BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS AND TRAINMEN

A DIVISION OF THE RAIL CONFERENCE

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS

SAFETY TASK FORCE

INDEPENDENCE, OHIO

BEFORE THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD ("NTSB")

NTSB Accident Number: RRD25FR022

Class: Regional

March 13, 2026

Proposed findings, probable cause, and safety recommendations, in connection with the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway ("BNSF") train collision that occurred during switching operations in Denver, Colorado on August 5, 2025.

[redacted], BLET Safety Task Force, National Chairman

[redacted], BLET Safety Task Force, Party Spokesman

Final Submission

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen ("BLE-T"), a division of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT"), was granted party status by the Board in the above-referenced investigation. BLET respectfully submits these proposed findings, probable cause, and safety recommendations to the Board for consideration.

Accident Synopsis

On August 5, 2025, at approximately 12:11 a.m. Mountain Standard Time ("MST") [1], a BNSF mixed freight train (H-LINDEN1-02A) collided with standing cars in BNSF Globeville Yard [2] in Denver, CO. The collision occurred while the Conductor was mounted on the leading end of equipment (railcar) during a shoving movement.

At the time of the accident, train H-LINDEN1-02A was traveling in a northward direction, on straight track that was referred to as the "South Lead". As a result of the collision, the Conductor was thrown from the railcar and was seriously injured.

Figure 1- Post accident photo of accident site. (*Photo courtesy of BNSF*)

[1] All time throughout this report will be MST.
[2] *See* Appendix A at the end of this report for a map of the BNSF Globeville Yard.

Accident Narrative

Train Information:

Train H-LINDEN1-02A:

Train H-LINDEN1-02A originated in Lincoln, NE and was destined for Denver, CO. The train consisted of two (2) locomotives (BNSF 9014, BNSF 6757). Both locomotives were on the front of the train, with the BNSF 9014 as the controlling locomotive. The train consisted of fifty-one (51) loaded railcars and fifty-two (52) empty railcars, for a total of 103 mixed freight railcars. The train weighed 8,337 tons and was 5,823 feet long.

The H-LINDEN1-02A train crew went on duty in McCook, NE at 2:00 p.m., consisting of a Locomotive Engineer, Student Engineer and a Conductor.

Method of Operation:

At the time of the accident, train H-LINDEN1-02A was operating on the BNSF Brush Subdivision.[3] The BNSF Brush Subdivision extends from milepost ("MP") 541.7 near Denver, CO to MP 114.7 near Sterling, CO and encompasses the BNSF Globeville Yard.

All train movements within the BNSF Globeville Yard are governed by BNSF General Code of Operating Rule ("GCOR") 6.28 (Movement on Other Than Main Track), [4] which requires trains to move at a speed that allows them to stop within half the range of vision and stop short of trains, engines, railroad car, men or equipment fouling the track, stop signals, or derails or switches lined improperly. Additionally, BNSF GCOR Rule 6.28 requires trains to move at a speed that allows them to stop short of the listed obstructions consistent with good train handling.

[3] *See* Appendix B at the end of this report for relevant portions of the BNSF Brush Subdivision timetable.
[4] *See* Appendix C at the end of this report for BNSF GCOR Rule 6.28.

BNSF Rules and/or Documents for TY&E [5] Employees:

Below is the list of documents governing TY&E employees provided by BNSF for this accident investigation.

- GCOR – 9th edition- *effective October 1, 2025*
- BNSF Brush Subdivision Timetable- No. 6 – *effective October 15, 2025*
- BNSF System Special Instructions – *effective October 1, 2025*
- BNSF Air Brake and Train Handling Rules – *effective June 1, 2025*
- BNSF Safety Rules – *effective June 1, 2025*
- General Notices and Track Bulletins

No additional information was provided regarding the documentation and/or rules in effect at the time of the accident.

Train Crew Information:

Train H-LINDEN1-02A

Locomotive Engineer:

The Locomotive Engineer began his railroad career on October 3, 2011, as a Conductor. He was promoted to Locomotive Engineer on September 7, 2013. In accordance with BNSF testing procedures, he has been periodically tested on both rules and efficiency. He had no medical condition that would affect his performance, and he was deemed fit for duty.

Student Engineer:

The Student Engineer began his railroad career on June 19, 2023, as a Conductor. In accordance with BNSF testing procedures, he has been periodically tested on both rules and efficiency. He had no medical condition that would affect his performance, and he was deemed fit for duty.

[5] Train, Yard and Engine

Conductor:

The Conductor began his railroad career on May 1, 2006. In accordance with BNSF testing procedures, he had been periodically tested on both rules and efficiency. He had no medical condition that would affect his performance and was deemed fit for duty.

Movements of Train H-LINDEN1-02A:

On the day of the accident, the H-LINDEN1-02A train crew went on duty at 2:00 p.m. in McCook, NE. After gathering their necessary paperwork and boarding into a company issued taxi, they departed McCook, NE and traveled to the location of their train, which had been secured by a previous train crew in a siding located near Wiggins, CO.

After arriving at their train, the train crew released the handbrakes and notified the BNSF Train Dispatcher that they were onboard the train, and ready to depart the siding. After receiving proper authority to depart the siding, train H-LINDEN1-02A began traveling in a westward direction towards Denver, CO.

Train H-LINDEN1-02A arrived at the BNSF Globeville Yard in Denver, CO at 11:39 p.m. Upon arrival, the train crew contacted the BNSF Globeville Yardmaster and received instructions via radio to bring their train into Track No. 104. The BNSF Globeville Yardmaster further instructed train H-LINDEN1-02A to place any remaining railcars of their train that did not fit into Track No. 104, into Track No. 103. The train crew performed a job briefing about the switching moves that were to be made, and the Conductor dismounted the train.

Under the direction of the Locomotive Engineer, the Student Engineer began moving the train in a westward direction. The Conductor instructed the Student Engineer to stop the movement via his hand-held radio (in accordance with BNSF GCOR Rule 6.5 Shoving Movements) [6] after the train had passed completely over the necessary switch to enter Track No. 103. Once the train came to a complete stop, the Conductor mounted the rear railcar (CKIX 7080) and began making a

[6] *See* Appendix D at the end of this report for BNSF GCOR Rule 6.5 (Shoving Movements).

shoving movement in an eastward direction. At this time, the shove movement consisted of forty-nine (49) railcars.

In a post-accident review of the audio recordings, the Conductor can be heard giving various instructions to the Student Engineer and making active "car counts" [7] to gauge distance until a stop was necessary. Approximately three (3) minutes after beginning the shoving movement, the Conductor can be heard saying "*BNSF 9014 good for thirty (30)*". After moving approximately five (5) railcars lengths, while traveling at a speed of 8.9 MPH, an undesired emergency brake application [8] occurred. and the Conductor can be heard making a distress call, "*HELP, man down, man down*".

Figure 2 - Schematic of accident site *(Courtesy of BLET)*

After hearing the distress call from the Conductor, the BNSF Globeville Yardmaster contacted two (2) BNSF Foremen who were working in the nearby vicinity and requested that they travel to the scene of the accident and help the Conductor as needed. In post-accident interviews, the BNSF Globeville Yardmaster stated that he was calling emergency services, while the BNSF Foremen were checking on the Conductor. Once the BNSF Foremen located the Conductor, they immediately contacted the BNSF Globeville Yardmaster and notified him that the Conductor was stable, but he was pinned under the railcar. The BNSF Globeville Yardmaster was coordinating

[7] One "railcar" when spoken in directive form equals fifty (50) feet.
[8] "Undesired Emergency Brake Application" refers to the emergency application of a train's air brakes not initiated by either of the crew members actions. Emergency application of the brakes is caused by a rapid exhaust of the train's brake pipe air system. This action results in maximum braking effort on a train.

with other TY&E employees that were working in the area to assist in guiding emergency services from the main entrance of BNSF Globeville Yard to the accident area.

Post Accident Toxicology:

The toxicological specimens of the H-LINDEN1-02A train crew were sent for post-accident testing which determined that the Locomotive Engineer, Student Engineer and Conductor were negative for alcohol and drugs.

Post Accident Actions by BNSF:

After the accident, BNSF distributed a Safety Briefing [9] (dated 8/6/2025) to their entire workforce, presenting specifics of the August 5, 2025, accident and circumstances that led to the employee injury.

The Safety Briefing also gave a brief synopsis of the accident, with the intention of providing immediate awareness to the entire workforce of the accident that had occurred and to provide key information to brief and/or train employees and also included a reminder to all employees concerning the applicable rules associated with the incident.

Switching Operations Fatality Analysis ("SOFA") Working Group:

The SOFA Working Group is an established, volunteer, non-regulatory, workplace safety partnership that is sponsored by the FRA. The SOFA Working Group issues regular Safety Alerts to help achieve its goal of eliminating switching injuries and fatalities. FRA formed the group in 1998 to review switching operations accident reports and to develop recommendations for reducing fatalities and injuries.

On November 19, 2020, following an accident in Tuscola, IL, the SOFA Working Group issued a Safety Alert that focused on the fact that 1 in 4 switching fatalities occur in close/no clearance [10] situations and included a recommendation for employees to "*Plan for the worst-case scenario and.*

[9] *See* Appendix E at the end of this report for the BNSF Safety Briefing issued August 6, 2025.
[10] "Close/no clearance" refers to a permanent or temporary safety hazard involving insufficient space or no space for an employee to take evasive action to avoid being struck if passing or being passed by an object, structure, or equipment.

. . . *prepare an escape strategy."*[11] The accident in the BNSF Globeville Yard included an area that was designated as close/no clearance.

On July 9, 2024, the SOFA Working Group issued a Safety Alert [12] addressing an accident that occurred on July 6, 2024, in Melrose Park, IL during a shoving movement that resulted fatal injuries to the Conductor. The accident occurred in the UPRR Proviso Yard. The Safety Alert reminded all employees to *"remain vigilant during switching movements by not only protecting shove movements but also protecting themselves by avoiding close or no clearance hazards."* The Safety Alert further advised that *"Inexperienced employees should always be mentored when possible."* Lastly, the Safety Alert stated to "*stop the movement in instances of uncertainty and remember to always hold a job briefing whenever the job or situation changes."*

Following the accident on August 5, 2025, the SOFA Working Group issued a Safety Alert [13] the Safety Alert gave a brief synopsis of the accident and circumstances that led to the employee injury.

Probable Cause

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen conclude that the probable cause of the August 5th, 2025, train collision which resulted in the serious injury of the Conductor of train H-LINDEN1-02A was the Conductor's failure to adhere to the requirements of BNSF GCOR Rule 6.28 (Movement on Other Than Main Track), which clearly states:

6.28 Movement on Other than Main Track

Except when moving on a main track or on a track where a block system is in effet, trains or engines must move at a speed that allows them to stop within half the range of vision short of:

- Train.
- Engine.
- Railroad car.
- Men or equipment fouling the track.
- Stop signal.

or

- Derail or switch lined improperly.

[11] *See* Appendix F at the end of this report for the November 19, 2020, SOFA Safety Alert.
[12] *See* Appendix G at the end of this report for the July 9, 2024, SOFA Safety Alert.
[13] *See* Appendix H at the end this report for the August 5, 2025, SOFA Safety Alert.



Figure 3 – Example of crossover switches *(Courtesy of Google Search)*

Additionally, the BLET concludes that there was one (1) contributing factor that further contributed to the accident:

1. Following the accident, it was discovered that previously in the day, the crossover switches [14] *(see Figure 3)* between Track No.103 and Track No.102 had been operated by BNSF Carmen. These crossover switches had been left out of correspondence [15] by the BNSF Carmen. Per BNSF GCOR Rule 8.12 (Hand Operated Crossover Switches), these switches should have been left in correspondence:

> **8.12 Hand-Operated Crossover Switches ◆**
>
> Both switches must be in corresponding position before moving over or through a crossover switch and must remain in corresponding position until movement is complete.
>
> Crossover switches may be out of corresponding position when:
>
> - One crew is using both tracks connected by the crossover during continuous switching operations.
> - Providing blue signal or inaccessible track protection in Rule 6.14 (Restricted Limits), Rule 6.28 (Movement on Other than Main Track) or non-signaled Rule 6.13 (Yard Limits) territory.
> - Performing maintenance, testing or inspection in signaled territory.
>
> Crossover switches must be left lined in corresponding position. Crossover switches connected to a main track or siding must be left lined in normal position.

   During the shoving movement being performed by train H-LINDEN1-02A, the train entered the improperly lined crossover switch on Track No.103 and struck the side of standing cars in Track No.102.

[14] The term "crossover switches" refers to switches that enable a trains or railcars to move from one track to another and are often used on parallel tracks.
[15] The "correspondence" of crossover switches refers to both crossover switches being lined for movement through a crossover, or both switches being lined for straight track.

Proposed Recommendations

To BNSF:

1. Make changes to BNSF GCOR Rule 8.12 (Hand Operated Crossover Switches) that ensures that there is transparency across all BNSF work groups that crossover switches are to be left in corresponding movement. All employees should also be aware of where crossover switches are in all BNSF locations.

2. Identify and implement changes to improve the identification of close/no clearance tracks. The switch target indicators in the BNSF Globeville Yard do not distinguish which tracks are considered close/no clearance tracks. When the accident occurred, the Conductor was riding the railcar in Track No.103, which is listed as a "close track center" track in the BNSF Powder River Division Timetable (*see Figure 4*).

Close Track Centers

Location	Track Name	Track Nos.
Sterling	Yard	105 - 106
Brush	Yard	101 - 104
Denver	Yard	101 - 110, 124 - 130, 145 - 146

Figure 4 – Listing of BNSF Globeville Yard close track centers from timetable. *(Courtesy of BNSF)*

A simple asterisk (*) or similar marking (*see Figure 4*) on the switch target could have potentially helped remind the Conductor that riding the railcar may not have been the best option for that location. Ensure any and all tracks have identifiable switch indicators.

Figure 5 – Example of marking on switch target *(Courtesy of BLET)*

3. Use the circumstances of this accident as a training tool for all employees.

To the FRA:

1. Develop and implement a program to identify and implement changes to how crossover switches are to be left and operated in all areas where regular switching operations occur.

2. Develop and implement regulations requiring the use of a marker (*see Figure 4*) on switch targets where close/no clearance conditions exist throughout all rail carriers.

3. Mandate that railroads implement a training program that includes extensive training on dismounting moving equipment in emergency situations.

4. Mandate a process that would require rail supervisors to review trainees for proper knowledge of close/no clearances, shove movement requirements, bulletin and timetable instructions and for proper demonstration of the application of such rules.

To the NTSB:

1. Due to the number of significant accidents on multiple Class I rail carriers in the US, open additional special investigations into the organization and safety culture of all Class I rail carriers. These special investigations could be done on an individual basis with each rail carrier (including involvement of management, employees, and rail union labor leaders) with a goal of ensuring that they all have active and productive safety plans and policies, as well as a safety culture that fosters good working relationships, with participation and input from employees and rail union labor leaders at all levels, without fear of retribution or retaliation.

2. Open additional special investigations into the training facilities, curriculum, and activities of all Class I rail carriers. These special investigations could be done on an individual basis with each rail carrier (including involvement of management, employees, newly hired individuals, and rail union labor leaders) with a goal of ensuring that they all have active and productive instructional plans and practices, as well as a culture that fosters good work habits, with participation from employees and rail union labor leaders at all levels, without fear of retribution or retaliation. Safety is not a secret and the importance of working safely begins on day one.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on March 13, 2026, I have electronically served upon Mr. Scott Lavallee [redacted], Investigator in Charge, National Transportation Safety Board, a complete and accurate copy of these proposed findings regarding the August 5, 2025, BNSF train collision that resulted in a serious injury to the Conductor that occurred in the BNSF Globeville Yard in Denver, CO (NTSB Docket No. RRD25FR022). An electronic copy of same was also forwarded to the individuals listed below in this certificate of service, as required by 49 CFR § 845.27 (Proposed Findings)

Mr. Scott Lavallee
Investigator-in-Charge, RRD25FR022
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L 'Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, DC 20594
[redacted]

JD Archie, FRA
Railroad Safety Inspector (Operations)
[redacted]

Michael S. Cook, BNSF
AVP System Safety
[redacted]

Kamron Saunders, SMART-TD
SMART-TD National Safety Team
[redacted]

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

[redacted]
BLET National Vice President
Safety Task Force National Chairmen
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen
[redacted]

Appendix A


DENVER, CO
Brush Subdivision
19th St, CO
Union, CO
15
541.2
541
LS 135
SOUTH PLATTE RIVER
A LEAD
B LEAD
C LEAD
SALT MINE
DRK SPUR WP
0901-0146
0901-0145
0901-0144
0901-0143
0901-0142
0901-0141
0901-0140
0901-0139
0901-0138
0901-0137
0901-0136
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0901-0134
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0901-0132
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0901-0107
0901-0106
0901-0105
0901-0104
0901-0103
0901-0102
0901-0101
0901-0102A
0901-0126A
0901-0119A
0901-2010
0901-2009
0901-2008
0901-2021
0901-2022
0901-2040
0901-01298
0002-0541A
0002-0541
0002-0541B
0002-0198
0135-1
0901-0101
0135-2
0002-0
0135-3
6567-0001
6567-RED1
6567-RED2
6567-0001A
6567-9999P
9610-1060
9610-0135A
9610-0157
9610-0135B
9610-0135C
9610-0135D
9610-0135E
9610-0135F
9610-0135G
9610-0135H
9610-0135J
9610-0135K
9610-0135L
9610-0135M
9610-0135N
9610-0135P
9610-0135Q
9610-0135R
9610-0135S
9610-0135T
9610-0135U
9610-0135V
9610-0135W
9610-0135X
9610-0135Y
9610-0135Z
9610-1060
9610-1060
9610-1060

Appendix B

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WESTWARD	Length of Siding (Feet)	Station Nos.	Mile Post	Siding Switch	Brush Subdivision MAIN LINE STATIONS	Rule 4.3	Type of Oper.	Line Seg.	Miles to Next Stn.	EASTWARD
	Adjoining RR: (UP) Julesburg Subdivision Boundary: Brush, MP 56.7 / (UP) Julesburg, MP 56.7									
	8,690	84081	116.0	114.7 116.4	STERLING Adj. Subdivisions, MP 56.1: Angora, MP 115.0	BJ Y	RL ABS	8014	17.0	
	6,742	84100	133.0	132.2 133.6	MESSEX		CTC		8.0	
	7,262	84109	141.0	140.5 142.0	NEW HILLROSE			21	7.1	
			148.1		BRUSH JCT Adj. Sub: Akron, MP 453.2	JT			1.9	
	N 7,590 S 7,110	20891	N 150.0 S	149.9 456.5 455.0 456.5	BRUSH CENTER Adj. Sub: Akron, MP 453.2 MP Range Change, MP 150.0=455.0	BJT			1.5	
			456.5		WEST BRUSH				1.6	
		20894	458.1		PAWNEE JCT				5.9	
	6,372	20900	464.0	463.5 464.8	FT. MORGAN				5.0	
	17,089	20904	469.0	467.3 470.7	BIJOU				6.0	
	9,886	20911	475.0	474.0 476.0	CORONA				4.0	
	6,953	20915	479.0	477.8 479.3	WIGGINS				10.0	
	10,033	20924	489.0	488.0 490.1	CREST				8.0	
	14,870	20932	497.0	495.1 498.1	ROGGEN				4.9	
			501.9		CP 5019				0.2	
		20937	502.1		TAMPA				0.2	
			502.3		CP 5023				2.7	
	7,106	20941	505.0	503.7 505.3	KEENESBURG			2	5.9	
	15,151		510.9	510.7	EAST HUDSON				0.5	
			511.4		HUDSON CENTER				0.6	
		20949	512.0		HUDSON				1.7	
			513.7	513.8	WEST HUDSON				4.3	
	9,810	20954	518.0	516.8 518.9	TONVILLE				7.0	
	7,602	20960	525.0	524.5 526.1	BARR				8.0	
	14,635	20968	533.0	531.0 534.0	IRONDALE				2.6	
			535.6		JANSSEN				1.7	
			537.3		UP CROSSING	M			1.9	
			539.2		FOX				0.5	
			539.7		CP 5396				1.5	
		20977	541.2		31ST STREET YARD	BT			0.3	
	GCOR/MWOR 6.28 governs between MP 541.2 and MP 541.5									
			541.5		23RD STREET Adj. Sub: Front Range, MP 541.5	MJ	CTC 2 MT	135	0.2	
			541.7		20TH STREET				179.7	
	Adjoining Sub: Pikes Peak Subdivision Boundary: Brush, MP 541.7 / Pikes Peak, MP 0.0 Information for 20th Street is located in the Pikes Peak Sub Timetable									

Radio Call-In		
Radio Channel TX 091/RX 039 in service at Sterling Yard for switching - 63(X)		
Rennick Yardmaster - 256		
Radio Channel 040 in service at Sterling Yard for Switching		
Radio Channel 013 in service Sterling to Brush Center		
Merino – 20(X)	Brush – 25(X)	
Radio Channel 066 in service Brush Center to 20th Street		
Brush – 26(X)	Wiggins – 27(X)	Keenesburg – 28(X)
Barr – 29(X)	Denver – 31(X) Rennick Yardmaster - 256	South Denver 32(X)
Radio Channel 096 in service at Denver for Amtrak		
Amtrak – 32(X)		
Radio Channel 039 in service at Denver Yard - 31(X)		
Denver Yd - 31(X)	Rennick Yardmaster = 256	
Emergency - 911 *(Locations identified in italics do not have 911 functionality)*		
Dispatcher X=0, RFE Desk X=1, Mechanical Desk X=2, Customer Support X=3, Detector Desk X=5, PTC Desk X=9		

Radio Channel TX 046/RX 079 in service Switch Yard (31st and 38th Streets) unless instructed by yardmaster.

Radio Channel TX 017/RX 076 in service Switch Yard Rennick, all industry jobs in the Denver Terminal Complex, and when industry jobs leave the Main Track to perform industrial switching.

Radio Channel 078 in service as yard information channel including all BNSF crew haulers and contract drivers.

Radio Channel 031 in service Mechanical and MW Employees in Denver Yard, including the Locomotive Facility.

Radio Channel 039 in service for industry jobs/inbound/outbound crews when train is on other than main track, Coal 1, Coal 2 and when working with utility men, for yardmasters 31st Street and Rennick, and by inside/outside hostlers when communicating with yardmasters.

Radio Channel 066 in service Prospect Jct, main track, Coal 1 and Coal 2.

Dispatcher Information
MP 56.7 to Brush Jct—817-867-7079, Fax 817-352-7060
Brush Jct to 20th Street—817-867-7087, Fax 817-352-7028

1. Speed Regulations

See Item 1 of the System Special Instructions for additional speed restrictions.

1(A). Speed—Maximum

Main Track	Psgr	Frt	
		Under 100 TOB	100 TOB & Over
MP 56.7 to MP 57.0	50	50	45
MP 114.7 to MP 138.7	50	50	40
MP 138.7 to MP 150.0	60	60	45
MP 453.2 to MP 541.2	79	60	45
MP 541.5 to MP 541.7	20	20	20
[illegible]			
MP 454.9 to MP 456.4, Number one track	20	20	20
MP 539.1 (Fox) to MP 541.1, Coal 1	40	40	40
MP 539.1 (Fox) to MP 541.1, Coal 2	40	40	40

Temperature Restrictions
Contact the train dispatcher if in doubt of the temperature.
Notify the train dispatcher when the train is restricted.

MP 116.4 to MP 138.7	90 deg F & over	50	50	30

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1(B). Speed—Permanent Restrictions

	Psgr	Frt
MP 56.7 to MP 57.0	20	20
MP 149.8 to MP 150.0	20	20
MP 148.9 East Brush to MP 148.1 Brush Jct	35	35
MP 506.0 to MP 506.8	65	—
MP 537.2 to MP 537.4	30	30
MP 537.4 to MP 541.2	40	40

Key Trains Maximum speed within the following municipal area limits unless otherwise restricted.	Frt
MP 514.0 to MP 541.2	35
MP 541.5 to MP 541.7	35

1(C). Speed—Sidings and Main Track Switches and Turnouts

Trains and engines must not exceed 10 MPH through turnouts unless otherwise indicated. Trains and engines using sidings must not exceed the siding turnout speed unless otherwise indicated.

	Psgr	Frt	
		Under 100 TOB	100 TOB & Over
MP 141.0, New Hillrose, siding turnouts	40	40	25
MP 148.1, Brush Jct, turnout	35	35	35
MP 453.2, E Brush, turnout	35	35	35
MP 454.9, Brush Center, turnout on Sterling main and crossover	20	20	20
MP 150.0, Brush Center, siding turnouts	40	40	25
MP 456.5, West Brush, turnouts	20	20	20
MP 464.0, Ft Morgan, siding turnouts	20	20	20
MP 469.0, Bijou, siding turnouts	40	40	40
MP 475.0, Corona, siding turnouts	40	40	40
MP 479.0, Wiggins, siding turnouts	40	40	25
MP 489.0, Crest, siding turnouts	40	40	40
MP 497.0, Roggen, siding turnouts	40	40	40
MP 501.9, CP 5019, turnout	25	25	25
MP 502.3, CP 5023, turnout	25	25	25
MP 505.0, Keenesburg, siding turnouts	40	40	25
MP 512.0, Hudson, siding turnouts	40	40	40
MP 518.0, Tonville, siding turnouts	35	35	35
MP 525.0, Barr, siding turnouts	40	40	25
MP 533.0, Irondale, siding turnouts	40	40	25
MP 539.2, Fox, turnouts to Main	40	40	40
MP 539.2, Fox, Coal 1 and Coal 2 turnouts	40	40	40
MP 539.6, CP 5396, turnout MT to North Lead	20	20	20
MP 541.2, 31st Street	12	12	12
MP 541.4 to MP 541.7, MT1 and MT2	20	20	20

1(D). Speed—Other

Trains and engines must not exceed 10 MPH through turnouts unless otherwise indicated. Trains and engines must not exceed 10 MPH on other than main track (GCOR 6.28), unless otherwise indicated.

	Psgr	Frt	
		Under 100 TOB	100 TOB & Over
Sterling, Coal 1 and Coal 2 Tracks	20	20	20
When leaving Pawnee Power Plant MP 458.8 County road Q, EWD, (HER)	5	5	5
Tampa: All tracks within crude oil loading facility	5	5	5
31st Street Yard to Denver Union Terminal via Passenger lead	10	10	10
Through Denver Union Terminal limits	10	10	10
Trains operating on Coal lead between 31st Street (MP 541.2) and 23rd Street (MP 541.5) governed by GCOR/MWOR Rule 6.28.	20	20	20

2. Bridge and Equipment Weight Restrictions

Maximum Gross Weight of Car

Sterling to 20th street ..... 143 tons, Restriction C
Market Street line ..... 143 tons, Restriction E
Jersey Cutoff ..... 143 tons, Restriction E

Location	Track Name	Track No.
Six-axle locomotives and six-axle derricks in excess of 330,000 lbs. are not permitted on:		
Moseley	Stock track	410
Fort Morgan	Factory lead	555

3. Type of Operation

Main Track

MP 56.7 to MP 57.0	RL, ABS
MP 114.7 to MP 116.4	RL, ABS
MP 116.4 to MP 150.0	CTC
MP 453.2 to MP 541.2	CTC
MP 541.5 to MP 541.7	CTC, 2 MT

Other Tracks Where CTC is in Effect (GCOR/MWOR 10.0)

Number one track between Brush Center and West Brush
Coal 1 and Coal 2 between Fox and 31st street

Interlockings

The operating rules, timetables and special instructions of the railroad dispatching the track govern unless otherwise instructed (GCOR/MWOR 1.14).

Milepost	Type	Notes
537.3	Manual	Controlling RR: UP MW must obtain permission to occupy interlocking from UP dispatcher. UP Dispatcher (800-726-1178)
541.5	Manual	Controlling RR: BNSF

4. Subdivision Specific Rules Information

Safety Overlay Systems in Effect

- Positive Train Control (PTC)
- Hi-Rail Limits Compliance System (HLCS)
  - **Sterling Main Track:** Use HLCS thumbwheel setting “M1” when authorized on:
    - Main track - MP 56.7 to 57.0 and MP 114.7 to MP 140.5 added text.
    - Sterling main - MP 140.5 to 150.0.

c

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Energy Management Systems in Effet
- Talos
- Trip Optimizer (TO)
  - TO/PTC Interface Mode (TO/PTC-IM)

GCOR 5.8.2, Sounding Whistle—When operating between Sterling and Union, all whistle posts marked with an X require the whistle signal be sounded regardless of the type of crossing the train is approaching.

GCOR 5.8.4, Whistle Quiet Zone—Whistle signal 5.8.2(7) is not required at the following crossing locations. All other whistle requirements remain in effet .

Location	Milepost	Crossing Name
Brush, CO	454.83	Clayton St
Fort Morgan, CO	462.74	Barlow road
	463.73	Sherman street
	464.24	Main street
	464.49	Deuel street
	464.70	West street/CR 18
	464.98	Nelson Rd/CR 17.7
Commerce City, CO	529.96	104th avenue
	531.30**	96th avenue
	532.65	88th avenue
	534.03	80th avenue
	535.34	72nd avenue

** Wayside Horn System (WHS) - WHS includes a wayside horn, activated by the approaching train, which sounds a warning in conjunction with the automatic crossing devices. When the crossing signals are activated, the WHSwill automaticallsound a horn at the crossing.

To confir WHS is functioning, an indicator flases at the crossing. After indicator is observed to be flahing, whistle signal Rule 5.8.2(7) is no longer required.

The train horn must be sounded if the wayside horn indicator is not visible approaching the crossing or if the wayside horn indicator, or an equivalent system, indicates that the system is not operating as intended.

GCOR 6.17, Switches at Junctions—The normal position of the switch at Chestnut Street MP 115.04 is lined as last used. Trains and engines must approach this switch expecting to fin it lined against their movement.

GCOR/MWOR6.19, Flag Protection—When flagging is required the distance is 2.0 miles.

6.32.2 Crossing Warning Devices (Highway/Pathway-Rail Grade Crossings)—Crossing gate at Chestnut St on the Brush Sub is a delayed exit gate. Itsis functioning as intended and complies with FRA rules when, lights start flahing like a normal gate, and the East gate arms lowers at an 18 second(s) delay; for adjacent track clearance to allow trucks to traverse the whole crossing. If the gate is not working as described please report the issue to the dispatcher.

GCOR/MWOR 8.3, Main Track Switches—
- MP 114.7, East Sterling - The normal position for the switch between main track and Sterling siding is lined for movement to and from the siding.

USHMI II.4. Document Indicating Position in Train— The following locations are equipped with an AEI Reader. Trains carrying hazardous material shipments must refresh their train list in the Mobile Train Reporting(MTR) system once they have passed the firt avaiable AEI Reader when departing the initial terminal, and after experiencing a change to the train's consist.

Mile Post	Name	Notes
148.0	Brush North	
460.2	Brush West	
538.1	Denver BN East	
541.3	Denver Transfer	

5. Trackside Warning Devices (TWD)

MP	Device	Recall Code	Notes
Type B. Locations			
124.2		248	Exception reporting
144.4		268	Channel 013
471.8		278	
494.1		288	
510.5		108	
521.9		298	
535.0	HBD	308	
Type C. Locations			
494.1	WILD	948	

6. FRA Excepted Track
Stock Yard trackage on the Denver Rock Island Railway Inc.

7. Special Conditions

PAP (Pawnee Junction Power Plant)—Crews operating to or from this facility must have a copy of the current general notice outlining instructions for spotting, servicing and reporting work.

UP Crossing—Market spur begins at UP crossing

Market Street Line
- MP 2.09 46th avenue North - This grade crossing is equipped with a highway traffic signal system The railroad engineer signal will display a flahing red over flasing red aspect for rail movement. A red over red engineer signal or dark engineer signal requires the movement to be protected by a member of the crew per GCOR 6.32.2 and must be reported to the yardmaster. Radio DTMF may also be used to activate the crossing warning system by keying 2*09 on channel 39.
- MP 2.10 46th avenue South - This grade crossing is equipped with a highway traffic signal system The railroad engineer signal will display a flahing red over flasing red aspect for rail movement. A red over red engineer signal or dark engineer signal requires the movement to be protected by a member of the crew per GCOR 6.32.2 and must be reported to the yardmaster. Radio DTMF may also be used to activate the crossing warning system by keying 2*10 on channel 39.

Jersey Line—Switch #1009 at 38th must be lined for North lead and properly secured with lock after movement.

31st Street, 23rd Street, Denver Union Depot—All movements between 31st street and 23rd street, and between 31st street and Denver Union depot (Passenger lead) are under the direction of the yardmaster at 31st street.

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Denver Union Station (DUS) and Regional Transportation District Command (RTDC) Instructions—31st street - 23rd street, Denver Union station:

Between 20th St and UP Crossing, RTDC Commuter Rail operates adjacent to BNSF main track and Coal 2 (MP 541.2 to MP 538.36) utilizing a high-voltage overhead catenary system. Report todBrush dispatcher any emergency or conditions that may affet ei ther BNSF or R TDC operations (e.g., damaged overhead structure or fallen catenary power lines). If necessary contact RTDC dispatcher and request to de-energize the catenary system.

Crews operating on RTDC trackage must have in their possession a current copy of the RTDC operating instructions for Denvec Union station and reference applicable track bulletins that affet thei r mo veme nt .

All movements between 31st street and 23rd street, and between 31st street and Denver Union station (Passenger lead) are under the direction of the 31st street yardmaster on the assigned BNSF radio channel. Movements to and from Denver Union station must contact RTDC operations control center-East DS for permission. Reference applicable general notices for additional operating instructions.

BNSF 31st Street yardmaster: 303-480-7436

RTDC operations control center - East DS: 720-460-5907

RTDC emergency number: 720-460-5959

31st Yard—The power switches on the Coal lead to South lead crossover located at 31st street yard, MP 541.4 are operated by push buttons located on the switch panel, or by VHF radio. When unable to operate with power these switches can be hand operated.

Instructions to operate power switch using push button on switch panel:
1. Press button labeled Normal to line switch to the normal position. A green LED will illuminate when the switch is in normal position.
2. Press button labeled Reverse to line switch to the reverse position. A yellow LED will illuminate when the switch is in the reverse position.

NOTEsA flahi ng red LED wi ll illumi nat e wh en the swi tch is not properly lined (out of correspondence). Switch may need to be hand operated.

Instructions to operate power switch by VHF radio:
1. Set radio to channel 039 or 066.
2. On radio keypad, press #70 to line switch to normal position. Green LED will illuminate when switch is in normal position. An audio message of “switch normal, switch normal” will sound over the radio.
3. On radio keypad, press #71 to line switch to reverse position. Yellow LED will illuminate when switch is in reverse position. An audio message of “switch reverse, switch reverse” will sound over the radio.

NOTE: If the switch does not line, an audio message of “switch not lined, switch not lined” will sound over the radio.

Instructions to hand operate power switch:
1. Remove the pump handle from the handle holders.
2. Open the hand throw cover and insert the pump handle in the pump socket.
3. Select the direction of travel by moving the directional valve lever in the direction the points are to move. If direction of travel is incorrect, reverse the position of the valve lever.
4. Operate the hand throw by moving the pump handle back and forth. It may be necessary to hand throw the points all the way and perform a visual inspection of a good point closure after completing the hand throw.
5. After lining the switch, close cover and reinstall the pump handle in the holders.

Note: Before making movement over the switch ensure opposite power switch of crossover is lined for the intended route. If switch is not lined for intended route, repeat steps 1 thru 5.

Instructions if switch does not properly line due to an obstruction:
1. Visually inspect points for switch obstruction. If switch obstruction exists, open MW cpver on the switch panel and set MW switch to the off osi tion to isol at e powe r from switch.
2. Remove obstruction from points.
3. Restore MW switch to the on position.

NOTE: Report failures to the Yardmaster.

Denver Car Shop—Locomotive bell must be rung continuously while operating on tracks 120 and 124 adjacent to the car shop area. Kicking cars into the rip track is not allowed. While spotting cars into tracks 122 and 123, cars are to be shoved to a coupling or spot.

Denver—All inbound trains that are required to be doubled over must use the corridor, rather than the wye bridge route. The same requirement applies when setting out any bad order cars from outbound trains.

When working in the UPRR North yard or 36th St yard, all switches are to be treated as rigid switches. Any variable switches must be lined by hand for the intended route.

Dimensional shipments—No train containing dimensional shipments may meet or pass another train between MP 116.4 and MP 138.7.

Milepost Range Changes
MP 57.0 = MP 114.7
MP 150.0 = MP 455.0

TOC Home

Remote Control Zones

Denver

- **RCZ 8** - is established on the North lead and begins 250 feet West of the Eastbound control signal to the clearance point of the Jersey switch on the North lead. Approximate length of zone is 1130 feet.
- **RCZ 9** - is established and begins West from the limits of RCZ 8 to 38th Street on the North lead, with access to tracks 124 through 148 (CM38), approximate length of zone is 1230 feet.
- **RCZ 10** - is established and begins from the clearance point of the Jersey switch on the Jersey lead to National Western road. Approximate length of the zone is 1000 feet.

Sterling

- **RCZ 1**—extends south on Cheyenne main from South end of 101 track switch to the end of track South of Front street. Approximate length of RCZ 1 is 2,123 feet.
  - **RCZ 1**—activated by the remote control operator who will display the "Remote Control Zone Activated" signs located at South end 101 track switch and South of inside Diversion switch. When "Activated" portion of sign is displayed no movements other than RCO switch job are allowed within limits of RCZ 1. The RCZ will remain activated until the remote control operator has dropped the "Remote Control Zone Activated" signs to deactivate the RCZ. RCZ 1 is deactivated by the Sterling switch crew who will deactivate RCZ 1 when not in use and when going off duty.

No Clearance Locations

Location	Track Name	Track No.	Obstruction
Brush	House track	150	Building
Moseley	Simplot	450	Building
	Colorado Tubular	460	Dock
	Maverick Sand	470	Structures, building
Ft. Morgan	Cargill Meat	515	Gate, structures
		520	Gate, structures
	Erker Grain	550	Building
		560	Building
	Midwest Palms	551	Building
		552	Building
	Western Sugar	555	Building
Wiggins	South Platte Grain	910	Building
	M&M Co-op	970	Building
Roggen	Roggen Farmers	1110	Elevator
Kennesburg	Grey Oil	1310	Loading dock
	Gray Oil	1398	Hoses and steep drop off
	G&G Transport	9950	Building
Irondale	Home Depot	602	Going into the building; do not ride the cut when spotting
	Cast Transport	604	North side at loading dock
	Delta Petroleum	605	Loading racks
		606	Loading racks
	Purina/Land O Lakes	613	Loading chute
	Dolly lead	616	Building south side of track
	Headwater Resources	618	Unloading chute (ISG)
	GCC	623	Unloading chute
Commerce City	Suncor Energy	502	Loading racks
		503	Loading racks
		504	Loading racks
	Conagra	531	Under sheds at track
		532	Under sheds at track
	Ryerson	541	Going into the building; do not ride the cut when spotting
	Rocky Mountain Transload	561	Do not ride beyond gate (Wasco)
		562	Do not ride beyond gate (Wasco)
	Koch Asphalt	706	Loading racks
	Suncor Asphalt	710	Loading racks
	McCoy Dock	714	Cement and wooden loading docks
	Valentine Lumber	721	Building side of rail
	Paxton Lumber	724	Building side of rail
	Waste Management	726	Building side of rail
	Manna Pro	7348	Between buildings
Denver	Colorado Petroleum	160	Unloading spots
	United West Supply	821	Going into building; do not ride the cut when spotting
	Adams Reload	832	Building side of rail
	Fowler	834	Dock and fence
	Stone Container	836	Building side of rail
	Americold	839	Building side of rail
	ITW Plastics	847	Building
	American Warehouse	848	Building side of rail
		850	Building side of rail
	Western Beverage	846	Building side of rail
	General Chemical	852	Acid dumper

Close Track Centers

Location	Track Name	Track Nos.
Sterling	Yard	105 - 106
Brush	Yard	101 - 104
Denver	Yard	101 - 110, 124 - 130, 145 - 146

SSI—Switch Control/Monitoring Systems

- Turnouts Equipped with Two Switch Machines - Movable Point Frogs/Swing Nose Frogs (MPF), Derail (D)

Location	Mile Post	Device	Notes
Pawnee Jct	458.1	D	
CP 5019	501.9	D	Switch point derail

Test Miles

MP 144.0 to MP 145.0
MP 467.0 to MP 468.0
MP 532.0 to MP 533.0

Flash Flood Critical Areas

MP 132.6 to MP 140.5

Appendix C

6.28 Movement on Other than Main Track ◆

Except when moving on a main track or on a track where a block system is in effet, trains or engines must move at a speed that allows them to stop within half the range of vision short of:

- Train.
- Engine.
- Railroad car.
- Men or equipment fouling the track.
- Stop signal.

  or

- Derail or switch lined improperly.

Appendix D

6.5 Shoving Movements ◆

Providing Protection Prior to Initiating Shoving Movement

Radio Communication & Hand Signals:

Equipment must not be shoved until it is visually determined by a qualifie emp l oyee that:

- To the extent of the observer's range of vision and the portion of the track that is to be used for the intended movement is clear.
- The track will remain clear to the location where movement will be stopped.
- Switches and derails are properly lined for the intended movement.

Equipment must not be sh oved until the engineer and the employee protecting the movement have completed a job briefin.

Additional Information:

- The employee(s) providing protection must visually observe the leading end of the equipment during the shove movement.
- Employee(s) involved in the shove movement must remain focused and not engaged in unrelated tasks.
- Cutting off ar s in no t ion is not consi dered a shove mo veme nt if the d stance to oper at e the uncoupl ing lever does not exceed fiv car lengt hs. It mu st firs be veri fied hat t hei ntended r oute is clear , and switches and derails are properly lined.
- When operating a vehicle, the employee observing the leading end of movement must stop the vehicle to provide instructions or additional information.
- Shoving movements over road crossings must be made in accordance with Rule 6.32.1 (Providing Warning Over Road Crossings).

Radio Communication:

Before beginning a shove movement using radio communication, the employee providing protection must include the necessary information (Who, How, Direction, Distance). In addition, the employee controlling the engine must verbally acknowledge by repeating the following:

- **WHO** - will protect the shove.
- **HOW** - the shove will be protected.
- **DIRECTION** - described in relation to the front of the controlling locomotive (F stencil). Use the following terms:
  - "Ahead" to move forward.
  - "Backup" to move backward.
  - "Stop" to stop the movement.
- **DISTANCE** - to be shoved and must:
  - Not exceed the observer's range of vision.
  - Use 50 feet as a standard for one car length.
  - When moving, employee controlling the engine must verbally acknowledge radio instructions by repeating the distance communicated when more than four cars.

Movement must stop within the half the distance specifie unl ess addi tional instruct ions ar e rece ived.

Camera Use:

An employee directing movement may utilize camera(s) to provide visual protection per local instruction.

Not Observing Leading End of Movement:

The employee directing movement is not required to observe the leading end of the movement when:

- Local instruction specifies tracks that will be protected with Shove Lights.

or

- Making back up movements in accordance with Rule 6.6 (Back Up Movements).

Speeds When Shoving:

When cars are shoved on a main track or controlled siding in the direction authorized, movement must not exceed:

- 20 MPH for freight trains.
- 30 MPH for passenger trains.
- Maximum timetable speed for snow service unless the employee in charge authorizes a higher speed.

Appendix E

Safety Briefing Transportation

Employee Seriously Injured on the Powder River Division

SB-2025-09T
Aug. 6, 2025

On August 5, a BNSF employee was seriously injured while yarding a train in Denver Yard in Denver, Colorado, on the Powder River Division.

Please take time to engage with your teams in a Job Safety Briefing (JSB) about this incident and discuss preventive measures to minimize this risk.

While the investigation is still ongoing, this is the preliminary information we know:

At approximately 0015MT on August 5, 2025, an inbound train crew pulled into Denver Yard Track 104 where they secured the rear portion of their train and cut away the head portion to set over to Track 103. There was a standing cut of cars in Track 102 and the crossover switch between Track 103 and Track 102 was lined into Track 102. The conductor was riding the lead car of the shove into Track 103 prior to it colliding with the standing cut of cars in track 102 causing a derailment.

As we continue to investigate the circumstances that led to this incident, we want to take the opportunity to review several critical factors to help ensure all movements are completed safely.

Risk Mitigation

We work in a safe but unforgiving environment with the potential for incidents that could have life-altering or fatal results. **Always remember that no task is more important than your safety and the safety of your co-workers.**

Ask yourself the following questions prior to initiating a shoving movement.

- Did I complete a thorough Job Safety Briefing (JSB) before beginning this task?
- Have I visually verified all switches are lined for my intended route?

Ask yourself the following questions before moving over or through hand-operated crossover switches.

- Are the switches in the corresponding position?
- What position must crossover switches be left in after use?

Please review the following rules:

GCOR 6.5 Shoving Movements SIF

GCOR 6.28 Movement on Other than Main Track SIF

GCOR 8.12 Hand-Operated Crossover Switches SIF

Please note that rules and policies that are in effect at the date of issuance of this publication are subject to change. Contact Safety/Rules to determine validity before you use the information in this document at a later date.

BNSF RAILWAY | We Choose Safety.

Appendix F

Share Knowledge ~ Save a Life

ZERO FATALITIES

SOFA ALERT

PLEASE POST IMMEDIATELY

August 13, 2020: Crossett, AR – An employee protecting a shove movement into a customer warehouse was fatally injured after encountering a close clearance situation and contacting a loading dock.

October 11, 2020: Richmond, VA – An employee protecting a shove movement into a track was fatally injured after encountering a close clearance situation and contacting a box car on an adjacent track.

November 11, 2020: Tuscola, IL – An employee protecting a shove movement into a customer siding was fatally injured after encountering a close clearance situation with a fence and was struck by the equipment.

Take Away

While these recent cases have not yet been analyzed, the SOFA Working Group is concerned by the 159 injuries that occurred this year through August 31, 2020 and reminds all employees to remain vigilant during switching operations by not only protecting the shove movement, but also protecting themselves by avoiding close or no clearances hazards. Last, but not least, remember to always hold a job briefing whenever the job or situation changes.

As a cross-industry collaboration for over 20 years, the SOFA Working Group has identified the Possible Contributing Factors for more than 210 switching operations fatalities since 1992. The SOFA Working Group reports its finding and emerging data trends with the goal of zero fatalities in the railroad industry.

SOFA Working Group

Share Knowledge ~ Save a Life ~ Zero Fatalities

As a cross-industry collaboration for over 25 years, the SOFA Working Group has identified the Possible Contributing Factors for each of the more than 210 switching operations fatalities since 1992. The SOFA Working Group reports its findings and emerging data trends with the goal of zero fatalities in the railroad industry.

Care During Shove Moves

"When in Doubt, Dismount!!"

From 2011-2021, 27 of the 34 analyzed SOFA Fatalities involved a shove move

- ✓ *Maintain ongoing crew communication by repeatedly giving only the distance known to be clear*
- ✓ *Continually ensure entire route to be ridden is clear of unexpected close or no clearance*
- ✓ *Ensure a position of safety while riding and/or mounting/dismounting equipment*
- ✓ *Update initial job briefing with entire crew when any circumstance changes*

What **Happened**?

A crew consisting of a conductor, engineer, and trainee were performing work at an unattended yard with known clearance issues. While shoving a cut of cars the conductor was fatally injured by a tree branch fouling the track after a storm.

What **Happened**?

While riding the leading end of a shoving movement into a loading dock a conductor attempted to dismount moving equipment on to a defective stairway, causing him to foul the track and be fatally injured between the leading car and the platform.

For Every Shove...

Prior to beginning a shove move, every crew should job brief and answer the following questions:

- *What type of car is to be ridden?*
- *Which side is to be ridden?*
- *Is there sufficient clearance to ride?*
- *Where will dismount occur?*
- *Is it safer to walk any part of the move?*



Most Common Findings in Switching Operations Fatalities

Inexperienced Employee	Close / No Clearance	Inadequate Job Briefing	Industry Hazard	Struck by Mainline Train	Slips, Trips, & Falls
19%	18%	15%	15%	11%	11%

Appendix G

Appendix G

Share Knowledge ~ Save a Life

ZERO FATALITIES

SOFA ALERT

PLEASE POST IMMEDIATELY

July 7, 2024, Melrose Park, IL – While shoving into a track a Conductor was riding the leading end of a tank car and was fatally injured after colliding with a train on the lead track.

Take-Away

While this recent case has not yet been analyzed, the SOFA Working Group reminds all employees to remain vigilant during switching operations by not only protecting shove movements, but also protecting themselves by avoiding close or no clearances hazards. Inexperienced employees should always be mentored when possible. Last, but not least, stop the movement in instances of uncertainty and remember to always hold a job briefing whenever the job or situation changes.

As a cross-industry collaboration for over 20 years, the SOFA Working Group has identified the Possible Contributing Factors for more than 210 switching operations fatalities since 1992. The SOFA Working Group reports its finding and emerging data trends with the goal of zero fatalities in the railroad industry.

Appendix H

Share Knowledge ~ Save a Life

ZERO FATALITIES

SOFA ALERT

PLEASE POST IMMEDIATELY

Serious Injury: On August 5, 2025, at 12:10 a.m. in Denver, CO, A conductor with 19 years of experience suffered a lower leg amputation, while shoving 49 cars into a yard track . Based on FRA's preliminary investigation. The conductor, riding the lead car, instructed the move to shove 30 cars and the movement encountered a crossover switch out of correspondence. The train then traversed through the switch and into a standing train on the adjacent track.

As a cross-industry collaboration for over 20 years, the SOFA Working Group has identified the Possible Contributing Factors for more than 210 switching operations fatalities since 1992. The SOFA Working Group reports its finding and emerging data trends with the goal of zero fatalities in the railroad industry.