



**Survival Factors- Crashworthiness Investigation Attachment**

**Interview with Incident Commander**

**Ridley Park, PA**

**RRD25MR006**

**(26 pages)**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

\* \* \* \* \*

Investigation of: \*

FIRE ABOARD SEPTA TRAIN NEAR THE \*

CRUM LYNNE STATION IN RIDLEY PARK, \*

PENNSYLVANIA ON FEBRUARY 6, 2025 \*

Accident No.: RRD25FR006

\* \* \* \* \*

Interview of: MICHAEL ECKENRODE, Fire Chief  
Fire Company No. 1  
Ridley Park Fire Department

Ridley Park Fire Station  
102 East Ward Street  
Ridley Park, Pennsylvania

Friday,  
April 18, 2025

APPEARANCES:

SHERYL HARLEY, Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board

I N D E X

ITEM

PAGE

Interview of Michael Eckenrode:

By Ms. Harley

4

I N T E R V I E W

(3:57 p.m.)

1  
2  
3 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Good afternoon. My name is Sheryl  
4 Harley. I'm an investigator with the National Transportation  
5 Safety Board. Today's date is April the 18th of 2025. It is now  
6 3:57 p.m. I am located at the Ridley Park Fire Department located  
7 at -- the address?

8 MR. ECKENRODE: 102 East Ward Street, Ridley Park, PA 19078.

9 MS. HARLEY: 19078. And this interview is being conducted in  
10 regards to the SEPTA train fire that occurred on February the 6th  
11 of 2025 at approximately 5:56 p.m., just south of the Crum Lynne  
12 SEPTA station.

13 And sir, I'm going to ask you to identify yourself for the  
14 recording, please.

15 MR. ECKENRODE: Sure. My name is Michael, middle initial J,  
16 last name Eckenrode, E-c-k-e-n-r-o-d-e, and I'm the fire chief of  
17 Ridley Park Fire Company No. 1.

## INTERVIEW OF MICHAEL ECKENRODE

18  
19 BY MS. HARLEY:

20 Q. So as we discussed earlier, what I would like you to do, sir,  
21 is to just kind of walk me through what happened from the time  
22 that you were notified of the incident.

23 A. Sure. So I believe we received the dispatch shortly after  
24 6 p.m. that evening. I was home. I have a fire department  
25 vehicle. I immediately responded. Police officers were on

1 location very quickly. Their police station's not far from the  
2 location of the fire. As I was responding, I was notified -- the  
3 location came out as at the Crum Lynne train station railroad  
4 bridge. So I was given that information. When the police  
5 officers arrived, then determined it was a working fire, I had  
6 additional companies dispatched.

7 So the initial dispatch for a vehicle fire, regardless of the  
8 vehicle, would get the Ridley Park Fire Company and the Prospect  
9 Park Fire Company. That's our standard operating dispatch.  
10 Because of the potential the train cars could have been on the  
11 bridge itself and they were doing evacuations, I requested our  
12 next-due company, which is Tinicum Township Fire Company, for  
13 their ladder truck. We got that moving.

14 It didn't take me but 3 or 4 minutes to go on location. I  
15 arrived on location, I pulled into the parking lot of the  
16 landscaping supply company that is located adjacent to the tracks.  
17 It appeared to be a five or six car train to me at the time. I  
18 wasn't sure how many cars. The lead car was heavily involved in  
19 fire on the undercarriage. When I pulled up, I gave my initial  
20 report, asked the dispatch to have power secured. I engaged with  
21 the train engineer, asked him to drop the pantograph. He said he  
22 was already working on that.

23 At that point in time I knew the car wasn't safe just from  
24 previous experience. Our first-in company was -- our sister  
25 company had the first truck on location, Prospect Park. They

1 prepared to go in service, but we held off with water, etc., until  
2 we could get assurances that everything was secure. The Tinicum  
3 Township Fire Company also responded with an engine. It was their  
4 crew night, I believe, or a meeting night, so they had additional  
5 staff. That engine was the one that went into the business at the  
6 rear of the train and began to cut the fence because they saw  
7 people there, and the evacuation continued.

8 We were evacuating through the landscape supply yard. The  
9 fence was down and we had companies working on that. We requested  
10 additional companies, Woodland Fire Company. We requested two  
11 rapid intervention teams because we knew we still had people on  
12 the train and we were trying to get them out and would be  
13 committing people inside those cars. And then basically set up a  
14 command post and started to work.

15 A gentleman approached me. He identified himself as a SEPTA  
16 employee -- he's apparently a member of a neighboring fire  
17 company -- and offered his knowledge and experience, which was  
18 huge for me. He was in contact with, I guess, SEPTA dispatch and  
19 others. The train was located on car 4. The initial evacuation  
20 was bringing -- or train -- or line 4, track 4. The evacuation  
21 was taking -- the initial evacuation was taking passengers onto  
22 track 3 side. We recognized that as a hazard. Not that long  
23 after that, a train did come through, I believe, and, you know, I  
24 had indicated to him that I wanted all traffic shut down until we  
25 could get assurances that everybody was off the train. You know,

1 folks weren't -- you know, I was afraid that folks weren't  
2 thinking about where they were, situational awareness, and we can  
3 have a, you know, a fast train come through there, which they do  
4 at pretty high speeds, and we could have, you know, multiple  
5 fatalities.

6 I don't know how long it took to get that done, but it seemed  
7 like an inordinate amount of time for me to have that happen. You  
8 know, I know, having been involved with Amtrak and others, that it  
9 takes a while. It's got to go get approval in Washington or  
10 somewhere and then get all that. That process I think needs to be  
11 able to be quickened. If you have a line supervisor on, I believe  
12 that line supervisor should have the authority to say shut it down  
13 until we figure out what's going on.

14 It took a long time, in my estimation, to get the power  
15 secured. Initially only the first or second pantographs were  
16 dropped. I had the crew drop all the pantographs so we knew that  
17 there was no direct contact with the lines, but I was advised that  
18 nothing would be secured until they were -- those catenary lines  
19 were grounded. That crew came out of Wilmington, Delaware. So  
20 that's a little bit of a ride and it took us, you know, a while.  
21 It probably took them at least a half hour to get there and then  
22 another 15 or 20 minutes to get secured. So no firefighting  
23 efforts took place easily for the first 45 minutes because we had  
24 no guarantee that the power was secured.

25 Once we had our additional crews come in, we did commit fire

1 crews starting at the rear of the train working their way forward  
2 with a rapid intervention crew making sure that all cars were  
3 evacuated, all passengers were off and accounted for. You know,  
4 because it's not like an airplane, we didn't have a manifest of  
5 passengers. We don't know how many people were on it. The SEPTA  
6 staff told us it was 325 to 350. Based on the crowd we saw, I  
7 believe it, but we don't really know how many people were on that  
8 train.

9       You know, the crew did a great job, in my estimation, of  
10 getting the folks off the train. You know, they recognized that  
11 there was a hazard on the, I guess, the track 4 side of train, you  
12 know, trying to get off when that fence was in place. You know,  
13 they started the evacuation and getting people off on the track 3  
14 side. You know, while there was a hazard there from other trains,  
15 there was less of a hazard than what the fire was bringing, in my  
16 belief. But again, I think someone should be able to call and say  
17 we're evacuating people on the track 3 side, we need all traffic  
18 stopped in this area, and have that happen without it having to go  
19 through the red tape it seems like it took to get that done.

20       You know, we had, you know, extended operations on scene, you  
21 know, once we got the clear that everything was done. And we had  
22 Amtrak field supervisors there. We had SEPTA field supervisors  
23 were there, you know, and they were interacting with us at the  
24 command center. That was all great communication. But once we  
25 were given the signal that everything was good, we did put crews

1 in that first car, you know, to do the fire extinguishing and then  
2 the overhaul.

3 We had a second incident with the same train car a few hours  
4 later when they were bringing it back to, I guess, their  
5 Philadelphia yard. There was a second fire on that car. The  
6 crew, when they recognized that it was on fire, pulled it as far  
7 as the Prospect Park train station for ease of access. And then  
8 the roles were reversed in this case, the Prospect Park Fire  
9 Company was the lead and we were the assisting company. It was a  
10 small fire, extinguished very quickly, and there was no other  
11 incident there.

12 We later found out that asbestos was in that car, so we had  
13 asbestos exposure to all firefighters, all police officers on  
14 scene. That's one of the things that would have been nice to know  
15 beforehand, you know, some of the hazards that are inside that  
16 car. There was -- the gentleman who was first on scene, he was  
17 going to work with one of the other local fire departments and  
18 their friends, and they were going to work on getting us a  
19 refresher training for everybody that was involved. I've been in  
20 the fire department 46 years. It's been a long time since we've  
21 seen that training.

22 You know, I don't have contact information of who to contact,  
23 when to contact, etc., so that information would be nice to have  
24 and updated on a regular basis. You know, we had folks from SEPTA  
25 come out at the Prospect Park Fire Company a few years ago to talk

1 about the electric buses. That was helpful, but having that  
2 information on the railcars would be helpful as well. It would be  
3 helpful to have that from Amtrak because they come through a lot  
4 as well. So knowing the hazards, etc. would be helpful.

5 I think that's pretty much it.

6 Q. Okay. I'm just going to go back. I just have a couple  
7 questions for you.

8 A. Certainly.

9 Q. Okay. Let's see. So when you arrived on the scene, were the  
10 police officers already there?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. And the passengers, where were they being evacuated  
13 from? Could you tell were they from multiple cars or just from  
14 one location?

15 A. So when I first pulled up, I did not know. There was -- have  
16 you been to the scene?

17 Q. Yes, sir.

18 A. So you -- when you come under the bridge, there's a long  
19 building that sits there prior to the landscaping business.

20 Q. Correct. Yes.

21 A. Cars 2 through whatever were pretty much behind that building  
22 and I had no visual with that. I pulled into the landscaping  
23 business. I went all the way up. So the first car was completely  
24 visible to us and maybe part of the second car. There were folks  
25 standing there and I directed the first-in company to take the

1 rest of the fence down, let's get the people out. So they were  
2 coming out, I guess, of the second and third cars and coming up  
3 the tracks towards us. I couldn't tell where everybody else was  
4 until the engine from Tinicum Township Fire Company got there and  
5 said, Chief, we have people at the fence back here; we're cutting  
6 the fence. Go for it. That was perfect.

7 So I didn't have a clue of how many people, where they all  
8 were, where they were all going. I was concerned about that track  
9 3 because, you know, when things are on fire, people are going to  
10 get out as soon as they can. I didn't want to have an issue  
11 there. So, like I said, my first order of business I contacted  
12 the engineer, told him I wanted the pantographs down. He said he  
13 was working on it. And then it was fire aboard, have them shut  
14 the rails down.

15 Q. Okay. When you got close to the cars could you see which  
16 doors on the train cars were open or did your guys have to do any  
17 kind of extrication to get the doors open?

18 A. Well, you know what? I don't, I don't recall. Yeah, I don't  
19 remember. I know at one point in time our guys did put a ladder  
20 up to the side because I didn't want anybody physically inside.  
21 They did put a ladder up to the side, remove one of the windows,  
22 and they were doing an exterior fire attack. I don't, I don't  
23 recall.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I'm assuming, again, that somewhere between cars 2 and 3,

1 those doors were open and people were coming out because that's  
2 the direction people were kind of coming from. And I later heard  
3 that the rear car had track 3 side door open and they were taking  
4 people out there, and then they opened the track 4 side.

5 Q. Have you ever received any kind -- I'm going to say you and I  
6 mean your company -- received any kind of training or any  
7 instruction about those Silverliner IV cars specifically?

8 A. Again, I've been here 46 years. It's been a long time since  
9 we've had any kind of training with any of that. The latest  
10 training we attended was tank car operations, and that's got to be  
11 a good 15 years ago, if not more. And that was at Tinicum  
12 Township, they had someone come in for that. But it's been a long  
13 time.

14 Q. Okay. All right.

15 A. Nothing in recent memory.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And when I say recent memory, I'm talking probably 20 years.

18 Q. All right. So I guess this may be kind of a little bit of a  
19 redundant question. Were you aware that the only way to access  
20 those train cars in an emergency, those doors, is by a key; there  
21 is no external emergency access?

22 A. I was not aware of that.

23 Q. Okay. All righty. You said that there were -- that you sent  
24 teams into the train to verify that the passengers were out of  
25 each of the cars.

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. Do you have some sense of how long it took them to actually  
3 check?

4 A. It took us -- we were concerned about putting people in the  
5 cars until we knew the power was -- at least the pantographs were  
6 down. Once I was told that the pantographs were down, the crews  
7 entered from the rear, which is really where most of the people, I  
8 think, came off the train. Once they entered the care, I don't  
9 think it took them 5 minutes to go through that and verify  
10 everybody was out. We had them work from the rear because the  
11 front of the car was still actively involved in fire. We didn't  
12 want to subject anybody to that. I figured we'd start from the  
13 rear, work our way to the front.

14 Q. Okay. So you said you spoke to the engineer. Did you or  
15 your crew also speak to the conductors on the train?

16 A. I did not speak to the conductor. When I pulled up, like I  
17 said, he was -- the engineer was right there. The conductor, I  
18 don't believe I ever saw the conductor until the meeting the other  
19 day.

20 Q. Okay. Do you have some sense of when the fire was actually  
21 out?

22 A. It should be in the times because we did give a fire under  
23 control. It seemed to take a while only because, like I said, we  
24 made a conscious decision to let it burn until we could get  
25 assurances that the scene was safe.

1 Q. So when -- looking at it in terms of once the scene was safe,  
2 once you were -- once you had confirmation that there was no more  
3 power to the train and at the time that you initiated suppression  
4 activity, how long do you think it took to get the fire under  
5 control?

6 A. Less than 30 minutes. Yeah, when the pantographs were down,  
7 they were doing some exterior firefighting to the fire on the  
8 undercarriage. As soon as we were given the clear that it was  
9 safe to enter the train, the crews did that and made pretty quick  
10 work of it. It probably took longer to do the overhaul than the  
11 actual fire suppression.

12 Q. Understood. So you said the emergency -- the local emergency  
13 responders were notified about the asbestos. Who notified you?

14 A. It was -- and I don't have the person's name. It was  
15 somebody from SEPTA safety.

16 Q. And when did you get that notification? That night or the  
17 next day?

18 A. It was the next day. We were given verbal notification  
19 followed by a letter. And then when I physically talked to the  
20 person -- and I have her information if you need it. When I  
21 physically talked to her, I was the one that advised her that  
22 there was a second incident. And then we had a second  
23 notification done because different firefighters were involved.

24 Q. So SEPTA seemed to be unaware that there was a second, that  
25 there was a second incident and there was a second group of

1 firefighters?

2 A. The safety person that I dealt with was unaware.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Until I -- I was the one that gave her that information. The  
5 folks that were from SEPTA that were at the original call were the  
6 same ones that were at the second call.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. And again, it was not a large-scale incident like the first  
9 one. It was 10 minutes to verify that the fire was out.

10 Q. Okay. So let's talk about the first fire. When you arrived,  
11 where was the bulk of the fire in the first car?

12 A. The undercarriage towards the front. I guess the first set  
13 of trucks, in that area.

14 Q. The second time you responded, where was the fire located  
15 there?

16 A. Actually, by the time our apparatus got there, the bulk of  
17 whatever was burning was knocked down by that crew, but it's my  
18 understanding that it was that same truck with a little bit on the  
19 interior.

20 Q. Have you ever, and I'm talking about your company or your  
21 community, to your knowledge ever received a copy of SEPTA's  
22 emergency response plan?

23 A. I can't speak to that. There were three fire chiefs, four  
24 fire chiefs before me.

25 Q. Okay. Have you ever been provided by SEPTA with an updated

1 list of contact information in the event of an emergency?

2 A. Not me personally, no. Yeah, most of the those kind of  
3 things we rely on the fire dispatch center.

4 Q. Okay. So you were talking about the time it took for the  
5 confirmation that the power was off. So by that -- by this time  
6 there are SEPTA representatives on the scene.

7 A. And Amtrak.

8 Q. And Amtrak.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. However they could not provide you with that information  
11 immediately?

12 A. Well, they had to wait for the crew that was coming and I --  
13 the crew had a name, you know, they had a term that they were  
14 using. But they had a crew that was coming that had to do the  
15 securing of the lines, the ground lines front and back of the  
16 train --

17 Q. Got it.

18 A. -- to isolate. It's not that they didn't know. They were  
19 waiting as well.

20 Q. They were waiting. Okay. You said that a train had come  
21 through while you were there. Was it heading southbound, the same  
22 direction?

23 A. I'm almost positive it was on track 3 going southbound.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Yeah, again, a lot of things were happening very quickly.

1 And they did, you know, they did confirm that everything was shut  
2 down at one point in time. We had everything shut down. And then  
3 once things got situated, we were sure everybody was off the  
4 train, they -- someone did come back and ask if they could open  
5 tracks at 1 and 2 at low speed through the area, and that was  
6 granted.

7 Q. Okay. All right. They did ask?

8 A. They asked permission. Absolutely.

9 Q. Did your crew actually -- your department take part in the  
10 evacuation of the passengers from the other trains that were  
11 stopped in the area?

12 A. No. No. In fact, I didn't know that there was a second or  
13 third train until later. The police department, the police chief  
14 was there. They were helping coordinate some of that, but I was  
15 not aware.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. You know, and that's since it wasn't on fire and it wasn't  
18 really an issue for me at that point. I did learn that there was  
19 a train stopped basically at the station, and then the train  
20 behind it they were able to back out I was told.

21 Q. And I'm sorry, the -- what's the name of the police chief?

22 A. William Thomas is his name.

23 Q. And he's the police chief for the Ridley Park police?

24 A. Ridley Park Police Department. He was not on duty. He did  
25 respond though.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And his officers, you know, were working with people.

3 Q. Were there police officers on the track as well?

4 A. Yes. Yes. In fact, I'm pretty sure that's what clued me in  
5 when the train went by, because I heard one of the yelling on the  
6 radio. But, yeah, there was two Ridley Park police officers on  
7 and there was multiple police agencies responded to assist. I  
8 couldn't tell you how many police officers, but there was a bunch.

9 Q. And you were talking about Amtrak. Do you have some sense of  
10 when the last time you had any kind of training opportunities or  
11 any contact with Amtrak?

12 A. Me personally in this department, I can't tell you if that's  
13 ever happened. It's been a long time. If it has, it's been 20-  
14 plus years. Yeah.

15 Q. You said something about previous experience. Was that an  
16 incident involving a train?

17 A. So we've had a couple little blips along the way. You know,  
18 we had a little fire on one of the trains here and there, you  
19 know. Again, having been, you know, along this corridor for 46  
20 years, we've seen little things. In a previous life, I worked  
21 with a man who was yardmaster for SEPTA at the 30th Street Station  
22 and we got a lot of lessons from him. You know, we -- I worked as  
23 a paramedic. He was also a paramedic. And we had multiple, you  
24 know, incidents involving trains and what to do, what not to do to  
25 be safe around them if you're responding. So --

1 Q. Do you provide that training or that knowledge to the rest of  
2 your company?

3 A. Yes. Yeah, we've talked multiple times about just different  
4 incidents and, you know, we're not going near the wires; don't,  
5 you know, don't make those mistakes, that kind of thing. And, you  
6 know, the engineer is the guy and the conductor is the guy or gal  
7 that you need to deal with for those situations. They're subject  
8 matter experts right there that are the ones you should be dealing  
9 with.

10 Q. How often have you ever attended or been invited to either a  
11 debrief or a critique session with SEPTA?

12 A. This was the first time. We've never had an incident  
13 (knocks) of large scale, but -- yeah, I was actually surprised to  
14 get the invite to be on the call the other day and welcomed that  
15 opportunity. I learned things that I did not know. I didn't know  
16 they had cameras on those cars or any of that stuff, so --

17 Q. Okay. Let's see. So you said the crew removed some of the  
18 windows. Do you remember which car that was?

19 A. The first car.

20 Q. The first car?

21 A. Yep. First car, track 4 side, at least one of those windows  
22 was removed. There's actually -- if you go online and Google it,  
23 there's pictures that actually show somebody on a ladder with the  
24 train.

25 Q. Okay. So how -- after you arrived, how long did it take the

1 crew to drop all the pantographs?

2 A. I think there was some confusion there because I had asked to  
3 drop the pantographs. It was my understanding that the first one  
4 was the only one dropped initially. And then when the one  
5 gentleman from SEPTA that was there, like I said, again, very  
6 quickly, you know, I asked him to make sure that that had  
7 happened. My initial position, I was very close to the fire. I  
8 removed myself out to the main road so I could set the command  
9 post and get back out of the middle of the fray. So I didn't have  
10 direct visualization for a lot of that. But it did not happen  
11 right away. I think it took a little bit to do that, but I can't  
12 give you a timeframe because I didn't witness it physically.

13 Q. Got it. So once you were able to get onto the train and  
14 start the suppression operations, did you encounter any kind of  
15 difficulties?

16 A. I was not made aware of any difficulties. You know, that  
17 seemed to go pretty quickly and, like I said, it seemed like there  
18 was more overhaul than anything else.

19 Q. Was most of your overhaul dealing with the interior of the  
20 car?

21 A. Yes. I don't think they did any overhaul on the exterior of  
22 the car. I think it was all interior.

23 Q. And after the fire was out, did your crew conduct just a  
24 basic search of the car just to make sure that there was no one  
25 left inside?

1 A. So they did that while the car was still on fire, they had  
2 gone through. And then when they went in, they did search that  
3 car as well.

4 Q. Oh.

5 A. We were told somewhere along the line that everyone in that  
6 front car was evacuated to the rear because of an odor or smoke,  
7 some kind of smell of burning. So they had already moved the  
8 passengers back out of that first car and, you know, I had eyes on  
9 the engineer so I knew he wasn't in there. But standard procedure  
10 is they would also look.

11 Q. Okay. Is there anything about this incident you think -- any  
12 question I should have asked and I failed to ask you?

13 A. No. I think we've covered pretty much everything.

14 Q. So what I always tell people at this particular point, if  
15 anything comes to mind, please feel free to --

16 A. Certainly.

17 Q. -- to give me a call and provide me with whatever I have  
18 failed to ask.

19 A. No, no, I appreciate that. Thank you.

20 Q. Okay. All right. I'm just going to go through one more  
21 quick time to make sure.

22 A. And same, if you come up with any questions that you don't  
23 feel I answered well enough for you or if you need more  
24 information, by all means --

25 Q. Question: Were you on a fire ground channel?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. And is that a common channel that allows you and the  
3 police or is that just simply just for the fire department?

4 A. So there are specific police channels and fire channels here.  
5 They do have interoperability on some of the channels. Our radio  
6 system in this county is older. It's due, hopefully, by the end  
7 of this year to be a new system. But for me, my radio has the  
8 police channels programmed into it. I can't transmit on them, but  
9 I can listen. So I'm constantly listening as I was going to the  
10 scene. I knew what the police were reporting to their dispatcher  
11 before it got relayed to me. So -- that's pretty typical of what  
12 we do. And most of the police can do the same thing, they listen.  
13 You know, we're fortunate in this area. Several of the local  
14 police officers are also fire department members in the area, so  
15 it helps, you know, and we have a great working rapport with  
16 everybody.

17 Q. Do you guys do interagency drills together?

18 A. Yep. Yeah.

19 Q. When was the last time you've done something like that?

20 A. Let's see. We've done -- over the last year, we've done  
21 three or four with Prospect Park Fire Company just on, you know,  
22 regular things; Tinicum Township, probably once within the last  
23 year; Eddystone Fire Company, the same kind of thing. They're  
24 all, you know, local companies that we deal with. And quite  
25 frankly, we're with each other all the time now. You know, it's

1 been rather busy for all of us.

2 Q. And I guess everyone actually is trained and uses the ICS  
3 system. Do you train with the police departments at all?

4 A. We don't actually. You know, that's probably something that  
5 we could do. And again, we have a good working relationship with  
6 the police chief and the officers. And several of the officers in  
7 Ridley Park, in particular, two of them are or were fire chiefs in  
8 other departments and one of them is currently an assistant chief  
9 with another department, so experienced fire officers, you know.  
10 So there's a lot of good working knowledge on both sides of the  
11 fence.

12 Q. Great.

13 A. And I have several police officers or retired police officers  
14 working for me, so --

15 Q. Can you, just so as I -- so when I finish -- I've read it  
16 once. I just want to make sure. Ridley Park, the equipment that  
17 you guys provided to the incident, can you tell me what that --  
18 what they were?

19 A. So my command vehicle was there. I had one engine there and  
20 my ladder truck was there.

21 Q. Engine and ladder. Okay.

22 A. I don't know if our rescue truck made it that night. I'd  
23 have to go back and look at the report.

24 Q. So was -- and I can't remember. I need to look this up. But  
25 my understanding was that there was an ambulance there that had

1 actually looked over a young lady who was -- who thought that --  
2 was having an asthma attack. Where is that ambulance out of? Are  
3 the -- is the ambulance service contracted?

4 A. We don't have an ambulance service here. So, for our town,  
5 Tinicum Township Fire Company provides primary ambulance service  
6 here. I can't tell you if their ambulance was even there that  
7 night. I'd have to go back and look. The advanced life support  
8 services were provided by Crozer Health paramedics. As soon as  
9 their -- I guess he's their shift supervisor. As soon as the  
10 shift supervisor arrived, I handed all EMS over to them. And we  
11 put them on a separate channel so they could do their thing, call  
12 the ambulances that they needed. And, you know, as we were going  
13 through it, we were staging -- we were trying to stage a lot of  
14 ambulances because of the amount of people we had. And then we  
15 quickly realized that there were no injuries really reported. And  
16 then I was told at one point that they did evaluate a young lady,  
17 history of asthma or something like that, and she had refused  
18 transport to the hospital by ambulance and was going to go by  
19 private vehicle. And that's the only person that I was given any  
20 indication was an issue.

21 MS. HARLEY: Okay. Well, I think that is all I have. Thank  
22 you very much.

23 MR. ECKENRODE: Thank you.

24 MS. HARLEY: And we will end the interview at 4:37 p.m.

25 (Whereupon, at 4:37 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the  
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: FIRE ABOARD SEPTA TRAIN NEAR THE  
CRUM LYNNE STATION IN RIDLEY PARK,  
PENNSYLVANIA ON FEBRUARY 6, 2025  
Interview of Michael Eckenrode

ACCIDENT NO.: RRD25FR006

PLACE: Ridley Park, Pennsylvania

DATE: April 18, 2025

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed  
to the best of my skill and ability.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Kay  
Transcriber