UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
LOSS OF THE SUBMARINE *TITAN* IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN ON JUNE 18, 2023	*	Accident No.: DCA23FM036

Interview of: DAVID LOCHRIDGE
Former Director of Marine Operations
OceanGate, Inc.

via Microsoft Teams

Thursday,
August 24, 2023

APPEARANCES:

LCDR [redacted] Investigator
Titan Marine Board of Investigation
United States Coast Guard

LCDR [redacted] Advisor
Titan Marine Board of Investigation
United States Coast Guard

JASON NEUBAUER, Chair
Marine Board of Investigation
United States Coast Guard

[redacted] Engineer
Marine Board of Investigation, Member
United States Coast Guard

[redacted]
Investigations NCOE

LT. [redacted] Recorder
Marine Board of Investigation
United States Coast Guard

MARCEL MUISE, Investigation-in-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

DR. DONALD KRAMER, Materials Engineer Specialist
National Transportation Safety Board

BART BARNUM, Marine Casualty Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

JOYCE THOMAS, ESQ.
Frank Freed Subit & Thomas
Attorney for Mr. Lochridge

I N D E X

ITEM	PAGE
Interview of David Lochridge:	
By LCDR [redacted]	7
By Mr. Muise	55
By Mr. Barnum	62
By Dr. Kramer	77
By Mr. [redacted]	83
By Mr. Neubauer	86
By LCDR [redacted]	93

I N T E R V I E W

(2:06 p.m.)

LT. [redacted] At this time, I have started recording which in turn will start transcription.

We -- it is now currently the August 24th, 2023, at 1406 or 2:06 p.m. Eastern Standard Time.

I -- my name it Lieutenant [redacted] I am the recorder for this *Titan* Marine Board of Investigation.

The Coast Guard and the NTSB are jointly working together related to this matter of the incident that occurred on June 18th, 2023, where the *Titan* submersible and five passengers on board presumed to be deceased had a marine casualty that occurred 435 miles off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada.

Sir, could you just acknowledge if you are here represented by counsel?

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Yes, I am.

LT. [redacted] And, Ms. Thomas, if you could just introduce yourself, spell your last name for us please, and also your affiliation.

MS. THOMAS: Yes, my name is Joyce Thomas, T-h-o-m-a-s. I'm a law partner at the firm of Frank Freed Subit and Thomas in Seattle, Washington, and I represent David Lochridge in this matter.

LT. [redacted] Thank you, ma'am.

And what I will do now is I will go around the room. To all

those who are in attendance, I will ask that each party speak their first and last names, spell their last name for record, and their affiliation.

Lieutenant Commander [redacted] I'll start with you.

LCDR [redacted] Good afternoon, Mr. Lochridge. My name is Lieutenant Commander [redacted] that's spelled [redacted] and I am an investigator with the *Titan* Marine Board of Investigation. Thank you very much.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Thank you.

LT. [redacted] Mr. [redacted]

LCDR [redacted] Good afternoon, Mr. Lochridge and Joyce. [redacted] advisor to the Marine Board of Investigation for the submersible vessel, *Titan*. Thanks for being here.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Thank you.

MS. [redacted] Thank you.

LT. [redacted] Mr. Neubauer.

MR. NEUBAUER: Good afternoon, Mr. Lochridge. My name is Jason Neubauer, spelled N-e-u-b-a-u-e-r. I'm the chair of the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation, and I really appreciate your time, sir. Thank you.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Thank you.

LT. [redacted] Mr. Muise.

MR. MUISE: Good afternoon, sir. My name is Marcel Muise, spelled M-u-i-s-e. I'm the investigator-in-charge for the National Transportation Safety Board.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Good afternoon.

LT. [redacted] Mr. [redacted]

MR. [redacted] Hello. My name is [redacted] I am a Coast Guard engineer and member of the Board. I apologize for my camera. I've been having Teams issues for a while now. I thought they corrected it last week, but as you can see, it has not.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Hi, there.

LT. [redacted] He is a physically blocked (ph.). We apologize for that, but that -- it may be just him -- really. So, it's okay. So sorry.

Mr. Kramer.

DR. KRAMER: Yes. Good afternoon. My name is Dr. Donald Kramer. My last name is spelled K-r-a-m, as in Mary, e-r. I am a materials engineer specialist with the National Transportation Safety Board. Thank you.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Thank you.

LT. [redacted] Mr. [redacted]

MR. [redacted] Hi. Good afternoon, sir. My name is [redacted] I'm with the Investigations NCOE, and my last name is spelled [redacted]

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Good afternoon.

LT. [redacted] Mr. Barnum.

MR. BARNUM: Hello, Mr. Lochridge. Bart Barnum here, NTSB. That's B-a-r-n-u-m. I'm a marine casualty investigator.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Good afternoon.

LT. [redacted] And Mr. Lochridge.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Hi, there. I'm David Lochridge. The second name is L-o-c-h-r-i-d-g-e. And I'm here as the witness today.

LT. [redacted] And if I missed anyone, if you could come on the line, but I believe we have all parties.

(No response.)

LT. [redacted] Okay. And I would just like to note, sir, for your reference and, Ms. [redacted] for your reference, that if anything -- once we complete the interview, the interview and recording will be transcribed. That transcription will be provided to you. You can review that, and then make note of any changes that you would like or anything that you may want to add or that you don't agree with.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Thank you.

LT. [redacted] Is that understood?

MS. [redacted] That makes perfect sense. Thank you.

LT. [redacted] At this time, I will ask if you have any questions, yourself or Ms. [redacted] before we get started?

MR. LOCHRIDGE: I don't.

MS. [redacted] I do not.

LT. [redacted] Okay. Thank you.

Mr. [redacted] I will pass it on to you now.

LCDR [redacted] Thank you very much, Lieutenant [redacted]

INTERVIEW OF DAVID LOCHRIDGE

BY LCDR [redacted]

Q. Again, good afternoon, Mr. Lochridge. Thank you very much for being here with us today. I'm going to go ahead and start off the questioning, but first I'd like to kind of build a little background on yourself. If you could tell us about your previous education that you have.

A. Sure. So straight after school, joined the Navy, trained as a marine engineer and moved to the diving branch. After that, I got involved with electronics for a couple of years and got completely bored. Decided to go back subsea again, retrained as a commercial diver, did that for about 8 years. During that time, about 2 years of that, I was involved with the UK Submarine Rescue team. And when I worked with them as a contractor, I dealt with topside operations, helping with the life supports, and I'm also qualified, EODC diving saturation systems technician. So it came in handy working on the chambers.

From there, they offered me a full-time position. I fully qualified. We used to train as hatch operator, second pilot and then dry transfer pilot. As a dry transfer pilot, it allows you to basically pilot the rescue craft, take it down, land on top of the stricken vessel on the seabed. At that point, it was depths of 400 meter, did that.

After that, I went back contracting again. I continued working as a Submarine Rescue pilot, as a contractor for the same company, James Fisher Defense, and throughout my career since then, I've training as an underwater inspection coordinator and

that led me to work offshore oil and gas, inspecting pipelines with the help of saturation divers, air divers and the ROVs, and it's quite a list that goes on.

From there, I also as I said, continued doing some commercial diving and I qualified as a sub pilot in Australia, Singapore, South Korea, and I was also the -- basically, I dealt with the re-commissioning and all the trials and training for the Swedish Navy to get URF back up. That's as we call it the one hit wonder. You can basically land on top of any Scandinavian submarine. I rescued 36 people at the time.

From there, I run a team on board the super yacht. That was *Octopus*. It had a 35 ton sub. I -- 3,000 meter ROV and a full commercial (indiscernible) that I was responsible for.

After that, life goes on. I was also a trainer for the Vietnamese Navy. So we trained them in all their positions to accomplish to P2 to dry transfer pilots as well. That's ongoing. I'm also been a pilot for close to five -- well, like, over 5 years now. I worked for OceanX and --

LCDR [redacted] Mr. Lochridge, could you hold just one second?

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Of course.

LCDR [redacted] Ms. [redacted] can you go ahead and put yours on mute please? I think we're getting some feedback from you. Thank you very much.

BY LCDR [redacted]

Q. Sorry, Mr. Lochridge. It was just kind of echoing back. I

just want to make sure we get a proper transcription.
A. No problem at all. So I also worked for OceanX and you'll see them, world famous for the best exploration company in the world, and we worked all over the place. I worked on the *Alucia*, which is a vessel, expedition vessel. We would deal with science and media. We did -- we shot "Blue Planet," the TV series, last -- 2 years ago. There's a TV show coming out on Nat Geo which is called "Explorers." So you'll see me on this as well. And yeah, and I continue doing sub rescue globally for JFD, for Manned Sub International, along with doing the science and media for OceanX.
Q. That's quite the resume there. So I just want to go back, and I hate to go back on the education, but you had mentioned marine engineer.
A. Yes.
Q. And you had mentioned -- which Navy? I hate to ask, but --
A. UK.
Q. For the UK, okay.
A. For the Royal Navy.
Q. And in the marine engineering, what did that entail?
A. With that, it was pretty much -- it, I mean it was a year of training before we joined. You know, we did basic training. After that, we went away to HMS Sultan. You would do a year's training there, and I didn't want to, but I did very well on the exams. So they pushed me into the electrical side of things which I detested, and at any opportunity I could get, I knew I just

wanted to do subsea. So I was put in charge of all the dive systems on board. Chief Stokar (ph.) put me into that.

So with that, I would do (indiscernible) inspection, regularly or strip downs, any of the gas systems, the chief trained me on that, and I was basically the responsible body on board the ship. And, yeah, but we also did watch keeping as well. So --

Q. Of course.

A. --at sea. Yeah.

Q. Of course. And so can you give me -- so you've given everything in there. Can you give me a little bit of timeline? When did you join the Navy? And at what point did you then move, maybe a year or how many ever years? Perfect.

A. You have enough time for all my contracts?

Q. Very good. So when did you start working with the Navy?

A. Okay. So I joined, that was 1989, left '94 by the time I got (indiscernible).

Q. And then you went -- you began to work as a contractor?

A. After that, yes. While I went to go work in electronics for 2 years. After that, commercial diver '96 to 2004. During the last two years, 2002 to 2004, I also participated in the offshore operational side of -- it used to be Grimmick (ph.), world famous, but now it got taken over by DiveX and James Special Defense. And then full time with the company from June 2004 to May 2007. If I'm talking too fast, let me know. I do like to --

Q. No, no, you're doing great. And just a quick question.
A. Yeah.
Q. And I know -- between Mr. Lochridge and Ms. [redacted] So any notes or anything that you have, if you're reading off of, if we're able to be able to get those, that would be great as well.
A. Yeah.
Q. But [redacted] and Ms. [redacted] will work together on that. But --
A. No worries.
Q. Just to kind of be -- I really appreciate that.
So would you say you have approximately between 25 to 30 years working in subsea?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And with all that experience, is the majority of it in marine operations, or was any of it specifically to engineering? What kind of engineering?
A. I mean, apart from my time in the Navy, you know, where I had the title of marine engineer and basically a tech. The rest of the time it's been in diving, ROVs, manned subs and also qualified as an underwater inspection, they class you as an engineer but for that, it's a separate ecourse. But with this one, you may go ahead and actually run the underwater inspection projects. So alongside the ROV superintendent and the diving superintendent, you'll basically dictate what the course of action was in terms of inspecting the oil platforms, the pipelines or any of the offshore installations from there. So I did that for a couple of years as

well.

Q. Can you talk me through that inspections process? Say not necessarily of a pipeline, but of the ROV that you're using. What type of inspections would you do? And would you be using a standard? Basically, if you could just walk me through it, that'd be great.

A. Of course, absolutely. So what would happen is if it was using the ROV and they were actually doing it on the piles and J-tubes on the platform, they would go down, get video imaging. And what we could also do, we could also take measurements down there as well and from that, we would make assessments of any damage that's -- we did find it. You would also be assessing all the anodes for corrosion on the platform. So you would be doing an assessment of those as well, marine growth and -- yeah, just -- you're going to force, you know.

Basically, any of your projects that you were working on, what happen is as soon as you do all your reports and all your editing, and you're talking, hence why I'm good at talking, you were basically talking the whole time, your voice whilst they were filming everything as well. So those entire packages would then be sent shoreside, and that's where the proper subsea engineers would sit there and do the assessments on the wells, basically checking for any of the damage, corrosion, and obviously the marine growth as well which had to regularly get cleaned off.

Q. Just to reiterate what you said, and if I'm wrong, please

just correct me. So as being the on scene responsible or (indiscernible) responsible party or operations manager, you're doing the on scene inspection of the ROV. And then you're creating a report, sending it back to the engineers. Engineers are trying to determine exactly what happened and why.

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. Great. And did you ever do any non-destructive testing or any part of any type of actual, you know, standardized testing?

A. As a diver, yes, I did. Yes.

Q. And can you explain to me what you, what you did and --

A. With this, I mean, we would do MPI, magnetic particle inspection. So they do that. And there's a form of x-ray that we can do subsea as well. What else did we do? This is going back a wee bit. I'm trying to remember everything. What else did we do? Obviously, lots of images, and we do voiceover spec (indiscernible) checks. That was another thing as well, and just verifying that the structures were actually sound and within spec. Yeah, that was again a general gist of it, yeah.

Q. Great. I appreciate that, the background information. That really -- that kind of helps set, you know, as to your credibility and shows us who you are. We greatly appreciate that.

Now, I'd like to move forward a little bit. If you can go into how you came to work with OceanGate.

A. Absolutely. So obviously, as a contract submersible pilot

and, you know, in between doing jobs as underwater inspection, doing months of contracts for James Special Defense, my wife actually saw an advert online for OceanGate. This was back in 2015. And so I was away. She was like, you should maybe give them a wee email, see what kind of work they've got on. The link says they got lots of fabulous projects, and so I did. I dropped them a line and the COO at the time, Neil McCurdy, oh, I see you're Scottish. He has a lots of Scottish roots. So he, you know, got the -- basically the conversation going from there, they invited me across.

We went for a dive on *Antipodes* which is a classed vessel, as far as I know still to this day she's classed by ABS. They obviously let -- wanted to see my skills and stuff like that as well to see if could operate her. We did.

From there, they obviously offered me employment. That was in July 2015. The timeline of this rough. And from there, as part of the employment contract process, what they said is we can obviously offer you a full-time job but it's all dependent on work visas. Now, I did have the B-1/B-2, C-1/C-D as a seafarer, allowed me to come into the U.S. for conferences and, you know, stuff like that.

And so what happened was they went to Immigration attorney, and they sought out -- initially they were looking at a J visa. I really can't remember what that J visa entails, and then the decision was made by Lisa Kristofferson, who's based in Seattle,

to go for the O visa which is an extraordinary ability visa and got that in a matter of months. Basically with that, you've got to be an expert in your field. You've got to have all this paperwork to back it up, recognized parties verifying who you are, yeah. So that got approved.

We, my wife, myself, my daughter, we moved across to Seattle, January 2016. And then from there, as the director of marine operations, I was also the chief pilot as well. Now, obviously when I went across to visit with them, they -- I knew they'd been on the go, correct me if I'm wrong, 2009, I think. I think that's when the company started getting on the go. They had a lot to learn.

So obviously I was brought in as the expert to turn the company around, and as part of the allure of coming across, their COO and the CEO, Stockton Rush, had told me that the carbon fiber submersible that they were designing, they wanted to get me involved at the build, the testing piloting, and then take it down to *Titanic*. What they said to me at the time was that whole process would be classed, and it was going to be getting classed through Lloyds of London or DNV GL, not ABS. That's what they told me at the time.

So from there, I'm obviously over in Seattle. We are happy with things. Everything's going good, and I'm sure you've read some of the articles and magazines, Andrea Doria mission where the CEO had a meltdown. At that point, unfortunately the company COO

and the CEO decided not to bother pay for my wife and daughter's J cards anymore, which is part of the initial contract. Anyway, ended up coming to sign a contract stating if I left within 12 months, I would have to repay them. So under duress, I signed it. I was told not to speak to the Immigration attorney at the time. And looking back on it, I wish I had.

And from there, we obviously did other missions. We did Alcatraz. All of those -- you know, it's like everything. There's always issues, but nothing enough to warrant shutting down an operation, you know. The manned subs, things happen, you know. You get leaks, you get -- that's (indiscernible) thing.

From there, I went along to underwater intervention, which is held in New Orleans every year. I did a big presentation, basically told the entire industry, stood up there. I was told that still by the CEO and new director of engineering, that I would basically be -- sorry, the company would still be classing this vessel. They wanted me to show slides of what was happening, and so I did all that. Obviously, I found out later on that they'd been keeping it from me. They decided not to get the vessel classed once it was complete.

The director of engineering, Tony Nissen, who you've seen in some of the videos online, basically kept me away from the project. So I would ask questions, valid questions. As a manned sub pilot, as director of marine ops, as a chief pilot responsible for and as I stated on my, you know, my header on the OceanGate

website, I was responsible for all topside operations, for all the crew, and basically anybody that was out on a mission. So it was quite a bit of responsibility. So at the end of the day, always safeguard myself (ph.). Safety first.

So where were we? There's quite a big list here. Okay. So things went on, and I was obviously held back from what was happening. I started seeing some of the materials coming in right about -- I can't really remember the exact dates, but it was from like, the summer of 2017. We started seeing some of the components coming in.

Now, as they would get filtered into the workshop area, the main operations -- sorry, I'm moving my hands, but -- and the main operations area at the base in Everett, Washington, we had the two other submersibles there. So that was -- basically I was in charge of doing all the maintenance, getting everything all done and obviously, the teams were training there for those two submersibles. The incoming shipping and receiving was right next to our two subs. Everything that came in was unboxed there, and we see it, and we get our hands on things.

Now, it wasn't just me that would see these things. I was two other -- two contractors that were working for the company. They've got their own credibility in their own right, Chris Ijames and Tym Catterson. Unfortunately, he decided to continue working as a contractor. He was involved in the expedition this year.

And, I would seen things coming in. I would address them

with the engineering director. Unfortunately, we never saw eye-to-eye. This is his first manned sub project. Anything I would say to him, look, we need to get this looked at, and that looks completely incorrect. He got quite hostile. And as you'll hear from the voice recording that Joyce has passed onto you, and hopefully you have a chance to listen to that before us meeting today, you'll hear some of the comments from that individual even during that meeting. I experienced that since that individual started with the company. It wasn't just for me. It was for the rest of my team as well.

So, obviously all that stuff's coming in. I'm looking at the domes, with the -- you've got my engineering report now. You've seen the cut out sections, all that. I mean, it's red flags. For something that's going in the water, it's going to see low pressure as soon as it goes in, and in terms of the carbon, when that came in, it was disgusting. Absolutely disgusting. And they had -- I mean, you could literally, you know, when nobody was there, sometimes the ops team would walk in late and we'd get proper look at it. You could see --

MS. THOMAS: Excuse me. Excuse me. Can we -- can I just have a moment with David?

LCDR [redacted] Of course.

MS. THOMAS: So can we go off -- how can we do that?

LCDR [redacted] We -- I don't know if we can do a breakout room. If we can -- I don't know if you want to go ahead and mute

and turn off your camera, and give him a call maybe. Does that work?

MR. THOMAS: Sure. David --

(Off the record.)

(On the record at 2:42 p.m.)

LT. [redacted] Okay. So the recording has resumed at 1442 Eastern Standard Time.

You're good.

LCDR [redacted] Thank you, [redacted]

BY LCDR [redacted]

Q. Okay. Mr. Lochridge, so if we can pick up where we left off, and I believe, and I -- if memory serves me correct, the operations division as you as the lead was kind of working in the warehouse and a lot of the things for the new *Cyclops II/Titan* submersible began to come to OceanGate.

A. Okay. Right. So, as the components were coming in, obviously with the hostility from the engineering director, the CEO, Stockton Rush, and Tony decided that they wanted all the equipment taken through to the engineering workshop so that it was out of the way of the operations team. That decision was made by them.

So as these components are coming in, I'm witnessing everything and along the rest of my team as well. I was very vocal, and obviously, you know, that's on paper, but I would highlight these issues to Tony Nissen, and as I can't stipulate

enough, he had zero experience in the manned submersible industry. Stockton Rush, his experience existed only with OceanGate. Okay?

I would state to those two individuals, as the head of the ops division, as the potential, you know, train -- not trainee, as chief pilot for the submersible that I would be going in, and obviously do test dives in and stuff like that, I can't express enough how -- I'm not going to say angry, but basically these components were coming in, and I could see there were serious failure points. And I would highlight this to them. He would brush me off. They would brush me off on everything.

So it got to the point, you know, where, yes, the CEO would come out on the shop floor and he would start to make digs, you know, about, you know, some of my team and trying to put everybody down. It was horrible. It was a horrible work environment. But, as the carbon came in, we saw it firsthand, and I could see all these delaminations.

Now, obviously the carbon wasn't the first thing to come in. You know, you would actually see some of the components from TiFab, which was the titanium. It come in. I saw the issues with the dome, with the ceiling face. There was not chunks out of it, but it there was chips out of the ceiling face with the titanium. Obviously that plunge hole for the O-ring groove, which is -- it's a no-no for subsea operations.

I made this apparent to Tony who just got in an argument with me. Being Scottish, I can argue back. I mentioned it to the CEO.

He just brushed me off and he said you don't know what you're talking about. My engineering team and I have designed this. We have been given reassurances by TiFab that this is all correct. I still said I had my doubts, and I basically asked for every bit of paperwork that comes with any component that goes on the sub that I'm potentially going to put myself at risk in. They wouldn't give me anything. Nothing at all.

The viewport came in. It's a big viewport. That is basically out of design parameters, and seeing this, I would ask for the paperwork, you know, from the manufacturer. The manufacturer was Hydrospace, which is in California. Will Kohnen, who has made many interviews and stuff to the press, he is head of the MTS. He made that viewport for them, which subsequently you will hear in my dismissal interview, was only -- Will said it was only good for 1,000 meters and even then it might fail. So obviously that was news to me when we were going through the dismissal side of things.

Obviously, the carbon comes in, I see the carbon. It didn't look right, and it did, and I was online constantly trying to learn as much as I can about this new technology that I was told was going to be getting classed. I kept asking about the classification agencies to Tony, to the COO, to CEO, and I was just brushed off every time. We are dealing with that. You don't need to be concerned about that. And I kept saying, this is my job. This is my life, my likelihood. You have to tell me. No,

you don't need to know. That just kept coming across all the time.

Obviously carbon comes in. I'm seeing the cross-section of the actual cylindrical hull itself. On that, before they sent it away to do the gluing, which you'll have seen online, which they describe as putting peanut butter on with spatulas. When I, when I went through this whole process and the company was using the Applied Physics Lab which was in Seattle, before they were dropped back in 2016, one, they told me the hull thickness was going to be approximately between 7 to 9 inches thick to withstand that depth. Every pressure hull that's out there for manned subs, a minimum of 1.5 meter, you would basically over build it so that you do pressure tests on this. We would take other subs to do 1.25 pressure, Port San Diego, you know, you go to Texas. All of that was brushed off. I just kept -- they were blanking me out of the project, but they kept saying this is yours soon, this is yours soon.

And with the carbon, as I said, on the exterior sleeve, you could actually see pinholes. So when the 5 inch thick carbon hull that they brought in, pinholes in the top. There was no pinholes in the center because the way they actually rolled it, it's like -- how can I describe it? It's like a green film that goes on to stop the sticking to the mandrel, so they can withdraw the carbon from the mandrel when they're finished. It was the only section of that hull that came in that had no imperfections.

The cross-sections on the side, all the way around, all the way around it, there was pinholes. I could see delaminations. I could see voids in there.

We -- the company decided the off cuts as they kept telling me, so -- and I mean, obviously I'm doing my research. I made as many inquiries as I could about the carbon. It's a new material. It's never until -- it'd actually been used once before on a submersible that was meant to go in full ocean depth. The project failed. And it was nothing to do with pressure testing the hull. I think the owner died but nothing -- that material has never been used at that depth before.

So, you know, it's a new technology. So you can understand my concerns when I'm seeing this new technology coming in the door, and I'm seeing problems with it, imperfections. And as I said, I'm no carbon failure analysis specialist. If -- I guarantee you if somebody from Boeing, the NDT section in Boeing came in and seen that, they would have chopped it up and threw it (indiscernible). It was disgusting.

So, they had -- what happens is when they rolled the carbon and they did all the carbon, they're supposed to basically wrap it and put in these ovens all the way through the process to get the carbon to bond completely. It's the same as your -- the triathlons, my bike was made the same way.

But the way they did it, they didn't put it in an oven. They basically allowed the glue to settle for so long and what they

told me was they were just hoping that every time they would do a fresh wrap, that pressure would apply the glue and actually evenly, you know, spread it so that they got even coverage.

I just had so many doubts about it. I had so many doubts about being blocked from the project, lack of information, lack of paperwork. As I said, as the individual that was potentially going to be the first person doing it, after a successful pressure test which we've been told was going to be done at Penn State, after successfully getting classed by Lloyds or DNV GL, which never happened. They blocked me out of that completely. Just more lies.

So then what happened was they had cut off sections. Obviously the hull was designed a certain length, and I don't know whether the initial design by APL, the Applied Physics Lab in Seattle, University of Washington, I don't know whether they used their -- what they determined to be the correct length of the hull, the tube, okay? I know for a fact that they changed the thickness of it because Stockton and Tony said, no, no, no, we don't need it to be that thick, which was outrageous.

And what happened was they cut the tube to length. They had end sections brought into the work. They got a local company in Everett to chop them up into little sections. Now, each one of those sections, it was going to be given to the clients. Some of the clients hadn't even see this thing. There was 800 grand getting handed over the table on one occasion before the hull was

even built. A lady from Singapore, her and her friends wanted to pay deposits to go down in this thing. The money was handed down to the company.

And these cut off sections, myself, my two contractors who are very experienced personnel in the industry, very well recognized, they were taking them home. Disgusted. I actually gave it to my former attorney who kept a copy. Unfortunately, as part of the settlement he poached it, which is unfortunate, and I can guarantee you that other sections of this out there, potentially for the clients and potentially for these contractors. As I said, I'm not allowed to talk about the company, and obviously (indiscernible) subpoena.

Then what they decided to do was they decided to go and get the end caps glued. I had no involvement in this. I was not allowed to attend. They did it. They glued it. They brought it straight back to the shop. There was no NDT, no inspection of the bond line. You'll have seen it from the social media videos, I was told initially that they were going to be using a machine.

Now, when I worked for my 2 years in the electronics industry, I used to fix screen prepping machines for PCVs. So basically their circuit board would come in with all the little pathways. Then what would happen is we had these screen printers, you would apply a -- it had to be a specific thickness of that solder, over the top of those components. Then what would happen is the component was placed on top, into the oven so that you got

the correct bond on it. They decided to spread it on by hand.

Now, who can guarantee that you're not messing up that thickness or not, batter on the icing a cake was even all the way around. Nobody. CEO couldn't. COO couldn't. Wendy Rush, the owner's wife, when we spoke about it after we saw that social media thing, she said she was disgusted. She's obviously not done anything about it. Not one of -- when I complained about it, dead end. Within a week of that arriving back in the shop, you could see the titanium end caps over the top of the carbon. They then brought in to cover the imperfections on the exterior of the hull, a company that puts on truck bed liner to your RAM trucks, your F150s. They brought them in. They wheeled it outside to the car park, and they sprayed a layer of truck bed liner on.

My question: why are you doing that? Because it will keep the water out. And is this a proven thing? This is to the CEO, the COO and to Tony Nissen. Is this a proven method? I've never seen this get used in subsea equipment before. We have determined that this is a correct engineering practice. You don't need to know anything about it. So they had a company that sprays trucks come in and spray that hull to keep water out.

So obviously, you can imagine my frustration at the time. I've already got it in my head, there's no way in God's earth I'm getting in this thing. No way. It was appalling. Obviously they're continuing to get stuff in, do the build. I'm seeing things, and I speak to the engineering director, the flooring they

decided to use, it's HDPE, high density. The engineer that's online would be able to tell me exactly what it is, but basically it's your -- what you use in your kitchen for chopping your food up. Obviously that's food grade safe.

That stuff they were using, it was rubbish from Home Depot, okay. So I said to them at the time, did you get the MSDS on that, the safety data sheet. You don't need it. I'm like, come on, guys. Give me the safety data sheet. So I spoke to the CEO in private. I said, Stockton, how can you guarantee that that's not flammable? This is going to be a lining in the inside of the sub. You're going to have oxygen cylinders on there. You're going to have emergency batteries under there. It's a fire triangle in itself. Well, if you're that concerned about it, take it outside and do a burn test. So I did.

You will see that in my inspection report. At the time, I did have on video, I did submit that to my attorney at the time. That has also been purged unfortunately. And that material, as I actually did the burn test outside, it ignited like, straight away. You have no idea, and it emitted this black smoke. The thing would still light for so long it would drip onto the asphalt and then reignite again, and that, the debris coming off it, was still in flames.

I said to them, you're not doing this. It's disgusting. You can't use this material. You have to look at proven materials that have been used in submersibles, every other sub. You know,

it's -- you're looking at everything. Even the cabling has to be inside fire retardant (indiscernible) so that if you do get any sort of sparks, it's all inside there.

And with -- on these manned sub systems, the way we run it is we control the atmosphere by -- the minute you shut the hatch, okay, there's no more air coming in the sub. The only time you've got additional air is if you get -- say there's a fire and you go onto your boat and breathing system. That is air that comes in, diving air. If you get any sort of issues in there and -- sorry, correction. I'll correct myself there. The air that comes in, if you allow high pressure air to come in and you breathe off of that, say you constantly have that flow of air coming in, what happens is, is that compartment, the pressure escalates and you basically over pressurize the inside of the hull, and that happens very quickly. And we do trials on a regular basis with the rescue subs, even with the acrylic subs that I dive in as well. We've got tables. There are tables out there with the classification agencies know about.

So the way it works inside the sub, you have a chemical called Sodasorb. And what happens is as those five individuals breath out, the carbon dioxide gets absorbed by this scrubber can with this chemical in it, like a calcium product. It runs a little fine, and it will spit (ph.) out. But at that point, what you want to do is you want to do an oxygen topper (ph.) into the system. So across the board in the manned sub industry, it's half

a liter per minute per man or woman into the sub, and that's the way you maintain atmospheric pressure inside a manned submersible.

So they're putting all that straight in this fire triangle with the O2, with the emergency batteries with this flooring in there. Everything had gone wrong. There was cabling in there that had none of the protective screening on it, and the engineer will be able to tell what that material is offhand. I'm not sure what it's called but, yeah, the flooring was an absolute mess. But they wouldn't do anything about it.

So obviously all these things are coming in. I'm highlighting everything to them. I can’t stress enough how many times I spoke to them. I spoke to the owner's wife. I said, Wendy, you need to speak to Stockton about this. Speak to him when you get home. This isn't right. Okay? What I'm seeing here is setting off alarm bells in my head, okay.

So anyway, push come to shove, we get to the new year, 2018. What comes back? Right. The sub's going to be ready March time. We want the ops team to come in and basically do an inspection on things just to see what they think of the system. Now, the two other contractors who were working for me basically made it plain, clear and simple to the CEO, because he's the only one that would actually listen to them, they don't want anything to do with it. They'll help them if they want to go out on ops, but they will not go in the sub. What does that say?

Okay. So these are guys with 20, 30 years worth of

experience. They've worked with James Cameron, run Delta submarines, which was a classed submersible which used to run all the Newark (ph.) projects. And they refused. Okay. So they would not be test pilots. They would not actively go in this thing when eventually it was handed over to the ops team.

So CEO said to me, okay then. You've got all these issues, we know Tony's going to be handing the system over to you guys in the next few months. Why don't you do an inspection of the sub as you see it? Gladly. My report, okay.

So everything is in there. There were things I never put in there, which not necessarily life critical, but components that were just shoddy workmanship. You know? Things that, yes, it was going to be going into trials and like every submersible that goes out there, even though it's classed, there are things you can change, things you can do to make things better. But obviously at this point, what comes back to me? We're not getting any classification agencies involved.

So I'm appalled. They've lied to me. They've lied to my team. They had been lying to the general public who had been paying deposits on this system. From what I understand -- I never even went on their website, I was that disgusted with them after they fired me for raising all these concerns. From what I understand, they had DNV GL header up there which it's basically conning people into self-belief that they've got a classification agency on board. From what I'm told by many people, they were

stating this is going to be built better than any classification agency can overlook a vehicle. This is new materials. You know, all this false advertise. But, the general public, unless you were there and seeing the rubbish coming in, they wouldn't have a clue what's going on.

So I'm not just thinking about myself. I'm not thinking about my ops team. I'm thinking about them because what they had told me was if we do all these tests, they were going to out to *Titanic* summer of 2018 in this experimental, that they were taking money off of people, calling them mission specialists, which could be (indiscernible) opinion on. I certainly have one, and false advertising. They were lying. And, my conscience wouldn't let me, you know, it didn't set right with me from day dot when all this stuff started coming in and it was with every parameter I'd ever seen it in any other system.

I think at the time, and I've worked on even more since, seven systems, not just running. I'm supervising, I'm doing deck (ph.), I had experience with, you know? As a manned sub pilot, you have to learn all the systems on these things. You look over all the schematics. You basically are looking at the belt diagrams. So that you've got 100 percent confidence that you can operate it, you can fix it because some of these locations oversee, you get no back up. You have to know what you're doing. So he didn't. So I do the inspection report.

We go into the meet -- the HR director actually gave me the

heads up that he wanted me gone. Bonnie Carl, I'd actually had been training her as a trainee pilot, she was the HR director. She also dealt with their accounts as well. Lovely individual. I can guarantee she would love to talk to you.

I obviously, you know, she gave me the heads up. We then go into that 2 hour and 8 minute, 10 minute interview where you will hear me on that conversation. I hope every piece of the opportunity to listen to it because it will let you know how sure I was that this system is not going to work, that these components that they were building it with are not going to work. And you will hear the opposite side from the CEO, Stockton Rush, from their -- I can't even remember what Scott Griffith who was one of the other pilots that used to pilot this on the *Titanic*, he was not pilot when I was there. He used to deal with logistics, okay. I told him, and so he was at the meeting. Tony Nissen was at the meeting. CEO, Stockton Rush, was in the meeting.

The COO, I don't want to say -- I'm going to really say, didn't have the balls to come into the meeting to actually sit there because, you know, we used to go on really well, but at the end of the day, he was a yes man. But, at the end of the day, he's in charge of the company, and he wouldn't take on board what I was saying. He was like, yeah, we need to speak to Stockton, we need to speak to -- I've spoken to Stockton. But he didn't even come into my dismissal interview. Okay. He told Bonnie Carl, the HR director, you know, accounts director, that he disagreed with

what Stockton was going to do in regards to terminating me. Scott Griffith said to Bonnie, this is wrong what he's doing. So that was (indiscernible), Bonnie Carl. Basically everybody else that was in that meeting said it was the wrong thing to do dismissing me.

So obviously they got rid of me at that point, and obviously, first thing I straightaway get in touch with L&I, Labor and Industries up in Seattle. I let them we rent property out there, I brought my family across, you know, from the UK. I'm like, what the hell do we do here? And spoke to L&I, Mark Gray (ph.).

So what they recommended I do because I said to them, I was fired, and as I said, you will all hear it if you listen to that voice recording which the CEO took, you will hear on there, you know, I was the backbone of the company. He knew this, but it was because of standing up to him and telling him what he was about to do was not just going to harm him, it was going to harm any individual that goes in this thing, and it may not be the first dive, the second dive, the third dive, but there was so many failure points on that submersible, you know, I mean -- anyway.

So I go to L&I. L&I recommend that I go to OSHA. At that point, I'm going to avert to my timeline. Okay. I informed OSHA after speaking to L&I on the 6th of February 2018. I had a very candid interview with them and obviously initial emails with a gentleman call Tobias Kramer I think he was. And he dealt with the health and safety side of things. Okay. I explained

everything that I was concerned about. That that thing was a risk to life, and it was unknowing passengers that were going in this thing, and it could kill them.

So he then puts me onto another department on OSHA. He said you need to go into the whistleblower protection scheme (ph.). So that phone call happened with Paul, you've seen it in some of the emails, and for OSHA, February 8th. On February 23rd, so I'm basically -- I'm sorry, that was my intake interview under whistleblower protection scheme.

I was then being protected by OSHA, okay? For retaliation for reporting from my previous employer, for what he was about to do could kill people. So they told me I was fully protected unbeknownst to me. OSHA on the 23rd of February did their own digging. Now, because I'm a seafarer, I am classed as a seafarer, I still maintained a seaman's discharge book (ph.) from the UK. OSHA determined that I'm a seafarer, and what they said to me was, we're going to get the Coast Guard involved, okay?

OSHA sends a letter to OceanGate that they were going to be acting on my behalf, and I was now under the whistleblower protection scheme. OSHA then informed the Coast Guard of my complaint. That was March 7th, 2018.

OceanGate retaliates with a summons and complaint to me on March 16th, 2018. OSHA then turned around to me and said even though you're under this protection scheme, we recommend you get an attorney. As being now recognized, I'm now being put under

pressure to settle the OSHA complaint, okay?

Didn’t want to settle that complaint. I don't want people to die. So I'm going to continue with this complaint because it's wrong. I know fine well and my friends will tell you, I'm never without work. I could go work for any of these companies. I'm not being vacated in any way but my reputation, before I worked for OceanGate, and even after, still up here. You ask of any of them in the industry.

Then what happens is -- so obviously OSHA recommend I get an attorney. They didn't do anything at that point.

On June 30th, 2018, I was issued with legal papers, summons by Snohomish County Court. I was served with papers the day after my father-in-law died. Oh, I better jump back. My father died just after I was issued the letter of summons and complaint. So my dad dies just -- I think it was March 14th that I get this. Then issued summons by Snohomish County. They appeared at my door and handed me papers on June 30th.

So that was an official lawsuit started against me because I still refused to stop the OSHA investigation. I wanted this operation stopped. I wanted it to be public knowledge to stop what has happened from happening.

Okay. Jumping on, July 10th, 2018, I'm in touch with OSHA by phone at least once or twice every 2 weeks, okay? Emails, I've got all these emails. When I get in touch with my caseworker and his supervisor, July 10th. OSHA still has 11 cases older then

mine but they will investigate my complaint as quickly as they can. This is July. They were 6 months after. I told them, they contacted the Coast Guard, nobody's done anything about this. All this happened as OceanGate received a letter several weeks after me logging myself as a whistleblower protector under the protection of OSHA.

Then what happens is we decide to change attorneys, and at that point, our attorney, he said this is too much for him. Then we changed to a bigger law firm, and that was July 25th, 2018. I was still under all the pressure that we got put under, not drop the OSHA claim. I wanted this dealt with. I have to make this clear to everybody.

August 15th, my attorney and us, we decided to countersue, and we decided to it through Federal Court so that the public knew what was going on, and it's the only way we can get the public to know what was happening and try and prevent loss of life, okay? We did that. Myself, my wife, Carole, and our attorney.

August 29th, okay, as I said, I'm on the phone with OSHA all the time, seeing what's happening. I'm under protection. I wasn’t -- OSHA had still not started the investigation. My complaint, as they still have several other older complaints to finish up, they will get mine started in the near future and when they do, they will be in touch. August 29th, 2018, 7 months after, I make a complaint to OSHA stating people are going to die.

August 29th, OSHA on the phone to me, tell me, because of

everything that's going on with the lawsuit, OSHA will issue them with a second letter of retaliation. Okay. A paper stating that OSHA are not happy that they're retaliating against me. I chase it up. August 29th, still not sent it.

Okay. August to November, I do have other various emails. August to November, I'm on OSHA. They have still not started my complaint. We're under so much pressure. OceanGate, as you'll see, it's public knowledge, we paid for our attorney initially, the first attorney, and then Triton Submarines and Patrick Lahey decides you need help, okay, because we know how much a lawsuit is, okay? Patrick stepped up and he agreed to pay our funds, okay? He may have his other reasons. Obviously he's running a company building makes submersibles, classed submersibles for the industry, that may have been his reason for doing it. You know, that -- I knew the guy. I couldn't have been happier, to let us continue with our lawsuit against them while I was trying to stop death. So, this was August to November, OSHA still not done anything.

On November 24th, Carole and I, my wife and I decide enough's enough. Okay? OceanGate started forging documents against us. They started -- they handed my old attorney a false performance appraisal that some did. It's probably been in the manned sub industry for 2 weeks would have received. It's not me. It wasn't my signature. The attorney has destroyed it. So we decided to walk away from all this November 24th, 2018.

OSHA, I'm obviously in contact with them, OSHA settlement release agreement between us and OceanGate. So that was November 24th. Their attorney's despite for us to sign this so that we walk away, we pay that money, we're never allowed to talk about OceanGate again. So OSHA on November 28th request that I sign an addendum with them and OceanGate so that they have a record that I'm happy to walk away from the investigation, which never happened.

December 12th, OSHA gets a signed addendum from OceanGate, okay. So their CEO signs this thing stating that they will no longer try to get us deported, no longer accuse me of theft, no longer -- or my wife, and no longer accuse me of talking about my previous employer or my wife, talking about getting in touch with my ex-wife that I had nothing to do with in 20 years. All this is in the settlement release agreement. You can see it, and OSHA got a copy of this. This is December 12th, they send that and it's signed by the CEO. I then send a signed copy after their CEO signs it, and OSHA then confirmed the case is closed and informs the U.S. Coast Guard as such December 13th, 2018. And breathe.

So I'm sure everybody that's in this meeting just now will understand my frustration, how angry I am, that nothing was done by anybody else. MTS, who's a Marine Technologist Society that's actually run by Will Kohnen, he built the viewport, never came forward and told anybody about this. And I am not wrong, people -- but this is all going to come out. And I think it's important

you as an organization realize this. And you get in touch with these people, you'll have heard on the video, you know, the voice recording, he said it wasn't going to work. It will fail.

I don't know when it failed. When you do your investigation on the materials that you find on the seabed, it could have been any point. It could be the glue line that I was asking them to do an inspection on. Could have been the titanium. Could have been the viewport. It could have been, as far as I'm made to be aware, it could have been the carbon fiber air tank that they had mounted on the underside of the sub, which allegedly was never tested properly. It could have been anything.

It could have been as well, and I think it's very important that you gentlemen and ladies realize, you know, obviously I hear things. I can't say anything. I hear things. I think it's very important that the Canadians get in touch and find out where that submersible was all last winter. From what I understood it stood outside in the Canadian winter with a tarpaulin over the top of it.

Now, just to make it clear, I've got carbon fiber triathlon bike that I bring outdoors in the summer and the winter. Carbon is not like titanium. It's not like steel. Something that's hard and brittle gets exposed to corrosion, it's something that is manmade. It's affected by temperature. Your engineer will obviously do some research on that as well.

Now, from -- going back, sorry. One more drink. Please tell

me if I'm speaking too fast but I'm trying to get everything in as quickly as I can.

Q. Mr. Lochridge, you're doing an amazing job. Do you want to take, do you want to take a break before we go back over some things? No? Okay.

A. If you have no objections, if everybody's happy, I would just like to continue. All happy?

Q. All happy.

A. Okay. So going back to after I was terminated and with OSHA, they take that submersible with the first carbon blend hull, they take it to the Bahamas. Can't remember what year it -- well, I think it was 2018, the end of the year. And the -- I think -- no, I'm not, I'm not sure. I'm only going by what I'm told.

I think it would be important to find out if that hull may actually be in the car park in Everett next to OceanGate's facility with a tarpaulin over it. Reason being is they did a couple of dives with the CEO in it. One with Karl Stanley, one with Joel Perry who was the sales and marketing director. He knew this was an issue, agreed with me countless times, but did nothing about it. He was forced to go on that dive where Karl Stanley blatantly tells the press there was so many noises, it sound like it was about to cave in.

So what happened was they brought that hull back to the U.S., okay? It was chunks of carbon coming off that, okay? So they then decide they need to wind (ph.) another hull but they take

everything, every other component off of that badly made carbon hull. They go away. Don't know which company they used. I maybe did watch one video online. They stated the company several years back.

They got a local company in the U.S. to wind the new hull after NASA didn't have anything to do with the project, after Boeing didn't have anything to do with the project, which is what is stated here when they stated that they did have something to do with the project. Same again. They didn't NDT it from what I understand and that you need to speak to past, you know, employees after me on that. But same, same. They were so confident in this acoustic monitoring system which -- I'm being tactful. I do like to swear a lot. I'm not going to do it in this interview. It was ridiculous. They had kids (ph.) making this in their engineering department. With the CEO, Stockton Rush, his wife, the COO, Tony Nissen, the engineering director, Scott Griffith, they're all witness to this. They didn't say anything. I'm questioning this. That's not going to work. You have this on the, you know, you heard it on my interview, and as I said, if nobody hasn't listened to it, please listen to it.

Carbon fiber, if you get voids, if you get delaminations, their acoustic monitoring system and the CEO admits it, would not detect preexisting flaws. It would detect flaws as they occur. Now, it's madness, absolute madness. Why not get something looked at properly before we put it in water, before you put unknowing

passengers into it. It's -- it doesn't make sense to me.

It's bad engineering. It's bad operations if the operations team had anything to do with it, which I certainly did not. After me, I cannot say who was involved in the build. The engineering team and I know Scott Griffith, this other pilot that used to go on the *Titanic*, which you have read about in the news as well. They just appear to be doing everything backwards.

And, I think when -- I don't think, I know when the MTS letter was allegedly leaked to them, whatever month that was in 2018, it was one of the people that signed that before all the signatures went on it, he said, Stockton -- I mean I'm hearing this from people in the industry. This guy let Stockton know that a letter was going to be sent. Go back to the recording. No letter was sent. No letter.

Now, Rob McCallum (ph.), who -- I know Rob very well, I'm sure he'll gladly speak to yourselves, and Rob expressed his displeasure at the way they were doing things. He was also annoyed at the -- I didn't know this, at the end of 2017 when they told him it was no longer going to be classed. He didn't know this at this point because he was also told it was going to be classed and Karl Stanley, right?

So these people did do emails stating to Stockton that what he was doing was wrong, risk of life. You know, you need to do testing. You need to do things properly. The industry don't do it this way, and myself and Carole, you know, she was named in the

lawsuit. I'm going to say that. We were the only ones that were vocal and actually stood up and tried to do something.

And as I said, in November 2018, we had nothing left in us. The organization that I was told by L&I, OSHA Health and Safety, the one government body in the U.S., and they -- I've got emails. They got in touch with the Coast Guard. Why was nothing done? That -- for 5 1/2 years, it's still been going in my head, and I don't understand it.

And, I know, you know, obviously the results of this forum that you're doing and obviously all these other people out there, I would love to know, why nothing was done. I personally think OSHA should be standing there and doing interviews with you as well. Why did they not stop this? They knew what was happening. They read my report. They got every legal correspondence from my attorney at the time. Nothing was done. I tried everything.

And when companies make lies up about you, both our fathers have died, you know, it was difficult. I can't express this enough, and I'm sorry if I appear enraged about this; I am. I'm disgusted. I'm disgusted it was allowed to happen. I feel so sorry for the families. Now, and I know this is 2 months on. I've been at sea for the last 2 months working on a project in Norway and up in the Artic. In between doing my job when I'm diving every day in a sub, I've also got this going on at the same time. By God, I did a good job. Trying to compute what was happening. I've got depressed, you know, I've got yourselves,

I've got other people. It was a lot to take in, and I do consider myself a strong individual, and by God, I wouldn't -- this, what's happened will never stop me going in a sub. I love it. But you've got to do things right. They didn't do things right. They went behind everybody's bad. They lied to everybody and, you know, it's up to yourselves what happens with them, but it's disappointing. That's the type of work I was looking for, there you go.

Sorry. Do you understand my frustration?

Q. Absolutely, Mr. Lochridge. We definitely understand your frustrations. And we again greatly appreciate you coming and putting it out here to us.

A. Yeah. Thank you.

Q. Do you want to continue or do -- not by -- quite continue. I have some follow-up questions I'd like to ask, just based on the background that you've given so far. And then -- and I won't take up too much of your time, and then I'll pass it over to some other people.

A. No problem.

Q. But I just wanted to go back. So in 2015, when you began to work with OceanGate in July I believe it was, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me a little bit -- tell me about your workforce? Who did you have working for you? What kind of qualifications did they have? To include yourself and the engineering department.

I'm trying to look at like, the corporate makeup of OceanGate. Who was hired there? Who wasn't? Those types of things.

A. Yeah. So, there's one thing I didn't write down at the time. So I had -- at the time, there were two contractors with very good experience, and before I even met them, I'd heard their names in the industry.

So one is Chris Ijames, it's spelled I-j-a-m-e-s. He -- and I think you should speak to him because he was actually out on the expedition last year. And Chris will tell you, him and I were on a phone call the week before he was due to go out with them again this year. And I pleaded with him, please do not go. He's still thankful to this day he wasn't involved in it.

Second person that was working for me at the time was Tym Catterson. That's T-y-m, and let me see how you spell Tym's second name. Yeah. So that's T-y-m, second name Catterson, that's C-a-t-t-e-r-s-o-n. Tym was one of the individuals that was actually involved with the expedition this year. He was also -- he transferred vessels when the incident happened. He then, because he knew the owner of the ROV company that went out to do the debris recovery, very good friends of his, and he worked with them previously, he then moved onto that vessel.

So Tym wasn't only on the expedition this year and whatever involvement, but he also got his hands on the debris that was recovered by the ROV.

I also had -- okay. So far, the Applied Physics Lab who -- I

can't say anything bad about these guys, they were fantastic. They seemed to know what they were doing. They were all over the project when I was -- even in discussions in 2015, they were the ones that were helping with *Cyclops I*, which was an old sub that was getting -- you know, we were using it as a test bed before the carbon was coming on. And the two gentlemen that I dealt with there was Dave Dyer, he's still with the organization. His second name is D-y-e-r. And Pete Brodsky, that's B-r-o-d-s-k-y. That was the two individuals, amazing gentlemen and still say this to this day. Absolutely no fault. But they were pushed out.

Q. Why were they pushed out?

A. Well, I think -- obviously from a point of view, I think you should approach the University of Washington. They will give you their opinion. From me, what I was seeing and hearing on the shop floor was you need to stop talking to them. So Dave and I at the time, we were quite close. We would socialize. My wife would socialize with his wife. We became fond of each other. It was great. He would come in, we'd share dive gear, this, that and the next thing. They were just there. They wouldn't even talk. This is a year after I had initially started with them. They were pushed out. And obviously the new in-house engineering team were the ones that dealt with everything with *Titan*, *Cyclops II*, okay?

Scott Griffith, the one, he was the *Titanic* pilot, one of them. You had Ryan Stalkfleet who is still there. He is also -- he works on the shop floor. He helps with logistics up there.

And you've got another gentleman, I don't keep in touch with these guys at all. Chris Howard, who is the only expedition leader I've ever heard being called an expedition leader who's wife would never allow him to go to sea. He still works for the company. Just know he never went out on any expeditions.

You had Isabelle Johnston (ph.), one of my trainee pilots. Isabelle, fantastic girl. She had enough of the company. Can't remember what year, whether it was -- no, it was 2017, she had enough of the company. She's now a saturation diver in the Gulf of Mexico working Oceaneering.

You've got Alexandra Russell, lovely girl, another one of my trainee pilots. She was great. She had too many fallings out. Obviously you can look through all of OceanGate's notes if you manage to get ahold of them. There was something went on with the engineering director. She decided to leave the company.

So the two girls that were working for me, no experience with manned subs before. Scott Griffith, no experience with manned subs before. Ryan, no experience with manned subs before. The two contractors, Tym Catterson, he's been in *Ghosts of the Abyss*, the movie with James Cameron. He's worked on other projects. He run Huddle, which is the Hawaiian Research Lab. They've got their own sub -- well, they used to have their own sub system. Chris Ijames, as I said, these guys lovely, 20 years' experience diving and dealing with subs. So he was there as well.

And then in the office you had Stockton Rush, Wendy Rush,

Newman Cardi (ph.), COO, didn't do anything. You had Joe Cary (ph.), media marketing, and I'm going to call him liar. You had Tony Nissen, the director of engineering with no manned sub experience. Basically -- and then obviously whatever the other engineers that would have brought for Tony or the office people in terms of media, social media, whatever. Full time for the company, eight, two contractors. Our contractors, they'd come in now and again. That's it.

Q. How would you describe back when you worked with the company as -- describe the corporate culture or the company culture there at OceanGate?

A. So -- okay. So they'll be compared to other organizations that I've worked for, like sub rescue, James Special Defense, it's a dangerous job doing submarine rescue, and it's without a doubt, you know, you're landing on top of their sub, stupid depths, we got a rubber seal bolting you on, there's pressure preferential. It is a family atmosphere. They're more corporate now, you know, they've got bases in Australia, Singapore, Korea, they're all over the place but, you know, the guys are still there that I used to work -- family atmosphere.

When I worked on the super yacht and run the team on there, family atmosphere. Everybody spoke to each other candidly. If you saw a problem, and I'm all for safety, I mean I worked as a commercial diver. I did things that probably I shouldn't have done at the time, but you come away going you learn from your

mistakes, and you do. And everybody does have a life. No matter what you're an expert in, one day you'll do something and you'll say, God, I shouldn't have done it that way. Next time, I'll learn from that and I won't do it.

And, I've seen my fair share of incidents, but not intentional stuff. Stuff that's been in classification. I've seen motors going out. I've seen water coming in. You know, these things happen.

The atmosphere there, I'm going to say it was toxic. And I think if you can get ahold of, and I didn't know this at the time when I was going to work for them, I didn't realize how many people had actually been on the books. I didn't. And, from what I hear, there were hundreds. Hundreds. They'll come. They'll go. They would have disagreements with the CEO. They -- issues after issues after issues, you know? I mean, for me, my biggest loss at the time was losing, you know, the two ladies that worked for me, Isabelle and Alexandra, but they decided enough was enough. They knew what was happening.

They, you know, these -- the engineering director not telling us things properly, it was like a secret squirrel club. That's how we describe it, joking back in the UK. But basically these engineers and the CEO were keeping everything from us. And when that happens, it's not healthy. It's not healthy when you know that your team and yourself are going to be left with that. You're going to be lumped (ph.) with that, and you're going to be

responsible for it. The maintenance, the safety, you know?

And as I said, my name was all over the safety side of things for that company, you know? And I'm sure you'll -- and I've not got anything, but basically -- probably do somewhere but, you know, stating that I'm responsible for all safety for all crew and passengers.

If I see something wrong, and I speak up about it, something should be done. And if it's not done, we all sit down and we discuss it. Never happened. Never happened. It was a frustrating time for me. A learning curve. As I said, you know, you learn from your mistakes. But I was hopeful that, you know, I could turn it into something better than it was. You know, something -- that's why I stood up there in January 2017 and I spoke to the industry. And I said to them, this is what we're planning to do. This is innovative. This is going to be classed. This is -- and I went on and on and on, and I made a fool of myself because I was lied to.

And, you know, I know obviously people are reading what they're reading in the press and I've done one statement to the BBC, you know, stating to the families and the rescue efforts and stuff like that. I haven't done nothing else. I am tied by a NDA. I don't want to be one of these people that is talking to every level, the press and, you know, that's coming through the door. My wife had people at the door while I'm offshore, the other side of the world. It's not a pleasant environment to be

in, you know. And, it's been difficult for me. It's been for Carole. And I'll tell you what, it's been difficult for our 15-year-old daughter who we shielded from all this when we were out there. Now, she's got people at school, like, I heard your Dad's dead. You know, you know what kids are like. They hear a lot of stuff and it’s like --

So it's been difficult for the three of us. And I wish it never happened. I'm not going to come right out and say I wished I had never worked for them. It's a learning curve. It was a learning curve. I used to -- I really enjoyed and I'm passionate about this, and I'm passionate about new systems and I love getting involved in this. But when you're involved when new systems, you're in there from the beginning. You’re -- nothing kept from you. And if ever (indiscernible) been kept from me, I don’t even know -- you know, I’d have dealt with it then and there. So, sorry, I rambled a bit there.

Q. About -- it's okay. Greatly -- really appreciate that. Real quickly, I want to touch on the DNV GL and Lloyds.

Did you ever see anything while you were with OceanGate of any type of correspondence back and forth, either from Lloyds or DNV GL or was it just word of mouth?

A. It was word of mouth, and it was the CEO was the biggest culprit for telling myself and the ops team that it was going to be classed and for telling Rob McCallum. So the CEO, he was the one.

When I started moving across, you know, we were moving across, you'll be dealing with Lloyds. You'll be doing this. Once we get the final designs on the go, yada, yada, yada. I'm like, perfect, this is great because that's the way a good company is run. Get the most experienced people that are in the company to not only give things an overview before it goes to DNV GL, because people miss things, you know? Some of the best designers miss things and you're like, well, I'm stating the obvious here. You're like, God. So Stockton Rush, Tony Nissen, they're the liars.

Q. And then just to be clear on that, it wasn't built or when you were there, you didn't witness it being built to any of the PBHO standards and testing around that either?

A. Nothing. And, when you hear on my dismissal, I think -- that's why I was asking for the paperwork on the acrylic, because acrylic has only got a set lifespan. That's it. So many pressure cycles or I think it's like 20 years when you talk to ABS or DNV, right. And if it's only done so many cycles, and there's nothing wrong with it, then you can get extensions. They gave me nothing. I -- and as you'll hear from the recording, they weren't going to give me anything.

Q. Yeah. No. I've heard it, yep. Sorry. Now, I listened to all 2 hours and I think it's 8 minutes of it, multiple times, so.

A. A long time.

Q. Yeah. So we appreciate you getting that over to us. That --

it really is telling. I just have like, two more questions, and then I'll pass it on.

A. Okay.

Q. So the -- I want to talk quickly about the real time monitoring system. And as a pilot, right. So you -- as being a pilot of what was going to be the *Titan*, you would have been on board the sub while the real time monitoring system was operating, correct?

A. If I had stayed and everything had been above board, yes.

Q. Correctly. Correct. So -- and if you, as a experienced sub pilot, was there a process and a procedure already in place with OceanGate for a post-inspection in which they were to have multiple -- acoustic emissions during a mission? So, for say if they went down and they had a number of acoustic emissions, what was the -- did they have in place a post-dive inspection system?

A. From not -- that was not information that was given to me at all. And any time I would ask, you know, Tony Nissen wouldn't give me any information and -- yeah. No, I have no information on that at all.

Q. Okay. And you had mentioned storage of -- while you -- not really 100 percent sure, but you had heard or believed that it was stored outside. How should or the submarines that you've worked with, how were they normally stored or how are they normally cared for?

A. They are in a controlled environment so that they're not

exposed, you know, if they're on a vessel, yes, they'll get exposed to sea water, but they're washed down constantly. But no manned sub just stays outside. Most of these, you know, most organizations have got hangars where it's got air conditioning, it's not exposed to, you know, basically the elements. So that you're working on things in a controlled atmosphere. So that you can work in a clean environment, because that is important especially with life support systems. And what you see, they would work on that LRT system that they were towing out there, which is not right.

Q. Mr. Lochridge, I myself greatly appreciate your time. I'm going to go ahead and kick it over to the NTSB to either Mr. Muise or Mr. Barnum. Thank you again, Mr. Lochridge.

A. No worries. Thank you.

BY MR. MUISE:

Q. Good afternoon, sir. And again, thank you for joining us.

A. Right.

Q. I heard you say just a minute ago some of the best designers miss things.

A. Of course.

Q. And we have your quality report that you turned in. I'm curious what other formal systems were in place for you to communicate or your staff or the crews of these submersibles to communicate those design concerns or safety concerns back to construction or the design teams and how do you track those to

closure?

A. Absolutely. I mean the first thing, if I was, you know, there's a gentleman called John Ramsay who, you know, I used to work with John an awful lot when we were at Sub Rescue. He was our head designer. He was the one that went on -- he designs most of the manned submersibles that are on the super yachts and all the *Tritan* submersibles. He was the one responsible for the build and design of the deep diving sub, you know, the full ocean depth sub, that does Challenger Deeps. And we would talk to each other, and I said, John, you know, if something new was coming in, he wouldn't just put it down and say this is it, this is gospel, this what we're following. They would come in and talk to you. This is what I'm thinking. What's your thoughts? It's like, oh, no, I wouldn't do it this way.

It's common courtesy, you know, that way we're all gentlemen, gentleladies, and it's like, yeah. I mean, if you saw something, you know, with -- I've been very fortunate with the systems I've worked on, but any time I did see an issue, you do an email and do an email to, you know, your line manager. They then would CC onto the engineering department, you know, say it was James Special Defense and I saw a deformity on something, you know, obviously constant failure of an O-ring, say on the hatch O-ring, I would do something to my line manager and there would always be like call the engineer for the company that you would inform as well. Yeah, so it was always an open book. So no secrets.

Q. So it would be the same as a major shipyard then if you're tracking --
A. Absolutely.
Q. Okay.
A. Without a doubt.
Q. We've talked a little bit about PBHO and class standards. What's the standard for actually operating one of these vessels? If I wanted to be a pilot, what textbook should I be reading?
A. Right. So controversial. They're -- right. So for myself, my own experience, as I said, I started as a contractor for Submarine Rescue. You go out there. There's a process within -- and I'll use James Special Defense as an example. And as I said, I also worked for Manned Sub International where we do the training for the Vietnamese Navy. We got contracted to train their military rescue pilots.

So that works, as you come in, you'll either have diving experience or chamber experience. A lot of people that are in the industry are ex-submariners or commercial divers or Navy divers, and for James Special, it took 3 years to get qualified. You've been a hatch operator for a year. You would do 2 week course. You would do checkout dives under their supervision. From there, once you're qualified and you gain so much experience, and you've learned the rest of the system, you would then move up as a trainee P2 we would call it, pilot 2.

From that, you're then onto the sonar. You're running the

life support systems because we can pressurize the back head down with a saturation bell, so that if a military sub is pressurized, we can blow the hatch operator down so that he's at the same pressure as what they are. Do a dry transfer and the two pilots are at atmospheric. Then you move on in dry transfer pilot at a year. I was -- quite frankly, I went through it 3 years in total.

In terms of the yachts, you know, you see people out there with the yachts, they'll do an in-house training course with either a Triton subs, if it's a Triton sub course. If it's a Bell say by U-Boat Worx which is the Dutch company, U-Boat Worx, sail as part of your package if you buy a submersible, you do I guess a 3 week training course for them. Very basic subs, they are all classed, okay?

So the experience for these people that do a 3 week course compared to the 3 year course, 3 years plus course, is very different. So we are obviously, you know, most of the people that I work with at OceanX, I think six, no, seven out of the eight of us, there's two teams are ex-submarine rescue. So the one guy who's Huddle who worked for the University of Hawaii.

So, yeah, I mean it doesn't vary too much but -- yeah. Does that answer?

Q. Yes. thank you. Actually -- and you mentioned a UK license or it that an NCA license or ticket?

A. No. No. It's in-house approved by the company. The organization itself, they were (indiscernible). They worked --

were ex-British Oceanics pilots. So they used to do all the diver lockouts (ph.). I don't know if you've read *No Time on Our Side*, our old boss, Roger Chapman. Pretty much everybody was ex-military, submariner and then from there, they were trained -- it was basically in-house training for those organizations. Whereas the yachts, the yacht subs are by the manufacturer.

Q. Okay. Do you know if the NCA has an endorsement for submersibles? Is there such a thing?

A. Offhand, no, I don't know.

Q. Okay. Have you ever carried passengers for hire as a pilot?

A. Absolutely. Not for hire.

Q. Okay.

A. Oh, no. Well, I tell a lie. Yes, I have. With OceanGate. I'm not going to lie. Yep, absolutely. When we did the Alcatraz dives, the Andrea Doria, and that was it. Yeah, that was it, with OceanGate.

Q. So only with OceanGate.

A. Yeah. Everybody else is scientists or they are military, you know, if we're doing dives down in military subs, Ministry of Defense. I mean we've had the American military and we've had U.S. Coast Guard then, yeah.

Q. If you care to, can you share the Andrea Doria story, your side of the story?

A. Oh, geez. Go by a copy of Vanity Fair, you'll read it. It's pretty accurate.

Q. Okay. That's fine.
A. All right, I'll do the abbreviated version. How's that?
Q. That's fine. Absolutely.
A. All right. So, I was dive leader, chief pilot. We made a plan that -- the intention was we were going to go down and do a 3-D -- basically do 3-D scans on the Andrea Doria wreck itself. Plan was, go out, see these dives over (indiscernible), and then after we were happy with this 3-D model that we were going to create, we could then approach the wreck on, you know, going by the sonar scans and obviously being hesitant, going on the wreck, and actually survey it firsthand. But plan was 50 meters off, set areas with known lats and longs, that we were going to be dropping into.

Day before the dive I've giving my brief to the passengers, and the CEO. The CEO then decided the day of the dive he wanted to take over. I objected. He said, no, just remember you work for me. I said, well, fine. I'll come in on the dive, but let's stick to the plan. Unfortunately at that point, I got into an argy-bargy with him. He said do not tell me what to do. I'm the owner of the company. So I stopped him. Please understand me here, this wreck is dangerous. We've never dived it. There's been like, 18 deaths on board plus obviously passengers that went down. We're diving this in a sub. We have to watch entanglement.

Anyway, boogle (ph.). I say boogle, I say. So anyway, I pleaded with them. Come down. So as soon as we came off the dive

platform, you know, the dive platform sinks, sub comes off, go down. Rather than come down straight on underneath to the known lat and long, he started pulling to the wreck.

We went down and we were literally 2 meters off the bow. We were on the starboard side facing the bow, debris everywhere all over the seabed. The -- two of the (indiscernible) were right up in the viewport. I'm like, oh, my God. I'm like all stop, all stop. Unfortunately, the CEO told me stop telling them what to do. I said, please, there's debris everywhere. We need to be careful here. I can see nets over the top, and the visibility is not crystal clear. It's not like going in the Bahamas. At that point, I said to him, please let's do this controlled, back away from the wreck. We'll do some sonar scans, what we set out to do. Stop telling me what to do. I'm not going to pull (indiscernible) like he did.

Anyway, rather than do what I say, he decided to put some air at the balance tank (ph.), motored forward -- so I'll do it this way. Motored forward so we're passing the boat from the starboard side. He came clear, turned 108 degrees and got us jammed right in underneath the hull. And there was crunching, and it wasn't pleasant. It was like, Stockton, what have you done? We're stuck. We're stuck, we're stuck, we're stuck.

And at that point, he did, he had a complete meltdown, First Coleman (ph.), how long will it take for the dive team to come out and cut us out? How much life support have we got? I said, come

on. The clients. Give me the controller and I get us out. No. Give me the controlled, I'll get us out.

So anyway, this went on and on and on. I got my head up in the tower so I could see the fishing nets dangling over. It's deadly. The whole wreck is deadly, as everybody knows. He refused to give me the controller. He actually hid it behind himself. I was like, Stockton, stop being ridiculous. Give me the controller. No.

Anyway, it took for one of the clients, Renata (ph.), who has since dived on the *Titanic* to turn around and made the sweary words (ph.), burst in tears. The other two clients, they were visibly upset as well. So I'm trying to calm them down, trying to get the controller to get us out. She shouts, makes the comment to him, what the F bomb? And he launches it from the back, hits me in the side of the head, the starboard side. I grabbed the controller, (indiscernible).

And it was 15 something minutes I had it out, and it's experience, and it's just -- he wasn't an experienced pilot. He just wanted to do what he wanted to do and show everybody as a CEO he was better than everybody else. It was an ego, ego trip that went wrong but, yeah, a full on meltdown.

Q. Okay. Thank you again, Mr. Lochridge. I'll pass it to my colleague, Bart.

A. Yeah.

BY MR. BARNUM:

Q. Hey, Mr. Lochridge. Bart Barnum. Are you good at keep on going here?
A. Yes, I'm good.
Q. All right. Thank you. You told me a little -- first off, prior to coming to OceanGate, I think I know this, but had you had any experience with carbon fiber hull submersibles?
A. Never.
Q. Okay. So your expectation coming over was that it was going to be this new technology for the hull, but their intention was to get it fully classed. Is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. So what would you say to the argument that this was an experimental material, experimental design, and that often, when conducting experiments or experimental equipment --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- you know, thing -- shortcuts -- well, not shortcuts but, you know, you've got to be nimble. You've got to be flexible. What would be your response to that?
A. Well, I can state right now that, you know, the confidence was high when I started making communications with them. The reason being is, as I said earlier, the University of Washington, the Applied Physic Lab, they were the ones that, you know, and I didn't realize this, I read about it recently, they'd been funded. I knew they were being funded by OceanGate at the time, but didn't realize for how much. They were the ones that when I'm obviously

-- we're instigating (ph.) visas, we're moving across. Everything was going to be getting done through them.

So I had the confidence that these guys, okay, people that had built carbon fiber landers and the gliders and stuff like that, you know, the AUVs, that, yes, it was going to be an experimental process. The whole thing had never been done before. As I said, there was one other carbon fiber sub. Don't know what depth it got to, but it was meant to be full ocean depth. I couldn't even tell you who the owner was, but it never made it.

The confidence that I got from the University of Washington who, you know, I mean, in terms of oceanographic site, they're very well known. They're one of the best oceanographic departments, I mean, in the States. So I've obviously got confidence, I've got people that have got experience with this material, which I haven't. They are guaranteed -- obvious guarantees at the time. I'm being told I'll be all aboard on this project. I'll be working closely with these guys. So at the time, I didn't have my doubts. But at least I could have trusted these guys that had seen anything wrong, they would have stopped. They would have stopped.

Q. Got it.

A. Unfortunately, it changed departments and it went in-house.

Q. What -- so while you were there, was the intention all along to take paying passengers on these -- on this carbon fiber sub?

A. Mission specialists.

Q. Right. Okay.
A. Paying passengers.
Q. Yeah. The -- just to following on that. Was there any instruction while you were there on how to refer to these customers?
A. None. I had no exposure apart from seeing them come in. Hearing the (indiscernible) 800 grand from a Singaporean lady, her and her friends wanted to pay deposits. And I think that's something that, you know, people need to speak to Bonnie Carl. She was the one that was seeing all the money coming in. And yeah, from what I believe, and I'm sure Bonnie will be happy telling you, it was going straight back out the door.
Q. Yeah. But there was no memo or guidance saying do not refer to these people as paying passengers. Refer to them as mission specialists.
A. No.
Q. Can you talk to me a little bit about the plunge hole on the ceiling surface of the dome and the collar? Kind of like, why would there be a plunge hole there?
A. Well, okay. So, every other system I've worked on subsea, okay, you know, some of the rescue seats have actually got the double dovetail, okay. So like hatch 1 on most of the rescue subs has got it, but it's a lip seal that goes in there. So the entire thing is filled with an (indiscernible) lock on the outside, not your standard single core O-ring that goes around the top. So to

get -- I don't know why --
Q. So was this a square O-ring groove, or is it a dovetail -- double dovetail?
A. Dovetail.
Q. Okay.
A. Oh yeah. It was, yeah, thankfully the --
Q. And we have drawings, too. I was just --
A. Yeah, yeah. So, yeah. They were using, you know, just like a single cord that went all the way around it. That was the plan. So when this thing rocked (ph.) up in the shop, I'm obviously seeing this. And then as I'm going around it, I'm flabbergasted that I then saw the plunge holes.
Q. Right.
A. So myself --
Q. Can you -- what is that? Why would there be a plunge hole there? Is that part of the machine process or?
A. Exactly. There shouldn't be a plunge hole there. So I'm not a machinist. I'm not going to state that I'm an any expert on that, but basically they're using a single cord with this hole, and what happens with, you know, submersibles obviously, or what's happened with *Titan*, in terms of a submersible, the -- it sees a low pressure seal.

So what happens is when you put it into the water, what happens is the water pressure acts on that sealing face, and the O-ring prevents at shallow depths, water from penetrating, okay?

That wouldn't do that because the way the dovetail worked was as that water pressure's coming in, and I know it's low water pressure, that's still a flexible piece of rubber. So I did a test when I was in there, and I can't even remember what I used. It was like, water hose. I got a flat plate on the top, and I did it so that I had sealing over the entire O-ring groove, but obviously I still had the plunge hole area that side, plunge hole area that side, put water in and it comes straight out the other side. That was me trying to make it as tight as I possibly could on the top of it. (Indiscernible), but I did this with one of my colleagues.

So I stated this to the CEO and he says this is all perfectly normal, and I can guarantee you that this is fine. This is what they do. I was like, this is not what they do. They do not put plunge holes in submersible systems like this.

So I wasn't there for any of the dives, but if you speak to Chris Ijames or Tym Catterson, what they had to do to create that low pressure seal, okay, which a normal O-ring would create, they put the passengers in, bolted them in place, pulled the vacuum.

Q. Is that standard practice for submersibles?

A. Negative. It has been done on two submersible systems in the '70s, never used since. I don't know what the failure rate was, but in modern technology, absolutely not.

Q. And how did they accomplish that? How did they pull a vacuum?

A. I wasn't there. You would need to ask the employee.
Q. Okay. Just a clarification here. You said you had attended the underwater -- an underwater conference down in New Orleans.
A. Yeah.
Q. And you gave a talk down there. When was that?
A. January 2017.
Q. And that was the one where you were told by Tony and Stockton that that was -- it was going to be classed and then that's the talk you gave the industry, okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. You said you weren't allowed to attend the gluing.
A. No.
Q. Who told you that and what was the reason why you weren't allowed to go?
A. Stockton. You're busy enough.
Q. Okay. So when you were hired on, Mr. Lochridge, who -- was there someone that had left the company that was your previous ops manager or were you the first one? Who did you replace?
A. I think I was the first one with experience. Now, I know they had two pilots working for them before. I think they came straight from dive school and Stockton Rush trained them. Nobody else came through the door. I don't know, I can't answer that because I really genuinely can't think. I don’t know. I don’t know, sorry.
Q. You were telling us about the Andrea Doria and Stockton's

piloting that. Where did he cut his teeth or how did he become a pilot? Who trained him?

A. God, there was an article recently. Cassell, Steve Cassell? I don't know. You would maybe need to look on the media. Cassell. I think it's the guy that -- I think he is like an ambassador for Luminox watches. You know, the dive watches the Navy seal was wearing and stuff like that? I think -- Scott Cassell. I think it was him, and he made a statement recently not endorsing Stockton Rush. So I think that's out there somewhere.

Q. Okay. Have you ever operated unclassed subs before? Manned submersibles?

A. No.

Q. No.

A. Everything was all classed. The *Cyclops I,* which was the steel hull, it used to be Avilla (ph.). I think it used to be Lloyds and then when they brought her across, the owner got the hull and life support systems classed by ABS. I think that was ABS. It was ABS. I do have paperwork on that.

Q. So you said you work for OceanX now. What is -- can you explain your job there and --

A. Yeah, sure.

Q. -- what did you do for them?

A. So, we're the biggest Ocean Exploration Company. It's owned by a wealthy individual. You can do your homework. I'm allowed to talk about. And basically, what we do is we are basically

trying to map the oceans. We are doing DNA sampling from samples we -- basically on discovery.

So we -- I mean, when we were up in the Artic, we discovered two new types of jellyfish with the University of Burnham (ph.). And so we'll take scientists down. We'll do media. They also do -- I mean James Cameron comes on board quite a lot as well.

As I said, you know, we do -- there's a recent one that was out, I'm in it. It was the company Vice productions. You'll see that online, and it just gives you an example of the type of things we do. The company basically goes all over the world. We'll work for scientists, all these organizations that are trying to find out more. I don't deal with anything to do with finances or anything like that. But, yeah, it's genuine ocean exploration.

Q. Are you a pilot for them?

A. Yeah, I'm a pilot and also a surface officer. So the way it works is it's a four-manned team. So we'll get two 1,000 meter submersibles, we take (indiscernible). We basically do every fourth day you're the surface officer, which means you're the ops manager. You organize a drive, run the drive from start to finish. Everything's there. All communication, everything. So, yes.

Q. Just backing up a follow up, a couple of follow ups and then I'm done here. The -- you were going through your timeline with OSHA and letters to the Coast Guard. You said you had emails of the notifications to the Coast Guard. Is that -- did I hear you

right?
A. I've got confirmation that they let the Coast Guard know about my whistleblower complaint. Who they sent it to, I don't know. And obviously when we decide, my wife and I decided because nobody was doing anything, to walk away, then they informed the Coast Guard that I was no longer pursuing it.
Q. All right. So you just have the letter from OSHA saying that they notified them. You don't actually have --
A. Correct. No direct communication.
Q. Okay. NDT, touch on that a little bit. And I know -- I think it was mentioned in your exit interview that I also listened to.
A. Yeah.
Q. But for here, could you explain to us why the hull wasn't -- the *Cyclops II* or the *Titan* was not a NDT?
A. Absolutely. Sorry, I should have mentioned this earlier. So what happened was obviously during the talks on the build, everything -- during classification, you know, they will do a NDT on all vessels, okay? Unless it's the acrylic spheres. They don't do NDT on those because they can't. But in terms of any steel hulled vessel, the titanium vessel, you know, five deeps, everything gets an analysis done on it to make sure that the component is good. It's a known component. It's being produced properly.
Now, what happened was I was told that NDT was going to be

done on the carbon fiber to make sure, and this is initially, when I was in talks at the beginning with the University of Washington, the Applied Physics Lab. They told me, Stockton Rush told me, the COO told me, that we will be having a NDT on the carbon fiber.

Now, having no experience at the time on carbon fiber, I'm still not saying I'm expert on it, but I know a hell of a lot now, like, fantastic. This is great. The talks kept going on, you know? With Stockton Rush, with Tony Nissen, especially when the carbon came in, and I'm seeing all these issues. And I'm stressing. This is a problem, and Stockton completely disregarded me. Completely disregarded me. Tony Nissen, this is not your business. What you see in carbon fiber products, how can that be natural? There's holes in it. It genuinely was like Swiss cheese.

Q. Was there any discussion on what type they were trying -- what type of NDT testing they were trying to --

A. It was so long ago. So when the discussions were done with APL at the time, I honesty cannot remember. But, you know, you heard on my exit interview and stuff like that as well, they just -- they kept refusing to get this thing tested. Not just pressure tested but NDT'ed and there's got to have been something that could have been done.

I'm sure Boeing that builds all these big planes and, you know, yeah, there's a delamination in that wing. My God. It would shut down the company. AirBus would take over. Yeah. I

mean it's common sense.

And what I saw and stated clearly to all these people, to the whole, I'll watch my language, company, was common sense. And I don't know what it was. I don't know whether it was denial. I don't know whether they are so subservient to the owner or his wife or the COO. I can't get that into my head. But it's common sense. You see something like that, oh, my God, you're going to insist on testing. Whether it be x-rays, there's got to be something. I mean, it was like the application of the glue. I saw the video. It was disgusting. As well, I'm sure, you all --

Q. Sure, okay.

A. That can't be the right way to do a subsea application. Another thing on the, not on NDT, but on the hull, I kept asking them, you know, is there anything just in case you get any sort of failure (ph.) point on that bond line, you know, the glue that they put on, is there going to be any sort of stiffener rings or anything like that will actually take up -- it’s like, you know, something that send compression but will actually (indiscernible) basically take up that slack if there's any sort of shock loading or -- because nobody knew what was going to -- don’t be ridiculous. I was basically put down, put down any time I would make a suggestion. And in my eyes, and still in my eyes, it was common sense, but I was dismissed by all.

Q. Yes. The last question here. The -- I think they called the LARS system. I don’t -- you said the LRT, basically the launching

and retrieving platform they had. You said it was not right. What do you -- can you kind of talk a little bit more on that?

A. When you say not right, are you relating to the point where you would -- the storage? Are you going to --

Q. I'm sorry. I might have misheard you if you didn't say anything about it. I thought you were talking about their LARS system, their launching platform that they towed behind the vessel. Do you have any comment on that?

A. I'm not going to say it's not right. That system might have worked. I mean I never had any exposure on the new one. It was on the old one. You know, and we had times where there was issues with the vents sticking and stuff like that. But the new one, I don't know. I just know that they got outside --

(Crosstalk)

A. -- boat builder to build that thing just outside Seattle. So that's all I knew on that. So I can't give you any details on it.

One thing I would like to -- I don't -- if I may, I'm sorry. Give me two seconds. I'm just trying to think. Yes. I think this is a very important point for all.

In terms of the vessel this year, because they used a different vessel of opportunity to take the sub out to the dives, everybody who has seen it, and it's all over the news, they tore the vessel out. I think genuinely that, not just OceanGate, but basically the company onboard that run that vessel, should be brought into question why there was no secondary means of

recovering of the submersible. That's one thing I never would have allowed.

If you're putting something on a barge, towing it out there, from what I'm led to believe, please chase this up, it couldn't be a completely utter waste of time, they had nothing, no means to recover this sub if the sub banks to surface and that barge had sunk. Nothing. And, considering that these people are bolted into the submersible, you know, even if you used main lift bags (ph.), talking as a diver here, main lift bags to try and right that sub.

So if that thing is sitting like this, how are you going to lift that? I don't know how heavy it was, but I bet you it's bloody heavy. How are you going to get that off and people out without -- it's mid-Atlantic. How is that even allowed to happen? I think it's something else that should be looked at.

Q. Was that always the plan while you were there? To bolt the passengers in? Or how were they -- what was the securing mechanism going to be?

A. We -- so initially they talked about some sort of hinged mechanism with a pin, you know, where you would lock it in? We were talking about some sort of -- now, this is before the project was taken away from me completely. We were talking about a means where I was trying to get them to use, which is what we used on some of the subs, and it's basically an emergency sea escape tower.

So on normal subs, you know, when you've got conning tower on top, what can happen is you can come to the surface, if the weather's bad, and you need to evacuate, you can basically on your emergency air system activate this, I'm going to call it a tower, because it is. Dom, dom, dom, and it basically inflates, okay? And what happens is the free board design increased 11 people to open to the hatch and escape through the top.

I made the suggestion when they were talking, you know, towards the end of what they were going to be doing and this thing came in with all these bolt holes. I said you need a means for these people to get out, just in case your vessel disappears, which I've seen, you know? They lose on tracking. I came up one time on a well going system, and the vessel was a mile away. They're not -- they're still getting comms, but they had tracking on something else. Tracking fails. It happens.

I tried to get them, to encourage them to do something to right the sub and basically create this emergency tower. Dismissed. Dismissed. So the whole bolting thing, that was new. When this thing came in, I just -- I'm taken aback.

And one other thing. I think it's very important. During the 21 expedition, I heard this from a friend, supposedly the CEO decided that it was too much hassle putting all these bolts in. That they only put in so many and during a recovery, obviously I'm not there so this is secondhand information, during a recovery at the back of the ship because they used to pull that LRT into the

back of the ship on the rollers, the hatch fell off. The hatch rolled down the rest of the LRT and caught on one of the valves, that's the barge. You know, the dive barge. Caught on one of the big vent valves. The only thing that stopped that landing on the bolt (ph.) next to *Titanic*.

But supposedly, two of the passengers nearly fell out the front of the sub because the way they recovered that, it's bow down, steering done at the back end, done at the stern where the props are. Another thing to look at. I keep going on and on about this.

Q. Well, this would have been before they had a hinge on it then.

A. Yeah, potentially.

Q. Yeah, for it to do that. All right. That's all the questions I had. Thank you.

A. No worries.

LCDR [redacted] Dr. Kramer, I don't know if you had anymore from the NTSB.

DR. KRAMER: Yes, just a few.

BY DR. KRAMER:

Q. Thank you, Mr. Lochridge, for talking to us.

A. Thank you.

Q. I -- well, first of all, I can't let this go by. The material is high density polyethylene. So as a materials nerd --

A. Very good.

Q. -- I have to -- yeah. So anyway, with that aside, I wanted to ask kind of a question about where the idea for, if you know, where the idea for carbon fiber hull originated?
A. I don't know whether it was the CEO or whether it was the Applied Physics Lab in Seattle.
Q. Okay.
A. Can't say for sure.
Q. But the -- I guess the root I guess of the idea was that Mr. Rush wanted a submersible that I guess had certain attributes and could dive to a certain depth. And so they were kind of trying to, you know, to use a cliché, think outside the box a little bit.
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And I've heard mention a few times this program called the deep seaglider.
A. Yeah.
Q. Are you familiar with that at all?
A. Is this the one through the Applied Physics Lab?
Q. I believe so.
A. Yeah. If that's -- so if that's the same project I was talking about earlier on, as far as I know, I mean, this is going back a few years ago now.
Q. Yeah, I understand.
A. When I, you know, obviously went down, met with Dave Dyer and Pete Brodsky, you know, the guys that were helping, they were

basically running the project --
Q. Right
A. -- that they'd been hired to do by the CEO. They were explaining everything, they showed videos, slides and stuff, and there were gliders there. Now from -- I've got no experience with gliders but, you know, my understanding is -- say AUVs, we've gotten AUV with OceanX. You know, I mean, they've been on the go for years now. The military's used them.
Q. Right.
A. You know? Unmanned, untethered, drops down, goes along, you know, site scan sonar, takes data from the seabed, pops to the surface, you know. They get the signal with all the results before it comes onto the ship or it's plug and play once they recover it. I know they worked on stuff like that. And from memory, it was carbon they used.
Q. So the Applied Physics Lab, it seems like it's quite likely they did have at least some experience designing with carbon fiber.
A. Correct, yes.
Q. In an unmanned --
A. Yes.
Q. -- scenario.
A. Yeah. Yep.
Q. All right. Okay. I've also heard some mention about third scale models and I was wondering if you had seen any third scale

models or knew anything about --
A. Yes, I --
Q. -- model testing?
A. So I saw it. Now only recently, I can't remember who it was that was talking about, there was an article. It may have been the *Vanity Fair* one. The third scale model that they did pressure testing on, now I had nothing to do with that. I couldn't even tell you where they did it, but it failed. I'd been told that it failed in excess of working pressure. That's all I remember. But I remember seeing this thing. And as far as I know, some of the ex-employees took photos of it. Where it ended up, I don't know. I don't know whether that stayed at APL or it was OceanGate's property. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay. All right. And do you know if any -- again, I understand that while communication was not necessarily fully open on what you're describing, but do you know whether any changes were made to the design of the hull based on the third scale test or not? If you don't know, that's fine.
A. No, I don't. I'm not going to say that I pretend to. I don't know.
Q. For sure. Okay.
A. (Indiscernible) would be the best people to --
Q. Right. And I just have one other question. I understand that there was some difficulty, or at least there was a perception that there was some difficulty, doing any kind of testing on this

hull. It seems like there would have been an option to do some unmanned -- well, I guess that's a question. Was there an option to do essentially like, unmanned testing of the vessel in the ocean?

A. Absolutely. You could have done it. I mean he refused it, and from memory, I mean, I've not listened to it for a few weeks, the voice recording. Obviously this version of the voice recording is the full version that I've managed to get ahold of. From memory, I mean, we made statement on this that we should get the unmanned testing, put weight on it, drop it down, and he said that's even more dangerous. I'm not going to put words into his mouth, but along those lines, do you realize how difficult that is? It's like -- yeah.

Q. Yeah. I was wondering if your experience as a diver and pilot if -- I mean, understanding that there are risks associated with all endeavors, I was wondering if you could qualify the risks between on an unmanned testing approach and the approach that OceanGate ultimately took.

A. It's -- their approach was reckless, dangerous. I -- I mean, there's not enough words to actually describe what he wanted to do. And any other system I worked on, even the acrylic spheres, what happens is every few years, and it's part of a special survey, what happens is we would do a yearly survey. We did a 3 year, maybe do a 5 year. Like, what happens is with these hulls, even the steel hulls, they have to be pressure tested. And

they're pressure tested (indiscernible) at the paperwork, at 1.25 former (ph.) -- working depth.

Then what happens is they come out, you inspect everything. And it's not just us that would inspect it, it would be the classification agency. They would inspect it. So unmanned -- so they are all unmanned. As I said, there's San Diego Defense, there's all these different places, but you have to take these hulls over the working depth. You have to.

From what I'm led to believe with that second hull (indiscernible) then they have to do it on -- I mean, at some time, but it is common sense. You would never put any of the (indiscernible) and I mentioned the accident investigating board, which is what's happening. Just sheer madness why he, Scott Griffith, Tony Nissen, Pail McCarthy (ph.), Joe Petty (ph.), all these people were (indiscernible) to work with it when myself, rest of the industry, nobody does that. There's --

Q. Okay.

A. There's a time and a place for trying something new, but you don't mess about human life. You know? It's important that everybody goes home to their families, you know, and that it key. At the end of the day, it's just a job. You know, it's like anything else. I'd rather come home to my family than die.

Q. Yeah. Okay. Thank you very much. That's all the questions that I have. Thank you.

A. No worries.

LT. [redacted] Thank you, sir. Now I'll go back to the Coast Guard side.

Mr. [redacted] do you have any questions?

MR. [redacted] No, I have no questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Lochridge.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: No problem. Thank you.

LT. [redacted] Mr. [redacted]

MR. [redacted] Yes. And again, please excuse my camera, David.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: No problem.

BY MR. [redacted]

Q. Yeah, thank you again. It's interesting stuff. I'd like to go back to your presentation at the MTS that you gave in Louisiana, the intervention; how was that received? Did you get a lot of positive comments and --

A. I did. I knew that there were a lot of people in the industry, especially even back then. I'm not going to say they were worried about it. They were like, my God, that's new. And they was asking me a lot of questions.

Now, I know he did a few personal run-ins with some of these people. But in terms of my presentation, yeah, I mean I'm a people person, you know. I present, I try and present as best as I possibly can. I hope I didn't -- well, I did, misrepresent it -- what did actually happen. I don't know. I -- you know, for me, I just hope people don't think I've been a complete idiot. I

mean, I fell for it. I did fall for it, but -- yeah.
Q. That's understandable. That's totally understandable. I mean, there's -- I don't think there's a much worse position to be put in to try and sell something that you find that product is not right, so. Is that presentation available? Could we get a copy or do we have a copy of that? Or do we need to go to the MTS to get it?
A. I don't even think -- it was me standing up there with slides. I don't even think I've got it. I mean, I've given my attorney everything I've got. Yeah, I --
Q. I think you have to give it to them. I think they own it after -- when you do a presentation, you actually own it after that.
A. Don't know.
Q. I can go there. One thing I'd like to briefly -- you sort of alluded to the hull may still exist, and it may be in a parking garage in Everett?
A. Yeah. I think, you know, it's worth a dig.
Q. Okay. Do you know that to be a fact or is it just -- have you discussed this with someone? Has someone told you this or --
A. Chris Ijames.
Q. Okay. Yeah, I would be -- I would like for the Board to track that down. That would be interesting to see that.
A. Sure.
Q. And that's been coated as well, hasn't it? That -- so that

would have the coating on it you mentioned; both inside and outside?

A. That would have -- yeah. That would have the Rhino coating and obviously that -- I couldn't tell you what it is, you know, the interior sleeve?

Q. Yeah.

A. But yeah, unless they've taken it away and destroyed it. I mean it's quite a big thing to go and destroy and it's quite heavy. But like everything else, it may be up there. It may be there. I think it's worth having a look. You know, you may even find part of the acoustic monitoring. I don't know. I'm only going by what Chris Ijames, and I'm sure he would be happy for me to discuss this with you, but yeah, definitely, worth having a look.

Q. Yeah, I think it would be. Yeah, I think it would be interesting to look at.

A. For sure.

Q. Now the insert, the pilot space insert went inside the hull. How did that interface with the coating?

A. They -- right. From memory, they were talking about putting like, I don't know how to describe it. The way to describe it as a big toilet roll tube and a smaller toilet roll tube, but basically to pack it out they were putting like, rods. I don't know how they secured them on. I really don't. I'm not going to pretend to know. I really don't, but I think that's what they

were planning on doing.
Q. Yeah, I don't either. Okay. Just one final thought. The control system, you used the same control system in *Antipodes*. Were you happy with that?
A. No. *Antipodes* didn't. It was *Cyclops I* that we had the controller. No, I wasn't happy with it. That project, that stemmed from Pete Brodsky at APR. So he's your man for that. I wasn’t (indiscernible).
Q. Okay. Was there any redundancy?
A. Nope. Spare controller.
Q. Okay. That's all I really have.
A. No problem.
Q. Thank you for your time, sir.
A. Thank you very much.
LT. [redacted] Mr. Neubauer.
BY MR. NEUBAUER:
Q. Hi, good afternoon, Mr. Lochridge. This is Jason Neubauer again. Hi.
A. Hi.
Q. We really appreciate your time, sir.
A. No problem.
Q. Just a couple of follow ups and I think we're almost done, if you're okay to keep going.
A. Of course, yeah.
Q. Okay, excellent. Sir, can you clarify which submersibles

were used for like, the *Andrea Doris* and the other mission?
A. Yup. So for the ones with the mission specialists, that was *Cyclops I*.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So that was -- those were the ones that you had kind of referenced, the two --
A. For that vessel, yeah. Alcatraz, *Andrea Doris* was *Cyclops I* and *Antipodes,* I don't -- no, we didn't do any big expeditions with *Antipodes*. It was all local, you know. There's a wreck out Puget Sound, we would dive on and stuff like that there. So, yeah.
Q. Okay. And for those local like Puget Sound dives, were passengers for hire on those, or are mission specials, so were those like, scientific personnel? Do you know?
A. The -- I don’t think we ever took any -- well, I don't know. But I don't think they ever took any money from the people that would come along for Puget Sound. I can't guarantee that, I wasn't privy to the finance side of things. Bonnie Carl is probably the best person to talk to. But I mean, I did dives with, you know, I think there were a couple of people came along. They were talking about signing up for the *Titanic* mission. I don't know whether they paid anything to come along onboard. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay. Thank you. And, did you -- going back to the OSHA

interaction, we're also into as part of the Marine Board, the federal agency, performance Coast Guard for OSHA. Did you ever participate in any kind of communications or even like, a joint conference call or even email with the Coast Guard along with OSHA?

A. Negative. It was -- as I said, it was two communications stating that the Coast Guard had been informed and -- of my complaint and the one where at the end of the -- yeah, OSHA confirms the case is closed and informs the U.S. Coast Guard December 13th, 2018.

So I think the best person to speak to would be Paul McDevitt, that Tobias Cramer, and whoever called me, McDeVitt's supervisor are. They're the three individuals I dealt with. The supervisor was pretty much cc'ed on all emails. I personally never spoke to him, but they would definitely -- I hope somebody speaks to them and asks. Look, I'm going to be completely honest with you all, makes a mockery of the whistleblower protection scheme, and -- it really does, and that's how I feel about that. I feel let down. I did everything I could and I feel let down.

Q. Did OSHA ever encourage you to go to the Coast Guard directly?

A. Nope.

Q. Did you ever consider going to the Coast Guard?

A. They told me they had everything in hand. So I trusted them and that's the organization the L&I told me, Labor and Industries,

told me that's who will protect you and make sure nothing happens to you. Next thing you know, I've got a lawsuit on my hands. And as I said, that's why eventually we decided to take a lawsuit against them. So that, and then I, you know, I offered to my attorney at the time so that it became public knowledge.

Q. Understand. Thank you. Kinda switching to a different topic. While you were head of operations, is there a standard practice of using like, office personnel to help with operations?

A. They would, yeah. They would come along. I mean, you would always have somebody, you know, somebody experienced on the topside, you know, in terms of doing the comms, for doing the comms and tracking.

Now we used to use an individual, you know, when I first started work for them, Mike Carpenter. He, I mean he's an electronics whiz. He worked at the time for APL. He didn't have a huge amount to do with the project but, you know, offshore, he'd use comms and tracking systems before. We would do in-house training with people as well. So, yes, they would come out.

Q. Okay. What about maybe in operations like the hatch? Would they help with that?

A. That was all done by the pilot. So those it -- two submersibles that I worked on for the company, they both had conning towers and the hatch was operated internally. And both of them did have a mechanism on the outside so that if the pilot and the passengers became incapacitated, at least you bring the sub to

the surface, they can open the hatch from the outside. And both had bleed points as well, so that if there's an over pressure inside, say with a gas leak, they could bleed that off before they open the hatch. *Titan*, nothing to do with.

Q. Fair enough. So from the fact -- but you understand that exact operation, would you call that a safety, like a vital safety process? Like, securing it and taking off the --

A. Yeah, big time, yeah. I mean -- oh, sorry. That was one thing for all of you. I think that was about to get to that, and I got sidetracked, which I usually do.

In terms of the viewports, obviously you've seen in the lawsuit this lovely photograph of me coming through it. Now, the reason for that, that image, what happened was the CEO told me to try and see if you can get through, okay? So that if there's any way we can actually remove the viewport and say there was an issue with the hinge or, you know, any other mechanisms, get the viewport out and it's a means of escape. This was around about the time my communication with them to create this emergency tower. So they never took it on board with that, either, so -- but, yeah.

Q. Along that same line, sir, I know the lawsuit says there was an issue with you touching that surface. Is that common practice for OceanGate or is that something that was prohibited?

A. Listen, I think if you look closely at the photograph, you'll see somebody actually stuck a big ribbon on it because it was

nearly Christmas and that was not me. So, it was, it was done -- everybody was there. I was asked to do it by the CEO. It's in the lawsuits. I can swear on the Bible he asked me to do it, which I do have here if anybody would like to see that.

I, you know, like they -- you saw yourself. There were trying to belittle me into backing down from this, and they used everything they possibly could to try and do it, so.

Q. Okay. You mentioned that some of the money was coming in while the submersible was still under construction.

A. Correct.

Q. Did you sense any pressure directly from the CEO? I heard you call it like, monetary pressure. Did you think that -- did you see any changes as you went along as the process was --

A. I mean all, all -- I mean my exposure, I know that the CEO's sister contributed a lot of money. I think she's got her own wealth. I met her, I met her husband. They've got their own money, and they were putting a lot of money into the company.

I just want to get this out there for everybody as well, Guillermo Sohnlein (ph.) who has been very clear in stating that he walked away from the project in 2013, please investigate the fact that man was still getting shares and finances from the company. I'll take that opportunity to say that because he's been very dismissive of that in the press.

And I'm just going to read something out on that one is that's possible. Is that okay just to jump on something?

Q. Yeah, absolutely.
A. Yeah. I remembered it last night and I made a note if I can find it. Yup, here we go. Right. So after I was fired, Guillermo got in touch with me. He called me Panama, asked me -- as I said, this just came to me last night and I thought it'd be worthwhile. He asked me what was going on, and he was shocked to hear that I had been fired. With his involvement in OceanGate, I was rarely speaking to him. This is me, and after his request as to what happened, I said, I was fired for doing my job.

This is one of the comments that was quoted to me by the CEO, Stockton Rush, during my termination. He kept asking me repeatedly, this is Guillermo, why I was fired. So I told him if he wanted to know, he should speak to Stockton directly, and ask for a copy of my quality inspection report and that will explain everything.

Guillermo said to me he was very concerned with Stockton's attitude over the past few years and the way he was dealing with the project and cutting corners. And he'd be speaking to him to address his concerns. He then said, his and Stockton's attitude to safety, day-to-day runnings of OceanGate completely different and having seen the way that I operate, he and I have the same mindsets regarding the way operations should be run. He then discussed options with me to go work for his company, Blue Marble.

So I'm just putting that out there. He's still earning from the company but seems to distance himself on the media front.

Q. Yes, sir. I understand.

LCDR [redacted] Joyce, do you have an interjection?

MS. [redacted] Pardon me?

LCDR [redacted] I just saw your symbol flash up. Did you want to say something?

MS. [redacted] No, I didn't flash anything. I don't know why that happened.

LCDR [redacted] I just saw your Teams was flashing. It might just be ambient noise (ph.).

MS. [redacted] Oh, I can tell you there was a sign that said about 6 minutes ago this was scheduled to end, I think at 1:30. So maybe I'm going to lose my connection. Maybe that is it because it's -- here in Seattle it's 1:38. So we're quote, "over time." I don't know. Maybe that was it.

LCDR [redacted] Okay, no, I -- it's probably just some ambient noise. I just wanted to make sure you weren't trying to --

MS. [redacted] Oh, no. Thank you for checking. No.

BY LCDR [redacted]

Q. Okay. Just a couple more questions, sir. You mentioned the first *Titan* hull and the damage to that. Were you still part of OceanGate while that was being tested in the Bahamas?

A. No, I had been fired before the thing even saw water outside in Seattle.

Q. Okay.

A. So as I'm saying, that was the one that they were building in

the shop, in the engineering shop. So it never had even been in the Sound. So.

Q. Okay. I just wanted to make sure.

A. Yeah.

Q. Those are all my questions. I appreciate your time. I think we'll just do a quick check with the other team members and make sure there's no, you know, no alibis. But before we go to that, is there anything else that you wanted to present? Information to the Board or the NTSB that you think is going to be important, that we might not have covered?

A. In terms of the sub, no. I think, I think everything was covered, you know. I just -- yeah, I think I've covered everything. I wasn't there for the dives. I mean, that's -- obviously you need to go and speak to personnel that were there during it, yeah. I mean, it's -- listen, it's been a difficult time, and it's difficult reliving all this again and having our names all over the press, you know? And don't get me wrong, it's been well received. I just -- I still can't believe nobody else did anything about it considering that everybody knew, you know. Well, lots of people knew. So, you know, I tried.

Q. Well, thank you. Appreciate that.

LCDR [redacted] Okay. Talking to the other investigators online, does anybody have any follow-up questions before we adjourn?

(No response.)

LCDR [redacted] Okay. I don't but -- I just want to make sure. Okay. It looks like we're finished, sir, for today.

MR. LOCHRIDGE: Thank you.

LT. [redacted] Thank you.

Thank you all for your time. I will conclude recording at this time. The time is currently 1641 Eastern Standard Time.

(Whereupon, at 4:41 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	LOSS OF THE SUBMARINE *TITAN* IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN ON JUNE 18, 2023 Interview of David Lochridge
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA23FM036
PLACE:	via Microsoft Teams
DATE:	August 24, 2023

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Kathryn A. Mirfin
Transcriber