a
24 training video for fire departments, police departments, and also
25 for dispatchers --

1 A. Right.
2 Q. -- on just basic safety stuff while you're waiting for the
3 railroad, and what I always tell people is if you want, I can send
4 you a couple of the videos for you.
5 A. Yeah, yeah.
6 Q. I also give free advice, and I'll write it down for you.
7 There's something that's called AskRail, it is a free app, and you
8 put it on your phone or your computer. And what happens is you go
9 in, and it will ask you to register. It will ask you if you're a
10 fireman or a police officer or whatever. That one.
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. So you put that in. So you put in the railcar number, it'll
13 tell you what it is; it'll tell if it's a hazardous material,
14 it'll give you all the information --
15 A. Yeah.
16 Q. -- about how far away you need to evacuate, and it will also
17 tell you the shipper and give you all the information. It will
18 tell who's shipping it, where it is, and how much of it.
19 A. Nice.
20 Q. So one of the things I always tell people, this is stuff that
21 people can carry around on their phones.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. It's a really quick app and that's -- so I offer that to you.
24 A. That's a good one. Yeah, yeah.
25 Q. But also I'm going to tell you to reach out to Amtrak, reach

1 out to BNSF --
2 A. Okay.
3 Q. -- they will do it. They do it --
4 A. Awesome.
5 Q. -- and they have a program in place. And one of the things
6 that they do is they -- it's like a two-part class. The first
7 class is kind of a classroom and they go through things. The
8 second part is the part I love, is to go out and play around on
9 the train.
10 A. Yeah, yeah.
11 Q. And you actually get to touch, feel, and they show you
12 things, and you actually get to go out there.
13 A. Okay.
14 Q. So that's one of the reasons why I asked --
15 A. That's fantastic. Yeah, thank you.
16 Q. -- if the training was available.
17 A. That's good.
18 Q. Okay. So the -- all right, so let's see. So we talked about
19 the response, we talked about the patient accountability, fire
20 department. Was there anything that you saw that you would want
21 to change?
22 A. About the way --
23 Q. Anything, and I put it out there as a broad statement --
24 A. Yeah, yeah.
25 Q. -- because sometimes, for example, one of your guys would

1 come to you and say, you know what, we had a hard time breaching
2 this wall or getting into this car.
3 A. Sure, sure.
4 Q. Or something like that. And then they say, well, you know
5 what, is that something that can be designed differently?
6 A. Yeah.
7 Q. Can we put in something that's breakable to allow us to get
8 in?
9 A. Right.
10 Q. Okay? So with that, one of the things I want to check with,
11 are you aware of any particular problems they had with
12 extrication, accessing patients, in dealing with the railcars?
13 A. Well, I know one thing, I mean, as far as the rescue group
14 getting on scene, I know they stutter-stepped when it came to the
15 car that was dangling. Because that rescue group sup, you know,
16 very first thing he thought was stabilization, and to stabilize a
17 railcar really -- I mean we're used to stabilizing passenger
18 vehicles.
19 And so I think that they did the best that they could, but
20 you know, I know that was something that they viewed as a
21 challenge. And I can't even tell you what they used down to the
22 task level, but I know that they said, well, it's hopefully enough
23 to keep it from moving. Would it hold the railcar? No, but --
24 you understand. So I think that was a challenge for them.
25 Other challenges, just -- and I would say, you know, things

1 that we've talked about like what would we do next time, could we
2 do it better? Because obviously, we could. Radio, you know, it
3 would be nice to, even en route, to just share a frequency with
4 the other agencies.
5 A. So let me ask you a question.
6 Q. Yeah.
7 A. You talk about sharing frequencies, and that kind of reminds
8 me, do you work -- do you guys train together, different counties?
9 Do you have --
10 A. No, we hardly ever -- I mean, I want to say, so I've been
11 here for 23 years and I think we've maybe trained with JBLM once
12 or maybe twice. So to me, that's a never.
13 Q. Right, yeah.
14 A. And not for any reason, other than, you know, it's just we're
15 a really busy fire department and --
16 Q. Right.
17 A. -- I mean, we play well with our neighbors and stuff, but
18 they just feel like they're a little bit far away.
19 Other things that we would do differently or that I would do
20 differently, we talked about we would have liked to have had a
21 little bit better choke point or filter going to the two different
22 treatment groups. That north side was fed really heavily, and
23 part of our -- you know, that triage group supervisor is not only
24 to supervise the triage portion but to kind of be that filter for
25 harvesters and direct folks either north or south. And so, you

1 know, that triage group sup got a little bit task saturated and
2 that part got missed, and we fed you know probably three-quarters
3 of the folks to the north.
4 Q. Okay.
5 A. So we would -- you know, that's something that we talked
6 about. And then, I don't even know, I mean I'm just rambling on,
7 but from my standpoint a lot of our MCI training is really
8 controlled and it's pushed through, you know, Thurston County
9 Medic 1, and kind of surrounds incidents maybe like mass shootings
10 or that sort of thing where we kind of walk into a warehouse and
11 there's 20 people laying on the ground or 20 cardboard cutouts
12 with various things. And it's a very controlled environment. And
13 we practice, you know, our start triage and whatnot, but we don't
14 incorporate rescue groups or, you know, a fire branch or anything
15 into it. And now after running something that is truly a large-
16 scale incident, I think that we could do a better job in training
17 to a little bit more realistic standards and incorporation of
18 rescue groups and fire branches and just increase, you know, the
19 difficulties so that folks truly understand it.
20 And then probably the last piece is just on the communication
21 would be the fact that, you know, how we operate around here,
22 especially from a fire sense, because we obviously run a lot more
23 fires than we do MCIs, you know, people are used to showing up on
24 scene and speaking to the incident commander. And so a lot of
25 communication jumped the medical program -- or the medical branch

1 director, and so I got too much and I shouldn't have. You know,
2 all those groups under that branch should have just talked to the
3 branch director and I shouldn't have received a lot, and I heard
4 that from the Pierce County side as well. For what it's worth.
5 Q. So in that, clearly you've had a critique, a debriefing on
6 what went on.
7 A. Yeah.
8 Q. Was that for just the Thurston County units or was that
9 everyone? Did that also include like JBLM?
10 A. We've had several, yeah. We had one just with Thurston. We
11 had one with Thurston and Pierce, and we've had two with Pierce
12 County Emergency Management.
13 Q. Okay. And was JBLM there with the Pierce County EMA?
14 A. One of the two.
15 Q. Okay, they were at one.
16 A. They actually -- no, they were at both. I'm sorry.
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. There were just less of them at one, but yeah, they had a rep
19 at one.
20 Q. Okay. All right. So I guess one of the things that I look
21 at, who's responsible for drawing up the after-action report for
22 Thurston County?
23 A. Yeah, I'm not sure what you mean, the after-action. Just
24 like, we call it a post-incident analysis, like a PIA.
25 Q. Yeah, yes. You call it a post-incident analysis. Okay.

1 A. So as far as drawing it up, you mean like lessons learned --
2 Q. Yeah.
3 A. -- and whatnot?
4 Q. Yeah, that kind of thing.
5 A. I would say our organization probably. I'm not sure who did,
6 but I know somebody was scribing.
7 Q. Oh, okay.
8 A. Somebody from the training office.
9 Q. So who would I contact to get a copy of that? Do you know?
10 A. You can email me and I can probably get it for you.
11 Q. Oh, that works. Just to let you know with things like this,
12 what we're just looking for is, okay, so there were some issues;
13 fine, they pointed out their issues, and, all right, next time
14 what's the corrective action? That's what we look for.
15 A. Yeah.
16 Q. We look for, okay, we're moving forward. We now know what
17 we've got to do better, let's kind of correct it. Ultimately,
18 yeah, communications is an issue. And again, the biggest
19 drawback, of course, is how do you communicate with DoD? Because
20 that's the biggest stumbling block.
21 A. Yeah.
22 Q. You have to get the Department of Defense to say, okay,
23 somehow or other we're going to let civilian agencies hook into a
24 military radio system.
25 A. Right, right.

1 Q. And that's one of the things that actually we're all looking
2 at trying to see how do we do this. We do know that in the United
3 States, smaller bases do. And we do know -- I think it's for Sam
4 Houston in Texas is probably one of the few that actually has kind
5 of the same agreement as JBLM; they actually do come off base and
6 they're first due in that area off base.
7 So one of the things we're going to look at is there
8 something that we can possibly suggested to the DoD to say, look,
9 we understand that you've got security issues. Got it, not a
10 problem. But there's got to be a way where you can have a stand-
11 alone radio system --
12 A. Sure.
13 Q. -- where you can talk to everyone.
14 A. Yeah.
15 Q Especially if JBLM is going to be the first due off-base in
16 I-5 kind of situation. So that's one of the things we are kind of
17 looking at.
18 A. Yeah, awesome.
19 Q. And they've done it before. We're just trying to figure out
20 why they're dragging their feet here when they've done it in
21 different areas in the country.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. And it just may be that no one actually thought about it or
24 everyone thought everything was fine.
25 A. Sure.

1 Q. But that is one of the things that we're looking at.
2 So in wrapping up, I guess, what I'm really interested in is.
3 number one, your thoughts of what went on, if there was anything
4 that struck you as maybe something that needs to be done.
5 And let me back up for a second, to your knowledge, there was
6 no one there from the railroad? Was there any communications with
7 the railroads at all about what was going on?
8 A. Yeah. And so you say to my knowledge there was nobody there
9 from the railroad?
10 Q. Well, I'm saying that you didn't personally speak to anybody
11 from the railroad --
12 A. Well, I know the conductor --
13 Q. -- outside of the conductor that came up.
14 A. Yeah, yeah.
15 Q. One of the things that I was looking, was there a
16 representative from the railroad that came up and says, okay, the
17 railroad is shut down; there's not going to be a problem.
18 A. Oh, right, right, right.
19 Q. If you need any kind of expertise or any suggestion about
20 safety, I'm here to help. That kind of situation.
21 A. Not to my window.
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. But like I said, we had two windows going at once, so I'm not
24 sure if Chief Barnard got that. We did duplicate some effort in
25 the sense that I called, so that -- you know, we got both rail

1 lines right there. So I shut them both down at one point through
2 my dispatch. I know that's on the tape. And they said, both?
3 And I said, shut everything down, you know. And so I know I shut
4 both of those down and, you know, I called Ecology and I called
5 Snell Crane and I called DOT and -- all through dispatch.
6 Q. Well, one of the things that we're looking at is that -- let
7 me ask you a question before I say this.
8 A. Yeah.
9 Q. First of all, when they decided that they were going to run,
10 South Transit decided they were running those trains --
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. -- on that Lakewood Division.
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. Was there any notification given to the fire departments?
15 Did you guys get any training about those trains coming through
16 there?
17 A. Not our organization to my knowledge, no.
18 Q. One of the things that we look at, and the reason that I
19 asked that first -- back up to my original statement. One of the
20 things that we're looking is communication from the railroad to
21 let you know exactly what's going on.
22 A. Sure.
23 Q. If there was training provided, then you would know how this
24 line operates or what operates on this line, that kind of
25 situation. So as far as shutting down all the lines or whatever,

1 that kind of goes back to the railroad.
2 A. Yeah.
3 Q. If they've never bothered to educate people about what goes
4 through there, how these rails are going to be operated, if
5 there's never been any training that was provided or given --
6 A. Yeah.
7 Q. -- then it's pretty much on them. So one of the things that
8 I was looking to find is at any time did anyone from the railroad
9 say, look, I'm a representative here from the railroad; I'm here
10 to help you in this operation; my job basically is to kind of work
11 you around the rail issue.
12 A. Sure. Yeah, I think there was someone over on the other
13 window, but I didn't speak so I wouldn't know.
14 Q. Okay, okay. So at this particular point I always ask people
15 this question, which is, is there anything that you think I should
16 have asked you and I failed to ask you about the incident?
17 A. No. No.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. I think, you know, all said and done -- and I know there was
20 some frustration on the Pierce side about, you know, did the MCI
21 get called. Or is that what you're speaking to when you said as
22 far as things running, there's things that need to be fixed?
23 Q. Well, now, let me back up. So one of the things that I look
24 at is what issues you had on the scene. Clearly, communications
25 is an issue.

1 A. Challenge.
2 Q. Right, a challenge. So at this particular point, all right,
3 everyone is now aware of it. What can we do to fix it?
4 A. Yeah, yeah.
5 Q. What can we do to make it better.
6 A. Right. Yeah.
7 Q. Is there something or someone that we can make a suggestion
8 to, like DoD, saying, okay, you need to somehow or other figure
9 out how you're going to do a radio system that allows your guys
10 who are going to be operating off-base --
11 A. Right.
12 Q. -- or who are that close to different counties and different
13 agencies to be able to communicate.
14 A. Yeah.
15 Q. People need to be able to communicate back and forth. That's
16 one of the situations.
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. The other thing that we look at is sometimes there are
19 concerns. For example, one of the concerns that a couple of the
20 firefighters had was the labeling of the windows was a little
21 confusing. By laws, windows have stickers on it, and the stickers
22 are supposed to help you figure out which window is the emergency
23 window, which windows can be broken. They get a little
24 complicated if there's a sticker on every single window because
25 not everyone's going to stop to read --

1 A. Yeah.
2 Q. -- every single sticker. And especially when the windows,
3 each sticker says something completely different. No one's going
4 to notice.
5 A. Right, right.
6 Q. So, as a result, we had firefighters trying to do one thing
7 with a window that that window wasn't designed to do because the
8 window next to it --
9 A. Was.
10 Q. -- was designed to do that.
11 A. Oh, wow. Yeah, wow.
12 Q. So that's also something --
13 A. That's big.
14 Q. -- that we look at the railroad that you need to make your
15 signage clearer.
16 A. Right.
17 Q. Not only for the first responders --
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. -- but also for your passengers.
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. They need to be able to get out. One of the other things
22 that we were looking at is that there was no emergency lighting,
23 which means that, number one, passengers are trying to scramble
24 out of a train in various attitudes --
25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. -- in the dark.
2 A. Wow.
3 Q. And then you're asking firefighters to go in --
4 A. Sure.
5 Q. -- and try to rescue people in the dark.
6 A. Sure.
7 Q. Yeah, sure, they have flashlights, but you can only aim that
8 sucker in one direction.
9 A. Right, right.
10 Q. There may be something dangerous in the other direction.
11 A. Sure, sure.
12 Q. So one of the things that we're looking at to try to correct
13 is going to be the lack of emergency lighting.
14 A. Yeah, that's good.
15 Q. And the emergency lighting is required not only for
16 passengers but for the safety of first responders. That's another
17 issue we look at. So when I say things to fix --
18 A. Yeah, yeah.
19 Q. -- it may not necessarily be about the fire department.
20 A. I got you.
21 Q. But it's going to be something where our job ultimately is to
22 make your job easier.
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. We're not going to be able to -- well, we kind of hope and
25 pray we can keep people from dropping trains onto the interstate.

1 A. Right.
2 Q. But in the event we can't, what can we do to make your job
3 easier?
4 A. Yeah. That's good.
5 Q. And so that's what I mean by trying to find a fix --
6 A. Yeah, I get you. Yeah.
7 Q. -- to stuff. So what I always tell people is if you come up
8 with anything later on, please feel free to give me a call. My
9 cell number's a 24-hour number, office number not so much. I do
10 also answer my email; it comes straight to my cell. I am very
11 interested in people's opinion. I don't care, even firefighters
12 who may have an opinion that, you know what, maybe we need to have
13 a door that's made to be broken for us to get quicker access into
14 the train car.
15 A. Yeah.
16 Q. These things are kind of important to us.
17 A. Right.
18 Q. Because ultimately you guys are first on the scene. If you
19 can't do your job efficiently --
20 A. Right.
21 Q. -- then it doesn't work well for the passengers.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. That's basically what we look at.
24 So the other thing is, please reach out to Amtrak or BNSF. I
25 will -- I promise when I get back to Washington, I will send you

1 some copies of the videos.
2 A. Great.
3 Q. AskRail, it's a great tool.
4 A. It's a good app? Okay.
5 Q. It's free.
6 A. Yeah.
7 Q. And it's -- usually it says it takes about 24 hours to sign
8 up. It took me between 8 and 12 hours to get on. It's just that
9 they simply, they keep track of whether fire department, police
10 department or who's actually --
11 A. Um-hum.
12 Q. But the nice part about it is, is that the information on it
13 is updated almost hourly.
14 A. Okay, wow.
15 Q. I mean, it's always good, up-to-date information.
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. But thank you very much, Chief.
18 A. Oh, you bet.
19 Q. I'm sorry it took me so long to get here.
20 A. No, not at all. I glad we squared it right away.
21 Q. Basically, if anybody has any suggests or any concerns --
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. -- or anything that. One of the other things that we are
24 looking at is the fact that you guys are going to need to have
25 access to an accurate accounting of the number of victims --

A. Right, right.

Q. -- that you're looking for. And that is something that we have been looking at for a long time.

A. Yeah.

Q. And once again, it's an issue.

A. Yeah.

Q. So once again, we're going to try to push that. You need to know how many people you're looking for.

A. Right, right.

Q. So I appreciate it, thank you very much.

A. Yeah, you bet.

Q. So, all right, and I almost got you for an hour.

A. Hey, not bad.

Q. It's 5:49. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 5:49 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	AMTRAK DERAILMENT IN DUPONT, WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 2017 Interview of Ryan Fox
ACCIDENT NO.:	RRD18MR001
PLACE:	Lacey, Washington
DATE:	March 8, 2018

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Nancy Sackett
Transcriber

First responder interviews: Lakewood Police Department

1. **Detective Bryan Johnson** Telephone ([redacted]

01-03-18 Start: 10:11 a.m.

End: 10:51 a.m.

Detective Johnson advised that he doesn't remember the exact time of the dispatch. He heard the call go out over the radio and responded to the scene. He advised that Lakewood is the adjacent city, just south of the scene. Detective Johnson is the Forensic Science Manager for the Major Crimes unit. The unit is comprised of representative from 10 agencies that work together as a team on major incidents. One of the agencies represented in the unit is the DuPont Police Department which is the jurisdiction where the derailment occurred.

Detective Johnson advised that he and Detective Bunton were one of the first officers from his agency to arrive on the scene. Upon arrival, police officers and fire department personnel from various agencies were already on the scene. The triage areas had not been set up. He began directing patients to the wide median area. Detective Johnson advised that the tracks had undergone work recently and there was a gravel area between the north and southbound lanes which was used for the triage area. Detective Johnson noted that there were people everywhere. Some were lying on the ground and others on the hill. His first action was to assist with the evacuation of victims from a train car. He recalls entering the train car that was right side up and was underneath the train car dangling from the bridge. When he entered the car, he observed a victim lying on the floor near the door, adjacent to the first window. This end of the train car was located just in front of the pick-up truck. A backboard was required to extricate this victim. Once the victim was placed on the backboard, he was evacuated through the open window. Detective Johnson advised that several of the windows were missing. The other passengers in this train car were able to self-extricate. This train car was attached to another car in the front that was partially smashed. Detective Johnson advised that he was unable to go too far into the next smashed car due to the debris. The train car was empty of all passengers. Once all the victims were extricated; they were taken to the triage area. Detective Johnson then went to the train cars located on the hill. The rear locomotive was still on the track and the baggage car was still attached. The train car dangling from the bridge was attached to the baggage car. He assisted the fire department with ladders as they entered the "dangling" car. Several people were observed standing on top of the dangling car assisting other passengers out of the train car and down to the ground.

Detective Johnson advised that he observed two people in the F150 pick-up that were trapped inside of the vehicle. The passenger was pinned and could not self-extricate. The driver was seriously injured by mobile. It appeared to the detective that the train car fell on top of the passenger side hood of the pick-up truck. Detective Johnson advised that he observed a female inside of a vehicle that was stopped on the left side of the roadway. She was not pinned in vehicle but required assistance in getting out. The woman sustained pelvis and femur fractures. The detective advised that he had no sense of time when it came to the removal of victims from the scene. Detective Johnson advised that he had no contact with the train crew. He noted that the railroads and transportation agencies had responded quickly to the scene.

Detective Johnson advised that the extrication of the injured passenger from the train car had been hampered by a broken storage cabinet door. The long thin door located near the exit door of the train car was open and could not be closed or moved. This resulted in the limiting of the available space to evacuate passengers. This resulted in the decision to evacuate the injured passenger on the backboard out the window.

Detective Johnson assisted the medical examiner's office with the removal of two of three decedents. All three decedents were found close together. They were all from the sideways rail car that was sheared by the trees. One of the victims was on the hill between the rail bridge and the bottom of the train that was lying on its right side. Another victim was underneath the train car on the hill.

Detective Johnson advised that law enforcement communication was "pretty good". The local law enforcement agencies operated off 800 megahertz and the interoperability of the communication system was good. The law enforcement agencies switched over to L.E.-11, a radio frequency that allowed all responding police agencies to communicate with the command post and one another. However, law enforcement agencies were not able to talk directly to fire department agencies on the scene. Ultimately, the establishment of the "joint command" permitted communications between agencies. Detective Johnson was unaware of any communications issues involving law enforcement agencies.

Detective Johnson advised that the Wednesday before the crash, he had attended a "Train Crash Investigation Course" that was hosted by the DuPont Police Department. The course was taught by BNSF and Det. Vander Fange of Amtrak. Detective Johnson reported that the training had been invaluable during the incident and provided information involving hazardous materials that the detective was able to use on the scene. In addition to this training, the Major Crimes unit usually take part in joint training sessions; especially the Steilacoom and Dupont Police Department in conjunction with the Lakewood Police Department.

Detective Johnson advised that later that evening word was received from Amtrak that the engineer's backpack was still inside of the lead locomotive. It was requested that the property be recovered for safekeeping. Detective Johnson photo-documented the recovery of the backpack and a cellular telephone from a coat located in the lead locomotive. The property was turned over to representatives of the NTSB on the scene.

Call back number: [redacted].

2. **Sergeant Scott Novasky** Telephone [redacted]

01-03-18 Start: 10:51 a.m.

End: 11:00 a.m.

Sgt. Novasky advised that he is a member of the Incident Management Team (IMT). The Incident Management Team is comprised of representatives from various agencies from both Pierce County and Thurston County.

A text went out at approximately 8:30 a.m. He was off duty and didn't get the text message until 11:00 a.m. He arrived on the scene at 12:00 p.m. He went straight to the Command Post located on top of Mounts Road. The "Unified command" was set up prior to his arrival. At the Command Post was the Washington State Patrol, the Washington State Department of Transportation, BNSF railroad and Amtrak. Amtrak was very helpful and kept in constant communications with the command post. All the victims were already transported from the scene before he arrived. Sgt. Novasky advised that he was stationed at the main Command Post and was relaying messages from Assistant Chief Unfred who was manning the "Forward Command Post" at the scene. All the law enforcement agencies were able to communicate with one another. The only difficulty experienced during this operation was the coordination between the command post and the Emergency Operation Center. It was eventually dealt with.

The Communications system has the "Learn Network" which is a state-wide patch that allows various agencies to communicate with one another. There is also a "Command Tac" patch that connects the various agencies communication centers. Normally, the radio system operates without any problems in Pierce County. The radios function well until Pierce County units travel farther south into Thurston County, near Lacey.

The only difficulty related to extrication that was experienced was the removal of the decedent that was trapped underneath one of the rail cars. The rail car had to removed first before access to the victim could be made. This occurred on the second day. Sgt. Novasky advised that in addition to the truck semi, there were one or two vehicles that had been struck by the derailed train.

Sgt. Novasky advised that the Lakewood Police Department takes part in Critical Incident/Active Shooter training. Members of the Incident Management Team receives quarterly training. Sgt. Novasky participated in a "Grade Crossing Collision Training" by BNSF.

3. **Officer David Butts** Telephone [redacted]

01-03-18 Start: 11:11 a.m.

End: 11:29 a.m.

Officer Butts advised that he believed that he was approximately the 10th car on the scene. Upon arrival, he advised other responding units of better routes of access to the scene. He advised that he wanted a different county to respond since it would be easier for agencies coming from the south to access the scene. It appeared to him that when he arrived that there was no command post in place and he didn't know who was in charge. He attempted to take charge of the scene but had difficulty getting the fire department to cooperate. Many of the Fire Department Personnel appeared to be standing around. Eventually Chief Unfred took charge but this was prior to his arrival on the scene.

Officer Butts advised that he observed a member of the military police trying to break open the window from the outside. The man was able to kick the window out from the interior. A ladder was placed up against the train car that was hanging off the bridge. Communications between members of the various fire departments was done by word of mouth. Officer Butts would assist by relaying information about victim location to the various fire department personnel on the scene.

Officer Butts assisted with the removal of the victim on a backboard from the train car located below the bridge. Officer Butts advised that he didn't enter any of the train cars. He heard Chief Rodriguez, from the Steilacoom Police Department, report the presence of passenger trapped in an F150 truck. In addition to the F150, Officer Butts advised that a truck semi and another vehicle stopped on the left side of the road were potentially struck by the train cars. One or two vehicles farther down the road had also been damage possibly by the train. Officer Hinton and Officer Latrelle performed the final walk through of each rail car. It took approximately one and a half hours to transport all the victims from the scene.

Officer Butts advised that he had no contact with the train crew. He couldn't recall seeing any personnel from the railroad (Amtrak, BNSF) but advised that he did see several individuals standing by the tracks. He was unsure who these individuals were.

There were no communication issues involving the law enforcement agencies. At one point, all the agencies switched over to a common channel, PC-11, but Officer Butts could not remember the exact moment the agencies switched over. The communications system for law enforcement is generally thought of as good and the signal is usually maintained as far south as the Nisqually jail.

Officer Butts advised that his agency participates in annual Active Shooter training. He attended a 4- hour course offered by Life Savers in "Grade Crossing Collision Investigation" but has never attended any training involving train derailments or hands-on familiarization of rail equipment.

4. **Officer Jeremy Vahle** Telephone [redacted]

01-03-18 Start 12:42 p.m.

End: 1:15 p.m.

Officer Vahle advised that he received the dispatch between 7:36-7:40 a.m. The call came in as a "train derailment". It was confirmed that the train had derailed and was on the interstate. It was later reported that it took between 12-17 minutes for Officer Vahle to arrive on the scene. As he approached the scene, Officer Vahle advised that he could see one train car on the interstate and another car dangling from the bridge. He grabbed his first aid equipment and blankets and ran to the scene. When he arrived, he saw that patient care was well in hand by members of the fire department and military personnel. They were assisting passengers in evacuation of the rail cars. Most of the passengers had been evacuated prior to his arrival. Since there was no need for the first aid equipment he brought, Officer Vahle assisted the fire department personnel with carrying their equipment to the site. After that, he acted as litter bearer, bringing victims to the triage area. Many of the victims were not seriously injured.

Officer Vahle believed that at least six vehicles had been struck by the train or debris. One of the SUV's on the scene appeared to have struck by a flying tree. One of the train cars landed in the roadway in front of the truck semi. The pick-up truck was to the right of the semi. The passenger in the pick-up truck was trapped in the vehicle and had been the last victim extricated.

Officer Vahle noted that several problems had arisen during the incident. The Fire Department didn't have any representative at the command post. It appeared the fire department didn't know a command post existed. A law enforcement representative at the command post requested the response of a fire official to act as liaison. There was no joint communication operation. Communications between the fire departments themselves did not appear to be very coordinated. Most of the fire department personnel were not using radios and information was being relayed by mouth. Communications between law enforcement agencies was better. South Sound 911 is the communications center for Pierce County. Lakewood Police Department shares a channel with the Steilacoom Police Department and the DuPont Police Department.

Extrication was hampered by the lack of lighting in the train cars. Other difficulties noted by Officer Vahle was the extrication of victims from train cars that were lying on their side. This made getting and maintaining the rescuers footing very difficult due to the angle of the train cars. The debris from the train was larger than that normally found on the scene of a regular vehicle crash. The debris made moving about the scene treacherous. Though, in one instance, a large piece of a train car was used as an anchor point because of it's size and weight. Officer Vahle noted that he spoke to one of the passenger who identified the train car he was occupying. He noted that even though the train car was marked with a white sticker on a taupe colored background, it would have been easier to see the car identification on a more contrasting background.

One of the issues that Officer Vahle advised that rescuers faced was trying to accurately account for the passengers in the train. It was very difficult to get a definitive number of passengers to ensure that everyone was accounted for. He advised that Amtrak arrived on the scene quickly and was very responsive.

Officer Vahle reported that he has never taken part in any training dealing with rail emergencies. On the scene, he advised that he followed the fire department's lead and did what they did. He learned by watching during the incident. He noted that no one was keeping track of the personnel on the scene. Only those individuals with police cruisers with Mobile Data Terminals (MDT) or individuals that "went over the air" on the radio; were initially accounted for. As the incident continued over the next couple of hours and into the next day, new arriving personnel checked in with the command post and could be accounted for. Normally, the process of personnel accountability is initiated by a command officer on the scene.

Officer Vahle noted that the Lakewood Police Department does not use Body Worn Cameras.

5**. Officer Rich Hall** Telephone [redacted]

01-03-18 Start 4:47 p.m.

End: 5:03 p.m.

Officer Rich Hall advised that on the day of the incident he was off duty for the Lakewood Police Department. He was working an overtime detail at Pierce County Transit. Pierce County Transit provides some similar services as Sound Transit. Though the two transit agencies do share some facilities at certain locations, they are separate agencies.

The Pierce County Sheriff's Department is contracted to provide manpower to Pierce County Transit. Each month additional overtime slots open and police officers from Takoma and Lakewood bid for the jobs.

Initially, the officers working at Pierce County Transit were told to remain at their duty station and not to respond to the incident. Several hours later, the Pierce County Transit dispatcher sent three coaches to the scene to help with the evacuation of the passengers. The origin of the request for help was unknown. Officer Hall and several other officers escorted the three coaches to the scene. Once on the scene, 19 passengers were loaded onboard one of the coaches and transported to the DuPont City Hall building. There, the passengers were to be interviewed. Officer Hall advised that he did not take part in the interview process nor did he have any personal dealings with the passengers.

Officer Hall remained on the scene at the Command Post assisting Lt. Randy Hollinger from the Washington State Patrol, Operations. By that time, he believed that all the injured passengers had been transported from the scene. The communications operation was set up and running prior to Officer Hall's arrival at the Command Post. Officer Hall organized the dispatching of police officers to various hospitals to check on passengers sent to that facility. Officer Hall did not know how many of the vehicles that were traveling on Interstate 5 were involved in the derailment.

In Pierce County, many of the agencies take part in interagency training in critical incidents such as "Active Shooter". Usually, the training is limited to all the agencies in Pierce County. To his knowledge, Officer Hall believes that not much interagency training is conducted with Thurston County. Officer Hall has never participated in any training sponsored by the railroad regarding train derailments. However; the Wednesday before the crash, he did participate in a 4 hour, "Grade Crossing Collision Course" that was sponsored by the DuPont Police Department. Officer Hall advised that the training was part of his job as a member of the Major Crimes Investigation unit.

6. **Assistant Chief John Unfred** Telephone [redacted]

01-30-18 Start: 5:16 p.m.

End: 5:44 p.m.

Assistant Chief Unfred advised that several years prior to the incident, the police and fire communications were consolidated within the same system and works well. Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) is not a part of the Pierce County communications system. Thurston County also has a different system but unlike JBLM, the system is designed to combine communication operations via a "patch". Frequently these attempts to patch the counties together do not work. JBLM by a pre-determined agreement was given the primary responsibility of the "freeway" at that location. But JBLM's inability to be patched into the Pierce County or Thurston County Communications system requires various command officers to be face to face during an operation to facilitate a unified command structure.

On the day of the incident, JBLM had initiated a unified command with the chief from the Lacey Fire Department and the Fire Chief from the DuPont Fire Department. They were sitting in a SUV parked north of the scene. Upon arrival of the law enforcement agencies and Chief Unfred, an attempt was made to set up a unified command with all the agencies at the golf course.

It was believed that setting up the command post away from the scene would provide better access and prevent inadvertent interference with the on-scene rescue operation. However, the fire department did not send a representative to the command post, now set up at the Golf course.

Thurston County and Madigan hospital provided all the patient transports. Three DMCC (Disaster Management Control Centers) were "stood up". These DMCC represented Pierce County, Thurston County, to the south, and King County, to the north. Harbor View is believed to be the only Level 1 Trauma Center still left in the area and several patients were flown there. The Harbor View hospital is in Seattle, Washington. Assistant Chief Unfred was unaware that St. Claire hospital had been bypassed. The hospital's closeness to and being located north of the scene would have made it a viable option for receiving victims.

Assistant Chief Unfred was aware that the West Pierce Fire Department, which is a large organization, had questioned the dispatch decision and the proper utilization of resources. Only 2 of West Pierce Fire Department medic units were dispatched to the scene. Chief Unfred advised that the decision about the allocation of resources and where units were pulled from was made by the DuPont Fire Chief. The decision was based on the belief that pulling units from the north would be problematic due to the traffic congestion.

Ms. Norma Pancake from the Emergency Management Administration had already completed the "After Action report" for the Emergency Medical Services. JBLM also completed their AAR on their operation. The AARs were done separately without any coordination between the agencies that were on the scene. Chief Unfred will be drafting the "After Action" report for the Lakewood Police Department. The Washington State Patrol has requested the Incident Management Team prepare the "After Action" report for that agency. Chief Unfred tentatively plans to hold a meeting with the involved agencies in May. However, this is still in the planning stage. One of the issues encountered by the first responders dealt with this unincorporated portion of the county that was close to the county line. The railroad operation was controlled by several organizations to include the Washington State DOT, Sound Transit and Amtrak. In addition, the Washington State Patrol had jurisdiction of the highway at that location. No one acknowledged being the agency in authority and it was unclear who was ultimately in charge. Normally, the Incident Management Team gets a "Declaration of Authority" from the agency in-charge. In this case, no declaration was received because no one wanted to be charge. The Incident Management Team attempted to coordinate the efforts on the scene. There was a lack of strong leadership on the scene. Chief Unfred characterization of the scene was that "it was a mess".

Chief Unfred advised that last summer, an Amtrak train derailed in Steilacoom. There were no injuries in that derailment. Chief Unfred noted that unlike in that incident, there has been little contact with the agencies involved in this crash, Amtrak and Sound Transit, regarding "after action" analysis and reporting. The chief advised that with or without the cooperation of these two agencies, he would be moving forward with his plan for the AAR.

Chief Unfred advised that his agency has an active training program. In the last year, two Grade Crossing Collision Courses were offered to his agency's personnel.

Accountability at the scene was accomplished by utilizing the CAD system. Officers utilizing their radios to announce their intent on responding to the scene are tracked on the CAD. However, those officers that responded to the scene in their own vehicles or did not "come over the air" as responding

could not be accounted for. During the initial attack phase, accountability is done solely by CAD. After 35-40 minutes, as the operation moves into its next phase; a concerted effort is made to account for personnel on the scene by having them check in at the command post.

Lakewood Police Department does not utilize Body Worn Cameras. They use the onboard dash-cam in the cruisers. Not many agencies do use the BWC; to his knowledge neither Steilacoom or Takoma utilize the system.

7. **Investigator Jim Lofland**

01-04-18 Start 1:42 p.m.

End: 2:16 p.m.

Investigator Lofland advised that he believed that the call was dispatched some time around 7:33 a.m. He responded from his office which was approximately 6 or 7 miles away and arrived 5-10 minutes later at about 7:50 a.m. He advised that the trip took additional time due to the time of day and the traffic congestion. He drove to the scene utilizing the shoulder area adjacent to the jersey barrier. Upon arrival, Investigator Lofland advised that he had no idea who was in-charge of the scene and there was no central casualty collection point established for the victims. He noted that a lot of the fire department personnel were standing around waiting for the arrival of a "tech unit". Police officers on the scene began rescue operations and directing members of the fire department. Investigator Lofland described the lack of command structure as "a lot of people with great ideas but not one central great idea". The Investigator had no contact with any of the train's crew members. The investigator couldn't determine who was responsible for the triage area and observed a lot of people from JBLM, Thurston County and Pierce County standing around.

He believed that the delay in getting to the scene resulted in many of the passengers being loaded into privately owned vehicles and being transported to the hospital by good Samaritans. This became problematic when trying to obtain an accurate count of passengers on the train and account for all potential victims. At that time, he believed that 90% of the victims had been extricated from the train. He assisted with carrying patients to the casualty areas; including one patient that had to be evacuated from the "dangling" train car in a stokes basket.

The trapped passenger in the F150 pick-up truck was still in the process of being extricated upon his arrival and the last of the injured had been extricated from the train within 30-40 minutes. Most of the train cars had been breached by emergency personnel upon Investigator Lofland's arrival. There were no lights on inside of the train cars. He did not see the initial extrication that gave the first responders access to the interior of the train.

On the scene, there were 19 passengers who were uninjured and did not go to the hospital. They were loaded onto a bus and transported to the DuPont City Hall. There, Investigator Lofland, his partner and another officer from the DuPont Police Department attempted to conduct interviews with these passengers. Investigator Lofland advised that he was able to complete 3 interviews. His partner completed 3 or 4 and the officer from DuPont was able to interview an additional 3 or 4 people. In all the three officers were able to conduct 12 interviews out of 19 passengers.

Before any additional interviews could be conducted, the passengers were loaded on to a bus to their final destinations and left the scene. Investigator Lofland advised of the three passengers he interviewed, they all reported that the trip seemed normal. The train was delayed for approximately 15 minutes for mechanical issues but got underway. The passengers reported dozing on and off and believed that there was nothing unusual about the trip and no concerns that the train was going too fast. The first sign of trouble was as described by one of the passengers when the train began to slide like it was on ice. Another passenger heard a "bang" and then felt the rear end of the train raised upward. Investigator Lofland advised that the two of the individuals he spoke to advised him that they were riding in car #3 or car #6 at the time of the derailment. The investigator did not know where these train cars came to final rest. He did not know the condition of the other passengers who had been riding in those cars. The investigator spoke to the driver of a vehicle traveling southbound on Interstate 5. The driver reported that he was approximately 2 cars back when he observed a train car fall from the overpass onto the roadway in front of him. He had been able to stop before getting hit by the train car. The driver got out of his vehicle and ran to help the other victims. He inadvertently locked his keys in his vehicle and the vehicle had to be towed away for safekeeping. The driver's car was identified as a little red car and that he stopped in the left lane. In front of his vehicle was a lime green car that appeared to have been damaged by the train. Both front doors of this vehicle were missing. The investigator could not advise how many vehicles on the interstate had been involved in the derailment. The driver had advised that people fell out of the train car windows onto the highway; though it can't be determined whether this was by accident (i.e.: ejection) or deliberate as passengers attempted to self-extricate.

One of the biggest issues that the responding officers faced was attempting to determine the actual number of victims. Amtrak initially indicated that there were 78 passengers on board; however, that number didn't account for the on-duty crew or crew members deadheading on the train. The number of passengers on the train, as reported by Amtrak, constantly fluctuated. Officers had to be dispatched to the various hospitals to obtain an accurate count. Some officers had to travel as far away as the Harbor View hospital in Seattle. The investigator checked with the "Casualty Collection Point" and found that only 52 passengers could be accounted for at this staging area. Investigator Lofland believed the rest may have been transported by bystanders. Investigator Lofland and his partner were assigned the task of accounting for all the passengers in the train. It took several hours to track down all the passengers in the various hospitals to get a "head count". He did not see any Amtrak officials on the scene and the passenger manifest that he received was incomplete and the number of passengers believed to have been on the train kept fluctuating.

Radio communications in Pierce County is believed to be good. In certain locations there have been incidents of intermittent radio problems; however, the Pierce County repeater system has provided good coverage. To facilitate communications between various law enforcement agencies in Pierce County, a coordinated effort must be made at the dispatch center to patch the agencies frequencies together. In addition, PCLE-11 is a common radio frequency that is available for law enforcement agency units only that allows various agencies to talk to one another without having to undergo the extended effort of trying to patch the frequencies together. The utilization of this common frequency, PCLE-11, was used early on into the incident. Investigator Lofland noted that Pierce County dispatcher advised units to switch over while he was responding to the scene. To communicate with Thurston County requires the "patch". There is no common radio frequency between Pierce County units and Thurston County units.

Pierce County Fire Department units can be patched into the frequency to allow communications between the fire department and the police department. However, the Pierce County Fire Department does not have access to PCLE-11. This frequency is strictly for law enforcement use. It is unknown whether JBLM can be patched into Pierce County. Lakewood, Steilacoom and DuPont worked together regularly. Infrequently, Lakewood Police Department would work with the Takoma Police Department or the Pierce County Sheriff's Department. However, there is practically no instances were Lakewood Police Department would work with agencies from Thurston County. In the area of the derailment, the Washington State Patrol has the actual jurisdiction on the freeway. There are few residential properties between the location of the derailment and the county line.

Investigator Lofland advised that despite the chaos, the operation went "really well". Despite the adverse conditions, first responders were able to get to the scene quickly. The key issues that needed to be address is the lack of an accurate manifest that delayed the identification of passengers. Investigator Lofland provided several examples. In one instance, a family was listed on the manifest as occupying position 11 and 12. In position 55, a single name (unknown whether it was the first or last name) was listed. Later, a report of a missing child had come in to the law enforcement officers on the scene. It was determined that the child was the name (first name only) listed in position 55 and that he was in fact a member of the family in position 11 and 12. In another instance, an individual was listed on the manifest twice; once by a single name (unknown to the officers whether it was a first or last name) and then again listed with a first initial and a last name. The officer later determined that it was the same individual and that the single name listed on the manifest was a combination of the first initial and the last name. There was no uniformity when it came to listing passengers on the manifest. Railroad personnel used first names, surnames and combinations.

8. **Officer Joseph Wellman** Telephone [redacted]

01-06-18 Start: 11:02 a.m.

End: 11:22 a.m.

Officer Joseph Wellman advised that on the day of the incident, he was off-duty heading home in his "privately owned vehicle" (POV). He was traveling southbound on Interstate 5 when the incident happened in front of him. He realized that something had occurred when traffic stop. At that time, he turned on his "take home" radio and monitored the incident. He believed that this occurred between 7:40-7:45 a.m. He checked in "on the radio" as Lakewood 175. Officer Wellman didn't try to approach the scene, the train and had no contact with the victims. Instead, he got out of his "POV" and attempted to clear the traffic ahead of the emergency vehicles that were approaching. Initially, the responding fire responders used the left shoulder and the "on ramp" for Mounts Road to access the scene. Mounts Road provided a loop that connected the northbound side of the "freeway" to the southbound side. The emergency vehicles would use the northbound "off ramp" and then loop around and take the southbound "on ramp" to access the scene. A utility road, that belonged to a transportation company doing work in the area, also provided the needed access.

Once the initial emergency vehicles had arrived; Officer Wellman moved up to the Mounts Road and used it to direct vehicles off the "freeway".

Officer Wellman advised that he has only been employed by the Lakewood Police Department for two weeks and was not competent to discuss how interagency communications worked between the various law enforcement agencies and JBLM. He was unaware how communications for the incident was set up. He knows that during the incident, the Lakewood Police Department switched to "a side channel" or an alternate frequency which allowed the various agencies to communicate with one another.

Officer Wellman advised that traffic control in the immediate area was handled by various law enforcement agencies. He was directed by one of the Lakewood traffic officers and north of his position, traffic control was being handled by a Washington State Patrol Commercial Motor vehicle enforcement officer. Officer Wellman noted that he observed two Washington State DOT mobile message boards being deployed north of the crash scene. He was finally relieved of his post by Chief Zarro of the Lakewood Police Department approximately two hours later.

9**. Detective Todd Jordan** Telephone [redacted]

01-06-18 Start: 4:26 p.m.

End: 4:44 p.m.

Detective Jordan advised that on the day of the incident he was assigned to a multi-agency regional Task Force located in Auburn, Washington approximately 20 miles away. Detective Jordan advised that he was on his way to the Lakewood Police Department to re-fuel his cruiser when he heard the call for the derailment come out on the radio. After refueling the cruiser, he received a call from his supervisor at the Washington State Patrol that his unit was being tasked with victim interviews. Detective Jordan advised that as he traveled to the Madigan Army hospital, he was amazed to find that the roadway was "cleared up". There were no traffic obstructions impeding his way. Detective Jordan, along with Detective Tim Hanson of the Washington State Patrol and Detective KC Krusey of the Federal Way Police Department arrived at Madigan Army hospital to interview the victims. Detective Jordan believed that he arrived at about 9:00 a.m. The detectives were able to interview approximately 12 of the 19 victims at that facility. All nine of the victims, that were interviewed, were passengers from the derailed train.

Detective Jordan advised that he interviewed a family that had been traveling together on the train. The family was comprised of the father, mother, a 15-year old boy and an 18-year-old girl and an older woman; identified as the "mother in law" and an infant. The detective advised that the father and mother were off-duty police officers from Albany, Oregon. He identified them as Jacob and Jessica Burke. Jacob Burke reported that the train was going a lot faster on that trip than on the trip on the way up. Mr. Burke hadn't expressed any undue concern about the train's speed. The family had been told upon boarding that the train was running behind schedule and the crew would try to "make up the time". The family reported that they were seated in car #7 which they complained was extremely loud;

noting it was louder than the other train cars. The family believed that the elevated noise level was an indication of some type of mechanical problem with the train car but heard nothing else unusual prior to the derailment.

The 15-year old son reported that he crawled underneath the table and held on at the time of the derailment. After the collision most of the family was able to crawl out of the derailed train car which Detective Jordan believed was the car hanging off the bridge overpass. The only family members unable to self-extricate were Mr. Burke and the infant. Just prior to the derailment, Mr. Burke had gone into the bathroom located in the rear of the train car to change the child's diaper. After the derailment, he was unable to open the door and had to call out for help. Mr. Burke advised that he believed that the infant's life had been saved by the fact that they were in the bathroom at the time of the derailment. During the train ride, the infant was strapped to a car seat that was sitting on top of one of the train car tables. The seats in the train did not have seatbelts and the child's car seat could not be properly secured.

The elderly woman identified as the "mother in law" was not interviewed. She was in critical condition and was flown to the Harbor View Trauma Center.

Detective Jordan reported that in addition to the 19 patients that went to Madigan, 19 or 20 went to Good Samaritan but very few went to Takoma General which was a regional trauma hospital.

Detective Jordan advised that radio communications are excellent in Pierce County. All county law enforcement agencies can talk to one another over a county-wide frequency which is used in events such as this. In addition, the region has a Crime Response Unit (CRU) that is comprised of police officers from local agencies representing the smaller cities and police agencies such as Pierce County Sheriff's Department, Takoma Police Department, Tukwila, Federal Way, Washington State Patrol, Lakewood and Auburn. The CRU unit responds to assist with all major incidents and the various agencies work frequently and work well together.

Detective Jordan advised that Lakewood Police Department worked with JBLM frequently. The entrance to the base is in Lakewood and the 100,000 people that populate the base combine with the 60,000 people that reside in Lakewood.

Recently, within the last couple of weeks, Detective Jordan advised that his agency participated in training regarding the "high speed/fast rail" trains that would be running in through Lakewood. Detective Jordan advised that he was unable to attend due to other obligations.

Detective Jordan advised that he was unaware of the exact time that Amtrak arrived on the scene. He observed a female employee from Amtrak at Madigan hospital. She had been standing at the entrance to the facility. She was attending to interview victims but was not allowed by the hospital staff. Detective Jordan advised that the woman confronted him asking "why he could talk to the victims and she was not". Detective Jordan jokingly told the woman "because he carried a gun" and walked away from her. He did not have any other contact with representatives of Amtrak, the train crew or Sound Transit.

Detective Jordan reported that one of the difficulties that law enforcement officials encountered was the inability to accurately account for the passengers on the train based on Amtrak's own manifest.

The manifest contained errors, missing information or inconsistencies that made it useless in determining the number of potential victims and their identities. Passengers were listed by partial names, incorrect names, by first names or by surname. Some passengers were listed multiple times using multiple variations of their name. This is a known problem that exists whenever an Amtrak train is involved in an incident.

Detective Jordan advised that all the reports generated by the detectives from the victim interviews should be available through the Washington State Patrol. The generated reports will contain the header for the Puget Sound Auto Theft Taskforce.

10. Detective Les Bunton Telephone [redacted]

01-09-18 Start: 1:02 P.M.

End: 1.23 p.m.

Detective Bunton advised that he had just arrived at the office when he heard the call regarding the train derailment go out over the radio. He believed that the run was dispatched at 7:37 a.m. Detective Bunton advised that he had attended a training course regarding railroad emergencies the week before and knew that the agency where the incident occurred would require assistance. He went over the air when he responded and as he arrived on the scene. His call sign for all radio traffic was "Lakewood 52". Upon arriving on the scene, he observed several train cars on the "freeway" and several more up on the hill. He immediately went to the train car that was dangling off the bridge to assist the firefighters with evacuating the passengers. The train car was still attached to the car in front of it and hanging down. It was resting on top of another train car, below on the "freeway". Detective Bunton assisted with the removal of a female victim, who had been placed on a back board. There were several more passengers were still inside the train car and firefighters were in the process of extricating them. There were several other passengers standing around the train cars. Passengers were taken or escorted to the staging area that had been set up on the east side of the freeway in the southbound lanes.

Detective Bunton advised that he observed four vehicles, for certain, that had been struck by the derailed train. He did not see anyone trapped inside of the vehicles and believed that everyone had been extricated prior to his arrival. Detective Bunton advised that he was on the scene between an hour and an hour and a half and during that time, extrication activities were ongoing. The detective recalls the Chief of the Steilacoom Police Department announce that there were two deceased passengers on the scene, but he did not observe the victims. Detective Bunton had no contact with the train crew but did speak to an individual who identified himself as an Amtrak employee who was a passenger on the train. The individual was identified as Mr. Christopher Benninger. Mr. Benninger advised that the train had been traveling very fast when it left the track. Mr. Benninger was able to provide Detective Bunton with an electronic copy of the passenger manifest which he had on his cellphone. Detective Bunton noted that the manifest was incorrect and was not useful in trying to determine the identity and the number of passengers on the train. Detective Bunton advised that Mr. Benninger did not say where he was located at the time of the derailment. Mr. Benninger told the detective that he was uninjured.

Detective Bunton spoke to several of the passengers on the scene and at the DuPont City Hall. None of the passengers reported anything unusual prior to the derailment. One passenger advised that the brakes sounded abnormal when the train had stopped at one of the stations. Many of the passengers had noted that the train was going fast but believed that this was the normal speed for the train. Detective Bunton advised that all the victims he spoke with were passengers on the train. Most of them reported being asleep at the time of the crash. Detective Bunton reported that when he approached the train, there were no interior lights. All the passengers he interviewed complained that it was extremely dark inside of the train cars after the collision. The passengers were forced to use anything they had at hand to light their way (such as cellphones). None of the passengers reported seeing any of the train crew. Many were helped from the train car by first responders or bystanders.

The detective did not see any other representative from Amtrak, Sound Transit or the Washington State DOT on the scene. He advised that he stopped at the command post but was too busy to see if any representatives were there. He did note that a WSDOT mobile sign board truck had arrived on the scene, but traffic control was performed mostly by local law enforcement agencies and members from JBLM.

When Detective Bunton advised on the scene, it appeared to him that no one was in charge. People just "jumped into action" on their own initiative. "They knew what had to be done". Assistant Chief Unfred arrived on the scene and set up an "on-scene" command post. Communications between various law enforcement agencies in Pierce County was handle by the dispatcher who switched all the units over to a common channel. This was done very quickly, and Detective Bunton advised that it occurred while he was on his way to the scene. Pierce County does not have a common channel with Thurston County. To facilitate communications between the two counties, a message relay is usually set up. There was little coordination between the law enforcement agencies and the fire departments on the scene. Detective Bunton advised that there was a noticeable lack of coordinated effort between the two entities. The local law enforcement agencies frequently worked together. A "Cooperative City Crime Response Unit" provides resources, such as investigators, to smaller cities and agencies. Recently, many of the local agencies took part in training specifically geared towards emergency railroad response due to the "high speed rail" services that was now occurring in the various jurisdictions. The training class held approximately one-week prior was taught by an investigator from BNSF and a representative from Amtrak. This class was held in the city of DuPont. Detective Bunton advised that it was extremely useful in dealing with this derailment.