

TED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

CPKC TRAIN DERAILMENT IN *

BORDULAC, NORTH DAKOTA * Accident No.: RRD24LR012

ON JULY 5, 2024 *

* * * * *

Interview of: EDWARD DANKBAR, Director
Northern Region Emergency Management
and Hazmat Response
CPKC Railroad

Bordulac, North Dakota

Thursday,
August 8, 2024

APPEARANCES:

PAUL STANCIL, Senior Hazardous Materials Accident
Investigator and Hazardous Materials Group Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board

DAVID CASACELI, Investigator-in-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

BENJAMIN STROT, Rail Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DION MILLER, Hazmat Inspector
Federal Railroad Administration

VERNON WALKER, Tank Car Quality Assurance Specialist
Federal Railroad Administration

JIM KOZY, Managing Director, Hazmat Program
CPKC Railroad

RON LAWLER, Senior Director, Mechanical Services
Trinity Leasing

RAUL GONZALEZ
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

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I N T E R V I E W

(3:50 p.m.)

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3 MR. STANCIL: Today is August 8th, 2024. It is 3:50 p.m.
4 This is an interview of Mr. Ed Dankbar of the CPKC Railroad, and
5 it's being conducted in connection with the July 5th, 2024
6 derailment of CPKC Freight Train 242-03 in Bordulac, North Dakota.
7 The NTSB number is RRD24LR012.

8 My name is Paul Stancil. I'm a senior hazardous materials
9 accident investigator with the NTSB. We are located at the site
10 of the accident in Bordulac, North Dakota.

11 Mr. Dankbar, are you aware that this conversation is being
12 recorded?

13 MR. DANKBAR: Yes, sir.

14 MR. STANCIL: And do we have your permission to record the
15 conversation?

16 MR. DANKBAR: Yes, sir, you do.

17 MR. STANCIL: Thank you. I'll go around the room and we'll
18 do introductions. It's very important for the recording that we
19 all speak loudly and clearly.

20 We'll start with you, Mr. Dankbar. Would you give us your
21 name, the spelling of your name and your current position please?

22 MR. DANKBAR: Yep. Edward Dankbar, spelling for last name is
23 D-a-n-k-b as in boy, a-r.

24 MR. CASACELI: David Casaceli, C-a-s-a-c-e-l-i, investigator-
25 in-charge for this accident with the National Transportation

1 Safety Board.

2 MR. STROT: Ben Strot, S-t-r-o-t, NTSB, rail accident
3 investigator.

4 MR. WALKER: Vernon Walker, W-a-l-k-e-r, tank car quality
5 assurance specialist, FRA.

6 MR. KOZY: Jim Kozy, managing director, CPKC, hazmat program.

7 MR. MILLER: Dion Miller, hazmat inspector, FRA, in North
8 Dakota.

9 MR. LAWLER: Ron Lawler, L-a-w-l-e-r, senior director of
10 mechanical services, Trinity Leasing.

11 MR. GONZALEZ: Raul Gonzalez, PHMSA. Gonzalez. G-o-n-z-a-l-
12 e-z.

13 MR. STANCIL: All right. Mr. Dankbar, if any question is
14 unclear or you do not understand the question, please ask the
15 questioner to clarify or restate the question. And if you don't
16 know the answer to any of the questions, it's okay to say that you
17 don't know. We don't want you to speculate if you don't know the
18 answer to any question. Do you understand?

19 MR. DANKBAR: Yes, sir.

20 MR. STANCIL: Okay. The sole purpose for this investigation
21 is to improve safety, not to assign any fault, blame or liability.
22 Our mission is to improve transportation safety and prevent
23 accidents. As such, the NTSB cannot offer any guarantee of
24 confidentiality, immunity from any legal proceeding or by any
25 other agency, whether it be local, state or federal.

1 A transcript of this interview will be placed in the public
2 docket for this investigation which will be available via the NTSB
3 website.

4 INTERVIEW OF EDWARD DANKBAR

5 BY MR. STANCIL:

6 Q. Okay. To begin with, tell us about your background, your
7 education and your expertise.

8 A. Okay. Education, I've got an associate's and bachelor's
9 degree in fire science from Lake Superior State University in
10 Sioux St. Marie, Michigan. I also have been with CPKC since 2008,
11 starting in intermodal and then transitioning to mechanical,
12 working my way up as a carman to then foreman, train servicing
13 foreman, and then eventually transitioning over to CPKC hazmat. I
14 started as a hazmat field officer. Through that, transitioned.
15 I've been able to participate in many different trainings, product
16 specific trainings to include Ammonia Safety Training Institute,
17 32 hour technician course; Chlorine Institute, 40 hour CHLOREP
18 course. I've also been able to attend SERTC (ph.) for multiple
19 different trainings to include tank car specialist, advanced tank
20 car specialist. We have completed NFP-1081, industrial brigade
21 training. Through my (indiscernible) programs, I was able to
22 obtain NFP firefighter I, firefighter II, also NFP hazmat
23 awareness and operations in addition to OSHA or HAZWOPER awareness
24 operation technician and specialist. I think that's probably a
25 few that are relevant to this response.

1 Q. Okay.

2 MR. KOZY: Incident command.

3 MR. DANKBAR: Yes. Also I have completed FEMA ICS-100, 200,
4 700 and 300. I also hold NFPA incident commander certification
5 training as well.

6 BY MR. STANCIL:

7 Q. Perfect. How long have you been in your current position,
8 sir?

9 A. I believe 10 months in my current role. As we recently
10 transitioned, I was promoted to director of hazardous emergency
11 management and hazardous materials response for our northern
12 region.

13 Q. And what was your position immediately prior to that?

14 A. I was a hazmat field officer in our hazmat programs.

15 Q. Okay. And what are your current duties? Can you describe
16 those to us?

17 A. Yeah. My current duties, I over see and manage our northern
18 region team. I have seven direct reports, spanning across
19 multiple states and multiple provinces throughout Canada. We see
20 everything from overseeing the TM (ph.), that's hands on
21 everything from day-to-day, any hours and non-conforming packages,
22 first responder training, our question maintenance program, major
23 response work as required. We also help manage and oversee our
24 wildfire mitigation program through North America as well.

25 Q. Okay. Thank you for that. And -- who do you currently

1 report to?

2 A. I currently report to our managing director, Jim Kozy, based
3 out of Calgary.

4 Q. Thank you. So I'm going to let this truck go by first.

5 Okay. I'm going to start by asking you to tell us as completely
6 as you possibly can what happened after you were notified of the
7 incident, and please walk us through what you did, what you saw,
8 what you heard once you got here onsite, your communications with
9 others beginning on the day of that derailment. Take all the time
10 you need. Give us the most complete accounting of what you can
11 remember with respect to that.

12 A. Absolutely. It was a little after the 0400 hour on the
13 morning of the 5th, I received a call from our superintendent of
14 operations for North Dakota. He informed me that we had a
15 mainline derailment. He said that there was hazardous materials
16 on the train. There was initial reports that there was fire.
17 They were still trying to get more information, but he was
18 requesting that we mobilize our resources contractors and
19 personnel. I immediately started making phone calls, reached out
20 to our corporate team in Calgary, and then also started calling
21 our US based response staff in addition to all of our response
22 contractors.

23 CPKC has a pretty robust network of company owned response
24 assets, everything from transfer equipment to command posts, fire
25 suppression assets. They're staged strategically with contractors

1 throughout the region. So we were making contact to get those
2 people and resources mobilized in addition to contracted resources
3 that we could get on the road.

4 Simultaneously, getting packed, getting in the truck, getting
5 on the road, started to communicate again with our corporate team
6 to see if train documents were available yet. We have a very good
7 and historic relationship with Carrington Fire. So, one of my
8 first calls there within that first hour was to Chief Wangen with
9 Carrington Fire. I wanted to understand, I'm assuming him was
10 involved. If he wasn't, he was going to know who was involved or
11 who was on scene. He was the IC and I had confirmed with him that
12 we did have -- we were activating resources and wanted to know
13 what he needed. What was he seeing and what was he needing?

14 Initial conversations with him while we were driving is they
15 were in an information collecting phase. They were being very
16 defensive in their actions, and they were -- again, they were
17 trying to get information together. It was still dark when I
18 talked to him, and they were hoping to have some better images to
19 understand so we could start getting just better support for them
20 going. I did inform him at that time that we were going to be
21 trying to get the consist over to him if he didn't already have
22 it. He was able to confirm that there was some CPKC personnel
23 onsite, unknown who that was, but that they had made contact with
24 them.

25 And, yeah. So again continued to drive, a lot of phone

1 calls. It's about 5 1/2, 6 hours from the Twin Cities to
2 Bordulac. So again, amidst many other calls, talked with the
3 superintendent again after the call with Chief Wangen. And, the
4 superintendent was able to confirm that there was anhydrous,
5 methanol and molten sulfur on the train. Again, they were
6 uncertain what, if any, products were involved. I was able to
7 confirm that they did have fire. We did conference in Chief
8 Wangen at that time, just figured that was going to be the most
9 efficient way to conduit information to him. Operations was able
10 to again to the Chief that we did have anhydrous, methanol and
11 molten sulfur involved, and again they were working on continuing
12 to try to get him the consist.

13 One of the things I did remind him of in our conversations
14 was -- asked him if he was able to utilize the AskRail app, just
15 as -- there's a traditional means to get that paperwork but also
16 just to empower his staff and himself as well, but we also
17 reaffirmed that we were going to be sending it to him if he didn't
18 have it already.

19 A lot of calls during that drive, just getting other
20 resources going. We reached out internationally, everybody from
21 Texas to teams we have throughout parts of Canada that are just
22 high haz responders, getting personnel and equipment going. One
23 of the other calls as soon as we knew we had fire is we also
24 reached out to SRS out of Dallas-Fort Worth and requested -- I
25 don't know the exact time. I know it was in that first couple of

1 hours that we requested that they get private aircraft and get
2 specialty industrial firefighters airborne as quick as possible.

3 A lot of calls during that, during that 5 1/2, 6 hour drive
4 there. Throughout the drive, continued to call, touch base with
5 the Chief, just to understand what was going on. One of the
6 things I saw that was of value is just through previous events,
7 Carrington Fire definitely has grown to understand that defense
8 measures sometimes are the best. I know that Chief did have a
9 very small recon team, tried to get some initial -- get some more
10 information especially as the sun started to come up.

11 He did state, you know, that they were hearing lots of pops,
12 that the fire was very large, and I believe they only had one
13 recon team actually kind of work through the area during the
14 daylight hours. And again, I'd have to look at when sunrise was
15 that day, but there was just -- there was heavy fire. So it was
16 hard to tell which cars were which. Again, we were trying to
17 reaffirm and reference -- referencing the consist and those
18 documents on there, so if they were able to identify any car
19 numbers, we could try and really drill down on what specifically
20 was involved.

21 Yeah. So, one of the good things they did do is they -- he
22 was communicating that they were basically keeping folks back, and
23 they had quite a few local resources activated, multiple fire
24 departments. I don't know the total count, but they did have
25 mutual aid partners that were responding to support. And again

1 they were -- when I was talking with him, he was definitely taking
2 a defensive approach just based on the unknowns. We weren't
3 there. We couldn't tell him exactly what was involved, and with
4 the fire conditions, it was hard to decipher exactly what was
5 involved.

6 Yeah. I was onsite about 11:30-ish, noon, that day. One of
7 the first things I did when I got here, I had a face-to-face
8 briefing with the Chief. Again, they were staged up in the
9 Bordulac Township area. The derailment site was I think it's half
10 a mile, three-quarters down the road to the east. The fire was
11 extremely visible. Obviously it was daylight hours as we were
12 coming up from the south from Jamestown. You could see a smoke
13 column pretty clearly from quite a ways away. Very heavy, thick
14 black smoke.

15 Knowing that there was methanol and anhydrous and molten
16 sulfur board, methanol burns clear. So, you know, it was --
17 raised a question to me what else is burning? What else is
18 burning especially with that kind of smoke. Again, Chief had the
19 same thoughts or concerns.

20 I was able to gear up, put on my turnout gear and with
21 assistant chief for Carrington Fire, him and myself basically did
22 another recon walk from the upwind side. So coming from town,
23 moving east, we were able to get to the west end of the
24 derailment. Again, just very defensive, very precautionary, trying
25 to understand -- if I could see anything they hadn't seen.

1 Based on the fire conditions we had, it was very hard to see
2 anything. It was very evident to myself as we were walking up
3 that there was plastic pellet hopper cars, that they were very,
4 very much involved, and that they were generating a lot of the
5 heavy dark smoke. While we were downrange, we did have a PRD
6 activation, unknown what car it was, if it was methanol, if it was
7 anhydrous. At that point in time, I just said, hey, we're going
8 to back out. We need to get some additional resources here
9 onsite.

10 So we came back up, regrouped. A lot of our executive staff
11 had started to arrive. Mr. Mark Redd, our chief operating
12 officer, Trenton Anderson, senior VP of safety, rules and safety,
13 and did a face-to-face with them briefing, just kind of informed
14 that we've got heavy fire, looks to have multiple tank cars
15 involved, still trying to understand what's burning, what's
16 releasing, et cetera. Regrouped with the Chief, basically talked
17 about continuing kind of defensive approach until additional
18 resources got here.

19 It was becoming more and more clear that to peel the layers
20 of the onion, to really understand what was going on, we were
21 going to need to get some fire suppression activities in place.
22 So we started to work those logistics. Obviously we're in a rural
23 area. We don't have a hydrant system. So water shuttle was going
24 to be key. So, identifying what Carrington Fire has through their
25 mutual aid resources to supply some offensive -- not offensive,

1 but fire suppression activities. And that took, that took several
2 hours to line up.

3 One of the things we did talk about is noticed that there
4 were some residents in town. Obviously this is going to draw
5 public attention. In talking with the Chief, just, you know, I
6 asked if there was an evacuation in place. He said that they had
7 put a voluntary evacuation in place, and that not all residents
8 were choosing to participate. I think they coordinated it through
9 emergency management and the sheriff's office. But, I believe --
10 yeah, he just said that not everybody in the township had decided
11 to participate.

12 One of the things we also did very early on while I was
13 driving, is we activated our air monitoring program. We have it's
14 called RAID. It's railroad air monitoring incident deployment.
15 We have specially trained contractors throughout the network, and
16 we do have a group in North Dakota with that -- with assets that
17 CPKC owns and also that training. They're based out of the
18 Bismarck area. So they were also getting onsite. They got onsite
19 before I did. That was one of the things as we realized not
20 everybody was participating in the evacuation order, not only did
21 we want to have good air monitoring support for first responders
22 and contract responders, but also for any residents that were
23 still in the area. So, that program was also spooling up to make
24 sure that we had appropriate parameters in place so we could also
25 continue to work forward through the response.

1 Logistics, like I said, felt like minutes, but it was a
2 couple hours as we got everything lined up. Simultaneously,
3 operations, mechanical, engineering, were also mobilizing
4 resources. Those resources were starting to get into the area.

5 One of the things also that did happen prior to my arrival is
6 our operations team was able to coordinate with Carrington Fire.
7 They were able to get the cars that were still upright on the
8 track pulled back, helped reduce some of that hazard load which
9 was good. I know our superintendent was able to get onsite and
10 coordinate with the Chief. And then that just allowed for us to
11 potentially explore doing some fire suppression operations.

12 As everything started to come together, we needed to continue
13 to understand what was going on. We brought in our fire trailers
14 from Carlstadt, Minnesota, Minot, North Dakota, the Twin Cities,
15 Milwaukee, Winnipeg, and we made the decision with the Chief that
16 we'd rather utilize those assets downrange just because if we did
17 have to evacuate, we didn't want to compromise an asset for the
18 community. Just because we're having a bad day, doesn't mean
19 people aren't having car accident or house fires or needing help.

20 So working from the upwind side, working from Bordulac each
21 on the main road there, we positioned two fire trailers. They
22 have their own standalone fire pumps, utilizing drop tank bladders
23 that Carrington Fire and Jamestown Township was able to provide.
24 We started to back tanker trucks down the road from the upwind
25 side.

1 Again, at this point, we had air monitoring in place and air
2 monitoring resources were getting more robust -- more and more
3 robust by the hour. GHD's position, that's our primary industrial
4 hygiene group, they're based out of Twin Cities, they were onsite
5 at this time with again more robust resources, area RAEs (ph.),
6 MultiRAEs, et cetera. But again working from the upwind side,
7 exercising caution, we opted to back the tanker trucks down, fill
8 the drop tanks and then start using master streams, or just the
9 bigger nozzles to try and start suppression activities. As we got
10 into the suppression activities, it was very clear that the
11 plastic pellets were heavily involved, and they were creating this
12 heavy smoke.

13 One of the challenges we encountered is a lot of these master
14 streams are very resource demanding. They need a lot of water to
15 keep up. So, we had plenty of local resources. It was just a
16 matter of getting trucks to the derailment site to actually keep
17 that water supply fed. And as more and more resources started to
18 arrive on scene, things started to get a little congested. I'll
19 let him pass. So, we were able to keep up with the -- with using
20 local water supply resources backing down from town for quite some
21 time. Again, I'm trying to put an exact timeframe on things, and
22 it's hard to do.

23 But several hours into it, we did start to see an
24 improvement. That was one of the things we were able to notice.
25 Again, throughout this whole process, there was lots of face-to-

1 face communication, briefings with the Chief who had at this point
2 also stood up a unified command with the county, county
3 commissioners, and county emergency management, county -- or local
4 ambulance. So we were primarily updating that group through the
5 Chief.

6 We started to see significant smoke condition improvements,
7 definitely on the plastic pellet side. As conditions started to
8 improve, that was kind of that first layer of the onion being
9 peeled back. And as smoke conditions started to improve, it was
10 very evident on the east side of the derailment that you could see
11 a white cloud, that there was what appeared to be anhydrous vapor
12 leaking from somewhere. And, you know, that was the next kind of
13 big chunk information that we got.

14 So that being said, that also definitely raises, you know,
15 how do we need to adjust our response? So with that coming to
16 light, obviously we still had to focus on fire suppression but
17 also there's this confirmed new challenge in the mix of we clearly
18 have an active anhydrous ammonia release. So not only did fire
19 suppression operations become critical, but also anhydrous vapor
20 suppression. So the tactic we chose to use again was water,
21 right. That was going to be the best approach for the resources that we
22 had.

23 The other challenge we encountered which also helped us was
24 there was a substantial amount of standing water between the road
25 and the actual rail bed. So it was not -- the cars were very hard

1 to access. They were burning. There was no way to safely get in
2 there to do a detailed assessments. So again, even though we were
3 doing water suppression or fire suppression activities, it was
4 still what I would call more defensive. We were using large
5 master streams to not only try to knock down the fire but now also
6 get appropriate resources to help suppress the visible vapors.

7 We were pretty diligent about staying on the upwind side,
8 also incorporating once the anhydrous vapor became confirmed,
9 making sure that we had ample SCBAs in the area. One of the
10 resources that we have internally is we have a SCBA air supply
11 trailer, and we have a cache of about 40 SCBAs internally in
12 addition to what local first responders had. Clearly with those
13 conditions going on, we needed to make sure that we had
14 appropriate respiratory protection in place if required to utilize
15 it.

16 As we continued to gain ground, on suppression activities, it
17 also allowed us to direct more water streams towards vapor
18 suppression, and as we were able to -- as we got later and later
19 into the day, and we gained more and more ground on the fire
20 suppression piece, it was very clear that we had a complex
21 situation with the anhydrous, and the big question was which cars?
22 Where were they leaking from? Is there anything we can do besides
23 vapor suppression to mitigate accordingly?

24 And water really became more and more crucial to not only
25 mitigating the issue but also protecting first responders and our

1 own personnel, protecting the public, and as those supply demands
2 continued to rise, we were able to continue to utilize local
3 resources, but it was clear that we just -- we needed to be aware
4 of that and to continue to just make sure we had adequate water
5 supply.

6 As we made good progress, it was before dark on the 5th. We
7 had a pretty good knockdown on the plastic pellet fire, and the
8 methanol fire seemed to be diminishing. The pellet fires weren't
9 completely out, but it was quite improved conditions as compared
10 to initial arrival, but the vapor, anhydrous vapor was still
11 evident. The water streams were definitely working, but we really
12 needed to try and get some better intel on the cars to understand
13 what was going on. Coming in from the east or the west with
14 proper -- with SCBA respiratory protection, you could only get so
15 close just because of where the cars were. There wasn't a really
16 good way to get a boat or anything in that or nor did it
17 necessarily make sense to try and take that kind of risk.

18 Talking with Chief and the unified command group, talking
19 with our mechanical group, engineering group and operations group,
20 we were kind of evaluating next steps, and it became pretty
21 evident that we were going to have to try and move some of the
22 cars that, you know, after evaluation to try and make those next
23 steps to understand what was going on, what we needed to do.

24 So we started working as a group. Again, it was just getting
25 to that next layer of the onion, and strategically in deciding and

1 talking through what cars could we look at possibly starting to
2 move, what move made sense? Did it make sense to try and take a
3 car that doesn't appear to be compromised and get it a little bit
4 further away or is it a car that, hey, we'll need to move it to
5 understand a little more but, you know, we need to make a small
6 move here so that we can understand that next piece.

7 I believe train damage assessment doesn't end until the cars
8 are dismantled. That's kind of -- that is not kind of, it is the
9 approach we took here. So sometimes there was little moves.
10 Sometimes there were big moves but it was always based on getting
11 personnel insight to evaluate the cars. Some of the first moves
12 that came together were on the east end of the derailment site,
13 and that was only after we had good progress with fire
14 suppression. When I say suppression, understand that it doesn't
15 mean that the fire is completely out but we've got good water
16 flowing on it, we're seeing improvement. Smoke conditions have
17 tremendously improved, and also making sure that we had good vapor
18 suppression on the visible anhydrous vapors.

19 To do that work on the east side of the derailment, clearly
20 that's a downwind position. So to do that, not only did we have
21 to make sure that we had appropriate personnel, we had appropriate
22 PPE to include SCBAs as needed, but also that we had a clear
23 strategy in place, et cetera.

24 So, some of the first cars that were identified to try and
25 move were on the east side. Many of them were not in the main

1 pile of cars. So working with our industrial hygiene group, GHD,
2 and then also first responders, because again we have to continue
3 this water flow. One of the other things to gain access to these
4 cars to get some of these moves in place, we needed to get
5 material down in the ground, get some rig mates, rocks, et cetera.
6 So how do you do that, right? How do you do it safely? How do
7 you do it effectively? And again that's where we saw not only
8 internally on the CPKC side, but also working with Chief and the
9 unified command group to put that plan and strategy into play.
10 So, one of the things that came to light was if we could continue
11 to -- instead of backing the fire trucks down, if we could
12 appropriately get some of the rock trucks in as conditions were
13 right, to move some material and then also have married in some
14 fire trucks to keep that up. That was the strategy that was kind
15 of adopted and moved forward.

16 Again, air monitoring was critical especially as we started
17 to get the fire more knocked down. So it became very, very
18 critical. We had wind coming out of the north, northwest, and it
19 was pretty strong which was awesome. And, with the strong water
20 supply we had in place, we were able to really have a good vapor
21 collection so that we could get rock in and also continue to try
22 and pull these layers apart.

23 As we had good success in that capacity, we were able to
24 actually then move a few of the cars on the east. They came back
25 to try and look at some of the pellet cars to try and get them out

1 of the way so that we could actually address each car as an
2 individual player, just to kind of move towards final suppression.
3 Just again, we were looking at the little victories, right. What
4 can we do to improve site safety for not only the first
5 responders, the public, but also for the contract groups.

6 So as they -- I don't have the exact car numbers in front of
7 me, but there was a couple methanol cars and a couple of anhydrous
8 cars on the east side that they were able to move out. Those cars
9 did not appear to be compromised at all. So that was a pretty
10 easy calculation. Again, then they moved to the west side again
11 on the upwind side, and we started to further address some of the
12 plastic pellet cars. As we got the plastic pellet cars mitigated,
13 that started to open up to the tank cars, and we were able to
14 start piecing together based on the consist what cars we believed
15 were to be involved.

16 Again, with the fire that we were dealing with, car markings
17 were sparse at best to try to piece together. So again, our
18 corporate team in Calgary was working very diligently based on
19 drawn imagery while we were doing all the suppression, to try and
20 help us put together what was going on. It appeared that some of
21 the methanol cars were closest on the west. How did we know that
22 without car markings or placards? We were able to see the
23 manways. So we did -- so we were looking for them. We had a few
24 methanol cars on the west side. Which cars they were, I still
25 couldn't tell you right now. I'd have to pull some reference

1 materials.

2 And the first general service cars we encountered were
3 heavily damaged. Heavily damaged. It was very clear they were
4 substantially breached. So we were able to get those out of the
5 way with reasonable effort. Again, each one of these steps we
6 were having a lot of face-to-face meetings, coordinating with the
7 Chief, not only internally were we coordination, but also
8 coordinating with the Chief, just so that -- not only were they
9 ware of actions we were trying to take, but also resources, right,
10 and as Chief as the IC, legally he owned the site, and we were
11 very aware of that. And, like I said, we wanted to work with them
12 to make sure that everybody was on the same page.

13 From there forward, we really got into a good rhythm of water
14 supply and to keep the anhydrous vapors suppressed, but also
15 continued to deal with the little fires that were with the pellet
16 cars and the pools of methanol that were here and there. And it's
17 always amazing as you pull the cars apart how you can then take a
18 more surgical approach, those individual cars, treat them as an
19 individual fire and just -- and keep progress moving forward.

20 As we saw that good progress, good safe progress continue, we
21 also started to explore are there opportunities to start moving --
22 I'll let him pass. Were there opportunities to continue to pull
23 cars from the east? Are conditions safe? Are they right to do
24 it? Does it make sense to do it, and keep understanding what was
25 going on?

1 Working from the west, we also discovered -- we got to one of
2 the first pressure cars, one of the first anhydrous cars, and it
3 was very visible that there was a hole in one of the cars that was
4 later confirmed to be the A6 car that we referenced on our map
5 work. Again, not necessarily visible vapor, but there was a
6 visible. So one of the questions then to come, do we have auto
7 refrigerator product? Is the car empty? Unknown, but again that
8 definitely raised a high level of caution just because we didn't
9 know. And again, just water supply, vapor suppression and air
10 monitoring and appropriate respiratory protection were critical.

11 While this was evolving, we were able to continue to work
12 with our industrial hygiene group to understand besides SCBAs,
13 what do we need for this growing response group? We started
14 bringing in respiratory protection, respirators, APRs, just to
15 augment what a lot of folks onsite already had. First responders
16 were all trained and certified with SCBA. So, if you know a
17 respiratory, if you're an operator in a fire truck, it was
18 expected that you had a SCBA on the front seat with you. And, we
19 were starting to also put together that piece because it was clear
20 we were going to have -- we were going to be here for a while, and
21 it was not going to be a simple response.

22 And there were a few times in there, too, throughout the
23 response where we were able to slow the pace, just to make sure,
24 kind of take that tactical pause to reevaluate what do we need?
25 Do we have enough of what we need? Is what we're doing, does it

1 make sense? We were also pretty fortunate. Through Stutsman
2 County, they have a very robust drone program. I think many folks
3 saw some of that initial footage, and that was a huge tool, and we
4 kind of add those tactical pauses, when we would be reevaluating
5 what happened, the drones were invaluable to us. Hey, this is
6 what I think I'm seeing from the road, but what's the eye in the
7 sky seeing? Does that coincide with what we're talking about
8 doing?

9 Yeah, and that brings up to the end of day 1 the best I can
10 remember. I can keep going on some of the stuff if you want me
11 to. It's kind of a -- I figured --

12 Q. Okay. So that's pretty much the end of day 1.

13 A. Yep. We were able to get a few cars off the east and a few
14 cars off the west, make that, that that was somewhere in the early
15 morning hours again that we were there but, yeah, generally that's
16 kind of the end of day 1.

17 And, you know, getting into day 2, it kind of was continued,
18 right. It was definitely clear that the anhydrous component was
19 not simple, and it wasn't necessarily -- we didn't know where it
20 was coming from. That was the hard part. Aside from the A6 car
21 that had the visible hole, it was clear to understand what we were
22 dealing with. We were going to have to try and continue to safely
23 move some of the cars, to understand what we were going to have to
24 do, to mitigate this.

25 As we got to those deeper and deeper layers of the onion,

1 slowly working from the east and slowly from the west, it
2 definitely got just more and more technical. A lot more tactical
3 pauses, but the water supply piece really became critical. One of
4 the things that we did, kind of come up with, is to get to these
5 cars, to make those moves, to understand, to continue the damage
6 assessment process, we needed to get to the cars, and it was clear
7 we were going to have to get rock and rig mat in. Again, how do
8 you do it safely? How do you do it effectively? How do you do it
9 the right way?

10 So one of the challenges we had is as we needed more rock and
11 rig mats, that meant more trucks. As you have more trucks coming
12 to the area, how do we make sure we have safe working conditions?
13 That's where air monitoring and respiratory pieces were becoming
14 more and more critical. And then also, yeah, how are you going to
15 get the fire trucks in to keep the water supply going?

16 One of the things we evaluated and brought to Chief was
17 utilizing surface water. It was clear there just wasn't a good
18 effective way with the single lane road to just keep those water
19 trucks coming in. So we transitioned one of our fire trailers
20 over to drafting from the slew or the body of water between the
21 rail bed and the road, and it worked really well. It worked
22 really, really well.

23 So then we transitioned our second fire pump over to pulling
24 from the surface water and once we were all in agreement, we had
25 sustainable water flow that it seemed like a reasonable pathway

1 forward. We kept the fire trucks full. We kept them staged up in
2 the Bordulac Township area, and basically if we were to lose -- if
3 we were having an issue with water supply, we could clear the road
4 of the rock trucks, and then we could quick cascade in the fire
5 department tankers to drop water.

6 That was where Chief came to us and one of the things -- this
7 was actually I thought one of the more brilliant things, is he
8 actually handpicked tankers. They were all side dump tankers. So
9 they could come in quick, and they could drop, you know, 3 to
10 5,000 gallons of water in minutes. So we handpicked the trucks.
11 They had they lined up in town. So once we had all those things
12 in position, we just continued to pull surface water from the slew
13 for suppression activities, not only for fire suppressions but
14 also vapor suppression. And, yeah, we were able to start getting
15 rock and rig mats in to start building some of those pathways over
16 so that we could continue the car wrecking and assessment process.

17 As we continued to peel back that onion, into the early
18 morning hours of day 2 and into the afternoon, it was, it was
19 clear that the slew ditch area was incredibly deep, deeper than we
20 thought from initial glance, and it took, I don't even know how
21 many loads of rock to start to get a base to actually lay rig mats
22 down. And progress on that was much slower than many people
23 hoped, but we were able to start making progress.

24 As we got the first kind of roadway, a pathway across, we
25 were able to get some more of the cars out of the way, general

1 service cars. The nice part about dealing with the general
2 service cars is the damage was already apparent. It was much more
3 visible, what was compromised, what wasn't. Any of the cars that
4 were compromised, many of them appeared to have flooded with
5 surface water which I think helped some of the suppression
6 efforts. So, there was, you know, we were comfortable actually
7 getting after those fairly reasonably but with the anhydrous cars,
8 you know, very high level focus on just continued damage
9 assessment to try and understand where these problems were and
10 could we solve them.

11 As we kept peeling that onion, into day 2, just east of the
12 A6 car is where we discovered A2. A2 also had another visible
13 leak, or not visible leak, had a visible hole and you could hear
14 some audible noise coming out of it. Again, so again raised
15 caution levels.

16 As we discovered A6 and A2, a couple of the things we looked
17 at, is there a way -- is there anything we can do to help improve
18 the situation? You know, dealing with compressed gas in a car
19 like that, and a pressure car -- dealing with a car like that, you
20 know, it's going to be a technical solution. So one of the things
21 we did very early on especially on A2 as we had an audible noise,
22 was we opted to tarp the car. Does tarping a car stop the leak?
23 No, but it does help compress and suppress the vapors and redirect
24 them to the ground. And, in doing so, you know, the car was
25 sitting on the side of the right-of-way, half submerged. So

1 getting those vapors redirected towards the water was going to
2 help, and it did. It didn't completely solve the problem, but it
3 definitely, we noticed we weren't having to use as much water to
4 help suppress vapors in that area.

5 A6, again was still something we were dealing with. The
6 problem with A6 is where the hole was at, the car was still very
7 high in the air. So there wasn't a safe way to necessarily and
8 get up there, try and apply a tarp, try and apply a patch, but A2,
9 they were able to deal with.

10 Continuing to work on the east and the west side, continued
11 fire suppression activities, continued vapor suppression where we
12 saw visible vapor.

13 They got to what has now been defined as the A1 car. It was
14 clear the housing was missing. It was clear several of the valves
15 had been compromised, and the interesting part about that initial
16 discovery is there was no visible vapor. There was no noise. It
17 appeared check valve systems were working. Again, it was an issue
18 that was going to have to be addressed, but it was definitely
19 something we took note of, and we were continuing to actively
20 monitor and watch.

21 We continued working through the day, into the evening, just
22 water supply, bringing in more rock, bringing in more rig mats,
23 getting more and more responders to say. Again, we brought in
24 additional folks from companies all over to help with the damage
25 assessment process. Started working on solution options. Yeah,

1 so it was coming to light there that A6, A2 and A1 were definitely
2 three of, three of our potential major issues, and water
3 suppression was -- water supply and vapor suppression were key to
4 us continuing to evaluate this and start working towards
5 solutions.

6 As they worked to get the other cars in the area kind of
7 moved out of the way, it became very clear, and we made it very
8 clear internally that these cars that we've identified are not
9 just something folks are going to be able to connect on to move.
10 Like this is going to be something we've got to be very strategic
11 and methodic on. So they continued to work the other cars out of
12 the way.

13 As we were getting into the evening hours of that second day,
14 I don't know the specific time, the car identified now as A3 was
15 kind of the next car in the line up to move. It was decided based
16 on the assessments we had, the car appeared to be very stable.
17 The housing was intact. Valves were in place. There was no
18 notable visible -- there's no noise. There's nothing visible
19 coming from it. So it was still kind of in the right-of-way, and
20 we decided to -- they asked if we could look at moving it. It was
21 decided to move it, but only go a short distance, just kind of get
22 it a little bit more out of the right-of-way.

23 As our mechanical crews got down there and hooked on, they
24 started to make their move. I don't know if they went more than
25 20 feet, and the car became very angry, started to have visible

1 vapor releasing from up around the housing, down by the body
2 bolsters. Luckily, we had people in the right place with the
3 right respiratory protection. They were working down or upwind as
4 much as possible. So they were able to disconnect, step away.
5 Everybody was able to get out of the area.

6 At this point in time, I considered we had very heavy visible
7 vapor coming out of the car. And one of the challenges was we had
8 been able to stabilize stuff with the surface water, and so we had
9 -- I think one of the fire pumps had -- was out of service at that
10 time, but we were able to get water supply in place to help knock
11 that vapor down. Simultaneously we were able to utilize mud
12 essentially to kind of start packing around the housing. They
13 re-tarped the top of the car. We were able to get a big heavy
14 tarp over the top of the car, and then we put some more wet soil
15 on top of it, and then continued vapor suppression with the car.

16 At that point in time, I believe that was when the Chief
17 opted to pull everybody out of town just because there was a
18 precautionary. There was -- it was notable vapor releasing from
19 the car, but thankfully with the resources we had immediately down
20 in the area, we were able to get everything stabilized fairly
21 quickly.

22 After that, basically we had a unified command group regroup
23 so we could understand what was going on, what we need to do and
24 it was very clear that there was no more even moving, yeah, moving
25 A3 until we better understood what was going on. Like I said,

1 initial assessment looking at it, there was nothing obvious that
2 said, hey, this is an unreasonable, unreasonable move. But, after
3 that, we continued vapor suppression activities, started working
4 on getting folks some rest as we were able to really kind of
5 stabilize things with the water supply.

6 As we got into that next day, because of the position of A6,
7 they wanted to -- we wanted to try and get it to a better position
8 where we could try and better understand what was going on in
9 light of what happened with A3. A lot of pre-thought went into
10 that. How are we going to do it? What do we need to have as
11 contingencies?

12 So one of the things that we put together was a MagPatch to
13 go over the visible opening. The MagPatch is not going to stop a
14 leak on a traditional pressure car, but it could help with vapor
15 suppression. So we drove a hole in the MagPatch, were able to
16 attach a valve and a fitting, so that we could direct the vapor
17 into a line, and then run it through an anhydrous flare, and it
18 worked well. We were able to move the A6 car, get the high side
19 down to more of a level area. Obviously we anticipated some -- if
20 there was a refrigerated product, we did anticipate it was going
21 to agitate it, but we had the personnel and resources in place to
22 get that, to get that system in place and flaring, and it did, it
23 did work well.

24 Once we were able to get the A6 car moved, we were able to
25 finally take a closer look at the housing. When we got to the

1 housing, the protective housing was bent. So we weren't able to
2 open it in a traditional sense. It was clear that the valves had
3 been heavily involved in the fire. So there was, there was some
4 concerns there about functionality, if it would operate as
5 required for just additional mitigation measures down the line.

6 But getting that MagPatch with the valve on it to redirect
7 vapor to the flare was a really big step and also we were able to
8 get to that next layer of the onion to understand potentially what
9 other requests or personnel or resources we needed to explore.

10 This was also when the conversation about explore hot tapping
11 became more and more -- came to the table more and more. I know
12 we started to reach out, not only to the agencies to see if this
13 is something that would be acceptable or feasible, but also taking
14 a look at, based on what we saw with A3, based on the fire that we
15 had involved, is this going to be a reasonable risk? Is this
16 something that's worth exploring? So we really started to look at
17 hot tapping from all angles or does our approach just need to be
18 continued flaring, continued vapor suppression through tarping and
19 water curtains.

20 As we got the A6 car moved and stabilized, we were able to
21 get more vapor suppression systems in place. We engineered all
22 kind of creative sprinkler systems, not only using our fire pumps
23 but also using trash pumps and other industrial type pumps.

24 One of the things we realized, too, is that the surface
25 water, while it presented challenges for access, in a lot of ways,

1 was also a tremendous resource. So we were able to actually
2 really make good progress with vapor suppression with these
3 different cars we were identifying using surface water which a
4 positive side effect is it allowed us to really to help start
5 getting the first responders rested, get some folks back in
6 service for the community, but also again get folks rested and
7 just kind of continue to stabilize the scene.

8 At this point in time, we also had started shipping in,
9 especially anhydrous ammonia flares. We carry them on all of our
10 transfer equipment. All of our flares are capable of injecting
11 propane but we have some that are specifically designed. So we
12 were able to get those onsite, and we were able to start
13 installing them on more and more of the compromised cars.

14 And, as we got into I think it was the following day, because
15 it all comes together, this is where -- yeah, it was daylight
16 hours and it was -- I believe it was that next day, Al that was
17 missing the housing, we started to get through the air monitoring
18 program pretty substantial readings coming from where the valves
19 were missing. So, we didn't mess around, just basically put a
20 clutching tarp over the pressure plate, around the nozzle, put a
21 jet pump in there to hold vapor out of that collected space, and
22 channel it into a flare. We were able to get some small
23 MagPatches in place over some of the valves that were missing.
24 Again, it's not going to stop your leak, but just to help suppress
25 as much vapor as possible. And again, that worked really, really

1 well.

2 So it was becoming more and more clear to us that using
3 engineering controls with tarping, flaring and vapor suppression,
4 utilizing the -- we were having good success with stabilizing. We
5 were also starting to see tremendous improvements in air
6 monitoring quality.

7 It was very interesting with the weather we were having. We
8 didn't have wind, you know. Through the day you get thermal
9 inversion and stuff will lift. It'll go away and there was -- I
10 think it was the third night, we had no wind, and basically you
11 felt the humidity bank down. Activity onsite, downrange, we had
12 crews that were continuing to run, maintain flares, keeping them
13 fed with propane, keeping the suppression, vapor suppression pumps
14 going, but it took any anhydrous that was in the air and it just
15 brought it down, and that was -- yeah, you just -- it was very
16 evident with the reading.

17 That night there was some vapor that did migrate up the road.
18 We did have -- folks opted to move out of town while we worked to
19 validate where we were at on things. Was this an action level
20 that warranted a bona fide evacuation or not. We were able to
21 coordinate with Chief Wangen on that. Basically we saw a
22 measurable spike in vapor. Again, I'd have to talk to IH what the
23 readings were, but basically it passed very quickly. So Chief
24 opted that, no, they weren't going for an evacuation.

25 But, after that, again the command group got together and we

1 chose that there were going to be no heavy equipment operations at
2 night. We were going to go strictly down to flare maintaining,
3 water suppression, maintenance of vapor, but just didn't want a
4 whole bunch of activity. So if there was any more vapor trap --
5 we didn't want to risk anything migrating into town. Public
6 safety, responder safety, that was a priority. So, we were able
7 to get that support. And we maintained that program up until the
8 -- no heavy equipment or substantial activity at night until Chief
9 ended the emergency response here a few weeks ago. So, it was a
10 good formula. It worked well, and it really just helped us to
11 continue to maintain stabilization on scene.

12 As the days continued on, we looked more and more to hot
13 tapping. You know, the question we continued to ask was if you
14 move these cars that have had this fire exposure that have some
15 unknowns, is that the acceptable move? Is that the acceptable
16 risk? We had a stable site. We were getting more and more stable
17 by the hour and the day. We were being able to gain more and more
18 knowledge on the cars with each day. And so we just -- we opted
19 for those reasons to continue with that strategy.

20 As we got more and more stabilization onsite, through
21 engineering controls, we were able to bring in transfer trucks to
22 start transferring off the non-damaged anhydrous cars. We were
23 able to successfully transfer all the non-damaged cars, and we
24 just continued to flare those four cars that clearly were
25 compromised under different capacities.

1 So -- and we did. We flared through vapor suppression with
2 water and tarping and flaring, consuming vapor through flaring
3 with those four cars. We just proceeded forward. We had -- and
4 the other cars were transferred off. Eventually the four
5 compromised cars were steamed in place. We just began -- didn't
6 want to take any unnecessary risks. So we steamed the cars in
7 place. Once they had an initial steaming, again we were able to
8 move the cars up to the staging inspection pads where we were able
9 to try and pull any remaining residual product off.

10 Again, some of the questions we had was were the dip lights
11 (ph.) -- were valves operable? Were they going to operate after
12 what they've been through? Were the dip lights compromised? We
13 were actually going to be able to pull any product? We were able
14 to recover some product on some of those cars, and -- but not a
15 lot. I'd have to pull those numbers. I don't know them off the
16 top of my head. And then ultimately the cars were continued to be
17 cleaned and purged during high pressure, high pressure dry steam,
18 and then they were swept with air until they reached clean cert
19 levels.

20 I think that's the bulk of the high level story. I know
21 there's a bunch more little things in there.

22 Q. Yeah.

23 A. It was a pretty busy several days there, but -- yeah.

24 Q. Well, thank you so much for that detailed narration and
25 chronology of what occurred the first few days. We really

1 appreciate that. I just have a few questions.

2 A. Absolutely.

3 Q. You pretty much took a lot of my questions away, and I again
4 appreciate that detail you provided. You talked about a lot of
5 resources that were deployed on this from CPKC. Do you have sort
6 of an idea or can you give us a summary of the scale of the CPKC
7 response to this incident?

8 A. Yeah, personnel-wise, we saw six of our seven hazmat officers
9 and managers from the northern region respond to the site. We
10 also had two of our hazmat officers and managers from the southern
11 region respond to the site. We also had our environmental team
12 that we worked side-by-side with. They had their entire US team
13 or northern region team 3 was onsite. We had company police
14 onsite. You had mechanical engineering, operations, CPKC hazmat
15 environmental assets that we had. We had five of our fire
16 trailers onsite. We had three of our incident management trailers
17 onsite. Multiple UTVs, tents. We had specialty flares shipped in
18 from Calgary and Saskatoon. We had our air trailer brought up out
19 of the Twin Cities. We had transfer hose from our equipment base
20 in Albany, New York that was transported out to, transfer hose and
21 additional flares. Our air monitoring, our RAID (ph.) program.
22 We had not only contractor monitoring resources but also our
23 company owned assets from North Dakota, Minnesota and -- yeah.
24 North Dakota, Minnesota primarily responded in. I think that's
25 high level the bulk of the company assets.

1 Q. Yeah. In total, can you estimate how many personnel were
2 involved in this from CPKC?

3 A. Well, over 100 I would say, and that doesn't get into craft
4 employees, the operating employees. I'd say 100 would be a safe
5 number to go with.

6 Q. Okay. Compared to other derailments that you've had, how
7 does this one stack up?

8 A. This was definitely a technical derailment. Response-wise, I
9 would say that our -- this is a fairly comparable response
10 approach. We've had previous events in the region, and we've had
11 really good internal support to get not only contract personnel
12 but internal personnel that we need onsite. We chartered multiple
13 private aircraft to get people here internally just so that we had
14 the internal technical support, and then also so we could try and
15 get some folks some naps as needed.

16 Q. So what role did CPKC in the incident command or the incident
17 command system here?

18 A. Yeah. So, formally we had a representative with a unified
19 command team, and then also we were working I guess I'd say in
20 more the operations branch to support the overall operation and
21 make sure our appropriate response was provided. How did that
22 unified command program flow?

23 As we got into it, I was there and into it pretty much out of
24 the gate, starting at 2000 and 0800 every day. Aside from all the
25 side meetings that go on, there was a formal meeting where you

1 would not only have a job brief for crews coming in and out, but
2 also the command group could brief the group, make decisions as
3 needed, make sure that community needs, agency needs, first
4 responder needs and then anything that, you know, we needed to
5 address were run.

6 We had really good participation from our executive team. So
7 Mr. Redd and Mr. Andersen participated in those directly. They
8 were our leads in those meetings or our representatives with that
9 command group. We were there supporting them as needed. But that
10 was kind of the general flow. And we were there at -- in the
11 unified command group, I'd say that we were there as a stakeholder
12 but --

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. -- but Carrington Fire maintained the other role of authority
15 having jurisdiction as the IC.

16 Q. Did they have the ultimate --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- authority --

19 A. They did.

20 Q. -- for decision making?

21 A. It was very clear.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And it was respected. So.

24 Q. Great. And you mentioned different -- you brought in
25 different contractors and groups to assist with damage assessment.

1 Who did the damage assessment work on the tank cars?

2 A. Yep. So initially we had two groups. Initially, locally,
3 regionally here, we had West Central. We had a couple of
4 individuals from West Central we brought up. And then we also had
5 Chip Day with SRS came in on another charter flight, up from
6 Texas, and he was also working with individuals from SRS to put
7 those -- help put that altogether. Make sure everything was
8 documented on forms using the tank car damage assessment forms and
9 we've continued that process built in binders now. But, we've got
10 that all compiled, just for the record.

11 Q. Yeah. Is there any different information in those assessment
12 forms from the data that you provided us in those spreadsheets?

13 A. No, I think that's pretty well reflective. It's more of just
14 our own, making sure, you know, if the car moves a foot or
15 something little, whatever.

16 Q. Right.

17 A. But I believe the spreadsheet is based off of a lot of the
18 information coming off those sheets.

19 Q. But you have those? You still have those damage assessment
20 forms.

21 A. Yes, and they are available.

22 Q. Yes. Okay. We'll probably ask for those.

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. And those are -- SRS put those together?

25 A. Yeah, Chip Day of SRS and Sam Barrent (ph.) with West

1 Central.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. We have -- and we have those. Those are something that are
4 turned in every day. So we have those in our custody if that's
5 something you guys need.

6 Q. Okay. And you mentioned the A6 car. That was the first car
7 that you had a visible release from. Is that correct?

8 A. That was the first car that we had a visible hole in. There
9 was visible vapor as we got into the suppression. Again, exactly
10 what car, it was hard to tell just because of all the heavier
11 smoke we had going on, and that was part of the reason we decided,
12 you know, decided that, hey, we need to start potentially moving
13 some of these cars to better understand where is this, but the A6
14 car was the first car that we had the visible hole or breach in.

15 Q. When did you first learn that anhydrous ammonia was releasing
16 from any of the cars? At what point?

17 A. The first time I actually visually confirmed it was when I
18 got onsite, and we started to do that recon walk. You could see
19 little bits of white, but it was hard to tell if it -- it was hard
20 to tell exactly what was going on with all the smoke. But, I
21 don't know if that --

22 Q. So when was that about? Midday on the first day.

23 A. Yeah, midday, early afternoon --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. -- walking downrange.

1 Q. Okay. And you mentioned you instituted this air monitoring
2 program. What was the highest concentration of ammonia detected?

3 A. I would have to refer back to our IH group. Tara Hill would
4 be the best person to talk about that. She's got all that data.

5 Q. Tara.

6 A. Tara Hill, yes, sir.

7 Q. Okay. And with respect to the plume model that was
8 developed, did you have any involvement in that?

9 A. No, that was Tara's group.

10 Q. That was Tara as well.

11 A. Yep, working with GHD.

12 Q. All right. You mentioned that you took an approach to pause
13 and reevaluate. What prompted that position, that -- what
14 influenced those decisions?

15 A. Good training. I had a lot of really good mentors. So, you
16 know, there's -- everybody needs to go home the way they came out.
17 So just -- when you don't know, it doesn't mean keep doing
18 something. So we just -- yeah, just training I'd say has been --
19 good training and good programs.

20 Q. And how did that -- did the contractors you brought in, since
21 you mentioned, SRS, Chip Day, did they have any -- did they
22 provide you any suggested actions or input as to what you should
23 be doing to address the releases on the cars?

24 A. Yeah, there was -- some of it was, you know, even requested,
25 you know. Nobody knows everything, right. Nobody can see

1 everything.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. So, yeah, they were part of the collaboration process of
4 coming to put the final strategies in place, but again, as we
5 worked through strategies that were brought to the table through
6 different selected individuals, it ultimately was all run through
7 the unified command group. You know, if that group didn't feel it
8 was acceptable, then that was that. And also internally, we were
9 working through that same hazard analysis internally of is this
10 option the best option for the response?

11 Q. Who made those decisions? Was it you or your contractors?

12 A. Internally?

13 Q. Yeah.

14 A. It was the CP group. We'd take that back offline. We had
15 our own daily call internally, and we would -- actually multiple
16 daily calls, but we would work through those collectively with our
17 corporate team. But, no, it was -- that was -- contractors were
18 part of the mitigation process, the solution process, but those
19 final decisions came through the CPKC and the kind of working
20 group we had going internally.

21 Q. You mentioned they attended the incident command briefings.

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. And so they provided technical support --

24 A. Yep.

25 Q. -- to those meetings?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Good. What contact did you have with any of the shippers?

3 A. Me personally, direct, I did not. We were working with our
4 corporate team. There were multiple notifications. There was a
5 CHEMTREC notification that went out initially.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Typically a lot of that stems from there very quickly,
8 getting SDSes, et cetera and then those conversations just kind of
9 blossom from there as our needs questions evolve.

10 Q. Did you have to resort to asking for any technical input from
11 the shippers as to how to address releases of the materials or --

12 A. No, we were -- they were made aware, and we were able to
13 utilize the trained staff we had onsite. We were able to work
14 through that. Obviously they are a resource and option but with
15 the group and the technical specialty we were bringing in from the
16 contracts, we were able to work through it.

17 Q. How much did you rely on the safety data sheets for technical
18 information on the response?

19 A. That was part of everything. That sets your baseline. So,
20 air monitoring is the big cornerstone of the response. That's
21 where it all starts obviously. We're fortunate to have Tara
22 internally. She's our IH. She also will come out to the field.
23 So, as she was traveling here, she was working with GHD and others
24 to make sure we were having that field ready resources as we were
25 all responding and as well have that baseline.

1 Q. Okay. And you mentioned the responders or your folks noted
2 popping or -- what did you mean by that? Is that -- are you
3 talking about pressure release or some other --

4 A. That's what was described to me. Again, I can't say exactly
5 what it was, but it, you know, led me to believe that we just
6 needed to do continued investigation, that clearly something's
7 going on. And like I said, with the smoke condition we had and
8 the access issues we had, leads your mind to believe things, but
9 like I said, it was one of those signals that said we need to keep
10 investigating. We need to continue mitigation efforts so we can
11 accurately define and understand what's potentially going on here.

12 Q. And when did -- when was the first actuation of a pressure
13 release device?

14 A. I don't know off the top. I have no idea.

15 Q. Did you personally note one?

16 A. I did not. There's the one that I heard when I went
17 downrange with the assistant chief to do a recon walk. Prior to
18 that, like I said --

19 Q. And when was that?

20 A. Around the 1300 hour on the 5th.

21 Q. On day 1?

22 A. Yeah, on the 5th, yeah.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Yeah, we'd have to --

25 Q. Did anyone note those sorts of events or record the

1 information?

2 A. Yeah. The fire department did make mention that they had
3 heard some noises early on. Again, they weren't able to validate
4 what specifically it was, what car. I do know that through the
5 damage assessment process with some of the personnel assigned
6 there, they were able -- I think there were some events recorded,
7 but what cars, what specifically it was, I can't speak to what
8 that was.

9 Q. And that would be among the records you mentioned --

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. -- just a minute ago, that the SRS --

12 A. And West Central.

13 Q. -- and West Central?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Okay. So there could be additional notation of pressure
16 release device activity on those records?

17 A. Potentially, yes.

18 Q. Okay. All right. My last question at least for now is what
19 do you think about the incident command's actions? Do you think
20 they were appropriate for this incident?

21 A. Yeah. we have worked with this unified command group before.
22 The responder safety and community safety is absolutely at the
23 forefront for them. That's -- yeah, it's very evident, very clear
24 and, yeah, the community and responder and a safe appropriate
25 response was their priority, and that was -- it was our

1 responsibility to provide it, and if that was going to be the
2 case, then they were here to do the right thing. So.

3 Q. Okay.

4 MR. STANCIL: All right. I'm going to pass it around the
5 room now and let our colleagues ask questions. Please speak
6 loudly and first I'll go to my right to Mr. Gonzalez with PHMSA.

7 MR. GONZALEZ: I have not really any questions.

8 MR. STANCIL: Okay. Mr. Lawler with Trinity.

9 MR. LAWLER: No questions.

10 MR. MILLER: Dion Miller with FRA hazmat.

11 BY MR. MILLER:

12 Q. Was there -- during your response was there any time you guys
13 thought about talking with the fire chief about doing a mandatory
14 evacuation? Was it ever brought up?

15 A. The clarification of what evacuation was in place, we did
16 have that conversation. But, no, we never made a recommendation
17 to him that, hey. Obviously we would provide the resources and
18 information and with him having the authority and having
19 jurisdiction, let him decide what that appropriate call was for
20 the community.

21 Q. Okay. You mentioned that the ditch was deep. Did you guys
22 use the water? Did you see if it was up on the ballast rocks or
23 anything like that, how high up on it, it was on the track, did
24 you notice?

25 A. It was up to the edge of the road. I guess with all the fire

1 and cars in the way, it was hard to see exactly where everything
2 was on that side but, yeah, I mean I do -- it was up to the edge
3 of the road, but that's --

4 Q. Not on the roadbed or the tracks, you couldn't tell?

5 A. I couldn't directly see it. I can't recall.

6 MR. MILLER: That's all I have.

7 MR. STANCIL: Thank you, Mr. Miller. Mr. Kozy, CPKC.

8 BY MR. KOZY:

9 Q. I just have one clarifying question. You talked about
10 response strategies and the hazmat team deciding, the contractors
11 gave information. You guys ultimately decided on the strategies.
12 Those strategies were then presented to the Chief for I guess
13 ultimate decision --

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. -- as to what they were going to do?

16 A. Correct. Chief has the authority having jurisdiction, yeah,
17 everything was brought to him for final approval.

18 MR. KOZY: That's all I have.

19 MR. STANCIL: Mr. Walker, FRA.

20 MR. WALKER: I have no questions. Thank you.

21 MR. STANCIL: Okay. Mr. Strot, NTSB.

22 MR. STROT: Ben Strot, NTSB.

23 BY MR. STROT:

24 Q. Ed, I just want to go back to the very beginning. I just
25 have two clarifying questions. You said -- do you remember what

1 superintendent contacted you?

2 A. Yeah, it would be superintendent, Ross McMann.

3 Q. Okay. And then you were talking about discussing with the
4 Chief about using AskRail as you were coming in. Do you know if
5 he ever accessed AskRail to get the list of the train?

6 A. I'd have to go back and confirm with him, but I know that we
7 did talk about referencing it just as busy as a response can be on
8 the front end.

9 Q. Do you know when and how he got the consist? Did you ever
10 hear anything about that?

11 A. I would have to go back and clarify with them. I know that
12 we made -- I know that we emailed it his email address. I don't
13 have that exact time in front of me. I know it was very, very
14 early on and everything.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. But, yeah, I'd have to go back and clarify exactly where he
17 got it.

18 Q. Okay. No problem. Appreciate it.

19 MR. STROT: That's all I have.

20 MR. STANCIL: Mr. Casaceli.

21 BY MR. CASACELI:

22 Q. Thank you, Ed. You're almost done. Dave Casaceli, NTSB.
23 Another clarifying question on the consist. I know this isn't
24 always a black and white answer when you know this, but when did
25 you kind of feel like you had a pretty good idea of what line

1 items were in that general pile up? And I mean not necessarily
2 when you knew exactly what they were, but you knew it was this
3 block of cars, give or take one or two?

4 A. Yeah, that's definitely not black and white. The -- we were
5 able to confirm the book end if you will, what the last upright
6 cars were. I would say it took at least a day, and part of that
7 was we had to peel the onion, right.

8 Q. Right.

9 A. As the cars were all in there, we have to get that first
10 layer back like I said. We weren't able to confirm that. The
11 first tank cars we were dealing with on the west end were methanol
12 until we seen the manway, right. And so, yeah, it took probably
13 all that first day or first 24 hours to really get through that,
14 and part of that was just accessibility and having to peel back to
15 confirm what type of car was which as the fire suppression
16 activities were able to move forward.

17 Q. That's it. Thank you, sir.

18 A. Yeah.

19 MR. STANCIL: Okay. I have no further questions. Does
20 anyone else?

21 (No response.)

22 MR. STANCIL: Okay. Seeing none, it's 5:20 p.m. I think
23 we're going to end the interview. Do you have any final questions
24 of us or do you have anything else you would like to add before we
25 terminate?

1 MR. DANKBAR: No, I'm good. I'm good.

2 MR. STANCIL: I think you've told us most of what happened
3 out here hopefully. If we have any questions, we'll get back to
4 you. Thank you so much. We're going to stop the recording now.

5 MR. DANKBAR: Very good. Thank you.

6 MR. STANCIL: Thank you.

7 (Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: CPKC TRAIN DERAILMENT IN
BORDULAC, NORTH DAKOTA
ON JULY 5, 2024
Interview of Edward Dankbar

ACCIDENT NO.: RRD24LR012

PLACE: Bordulac, North Dakota

DATE: August 8, 2024

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Kathryn A. Mirfin
Transcriber



National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594

Transcript Errata

Subj: Transcript Review Request for: Derailment of CPKC Freight Train 242-03 with Hazardous Materials Release in Bordulac, North Dakota, on July 5, 2024.

Accident No.: RRD24LR012

To: Edward Dankbar,

The enclosed transcript of your interview on August 8, 2024, is provided for your review and comment to ensure its accuracy. It is not for public release.

The transcript is investigative information of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) created as part of the NTSB's investigation into the derailment of CPKC freight train 242-03 with hazardous materials release in Bordulac, North Dakota, on July 5, 2024. (NTSB Accident No. RRD24LR012).

NTSB regulations prohibit the public release of investigative information prior to release by the NTSB without the permission of the NTSB Investigator in Charge (IIC). See 49 C.F.R. § 831.13(b). The IIC has not approved public release of this information at this time. Therefore, we request that you refrain from any further dissemination of this transcript.

Kindly review this transcript for accuracy and provide corrections, if any, in the attached table. Please print, sign, and return it to me via email by **September 13, 2024**. Please delete or destroy the transcript after providing your comments.

Requests for an extension of this deadline must be in writing and received prior to the due date. If comments are not received by the due date, we will consider the transcript to be final without comment.

Thank you in advance for your attention to this matter. If you have any question regarding the process, please feel free to contact me.

Paul L. Stancil, CHMM

Senior Hazardous Materials Accident Investigator

National Transportation Safety Board

Phone: 202-XXXXXXXXXX Mobile: XXXXXXXXXX

490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW, Washington DC 20594

Web: www.nts.gov

Email: XXXXXXXXXX@nts.gov



National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594

Transcript Errata

TABLE OF CORRECTIONS FOR TRANSCRIPT INTERVIEW WITH: Edward Dankbar
RECORDED ON August 8, 2024

PAGE NUMBER	LINE NUMBER	CURRENT WORDING	CORRECTED WORDING
5	6	Kozy	Kozey
6	10	Sioux	Sault
6	20	We	I
6	20	NFP	NFPA
6	22	NFP	NFPA
7	2	Kozy	Kozey
7	21	hours	NARS
7	22	question	Equipment
9	9	him	He
10	10	to	Tell
13	25	offensive	Defensive
15	14	carlstad	Karlstad
15	20	each	East
19	16	that	There
24	7	refrigerator	Refrigerated
25	3	tool	Resource

If, to the best of your knowledge, no corrections are needed kindly circle the statement "no corrections needed" and initial in the space provided.

NO CORRECTIONS NEEDED. _____
Initials

Edward Dankbar

Printed Name of Person providing the above information



Signature of Person providing the above information

9/20/2024
Date



National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594

Transcript Errata


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PAGE NUMBER	LINE NUMBER	CURRENT WORDING	CORRECTED WORDING
27	11	They	Them
29	7	and	Delete word
31	3	Down or	Delete words
31	24	even	Evening
32	15	drive	Drilled
34	9	Especially	Specialty
34	20	clutching	Capturing
34	21	hold	Pull
37	10	lights	Legs
37	12	lights	Legs
48	18	having	Being
49	7	kozy	Kozey
49	18	Kozy	Kozey

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NO CORRECTIONS NEEDED. _____
Initials

Edward Dankbar
Printed Name of Person providing the above information



Signature of Person providing the above information

9/20/2024
Date