

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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ENGINE FAILURE ON BOARD OFFSHORE
SUPPLY VESSEL OCEAN GUARDIAN
IN SHILSHOLE BAY NEAR SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON, ON MAY 27, 2022

Accident No.: DCA22FM021

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Interview of: SCOTT DUNAWAY, Captain
Stabbert Maritime

Seattle, Washington

Tuesday,
June 7, 2022

APPEARANCES:

BRIAN YOUNG, Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

LT [REDACTED]
U.S. Coast Guard

LT [REDACTED]
U.S. Coast Guard

MS. [REDACTED] Cadet
U.S. Coast Guard Academy

BRAD WESTLUND
Stabbert Maritime

I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Scott Dunaway:	
By Mr. Young	4
By Mr. [REDACTED]	30
By Ms. [REDACTED]	32

I N T E R V I E W

(11:43 a.m. Pacific Time)

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2
3 MR. YOUNG: Okay. The recording is on. It is 11:43 in the
4 morning on June 7. This is Brian Young with the National
5 Transportation Safety Board. We're interviewing the captain of
6 the Ocean Guardian here in Seattle, and again my name is
7 Brian Young, Y-o-u-n-g, and we'll go around the room.

8 MS. [REDACTED] Good morning. Also in the room is Lieutenant
9 [REDACTED]. Last name is spelled [REDACTED]

10 MR. YOUNG: Thank you.

11 MR. WESTLUND: And Brad Westland with Stabbert Maritime.
12 Last name Westlund, W-e-s-t-l-u-n-d.

13 MR. DUNAWAY: Scott Dunaway. Last name is spelled
14 D-u-n-a-w-a-y. I'm a captain.

15 MR. [REDACTED] Also in the room Lieutenant [REDACTED].
16 Last name is spelled [REDACTED]

17 MS [REDACTED] Also in the room [REDACTED], cadet at the
18 Academy. [REDACTED]

19 MR. YOUNG: All right. Thanks very much.

INTERVIEW OF SCOTT DUNAWAY

20
21 BY MR. YOUNG:

22 Q. Captain, appreciate your time today. Like we discussed
23 before we started recording, we're just looking to establish the
24 facts that took place on the 27th of May with the casualty with
25 the engine aboard your vessel.

1 If you could just start out and maybe talk about your
2 maritime experience and how you got to be a captain on the
3 Ocean Guardian.

4 A. Okay. I started out in 1977 in the Coast Guard. I did 20
5 years in the Coast Guard, retired as a Chief Officer --

6 Q. Thank you for your service.

7 A. My -- thank you. My time with the Coast Guard, I was in
8 charge of a couple of stations, was second in command of a couple
9 of patrol boats and different places. I stood deck watch officer
10 on 378s and 210s. I retired in 1997. I went ashore for a couple
11 of years because I wanted to watch my sons grow up a little bit.
12 I've missed that on ships, and I started out again with
13 Edison Chouest Offshore in the Gulf in 2001.

14 I had my -- I got my master unlimited in October -- I think
15 October 2005. My first ship as master was the Edison Chouest
16 Icebreaker Nathaniel Palmer working in Antarctica and worldwide
17 essentially. From there I went to Hornbeck Offshore, kicked
18 around a couple of boats as master on the smaller supply boats,
19 and then I went to Rotterdam and brought the HOS Achiever,
20 multipurpose supply boat out of shipyard, did all the shakedown,
21 FMEAs and everything and brought it over to the states.

22 I left Hornbeck I want to say in -- I'm not real sure, but I
23 think in 2009, 2010 I left Hornbeck and I went to Transocean for a
24 couple of years. Was on a couple of drill ships as Chief Mate,
25 was on the deep water Horizon, got off of it six months before it

1 blew up, and knew everybody that was on the crew, so from
2 Transocean I went to -- I've been to a lot of places.

3 I went to -- I worked for Oceanwide, a crewing agency,
4 working for McDermott offshore. I ran first as the Chief Mate,
5 and then I went to another in between job, and then I went back to
6 McDermott as Master on the Dirt Barge 50 (ph.), multipurpose heavy
7 lift. We did everything. We did heavy lift, we did crane, we did
8 subsea, we did dive, we did ROV, we did everything.

9 So I left McDermott when the ship went into shipyard in
10 Singapore and I would need to look at my CV to see what is next in
11 order to be honest with you, but the -- somewhere along the way I
12 went to Petra Saudi International working for them on an anchor
13 drill ship working Venezuela and we did a lot of time up around
14 Trinidad, in between jobs into Venezuela, working for the
15 Venezuelan Oil Company.

16 I left there and went to a company called Opus Offshore (ph.)
17 out of Singapore. They were building a 540 foot anchor drill
18 ships in China. I brought the first two out and did sea trials on
19 them, and then they went bankrupt with the downturn and all four
20 of those drill ships are now stacked in China right now. Brand
21 new drill ships.

22 I left there and I went to work for another Singapore company
23 called EAMS. Of course, with the downturn, jobs were pretty
24 scarce at the time and a lot of companies were having trouble
25 staying afloat. I went to an accommodation barge in Congo, West

1 Africa, and I ran that, had 400 people on that.

2 Left there, went back to Petra Saudi International on another
3 drill ship that they had called the Petra Saudi Saturn (ph.).
4 That was mostly in Venezuela and then it went to stack, so that
5 happened quite a bit at that point in time, so I went back to
6 another barge for another company called African Offshore Ventures
7 working for a company called V-Ships (ph.), and I was Master on a
8 424 man accommodation barge.

9 I left there because I resided in the Philippines. I have
10 for about 10 years. Covid was outbreaking at the time. I
11 couldn't go to the Philippines, they were locked down so I came
12 back to the states last -- end of last March, and I tried to get
13 some stuff processed, paperwork and stuff that I had been kind of
14 lapsing because I'd been working overseas, and I went to work for
15 Harvey Gulf down in the Gulf of Mexico last May. I worked for
16 them on various supply boats running as Captain, a couple of times
17 as Master.

18 Wasn't really liking the work so I didn't really want to run
19 as master in the Gulf, so I was running as Second Captain, and a
20 friend of mine contacted me through LinkedIn that had worked with
21 me at Hornbeck years and years ago, Captain Pete Hall with this
22 company, and I talked to them and I was brought up here as a Chief
23 Mate because the procedures pretty much are here, this is a family
24 company. They want to know their Masters, and they want to
25 interact with them before they actually put them in that position,

1 so my first month here I was running as Chief Mate underneath
2 another Captain that was here, and then when he left, I took over
3 as Master on here. I've been here for just about two months
4 coming up tomorrow.

5 Q. So would you say a month as Chief Mate and a month as
6 Captain?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And for your entire time as Chief Mate and Captain, have you
9 been working here in the shipyard?

10 A. Yes, we've -- yeah, pretty much. We went and did an incline
11 test over at North Lake Shipyard after the fire. Over at
12 North Lake Shipyard and Lake Union, the rest of the time's been
13 pretty much here at SMI.

14 Q. Since the fire, just the last few days?

15 A. I'm sorry?

16 Q. Since the fire?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So just recently.

19 A. I think it was I want to say four or five days after the
20 fire, something like that. We got towed over there and --

21 Q. Did the --

22 A. -- because that really doesn't affect the incline test, so --

23 Q. Right.

24 A. Right.

25 Q. And during your time here as Captain and Chief Mate, can you

1 just talk a little bit about what type of work is being done on
2 the vessel in shipyard?

3 A. A lot.

4 Q. What has been?

5 A. A lot. I have seen these boats when they were running supply
6 boats. I knew what they looked like. I have some friends that
7 have run these boats. I was pretty familiar with what I was
8 coming to when I got here. They've added this shelter deck from
9 the wheelhouse aft. There's a small area that's the fantail now
10 that an A frame is on. Inside of the shelter deck which ford to
11 the A frame and aft of the deck house itself is some offices and
12 some additional spaces that have been added. There's a loon pull
13 there. There's a carousel room down below for maybe doing cable A
14 sometime in the future. There's a hatch above that that opens to
15 the O2 deck. The Z drives are down below the aft. The engine
16 room is down below in ford of the carousel room.

17 There's been a lot of work done. There's been rerouted fire
18 mains which we've tried to stay up on. A lot of the old mud and
19 bolt tanks were taken out. There's three liquid one tags that
20 remain, two on the port and one on the starboard that are pretty
21 much used for counterweight for the 60 ton crane that was added up
22 on the starboard side. Pretty extensive shipyard.

23 Q. And what kind of crew do you keep on board throughout the
24 shipyard? Do you have a full complement or do you have layup
25 status crew?

1 A. Pretty much layup status crew. I'm not sure that there's
2 actually a requirement for a specific crew, but we've pretty much
3 tried to maintain to our best ability three to four deck officers,
4 three to four engineering officers, and then ABs and oilers,
5 Q-meds (ph.) beyond that.

6 Q. And at the time of the fire, what was your crew compliment?

7 A. Crew compliment at the time of the fire was myself, the
8 Second Mate, I believe four ABs. There was chief engineer, a
9 first assistant, two one-third assistant, a Q-med and an oiler.
10 Then there was other people that were on to support the ETOs were
11 on board to support that, and a couple of electricians were on
12 board to support the stuff that was going on then.

13 Q. Do you have just an estimate? Because in my report I have to
14 say how many crew was on board the vessel at the time of the
15 accident.

16 A. There was a total of 22 people on board. If I recall right,
17 there were 17 crew. I would have to check. I had a couple of
18 cooks, also.

19 Q. Cooks.

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. And some vendors as well or shipyard people?

22 A. No, no, they're company people.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. Okay. And during the time in the shipyard with your crew, do

1 you run any sort of drills or safety meetings?

2 A. Run safety meetings every day. I ran a drill snap bar safety
3 meeting because I had lot of civilians on board, so I wanted to
4 really talk about what was going on before we went out on the sea
5 trial, so it was discussed pretty heavily exactly what would need
6 to happen. Essentially I tried to keep it very simple for the
7 passengers on the O2 deck, and I will tell you I got some good
8 feedback after that it was much appreciated, the information that
9 they got before the fire.

10 The crew was pretty simplistic. I had two fire teams, one
11 down below, a second backup fire team on the O2 deck. The
12 intention was if anything would happen, if the number one fire
13 team which is -- comes out of a locker ford of what we call the --
14 after what we call the dance hall on the main deck, they would
15 work out of that primary station and then the secondary crew which
16 was on the O2 would do muster and then go down to that station and
17 take care of the fire boundaries and stuff.

18 Q. Is this something you talked about during previous --

19 A. Extensively.

20 Q. -- trials? And in your Coast Guard time and your commercial
21 time, have you ever been to any sort of fire training?

22 A. More than I could possibly tell you about.

23 Q. And do you maintain your advanced firefighting --

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. -- to keep your license?

1 A. Yes, everything's current with me, yes.

2 Q. Just for the record, can you recall the last time you went to
3 an advanced firefighting class?

4 A. I think '21. I think last year I went to get my advanced
5 firefighting and my basic safety current. The -- I went to a
6 myriad of fire schools with the Navy and with the Coast Guard. I
7 went to -- I've been to a couple of pretty good fire schools in my
8 Merchant Mariners time. The best I've been to was Texas A&M up in
9 College Station. It was a very realistic fire scenario. I will
10 tell you that the second best I've been to was probably the Navy
11 firefighting system in San Diego. It was very realistic, also.

12 Q. And would you say your extensive training assisted in the way
13 you were able to train your crew?

14 A. Yes. Unfortunately or fortunately this is the first time
15 I've been to multiple fires in my career, Coast Guard and Merchant
16 Marine. This is the first one that I was on scene, so kind of an
17 eye opener for me to some extent.

18 Q. And as you were briefing your crew on the sea trials that
19 were about to happen on the morning of the 27th, what was the
20 purpose of the sea trials? Why was the vessel even doing any sea
21 trials?

22 A. The purpose of the sea trials was to test the management,
23 electrical management system. This is a diesel electric boat.
24 That's what the -- that's the breathing, the breath within the
25 boat is coming from that system. Obviously wanted to test the

1 thrusters and stuff. We had gone through the couple of days
2 before cycling all the thrusters at the dock with people visually
3 looking and see which direction the cans were on the Z drives, and
4 everything was pumping the way it was supposed to. We went
5 through all that. We did do some power management tests before we
6 went offshore, but we really were trying to push the envelope a
7 little bit with the power management systems out there. I would
8 say the highest I think I saw was 65 percent on the thrusters. I
9 think the -- maybe 70 percent. It kind of all became one gel of
10 things happening at the same time, but I think the most I saw on
11 the thrusters on the main ASMAS was probably 70 percent, but that
12 does not give me any indication of what the power management
13 system capabilities was happening down there.

14 Q. Right.

15 A. The chief would -- him and I were on the phone constantly
16 talking between -- during the whole time that the Para management
17 system was being tested.

18 Q. And was there a written plan of the day, here's what we're
19 going to do, here's what we're going to test for the day of the
20 sea trial?

21 A. It was discussed what we were going to do. We were going to
22 test -- the first thing we're going to test was the drop down
23 because we have -- both have experience with drop downs. They
24 historically have trouble coming back up to a stoad position so we
25 decided to do it first so if we had a problem, we could deal with

1 that issue first and do that. Then we tested the -- both of those
2 thrusters, 360 degrees on the drop down, and then port to
3 starboard on the tunnel thruster, and then we tested the ASMAS. I
4 tested them 360 degrees to insure rotation was good, and then we
5 did some power trials off the Shilshole Bay, staying pretty close
6 with a tug at hand me and tar time, so --

7 Q. So a tug was nearby, not alongside?

8 A. No, he was shadowing us. As a matter of fact, when I got
9 down to -- we got up to the top of Shilshole Bay and topped
10 around, I had to have him move out of the way because he was
11 following right behind me. I had him close at hand just to be
12 sure, so --

13 Q. And can you recall the last time the thrusters were run prior
14 to the sea trials?

15 A. No.

16 Q. So not in your time there?

17 A. I've never seen them run before. Well, the two days I told
18 you we tested before the sea trials, but other than that, I've
19 never seen them run, no.

20 Q. And can you recall just again for the report the position you
21 might have been at when the incident occurs?

22 A. No, but I did write it down in the log.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. It is in the log.

25 Q. In the log.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. Perfect.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm sorry, just before you ask the
4 next, do we have the right to record as well?

5 MR. YOUNG: We're going to pause recording and we'll discuss
6 that.

7 (Off the record. On the record.)

8 MR. YOUNG: Okay. It's 12:03 and the recording is resumed.
9 We're continuing the conversation with the Captain of the Ocean
10 Guardian.

11 BY MR. YOUNG:

12 Q. We were talking about preparing for the sea trials and it was
13 a test of the power management system and part of that test with
14 the power management system has increasing and decreasing loads so
15 that the main engines can start and stop say in sequence or based
16 on a load dependence start?

17 A. That's correct. We at one point were running with all four
18 mains on, and then we dropped down to two. Like I said, the chief
19 and I were talking, and I knew it was the configurations were that
20 were going on, and we dropped down to two, and we're in the
21 process of trying to load up the ASMAS so the power management
22 system would go in and pick up additional generators, and I
23 believe that right after that is when I got the call to pull back
24 the mains -- pull back the ASMAS.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. So then of course at the same time somebody on the bridge --
2 I had a watch on the bridge. Somebody told me about the smoke
3 coming out of the back of the funnels, and that's where everything
4 degraded from there obviously.

5 Q. Okay. Okay. And do you remember the day of the sea trials,
6 did you have a set departure time and what time you actually left
7 the pier?

8 A. I'd have to look at the log. I don't remember.

9 Q. And was the plan to do it at daylight hour kind of a few hour
10 trip?

11 A. Yeah, I told them that I would like to do it in daylight
12 hours. We did get towed out. I did not drive the boat out.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. We had two tugs for and aft going all the way up. Once we
15 got outside, I released the after tug and then once the systems
16 were up and I was told they were running, I cut loose the other
17 one so we could -- I waited until I got out in the little bit
18 deeper water and just so I had a little bit of room, and I cut the
19 one -- the lead tug loose, and I told them to shadow me in
20 everything that I did, so -- and they did that. I think it was
21 the tug Wasp if I remember right.

22 Q. Wasp.

23 A. So --

24 Q. And just for a ballpark, after you did start the trials at
25 the time of the incident, how long are we talking? Was it a few

1 hours or --

2 A. I'd have to look at the log. I would guess inside of two
3 hours.

4 Q. Okay. So maybe if you would walk us through what happened
5 leading up to the time of the engine failure and just kind of talk
6 about the response, the crew's response, the communication. Give
7 us the whole story.

8 A. Sure. So I just alluded to the fact that they called me, the
9 chief engineer called me, said pull back the ASMAS, click. So I
10 knew having worked with him a little bit and understood what the
11 situation was we were doing, I knew there was a problem, and just
12 about the same time, I had a couple of ABs on the bridge. One of
13 them said there's smoke pouring out of the back of the stacks, so
14 I took a look at that.

15 Just about that time I -- there was a couple of things that
16 happened all at the same time, and I think in my statement I tried
17 to put them in order, but I'll be honest with you, it was all
18 happening all at the same time. The -- I heard on the radio fire
19 in the main space, and I saw the smoke. I -- when I identified
20 there was fire on the main space, the second mate called me and he
21 was the guy that was taking muster on the O2 deck, and he told me
22 he was taking muster at the time.

23 I pulled the emergency stops on the emergency stop panel on
24 the back. I did not pull the ASMAS because I had not been
25 directed to do the emergency stops on the ASMAS, kind of a moot

1 point anyway if there's no power to them, there's nothing to stop.

2 Q. What emergency stops did you hit?

3 A. I did for the ventilation, fuel pumps, water tight doors at
4 the water tight door panel, but I didn't hit that one at the same
5 time I hit the emergency stops. I didn't do it for the water
6 tight doors until I got word from the engine room that everybody
7 was out. I didn't think it was prudent to do that until I heard
8 the word that everybody was out.

9 As I was getting notice that they had accounted for everybody
10 on the O2 deck, I had made a comment as soon as the second mate
11 told me he was taking a muster to run somebody down through the
12 deck house and make sure there was nobody in the rooms, that
13 person got back up to deck, everybody was on deck at the time and
14 I got an accountability from the second mate. At the same time, I
15 got an accountability from the chief engineer that everybody was
16 out of the engine space, and at the same time we -- he let me know
17 it was time for CO2 and we released the CO2.

18 As this was going on, I called the tug. Like I said, this
19 was all within probably I would guess about seven minutes. I
20 called the tug and had them come. I sent a couple of guys, deck
21 guys from the O2 muster up forward to take the tow bridle for the
22 tug because I wanted to control that as soon as I possibly could,
23 get the ship under control, drift off, controlling the smoke
24 movement across the deck, you know, all that kind of stuff.

25 The -- at the same time I was calling the operations manager

1 who was ashore, Jack Cuttiddy (ph.) and let him know what was going
2 on, just an update quickly, and I pretty much did as I got a
3 breather in different places I was texting him as to the situation
4 that was going on and what the different things were.

5 Somewhere along the way, and I'm not sure exactly where, I
6 requested the second tug to come back out, the West Point had been
7 sent in after we had cut him loose when we had first come out. I
8 requested the second tug. Somewhere along the way, the second tug
9 stopped and picked up some backup SEBA bottles because I have an
10 air compressor on board, but it has not been air tested and I
11 didn't want to use it, so we had requested the extra SEBA bottles
12 come out.

13 Somewhere in the midst of all of that, I had the deck
14 personnel start at the deck house, the bridge, work their way down
15 gathering all the fire extinguishers and taking them down to the
16 main deck just after the engine room opening down there. I -- in
17 my log I initially was not tracking people in and out of the
18 engine room. I was just trying to keep up with who I knew was
19 doing what inside of the engine room and going into the engine
20 room, but I kind of got my second wind after a few minutes and
21 started getting those all down in the log.

22 I was pretty much tracking pretty well, me and the chief
23 engineer who went in after the CO2 was popped to go check for hot
24 spots and stuff like that. I kind of knew who was going in and
25 out, and like I said at some point I started logging that in

1 there. I should have been doing that earlier, but I just was
2 trying to concentrate on not missing anybody, so that was my main
3 concern. As far as I'm concerned, if you have a fire and
4 everybody walks away from it, I don't care how they walk away from
5 it, it's a good fire, so that's my opinion, so --

6 Q. I know you said you had a lot going on up in the bridge, but
7 do you recall hearing any sort of a smoke detector alarms, fire
8 detection system?

9 A. I did not. I don't remember hearing that.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. I know at some point I shut it down because of the alarm,
12 constant alarm going on, and I just didn't have the ability -- I
13 was really the only person on the bridge. I didn't have the
14 ability to do anything about it, so I shut it off just because it
15 was a complete distraction. I knew what was going on. I had
16 boundaries. I was in control of the space. I was comfortable
17 where I was at with it, so --

18 Q. So it may have been going off, but it just --

19 A. I wouldn't have noticed.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. I know you had a tug standing by and another one coming
23 along. Were you concerned about the current or the weather that
24 day?

25 A. No, it was pretty bright. There was a little bit of breeze,

1 maybe 10, 15 knots, but it was enough that I was kind of concerned
2 about the possibility of getting over towards the boats going in
3 and out of the Lake Washington Ship Canal and from the marina that
4 was over there, and I wanted to stay away from that as much as I
5 could. That's why I wanted the two tugs just to be there, also
6 just in case, so --

7 Q. And is there any current in this area where you were working?

8 A. Any what?

9 Q. Current.

10 A. Current?

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. The only current that I noticed at the time was wind driven
13 current.

14 Q. And you said about 15?

15 A. I would say about 10, 15 knots, yes.

16 Q. From the --

17 A. I think from the south. I want to say it was from the south,
18 southeast if I remember right because at one point I asked the tug
19 to turn so that I'd have the wind running across the deck, so --
20 and he did that, so -- but I think that's about right. I'm sorry,
21 I don't really remember.

22 Q. How did you notify your crew of the incident down there? Did
23 you ring the general alarm or was everything --

24 A. UHF radio.

25 Q. Everything was UHF?

1 A. We're pretty thorough about making sure that the majority of
2 the crew has a radio, and then I sent runners through to make sure
3 because to be honest with you, I'm not completely sure how
4 adequate the PA system is, and word of mouth to me is a good
5 thing, so I sent people down through the inside just to make sure.

6 Q. Okay. And do you know if the general alarm had -- and the
7 ship's whistle had been activated at any point for alerting the
8 crew? Or everything was UHF?

9 A. Everybody -- by the time I would have thought about doing it,
10 quite honestly, everybody was accounted for.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Like I said, within a couple of minutes we had a full
13 accountability, so --

14 Q. Okay. And it seems like you were -- had the ability to hit a
15 lot of the east ops and you talked to the chief about releasing
16 CO2. How did the CO2 actually get released? Did you do it in the
17 wheelhouse or did --

18 A. He did it down below at the CO2 room.

19 Q. But he consulted you first and then talked?

20 A. We talked and he said -- actually it was kind of a mutual
21 decision --

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. -- you know. We had everybody accounted for. I knew from --
24 I had had the ETO come up who had been down in the engine space
25 and told me how bad it was, and I knew that that's the direction

1 we were going, and so when the chief said everybody's accountable,
2 I'm popping the CO2. I had no -- not a problem with that.

3 Q. And you feel that communication between yourself and the
4 chief was effective?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. All right. With your shutdowns I know you shut down several
7 systems. What about dampers in the ventilation system? Do you
8 know if that was something --

9 A. There are some dampers on the panel up there, but the CO2
10 system automatically shuts damper systems, so we knew that.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. So we had actually discussed it when Western Fire and Safety
13 came on board, me and the chief had discussed it at length with
14 them what would be affected if we used the CO2 system, so --

15 Q. Was that recently that they were --

16 A. Yeah, it was that week, early in that week, yes.

17 Q. And were they aboard to test the system?

18 A. They were on board to verify the system was operational. I
19 wanted to make sure because so much had changed. I wanted to make
20 sure that I had an effective system before I moved offshore.

21 Q. Very good.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. And do you recall if they found any issues prior?

24 A. Their -- the fire -- the paint locker was not connected. I
25 did not think that was an issue. The main space was connected. I

1 had -- I took him personally down to the Z drive room and to the
2 ford -- the bow thruster room because those are separate systems
3 that are pulled. The bow thruster system is pulled outside of the
4 water tight door in the engine room to the bow thruster room, and
5 the C drive system is pulled outside of the access to the Z drive
6 room. I had them go verify that all the piping was in place,
7 everything was in place as it should be. Everything was intact,
8 and me and the chief both got together and went through the fixed
9 CO2 system for the engine room, so --

10 Q. Good timing.

11 A. Yes. You never know.

12 Q. Yeah, yeah.

13 A. I mean, we talked about this before we went. I said
14 everything goes right until it goes wrong. You got to be
15 prepared.

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. So --

18 Q. And then in addition to releasing the CO2, did you have any
19 boundary cooling going on?

20 A. Any what?

21 Q. Boundary cooling.

22 A. Did not have boundary cooling, but I had boundary watches
23 set. Nobody ever told me that anything got hot to the touch. I
24 had boundaries on top of the engine room and the dance hall, I had
25 boundaries aft, the boundaries on the sides and forward are tanks,

1 and nobody ever -- all I ever heard was cool to the touch, so I
2 never heard anything being hot.

3 Q. So you assigned people to go to specific locations?

4 A. Yeah, the second mate was responsible for the boundaries. He
5 put people at different locations and he doubled checked all the
6 boundaries himself.

7 Q. And were they using any sort of thermal gun or just hand --

8 A. Any what? I'm sorry.

9 Q. Thermal gun or --

10 A. We used a thermal gun in the engine room, but we did not use
11 it on the boundaries, no.

12 Q. Okay. So they were feeling by hand the bulkheads --

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. -- or the decks or overheads?

15 A. Um-hum.

16 Q. And the teams entering the engine room, you were sending in
17 two person teams on air?

18 A. I am -- the only conversation I remember having at this time
19 besides the fact that people were going in was my reiteration
20 there had to be two people. Two man teams. All the teams that I
21 heard going in were two man teams.

22 Q. And what was their purpose when you -- when teams were sent
23 in to the --

24 A. To --

25 Q. This is after the CO2.

1 A. -- check the effectiveness of the CO2 system and to check for
2 spot fires.

3 Q. Okay. And after they exited the space, they would report in
4 what they found?

5 A. They were reporting to the people on scene which was the
6 chief engineer and them, and then they would let me know. I know
7 a couple of times I was told there was some smoldering problems
8 that they sent people back into after those people reported it
9 which I thought was a pretty good thing because they came out, let
10 us know, and then went back in so that you knew that there was an
11 issue that had to be dealt with, so that happened a couple of
12 times, and I think -- I want to say about the third time that
13 teams went in we started using the thermal guns to check heat. I
14 don't remember what temperatures they were, but I know they were
15 above 190. I remember that.

16 Q. 190?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. 190.

19 A. And then I remember them dropping, the temperature dropping
20 after that, so -- and every temperature reading that was given to
21 me after that initial were dropped every single time, so --

22 Q. And do you know if the firefighting teams were equipped with
23 any firefighting gear such as extinguishers or foam or --

24 A. Well, we put the fire extinguishers down there so they would
25 have access to them. They were all SEBAs that I'm aware of. Of

1 course, I was not on scene. We did at one point go in with a
2 triple F with -- from the carousel room into the engine room to
3 the bill just to make sure there was not a problem with that.
4 That's what I was told. That's what I knew, so --

5 Q. And can you recall the last time you had a fire drill that
6 you had people suited up?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Is that something that you typically do during a drill?

9 A. Dress out?

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. Yes, of course, yes.

12 Q. All right. How frequently do you do fire drills?

13 A. We don't do fire drills because we're in layup status.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. We just haven't done fire drills. My whole background when I
16 talk to the people here when we're at the dock, if we have a fire,
17 we get off the boat and call 911, so --

18 Q. Um-hum.

19 A. -- again, safety first. I get my people off and then we
20 worry about it.

21 Q. Okay. And does your company have a SMS system?

22 A. We have an SMS system. I'll be honest with you, I'm not that
23 familiar with it.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. There's certain things about it I am familiar with. For

1 instance, injury reports and stuff like that. I had a guy, not a
2 work related injury, but had a problem. I had to take him to the
3 local hospital, so I was familiar with the -- that system. I've
4 glanced at other parts of it and stuff, but I'll be honest with
5 you, the main thrust of what we've done here is preparing a boat
6 from -- through a shipyard. That's what we've done.

7 Q. Um-hum.

8 A. I've worked harder at this boat than I have probably in 15
9 years.

10 Q. Um-hum.

11 A. And it's physical labor is what we've been doing.

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Yeah. And I think this will be my last question, but if you
15 -- now that you've had a week or so to say review the entire thing
16 through your head, do you have any lessons learned or anything you
17 would have done differently?

18 A. Well, one thing that I would probably do differently is I
19 would probably now that I know specifically the rules, which I did
20 not know before, I would notify the Coast Guard earlier than we
21 did. I consider that a fault on my part, but I'll be honest with
22 you, I really did not know the regulation. I knew about 2692s.
23 I'd done that, but as far as the notice in addition to that, I
24 didn't -- I was not aware of that. I just didn't know it.

25 So I think that as far as requesting Coast Guard assistance,

1 I wouldn't do anything differently. We had conversations a couple
2 of different times. I specifically asked if we needed assistance
3 and I was told everything was under control down below, so I
4 specifically asked, so --

5 Q. And in terms of firefighting or muster or communication?

6 A. I think everything went all right to be honest with you.
7 Again, everybody was accounted for right away. I had two
8 different tiers of accountability. I had people out of the engine
9 room. I had people accountable on the O2 deck, so I was
10 comfortable that we were taking care of our people and the next
11 step, of course, was to try to get the fire under control, so,
12 yeah.

13 Q. And I did have one last question. What -- do you typically
14 work days and sleep at night or are you working around the clock,
15 or what's your typical daily --

16 A. Pretty much --

17 Q. -- captain schedule?

18 A. -- around the clock for the most part, but I try to maintain
19 12 to 15 hours maximum just because I don't want to be a burden,
20 so as far as not getting enough sleep and I'm not there to be able
21 to back people up if I need to. I try to keep in contact with
22 everybody if I go off the boat. Everybody's got my phone number
23 so they can get ahold of me if they need to, and I try to stay
24 pretty close, if I go to the grocery store or whatever, so --

25 Q. And are you living aboard the vessel --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- in the shipyard?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And not in a hotel.

5 A. Yup, never been anywhere else.

6 Q. Okay. Great. Thank you.

7 MR. YOUNG: I don't have any other questions at this time. I

8 don't know --

9 MR. [REDACTED]: I have a couple. This is Lieutenant [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] with the Coast Guard.

11 BY MR. [REDACTED]

12 Q. So just kind of going back, so you -- at any point did you
13 notify Seattle Fire or any of those other external resources?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. I did talk to -- I let VTS Traffic, Seattle Traffic, know
17 that I was going out and going on sea trials, and I did let them
18 know that I was checking out the system under tow going back into
19 the ship channel.

20 Q. Okay. So being that you had expended all of your CO2, there
21 was potential for reflash.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. What was the -- did you have any reasoning of why you
24 wouldn't have called for Seattle Fire or somebody stand by for the
25 rest of the transit in, or was it just something you did not feel

1 was --

2 A. I didn't think it was warranted.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. I had a little bit of time before I started the tow to make
5 sure that we had things under control down below. Temperatures
6 were dropping, boundaries were effective, we didn't have any flash
7 fires left, and everything appeared to be under control. I had
8 parties in place constantly going back in and monitoring with the
9 reflash watch to make sure nothing did come back up. I didn't
10 feel uncomfortable.

11 Q. Okay. And you checked out -- you said you checked out with
12 traffic on the way out. Did you check in with traffic on the way
13 back in through?

14 A. Yes, I did.

15 Q. Okay. And then, you know, you had discussed that you weren't
16 familiar with the reporting requirements.

17 A. Right.

18 Q. When you came back to the office in the days following, what
19 were the discussions that you were party of about reporting it to
20 the Coast Guard? Like with the -- surrounding the 2692, did
21 anybody ever question whether the Coast Guard should be told
22 before submitting that 2692? Can you kind of speak to those
23 discussions --

24 A. It was all --

25 Q. -- that were had?

1 A. All the discussions I recall were about the 2692 in five
2 days.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. I never heard any other discussions outside of that. And all
5 of my discussions for the most part were relegated to the DPA,
6 so --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Which of course is who I would in such a situation be
9 reporting to.

10 Q. Okay. And so there was never any discussion about the
11 immediate notification of the Coast Guard. Okay.

12 A. I'm sorry, I don't know what else to beg but ignorance. I
13 just didn't know, so -- and if I had known, I probably would have
14 put my foot down and said we needed to do that, so I don't have
15 any hesitation about the Coast Guard, but I just didn't know.

16 Q. Yeah, that's understandable.

17 MR. YOUNG: Do you have any other questions?

18 BY MS. [REDACTED]

19 Q. Just a couple quick questions, Captain.

20 A. Sure.

21 Q. This is Lieutenant [REDACTED] speaking. When did you
22 notify the company of the fire?

23 A. Within minutes.

24 Q. Within minutes afterwards.

25 A. Jack Cuttidy, the operations manager, was ashore. Within

1 minutes.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. And as far as you know per your -- the safety management
5 system incident reporting procedures, your responsibility is
6 strictly to notify the company. That's the only requirement that
7 you're aware of.

8 A. That's my understanding, yes.

9 Q. And then just my last question, when you checked back in with
10 VTS that you were entering the ship channel again, why did you not
11 mention the fire or anything that --

12 A. No particular reason.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. I'll be honest, it was not a conscious decision. I just
15 wanted to get -- let them know I was getting out of the system and
16 I was under tow. They knew that.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. That's about the extent of it.

19 MS. [REDACTED] I think that's all I've got.

20 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Do you any further follow up questions?

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No.

22 MR. YOUNG: Do you have any questions for us? Do you have
23 any questions or anything for the record?

24 MR. DUNAWAY: I do not.

25 MR. YOUNG: Okay. With that being said, we'll go off record.

1 It is 12:28, and thank you again, Captain, for your time.

2 Appreciate it.

3 MR. DUNAWAY: No problem.

4 (Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m. Pacific Time, the interview was
5 concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: ENGINE FAILURE ON BOARD OFFSHORE
 SUPPLY VESSEL OCEAN GUARDIAN IN
 SHILSHOLE BAY NEAR SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
 ON MAY 27, 2022
 Interview of Scott Dunaway

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA22FM021

PLACE: Seattle, Washington

DATE: June 7, 2022

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



LOIS D. RUSH
Transcriber