UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
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FATAL NATURAL GAS EXPLOSION	*	
IN SOUTH JORDAN, UTAH	*	Accident No.: PLD25FR001
ON NOVEMBER 6, 2024	*	
	*	

Interview of: [redacted], Operations Supervisor
Enbridge Gas Utah

South Jordan, Utah

Sunday,
November 10, 2024

APPEARANCES:

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National Transportation Safety Board

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I N D E X

ITEM	PAGE
Interview of [redacted]:	
By Mr. Lavallee	5
By Mr. Hess	10
By Mr. Lynum	11
By Mr. Dawson	14
By Mr. Lavallee	15
By Mr. Hess	21
By Mr. Lynum	22
By Mr. Lavallee	25
By Mr. Hess	27
By Mr. Lavallee	28

I N T E R V I E W

MR. LAVALLEE: My name is Scott Lavallee, and I am the NTSB emergency response group chair for this incident. We're conducting an interview today, November the 10th, 2024, with [redacted] who works for Enbridge Gas Utah.

This interview's in conjunction with NTSB's investigation of the accident in South Jordan, Utah. The NTSB accident reference number is PLD25FR001. The purpose of this investigation is to increase safety, not to assign fault, blame or liability.

Before we begin our interviews and questions, let's go around the room and introduce ourselves. Please state your name, your title and spell your last name. I'll start off and pass it to my right.

Again, my name is Scott Lavallee. I'm the NTSB emergency response group chair. My last name is spelled L-a-v-a-l-l-e-e.

MR. HESS: Reid Hess, Dominion Energy Utah, region manager. Last name is spelled, H-e-s-s.

MR. LYNUM: I'm Sean Lynum. That's S-e-a-n, L-y-n-u-m, chief of the pipeline and hazmat division at NTSB.

MR. [redacted]: [redacted], operations supervisor for Enbridge Gas. Last name's spelled [redacted].

MS. [redacted]: I'm [redacted]. Last name's spelled [redacted], and I am the director of operations for Enbridge Gas Utah.

MR. DAWSON: Chris Dawson, fire chief, South Jordan Fire

Department. Last name is D-a-w-s-o-n.

MR. JORGENSEN: Jake Jorgensen with PHMSA, accident investigator, and J-o-r-g-e-n-s-e-n.

MR. LAVALLEE: And just point of clarification. My colleague to my right, Reid, had mistakenly said Dominion Energy. Reid, would you like the opportunity to clarify that for the record before we continue?

MR. HESS: Yes, I would. It is Enbridge Gas Utah, thank you.

MR. LAVALLEE: Okay, thank you. Easy mistake to make. All right. [redacted], thank you. Do we have your permission to record our discussion here today?

MR. [redacted]: Yes.

MR. LAVALLEE: Thank you. Do you understand that these transcripts will be part of the public docket and, as such, we can't guarantee any confidentiality?

MR. [redacted]: Yes.

MR. LAVALLEE: Okay. I'll start off and just some general background questions for us to get to know you there, [redacted].

INTERVIEW OF [redacted]

BY MR. LAVALLE:

Q. Give me a brief summary of your career in this industry from when you started up until the present, please?

A. Yeah, so I started with Questar Gas in 2007 in the operation groups as a utility worker. Worked my way up through the operations group through their titles of representatives in the

field. Became an operations lead roughly 7 years after I started. Was an operations lead for about 5 years and then became an operations supervisor in 2018 and have been in that position since.

Q. Okay. Thank you for that. Just kind of piggybacking on that and I've asked this of everyone we've interviewed today, any training certificates or any licenses that you hold regarding the position that you hold now?

A. I still do hold a welding certificate, and I do hold a CDL license.

Q. Thank you. And then the last one I'm going to have for this go around, just give me a brief synopsis of the start of your day on the day of the incident?

A. Yeah. We, or I start at 6:00 as an operations supervisor in the Eagle Mountain office.

A typical day is kind of get our group lined out with what the work is that day. Had a few meetings. We assign a supervisor to be first call for a week; I was the first call supervisor on that Wednesday.

But, yeah, I really had some meetings, interacted with some of the guys in the morning. I'm trying to think anything else up and to when I got called with the incident. That was pretty much how my day went.

Q. Okay. Well, let's go with that then. Roughly, what time did you get a call regarding this incident?

A. So, our dispatch notified me, and I don't know exact times, but can give you pretty rough guesses, around 3:15 p.m.

Q. Okay, 3:15 p.m., and that was Enbridge's dispatch, right?

A. Yeah. The notification was we had a fire/explosion, and they had sent a technician to head that way. I said I would get ahold of him and see if he needed any assistance.

Q. This is, again, Scott from the NTSB just for the record. So, dispatch notified you of a fire/explosion at the address in question and that the technician had already been dispatched to it. Who was that technician that had been dispatched, did they give you that info?

A. Yeah. So, it was [redacted].

Q. [redacted], okay.

A. And I roughly guess he got the call around 3:00, but I don't know for sure.

Q. Okay, and thank you for clarifying that. How far away, well, let's just say this, how long did it take you to get on scene roughly?

A. So, I mean, really what I did is I reached out to [redacted], and I would say this was probably at 3:20-ish, shortly after dispatch notified me, asked [redacted] if he would let me know what he had when he arrived on site so I could do what needed to be done and make notifications if needed.

At that point, I chose to head that direction. So, yeah, I would say between 3:15 and 3:30, I started heading that way.

I didn't, I think [redacted] did tell me he was roughly 10 to 15 minutes out when I called him. And, yeah, I just said, will you please let me know what you have when you get out there.

Started enroute to the location, reached out to [redacted], I would guess around, like, 3:45 to verify if he had been on site. He did say he had got on site. The fire chief had asked him kind of to stay back while they dealt with the situation. And then I continued enroute.

I'm trying to just think about the times. I think I arrived, well, let's go back just a little bit. [redacted] called me probably between 4:05 and 4:10 and said the fire chief had requested that we shut down the gas line going to that house. At that time, I reached out to our construction crew that was on call and asked them if they would start responding to that location.

I was probably 5 or 10 minutes out at that point. I think I arrived roughly around 4:15 on, well, and I take that back. I did call [redacted] and asked if he had been notified about the fire/explosion. He said he had not, and he indicated that he would start heading that way as well.

Arrived on scene roughly 4:15, got in contact with [redacted] and another technician that actually shown up to help [redacted]. We went over to [redacted]'s truck, kind of looked at his map to verify where our gas lines were running and what served that house, wrote down a few measurements. And then we got in contact with the battalion chief that was overseeing the situation, asked if it was safe to

enter the yard to start trying to shut down that service line.

That was roughly 4:30-ish that we talked to the battalion chief. He did say it was safe. We told him roughly where we would be and then that's when we entered into the yard.

Q. Based on your conversations with [redacted], and I think you said you also had another technician that had shown up there by that point and with -- I think you had mentioned that, maybe you didn't, but with the fire department personnel on scene, them asking you and [redacted] to kind of hang back momentarily, well, them asking you to hang back for now, would that be out of the ordinary for that sort of situation?

A. I would say no, and they didn't ask. Once -- so that was while I was enroute that [redacted] had informed me 'cause I kind of reached out 'cause he told me he'd be there maybe 10 to 15 minutes. I was concerned so I reached out, and he had said that he was on site but the battalion chief had said to kind of step back.

I would say that's not out of the ordinary because they have a job to do as well, and they want to protect anyone around that situation.

Q. Copy that. I appreciate that answer. The calls made shortly after you get there, the battalion chief says, now we want the gas turned off and that's when you begin that work?

A. Yes.

MR. LAVALLEE: Fair to say, okay. All right, that's what

I've got for my initial round. I'll pass it on to Reid here.

MR. HESS: First of all, [redacted], thanks for being here. Hess from Enbridge Gas Utah.

BY MR. HESS:

Q. Can you describe the process that was used to test that service line at [redacted] South?

A. Yes. So, we dug up the service tap which ties onto our main and goes up to the house, shut the tap down. We did ask the fire department, because of the debris around our riser and meter area, I did ask the fire department if they would shut the valve off for us, which they were more than willing to do. They shut the valve off.

About this time is when the crew showed up and we had hand dug, exposed that. We ran the T down to, which shuts the gas from the main to the service. We cut the service apart and then at that point what we'll do is we'll put a test head on the end of the service, pump it full of air and then we test it for, depending on the length which that one was under 100 feet, which we test it for 15 minutes.

Q. Do you recall the pressure you tested it at?

A. Yes. I was asked to test it at our operating pressure, and it was 45 pounds.

Q. Thank you. When you severed the service from the main, did you smell any natural gas?

A. When we did sever the service, we did smell natural gas.

Q. Had you smelled natural gas prior to that at all on the scene?

A. No, we hadn't.

MR. HESS: That's all I got for now, [redacted], thank you.

MR. [redacted]: Okay.

MR. LYNUM: Sean Lynum, NTSB.

BY MR. LYNUM:

Q. So, let's stay on the testing here. You tested the service, about how long afterwards did you guys get around to being able to test the main right in front of the house?

A. Kind of in conjunction with testing the service, I asked [redacted] if he would start monitoring for gas migration, which he did and started finding some gas along the main and the service.

If I recall correctly, we tried to find the extent of where the gas had migrated along our main and services to the house of the incident.

Going south, we didn't have any gas in the next yard. Going north, we did have some gas in front of that house, it kind of verified the migration and at that point, understood there was some gas on the service to the north of the incident.

At that point, we chose to dig up the service to the adjacent house to the north, dug that up. On that one, we attempted to test multiple times but found we did have a faulty gauge. So, we did disconnect the service so no gas was going to the house and at that point, kind of left it that way because we didn't have a

gauge that was working properly to test that service.

I think from there, that's when we went over and chose to test the main in front of the home that had the incident, [redacted]. Severed the main from the far north side and then we went to the south lot or the next house over south lot, severed the main there and then did, put pressure tests on that main, and it did pass the test.

Q. After you tested, well, you tested one service, the other service, you had a faulty gauge so you couldn't test it, but you disconnected, and did you test the service on the other house that was, was that to the south of the --

A. So, no, we never did test the house to the south because with our surveying of gas migration, we had no gas over in that yard.

Q. All right, so you have that, and I'm pontificating here so you're probably scratching your head going, so where's this gas coming from.

I mean, I'm sure you were doing bar holing, what led you to start thinking the gas was potentially coming from the other main line in the house?

A. Yeah so, and I'll go back a little bit. In our gas investigation and migration, like I said, we did have gas along that main in front of kind of the two houses so that's why we chose to test where we did.

There also was a main that went west. There was an intersection between the two, kind of between the two yards that

went west, and there was actually a giant pine tree kind of sitting where that intersection would be.

Our next indication was maybe there's a possible issue there so we did test that section of main as well. So, between the two houses and then going across the street, and this would be early morning now, Thursday morning, when we tested that, and it passed as well. Really, like you said, we were, we had tested everywhere we had gas and so we were wondering where is this gas coming from.

With the group that was there, had some conversations and said let's expand our bar holes. I think really initially why maybe we didn't go down between the two homes is I have never seen so much response from first responders. That site was still being controlled by the fire department, and they were working diligently with the debris between the two homes, with the fire, with the recovery and everything else. In a way, we were kind of staying out of each other's way.

But, yeah, at that point, early morning, decided, hey, let's expand our investigation. Started putting holes down this, really between [redacted] and 10, I think, [redacted], are the two homes, and we did get indication that there was some gas.

They were lower levels than we had out along the main in the front but as we continued going towards 3200 West, they started coming up.

Q. My last question before I let it go around. Do you have any thoughts on why you had such high gas levels in front but no

leakage there but, yet, you had to work your way to, I mean, I know with gas migration, you just have to follow where the gas is in the ground, but any ideas on why that's the case, or has something like this ever happened in the past?

A. Honestly, I haven't seen it, like, in this situation in the past. Usually, we always look to what connects to those houses and investigate that. I mean, I would say almost all the time, that's where we find what we have.

Really, I don't know why it would, we'd have that much gas up in front and then have gas coming from back as well.

MR. LYNUM: Thank you.

MR. DAWSON: This is Dawson, South Jordan.

BY MR. DAWSON:

Q. Just want to confirm that the house of the incident, the explosion, that you tested from the tap to the meter, is that right?

A. Well, so the meter had been severed off, it was under some debris. Our service valve was still there so, yeah, we tested from the tap to the service valve.

Q. And you had no indication of leak there?

A. No.

Q. And then the house to the north, that was the one that you were not able to confirm because of the gauge problem?

A. Yeah, and I say confirm, and that was Wednesday night, we weren't able to confirm. Thursday morning, we did get another

gauge out there, tested the service and it passed.

MR. DAWSON: Thanks, that's all I have.

MR. [redacted]: The only other comment I do have on the incident service is on that road, it was the only service that's equipped with an EFV, which is an Excess Flow Valve. I would say that it did shut off when that meter was severed so I don't believe there was any gas bypass once that meter was severed off.

MR. LAVALLEE: Lavallee, NTSB.

BY MR. LAVALLEE:

Q. The valve, the emergency shut off valve that you were just describing, that valve was on the feed to the house, the incident house, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. The house just to the north of the incident house, the one that, the feed, we tried to do pressure tests but the gauge had failed, were you or your crew able to gain entry to that house and take any interior gas readings?

A. Yes, we were.

Q. What did you find?

A. Very low readings. I don't recall the exact readings, but safe readings in the home. We continued to monitor them throughout the night 'cause that is our process is if we do find gas in there, we continue to monitor until we have no gas in there.

I mean, I don't want to just throw numbers out there, but

very low indication of gas in the home. We did open some windows and doors and within a few minutes, had no gas indication in the home.

Q. So, even in spite of the failed gauge, the actions that you were able to take by basically severing the gas feed to that house combined with the readings that you were getting the gas inside that house, were you able to make a determination that the house to the north, the one that failed, the gauge failed so you weren't able to perform the test, were you fairly confident that that also was not the source of the leak by the time you had got a chance to look at the sum total of your facts there?

A. Yeah, we felt confident that that wasn't the leak due to, yeah, what we had seen on the failed gauge and then, yeah, the indications of what we had in the ground.

Q. At that point where we've tested the feed to the incident house, tested the feed to the north, tested the main in front of the incident house, is it now that logical progression that led you to believe that we're looking for a leak not on this particular main?

A. Yeah. I think that was, that would be correct. We needed to expand where this gas is coming from.

Q. And based off of that, would that then spark you and your team to expand your bar holing?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And that is what led you to believe, to take those

measurements down the, between the two houses -- and just to confirm, make sure I understand it, you were getting bar hole readings of gas in between the two houses, but it was lesser than what had been read at the front, is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Which would seem, I don't know, to me, it would seem like there's gas there but it's not as strong, kind of an anomaly?

A. And we kind of, and so we, yeah, because of what we had done on the front of the house, we continued on even though those levels came down in between the two houses.

Just knowing everything in the front had passed, we felt confident it wasn't leaking and that's when, as we got further in the backyard, they did start coming up and that's why we continued to 3200 West.

Q. Even prior to going east towards 3200, I understand, you described doing some isolation of the T that fed the cul-de-sac across the street.

A. Yes.

Q. Were you concerned that, perhaps, with that joint, maybe there was some tree root incursion into the joint?

A. Yes.

Q. What were your readings across the street?

A. Across the street, we had zero. In the park strip on the east side of 32, west side, sorry, west side of 3210, we had zero. On the park strip on the side of the road of the incident, I'm

guessing, but we had 60 to 70 percent there so a good indication that it could possibly be in that area just from our gas readings.
Q. Again, it sounds like due diligence was performed to make sure it's not coming from that section and that would further lead you to believe that --
A. Yeah.
Q. Were we aware that there was an adjacent main on 3200 at that time?
A. We were aware there was a main. We were also aware that it did not communicate with the homes on 3210. So, I think that was kind of an indication of, I mean, in my experience, we always start with the gas that communicates directly with the homes because that would be what communicates closest to those homes.
But, yeah, looking at a map, I mean, pretty much every road has a gas line on it so we were aware there was a gas line on 3200.
Q. Just to help out, when you say that the main on 3200 didn't communicate with the houses on 3210, what do you mean by it didn't communicate?
A. So, there were no service lines that ran off of the gas main on 3210 into those homes, I mean, on 3200 West into the homes on 3210.
Q. Copy. So, they were essentially isolated from each other?
A. Yes. I mean, the mains communicate, but nothing was running from 3200 West into the houses which was the back of the houses of

3210.

Q. Understood, thank you. Describe in your own words the communication process between you and your crews, and the fire department that was there on scene. If you had information that you needed to share or ask them something, were those lines of communication open and clear for you to do so?

A. I would say yes. We had great communication. The state chief was on site and then also the battalion chief. We would kind of run through what we were doing, make sure we were safety and aware. We'd also let them know what we were doing. So, I would say the communication was good.

Q. Did anyone from the fire department bring, I'm going to use the word, flare ups? Were there any discussion of any flare ups on scene?

A. So, I will go back to the beginning when [redacted] called me. That's when he said the chief would like us to shut the service down because there are some flare ups. That's the only indication of flare ups that I was communicated.

Q. On a scene like that where you would have an emergency valve that would cut off, right, and then an active fire, would it be out of the norm to perhaps experience flare ups based off of that valve being the only thing that's cutting service off to the house?

A. Will you ask that question again?

Q. Sure.

A. Yeah.
Q. So, to understand, right, at the time when the flare ups were reported, this is prior to us having been able to test the feed service to the house, so the only device that's severed gas going into the house, the incident house, would have been that emergency cut off valve, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. My question then is, if it's the emergency cut off valve that's cut the service and not actually turned off at the service valve, would that emergency cut off valve from time to time allow some gas passed it that might cause a flare up?
A. I would say no with my experience. The way they work is until they can build pressure, nothing builds back up so it will, it has to have something to build up against to create pressure.
Q. Okay. That being said, if flare ups were being experienced, would you have anything to lead you to believe, if it was truly gas causing those flare ups, that the source of that gas was coming from somewhere else?
A. So, just, I mean, as early on as it was, it didn't seem out of the ordinary that there would be flare ups with the size of the fire and explosion just due to the matter of debris and things in the home.
And I will say truthfully from the time I got there, the rest of the night, there were no indication of any flare ups. I was just communicated that the battalion chief said there were flare

ups and wanted the service shut off.

Q. So, to clarify, any flare ups that were reported weren't something that you, yourself, witnessed, they were just reported to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Nothing out of the ordinary that would scream to you, hey, we've got something much different going on based upon just the report of flare ups?

A. No.

MR. LAVALLEE: I appreciate that. I'll pass it on. Reid.

MR. HESS: I have a couple of clarifying questions, [redacted], and I know it's kind of strange being asked questions from me when I was right next to you and a lot of things were happening.

MR. [redacted]: Yeah.

MR. HESS: But sometimes you all see things differently as well and I hadn't heard anything like that yet. Hess, Enbridge Gas Utah.

BY MR. HESS:

Q. Was there anything that led you to believe the gas was coming anywhere other than the mains or service in front of the buildings prior to performing all the pressure tests you did?

A. No.

Q. Okay. How near were the mains in the front of the yards, the mains on 3210 West, how close to the homes were they in front of?

A. Again, I mean, I didn't pull a tape, 20 to 25 feet.

Q. Estimates great.
A. Yeah.
Q. The next one, how near was the main on 3200 West to the rear portions of the buildings on 3210 West?
A. I would say at least 300 feet.
MR. HESS: That's the questions I have for now, thank you.
MR. LYNUM: Sean Lynum, NTSB.
BY MR. LYNUM:
Q. So, you were there about, if you can recall, about when did you decide to leave the scene or get relief from the scene?
A. I was asked to leave the scene a few times, but a lot was going on. I was trying to communicate with the crew on 3200. I was also kind of involved in the meter recovery. I think I left between, I want to say probably between 1:30 and 2:30.
Q. And by that time, had they already located the source of the leak on 3200?
A. Yes, they had.
Q. Okay. You mentioned a meter, this wasn't a smart meter or was it a smart meter at home (ph.)?
A. No, a smart meter.
Q. Who took the meter into custody?
A. My understanding, the fire department.
Q. Let's see. So, when your crew that was on 3200 was slowly inching their way towards the leak and they pretty much were getting really close, did anything, you know, you said you didn't

smell gas at the front and then, of course, you were on the side looking at that main before they got to the back. You mentioned you didn't smell anything in the front, did you smell anything on the main on the side, between the houses I should say?

A. There was no main on the side of the houses. Yeah, really there was no gas line going in between those houses. So, really just the frontage had main and then the services that tied to house, and then 3200 was what backed off of 3200.

So, no -- yeah, there was no gas lines going between the two houses, yeah.

Q. And when the guys in the back were saying, hey, did they identify, we're not really smelling anything, but we're getting some serious gas readings?

A. Yeah, so I was part of putting some, you know, doing some of the leak surveying, and we had very high reads with our gas indicators.

My understanding from where they started, they exposed a few fittings and some Ts that communicated across the street that served the houses on the east side of 3200 West, and they didn't find any indications of any leaks. But, yeah, my understanding was they did say they didn't smell anything as well.

Q. I know in the last interview I think it was brought up, so when they were blocking the street or parts of the street to digging, did they completely block off the road or was it just, you know, allowing traffic to go by?

A. Yeah, traffic was allowed to go by. We had traffic control pushing north and south, the north, or, yeah, let's see, north and south veins out from the center line.
Q. When the crew that was there got to the point where they were like, yeah, when they jumped out of the hole because of the gas readings, did the street get shut down at the point?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. This will be last one and then I'll let someone else --
A. I do, they did communicate with me that they had found a leak, moved back, dug some remote holes and secured it fairly quickly though.
Q. My last question. So, when they did the squeeze offs north and south of where the leak was found, they saw the scar, scab --
A. Scab.
Q. -- whatever you want to call, they saw that there, did you come over and actually start, visually see that, that they were, what they were seeing, or did you just --
A. I didn't come over to the hole. I didn't see the scab. I'm trying to think.

So, I think I came over just prior to them finding the leak and then I had to go back over with the meter investigation (indiscernible) and then they called me and said we did find the scab, and we're going to secure the main.

And then as soon as I was finished up, I went back over there, but they had started removing the scab from the area.

MR. LYNUM: Okay. That's all I got now, thank you.

MR. LAVALLEE: Scott Lavallee, NTSB, again.

BY MR. LAVALLEE:

Q. I just want to verify, [redacted], at some point you were able to get to the excavation efforts on 3200 and see the exposed main that we later determined to be leaking, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you describe the soil conditions around the main where the leak was found? And if you weren't in a position to observe that then that's fine.

A. No, like, I did observe it. I would say, I mean, for the most part, normal soil but with some rock, yeah, that's what I would indicate.

Q. Okay. If you were installing new service at that location, would the substrate in which, would the ground in which the pipe would be laid, the new pipe were to be laid, would the soil conditions that you observed there be acceptable, or would you necessitate some sort of correction to that soil before putting the pipe in?

A. Yeah, our practice is now is we do shade our pipe with sand so it wouldn't be.

Q. And what does that mean, like, will we add sand?

A. Yeah, any new installation, we add sand around our pipe to protect it from any harm, yeah.

Q. And what could potentially harm a pipe that's in the soil?

A. I mean, a lot of the reason we put sand is to, is for excavation, make sure, but I mean, yeah, rocks, asphalt, cement, any of those things can harm a gas line.
Q. Okay. Fair to say that current practices would require you to add sand around the area where you're going to lay the pipe?
A. Yes.
Q. But that, what was observed when the pipe was excavated would have to be addressed. Do you happen to know how old that pipe was that was, that we found the leak was?
A. I believe it was 1974.
Q. Based upon the practices at that time, do you know if where that pipe was laid and the substrate, the soil and rocks around it, would that have been acceptable for that, I realize that it's before your time in the industry, but to your knowledge?
A. My understanding is it was.
Q. That's fair enough, thank you. Just back for a second when you described the gauge that failed in trying to perform the test on the house to the north of the incident house, is it common for gauges to fail?
A. I wouldn't say common, but does it happen, yes.
Q. Is it fairly common practice to carry spares?
A. Usually, yes.
Q. Was there one available on the night in question?
A. Not on that night.
Q. Okay. But as, we kind of talked about earlier --

A. I should go back, we --
Q. Sure.
A. I'm trying to think on that one. No, there wasn't one available.
Q. And this is hypothetical, would having a spare gauge available to you that night, would that have drastically accelerated your troubleshooting, or were the efforts that you were able to take in shutting it off and then taking measurements inside the house, was that almost as efficient?
A. I would say yes.
MR. LAVALLEE: Thank you. I'm going to pass it on one more time. Reid, it's to you, sir.
MR. HESS: Yeah, a couple of them.
BY MR. HESS:
Q. [redacted], let's stay with the gauge for just a moment. Will you talk about what gauges were being used on that job site and why there may not have been extra gauges because the processes going on?
A. Yeah, so just recently we have implemented some lock out, tag out to our gauges. We have just got some new brass gauges, and we have seen maybe an indication that they are leaking, and that's probably why I didn't have a spare is because we just recently got those newer valves to communicate with our lock out, tag out.
Q. Thanks. And then was there any other gauging going on beside the gauges that were being used on the surface lines that were

being tested?
A. Yes. During the whole time, we did have gauges to check pressure and make sure we maintained pressure when we were isolating and shutting down any services or mains.
Q. Back to the leak on 3200 West after it had been exposed, and they're getting ready to shut it down, if I heard you correctly, you were not there while the shutdown took place, is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Based on your experience, you know what was leaking over there, I can assume with the volume and gas and things, based on your experience, would you believe there was any reason to shut down 3200 West while that line was being squeezed down?
A. I don't think so.
MR. HESS: That's everything I have, thanks. Sean.
MR. LYNUM: I don't have any other questions.
MR. LAVALLEE: I've just got a couple more, and I feel like we'll be done here.
BY MR. LAVALLEE:
Q. So, would there be anyone that you would recommend that we speak to, to gain any further information regarding this incident?
A. Not that I can think of.
Q. We've asked you an awful lot of questions in a short period of time today, and I appreciate your answering them. Here's your chance, is there anything you just want to tell us rather than being asked?

A. I honestly can't think of anything.

Q. Okay. With that being said, you've given me your contact information. Should myself or the rest of the group have any additional questions that kind of pop up later, would you mind if we contacted you, [redacted]?

A. Yeah, that's fine.

MR. LAVALLEE: Then on behalf of the NTSB, [redacted], and the panel assembled here today, I would like to thank you for your time and cooperation in this issue.

MR. [redacted]: Okay, thank you.

MR. LAVALLEE: That's the end of the interview, thank you.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	FATAL NATURAL GAS EXPLOSION IN SOUTH JORDAN, UTAH ON NOVEMBER 6, 2024 Interview of [redacted]
ACCIDENT NO.:	PLD25FR001
PLACE:	South Jordan, Utah
DATE:	November 10, 2024

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Transcriber