

DCA21FA174

OPERATIONAL FACTORS/HUMAN PERFORMANCE

Attachment 1

Flight Crew Interview Transcripts

May 4, 2022

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:

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TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH *
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, *
ON JULY 2, 2021 *

Accident No.: DCA21FA174

*

Interview of: HENRY OKAI, Captain

Rhodes Aviation/TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

Tuesday,
July 6, 2021

APPEARANCES:

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National Transportation Safety Board

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National Transportation Safety Board

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:03 a.m.)

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2
3 MR. BRAMBLE: -- interview with Captain Henry Okai at 10:03 a.m., Hawaii Standard
4 Time on July 6th. Okay. All right, my name is Bill Bramble, I'm a human performance
5 investigator with the NTSB. Mr. Shawn Etcher and I are leading the operations and human
6 performance working group for Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174 involving Rhoades
7 Aviation Flight 810.

8 The NTSB is an independent federal agency determined -- charged with determining the
9 probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not
10 part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA, and it has no regulatory or enforcement
11 powers. I would now like to have
12 Mr. Etcher and each of the group members briefly introduce themselves.

13 Mr. Etcher?

14 MR. ETCHER: Good morning, Captain. Thank you so much for being in here this
15 morning with us and educating us. I'm Shawn Etcher and I'm the operational factors group
16 chairman for the NTSB.

17 CAPT OKAI: Good morning, nice to be here.

18 MR. KANAE: Good morning, Captain Okai. I'm Clarence Kanae with the FAA, I'm
19 actually assigned to the Honolulu Certificate Management Office, and operations is my specialty.

20 CAPT OKAI: Okay, good morning. Nice to meet you.

21 MR. BRAMBLE: And Clarence, did you want to add anything about your role with the
22 safety function?

23 MR. KANAE: Oh, yeah. So, this is an investigation -- accident investigation, so
24 please feel free to not worry about any enforcement type of situation in this conference, or in this
25 investigation.

1 CAPT OKAI: Okay, thank you.

2 MR. LEE: Rich Lee, Boeing safety pilot. Good morning.

3 CAPT OKAI: Good morning.

4 MR. LEE: I'm glad to see you here.

5 CAPT OKAI: So am I, very glad. Yeah.

6 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Is there anybody here that you object to being present for this
7 interview?

8 CAPT OKAI: No, negative. Nobody.

9 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview we
10 will send that recording out for transcription and the party members will have an opportunity to
11 review that transcription to correct it for typographical errors.

12 Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent
13 reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault, we're here as simply for you to share your insight
14 with the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, however, we cannot offer any guarantee
15 of confidentiality or immunity, and the transcription of this interview will eventually be made part
16 of the public docket for this investigation.

17 Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions, we'll ask questions one at
18 a time, and everyone's been instructed not to interrupt the person who's asking questions at that
19 time. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each
20 person has had a turn. Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't
21 understand a question, just say so, and if you realize you've misstated something, or you want to
22 correct something, please go ahead and do so. You're entitled to have one representative of your
23 choosing, is there someone you'd like to have as your representative?

24 CAPT OKAI: Yeah, that'll be Bill Katt.

25 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, and Mr. Katt, do you want to introduce yourself?

1 MR. KATT: Yeah, William Katt from the law firm of Wilson Elser.

2 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, thank you.

3 Does anyone have any questions? All right, Mr. Etcher is going to begin with the
4 questioning today.

5 INTERVIEW OF HENRY OKAI

6 BY MR. ETCHER:

7 Q. Again, good morning. I'm so glad to see you here.

8 A. Oh, good morning. Me too.

9 Q. As I'm asking you questions if there's something you just -- doesn't make sense what
10 I'm asking, please ask for clarification. It's not a check ride, so if you don't know something I
11 don't know is just fine.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. We just want to hear -- you had the birds-eye view of everything. So, I'm hoping I can be
14 a little fly on your epaulets.

15 A. Okay, sounds good.

16 Q. I can taste, touch -- well, maybe not taste the fuel, but I can feel everything you're feeling,
17 hear everything you're hearing if you will.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. All right. We'll start with the hardest questions first, though.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. Can you state and spell your full name, please?

22 A. First name is Henry, last name is Okai, spelled O-K-A-I.

23 Q. Excellent, and you like to go with Captain? Henry?

24 A. Henry's fine.

25 Q. Henry? Okay, great.

- 1 A. Yeah.
- 2 Q. How old are you, Henry?
- 3 A. 58.
- 4 Q. All right, and what is your job title?
- 5 A. Captain for the Boeing 737 200 at TransAir.
- 6 Q. Okay, and when were you hired at TransAir?
- 7 A. 2019, February.
- 8 Q. February? Okay. Can you kind of give me an idea of what a captain at TransAir's job is?
- 9 What do you -- what is your job description?
- 10 A. Is this my -- can I grab this?
- 11 Q. Absolutely.
- 12 A. Basically, a captain at TransAir is responsible for the airplane, the cargo, transportation of
- 13 the airplane and basically the cargo from point A to point B safely.
- 14 Q. Okay.
- 15 A. Yeah.
- 16 Q. All right. Can you give us -- tell us what airman certificates you have? Type ratings?
- 17 A. Yeah. I have type rating on the Embraer 170, 190, Dash 8 and the 737.
- 18 Q. And what is your airman certificate? Is it an ATP?
- 19 A. ATP, yeah. ATP.
- 20 Q. All right. Are you currently, or have you ever been, like, a line-check airman or anything
- 21 in your previous employment?
- 22 A. No.
- 23 Q. Okay, and this is probably the toughest question for most pilots, in big, round numbers, can
- 24 you give me your total flight time?
- 25 A. Somewhere around 16,000.

- 1 Q. Okay. How much of that was in the 737?
- 2 A. About 800, 900 maybe.
- 3 Q. And is that all as captain, or is some of it as first officer?
- 4 A. Some of it as first officer. Maybe roughly -- I cannot tell you how much is -- yeah, I
- 5 cannot even -- yeah.
- 6 Q. Okay, that's all right. I told you these were the toughest questions, so it's all right.
- 7 A. But most of it as captain, yeah.
- 8 Q. So, you got hired on here in February of 2019, when did you upgrade to captain?
- 9 A. Somewhere in December.
- 10 Q. Of?
- 11 A. '19.
- 12 Q. Of '19?
- 13 A. Yeah.
- 14 Q. Okay. All right. When was your most recent check ride here or training event?
- 15 A. About a month ago.
- 16 Q. And what was that?
- 17 A. That was my PC.
- 18 Q. Okay.
- 19 A. Yeah.
- 20 Q. Where did you do that at?
- 21 A. In Miami.
- 22 Q. In Miami?
- 23 A. Yeah.
- 24 Q. Who was your check airman?
- 25 A. Wallace Horibata.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. The chief pilot.

3 Q. Okay. Have you ever had an unsuccessful check ride of any kind?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Okay. Have you ever been involved in an accident or incident ever in your career?

6 A. No.

7 Q. All right.

8 A. Except this.

9 Q. Prior to this flight?

10 A. Yeah, prior to this flight.

11 Q. You mean you have not?

12 A. Yeah, prior to this flight, zero.

13 Q. Okay. So, I like to get to know you and your history. Can you give me kind of a nice Cliff
14 Notes version if you will of your flying history, what got you into flying, and how you got to here?

15 A. What got me into flying, it's funny when I tell this story, people laugh. I was born in
16 Ghana, West Africa, no opportunities to learn how to fly, and I just love -- I guess you would say I
17 love heights. As a little kid I would play with the trees, climbing trees, and the first time I climbed
18 a tree and I saw the roof of a house, I was fascinated. I started looking for taller and taller trees so
19 I can see more -- top of more roofs, and this is what got me into flying. So, basically you can say I
20 love heights, yeah.

21 So, I came here, went to flight school, I learned how to fly in Chicago, went to Lewis
22 University, got my A&P there and flying lessons there. I started flying, (indiscernible) was the
23 flight instructor, and then I got a job flying freights at night, singles and twins, out of Chicago
24 midway. I did that for a while and then I got on with a company called Allegheny, flying Dash-8s
25 up and down the East Coast, and then briefly with US Airways, twice over there I got furloughed.

1 US Airways trained me on the 737, the 300, and then I got furloughed, got recalled back,
2 and then got furloughed again, and then went to a company called Republic. I was there briefly,
3 and I left there, took a job in India, and I was in India and the contract run out, and I left India and
4 then went to the Middle East, and I was there for five years, and then came back. All these places
5 I'm talking about I was a captain.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And then came back and took a job in Kuwait, briefly, and they went out of business, and I
8 came back and then went to Horizon, and then I got a job in China. So, funny, I went on the
9 internet to buy tickets to go to China and then saw the advertisement for TransAir. So, instead of
10 buying the ticket for China, I bought the ticket for Hawaii, that's how I ended up here with
11 TransAir.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Okay, that's a great, nice Cliff Notes version of your history. Thank you for sharing all of
15 that.

16 A. Okay.

17 Q. You said in all those you were a captain; were you a captain at US Air and --

18 A. Oh, no, except USA, I was a first officer.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Yeah, anything after USA, I was a captain.

21 Q. So, at Horizon you were a captain?

22 A. Yeah, Horizon, yeah. All those places I was a captain.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. Okay. So, what made -- I know you got on at Republic and then you went -- you said

1 shortly and then you went to India?

2 A. Yeah, then I went to India, flew with Republic. When I was with US Air, US Air sold the
3 airplanes to Republic, and Republic didn't have pilots. So, when given the option, you can go
4 home without a job, or you can go work at Republic for Republic, so I decided to go work for
5 Republic, yeah. And one of my friends at Republic got the chief pilot position at this new startup
6 in India, so he gave me a call and goes Henry, I'm looking for pilots, you want to come to India,
7 the money is good. Blah, you know, they put you up and all that, which was better than what I
8 was making at Republic, so I left Republic.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. Okay. Thank you for clarifying that with me, that's great. Now, these were -- this is a
12 question I always hate asking, but we always do, have you ever been fired or terminated from any
13 of your employers?

14 A. No, all of the places I left, sadly. Sometimes I felt bad leaving them.

15 Q. Okay. So, we're going to start easing down, if you will, into kind of talking about the
16 airline here just so you can kind of help me understand, from your perspective, how it all works.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. Can you kind of give me, in your terms, who's in your chain of command here?

19 A. My immediate next guy would be, if I had anything and I want to raise it up, goes through
20 Wallace, the Chief Pilot.

21 Q. All right.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. And if you can't get satisfaction there, who would you take it to next?

24 A. Then I would go to Dave, but that has never happened before.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Usually, Wallace takes care of everything. If -- that is the way it is designed. If Wallace
2 can't handle it then I'll go to Dave.

3 Q. Okay. Is there a formal process of notifying Wallace, or is it just knocking on his door,
4 walk into his office, pick up the phone?

5 A. Yeah, you can do that, you can send him email, you can send him text messages, you can
6 give him a call.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Is there any formal process here that you can register a safety concern or anything?

10 A. Then I would say through emails.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay. As a pilot, how would you categorize staffing here? Are you adequately -- do you
14 feel like you guys are adequately staffed? Short staffed?

15 A. I think staffing is an issue worldwide, and we are part of the victims (ph.), because
16 sometimes you like to take vacations, have a -- what you want to do is ultimately take a lot of days
17 off, work very few days, you know, that is, like, the idea. You cannot do that, why? Because
18 we're short. Not only us, but the whole world is short.

19 Q. Okay. Are you required to work extra days here?

20 A. Not beyond regulations, yeah, but I prefer to work extra days. I ask Wallace, you know,
21 can you schedule me on my day off? I hate to stay home watching TV, yeah, so I volunteer. This
22 -- I'm speaking for myself.

23 Q. Right.

24 A. Yeah, I don't know about the other guys.

25 Q. I'm only talking to you right now, so that's okay. I'm glad you clarified that.

1 A. Okay.

2 Q. If you had a concern -- a safety concern -- I know you said your chain of command is
3 Wallace, but if you had a concern, any kind of safety concern, is there a way you would bring that
4 to somebody's attention?

5 A. Other than Wallace?

6 Q. Yeah is there --

7 A. Yeah. We have a procedure, you can fill out a safety form, yeah, and drop it in the box,
8 and they go through that, I don't know how often. But that's another way, other than going
9 through Wallace. If you want to have something done immediately, you're better off going to
10 Wallace, yeah.

11 Q. Have you ever had to do that? Fill out one of those safety concerns?

12 A. Yeah, I've done that before. I've gone through Wallace before and the situation has been
13 fixed, yeah.

14 Q. But if you didn't go through Wallace and you fill out a --

15 A. Then I would fill the safety report and it goes in the box. I don't know who is reading it
16 and how they're interpreting it, yeah.

17 Q. So, you -- do you get feedback from what you put into the safety box?

18 A. No, I haven't put anything in the safety box.

19 Q. Oh, okay.

20 A. Yeah, I just go to Wallace.

21 Q. Okay, thank you. All right. So, when you go -- walk me through a day in the life of a
22 captain here. How do you get notified of your assignments, how far in advance? Kind of -- help
23 me understand a day in the life?

24 A. Okay. So, the schedules come out, I think, twice a month. I don't even pay attention to
25 that, I want to know what I'm doing today, you know, because it changes a lot depending on what

1 the freight are and stuff. I guess they assign the flights for the captain on what they have. So, the
2 first thing is check my email in the morning, somewhere between 5:00 in the morning and 3:00 in
3 the afternoon, the schedules come out, so you have a rough idea of what you're doing and who
4 you're flying with. And that's a rough idea, it tells you when to show up at the airport.

5 So, I show up at that first schedule I see. Now, once you show up, sometimes the schedule
6 changes, it will say you're going to Maui but then you end up going to (indiscernible), I don't care.
7 I'm like I am here on time, that's the bottom line.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. So, do you know when you're report time is before that afternoon?

11 A. Oh, yeah. I know what the report time is; between, like, 5:00 and 3:00.

12 Q. Okay, so it's that --

13 A. Between -- yeah, it depends when that email comes.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Yeah. I guess it is like that because they don't really know what freight is coming in, you
16 know. By then -- by 3:00 they pretty much have a good idea what they are doing for the night.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Yeah, and they're predicated on that being -- okay, this guy's going here, this guy's going
19 there.

20 Q. Okay. All right, that's helps, thank you. Let's kind of ease into the night of the event.

21 Kind of -- I want to be that fly on your wall, kind of figure out when you got notified, what your
22 day was, and then when you reported -- just kind of let me live through you, how's that?

23 A. Okay. I don't remember exactly when the email came out, but the report time was, I think,
24 12:15 a.m., and I showed -- I live, like, just about 10 minutes from the airport and I always show
25 up early, I showed up, I think, 12:00 or some -- a few minutes 12:00. That was -- that's, like, my

1 normal time, I try to be there just a little early. I looked at the board and I saw that I was with
2 Greg, and we were going to Maui, and we had 810, and then I went to the table and the paperwork
3 was there. I looked at it, all it was good, there was no MEL, I believe -- yeah, there was no MEL.
4 And Greg showed up, we did our briefing, we went to work on the paperwork, the weather, no
5 temps, all that -- all the basics, you know.

6 Airplane was good, and I looked -- I did logbook, I had flown the aircraft, I think, yeah, the
7 day before. So, I was like, yeah, I know this airplane is fine, everything is good. I think nobody
8 had flown it since I did. And we went to the airplane, took off, you know, freight down (ph.), we
9 did the pre-flight. Greg was the flying pilot, we agreed that he would do that one and then I'll take
10 the next one, but of course that didn't happen. We taxied, everything was normal, there was
11 nothing abnormal, took off, and then everything changed, yeah.

12 Q. Okay. Well, we'll get into after the takeoff here in just a minute.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. Let's -- if you would, could we go back to when you were at the dispatch office?

15 A. Okay.

16 Q. You said you were looking over the paper and the airplane can, and then you said Greg
17 came in. Was -- do you remember how long you had been there before he was?

18 A. Oh, he -- I think he was right after me or -- yeah, something like that. He was not late.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. Okay. Do you remember, did you both sit there and look over the weather and --

22 A. Yeah, we always do that, yeah, and then I give the paperwork to Greg, and I said this is for
23 your reading pleasure, I always do that. And after we have both seen it, I give it back to him, I say
24 for your reading pleasure, you know, if something, maybe, we missed, you have all night to look at
25 it. And then he put back the clipboard and we put it on the clipboard, because he needs the

1 paperwork to get a clearance all that stuff, after that, it belongs to him. And then I took the aircraft
2 can, yeah.

3 Q. Okay. Then, did you both walk out to the aircraft at the same time?

4 A. Normally we do that, both take a break, go to the crew room and get a drink -- what you
5 call -- bottle of water, yeah. So, I did that, I got two bottles of water, very cold water. I remember
6 I told him one bottle for you, one for me, I give it to him on the airplane, I said it's very cold.
7 Yeah, I remember doing that. So, we both got out of the -- I think he was ahead of me out of the
8 dispatch office, and I made a right turn back to the crew room. This is back at launch, they have
9 couches and stuff that we go there to rest, you know, with a refrigerator and water.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Yeah, so, I went in there and got two bottles of water. By then he had gone farther up
12 ahead, he was much closer to the airplane than I was. Yeah, so, he went in, did his stuff that he
13 had to do, and then I got in. The airplane was already powered, had a GPU when we got in, yeah.
14 So, he was doing his little stuff, checking what he has to do, and I got this is a bottle of water for
15 you, and he got out and did his preflight.

16 Q. He did the preflight, or did you?

17 A. No, he did.

18 Q. He did?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. Okay. Sorry, I just wanted to make sure.

21 A. The walkaround.

22 Q. Right.

23 A. Yeah. He did preflight in the cockpit and the walkaround preflight outside.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. That is the routine for him.

1 Q. Okay, perfect. Did he mention anything to you that he found on the preflight or --

2 A. Yeah, he mentioned a, what you call -- issue with the lift when in the air. He goes, they
3 found some leak, and I didn't think that was a big deal, but I called the maintenance, I go what do
4 you make of this? They looked at it, I personally didn't make any -- if I had found it, I wouldn't
5 have even mentioned it. What I saw was something that was dry, it wasn't, like, wet, fresh --
6 something fresh leaking. But we looked up to the actuator to see if we can see any fresh leak, we
7 didn't see anything like that, but there was mark like something had been there before. But as we
8 were looking at that time, there was nothing there -- it was not of any concern to me.

9 So, I told maintenance, you know, we'll write this up after tonight, you know, I don't think
10 this is an issue, and he goes that's up to you. I said yeah, let's do it like that. So, yeah, that was
11 Greg's concern, yeah, that there's a leak, but it wasn't my concern.

12 Q. So, I just want to make sure I understand that you did not write it up, you were going to
13 write it up later?

14 A. No, I did not write it up, and I go this is nothing, there's -- we don't have a problem, you
15 know. But if you're worried about it, I'll have them look at it but not now. Yeah, exactly.

16 Q. And you said that to your first officer, or did you say that to the mechanic?

17 A. No, I told that to the mechanic and I thought I told that to Greg as well. Yeah, I told him
18 this is nothing, yeah, but I will write it up.

19 Q. Okay. Do you remember the mechanic you told that to?

20 A. That was Ricky.

21 Q. Ricky?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Okay. So, I know you said earlier that you have an A&P certificate.

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. Did that help you assess that it was nothing?

- 1 A. That has helped me a lot over the years.
- 2 Q. But in this event, did it actually --
- 3 A. Yeah, it did too. Yeah, in this event it did too.
- 4 Q. Okay. Did the mechanics do anything to it or did they --
- 5 A. After I told them?
- 6 Q. Yeah.
- 7 A. No, I -- after that I said just check the reservoir to make sure we have enough fluid in the
- 8 reservoir, and he checked and he said yeah, and I verified and that was true.
- 9 Q. Okay.
- 10 A. So, I didn't have any concern at all with the landing gear; with me it was no issue.
- 11 Q. Okay.
- 12 A. Yeah.
- 13 Q. Okay. So, you didn't put anything in the logbook, the mechanic checked the reservoir --
- 14 A. No, it was not necessary.
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. But we have a procedure that I could have done if I wanted. I could have written it up as
- 17 an informational, and I didn't even think it was necessary.
- 18 Q. What's a writeup for informational? What do you mean by that?
- 19 A. It would be like possible leak from actuator -- landing gear actuator, and then I have a box
- 20 that says F. F means you have to look at it, you have to fix it, and then, I mean, it's just
- 21 informational, keep your eye on it.
- 22 Q. Okay, and --
- 23 A. And I didn't think it qualified for either.
- 24 Q. If you had, does -- if you had written it up as an informational writeup, does maintenance
- 25 have to do something with it or --

- 1 A. Yeah, it means that they have to follow up with it.
- 2 Q. Okay. So, maintenance went and checked the reservoir, did they come back and tell you
3 how much oil?
- 4 A. Yeah. Greg came back and said it is good where it was. So, the reservoir has a gauge, and
5 it has RF for refill, and then it has F, full. So, the needle bounces between the F and the refill --
6 and the RF, you don't want it below the RF.
- 7 Q. Okay.
- 8 A. And it was in between the RF and the F, that's fine with me.
- 9 Q. Okay. Did you look at it?
- 10 A. Yeah, I looked at it.
- 11 Q. About where was it between -- just a ballpark?
- 12 A. Oh, you know, I cannot tell you exactly where it was, but I can assure you it was not below
13 the RF.
- 14 Q. Not below or --
- 15 A. It was not at a point where we needed to refilled -- I mean, not refilled, reservice it.
- 16 Q. Right.
- 17 A. Or service it.
- 18 Q. Okay. All right, I just wanted to make sure. When you said below, I just wanted to make
19 sure we're --
- 20 A. Yeah, you know, it's the way that these gauges are calibrated, it is backwards. So, yeah,
21 above actually is below.
- 22 Q. Right.
- 23 A. Yeah.
- 24 Q. Okay. All right. So, you -- when you guys get in the airplane were you in the cockpit
25 when they started loading you with pallets and cans?

- 1 A. We always have to be in the cockpit before the cargo shows up.
- 2 Q. Okay.
- 3 A. Yeah, and they give you the paperwork and what I do is I sit there, and I verify the cargo as
4 they load it to make sure they're putting it in the right space. And I have the paperwork and I just
5 took it off and they put it in right place.
- 6 Q. Okay.
- 7 A. Is that a requirement of the company, or is that something you do just because of --
- 8 A. No, that is Wallace. Wallace wants that.
- 9 Q. Okay.
- 10 A. Yeah.
- 11 Q. All right. Do you remember how much cargo you guys loaded that night?
- 12 A. Not really, but I know we were heavy full, enough to fill all the spaces, I believe. We were
13 very heavy.
- 14 Q. Okay.
- 15 A. Yeah. But exactly how much, I cannot tell you now.
- 16 Q. Okay.
- 17 A. Yeah.
- 18 Q. All right. So, was it all just cans, or was there --
- 19 A. It was a mixture of cookie sheets and cans.
- 20 Q. Is there any special loading requirements for those that they had to be in a certain spot?
- 21 A. That is not in my department.
- 22 Q. Okay.
- 23 A. Yeah, that is the loading people.
- 24 Q. Perfect. So, they load the cargo, did you shut the cargo door or --
- 25 A. No, that is maintenance job. When we are in Honolulu, maintenance takes care of that.

1 Other stations, either I'll do that, or the FO will do that.

2 Q. Okay. Do you guys have to check to make sure it's secured by looking at the door? Or --

3 A. Yeah, we have to make sure it is secure, looking at the door and all the lights agree that the
4 door is closed.

5 Q. Okay. Did you do that or was that something your first officer did that night?

6 A. That night, maintenance did that -- that the door was closed.

7 Q. Oh.

8 A. And I verified that the lights were out.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. So, you guys don't -- if you verify the lights are out and maintenance closes it, you don't
12 have to go back and verify that the door is --

13 A. No, we have to go back and -- before we were not doing that, but recently we started doing
14 that. They have since sent an email out for us to go out and double check, and I'm like
15 maintenance closed the door, they know what to do, why should we get out of our seat, go back
16 there -- this is more delay, you know. But that is what we've been doing lately -- a week ago
17 we've doing that, yeah.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Either I go, or the FO goes to double check, and then we got to double check the lights,
20 make sure all the lights are out.

21 Q. Okay, and then do you guys have to shut the entry door, the cabin --

22 A. Yeah, the cockpit door? Yeah, we got to close it because don't want -- in case of smoke
23 you don't want it coming in.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Yeah, so, we make sure it is closed.

1 Q. How about the exterior passenger -- you know, the smaller door? Not the cargo door, but
2 there's the smaller door?

3 A. Oh, the service door.

4 Q. Service door.

5 A. Yeah, funny thing, we used to come in from the service door, and email came out never to
6 use the service door anymore. So, we don't use that door, that door we have no reason even to
7 open it because we don't need catering.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Yeah, so that door is, most of the time, closed.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Yeah, and -- but when you do your checks, you check it too because every now and then
12 people open it and they're not supposed to, but they do.

13 Q. All right. So, you -- the doors are shut, you guys are getting ready to depart, kind of walk
14 me through what you guys do? You just sat in your seat, what do you do?

15 A. Oh, okay. I see where you're coming from. Okay, so, we sit in the seat, everything is
16 strapped, doors are closed, no lights up, and then we're looking for the guy with the wands. He's
17 in place, he's ready, I give him the signal, he goes, he's ready. At this point we've done all our
18 checklists, we've done all our -- what you call -- preflight, and the checklist after that. So, the
19 only checklist left on the ground will be three checklists, it will be the engine start checklist, the
20 taxi checklist, and the before-takeoff checklist. So, now we will be on the engine checklist. If the
21 guy up front says we are good to clear and good to start, we do the engine-start checklist, and then
22 he reads it off and we've accomplished that.

23 We start the engine on this night, the engine started normally -- both engines, and then
24 there's the flow to do, everything is good, you're good to go, we are good to go. Call for taxi, give
25 the guy the signal we can taxi, he goes yeah, you are clear to taxi, he checks the right, I check the

1 left, we're clear. Bring the power up, make sure they're responding, we have oil pressure and all
2 that, all those things normal. Taxi out, check brakes somewhere along the way, and do a taxi
3 checklist, bring the flaps and all that. He checks the controls, I check mine, and then we taxi to the
4 runway.

5 Along the way -- and this is not a company procedure, this is my procedure, I will bring the
6 power up and check all the engine instruments, basically everything to make sure I look at the Air
7 Force instruments. Make sure there are no red flags anywhere, and then I'll come over and look at
8 the hydraulics, we have pressure, we have quantity. Systems -- both two systems are good, within
9 the green, and then I'll check my flight instruments, and then I'll check the other pilot, make sure I
10 set up right, the courses and all that for the navigation. I'll come down, look at the frequencies,
11 make sure we're good. I'll look at overhead, make sure there are no initiators, and then I will
12 check the leading edge devices, that there's nothing sticking out.

13 This is me; this is not company procedure. I don't even know if they want me to do this,
14 maybe I might get in trouble with Wallace doing this. And then we're done, then to the runway,
15 we're ready for takeoff. This has been my procedure everywhere I've gone, yeah.

16 Q. Okay. You had mentioned something earlier, you checked the controls. Do you check the
17 --

18 A. The rudder controls, that's mine, and then he checks -- I check the bottom, he checks the
19 top.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. So, when you check the rudder controls, what do you do? Do you just finagle them, or do
23 you push them all the way?

24 A. No, I push it all the way just to make sure it's going to the stop, and also it gives me a
25 rough idea if my seat is adjusted properly.

- 1 Q. Okay.
- 2 A. Yeah. I check left, I check right, yeah.
- 3 Q. So, that night when you checked the left and the right rudder, was your seat located
4 properly?
- 5 A. Everything was normal, yeah. Sometimes every now and then, you know, I go oh, my seat
6 is not right, and I'll tell the FO you'll have the airplane for a second, you know, if you want to taxi,
7 and then I'll adjust my seat.
- 8 Q. Okay.
- 9 A. Yeah.
- 10 Q. Now, you say you check the bottoms, but he checks the top, so --
- 11 A. Yeah, our procedure -- company procedure is captain checks the bottom, that is the rudder,
12 FO checks the top, which is the pitch and the roll.
- 13 Q. So, when he checks the pitch and the roll, what does he do? What do you expect him --
14 your first officer to do?
- 15 A. Push it all the way forward and all the way to the stops, just like the way I do the bottom.
- 16 Q. Okay. Is that a company procedure there, or is --
- 17 A. Oh, I think -- okay, I think I know where we're going now, then. Okay. No, I believe this
18 is the way it should be done.
- 19 Q. Okay.
- 20 A. Yeah. We have to go all the way to the stops.
- 21 Q. Did your first officer that night go all the way to the stops?
- 22 A. Greg?
- 23 Q. Yes.
- 24 A. He always goes to the stop, everybody goes to the stop.
- 25 Q. Okay.

- 1 A. Yeah. Well, pretty much.
- 2 Q. Do you have some that don't?
- 3 A. Yeah, only one person who doesn't, and I do it myself -- in that case then I do both; I do
- 4 the bottom and the top.
- 5 Q. Okay.
- 6 A. Yeah.
- 7 Q. When was the last time you had to do that?
- 8 A. That would be the flight before I was with Greg, so that would be on the 1st.
- 9 Q. Oh, the night before?
- 10 A. Yeah. The night before, I was with Greg. Yeah, I did both the top and the bottom.
- 11 Q. Okay.
- 12 A. Yeah, because I was with this guy -- I mean, this pilot who wouldn't go all the way to the
- 13 stop.
- 14 Q. Was that in -- did you say that was in this aircraft, too, because you flew it the night
- 15 before?
- 16 A. Yeah, I think it was in that same aircraft, yeah.
- 17 Q. Okay. When you did it -- when you checked all the way to the stops, did it feel normal?
- 18 A. Normal?
- 19 Q. That you can recall?
- 20 A. Normal, yeah.
- 21 Q. Okay. All right. So, you've done your checks, you guys are cleared for takeoff on the
- 22 night of the accident. Walk me through -- just take your time, once you guys started bringing up
- 23 the power, I know you said that you guys were a little heavy because you had a lot of cargo?
- 24 A. Uh huh.
- 25 Q. So, just kind of -- like I said, I want to be that fly on your shoulder.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Just let me see what you're seeing?

3 A. Okay. So, I brought the EPR up to the carrots as it had been calculated on the weight and
4 balance for us. I brought it there
5 -- first Greg brought it up to 1.4 and it stabilized there, and I called engine stabilized. Just a quick
6 scan of the whole instruments, everything was holding as they were supposed to, and I go engine
7 stabilized, and then he brought it up to the carrots, and he goes set thrust.

8 So, I tweaked it, so both are bent to the carrots, and it was stabilized there, and I scanned
9 down, and everything was holding as where they're supposed to be, and I told him thrust set. And
10 then I called ATC, and then I came back, and I looked at the engine instruments again, I gave it a
11 quick scan. And then I went back, look at the airspeed, and I looked over the runway if
12 -- for any obstacles or anything -- any FOD, and then I came back -- this is what I do always, came
13 back to the engine.

14 So, by the time I finish all of this -- now during this roll at this time, the EGT on both
15 engines were between the green and the yellow, and this I have seen before. So, to me, okay,
16 everything is normal, and then back to the airspeed, yeah, V1 rotate, and then positive rate gear up.
17 400, started to turn, and then my next call would be at a thousand, flaps up, climb thrust. But we
18 didn't get there.

19 900 feet, whoosh, and it was a roll and a -- what you call -- a yaw, and Greg
20 counteracted that, and I ask him if he has the airplane or he wants me to take over, and he goes he
21 has it. I told him you've lost an engine. I immediately scanned the EPR, and I realized both of
22 them, they were not where I set them, they had dropped down a little bit. So, first I sort Number 1,
23 I told him I think you've lost Number 1, and then I looked at Number 2 and I think no, never mind,
24 I think it's Number 2. Of course, Number 2 had come maybe a few ticks lower than Number 1.
25 And I ask him do you want me to take over, or do you have it? He goes, he's got it, I said okay,

1 take it 220 heading, we're climbing to 2,000.

2 Our clearance -- original clearance was a right turn to 155 climbing to 5,000. So, I told
3 him no, we're stopping at two on the 220 heading, and I go okay, we are above 800. 800 is a on a
4 flap retraction for emergency, yeah. So, I say 800, okay, we have to clean up, I'll give you flaps
5 one. He goes okay, I say you got flaps one. Okay, speed is good, okay, flaps is coming up at zero.
6 I'll set MCT for you -- this is our emergency procedure. So, I brought both power back to MCT a
7 few notches of -- which I think it was already MCT since it had dropped. And I go, okay, I'm
8 going to go talk to ATC, 220 heavy and going to 2,000. You -- he goes yeah, you know, that was
9 our game plan.

10 But ATC became a project; it took a while for ATC to know what was going on. It was a
11 little bit of confusion, there was another airplane with the same call sign, so there was a little
12 confusion. So, eventually we got to 2,000, and my plan was -- we were going to go out 15 miles
13 and stay within 15 miles, use five miles for padding. That would keep us away from everybody
14 else; we'll have plenty of time to take care of the issue.

15 My thinking was we don't -- we are not on fire, everything is fine. Engine is running, no
16 need to rush for anything, that was my mentality. So, just relax, let's get to 2,000, turn the auto
17 pilot on, the airplane is under control, everything is stabilized, now let's figure out what it is. So,
18 that was my plan. We got to 2,000, and I go okay, Greg, I'm back with you, what is the situation -
19 - what do you have? And he says we've lost Number 1 engine. I looked up and yeah, the EPR on
20 Number 1 was not -- it was down, and I go okay, I have the airplane, I have the radios. Let's run
21 the QRH, you read the QRH, I'll fly the airplane, I'll work the radios. But before you do that, take
22 a look at Number 2 engine because that's all we have, how is it doing? And he goes Number 2
23 engine is hot, and I was like okay, let's run the QRH.

24 So, he read a few lines, and I looked over at Number 2 engine on the EGT and it was in the
25 red, and I was like, Greg, you know, forget about the QRH, we have to go back because this is not

1 good. And as I was talking to him, I was seeing the EPR was coming down on the Number 2. So,
2 I reach for it -- I reach over and push Number 2, throttle lever forward because now our airspeed
3 was going down, the -- we are not stabilized flight wise because we don't have control on airspeed.

4 We didn't have control on airspeed, we didn't have control on altitude, and we didn't have
5 control on the power. So, I go this is not good. This lever should not be all the way to the stop,
6 you know, I pushed, and it was at the stop, and then I realized the EGT had pegged at this point --
7 it passed the red and pegged, and EPR was coming down. So, then we told the ATC we're coming
8 to the airport right away, and my main focus was just the six-pack, maintaining altitude and not
9 stalling, and speed, that was the goal. Keep the wings leveled, don't stall, and heads towards the
10 light.

11 And we started working with ATC, headings back and forth. Then ATC said lower altitude
12 alert it has -- I say this is not good, and then the GPWS came on, too low, flaps too low, gear too
13 low, pull up. Everything went dark, and then we had to open the windows and jump out, wait for
14 rescue. So, if you're a fly somewhere in the cockpit, this is what you would have seen and heard,
15 roughly.

16 Q. And you gave me a lot of great information. So, I appreciate the time going through it, I
17 know it's no fun to relive it.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. But I appreciate it; you gave us a lot of information that might help us a lot. So, thank you.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. Can we go back just a little bit?

22 A. Definitely.

23 Q. To kind of walk through a little bit here, just -- I had a few questions as we were -- as you
24 were talking.

25 A. Okay.

1 Q. You had -- let me make sure I know the right spot because I don't want to start you in the
2 wrong spot. You had said something about the EGT was in between the green and the yellow?

3 A. On the takeoff roll.

4 Q. Right.

5 A. For both engines.

6 Q. For both of them?

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. And you said you've seen that before?

9 A. Yeah, I've seen that before on that airplane.

10 Q. Only on that one?

11 A. On that airplane and I think other airplanes.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Yeah. So, to me that wasn't an issue -- to me at that night. But now it is something I'm
14 thinking about, you know. Engines normally don't just stop; they sort of give you warning
15 -- advanced warning. I mean, everything, cars are the same way, yeah. And so, now, I'm sitting
16 back and thinking -- I think yeah, this airplane didn't come out of the factory with the engines
17 running between the green and the yellow, it became this slowly over time. This is me saying that
18 today.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Yeah. I wouldn't have said that last week.

21 Q. Okay. So, help me understand, it went to the green and yellow, what was -- were you on,
22 like, a max takeoff power?

23 A. Yeah, that power was pretty high. I don't know exactly what the numbers are, but yeah,
24 we were heavy, so it came with a high power.

25 Q. So, you were not doing, like, a reduced thrust power setting or anything?

- 1 A. No, I wouldn't call it that.
- 2 Q. Okay.
- 3 A. Yeah.
- 4 Q. And as you were going you said the engines -- the EPR had come back, you said, a little
5 bit?
- 6 A. Yeah. After the surge, somewhere around 900 feet, yeah. Both of them, yeah, those --
7 they were not at the carrots, they were definitely not where I put them.
- 8 Q. Okay.
- 9 A. Yeah. For both Number 1 and Number 2.
- 10 Q. So, just -- I know it's hard to remember exact, so just kind of give me an idea of what a
11 little bit back is? Help me understand what that is in your mind?
- 12 A. Maybe two lines -- maybe, you know, two notches.
- 13 Q. Okay.
- 14 A. To -- like, to middle weight, something like that, you know, you have those marks on there.
15 I think one is point-two -- this is just a rough number.
- 16 Q. Right, absolutely, I get that. It just kind of helps us understand what you're describing --
- 17 A. Yeah, like, two ticks on the gauge.
- 18 Q. Okay.
- 19 A. Yeah.
- 20 Q. All right, and when you saw that, did you push them up?
- 21 A. No, I did not because that would throw him off his flying.
- 22 Q. Okay.
- 23 A. Yeah. But what I have to -- what I did was -- I was like okay, I will give you -- after I did
24 the flaps and went through flaps zero and under, next thing is MCT. So, MCT, I have to tweak it
25 to a much lower power, yeah. So, I just brought it back slightly referencing the tick mark. So, I

1 just put it back slightly where it would normally be. But I didn't have a specific number for it. So
2 long as it is not above the tick mark, we're okay, yeah, we're not going to overheat it, yeah.

3 Q. Okay. So, you tweaked it just a little bit?

4 A. Yeah, I just tweaked it a little just to make sure that okay, this is not above the tick mark
5 because then we -- now we are overpowering it -- if we go above the tick mark, we are
6 overpowering it. Now we are doing ourselves -- it's not a favor, this opposite, yeah.

7 Q. All right. You said you brought the flaps up, what was your flap setting at takeoff?

8 A. It was flaps five.

9 Q. Is that a policy, or is that --

10 A. No, that was my preference. I prefer the flaps five because that gives you a lesser runway,
11 you stay on the ground -- you use less runway, yeah.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. So, I just want to have plenty of room in front of me if I have to stop.

14 Q. Okay. So, you chose flaps five to take less runway, but did the normal takeoff roll seem
15 about normal?

16 A. Yeah. Everything was normal until 900 feet.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Yeah. Now, listen to me, maybe something popped up and I didn't see it, but everything I
19 saw was very normal until 900 feet.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Yeah, and this is the thing, each time we takeoff, I relax once we pass 1000 feet because
22 the first thousand feet is when the engine is under the most stress, the first thousand feet. Why is
23 that? Because a thousand feet, you bring flaps up and you bring the power back, now you can
24 relax. You know you have an engine that's going take you to wherever it is you want to go. If you
25 don't make it past a thousand feet and something goes wrong, it means you have a problem.

- 1 Q. Okay.
- 2 A. This has been pretty much my experience, you know, with airplanes.
- 3 Q. Have you had experiences like this before?
- 4 A. Yeah, and it has been before a thousand.
- 5 Q. Here at this airline?
- 6 A. Yeah, here at TransAir, yeah, a few of them.
- 7 Q. Okay.
- 8 A. Yeah.
- 9 Q. Can you give me just an example?
- 10 A. Okay. An example would be I took off runway eight right, the same, and at 700 feet, pow,
11 and we turn around, went back right away, and it was an issue with Number 1 engine. At the time
12 we took off -- no, we didn't get to takeoff, we were at takeoff power, halfway down the runway
13 and it was a pow. And it swerved, but we came back to the runway and stopped, and that was an
14 engine failure. A complete failure, blatant, everything in the engine were gone, still before a
15 thousand. I've taken off so many times, after a thousand, you bring the power back, everything is
16 fine. So, I realize if you can make it past a thousand, you're okay.
- 17 Q. Okay. Now, I notice your description of the one at 700 feet, you said it went pow.
- 18 A. Yeah.
- 19 Q. Multiple pows, but when you were describing this event, you give it a different sound.
20 Was it a different experience than you had --
- 21 A. Yeah. This one I would say -- I would categorize this one as maybe a partial failure power
22 loss. Not a complete failure, but partial.
- 23 Q. Okay.
- 24 A. Yeah, because both engines had EPR, yeah. But the one I say failure, engine -- the EPR
25 was not there, yeah.

1 Q. Okay. So, I'm that fly on your wall -- on your shoulder again on this accident flight, you
2 said you had EPR in both engines, were the other gauges showing something normal? Were they
3 not showing what you would expect?

4 A. I didn't get a chance to scrutinize those gauges. Yeah, I just went for a quick snap just to
5 get a rough idea. It's like you heard a boom and then you look out of the window to see what it is,
6 or you look out of your window, you saw smoke. But you didn't follow the smoke to see where is
7 the smoke coming from; you follow what I'm saying?

8 Q. Uh huh.

9 A. And it was just a quick snap of what's going on, and the first thing you would get if you
10 have power or not is the EPR if you have thrust coming out of the engine, it is the EPR. So, that is
11 what I go for first, and then I use the other instruments as supporting the engine instruments, and
12 then the initiators, you know, to confirm the problem. But through all this issue, the EPR told me
13 that you don't have thrust -- this engine doesn't have thrust. So, I was like okay, it doesn't have
14 thrust, there's no need to spend time analyzing each single needle when you're falling out of the
15 sky. Yeah, you have to stay in the sky, don't stall.

16 So, once I got the information EPR is not working, it's okay I know I have a problem in
17 that engine. Now, my next course of action is don't let it stall. So, that was pretty much what it
18 was here. I was focused with the flight instruments, so I cannot tell you what the other gauges
19 were.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. What I do in that case is I use Greg, you know, like I told him -- what is the EGT, I told
22 him, yeah. And then he goes it is running hot -- something, you know. So, to define what hot is, I
23 looked at it myself and I realized it was in the red.

24 Q. Okay. All right. So, you asked Greg what was the EGT, was he the flying pilot?

25 A. No, at this point -- it's funny, but this was supposed to be the point where we all sit back

1 and relax and go okay, well we got here, you know, and he's been flying so I'll take over, give him
2 a little time to relax his foot and all that because he's been holding pressure somewhere. It will
3 give him time to relax. I took over and I worked the radios, and he takes the checklist like reading
4 the newspaper, and just reading the newspaper, what is the news? This is supposed to be the
5 easiest part, but we never got there.

6 Q. Okay. So, you never got to doing any of the checklists?

7 A. No, we didn't finish the checklist. So, he wrote -- he read a few lines, and I go this is
8 useless, which is engine you going to shut down? You have two of them gone, which one you
9 going to shut down, you know. I'm looking at Number 1 EPR, there's nothing coming out, I'm
10 looking at Number 2, EPR is going down. Why are we going to the checklist because it's a
11 shutdown checklist? So, which engine you going to shut down, they already shut themselves
12 down. We just have to stay in the air, figure out we're going to get this thing back like this,
13 without power. So, that became our primary focus. And he kept telling me just -- Henry, just fly
14 the plane, and I was like yeah, I just got to keep the wings level, don't let it stall, and everything
15 was pitch black, and the altimeter just kept winding down, airspeed winding down. It just wasn't
16 pretty.

17 Q. Okay. So, you saw them winding down, did you -- I use my hands, sorry. Did you try and
18 advance the thrust levers or --

19 A. It went eight and it stopped, you know. The only engine I knew I had power on that would
20 take me there, was winding down with the lever all the way on the stop, EGT pegged. Engine
21 Number 1 was gone, nothing on the EPR on Number 1. There was nothing to do.

22 Q. Okay. So, let's go back just a little bit to right when you put it -- I think you said it yawed
23 and it rolled?

24 A. Yeah. Greg was flying then.

25 Q. Okay. So, he was the flying pilot, you were monitoring him. Right at just before that, did

- 1 you -- were you looking outside at all?
- 2 A. And I was -- actually I was looking at the altimeter that took on 1000.
- 3 Q. Okay.
- 4 A. And we were at 900 and just about to say 1000, and he would say flaps one, set climb
5 thrust.
- 6 Q. Okay.
- 7 A. Yeah. So, I was anticipating that this was the action that was going to happen.
- 8 Q. Okay. So, that action didn't happen, right? So --
- 9 A. It did not. Well, it did happen, but in a different way.
- 10 Q. Right. Sorry, you're correct. I stand corrected.
- 11 A. Yeah.
- 12 Q. So, it made the noise, it yawed, it rolled, did you have any lights illuminated inside the
13 cockpit?
- 14 A. You mean like a normal light?
- 15 Q. Like a caution light, a fire bell, a fire light?
- 16 A. No, there was no -- none of that. If there was, I didn't see it because now, at this point, my
17 focus was the attitude indicator, yeah, that's what I was looking at, expecting a roll. You know, I
18 go okay, you don't want to roll, and we roll out of control. So, that is what I was focusing, he was
19 flying, I was making sure yeah, we're in a turn but it is not too much, you know, it is under
20 control. So, my focus was the six-pack.
- 21 Q. Okay. Do you remember which way -- because you said it rolled and it yawed, do you
22 remember which way it rolled and yawed?
- 23 A. Both ways. I guess one would be from the engine, and one would be from Greg from
24 counteracting that because it went both ways.
- 25 Q. Okay.

- 1 A. Yeah, and I ask him do you have it, you want me to take over? But he said no, I have it.
- 2 Q. Did you have your feet on the rudder at the time?
- 3 A. Oh, yeah. I always -- from the time I go you have controls, my feet, they never leave the
4 rudder. All the way until flap retraction and everything is fine, then I take my feet off.
- 5 Q. Okay. Did you remember feeling the rudders that night? Or did you apply pressure maybe
6 even to the rudder?
- 7 A. No, I did not. I felt the rudder movement from Greg, yeah, they both went like that, you
8 know. But I didn't do it, he did.
- 9 Q. And your indication was it was a pretty good movement, was he pushing the rudder all the
10 way to the stop? Or was it just --
- 11 A. Oh, no, it was just, like, a little quick tap.
- 12 Q. Okay.
- 13 A. You know, the rudder is very effective, if you push it all the way up, you might take the tail
14 off.
- 15 Q. I just wanted to make sure because you were making some pretty good gestures there. So,
16 I just wanted to make sure.
- 17 A. Oh, no, it wasn't that far. It was just tap, yeah.
- 18 Q. Okay, perfect. You had said that you made the decision at that point that you're going to
19 stop at 2,000 feet?
- 20 A. Exactly, yeah.
- 21 Q. I just -- I want to understand the reasoning, because, you know --
- 22 A. Why 2,000 feet?
- 23 Q. Yeah.
- 24 A. Why not 5,000 feet or some different number?
- 25 Q. Right.

1 A. Okay, so, 2,000 feet is not too far away, we'll get there in no time, and 2,000 feet will keep
2 us above the pattern of the people coming into Honolulu. Usually, Honolulu, they will clear you
3 for the visual at 1500. So, 2,000 feet I figured was enough, and it wasn't too high off an altitude, it
4 wouldn't take too long to get there. Running on only one engine, you don't want to be going to
5 8,000 feet, you know. So, low, and safe enough, yeah, so I said 2,000 feet.

6 Q. Okay, and I think you said you were going to stay within -- forgive me, I'm trying to
7 read my notes here, but I think you said you wanted to stay within 15 miles of the airport?

8 A. 15 miles, yeah.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Maximum of 15 miles.

11 Q. Maximum, okay. That's probably what I was missing because I have 15 with a question
12 mark, so --

13 A. Oh, I see. Yeah, maximum. 15 miles would be the boundary, and then ten miles -- 15
14 miles and ten miles so we can work -- we will have a five-mile area to work with.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Making our circles, yeah, and then that'll be ten miles from the airport, and the guys, they
17 can do their takeoff and landing, all the approaches within that ten miles, and that is plenty. ATC
18 is going to -- not going to bother us with heading changes because we're going to be in
19 somebody's way.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. We'll be just left alone, and quiet, and peaceful.

22 Q. Did you declare an emergency for -- at all?

23 A. Oh, yeah, I did, and that took a while. It was a lot of confusion initially; ATC wasn't sure
24 what we were doing. People were stepping over each other, it was a bit confusion initially. But
25 finally, it got sorted out, they understood what it is we're doing.

- 1 Q. Okay. So, you declared the emergency?
- 2 A. Yeah, I declared emergency.
- 3 Q. Okay.
- 4 A. Several times.
- 5 Q. Okay. At any point did you turn on the autopilot?
- 6 A. No, we did not. We never used the autopilot on this trip.
- 7 Q. Okay.
- 8 A. We never got -- usually, what we do is after we level and everything is stabilized, the
9 airplane is under control, we have a controlled flight, and then turn the auto pilot on, and then relax
10 and analyze what's going on.
- 11 Q. Okay.
- 12 A. We were not able to do it. We didn't get to that point.
- 13 Q. Okay.
- 14 A. Yeah.
- 15 Q. And just so I make sure I have a clear understanding in my head, what checklist did you
16 actually call for, for Greg to run?
- 17 A. Yeah, this is the engine failure shutdown checklist.
- 18 Q. Engine failure?
- 19 A. Failure shutdown checklist.
- 20 Q. Okay. Where's that checklist located?
- 21 A. That is in the QRH, that is on the engines, and that would be tab eight, I think -- yeah, tab
22 eight.
- 23 Q. Okay. So, it's not, like, a hard card or something?
- 24 A. No. It's not a hard card, it got -- it is a book, you got to yank the book out and go through
25 the pages to get to tab eight.

- 1 Q. Okay.
- 2 A. Yeah, and do that.
- 3 Q. All right, and you said he started reading and --
- 4 A. And I told him to forget it because I figured we had a bigger problem than that and -- yeah,
- 5 at this point we need to go to the airport. So, I told him put it away, set the approach up for the
- 6 airport.
- 7 Q. Okay.
- 8 A. And actually, I don't think we got to do it.
- 9 Q. All right. So, you were coming back in, did you see the airport from where you were?
- 10 A. No, we were too low. We saw the lights, we had a rough idea where the airport would be,
- 11 but we never saw the airport. The lady gave us multiple headings, but we never saw the airport.
- 12 Q. Okay. Do you kind of remember about what altitude you were at when you kind of turned
- 13 back?
- 14 A. We started turning at 2,000 -- struggling to maintain 2,000.
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. Yeah.
- 17 Q. Okay. At what point did you -- was there ever a point when you thought you weren't going
- 18 to make land?
- 19 A. Right after I took over the airplane I knew this was going to be a tough one.
- 20 Q. Okay.
- 21 A. Yeah.
- 22 Q. Why did -- you knew it, but I'm just trying to understand how you knew it? Teach me.
- 23 A. Because we were low on airspeed, we didn't have power, and we're descending.
- 24 Q. About what was you -- about where was your airspeed?
- 25 A. So, our target airspeed, I told Greg to maintain 220. That would be easy on the running

1 engine, and we're not -- it's not going to take us too far, you know, low speed, just to our stuff.
2 So, 220 was our original target. When I took the airplane, it wasn't at 220, I think it was 210 or
3 even lower, and decreasing, but at 2,000.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah, and then I took the airplane, I figured okay, we got to turn it to this, we're not
6 stabilized, this is not good. So, we were not able to accomplish our plan. At that point I knew this
7 is a tough one.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Do you remember what point you saw the water?

11 A. Right about when we hit it.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Did you have your lights on -- your landing lights?

15 A. Yeah, all the lights on. We take off with all our lights on until we pass 10,000 feet, and
16 then we turn them off. So, all the lights were on at this point, but it was still dark.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. The reason why, because we're flying slow with no flaps, so the pitch was a little high, so
19 the lights were not shining down, they were looking up in the air. So, it was dark.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. We touched down with flaps five -- eventually we went flaps five. We used the flaps on to
22 help with the stick shaker. You know, that took the shaker up a little. First, Greg suggested we go
23 flaps five, and I told him no, we don't need flaps, it's going to create drag, we don't have power
24 overcome that, so stay away from the flaps. So -- which he did, and -- unless we get slow, and I
25 was just struggling to keep the stick shaker from coming on. That was my main focus, was keep

1 the wings leveled, don't let it stall, keep the wings leveled, don't let it stall.

2 And then Greg said what about the flaps, they would help with the stall. I go yeah, so we
3 started getting lower and lower and with all the warnings, and all that too low, I go okay, flaps
4 five. We don't have any choice anyway. So, he brought flaps five and we were able to slow down
5 even further. And then too low, pull up, too low, pull up, and then I saw the reflection from the
6 blinking red light from the water, and then the reflection from the white strobe lights somewhere.
7 You know, I was seeing white flash, red flash from the water, just reflection and then splash, and
8 everything went dark.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Yeah.

11 MR. ETCHER: Are you -- do you want to take a break for a little bit?

12 MR. LEE: Let's take a break.

13 MR. ETCHER: Take a break?

14 CAPT OKAI: Yeah, I can use a break.

15 MR. ETCHER: Say any time, we're happy to take a break. So, we'll take a break. It's
16 11:13, and we'll be back momentarily.

17 (Off the record at 11:13 a.m.)

18 (On the record at 11:22 a.m.)

19 MR. ETCHER: I just have a few more questions. Then I'm going to let my other
20 colleagues here -- because, you've got to be getting a little tired looking at me and talking to me.

21 MR. OKAI: Okay.

22 MR. ETCHER: But I really do appreciate all that you've told us so far.

23 BY MR. ETCHER:

24 Q. I know when we took a break, you were coming into the water. You were getting the
25 ground (indiscernible) going off --

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. -- and all that. And you said you hit the water and it went dark.

3 A. Yeah. It went dark and quiet.

4 Q. Okay. Please, take it from there, if you can just tell us what you did.

5 A. Okay. So I looked over to my left, and the water was up halfway down the window. And I
6 told Greg we've got to get out immediately.

7 My thinking then was, we don't want the airplane -- the deeper the airplane goes, the harder
8 it's going to be to open the window because it's going to be much pressure on the window. So let's
9 open it now and get out.

10 So we opened, and it was broken down. The waters rushed in. I remember forcing against
11 the incoming water to get out. And I got out pretty quick. So did Greg. We both went towards
12 the front of the airplane and there was a (indiscernible) on top of the front windows. We held on
13 to that. The waves came crashing over us.

14 That was the last time I saw Greg, was hanging onto the window on the right side of the
15 airplane. I swam to the left side of the airplane. It was broken in two. I went in a few slides to
16 find something that I can hold on to. I was there for a while. I couldn't find anything. I left there.

17 I ended up on the tail because the tail was floating. I swam to the tail. I was floating a few
18 feet away. We had cargo in there. I went in there to see if I could get something that wasn't -- the
19 skin was flapping in the waves back and forth. It had the antenna attached to it -- the ADF
20 antenna.

21 So I grabbed the ADF antenna and hoisted myself up to the vertical fin where it meets the
22 fuselage. I sat there for a while and then the waves came up there. The tail, too, was sinking, but
23 slow. So I went to the right side of the tail. There was some (indiscernible) there or -- I don't
24 know what it is, but it was sticking off the vertical fin so I held onto that. And the waves knocked
25 me off a few times from there, and I would swim back and climb back again and hold onto it.

1 Depending on the size of the wave, sometimes I would duck my head under the wave so it would
2 go over me. Sometimes it just blew me off and then I'd swim back.

3 I did that for a few times. Then I saw the helicopter come over, did a few passes. And last
4 time I remember is a wave came and just knocked me off and the tail was not there anymore --
5 something like that -- and I was struggling to stay afloat. My boots wouldn't let me -- I was
6 wearing boots. I tried to take the boots off. That wasn't possible.

7 I remember just struggling to stay afloat. And next I remember was I was in the hospital. I
8 was waking up in the hospital.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Pretty much.

11 Q. Thank you for that detailed recollection. It's a -- you guys got out and everything. You're here
12 talking with us today. It's great to learn what you did. That helps us going forward.

13 A. I'm very glad to be here to see you guys. Again, I say apologies on the circumstances. It's not
14 the best of circumstances, but I'm very happy to see you guys.

15 Q. Well, that's good. Just a few questions, like I said, then I'm going to pass it off for a moment.
16 You popped the windows open to get out. Did either of you grab a life vest or anything?

17 A. There was no time. I didn't even really have the time to think about life vests. Our main
18 concern was keeping the airplane straight and level. That was the main thing. That was what I
19 was worried about.

20 I was like, there's no way we're going to stall into this darkness. It's not going to end up
21 good if we stall. We've got to keep the wings level. Keep at least some positive pitch.

22 This was my target. Keep some positive pitch, don't nose into the water, don't stall, and
23 don't bank. Just keep it level. And Greg just kept saying, Henry, fly, just fly the airplane. Just fly
24 it.

25 He was looking out -- because sometimes when ATC calls for a heading, saying, you have

1 the airport in sight, (indiscernible). So I say, I'm trying to look out to see -- to look for the airport.

2 And then he would say, no, just fly the airplane. Go to the heading and I'll fly the airplane.

3 So that was pretty much -- neither of us mentioned anything about floatation device or
4 anything like that. At least for me, that was the least of my problems.

5 Q. So once you came into the water and opened the window, did you guys just want to get out?
6 Or did you grab any floatation devices then?

7 A. No time. The water is coming. It was a fight against the water. It was a fight against that
8 rushing water, a wave of water. No time to grab anything. I left all my stuff in there. Everything.

9 Q. Perfect. We just wanted to make sure. It kind of helps us here. So I appreciate that.

10 A. At that point we were in survival mode. It's instinct.

11 Q. Yeah. So after you guys were getting ready to get out, did you have to undo your seatbelts?

12 A. So I opened the window. I tried to get out, then I realized my seatbelt was still there. So I had
13 to quickly unlock the seatbelt and jump, go out. But Greg was like a cat. He was out real quick.

14 Q. Did you have your shoulder straps on too?

15 A. I had everything on.

16 Q. Okay. Well, I'll tell you what. I know you've got to be tired of looking at me and having me
17 ask questions. So let me pass it on to Bill.

18 A. I'm not tired of you.

19 Q. He's a lot nicer to talk with and everything.

20 A. No, no.

21 Q. I appreciate it. And like I said, we'll go in a round and then we'll have some follow-up
22 questions, I'm sure. But thank you so much.

23 A. Okay. Well, thank you. Nice talking to you.

24 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

25 Q. Henry, do you know if Greg had his shoulder straps on?

1 A. Yeah, always he has it.

2 Q. And he had it on during the water landing? Do you know?

3 A. At this point, no, I don't know. I wasn't scrutinizing him that close.

4 Q. But you had yours on.

5 A. Yeah, I had mine on. And I know I had issue with it, because I didn't take it off.

6 Q. Did you see Greg hitting anything during the landing or being injured?

7 A. I saw him in the hospital with injury. And as we hit the water, I saw him move forward. But I
8 don't know if he hit anything. I (indiscernible). I was expecting it, so I was ready. So
9 (indiscernible), I grabbed the -- what you call -- the (indiscernible).

10 And I saw him -- it was dark. We're descending into the dark. It was hard to react to the
11 impact instantly. But I saw his body -- his head, I should say -- bob forward. But then it was dark.
12 It was dark and quiet, and I cannot tell you much about that very specific moment you're referring
13 to.

14 But I can tell you he opened the window because I told him immediately, let's get out. And
15 he was very quick to open the window and he was out. I was the second person -- he was first to
16 get out. I was second to get out because I had to take a pause to unbuckle my seatbelt.

17 Q. Okay. Can you describe again the noise that you heard whenever the anomaly began with the
18 engines? I think you said it --

19 A. Yeah. It was like a whoosh sort of sound, like that. It wasn't a pow, it was a whoosh. How
20 will I describe such a sound?

21 Q. You just did. So if I was to transcribe that, would it be accurate to transcribe it as, w-o-o-s-h?
22 Like a whoosh?

23 A. Yeah, you can say that.

24 Q. And is it accurate to say -- did it sound like an explosion?

25 A. No, definitely not. It wasn't a boom, no. A boom would be instantaneous. This was a whoosh

1 that took -- there was a time component in the -- as opposed to an explosion, which is like, boom, a
2 millimeter of a second. If you measure it, it's very little.

3 But this would take a few -- I don't know what the word to use. If you were measuring
4 noise in time, this would take longer time as compared to measuring the time of an explosion.
5 Does that make sense?

6 Q. Yes. Did you hear a single sound or multiple whoosh sounds?

7 A. It was more like a single sound. I cannot tell you. But what got my attention was the roll in
8 the yellow. Following that, I was like, definitely we've lost an engine because the airplane
9 doesn't do this by itself.

10 Q. Do you recall which direction the airplane rolled in the --

11 A. It went both directions.

12 Q. In what order?

13 A. I think it went to the right first, before coming to the left, I think. But don't hold me on that, I
14 might be wrong.

15 Q. Okay. I'll say, not certain. Do you recall what happened with the Number 1 engine power
16 lever after the whoosh sound?

17 A. I put both power levels to MCT. Just (indiscernible).

18 Q. Okay. And then after that, what happened with the Number 1 power lever?

19 A. I left it there and then I started talking to ATC, trying to (indiscernible) things up.

20 Q. What happened to it after that?

21 A. I didn't touch it from there. The only power lever I was working with was the Number 2. This
22 was after 2000, when I took over.

23 Q. You mentioned that the Number 2 power lever went to the stop. At what point was that?

24 A. This was at 2000, and that was my initial reaction to maintain speed.

25 Q. And what happened to it after that? Did it stay --

1 A. It hit the stop and I just left it there.

2 Q. Was it there for the rest of the flight?

3 A. Yeah, it was there for the rest of the flight.

4 Q. So at one point the Air Traffic Controller was directing you to a second airport.

5 A. Um-hmm.

6 Q. And I know you said you guys never saw the airport. But can you tell me, did you ever see
7 either airport?

8 A. No, we never. All we saw was a row of yellow lights on a cruise on the coast. Because we
9 were so low and so far out. Now, if we were high, yeah, we would distinguish the lights and the
10 airport. But we were so low and so far out, so all we were seeing was the coast.

11 Q. For the purposes of documentation, can you tell us what your injuries were?

12 A. How do you classify this? Scrapes and bruises and cuts.

13 Q. Did you have any other injuries or inhalation injuries?

14 A. I don't know. I guess that will come with time with the fuel and all that. Right now, I'm okay
15 except a little coughing and phlegm every now and then. I can still taste the fuel. But I'm okay.
16 As far as physical injuries, this is all I can see.

17 Q. Are you currently on any pain medication?

18 A. No.

19 Q. I think the airline has provided us your residential address here in Honolulu. But I'll check
20 with you after the recorded interview for that.

21 Can you confirm for us your mobile number? We will redact that before it goes into the
22 public --

23 A. [REDACTED].

24 Q. Okay. And actually, I guess, if we're going to redact that, we can redact the address, too. So
25 where do you stay when you're here in Honolulu?

1 A. You want the address? [REDACTED].

2 Q. I'm going to scan through my questions here. Shawn's gotten to a lot of the things that we
3 needed to ask you already.

4 Warning lights or warning sounds -- you mentioned the GPWS.

5 A. The GPWS, yeah. That was because we were low.

6 Q. And the stick shaker.

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Any other warning sounds you can recall?

9 A. No, that is it.

10 Q. Any other warning lights that you recall? A master caution, or anything like that?

11 A. No. If they came on, I didn't see it. I wasn't looking in that direction. I was just looking at the
12 six-pack. For those things -- for us to see those things, that is when we go through the drill.

13 And those things would be supporting evidence that, okay, this engine has failed. This
14 light is on because this engine is not running. This generator's light is on because the generator is
15 not running. Why? Because the engine is not running to support that the engine has failed.

16 We never got to doing that. That was no longer our primary objective. Our primary
17 objective became the six-pack.

18 Q. But initially, when the whoosh sound first happened, right away, did you see any lights
19 lighting up? Do you remember anything like that?

20 A. No. If any came on, I didn't see it because then I was focusing on the ADI, watching that our
21 roll was within limits.

22 Q. Scanning through some over here real quick. What is the last thing you recall seeing on the
23 engine gauges before the landing in the water? Can you recall the last things you saw as far as
24 what the readings were?

25 A. Yeah. I was focusing on the EPRs and they were both showing idle power.

1 Q. Do you recall anything else?

2 A. No.

3 Q. And the EGT?

4 A. The EGT for Number 2 was pegged all the way to the water.

5 Q. And that was -- do you mean in the red or all the way up?

6 A. It was pegged. It was past the red to the stop. I guess, if there were to be more room, it would
7 be moving towards the high side. It was off-scale if you want to put it that way, or off the scale in
8 the hot side.

9 Q. Is your sense that problems began with both engines at the same time?

10 A. Most likely. That is my conclusion. It was right about that time -- this is my speculation. But
11 I don't have supporting evidence.

12 Q. What makes you think that?

13 A. Because of the roll.

14 Q. Okay. Did you have any difficulty with controllability of the airplane that did not involve
15 purely the low air speed? In terms of roll and (indiscernible).

16 A. You mean after I took over?

17 Q. Um-hmm.

18 A. No, the airplane responded no problem. It did exactly what I asked it to do. Except he didn't
19 have power. But as far as --flight control-wise? If you're referring to that, the response was
20 positive.

21 Q. All right. I have a few specific questions that our aircraft systems people have asked me to
22 relay. I'm sure a lot of these things you're not going to recall because you were busy and you can't
23 look at everything all of the time.

24 But if you did notice things that were normal, even that's good information for us because
25 we don't even have a flight data recorder, and when we get one, it's only got 18 parameters.

1 A. There's no flight data recorder on this?

2 Q. It has one but we haven't recovered it yet.

3 A. I see.

4 Q. So I'm going to ask you a few things. No worries if you can't remember.

5 A. Okay.

6 Q. But let's see what you can recall. Did you notice any electrical system problems?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Any hydraulic system problems?

9 A. No.

10 Q. No, you can't remember?

11 A. There wasn't any. If there were to be hydraulic problems, I would have issues with controlling
12 the airplane. I would know.

13 Q. Okay. You said it was flaps 5 for the ditching.

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. Did the flaps seem to extend normally?

16 A. Yeah. Indication was flaps 5.

17 Q. And they seemed to go out normally?

18 A. Yeah, it went normal, flaps 5.

19 Q. Was there any unusual noise or vibration aside from the initial whoosh sound?

20 A. Yeah, there was a vibration that came with the whoosh sound. And also, during the climb to
21 2000 there was some vibration.

22 Q. Okay. Did the vibration continue after the climb?

23 A. No, when I took over, there was no vibration. If it was, at this point I wasn't noticing it
24 because the situation was worse than dealing with the vibration.

25 But there was a vibration during the climb to 2000. I did -- the airplane went

1 (indiscernible). Yeah, I did feel that even in my seat. That went out after a while, and I was busy
2 with ATC trying -- that thing just took too -- that didn't happen. But it took too much of my time
3 away from the cockpit.

4 Q. As far as the transfer control initially, you said, do you have it? And he said, I do. And then
5 at 2000 feet --

6 A. Yeah. At 2000 feet I came and I go, okay, what do we have? Because 2000 feet is when we
7 are supposed to analyze all this. And he's been flying it to 2000, so he would know more than I
8 do. So I ask him, okay, what do we have? And he goes, Number 1, the engine is out. And I
9 look at the EPR, and yes, the EPR was not where it was supposed to be; that was obvious. So I
10 say, okay, I have controls. (Indiscernible) the QRH. But before we do, what is the -- how is
11 Number 2 doing?

12 And then we realize Number 2 is not doing well. We forget about the QRH. I said,
13 (indiscernible), let's go back. We never got back.

14 Q. Did you have any difficulty hearing radio transmissions from ATC?

15 A. Yeah, initially. But at 2000 -- from 2000 onward it was not a problem. But initially, yeah,
16 there was a huge confusion -- everybody stepping over everybody, ATC not understanding what
17 was going on. It was a confusion.

18 Q. When they did transmit and they weren't being stepped on, could you hear them okay?

19 A. Yeah. When nobody is stepping over anybody, I could hear them.

20 Q. All right. Have you ever encountered a similar type of engine failure situation in your
21 training?

22 A. In training, yeah. Wallace puts us through this on a drill. This is pretty routine training stuff.

23 Q. How was this situation similar or different from what you encounter in training?

24 A. In training, the same. The same, except he doesn't train us for two engine scenarios like this.
25 But we get single engines all the time, and we go through the drill -- it's routine.

1 This is a very easy routine emergency situation, losing only one engine. But losing two is a
2 little different.

3 Q. Did that training experience help you or hurt you in this situation?

4 A. We were not successful, so I don't know how to classify this.

5 Q. How do you feel about the assistance that was provided to you by Air Traffic Control?

6 A. Given the circumstances, she did her best. And I would say good, great. She called the Coast
7 Guard. They saved us. So I would say good. No complaints on that, but I think ATC needs more
8 staff. She was doing too much, just one person.

9 Q. Let's talk about Greg. How well do you know Greg? Have you flown with him often?

10 A. I've flown with Greg a few times. I know Greg. He's a great pilot. He knows his stuff. He
11 knows what he's doing. His mind is straight. If Greg tells you the sky is blue, don't look at
12 the sky -- it's blue. That is how much I trust Greg.

13 Q. Do pilots generally like flying with him at the company?

14 A. I'm sorry?

15 Q. Do the other pilots like flying with him?

16 A. I haven't heard anybody complain about Greg. He's a great guy, very great guy.

17 Q. Did he seem healthy and alert before you left on the flight?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. And what's your take on his performance during the accident flight?

20 A. Good. I have no objections to his performance. The airplane didn't roll over. He
21 counteracted the roll. He was in control. And I have nothing to say.

22 I would have taken over and I was ready to. And I asked him, do you want me to take
23 over? He said no, and I trusted that. When he said, no, I have it on the control. I trusted that.

24 Q. All right. Let's talk about the company a little bit. Do you like working for Rhoades?

25 A. Yeah, I like working for Rhoades.

1 Q. Is the pay competitive? Or how is it compared to what other 737 pilots make?

2 A. When you talk about pay, the other places that pay is much more than Rhoades. Remember I
3 told you I got on the internet to buy a ticket to go to China, and I ended up buying a ticket to
4 Hawaii. So you compare routes to China, China pays more.

5 But I came here because I'm just tired of traveling. You're always in somebody else's
6 country. The language is different. You don't understand them. It's hard working overseas. But
7 the money is best overseas. But it's very tough.

8 Q. Okay. How would you describe the company's organizational safety culture?

9 A. I would say good.

10 Q. What makes you say that?

11 A. I have worked with other companies that if you compare them to Rhoades, they shouldn't be in
12 existence.

13 Q. At Rhoades, is there a company manager responsible for managing safety.

14 A. Yeah. I think I met the guy. What's his name -- I forgot. But the answer is yes.

15 Q. Do you feel supported by management and able to make safety-related decisions as a pilot
16 without fear of repercussions?

17 A. Definitely, yes. That is definite.

18 Q. Do you feel pressures from company managers to do things you feel are unsafe?

19 A. No, I wouldn't say yes to that.

20 Q. Do you have any safety-related concerns about the company?

21 A. No. I wouldn't be working here if I felt it wasn't safe. I wouldn't have taken that airplane if I
22 felt it wasn't safe.

23 Q. And how confident are you about the quality of the maintenance of the company? Any
24 concerns there?

25 A. Yeah. Sometimes we get into argument. Sometimes I have differences with the procedures

1 and analysis. But I think maybe I don't understand their procedure. So sometimes there is friction
2 with the maintenance personnel. I've had issues with their procedures.

3 Q. Can you give me an example?

4 A. A typical example is oil. Just putting oil in the engine. I would complain that, guys, we need
5 a top-off on the oil. Say, Number 1, Number 2 engine. And they would come and they would
6 look at it, and they go, well, start the engine, run it up for 15, 20 minutes, and then we'll talk about
7 the oil -- if we have to add oil or not. But we're not going to add oil as we're seeing it now.

8 That has been an issue. So many times, I've taxied up from the ramp to the runway
9 because they told me, run it up for 15, 20 minutes. And I get to the runway and it's still below the
10 takeoff limit, and then I have to taxi back. And then they put the oil. This has been a very serious
11 issue.

12 Q. Who do you interact with on that issue in maintenance?

13 A. Whoever the maintenance guy is on duty. If that doesn't get resolved, I'll call Wallace.

14 Q. When was the last time you had that problem?

15 A. It's been a while. I would say three, four months.

16 Q. How receptive is maintenance to pilot concerns or maintenance logbook write-ups?

17 A. Generally, not the best, because nobody likes working. So when you come up and tell them,
18 hey, this is -- they go, oh, man, what did you break? But eventually they fix it. They don't go, oh,
19 hey, you broke something, all right, what is it? No. They go, oh, man, what did you break now?

20 So I wouldn't call that -- what would you call that? How would you classify that?

21 Q. I probably shouldn't classify it for the record.

22 A. Okay. But eventually they fix it. So I guess to answer that question, receptive? If they fix it,
23 yeah, it is receptive. If they don't, then it is not receptive, if you want to say that.

24 Q. How often are they receptive versus not receptive?

25 A. I say always. They are receptive.

1 Q. So your general satisfaction with interacting with the maintenance people, how would you --

2 A. They are my buddies. They're my friends.

3 Q. Okay. How much sleep at night do you need to feel rested when you're off-duty for a while?

4 Let's say you have a week or two off and you're just sort of sleeping naturally. How many hours of
5 sleep per night do you need?

6 A. Sleep is a huge question mark in this business. Sleep is tough. You cannot go to bed the same
7 time every day and get the same hours of sleep every day, it varies.

8 Sleep is tough. Sleep is a huge question mark. The place I live I have to contend with
9 dogs, sirens constantly, neighbors, cutting grass using the weed whacker. So sleep is tough. I
10 cannot tell you exactly how many hours of sleep I get all the time.

11 Sometimes I get 10, 12 hours. Sometimes I go to bed and I'm just gone all day. And
12 sometimes you go to bed and in a few hours, you wake up, and it's hard to go back to bed. It's hard
13 to put an hour on it.

14 Q. All right. So one of the things that we do as a standard thing is try to document how much
15 sleep you got in the three days leading up to the accident.

16 So I have a table that just shows the dates. It maybe can help organize your thoughts if we
17 could walk through this.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. It just shows that the time of the ditching was about 1:45 on July 2nd. So I wonder if you
20 could tell me when you think you might've been asleep in that period of time, these three days.

21 A. That's impossible. I cannot tell you. This is -- I cannot tell you. I cannot tell even when I
22 went to bed and when I woke up. I don't know. Because my sleep has been so -- it fluctuates. I
23 cannot tell you this.

24 Q. Do you have any kind of general idea of whether you slept at all in three days?

25 A. I did sleep during the three days. But how much sleep every day, I don't know. But I think I

1 slept enough to get to work, I suppose. I wouldn't say that I was sleep-deprived when I reported
2 for this flight. I wasn't sleep-deprived.

3 Q. Can we walk through -- so the night of the accident that occurred at 1:45, you had to report at
4 12:15 --

5 A. 12:15, yeah.

6 Q. -- and you said you arrived, I think, a little earlier than that.

7 A. Yeah. Somewhere around 12:00.

8 Q. Okay. What time did you leave your house?

9 A. My drive is only 10 minutes, so probably, say, 11:30. I got to the parking lot, sat there for a
10 while, listened to music. So I left home 11:30.

11 Q. And then that takes us back to say here -- so what did you do in here? You worked this
12 previous day, I think, right? Thursday, the day before the accident?

13 A. Let's work this backward. So this would be shower time -- I mean, dinner time, shower time.
14 So I would wake up around this time, which is -- what is this? 8:00, here.

15 So then I would be sleeping this time, this time -- what time did I get back the following
16 day? I don't know when I got back the day before. So somewhere between 8:00 -- no, 10:00 and
17 8:00 at night -- if everything is normal, I would be in bed.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Can I scratch these?

20 Q. Yeah. You can just mark that up and we'll call that roughly 10 a.m. to 8 p.m.

21 A. So this would be bed-time.

22 Q. I think I have your schedule here for the 1st so I can see when you got off --

23 A. Is this 10:00? Yeah. This is like a normal schedule.

24 Q. I thought it was. Let me see if I can find it. July, when

25 -- okay. So I have you recording for July 1 at 12:15 a.m. also.

1 A. Okay.

2 Q. And then operating three flights. The last flight, you got in at 7:23 a.m.

3 A. So that would put me in this sleeping schedule.

4 Q. So 7:23, if you want to just mark work in there, and then we'll --

5 A. This would be work here at 7:00?

6 Q. Yeah.

7 A. Going upwards?

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. Okay.

10 Q. And then the previous day, I don't actually have the detailed flight -- oh wait, I do have it in
11 paper form. (Indiscernible). I do have the broader schedule that shows what shifts you have. Oh
12 wait, do you have the color-coded edition ones?

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I did not.

14 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

15 MR. OKAI: This is a future schedule. This is not going
16 to -- this is future. You want the daily schedule.

17 MR. BRAMBLE: Yeah, I thought I had that. I apologize.

18 MR. OKAI: This just gives you a rough idea. This changes because this is a prediction
19 into the future. But we don't how much freight we're going to get. We're only anticipating how
20 much freight we're going to get, how many airplanes are going to be launched, who is going to do
21 what, what's going where.

22 If you want the actual schedule, you want the daily schedule.

23 MR. BRAMBLE: Let's go off the record for one moment here.

24 (Off the record)

25 (On the record at 12:07 p.m.)

1 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. So we're back on the record at 12:07 p.m.

2 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

3 Q. So what we have is the monthly B737 crew schedule and it looks like on June 30th and
4 June 29, Rhoades had you scheduled on June 30th for something that's coded 1/L. Do you know
5 what that means?

6 A. No, we have to check with Wallace for that.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. And then prior to -- the day before that it's coded 2, does that (indiscernible)?

10 A. Yeah, Number 2 for the schedule flight going out.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Yeah. Number 1 would be the first flight for the night; two is the second flight, etcetera,
13 etcetera.

14 Q. I see.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. And so unless we can get the dailies you can't recall?

17 A. No, I cannot.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. This, I don't even look at this. Wallace sends this up periodical.

20 Q. Yeah.

21 A. I don't even look at that.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Because you cannot make plans based on this, it changes.

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. All right. We may have to revisit that at least by phone or something or email at some
2 point.

3 A. Okay, that's fine.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. Do you recall if you worked at all on this Tuesday, Wednesday?

7 A. I don't even know if I did.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. All right. Okay. All right. Do you have any sleep disorders that you know of?

11 A. Un-huh, no.

12 Q. And was your schedule in -- you don't recall your schedule so I can't ask you that question.

13 Did you ask about discipline and commendations?

14 A. Un-huh.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No.

16 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

17 Q. Have you ever been disciplined for your performance as a pilot at Rhoades Air?

18 A. Un-huh, no.

19 Q. Okay. Have you received any commendations or awards for your --

20 A. I wish, no, no.

21 Q. In the last year have you experienced any non-aviation accidents like an automobile
22 accident or anything?

23 A. Un-huh.

24 Q. Okay. And how is your health in general?

25 A. Pretty good.

- 1 Q. And your vision, do you wear corrective lenses?
- 2 A. No, I just wear glasses.
- 3 Q. Okay.
- 4 A. Yeah.
- 5 Q. Is that -- are the glasses for near vision?
- 6 A. For both.
- 7 Q. Near and distance?
- 8 A. Yeah, for both, yeah.
- 9 Q. Okay. And were you wearing them the night of the accident?
- 10 A. Believe it or not, this is what I was wearing. I lost my cell phone. I woke up in the
11 hospital with this still on my nose.
- 12 Q. Wow.
- 13 A. Yeah, yeah, and I've had it for years, yeah.
- 14 Q. Okay. And is that a limitation on your medical certificate?
- 15 A. Yeah, they said I have to wear this, yeah.
- 16 Q. Okay. All right. When was your last medical -- aviation medical exam?
- 17 A. Physical five months ago so that would be in February.
- 18 Q. Okay.
- 19 A. Yeah.
- 20 Q. And how is your hearing, do you have any issues with your hearing?
- 21 A. Un-huh, no.
- 22 Q. Okay. Do you have any chronic illnesses that you know of?
- 23 A. No.
- 24 Q. All right. Do you have a separate doctor besides your AME that you visit regularly or --
- 25 A. He's (indiscernible) a hospital guy, I don't know if that's good or bad but --

- 1 Q. Okay. Do you take any prescription medication?
- 2 A. Un-huh.
- 3 Q. Okay. And how long before the accident was your last drink of alcohol if any?
- 4 A. Oh, I don't drink alcohol, it's not my thing.
- 5 Q. Okay.
- 6 A. Yeah.
- 7 Q. Did you have any in the three days before the accident?
- 8 A. After the accident my friends drug me out to the bar and I had a bottle of beer.
- 9 Q. But before the accident, three days or so?
- 10 A. Oh, no, no, uh-huh.
- 11 Q. Okay, all right.
- 12 A. Yeah, they forced me to drink one bottle after this whole stuff and that was only one bottle
- 13 that was all I could take, yeah.
- 14 Q. And how about tobacco, do you use any tobacco?
- 15 A. No, I don't smoke, no.
- 16 Q. All right. And this last wrap-up question on medications is, in the 72 hours before the
- 17 accident basically this period, did you take any medication either prescription or non-prescription
- 18 that might have affected your performance?
- 19 A. Un-huh, no.
- 20 Q. Okay.
- 21 A. I don't even drink coffee.
- 22 Q. All right.
- 23 A. Yeah, it's bad for you, yeah.
- 24 Q. All right. In the, in the last year, have you had any major significant changes in your
- 25 finances?

1 A. No, un-huh, I just bought a boat so if anything I'm doing good, yeah.

2 Q. And any major significant changes in your personal life in the last year like a divorce or a
3 birth or a death in the family?

4 A. Un-huh, no.

5 Q. Okay. And your health has been consistently the same?

6 A. Yeah, pretty good, yeah.

7 Q. Okay. All right. That's all I have for right now. The other folks may have a few follow-
8 up questions but I want to give you another break opportunity if you need it. Do you guys want a
9 break or do you want to press on?

10 MR. KANAE: (Indiscernible) break.

11 CAPT OKAI: I guess we can keep going, yeah.

12 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

13 CAPT OKAI: Yeah, take it as it comes, yeah.

14 MR. BRAMBLE: All right. So, Clarence.

15 MR. KANAE: Okay.

16 CAPT OKAI: Clarence, you've been quiet and patient.

17 BY MR. KANAE:

18 Q. Henry, thank you for your time today, I appreciate it very much.

19 A. You're welcome.

20 Q. I'd like to take you back to the flight loading on that evening; you said you observed the
21 load out of the aircraft, loading of the cargo?

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. Was there any cargo loaded in the belly of the aircraft in the bulk compartments, you
24 know?

25 A. Oh that I don't recall.

1 Q. Okay, did the manifest indicate such?

2 A. I'd have to look at the manifest, yeah, because so many people work, go through, it's kind
3 of hard to remember every detail on every flight. Yeah, I'd have to reference it.

4 Q. And you mentioned that it appeared that you had a heavier load that evening. Why, why
5 was that, why did you say that?

6 A. Yeah, because the power requirement for the engine thrust was high.

7 Q. Did it -- did the aircraft have a longer takeoff roll?

8 A. No, normal takeoff roll, usually like within 20 seconds you're off the ground, you know.
9 Pretty similar -- same.

10 Q. Similar?

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Was there a delay on your flight prior to leaving the gate, prior to leaving the
13 (indiscernible)?

14 A. That is one thing I don't worry about. I try not to because there's a lot of politics in there.
15 The cargo people want to blame this guy, this guy wants to blame this guy. I stay away from that
16 stuff, the politics.

17 So I cannot tell you. I don't even know when I show up. I don't even know what time the
18 flight is scheduled to leave. I've given up that because it drives me nuts. So I just show up, hop in
19 the cockpit, do my stuff, hop in the cockpit and I'm ready to go.

20 So whenever they finish loading they close the door, I start the engines and I leave.

21 Q. Have you ever had an experience whereby you were called by the flight (indiscernible)
22 saying we have a change in your flight; we may have to add more cargo? Has that ever happened?

23 A. Yeah, it happens every now and then and when that happens and that paperwork is
24 garbage, they have to come in with new paperwork.

25 Q. Yeah.

- 1 A. Yeah.
- 2 Q. Who goes, who goes where to observe or retrieve the new release?
- 3 A. It might be the cargo supervisor or sometimes I'll go inside myself and get it, yeah.
- 4 Q. This, this also happens at the out station sometimes?
- 5 A. The out stations, not that much. Let's see. No, no, no, the out stations. Hilo, I cannot
6 recall, the out stations, yeah.
- 7 Q. Okay. That's okay, no problem.
- 8 A. Okay.
- 9 Q. I'd like to now go back to your flight whereby you took over the flight controls at or about
10 2,000 feet, something like that?
- 11 A. Uh-huh, yeah, uh-huh, yeah.
- 12 Q. Okay. You also mentioned you took over the radios for ATC?
- 13 A. Yeah. Yes. So the plan was at 2,000 feet at least that would give Greg a chance to rest his
14 foot and I'll take over flying the -- I mean, flying the airplane and working the radio. And then he
15 would read the checklist and then we'll do the drill and all that stuff. Yeah, that is the routine but
16 that didn't quite happen.
- 17 Q. So what happened was that you were flying and you were doing the radios continuously?
- 18 A. Yeah, yeah, with Greg sometimes answering the radio, yeah, because I was busy with a
19 six-pack, so then he would answer the radio. But I was supposed to answer it but I did not so he
20 did, yeah.
- 21 Q. I see okay, great. And then prior to impact on the water do you lock your shoulder
22 harness?
- 23 A. I had it on all the time from the ramp taxiing out it was, the shoulder harness, everything
24 was on. And usually I'll leave it on until we land.
- 25 Q. But do you have a lock feature on that shoulder harness system, a lock where you can lock

1 it where it locks (indiscernible)?

2 A. It has a lock but I don't mess with it.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. So if --

6 A. If you go for it too fast it would lock automatically, yeah.

7 Q. And upon departing the airplane you said you swam back towards the aft of the aircraft.

8 Did you see, did you see the wings at all?

9 A. Yeah, I saw the right wing sticking out. I did not see, I did not see the left wing. Yeah, so
10 it was only the right wing I saw, just the tip, the tip, just the slight tip of the right wing sticking out.

11 Q. Okay, okay.

12 A. And, of course, the water was still waving and it was like that and like that, yeah.

13 Q. Sure, yeah. And you mentioned that the aircraft looked like or appeared to be in two
14 pieces?

15 A. Yeah, it was in two pieces.

16 Q. Was it -- where was the break at, behind the wing, in front of the wing?

17 A. No, the break was aft of the wing, yeah.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Now that is, that is my, my estimation from the darkness and all that and knowing the
20 airplane, you know --

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sure.

22 CAPT OKAI: -- that's the wing ends right about here. I didn't really see the wing attached
23 to the fuselage and so, okay, I can see it is broken right here. No, is because I know the fuselage
24 and I can see. I know where the wing is supposed to be and where the break is. It is behind the
25 wing.

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sure.

2 CAPT OKAI: Yeah.

3 BY MR. KANAE:

4 Q. This will be my last question. You mentioned that you were able to get into the fuselage?

5 A. Yeah, uh-huh.

6 Q. What made you go into the fuselage again?

7 A. To look for something that floats, I can hang onto.

8 Q. Oh, okay.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Was there any loose cargo?

11 A. All over the place and that was, that was something I shouldn't have done because coming
12 out one of the straps that had come loose came onto my belt as I was trying to swim away I
13 couldn't because of that, yeah.

14 Q. Is that right?

15 A. But I removed it; I was able to get away, yeah.

16 Q. Thank you very much.

17 A. Oh, you're welcome, yes.

18 MR. KANAE: Henry, that's all I have; appreciate it.

19 CAPT OKAI: Yeah, oh, okay. Thank you.

20 MR. ETCHER: (Indiscernible).

21 MR. LEE: I just have a couple things then because they've covered pretty much
22 everything.

23 BY MR. LEE:

24 Q. You mentioned about you had to trim the aircraft up -- what, rudder trim, what?

25 A. Oh, no, pitch trim.

1 Q. Pitch trim?

2 A. Pitch trim, yeah.

3 Q. So the asymmetric thrust, you didn't -- you talked about letting that fo's foot rest?

4 A. Yeah, we didn't get there at all.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. You know, yeah. That was part of the drill. If we had gone through the drill, all this we
7 would have known, all the lights, generator number, whichever engine would have to be replaced,
8 if you would have to come on.

9 We didn't even turn the APU on to assist electricity with the generator from the APU. We
10 didn't do any of those so I cannot tell you asymmetrical with the rudder. I cannot, yeah.

11 Q. Could you tell when you were flying, you were holding the rudder and you were
12 maintaining level wings, was the slip indicator, did you notice was there any --

13 A. No, I did not. When I took over, Greg had pretty much trimmed the airplane, yeah. So I
14 didn't have to apply any rudder. It was more of the roll and pitch for air speed.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. I was more concerned with air speed and the altitude.

17 MR. LEE: So you think he put rudder trim in?

18 CAPT OKAI: Yeah.

19 MR. LEE: So you didn't have to hold a lot of pressure?

20 CAPT OKAI: No, no, I don't remember holding anything.

21 MR. LEE: Okay.

22 CAPT OKAI: Yeah, as far as the rudder goes.

23 MR. LEE: Okay.

24 CAPT OKAI: Yeah.

25 BY MR. LEE:

1 Q. You mentioned a couple times about it was a roll then a yaw, is that how it happened or
2 was it a yaw and then a roll, do you remember the order?

3 A. Yeah, I think it was a roll first.

4 Q. A roll first?

5 A. And then a yaw. Yeah, I think it was (making swishing noise) something like that. Yeah, I
6 think it was a roll first before the yaw.

7 Q. Do you -- from your training do you remember that for an engine failure being the normal
8 progression, a roll and then a yaw or what do you remember from training in the simulator?

9 A. Normally it would be like a yaw.

10 Q. Yeah.

11 A. Yeah.

12 MR. LEE: That's all I have. Thanks, appreciate it.

13 CAPT OKAI: All right, okay.

14 MR. BRAMBLE: All right, back to you, Shawn.

15 MR. ETCHER: Alrighty. I just have a few questions but do you want to take a break, are
16 you doing okay?

17 CAPT OKAI: Yeah, would take a pee break, yeah.

18 MR. ETCHER: Absolutely.

19 CAPT OKAI: Yeah, okay.

20 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

21 MR. ETCHER: We'll go off the record.

22 MR. BRAMBLE: At 12:23.

23 (Off the record at 12:23 p.m.)

24 (On the record at 12:40 p.m.)

25 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, we're back on the record at 12:40 p.m. with Mr. Okai. And I've

1 provided his day-to-day work schedules from June 29th to July 1st, and we've gone over those
2 together. And he cannot recall what his sleep activity was during that period for certain prior to
3 July 1st, but based on the work schedule, I have asked him to estimate when he might have slept
4 based on his usual habits during his off duty periods.

5 So, Mr. Okai, if you could provide us your best estimate based on your usual behavior that
6 would be helpful.

7 CAPT OKAI: Okay. So my best estimate for June 9th would be going to bed from 10:00
8 and waking up at 8:00. And for June 30th it would be from 3:00 in the afternoon, waking up at
9 9:00 in the evening. And then for July 1st it would be from 10:00 to 8:00 in the evening.

10 MR. BRAMBLE: Thank you, sir, I appreciate that. Okay. And so this schedule really
11 doesn't leave any room for other non-work activities, you're basically just working and sleeping
12 during this period?

13 CAPT OKAI: Pretty much, that's all I do, yeah.

14 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, all right. Shawn, did you have some additional questions?

15 MR. ETCHER: I have a few, yes.

16 BY MR. ETCHER:

17 Q. All right. Just a few questions that kind of come up as we were talking.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. You keep using the phrase six-pack --

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. -- you were looking at the six-pack?

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. Pilots all kind of have different opinions of a six-pack. What are you calling a six-pack?

24 A. Okay. Let me clarify this.

25 Q. Please.

1 A. When I say I'm looking at a six-pack I am not looking at a six-pack of beer, that is not
2 what I'm looking -- I am looking at the air speed heading indicator, the altimeter, and the heading
3 indicator down there in the RMI and the VSI.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. Thank you for clarifying that. I just wanted to make sure we were all on the same page.

7 A. Yeah, that is (indiscernible). I'm looking at the flight instruments.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. I should have asked when we were talking earlier, you said you had -- at some point you
11 had an engine on takeoff you were climbing out and it went pop, pop, pop, pop, pop. Do you
12 remember our conversation on that?

13 A. Yeah, that was a different airplane on a different occasion.

14 Q. It wasn't, it was not the accident airplane?

15 A. No, it was not the accident airplane that was a different airplane.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Let me put it this way that was a different flight. Of course, I don't even remember which
18 aircraft that was.

19 Q. Do you remember how long ago that was?

20 A. Three, four months, something like that.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Yeah. And again that's a rough estimate of it, yeah.

23 Q. And that's, that's fine.

24 A. Okay.

25 Q. We're just trying to make -- get an opinion in my head going of what you were looking at.

- 1 A. Okay.
- 2 Q. So I thank you for that.
- 3 A. Okay.
- 4 Q. You've been flying in and out of Honolulu for two years?
- 5 A. Yeah, since February 19th, yeah.
- 6 Q. Okay. Have you ever encountered any wildlife or birds on your departure or --
- 7 A. Like collide with any, any wildlife? No, un-huh.
- 8 Q. Have you collided or saw them fly by the aircraft as you --
- 9 A. Yeah, I've seen them fly by the airplane.
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. But I've never hit anything.
- 12 Q. Okay.
- 13 A. Yeah.
- 14 Q. Do you see that coming out of Honolulu some, a lot, fairly, fairly --
- 15 A. No, no.
- 16 Q. Help me understand that.
- 17 A. Maybe two, three times, if I can recall taking off and then it has been during the daytime.
- 18 Q. Okay.
- 19 A. This was daytime and we don't do much flying daytime anyway. I mean, I don't do much
- 20 flying daytime. Yeah, I think three times. Most we coming into land and two six, coming in
- 21 approaching two six, yeah.
- 22 Q. Okay.
- 23 A. Two six, two six left.
- 24 Q. So the opposite direction?
- 25 A. Yeah, the opposite direction. Yeah.

- 1 Q. Were they big birds or small birds, kind of --
- 2 A. No, just white birds. I don't know what you call them.
- 3 Q. Okay. White birds?
- 4 A. Yeah.
- 5 Q. Okay, alrighty. So I just want to make sure we have it on the record clearly. Did you
6 experience that on the night of the event, did you see anything?
- 7 A. No, no, no, un-huh.
- 8 Q. Okay.
- 9 A. Yeah, I've never had bird issue at night out of Honolulu.
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. Yeah. And if we did I cannot tell if we hit a bird, yeah.
- 12 Q. Okay, perfect. Thank you.
- 13 A. Okay.
- 14 Q. In a simulator as pilots we get all sorts of V1 cuts, engine failures on takeoff. Have you
15 ever had in a simulator an engine failure after you've left the ground but before 1,000 feet?
- 16 A. Uh-huh, yeah, I have had that.
- 17 Q. How did this event handle compared to what you remember of the simulator?
- 18 A. The simulator was much harder, of course, the what you call displacement of control to get
19 the airplane back to where it's supposed to be in the simulator is greater than it was on this flight.
20 The roll and the yaw in the simulator is greater than it was on this flight. I did not, I did not
21 input any controls on this flights that was Greg, he can tell you much more because he was flying.
22 But the roll in the yaw was brought under control with little displacement. Does that make
23 sense to you?
- 24 Q. It does.
- 25 A. Yeah.

- 1 Q. Okay.
- 2 A. If you were doing that in the, in the simulator you would have to be more aggressive, yeah.
- 3 Q. Okay. All right. Have you ever had time here where at the last minute they brought out
4 additional cargo just to put onboard?
- 5 A. Uh-huh, yeah, that happens.
- 6 Q. When they do that do they give you a new weight and balance, do they --
- 7 A. Yeah, you have new paperwork.
- 8 Q. Okay.
- 9 A. Yeah, everything you -- I didn't even -- some, some of the scratchpads I use old paperwork
10 that was no good, yeah. So I go, okay, that's another scratchpad, and then they bring you a new
11 one.
- 12 Q. Okay.
- 13 A. Yeah.
- 14 Q. And that's consistent or --
- 15 A. No, it's not consistent it happens every now and then. It's not something that happens all
16 the time, you know.
- 17 Q. What doesn't happen all the time them bringing out cargo or bringing out paperwork?
- 18 A. Yeah. No, bringing cargo and changing paperwork.
- 19 Q. Okay, okay.
- 20 A. Yeah.
- 21 Q. I just wanted to make sure I got that. Thank you.
- 22 A. Okay.
- 23 Q. When we were talking before we had mentioned that you flew the night before --
- 24 A. Uh-huh.
- 25 Q. -- in this airplane and you had had two FOs that you flew with that evening, if you

1 remember correct?

2 A. Oh, yeah, I ended up, I started with Gina and I ended up with Kim (ph.). Yeah, I remember
3 that night, yeah.

4 Q. Is that something they normally do is switch crews around?

5 A. No, that is not something they normally do.

6 Q. Is there a reason they did switch the crew around here?

7 A. Yeah, it wasn't for the best reason because Gina didn't want to fly with me, yeah.

8 Q. Okay. So did she make the request to switch?

9 A. Yeah, she made the request that she cannot finish the flight with me.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. I'm nosy so I'm going to ask, why would -- did she explain to you why she didn't want to
13 fly with you?

14 A. I guess she didn't want me to tell her what to do.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Basically, yeah.

17 Q. Okay. Well, we can leave it at that. That's all right.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. The last question I have and then I'll pass it back to Bill there, when you guys are getting
20 ready, you're riding the stick shaker down to the water and I'm sorry to have to take you back to
21 that point.

22 A. Oh, no, that's okay.

23 Q. Were you trying at all to land with the swells, into the swells or you were just --

24 A. I couldn't see anything.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. I didn't -- I couldn't even see the water let alone the swell, it was so just pitch black.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. I didn't see anything until we got so low when the GPWS had finished with it's one and
4 pull up, pull up and then the only time I saw the water was with the what do you call it, the
5 reflection from the beacon, from the red beacon.

6 Q. Uh-huh.

7 A. Yeah, and reflection from the water, red, red, you know, and I knew we were close. Swell,
8 I didn't know what the swell was.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. And it was pitch black, yeah.

11 Q. Okay. No, somebody had asked that and I wanted to make sure I answered, got an answer
12 just to make sure because --

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. -- you know, you guys were able to swim away so it's good to learn from you. But I
15 appreciate the time. Thank you for everything.

16 A. Okay.

17 MR. ETCHER: Bill, I'll turn it back to you.

18 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

19 Q. Yeah. Do you happen to recall if the stick shaker was going off when you hit the water?

20 A. No, that was my, my primary concern was to silence the stick shaker, we don't want, we
21 don't want to stall. Yeah, I wanted, I want to control it all the way to the ground wings level with
22 a slight pitch, no stick shaker and that was what I did pretty much.

23 Q. Okay. I don't know how you would know the answer to this question but our systems folks
24 are curious about whether or not you think there's a possibility that you could have had the thrust
25 reversers deployed somehow?

1 A. Oh, you would know the thrust reverse comes out you would know, yeah, it's serious yaw.
2 You'd be fighting the controls, yeah.

3 Q. And do you have a feeling; do you think that that is a possibility in terms of what happens
4 during this flight?

5 A. Besides safety thrust reverser comes, no, I -- you know, I don't know what happened on
6 this flight. I'm so curious to find out what happened but I don't think it was thrust reverser. If it
7 was thrust reverser you'll be fighting the control. Your head in would be -- you'll be working on
8 your heading, yeah, just to maintain the heading. You'll be seriously working.

9 Q. And because you didn't have to apply the rudder, it's what makes you think that?

10 A. You know, that is the thing, I didn't really fly the airplane because Greg flew it and he
11 trimmed it up, you know. So when I took over the airplane everything was fine except there was
12 no power, yeah.

13 Q. Okay. All right. And one more thing I just wanted to add to this 72 hour history stuff
14 because we talked about it off the record and I wanted to make sure we captured it was that even
15 for these periods where you estimated you might have been asleep you can't say for sure if you
16 were asleep the whole time, you might have woken up and gone back to sleep at some point?

17 A. That is true.

18 Q. Because of its daytime?

19 A. Yeah, go pee and work on the stuff, yeah, that is true.

20 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Clarence, do you have any additional questions?

21 MR. KANAE: Maybe just one.

22 Henry, what's the heading just before impact, do you remember?

23 CAPT OKAI: Oh, I don't remember.

24 MR. KANAE: Okay.

25 CAPT OKAI: Yeah.

1 MR. KANAE: (Indiscernible) first one.

2 CAPT OKAI: Okay.

3 MR. KANAE: That's all. Thank you.

4 CAPT OKAI: Okay.

5 MR. BRAMBLE: Rich.

6 BY MR. LEE:

7 Q. Maybe a couple things. Before hiring onto this company, when's the last time you flew the
8 737?

9 A. Oh, my God, years when I was, I was furloughed from US Air.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Yeah. And US Air had just gone through the training, I just finished the training and didn't
12 really fly away and I got furloughed.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. Maybe I'll ask you more about the thrust reverser, not necessarily on this night but have
16 you ever had any issues on, you know, any --

17 A. Thrust reverser?

18 Q. Yeah.

19 A. Yeah, in the sim.

20 Q. Okay, in the sim?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. But what about the actual aircraft, has there been any maintenance issues that you know of
23 with any of the aircraft?

24 A. Oh, with any of the airplanes. Sometimes you would land and then the thrust reverser
25 would not stop, the light would still stay on and the maintenance will go and put some lubrication

1 and take care of that. That's -- it happens every now and then, yeah, with TransAir airplanes; if
2 that was your question?

3 Q. Yes, yes.

4 A. Yeah.

5 MR. LEE: That's all I have. Thank you, appreciate it.

6 CAPT OKAI: Okay.

7 MR. BRAMBLE: Shawn, are you good?

8 MR. ETCHER: I'm good. Thank you.

9 MR. BRAMBLE: All right. Do you want me to do closeout?

10 MR. ETCHER: Sure, you can close, you're right there.

11 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

12 Q. All right. Is there anything that we have had asked you about that you would like to tell us
13 or think would be important for us to know?

14 A. Well, what I think you would want to let your bosses know is the idea of a single person
15 controlling multiple positions at ATC could be part of the contribution to this problem. Because
16 instead of talking to us, she was talking to somebody else and somebody else was calling her and
17 somebody else too and somebody else too.

18 And meanwhile, we're sitting there waiting for her so that took a lot of time instead of
19 dealing with this problem; we had to wait for her so that we can take action. If I have anything to
20 say that's something I would add to it.

21 Q. Okay. All right. And are there any other suggestions for safety improvement as a result of
22 your experience in this accident that you'd like to offer?

23 A. Yeah, I think they should make it standard practice anywhere there's an airport that there is
24 water, anytime anybody declares emergency the Coast Guard should be notified immediately.

25 That is what helped us on this, I think it should be made standard anywhere there's an airport with

1 water the Coast Guard should know anytime anybody requests emergency.

2 Q. Anything else?

3 A. That's about it.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. And is there anyone else? Obviously we're speaking with a lot of people at the company
7 and FAA and so forth and the Coast Guard, is there -- but is there anyone in particular that you'd
8 like to make sure that we talk to?

9 A. Yeah, the Coast Guard, the guys who came to our rescue, yeah, just tell them thanks.
10 Yeah, a lot of thanks, you know. If it wasn't for them she wouldn't be talking right now. And also
11 I would like to say thanks today to ATC control, she was by herself, and she helped a lot. It was a
12 lot of load on her, it wasn't only on us, it was on her too, yeah. She did a fantastic job.

13 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Anything else?

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That is it.

15 MR. BRAMBLE: All right, all right. With that, we will go off the record and it is 12:56
16 p.m.

17 (Whereupon, at 12:56 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

18

19

20

21

22

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII
ON JULY 2, 2021
Interview of Henry Okai

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FA174

PLACE: Honolulu, Hawaii

DATE: July 6, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.


Cheryl Farner Donovan
Transcriber

Appended Statement from Captain Henry Okai

Etcher Shawn

From: Henry Okai [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 9, 2021 5:24 PM
To: Etcher Shawn
Subject: Transair 810

[CAUTION] This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Captain Shawn D. Etcher:

We need to make a correction in my statement. Please note that the correct flap position was 1, NOT 5. I think I told you it was 5. The flap handle was moved only one notch, that would correspond to flap position 1. Please let me know if this correction is possible.

Sincerely,

Okai

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:

*

*

TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH *
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, *
ON JULY 2, 2021 *

Accident No.: DCA21FA174

*

Interview of: GREGORY RYAN, First Officer

Rhoades Aviation, TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

APPEARANCES:

WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factor Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector of Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

WILLIAM KATT, Esq.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

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I N T E R V I E W

1
2 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. My name is Bill Bramble and I'm a Human Performance
3 Investigator with the NTSB. Mr. Shawn Etcher and I are leading the operations in Human
4 Performance Working Group for Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174 involving
5 Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

6 The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause
7 of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the
8 Department of Transportation or the FAA and it has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

9 I would now like to have Mr. Etcher and each of the group members briefly introduce
10 themselves and their role.

11 MR. ETCHER: Hi, good morning, my name is Shawn Etcher, I'm the Operational Factors
12 Group Chairman for the NTSB.

13 MR. LEE: Hi, I'm Rich Lee, Safety Pilot from Boeing.

14 MR. KANAE: And, good morning, my name is Clarence Kanae with the Honolulu
15 Certificate Management Office, Assistant to NTSB Staff here.

16 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay and we'll get to your representative in a moment. Is there
17 anybody that you object to being present for this interview?

18 MR. RYAN: No.

19 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Today we'll be using the services of a digital recorder. After the
20 interview we'll send that recording out for transcription and the party members will have an
21 opportunity to review that transcription to correct it for any typographical errors.

22 Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent
23 reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault, we're here simply for you to share your insight with
24 us with a goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, we cannot offer a guarantee of
25 confidentiality or immunity and the transcription of this interview will eventually be made part of

1 the public docket for the accident investigation.

2 Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. Pardon me; let me turn
3 my speaker off. And we'll ask questions one person at a time. Everyone's been instructed to not
4 interrupt the person that's asking questions -- who is asking questions at that time and there will be
5 an opportunity for each group members to ask follow-up questions after each person has had a
6 turn.

7 For all the group members, and we've already gone over this but if you have questions just
8 make a note and when it comes back around to you be sure to ask them at that time.

9 Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a
10 question just say so. If you realize you misstated something or you want to correct something,
11 please do. Feel free to volunteer information if you wish to.

12 You are entitled to have one representative of your choosing, is there someone you would
13 like to have as your representative?

14 MR. RYAN: Bobby.

15 MR. KATT: Bill.

16 MR. RYAN: Bill, excuse me, I'm sorry.

17 MR. BRAMBLE: And can you state your full name, Bill?

18 MR. KATT: William J. Katt.

19 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. As previously discussed, Mr. Katt, you can direct the witness to -
20 - actually he's not actually the witness -- you can direct Mr. Ryan to answer a question, you can
21 request a short break to confer with him, if needed, but if you would please refrain from answering
22 any questions for him or on his behalf that would be appreciated.

23 MR. KATT: Understood.

24 MR. BRAMBLE: Does anyone else have any questions?

25 Okay. Seeing none. If everyone is ready we'll begin with the questions but I understand

1 that Mr. Ryan would like to say something before we do that. Let me just pull up my notes here
2 really quick. All right. All right.

3 Mr. Ryan did you have something you wanted to say before the interview started?

4 MR. RYAN: I wanted to make a disclosure that I have two prescriptions that I did not
5 disclose on my application for my medical.

6 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. What are they?

7 MR. RYAN: One is Wellbutrin.

8 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

9 MR. RYAN: And the other I don't remember the name, this one's for high cholesterol.

10 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Do you recall the dose of those meds?

11 MR. RYAN: I don't.

12 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. And how often do you take them or did you take them?

13 MR. RYAN: I haven't.

14 MR. BRAMBLE: Oh, you're not currently taking them?

15 MR. RYAN: No. I do have a prescription but I'm not taking them.

16 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, all right. Were you taking them in the 72 hours preceding the
17 accident?

18 MR. RYAN: No.

19 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right, is there anything else?

20 MR. RYAN: No.

21 MR. BRAMBLE: All right. Thanks for that. All right.

22 INTERVIEW OF GREGORY RYAN

23 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

24 Q. Mr. Ryan, can you state your full name for the record, please?

25 A. Gregory Lawrence Ryan.

- 1 Q. And how do you spell Lawrence?
- 2 A. L-A-W-R-E-N-C-E.
- 3 Q. Okay. Are you currently taking any pain medication?
- 4 A. Tylenol.
- 5 Q. Okay. And that's it?
- 6 A. Yes, sir.
- 7 Q. What was the nature of your injuries in the accident?
- 8 A. I had several severe head lacerations that were stapled at the hospital and just lots of bumps
9 and bruises all over.
- 10 Q. Okay. Anything that you were diagnosed with as far as the injuries from the accident?
- 11 A. They said there was something wrong with my lungs because I had ingested a lot of
12 seawater mixed with fuel. I don't know what they call that though but that was it.
- 13 Q. Okay. And where do you reside?
- 14 A. At [REDACTED]
- 15 Q. 96734. Can you tell me the street name again?
- 16 A. [REDACTED]
- 17 Q. Okay. And can you tell me your local phone number?
- 18 A. Yes, [REDACTED].
- 19 Q. [REDACTED], okay. And how old are you today?
- 20 A. Fifty.
- 21 Q. Fifty, all right. I should have asked how old were you at the time of the accident?
- 22 A. Fifty.
- 23 Q. Okay. And do you typically -- does your company typically refer to themselves as
24 TransAir or Rhoades, do you have a preference what I call the company?
- 25 A. No, Rhoades is the certificate, internally we say TransAir, but on the radio we say Rhoades

1 Express.

2 Q. Okay, all right. So what's your title at Rhoades Air?

3 A. I'm a First Officer on Boeing 737.

4 Q. And when were you hired by the company?

5 A. I believe it was July or so of 2019.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. So I'm just -- I'm at two years right now.

8 Q. And what are your roles and responsibilities at the company?

9 A. Just those assigned to First Officers which is pre-flight clearances and then assisting the
10 PIC as directed.

11 Q. Okay. No management roles?

12 A. No official role but for the last six weeks or so David Seest, the Director of Operations, has
13 asked me to assist him with revising the company's weight and balance manual so I don't have a
14 role for that, I'm not paid additionally for that but that's the only other task I perform for the
15 company.

16 Q. Okay. And can you give us a brief overview of your aviation background and what led to
17 you working at Rhoades?

18 A. I started flying or I went and started at the San Juan Pilot Training Program, which is a
19 Mesa Airlines Program in Farmington, New Mexico, when I graduated high school in 1989. I
20 completed the training there in January, I believe, of 1991, was hired by Mesa Airlines then and I
21 was with Mesa until May or so of 1995 at which time I decided to leave flying and go to law
22 school, which I did.

23 And two years ago I decided to see if I could get back into flying and so then I applied to
24 TransAir.

25 Q. So no aviation employment between '95 and two years ago?

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. Okay. And at the time of the accident, did you work for other employers besides TransAir
3 or Rhoades?

4 A. Yes. I have a law firm downtown, it's my name, it's Greg Ryan and Associates.

5 Q. And anything besides that?

6 A. No, that's it.

7 Q. Okay. And can you give us a brief overview of your certificates and ratings?

8 A. Yes, I have an ATP with a 737 type rating.

9 Q. Okay. Any other type ratings?

10 A. No.

11 Q. And what's your estimated total flight time? You can use big round numbers.

12 A. I think about 5,200 or so hours.

13 Q. Okay. How much on the 737?

14 A. It was 907 that night.

15 Q. Okay. And how long ago were you type rated on the seven, three?

16 A. It would have been in the fall of 2019.

17 Q. And was that in Miami?

18 A. It was.

19 Q. At which training provider?

20 A. It's Pan Am.

21 Q. Okay. All right. It's our understanding that you were the First Officer on Flight 810
22 ditched in Mamala Bay shortly after takeoff from Daniel K. Inouye International Airport on July
23 2nd, 2021.

24 Can you please describe for us what happened that day from the time you arrived at the
25 airport until the time you were transported to the hospital?

1 A. So I arrived at the airport, I went into the Flight Following Office where our dispatcher or
2 flight follower is. I met with Henry Okai, the Captain. The flight follower had prepared the load
3 briefing packet, the weather and those types of things, and so per our policy I went over that with
4 Henry in the Flight Following Office.

5 And then I took that packet, which he put on a clipboard, out to the airplane, which is kind
6 of the policy. So we do the briefing inside and then the First Officer goes out and does the pre-
7 flight.

8 So I went out to the airplane, did the pre-flight. It was -- the aircraft was normal except on
9 the left main gear there was a lot of fluid that was -- it wasn't currently leaking but it had recently
10 leaked, it was all over the tire, all over the ground, so I took a photo and I sent it both to Henry and
11 to one of the maintenance folks, who was on duty, his name was Ricky May.

12 They both came over with a flashlight, they looked at it. Ricky said it was fine, nothing to
13 worry about and said we -- I continued on with the pre-flight. Then we -- Henry and I were both in
14 the cockpit setting up the cockpit, getting the weather, the clearance and just waiting for the
15 ground crew to finish loading.

16 They finished loading. We closed the -- well, Ricky, the maintenance closed the cargo
17 door. He closed the entryway door, which is policy, but then the First Officer is in the low galley
18 area making sure everything is secured before getting back into the cockpit, so I did that.

19 Put on our seatbelts and did our, our pre-engine start checklists. Called for taxi clearance,
20 taxi out. We were cleared down to eight right. We got down to eight right, tower cleared us for
21 takeoff so we took off. I took off, I was flying. I was the flying pilot.

22 V1 rotate, V2, so V2 tail is off the ground and then I pitched up to about 18 degrees which
23 I normally do. Positive rate gear up, then next call is 400 feet and then we say heading select and
24 we start out on our heading.

25 But before the 400 feet call when after the gear came up we lost the Number 1 engine. So

1 heard a pop and it went still and all the gauges on the left side, the Number 1 just dropped.

2 So we leveled off to increase our speed. We put up the remaining flaps. We were at Flaps
3 5 on takeoff so we went from Flaps 5 to Flaps 1 then Flaps up. And then we started climbing and
4 Henry said level at 2,000 feet so I did.

5 He asked if I wanted him to take control and I said I'm okay. And we were at 2,000 feet, at
6 that I looked back to see the airport to the right and I said, Henry, I think we should head back to
7 the airport, because our, the departure procedure, as we're trained to follow is you turn to Heading
8 220 and you fly out, get stabilized, analyze the problem, run the checklist then coordinate with
9 tower to come back.

10 And I said, I think we need to go back and he said no, Heading 220, because that's the
11 procedure and he's PIC and so I said okay. So we were level at 2,000 or so heading out on,
12 Heading of 220, which is away from the airport, and our -- we started losing our airspeed.

13 And we pushed the Number 2 power lever up. The EGT was at red line and we were still
14 slowing. We pushed it above red line and we were still slowing. And Henry said, The gear must
15 be down or check the gear, is the gear down or something, to try to explain why with full power on
16 one engine we were losing air speed.

17 And I confirmed the gear was up, flaps were up, the spoilers hadn't deployed. Nope but we
18 weren't maintaining our air speed. So of course we have to start going down. And then I said,
19 again to Henry, we should turn back to the airport because we're getting farther away. And he said
20 you're right, let's turn back.

21 And so he started the turn. He was -- because he was flying so he started to turn back
22 toward the airport and we just got lower and lower, air speed was getting slower and it's -- weren't
23 going to make it.

24 So we touched down at about 160 indicated. The stick shaker was going off so had to nose
25 high altitude. We hit the water, came to a stop pretty quick. He and I both took off our seatbelts

1 and went out the windows and we saw the plane had broken in two, so I stayed with the nose
2 section, that I had just climbed out of, he swam to the tail section.

3 And we, we talked a little bit, just calling each other's names and so I heard him, I knew he
4 was still there. Then I saw him on the tail. And then the tail and the nose kind of floated away, the
5 waves were pretty high.

6 And then the nose started going down and the backend started going up, which worried me.
7 And right about then one of the big wooden pallets we were carrying that was stacked with boxes
8 and a big net over the top to secure, that was in the Number 1 position in the airplane, somehow I
9 got out and ended up at the front of the airplane.

10 So I saw it so I climbed on that. I could still see the tail, I could see Henry standing on top
11 of the tail and we just stayed there for I don't know how long. It seemed like a very long time. I
12 didn't know if that raft was -- I mean, that wooden pallet box raft was going to stay afloat or the
13 waves were big so I didn't know if I'd get knocked off that.

14 But after sometimes I heard a helicopter, Coast Guard, I think, I guess Coast Guard and
15 they made three big passes, three big circles around us and it was the fourth pass that they saw me
16 and they had their spotlight on me and then they blinked it, I guess, to tell me that they saw me.

17 And I was concerned about Henry because he was on the tail and I didn't know for how
18 long that was going to stay afloat so I used big waving arm motions to show the helicopter the
19 direction that Henry was.

20 And so they dropped a diver in the water who came to the floating pallet and stayed there
21 with me and the helicopter went over to the tail. And there was a boat from the fire department
22 that came and picked me up and took me to the fire boat dock, which took a very long time
23 because the waves were high so we were going slow.

24 We got there. While I was in the boat somebody wrapped some bandages around my head
25 because I had a lot of blood, my front of my shirt was bloody. So when we got to the boat dock I

1 walked off, people were holding my hands but I walked off and I smelled like gasoline very strong
2 or fuel.

3 And so they said we have to hose him off. So they got a hose and they hosed me off. And
4 then somebody decided that wasn't good enough so they got the special scissors and they cut off
5 my clothes and then hosed me off again. And then they wrapped blankets or something around me
6 and then I went into the ambulance.

7 And then in the ambulance there was a male and a female inside and the male was trying to
8 start an IV but I guess -- or he said because I was cold he couldn't get to the veins. He tried three
9 times and then he stopped and then we went to the hospital.

10 Q. Okay. Is there anything that you would like to add that you can recall before I start probing
11 with individual questions?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Okay. Do you know what the fluid was on the tire or the main landing gear area?

14 A. Ricky said it was hydraulic because only hydraulic lines run through the wheel well he said
15 so that was his conclusion.

16 Q. And who is Ricky?

17 A. One of the maintenance. He was one of the maintenance people on duty that night.

18 Q. Do you know what he did to address it?

19 A. I don't know. I mean he discussed with Henry, Henry was there, they were both talking,
20 and so then I continued on with the pre-flight.

21 Q. Did you see it again after, after they looked at it, had they cleaned it up?

22 A. I don't know because I didn't look at it again after I completed the pre-flight I would have
23 next looked at it in Maui. So I didn't have another opportunity to view it so I don't know what it
24 looked like.

25 Q. Okay. And can you confirm that the airplane seemed to break into two pieces; you think

1 it's mainly two pieces?

2 A. I only saw two pieces so I saw the nose cone section and then I saw the tail, the vertical and
3 the horizontal and then part of the fuselage. So I don't recall if I saw the wings attached, I don't.

4 Q. Okay. Did it seem like there was a lot of fuselage attached to the tail or could you tell?

5 A. What I recall it wasn't very much.

6 Q. Okay. You couldn't see very much?

7 A. I couldn't see, it was very dark out there.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. The moon, I look at the moon it was about a quarter or so in so it was some light but it was
10 pretty dark.

11 Q. Did the airplane have any maintenance write-ups or MEL items when you arrived?

12 A. Henry would know that better because he checks that but I -- yeah, I guess would -- I don't,
13 I don't know, he would know that.

14 Q. Did you notice anything else unusual about the airplane when you did your pre-flight
15 inspection?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Okay. You mentioned that you did the takeoff but then later Henry was flying. At what
18 point did he take over?

19 A. I believe I had just leveled at 2,000 feet as he directed. It was shortly, shortly after that that
20 he took control.

21 Q. Do you recall the last time you flew that particular airplane?

22 A. I could look in my electronic flight log but off the top of my head I don't.

23 Q. Okay. And off the top of your head do you recall experiencing anomalies on this particular
24 airplane in the past as far as something similar to what you observed with the leak or any other
25 mechanical issues?

1 A. I can't recall specifically as to that airplane. It seems like every airplane has its, you know,
2 unique issues but that one in particular I can't say, I'm sorry.

3 Q. Okay, that's fine. All right. How did your understanding of the abnormal situation and
4 what you should do about it evolve as the situation developed, like what was your thinking about
5 what the problem was and what you should do and how did that, did that change as this event
6 unfolded?

7 A. Well, initially I heard the pop and, you know, I thought I knew it was the left engine except
8 the airplane yawed to the, to the right, which shouldn't have been the case and but that may just be
9 I stepped on the rudder or something, I don't know.

10 But it pulled to the right but pretty quickly we realized it was the Number 1 engine just by
11 looking at the indications but we -- I believe we followed the procedures as we were trained but we
12 should have -- yeah, I don't know why the airplane came down.

13 Q. So the Number 1 is the left engine?

14 A. I'm sorry, yes, yes.

15 Q. And if the Number 1 engine went out you would expect the airplane to yaw which
16 direction?

17 A. To the left.

18 Q. And the airplane was yawing to the right?

19 A. That was it initially yawed to the right, yes.

20 Q. Was that immediately after you heard the pop sound?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And did you compensate with rudder?

23 A. I did, yes.

24 Q. Okay. And the -- I'm sorry, I'm going to allow you to continue, is there anything else you
25 want to tell me about how your understanding of what was wrong evolved beyond that point?

1 A. No, I think we -- once we agreed it was the right engine nothing changed after that. I'm
2 sorry; it was the right engine that was still running is what I --

3 Q. Okay. Which rudder pedal were you having to press to compensate for the yaw?

4 A. The right pedal.

5 Q. Right pedal?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. Do you recall any warning lights or sounds aside from the stick shaker after the
8 incident, after the abnormality began?

9 A. Well, we didn't get the stick shaker until we just about went in the water. We didn't get
10 the stick shaker on takeoff or climb out or anything. That was the very end. But, no, the engine,
11 there was a pop and that was it, no yellow master caution initially, certainly no fire. We didn't get
12 the red fire lights; we didn't hear the fire bell.

13 What they call a T handle, the fuel shutoff handle was not illuminated red so it wasn't on
14 fire or at least there's no indication it was on fire but no other indications.

15 Q. Okay. And since we have a fairly old airplane and we may not have a lot of parameters on
16 the flight data recorder your recollections about what you observed and the instruments are pretty
17 important to us, even things that were looking normal.

18 So I have a few questions I'd like to ask about some of those specific things. I understand
19 in the moment you may not have been able to look at everything or may not recall every detail but
20 I'm going to at least see what you do recall about it.

21 So the engine indications, how do you recall the engine gauges changing during the event
22 or did they change? Tell me what you saw on the engine indications during the event, I should
23 say?

24 A. On the left engine the indicators on some of the gauges went to zero. On the right engine
25 the indicators were normal except when I saw that the EGT was approaching the red line but I

1 don't recall anything else being unusual.

2 Q. And how, how soon after the pop did that occur?

3 A. I'm sorry, did what occur?

4 Q. The change in those engine indications when they went to zero?

5 A. Oh, immediately. I heard the pop, I looked up at the engine instruments and that's -- they
6 were winding down.

7 Q. Okay. All right. And so the instruments that were winding down included EPR, N1, what
8 else?

9 A. And I don't recall specifically. I know when I looked sort of toward the middle of the
10 vertical panel, the engine instrument, the middle ones were winding down but I didn't, I didn't
11 look at them or study them. I'm sorry, I just don't remember.

12 Q. Okay. And did you see any deterioration in the parameters on the right engine other than
13 the high EGT?

14 A. No, what I recall the other -- I don't recall any indication looking abnormal other than the
15 EGT as we would push it up past the red line a time or two to try to get more power out of it that
16 was primarily what I was focusing on because we were at the red line.

17 Q. Do you recall if the EGT became high only after the right thrust lever was advanced or was
18 it high before?

19 A. It was normal on takeoff and for the climb out and that's something the non-flying pilot is
20 monitoring on take out is the instruments and Henry's very methodical, I'm sure he was watching
21 the instruments.

22 I guess I don't recall the first time I saw the EGT indication above the red, it was several
23 times I saw that but it was certainly after we lost the engine.

24 Q. The first engine?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did you, did you have any -- did you see anything that indicated to you that you had lost
2 the second engine?

3 A. No, I believe I could hear it running and when we advanced the thrust lever for the right
4 engine the indications wound up as they normally would. We just weren't able to maintain any air
5 speed for some reason.

6 Q. Okay. And so the right engine indications aside from the EGT the right engine indications
7 appeared normal to the end?

8 A. I don't recall seeing anything abnormal so they may have been but I -- the one I was
9 focused on was the EGT because we were at close to or sometimes over red line. I know that was
10 very important so that was the one I was focused on.

11 Q. Okay. Did the, did the EGT go up to red line immediately after you advanced the right
12 thrust lever or was there some lag in that?

13 A. I don't recall there being any lag in the EGT when we moved the thrust lever up or down.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. But I don't -- it doesn't -- I don't recall --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- remembering that I noticed that so I don't.

18 Q. Okay. Was Henry operating the thrust levers after he took over?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And what were you doing during that time?

21 A. Checklist, the engine out checklist.

22 Q. How, did you guys work your way through the checklist and how far did you get?

23 A. Not very far, maybe a third of the way through or so because we were low, we were
24 slowing. My focus was on -- I forgot I said something to Henry about, you know, let's just fly the
25 airplane, you know, let's get back. I mean, we're supposed to run a checklist but we were running

1 out of air speed and altitude.

2 Q. Okay. Were you reading checklist items and he was doing things or how, how did that
3 work?

4 A. It would have worked that way, that's how we started but we didn't get very far into the
5 checklist.

6 Q. Okay. Were there any problems with controllability of the airplane before or after the
7 engine issues?

8 A. Other than the air speed but, no, no other flight control difficulties.

9 Q. Did you notice any electrical problems or hydraulic system problems?

10 A. No.

11 Q. And were there any flap changes made after you reduced flaps from five to one?

12 A. Oh, went five to one to up, sorry, I guess I didn't say that so, yes, we went all the way up to
13 -- as we -- as the speed was increasing we went from five to Flaps 1 and then Flaps 1 up.

14 Q. And what time did you go to no flaps?

15 A. It would have been -- I don't know, I guess. I don't know exactly what air speed we were
16 at.

17 Q. Still climbing out?

18 A. At that point we had leveled off --

19 Q. Oh, okay.

20 A. -- and we were, we were gaining air speed. And we were retracting the flaps as we were
21 gaining air speed.

22 Q. Okay. Were flaps used during the ditching?

23 A. Yes, every three or 400 feet above the water we went to Flaps 1 just for some lift but that --
24 we were coming down.

25 Q. Okay. Did they extend normally?

1 A. They appeared to by the indicator, yes.

2 Q. Okay. And what was the availability of outside visual references as you guys were
3 descending?

4 A. We could see the lights, the city lights but tower asked if we could see the runway and
5 neither of us could see I think because of how low we were and we were over to the northwest side
6 of the airport which is not the -- you know, most of our flights go down south and so at least for
7 me I'm not as familiar with the view from that vantage point.

8 But given that we were low there was just kind of a blur of lights. We could make out the
9 water somewhat but it was, it was pretty dark.

10 Q. Near the end of the flight ATC was directing you to a closer airport, do you -- were you
11 able to see that airport?

12 A. No. So she asked if we'd like a closer airport and Henry said yes, and he asked for vector
13 and she gave us like 060 heading but I never saw the airport.

14 Q. Okay. And could you see the surface of the water well enough to flare the airplane before
15 impact?

16 A. Yes, at the end, I mean, again Henry was flying but I -- on my side I could see the water,
17 the last few hundred feet.

18 Q. Okay. Any problems with noise or vibration or difficulty hearing radio transmissions
19 during this event?

20 A. Not on our end but tower, Henry repeated himself at least three times in trying to
21 communicate the emergency so I don't know what the difficulty was on the ATC side. But we did
22 not have any difficulty hearing ATC.

23 Q. Okay. Any problems with visibility out of the aircraft or the layout of displays and
24 controls during this situation?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Have you ever experienced a similar past emergency?

2 A. Yes. On, yes, departing Hilo with Captain Ed Rinsma, R-I-N-S-M-A.

3 Q. R --

4 A. I-N-S-M-A.

5 Q. M-A, okay.

6 A. We aborted a takeoff because the engine lining, I believe the Number 2 engine, came loose
7 and got sucked into the engine so we had several very loud like backfires. That was during takeoff
8 so we aborted the takeoff but I've not had an inflight engine failure.

9 Q. Do you know which airplane that was?

10 A. I don't know for sure.

11 Q. Okay. Have you ever experienced a situation similar to this experience in training?

12 A. Like an actual engine failure in training? All of our training is in the simulator and that is a
13 lot of the training is the engine failures.

14 Q. Do you do them -- do you do engine failures after takeoff?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. How did that experience help you or hurt you in this situation?

17 A. I think it helped in that it teaches us the procedure.

18 Q. Was it any different than you expected or that you would expect from an engine failure?

19 A. What was unexpected was that we weren't able to keep in the air on the remaining engine
20 that was unexpected.

21 Q. Okay. And do you have any idea why that was?

22 A. I don't.

23 Q. All right. How do you feel about the assistance provided by ATC?

24 A. It was good, very little she can do, I think. She initially gave us vectors back to Honolulu
25 and then she gave us vectors to John Rogers, I think. She apparently alerted the fire and Coast

1 Guard so I don't know what else she could have done.

2 Q. Okay. All right. Let's talk about Henry, Captain Okai, how well do you know him?

3 A. I've flown with him. I believe he was a captain here before I got here so I believe I've
4 flown with him the whole two years I've been here and we always rotate but there's just a handful
5 of captains so we fly with the same ones over and over but I wouldn't know how many times I've
6 flown with him but it's quite a bit, quite a few times.

7 Q. Okay. Can you describe his capabilities as a pilot in general compared to other pilots at the
8 company?

9 A. I think he's a good pilot. He's very methodical. He's very consistent on checklists and
10 procedures and doing things the way either we're trained or Chief Pilot Wallace tells him to do it.

11 Q. Did other pilots seem to like flying with him?

12 A. I think the only complaints he wasn't, he wasn't somebody that nobody wanted to fly with,
13 so it wasn't that at all. He's a very nice guy, I think people liked him. I think, I guess I don't
14 know, I'd be speculating.

15 But he did not have the reputation of being somebody that nobody wanted to fly with.

16 Q. Okay. And can you describe his, his personality and command style?

17 A. He's very direct, he's articulate but he's also very open to discussion and I know when I've
18 asked him why are we doing this or why did you say that, you know, he will explain, you know, in
19 a non-defensive way. So he's a teacher, I guess, in that way too.

20 Q. Did you feel, did you feel frustrated by the time that it took him to agree to turn around or
21 did you feel like that decision made sense?

22 A. I don't think it's fair for me to, you know, armchair quarterback what he did. I've done
23 that for myself many times. If it was me I would have turned back right away but he followed the
24 procedure as he's been trained to do so I can't fault him for that.

25 Q. Did he appear healthy and alert prior to departing?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. Did he complain of being tired?
- 3 A. No.
- 4 Q. And what was your take on his overall performance during the flight?
- 5 A. During the whole flight, it was fine, didn't see anything lacking.
- 6 Q. And during the emergency?
- 7 A. Yes, the same.
- 8 Q. Okay. All right. Let's talk about the company. How do you like working for Rhoades
9 Aviation?
- 10 A. I like it very much.
- 11 Q. What do you like about it?
- 12 A. Well, I'm happy to have the opportunity to fly again after so many years. The owner's
13 very approachable and very available to employees. The DO, David Seest, S-E-E-S-T, is the
14 teacher of teachers, I think. He's a teacher, he likes to talk, he likes to explain things, he likes to --
15 you know, he's very available, very helpful.
- 16 He's very personally concerned for the wellbeing of the pilots, at least that's how I feel.
17 Chief Pilot Wallace is -- I think he's a good instructor. He's very demanding in, you know,
18 following procedures. Those are about the only people I interact with.
- 19 Q. How's the pay compared to what other 737 pilots or FOs make?
- 20 A. I think it's -- I haven't looked but, I mean, I guess I don't know. I don't know.
- 21 Q. Okay.
- 22 A. I expect it's probably comparable but I've not looked at other places.
- 23 Q. And is there anything that's difficult about working there?
- 24 A. No, I wouldn't say so.
- 25 Q. Okay. How would you describe the company's organizational safety culture, if you're

1 familiar with that term?

2 A. I know they're very focused on safety, especially David Seest, as I said I've been working
3 with him on updating the weight and balance manual so I've had a lot of interaction with him these
4 last couple of months.

5 Based on that and my interactions with him prior to that he's very, very safety focused.

6 Q. Okay. And is that reflective of the management team as a whole?

7 A. Yes, I believe, safety is a priority for the company.

8 Q. Do you know if there's a company manager responsible for managing safety or like a
9 director of safety or --

10 A. There is, I believe his name is Orlando Debrum (ph.).

11 Q. Okay. And are there any safety officers or anybody like that that's sort of among the pilot
12 ranks or --

13 A. No.

14 Q. Okay. What means are available to you to report a safety concern to the company?

15 A. There's an internal process and there's also a form that can be filed that goes, I believe, to
16 the FAA as well as to the safety manager.

17 Q. Do you know what the processors of the form are called, is there a name for them or --

18 A. I'm sure there is but I don't know, sorry.

19 Q. Okay. I didn't want to make a gurgling sound every time I took a sip of coffee. Made it
20 worse. Okay. Have you ever reported a safety concern to the company?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. And can you describe what that was about?

23 A. It was the loading of the belly under belly compartments in the back. They're designated
24 L4, L5, L6 going back to the tail and I can't remember now exactly what it was but something
25 about the way it was loaded or wasn't secured.

1 I think that was it, the nets, there are dividing aprons between those compartments and they
2 weren't properly secured.

3 Q. Okay. And how did you report that?

4 A. Through the -- there was -- I believe there's a link on the website on the TransAir website
5 through which you can make reports and I believe that's what I did. I did it electronically, I think,
6 that's how I got to the form.

7 Q. Okay. And what was the outcome of that report, did you get any feedback?

8 A. I did from David Seest, he talked about the training program they were working on that
9 would address that kind of issue.

10 Q. So was it -- it was not an anonymous report so he was able to talk to you --

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. -- directly?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. Okay. Do you feel supported by management and able to make safety related decisions as
15 a pilot without fear or repercussions?

16 A. I do, yes.

17 Q. And do you feel pressures from company management to do things that you feel are
18 unsafe?

19 A. I don't, no.

20 Q. Do you have any safety related concerns about the company?

21 A. No.

22 Q. How confident are you about the quality of the maintenance of the company and do you
23 have any concerns there?

24 A. Yeah, I don't know that I'm -- I don't know that I have the information to answer that. I
25 guess sometimes things don't work and I don't know if it's the maintenance or if it's the parts or I

1 don't know what it is. And I do hear competing theories and explanations so I don't know.

2

3 Q. Okay. How receptive was maintenance to pilot concerns or logbook write-ups in your
4 experience?

5 A. I had very little interaction because the captain does the write-ups and we usually talk with
6 the maintenance but what I -- frequently I would say something to the maintenance folks to point
7 stuff out and they were always very receptive to that.

8 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. So that concludes my questions about the event and
9 the company and so forth. I have a set of standard questions that involves like your recent
10 activities and health and that kind of stuff but do you need a break?

11 MR. RYAN: Yeah, let's -- can I take a break?

12 MR. BRAMBLE: All right. It's been a while so I figured.

13 MR. RYAN: Yeah.

14 MR. BRAMBLE: All right, we're going off the record.

15 (Off the record)

16 (On the record)

17 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

18 Q. It is 10:57 Hawaiian Standard Time. Okay, so we're back with First Officer Ryan and Mr.
19 Ryan it's routine for the NTSB to collect information about general health, behavior and lifestyle
20 of pilots involved in accidents.

21 I have a number of questions for you in these areas. The first has to do with sort of sleep
22 and work history in the 72 hours before the accident and so in case it's helpful I've printed out a
23 table that just basically shows you the days with the 24 hour --

24 A. Thank you.

25 Q. -- block of time squares. Just if it helps for your organizing your thoughts.

- 1 A. Thank you.
- 2 Q. And you have a pen if you need to note on it you're welcome to.
- 3 A. Thank you.
- 4 Q. All right. So can you recall the day of the -- the night, the morning of the accident was on
5 July 2nd we have the ditching occurring approximately 1:45 a.m., do you recall your sleep in the
6 24 hours preceding that when you may have been asleep versus awake?
- 7 A. Yes. So on Thursday I went to sleep around 2 p.m. and I believe I got up at about 2330 or
8 so.
- 9 Q. Okay. So that was Thursday --
- 10 A. July 1.
- 11 Q. -- July 1st, okay. And how was the quality of your sleep during that sleep period?
- 12 A. It was good.
- 13 Q. Okay. So that's, that's 11.5 hours?
- 14 A. From 2, 2 p.m. until 11:30 or so.
- 15 Q. Uh-huh. Is that -- were you asleep that whole time?
- 16 A. I woke, I woke up a couple of times but most of that time I was sleeping, yes.
- 17 Q. Okay. How long were you awake during the couple times you woke up?
- 18 A. Maybe 15 to 30 minutes or so.
- 19 Q. Okay. All right. Do you live alone or do you have any --
- 20 A. I do.
- 21 Q. Okay. All right. So that takes care of that day. And then how about the previous day, that
22 Wednesday, June 30th, when would you have slept that day, do you think?
- 23 A. I usually go to bed around 10 to 11 p.m., which I would have on those days as well since I
24 wasn't flying and then I usually wake up around 6 to 7 a.m.
- 25 Q. Okay. And is that what you -- is that your best estimate of what you did on June 30th,

1 Wednesday?

2 A. Yes, and also June 29th.

3 Q. Okay. All right. So you woke up at 7, 6 or 7 a.m. on July 1st and then, then you went back
4 to sleep at 2 p.m.?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And then you slept until 2330 and then you were up for -- you were up?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. And can you tell me about your, your work schedule during that period, during that,
9 that three day approximately period?

10 A. I don't remember exactly but my routine is when I wake up at 6 or 7 I'll go to my office
11 and then if I'm flying that evening I'll leave the office early and if I'm not flying that evening then
12 I'll stay at the office until 5 or 6 usually. But, I am sorry, I don't remember specifically those,
13 those days but that's normal for me.

14 Q. Okay. And so did you -- do you work at -- did you work at your office on June 29, 30 and
15 July -- well, not July 1st because you were asleep, I guess, but at least not in the afternoon but did -
16 - I guess I should ask for all three days, did you work at your office any of those three days?

17 A. I believe I did June 29th and June 30th, I believe I stayed home July 1st.

18 Q. Okay. And what time do you typically -- what, what is your best estimate of when you
19 would have arrived at the office June 29 and 30?

20 A. I'd say probably between 7, 8:00 in the morning.

21 Q. Okay. And do you recall anything about the quality of your sleep on the night of the 29th
22 or the 30th?

23 A. I don't specifically. I don't generally have trouble sleeping though.

24 Q. Okay. Any sleep disorders that you know of?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Okay. And if you could describe just in general terms your off duty activities, were you,
2 were you running marathons in between or --

3 A. No.

4 Q. -- like what kind of activities did you engage in in between?

5 A. I usually go to the gym, there's 24 Hour Fitness nearby so I usually go there for about 45
6 minutes and it's just weight lifting, that's it. And then I go home and I'll either do emails, make
7 some phone calls for work or just relax but it's nothing strenuous.

8 Q. Okay. And so during that -- when do you typically do that going to the gym or when did
9 you go to the gym during this time period, if you can recall?

10 A. I can't recall specifically.

11 Q. Okay, okay. So any other off duty activities that you can recall aside from going to the
12 gym, relaxing at home or --

13 A. No.

14 Q. Okay. All right. And then for the 24 hours preceding the accident we usually like to
15 collect the most amount of details so let's see. Thursday, just to go over to make sure I have this
16 right, you woke up at 6 or 7 to your best recollection, you were home, is that correct?

17 A. I believe so, yes.

18 Q. And then what did you do between then and 1400 when you went to take your daytime
19 sleep?

20 A. Office stuff, so emails, phone calls, stuff like that but just remotely.

21 Q. Okay. And then so you stayed home until you went to sleep and then you went to sleep
22 from 1400 to 2330?

23 A. Yes, I think about 1400 I laid down, I don't recall when I actually fell asleep but I like
24 made myself get into bed early to make sure I got enough sleep before the flight that night.

25 Q. Okay. And so after 2330 then can you describe your activities from then until when you

1 arrived at the crew briefing room?

2 A. I got up, took a shower, got dressed, got in my car and I stopped at a 7-11 as a normally do.
3 I got coffee, I think, and like a protein bar and drove to the airport. I think our show time was
4 0015.

5 Q. Okay. And who else besides Henry did you interact -- Henry and Ricky did you interact
6 with?

7 A. The flight follower who I believe was Emilio, I believe.

8 Q. Okay. Anyone else?

9 A. No, I think just the three of us in the room.

10 Q. Okay. When was your last extended period of time off like a vacation or something?

11 A. I had just come off about 10 days, I believe, or no, I'm sorry, I guess I shouldn't say that. I
12 don't recall exactly. I could look but it's -- I was off for, I think at least a week maybe more prior
13 to that night because as I had said I was working with Dave, David Seest on the weight and
14 balance manuals and so Wallace had taken me off the flight schedule or minimized my flight so
15 that I'd have more time to work with David.

16 So, yeah, I'm sorry I don't recall the date that I flew prior to this night.

17 Q. But in terms of being off, off work entirely like had you a vacation from both the law work
18 and the flying work anytime in the last few months or --

19 A. The last two months, no. Well, so, with TransAir we work three weeks on and then we get
20 the fourth week off so I do have that. So I would have had, you know, that, that one week every
21 three weeks.

22 Q. One week off from TransAir?

23 A. Correct, yes.

24 Q. Okay. Is it, is it fair to say that you pretty much work every, every day or, I mean, did you
25 have regular days where you didn't have to do any work?

- 1 A. At my office or --
- 2 Q. Like total, like either the office job or the aviation job, like do you have days off just to
3 rest?
- 4 A. Oh, sure, yeah. On usually -- I've always tried not to work more than half a day on
5 Saturday and take Sunday off from the office.
- 6 Q. Okay.
- 7 A. And lately I hadn't been flying a lot with TransAir because I was working on the weight
8 and balance, weight and balance manuals with David.
- 9 Q. Okay. So the previous Saturday, the previous weekend do you think that you had half of
10 Saturday and Sunday off to rest or do relaxing, non-work things or --
- 11 A. I think the last day I flew was the 20th, that's sticking out to me for some reason June 20th
12 was the last day I flew prior to July 2nd and so --
- 13 Q. Uh-huh, if we include the, if we include the law work, like did you have time off from all
14 work --
- 15 A. Oh, yes.
- 16 Q. -- the previous weekend?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Okay. And was that half, about half of Saturday and Sunday?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. Okay. All right. All right. Any previous aircraft accidents that have occurred with you
21 before?
- 22 A. Accidents, no. I lost an engine in flight with Mesa Airlines a long time ago but we landed,
23 turned around and landed safely but no accidents.
- 24 Q. Okay. What type aircraft was that?
- 25 A. That was a Beechcraft 1900.

- 1 Q. Okay. And how did that unfold, like what phase of flight did it occur in?
- 2 A. It was right -- I believe it was shortly after takeoff because we reentered the pattern and
3 landed. We weren't too far from the runway.
- 4 Q. Okay. Any fire?
- 5 A. At that time or in that engine?
- 6 Q. In that, in that incident?
- 7 A. No.
- 8 Q. Okay. Involved in any other emergency or abnormal situations in aviation that you can
9 recall?
- 10 A. We landed once. I don't recall who was flying but -- and I don't know if he was heavy on
11 the brakes or the antiskid did it but the brakes on the right main got very hot and were smoking and
12 started a fire and the fire department came and put it out but I think that's it.
- 13 Q. Okay. Was that with Mesa or --
- 14 A. No, I'm sorry, TransAir.
- 15 Q. TransAir. And was that here in Honolulu?
- 16 A. No, that was Maui, I believe.
- 17 Q. Okay. When did that occur?
- 18 A. I don't recall.
- 19 Q. Okay.
- 20 A. It's many months ago.
- 21 Q. And was it a seven, three?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. All right. Ever disciplined for your performance as a pilot?
- 24 A. No.
- 25 Q. And any commendations for your performance as a pilot?

- 1 A. No.
- 2 Q. Okay.
- 3 A. Well, other than -- not a commendation but Wallace just a couple days before this said they
4 wanted me to start upgrading, the upgrade process but I have 907 hours so that was one reason he
5 put me on this flight was to start building my hours again.
- 6 Q. Any non-aviation accidents in the last year like automobile accidents that you've
7 experienced?
- 8 A. Like I sideswiped a concrete structure pulling out of kind of a small parking garage I
9 wasn't familiar with but that's it.
- 10 Q. Okay. Was it just maneuvering inside?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. Okay. All right. How is your health in general?
- 13 A. Good.
- 14 Q. Any chronic illnesses?
- 15 A. Yes, I have an autoimmune disease, I'm taking -- do you want to know that?
- 16 Q. Is this something that your AME is aware of?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Okay. Did they have to issue you a SODA or a waiver?
- 19 A. No.
- 20 Q. Okay. All right. Are you taking prescription medication for that?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. Can you tell us what that is?
- 23 A. Yeah, it's call Genvoya, G-E-N-V-O-Y-A.
- 24 Q. V-O-Y-A, okay. Do you know what the dose is and the frequency?
- 25 A. It's daily but I don't, I don't know the dosage.

- 1 Q. Okay. And the AME knows about that one?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Okay. And they signed off on it?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. Okay. Any other chronic illnesses that --
- 6 A. No.
- 7 Q. -- that we might want to be aware of? Okay. Were you experiencing any flare-ups or
- 8 symptoms of this illness that during the accident flight that may have impaired your performance?
- 9 A. No, with the medicine it keeps it down to almost non-existent so --
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. -- it has no effect at all on me.
- 12 Q. Okay. Do you have a doctor here that sees you for that in case somebody --
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. What's that person's name?
- 15 A. His name is Alan, A-L-A-N --
- 16 Q. Okay.
- 17 A. -- Wu, W-U.
- 18 Q. In Honolulu?
- 19 A. Waikiki, yes.
- 20 Q. Waikiki, okay. Is he a specialist?
- 21 A. No, he's just a general physician.
- 22 Q. Practitioner, general, general physician, okay.
- 23 A. Yeah.
- 24 Q. All right. Okay. How's your vision?
- 25 A. I have -- as it says on my medical I have to wear a corrective lens in my right eye.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. But not my left.

3 Q. I haven't seen your medical yet but is that for, is that for nearsightedness or farsightedness
4 or intermediate?

5 A. It's so I can see distance --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. -- whichever one that is.

8 Q. All right, distance only. And do you wear a contact lens or --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. And were you wearing it --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- that night? Okay. Okay. And your hearing, how's your hearing?

13 A. Good, I think.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. I mean, I don't have trouble hearing. You're kind of soft spoken; I don't have trouble
16 hearing you.

17 Q. Okay. All right. So aside from the Genvoya, are you taking any -- in the 72 hours before
18 the accident, well, let me just say, prior to the accident were you routinely taking prescription
19 medication?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Okay. And the medications that you mentioned, is it fair to say that that was -- you had not
22 taken that, taken that for several months prior to the event?

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Which medications are you talking about now?

24 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

25 Q. The Wellbutrin and the cholesterol meds?

- 1 A. That, I can't recall the last time so it's been a while.
- 2 Q. Okay. So it had been quite a --
- 3 A. So I don't --
- 4 Q. -- while, at least several months?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. Or you're not sure?
- 7 A. I wouldn't say that, I don't --
- 8 Q. Okay, all right.
- 9 A. Yeah.
- 10 Q. Is there a time period you could give me that would be sort of an amount that you're
11 confident that you would not have taken it in, like would have been -- can we say that you had not
12 taken either within the last month?
- 13 A. I just -- I don't know, it was very infrequent so I don't know --
- 14 Q. Okay.
- 15 A. -- I don't recall.
- 16 Q. Okay. And but in the 72 hour, 72 hours before the accident I think you said you were
17 confident you had not during the three days prior?
- 18 A. I believe that's right, yes.
- 19 Q. Okay. All right. And it's just helpful to kind of bound it --
- 20 A. Yeah.
- 21 Q. -- in case I have any questions from the medical officer.
- 22 MR. KATT: Can we just -- he stepped over your answer a little bit.
- 23 MR. BRAMBLE: Oh, yeah.
- 24 MR. KATT: Can we just get it clear? You were asking in the 72 hours beforehand had he
25 taken the Well -- what's it called?

1 MR. BRAMBLE: Wellbutrin.

2 MR. KATT: Wellbutrin or the cholesterol meds, right?

3 MR. BRAMBLE: Yeah.

4 MR. RYAN: Yeah, I don't believe I did, no.

5 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

6 MR. KATT: Sorry.

7 MR. BRAMBLE: Uh-huh.

8 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

9 Q. Okay. Alcohol, your last drink before the accident was, was it within the 72 hours?

10 A. I think two years or so.

11 Q. Okay. Two years, okay.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. And tobacco, do you use tobacco products?

14 A. No.

15 Q. All right. Last question on the medical stuff, I'm sorry to beat a dead horse but in the 72
16 hours before the accident did you take any medications, either prescription or non-prescription that
17 might have affected your performance?

18 A. No, not -- no, I might have taken an Ibuprofen or a Tylenol but, no, nothing else.

19 Q. Okay. Were you taking -- are you thinking you might have taken one because did you have
20 some sort of illness like a cold or a flu or --

21 A. Oh, no, no, sometimes I get headaches and so I'll take either a Tylenol or an Ibuprofen but
22 I don't recall feeling that way when I woke up Thursday night.

23 Q. Okay. Okay. In the last year I'm going to ask you three questions about major life
24 stressors. In the last year have you had any major significant changes in your health good or bad?

25 A. No.

1 Q. All right. Any major significant changes in your finances?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Any major significant changes in your personal life like divorce?

4 A. No, no.

5 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. That's it for me. I'm going to pass the baton to
6 Shawn. Do you need another break or are you all right?

7 MR. RYAN: I'm fine.

8 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let's go.

10 MR. BRAMBLE: All right. Go ahead, Shawn.

11 MR. ETCHER: All right. Well, thank you.

12 BY MR. ETCHER:

13 Q. And forgive me; do you like to go by Mr. Ryan, Greg?

14 A. Greg is fine. No, no. Thank you, thank you.

15 Q. I always want to make sure because I don't want to offend.

16 A. Thank you.

17 Q. Thank you by the way for all you've told us so far, it really has kind of given me that view
18 of what you were looking at and everything.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. But I still want to be that fly on your shoulder, so with some of these questions might get a
21 little detaily.

22 A. Okay.

23 Q. But if you don't know the answer it's okay, I don't know works really good.

24 A. Okay.

25 Q. But we'll go back to kind of towards the beginning and thank you for providing Bill with

1 your phone number, your cell phone number. Do you know what carrier you're with?

2 A. Verizon.

3 Q. Verizon, okay. This is a question I always hate to ask but it's one we have to, have you
4 ever been terminated from any employment?

5 A. Yeah, I got fired from my first job Taco Bell when I was 16, I think that's it.

6 Q. Okay. So a long time ago.

7 A. A long time ago.

8 Q. All right, I appreciate the honesty. I don't even know if I could remember back to that age
9 so thank you for bringing it up.

10 MR. KATT: That might almost be in your favor.

11 BY MR. ETCHER:

12 Q. I know Bill was asking about, you know, vision and things like that. You have a medical
13 certificate with the FAA, correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What class is that?

16 A. Second.

17 Q. Second class. And what date was that issued, do you remember?

18 A. It was last month, I don't recall the date.

19 Q. Oh, so you got it recently then, okay, great. So because I'm not overly familiar with
20 TransAir and Rhoades Aviation hoping you could kind of educate me.

21 A. Okay.

22 Q. Kind of walk me through, who is your chain of command, if you had a concern, an issue,
23 who, what's the chain of command you go by?

24 A. If I'm flying it's the pilot in command first.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. And I've never had to take a concern, you know, over his head. But next would be
2 Wallace, our chief pilot.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. And then after that David Seest, our DO.

5 Q. Okay. Have you, have you ever heard of anybody going higher than the director of
6 operations?

7 A. The only one higher would be the owner --

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. -- and I've not heard of anyone doing that.

10 Q. Okay. So the director of operations is right below the owner then?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. I just wanted to make sure.

13 A. That's my understanding, yes.

14 Q. Okay, perfect.

15 A. I'm sorry, there's, I think a position for a general manager, then a president, then the owner
16 but I think the top two are the owner and his wife and I believe the general manager is not filled so
17 something like that, I'm not exactly sure.

18 But for pilots, it's the DO and then --

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. -- the owner essentially.

21 Q. Okay. Pilots we like to talk, some of them like to complain a lot, I know. Maybe you
22 haven't experienced that and good for you but if you have. Have you ever heard of pilots taking
23 things up the chain of command here?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. I mean, I know -- does it happen, do you hear it often?

- 1 A. I hear it often about one person.
- 2 Q. About one pilot taking it up?
- 3 A. Pilot, yes.
- 4 Q. Oh, okay, all right. And forgive me I think you said you guys are kind of a small company
5 but I don't know how many pilots there are, do you know?
- 6 A. I think maybe 20 or so maybe.
- 7 Q. Okay. So everybody knows everybody?
- 8 A. Oh, yes, very well, yes.
- 9 Q. Oh, okay.
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And I believe you told Bill that there's, there's nobody that you wouldn't want to
12 necessarily fly with, did I get that correct?
- 13 A. Yeah, there's no one I would not want to fly with and I was saying I believe the question
14 was about Henry.
- 15 Q. Right.
- 16 A. He doesn't have the reputation that he's somebody nobody wants to fly with so --
- 17 Q. Okay. So I'm not trying to answer for you or anything but are there captains, are there
18 pilots here, not just captains, FOs that people -- that you have heard people saying they do not
19 want to fly with or prefer not to?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. Does that happen often?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. Okay.
- 24 A. It's one person but I hear it all the time.
- 25 Q. Okay. Without names is it a captain or first officer?

1 A. First officer.

2 Q. Okay, alrighty. So thank you for helping me with the chain of command. Now your flight
3 schedule, you say you get three weeks on and one week off?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. During that three weeks on I assume it's six in one, six on one, 24 hours of rest or --

6 A. It's, well, it's different, I suppose just based on the needs but we usually work about three
7 days a week, four would be considered kind of a busy week and at least from my schedule
8 typically it's one day on, a day off, excuse me, maybe two days on, something like that.

9 It's not usually four days back to back but, you know, sometimes we're busy or we're
10 shorthanded so it's -- the schedule varies.

11 Q. So you're busy, you're shorthanded. Some airlines call it getting junior manned, some of
12 them call it other -- pilots call it other unkind words but is that what it is here, do you get
13 voluntold, if you will, to come in and fly or is it a voluntary basis?

14 A. No, it's just we're scheduled, we're scheduled to fly --

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. -- on those, those three weeks and then the fourth week they call it the red week that we're
17 off; if they want us to come in they ask us if we want to come in.

18 Q. And if they ask you and you said, great, does that give you more money or does it --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. And pilots all seem to always -- it's all about money, right? But if they call and ask
21 you, hey, can you come in on your red week and say, no, how is that dealt with or is it?

22 A. I have not heard that's ever been a problem. I've heard people -- because Wallace calls and
23 he says, I need you to come in and I've heard people say, I can't do it.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And he says, okay. So I've not heard of any retribution or punishment to someone who

1 said he wasn't available to come on the red week.

2 Q. Okay, okay. So I'll go back to your three weeks on. So you know, do you know where
3 you're going to fly during -- in advance --

4 A. No.

5 Q. -- or is it just kind of like an on call?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. How does it work, how do you find out about your trip for a specific day?

8 A. So we have a show time is all we have so we know to be there at the show time and then
9 when we get to the Flight Following Office there's an electronic, you know, like a TV but they
10 have the flight schedule on it.

11 But we've learned or I've learned that it will usually have the first two or three flights
12 mapped out and we usually do about three flights a night, that's it, two or three, that's it. And so it
13 will usually have all three of those mapped out.

14 But what I've learned is that the only certain one is that first one because of the way
15 TransAir operates they don't run on schedules and so for the cargo delivery so they say if you
16 bring it we'll ship it.

17 So they don't say you have to bring it by midnight, you know, so which would then allow
18 them to have a set schedule so they're very flexible so it's whenever stuff comes we'll take it. And
19 so at the beginning of the night we don't always know how much stuff we'll have or when it will
20 come so all we know is to do the first flight and then when we get back we find out where the next
21 flight is.

22 Q. Okay. So if you come in to do three flights, three flights, I assume a flight is an out and
23 back or is it just --

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. -- to the out station?

- 1 A. No, out and back.
- 2 Q. It's a full roundtrip?
- 3 A. Yeah.
- 4 Q. So you'll do three roundtrips, six legs give or take a night?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. Okay.
- 7 A. Sometimes two, sometimes three.
- 8 Q. Okay. I just want to make sure I'm --
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. -- following along with what you're asking or talking, okay. So you come in you do the
11 first leg, first roundtrip and back and then let's say they don't have any cargo, do they just cancel
12 your flights or how does that work?
- 13 A. They usually have stuff when we get back and so it's either they're ready to load us and
14 send us out or they say, you know, it's 2:00 and we're doing a 3:00 Hilo so we sit around to 3:00,
15 something like that.
- 16 Q. Okay, okay. Typically, how long are your, your legs in the seven, three, are they --
- 17 A. Here to Maui is about 30 minutes, here to Hilo about 45. Our longest one is if we go up
18 north to Lihue, Kauai, down to Hilo and I think that's about an hour, hour and five minutes.
- 19 Q. Okay.
- 20 A. And we don't do that one very often. So I'm pretty sure.
- 21 Q. Is that just in -- is that not a demand for that leg, is that why you guys don't do it very often
22 or is there other reasons?
- 23 A. I don't know reasons.
- 24 Q. Oh, okay. I just -- thanks, I appreciate that.
- 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. So you know during your three weeks on you know you're on call or do you have to
2 show up every day or is it they call you by a specific time and say, oh, we've got some flights for
3 you to come in, here's your show time?

4 A. Well, either one. So if you're on the schedule, the schedule, the night shifts are they come,
5 they're one, two three, so you look on your schedule and you see either a one, two or three you
6 know for sure you're fine.

7 And then you'll get an email later that morning saying specifically what time to show up.
8 If you're on reserve then the schedule has an R on it and so that means you're on reserve which
9 means you have to leave your phone on and be available to get to the airport I think within an hour
10 after they call.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. So if you're in reserve you maybe will not fly, if you're not on reserve and you're
13 scheduled you will fly.

14 Q. Okay, okay, that helps a lot because I had saw the schedules and it --

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. -- it didn't make a lot of sense yet. But now that somebody explained it, it makes a lot
17 more sense, so thank you. Okay. So I think you said when you come in you report in and you go
18 to the Flight Follower Dispatch Office and there's a screen and that's when you look up to see
19 where you're going?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And is there --

22 A. Which airplane.

23 Q. Which airplane. So I know when I flew and forgive me but maybe I was a lazy pilot but I
24 knew if there was a certain airplane that I was assigned to I didn't always think the nicest things of
25 that airplane.

1 Do you have airplanes like that here that you're just like, ugh, I got assigned that one?

2 A. From time to time there are times where one airplane will have problems but then it gets
3 fixed. But, no, there's not one that, you know, every time I show up I hope it's not that one.

4 Q. Can you just -- when people say they have problems and then it gets fixed, kind of give me
5 an example? I know it may be hard for you to remember a specific one but kind of an example of
6 what you were thinking of?

7 A. Well, just like unreliable gauges maybe or hot oil temperature or air conditioning, you
8 know pressurization issues.

9 Q. Okay, great. Was 810 one of those that you remember having any of those issues?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. How recently do you remember those issues?

12 A. Not too recently but I also had not flown for a while, I think it was about 10 days or so.

13 Q. Okay, okay. Can you remember the last time; I know you said it's been about 10 days
14 since you flew back on the 10th?

15 A. I believe it's the 20th.

16 Q. Okay, sorry, I thought that's what you said and I wanted to make sure. So prior to that do
17 you remember when -- the most recent airplane issue you had?

18 A. I don't, I'm sorry.

19 Q. Okay. No, don't be sorry, that's okay. I know it's a while ago, some days I can't
20 remember yesterday so it's all -- it's perfectly fine. So you get into the flight follower, you see
21 where you're going, does it tell you who you're paired with or do you know before you get there
22 who you're paired with?

23 A. We know before. So when that schedule comes out in the morning --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. So Wallace sends out a calendar that has the one, two, three's so you know what shift and

1 then the morning by like usually late morning we'll get an email from whoever the load supervisor
2 or the ops manager is and it will tell us then who we're flying with so we know in advance.

3 Q. So you knew the day of the -- the 1st --

4 A. Uh-huh.

5 Q. -- that you were going to be flying that evening?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You knew that in the later morning?

8 A. Yes, yes.

9 Q. Oh, okay. And forgive me, who sent you that email the load

10 --

11 A. It's, I believe it's called the operator -- well, different people so sometimes it's Robert
12 Soon, who is I believe one of the operations managers, sometimes it's Michelle, I don't recall her
13 last name, she's a load supervisor.

14 So it's just -- Wallace makes that schedule, that email I think but then he passes it to
15 somebody who sends it out to us.

16 Q. Okay, okay. All right, that helps. Perfect. So you get your paperwork, you get the
17 airplane's logbook, the can, if you will?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Do you guys call it the can?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. I didn't want to use a term that you guys don't use. So you get the can, do you rifle
22 through the can for maintenance discrepancies or is that solely the captain's job?

23 A. It's solely the captain's job but depending what's going on if we have time, like sometimes
24 I'll sit there and watch or sometimes we'll talk about it but that's the captain's responsibility.

25 Q. Okay, okay. All right. So how would you know if the aircraft has some deferral issues,

- 1 does he just tell you there or do you --
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Do you do that in the briefing room?
- 4 A. Usually, yes.
- 5 Q. Okay. All right. So you guys got the can, you got the paperwork, I mean a 30 minute
6 flight, 20 minute flight, is that a lot of paperwork or is it --
- 7 A. It's a stack of maybe 10 pages or so.
- 8 Q. Okay. And that is weather --
- 9 A. Weather NOTAMS or flight release.
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. Yeah. And then there's a couple pages that have our -- like our fuel quantity, consumption
12 and those kinds of thing.
- 13 Q. Okay. Since you guys kind of sound like you kind of do similar routes all the time, do you
14 guys have kind of like a set fuel requirement?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. So for your event flight what was that set fuel requirement?
- 17 A. For Maui it's always 14,000.
- 18 Q. Okay.
- 19 A. Unless the captain requests something more.
- 20 Q. Okay. Did most -- have you ever had a captain request more fuel?
- 21 A. Only if the weather is down at the destination.
- 22 Q. Okay.
- 23 A. But otherwise, no.
- 24 Q. And does that 14,000 pounds, does that carry you over there and back or --
- 25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. Okay. So it does the whole roundtrip or whole route?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Okay. Alrighty. When do you find out how much cargo you're going to have onboard?
- 4 A. When we're -- the pilots are sitting in the cockpit and we're ready to go and at some point
- 5 the load supervisor, before they start loading the airplane the load supervisor comes into the
- 6 cockpit and gives us a load sheet and that's when we know what we have.
- 7 Q. Okay. Now when they give you the load sheet do you as a first officer, does the captain or
- 8 does somebody else do the weight and balance on that aircraft?
- 9 A. That's already done so whoever prepares the load sheet has done that.
- 10 Q. Oh, okay. Do you guys have any requirements to go back and check the accuracy of?
- 11 A. No.
- 12 Q. Okay.
- 13 A. We, the V speeds are blank so we write those in but otherwise we -- yeah, we don't check
- 14 or calculate anything else.
- 15 Q. Okay, all right. Now this is just a little aside question if you will, you said you're working
- 16 on the weight and balance manual, since we're kind of talking about weight and balance here, what
- 17 are you doing to -- what are you revising within that weight and balance manual?
- 18 A. We, met with our POI and he said that the weight and balance manual we had did not
- 19 conform to the 8900 the regulation, it was missing some stuff and that was my job to make sure it
- 20 conformed to the requirements of that regulation.
- 21 Q. Okay. Did you volunteer yourself for that job or was it encouraged?
- 22 A. It was encouraged.
- 23 Q. Okay.
- 24 A. But I was happy to do it, I'm not complaining about --
- 25 Q. Okay.

1 A. -- working on that.

2 Q. Okay, all right. And you said your chief pilot pulled you off line a little bit to help work on
3 that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And this may sound like a personal question so forgive me but are you guys paid by an
6 hourly rate or are you paid a salary for the month, how does that, how is your pay determined?

7 A. We're paid salary.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. But it's based on 16 days a month and so if we work more than 16 days we get extra pay.
10 If there aren't 16 days of flying then Wallace puts us on reserve to, you know, get the 16 days.

11 And I believe with what I was doing with -- when I was working on the weight and balance
12 manual and he would take me off the flight line or the flight schedule he would just replace, you
13 know, a flight day with an office day basically to work on the manual.

14 So my -- I received a full salary.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. So I guess in that sense I was getting paid to work on it but I wasn't getting paid extra to
17 work on it, I guess.

18 Q. Okay. So it wasn't -- I don't want to call it punitive if it's something you like but it wasn't
19 taken away from your time and your money it was --

20 A. No, I see.

21 Q. -- was a normal day's work, right?

22 A. That's right.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Instead of flying I was working on the manual.

25 Q. Okay. Well, that makes sense. So let's go back out to the airplane to give you the load

1 sheet, you guys calculate your V speeds?

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. And now this is where I really like to be the fly on your wall, the night of the accident, let
4 me be that fly on your epaulet, if you will. Walk me through, once you got the load manifest just
5 kind of in as much detail as you can, I know you said you guys strapped in and you did your pre-
6 takeoff checks but just kind of walk me through so, you know, you're getting ready to upgrade
7 right, or they're selecting you, so I'm a new FO, walk me through what you would expect me to do
8 as a new FO for you?

9 A. Well, we do it, we go through the load sheet together and so either the captain will take it
10 and write in the V speeds. We have these little flip cards where the FO will do it but then we brief
11 it and we just kind of, you know, start at the left hand corner of the load manifest and we -- there's
12 some information in that left hand corner, the aircraft numbers, so we make sure we have the right
13 aircraft number.

14 The date, the pilots' names, and then we go down and then it goes across horizontally is the
15 loads for the upper deck. Below that is the loads for the lower deck and the fuel is in the middle
16 there so we're just, we're briefing that, we're making sure we don't have hazmat or if we do then
17 it's in the right place and we have the paperwork for it.

18 We make sure that the weights are within limits so the load sheet has the max weight limit
19 for each position. So, you know, we'll say 8,000 so we make sure what's loaded there is not more
20 than 8,000 so that kind of stuff.

21 On that flight there was nothing in the belly which and then I always go down and confirm
22 to make sure it's empty and 14,000 pounds of fuel and then we -- there's a section for -- whether
23 bleeds are on and a skid on, which run we were taking. So just, you know that kind of
24 information.

25 And then the V speeds and then there's a CG envelope so we make sure we're within the

1 envelope and we make sure it's the current load sheet version because it gets updated from time to
2 time.

3 And then the last thing we check, which is in the top right hand corner, is the trim, so we
4 set the trim.

5 Q. Okay. And the trim was calculated by the load?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay, okay. You said you did not have hazmat on the night of the accident that you can
8 recall?

9 A. I guess, I don't recall.

10 Q. And it's okay.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. I just -- I wasn't sure, I just wanted to make sure if you -- I couldn't recall what you'd said
13 so I just was -- and it's okay. I don't know if just fine. All right. So they gave you the load
14 manifest and you walked me through that, thank you.

15 And then I guess you begin your pre-takeoff checks or, sorry, you said you go back and
16 make sure the doors are all secured when everybody's off?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. What do you look for, is there like two lines that have to line up or there light, how
19 do you know when you're looking at it at 1:00 in the morning that they're locked and secured?

20 A. Well, so we can when we close the cabin entryway door, you know, you can feel, it feels
21 like it's locked and then we always check there's a light in the cockpit. And most captains will
22 say, like when you close the door I'll hear the captain say, lights out, and if he doesn't say that
23 then I'll check --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. -- to make sure it's out. But that's our indication there.

- 1 Q. All right.
- 2 A. And then we'll check to make sure if there's a cargo net we'll make sure that's secured, all
3 the latches are secured. If it's the solid barrier we'll make sure the door's closed and that the guard
4 switch for the power switch to open the cargo door is -- we'll make sure the guard is down.
- 5 Q. Okay.
- 6 A. So just those kinds of things.
- 7 Q. So you don't shut the cargo door that's --
- 8 A. In Honolulu, we normally don't because maintenance will do that; in the out stations, we
9 always do.
- 10 Q. Oh, okay.
- 11 A. And sometimes in Honolulu we do if the maintenance folks are busy.
- 12 Q. Okay. And do you check -- visually check that the door is secured, the cargo door?
- 13 A. Yes, I do, yes.
- 14 Q. Okay.
- 15 A. And there's also a light in the cockpit that tells us that.
- 16 Q. Perfect. And please correct me if I'm wrong I think you said after the accident that there
17 was a wood pallet --
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. -- that floated in, was your life raft for a little bit?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. Is there any special requirements for palletized shipments, you guys ship in cans, right, or
22 maybe I misunderstand? Let me rephrase that, do you ship -- are things shipped in cans or --
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. -- is it all just on a pallet?
- 25 A. Mostly in cans.

- 1 Q. Okay. So if you have something on a pallet is there any special requirements for that?
- 2 A. Sure there are. We have a load manual which probably addresses that.
- 3 Q. Okay. Nothing you guys as a crew worry about much or --
- 4 A. No.
- 5 Q. Okay.
- 6 A. Unless it's hazmat.
- 7 Q. Okay, all right. So back to the night of the event, just before we taxi off the ramp here, I
- 8 wanted to back up just a little bit, you had said that during the pre-flight you had found some fluid
- 9 leaking around the Number 1 or, I'm sorry, there was a puddle of fluid on the ground around the
- 10 left side?
- 11 A. The left main gear.
- 12 Q. Left main gear, okay.
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. And you said you took a picture of that?
- 15 A. I did.
- 16 Q. Can we request that picture from you or how would you -- you know, because we'd like to
- 17 see what that fluid was and you can always run it --
- 18 MR. KATT: Get it to me we'll get it to you.
- 19 MR. ETCHER: Thank you, I appreciate that.
- 20 MR. KATT: So, yes, you can request it.
- 21 MR. ETCHER: Great, and I have requested it and you have been so gracious to
- 22 accommodate me.
- 23 BY MR. ETCHER:
- 24 Q. All right. So now you called, you got your clearance, get your clearance to taxi out. Did
- 25 this flight leave on time? Sorry, that's a wrong word because you guys are unscheduled.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So I guess you don't really have an on time like the airlines do, but did you leave on the
3 time you were anticipating to leave or was there a delay?

4 A. There was a delay.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. I mean, I don't know that it's a delay, as you say we're not scheduled. But if we show at
7 12:15, as we did, we were expected to leave at 1 and I think we left at like 1:30, 1:40, something
8 like that. But sometimes that's normal because the cargo's not here; it's not ready or something.

9 Q. So the night of the event do you know why you didn't leave at 1?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Okay, all right. Were they loading cargo later or --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Oh, okay, okay. Alrighty. So you're taxiing out, you got your clearance, away we go. Is
14 that a normal taxi route that you guys did or was that an extra-long taxi route?

15 A. No, normal.

16 Q. Normal, okay. So as you're taxiing out I assume you don't have a tiller on your side so the
17 captain's doing the taxiing right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You're doing radio calls and what else do you do?

20 A. We do the taxi checklist and that's it, radio calls.

21 Q. Okay. Does that checklist require you to look at any of the engine instruments?

22 A. No.

23 Q. No, okay. Alrighty. So we keep taxiing out, it's dark but I think you said there was about
24 a quarter of the moon?

25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. So it's not super dark but --
- 2 A. Correct.
- 3 Q. -- dark enough? Was there any, any issues taxiing out with vision, with visibility?
- 4 A. No.
- 5 Q. No, okay. So you get out to the runway, did you have to stop with the hold short line or
- 6 was it pretty much line up and wait and go?
- 7 A. I believe we were instructed to hold short but as we got closer she cleared us across so I
- 8 don't believe we held short.
- 9 Q. Cleared you across what?
- 10 A. Across the hold short.
- 11 Q. Oh, okay.
- 12 A. Oh, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. So we're on the -- down the taxiway there's -- they approach you
- 13 into four right and so they routine hold, tell us to hold short of that approach.
- 14 Q. Okay.
- 15 A. I'm sorry; I thought that's what you meant.
- 16 Q. And, no, thank you for clarifying because I was going to ask you for some clarification so
- 17 perfect. So you got cleared across four right and you taxi down to was it eight right you departed
- 18 on?
- 19 A. Eight right, yes.
- 20 Q. Okay. Did you have to stop there to hold short line or did she give you your takeoff
- 21 clearance while you guys were taxied and turning?
- 22 A. I believe we stopped, I believe we stopped.
- 23 Q. Okay. All right. Did this airplane -- were the engines, were they the Dash 9 version?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 25 Q. Okay. Is there any differences if it's a Dash 9 or a Dash 15 engine or a Dash 17, is there

1 any differences for you as a crew?

2 A. We know the Dash 9 are less powerful and we can feel that.

3 Q. Okay. Do you still takeoff with the same flap setting?

4 A. That depends on the captain. Let's see, we either leave at Flaps 2 or Flaps 5 and PICs have
5 different thoughts on what it should be but that's not -- I've never heard a captain say if it's a Dash
6 9 we use this flap setting, if it's a Dash 15 a different flap setting. It's usually just based on the
7 runway.

8 Q. The company doesn't provide that guidance either, if it's a Dash 9 you have to do this, if
9 it's a Dash 15 this is the flap setting?

10 A. If they do I don't recall seeing that.

11 Q. And that's okay. Just, like I said, I'm not overly familiar so I just -- you're teaching me a
12 lot here so you're ready for your upgrade because you're educating me. Alrighty. So you guys got
13 cleared for takeoff?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. When you added power, did anything -- I know as pilots we're not supposed to fly by the
16 seat of our pants but we always do have that feeling. So when you added power did anything feel
17 any different?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Accelerated what you would consider -- the engine spooled up what you considered sort of
20 normal acceleration?

21 A. I mean as you say that it did seem like it took longer than normal to get to the V, V1 speed,
22 but then also it might have been because we were heavier. But I don't recall the weight but I recall
23 saying to Henry whenever we got the load sheets we're heavy but I don't remember what the
24 weight was.

25 Q. Okay.

- 1 A. Our EPR setting was 201 which is high so that's, you know, because we were heavy.
- 2 Q. Okay.
- 3 A. And it took us a little longer down the runway to get there but that may have just been
4 because of the higher V speed too, I don't know.
- 5 Q. Okay. All right. Well, thank you that's -- you just knocked off several questions here
6 because I ask what your EPR was going to be if you could remember.
- 7 A. Okay.
- 8 Q. So thank you.
- 9 A. Sure.
- 10 Q. Are you looking at my sheet?
- 11 A. No.
- 12 Q. Oh, okay, well, that's all right then. So you're accelerating and it's your leg, correct,
13 you're flying?
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. All right. Is that normal, do you -- do you guys normally, the FO, do they fly out from the
16 out station, the captain's back or --
- 17 A. It's just up to the captain, the only exception is if we have to land on, there's a short
18 runway in Maui, our company procedure is the captain has to fly there, so other than that it's just
19 up to the captains.
- 20 Q. Okay. And you guys were going to Maui?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. Were you anticipating landing on a short runway for any reason?
- 23 A. No.
- 24 Q. Okay, alrighty. So you're rotating, you're going down the runway. Captain calls V1 --
- 25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. -- or is it an automated system?
- 2 A. Captain.
- 3 Q. Captain, okay. Until that point until V1 where is your hand, is it on the thrust or is that
4 where the captain's is?
- 5 A. Captain.
- 6 Q. Captain?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. So you just on takeoff you push the power up and then let go and the captain takes over?
- 9 A. So I push the power up and to about 1 point -- well, to our bug, close to the bug and then
10 I'll take my hand off and I'll say reduce thrust.
- 11 Q. Okay.
- 12 A. And at that moment the captain puts his hand on the throttle, the thrust levers and he's in
13 control of the thrust levers.
- 14 Q. Okay.
- 15 A. He's flying the airplane at that point.
- 16 Q. All right, okay. So the captain calls V1?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. And are both your hands on the yoke?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. Okay. Where's his hand go, do you ever notice?
- 21 A. I don't recall specifically that night but I can tell you what the training is and what I almost
22 -- what I normally see. The captain has the right hand on the thrust levers, left hand on the yoke
23 and as soon as the call is V1, whether the captain's flying or not, captain takes his hand off the
24 thrust levers.
- 25 Q. Okay.

- 1 A. So that we don't have an abort after V1, that's the training.
- 2 Q. Okay. So V1, the training is normally the captain's hand comes off the thrust?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. Rotate and V2, as the pilot flying you're on the yoke so you're pulling back, what is your
5 target attitude that you're shooting for?
- 6 A. Initially there's V bars --
- 7 Q. Uh-huh.
- 8 A. -- so that's the initial. But then once captain says V2 or at least we've cleared the runway
9 then I'll start pulling back to about 15 to 18 degrees.
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. Nose up so we can get altitude.
- 12 Q. Okay. So as you rotated did the airplane feel heavier than -- you know, sometimes when
13 they're heavy you can kind of -- I know you can't feel it but it has a different feel to a pilot.
- 14 A. Yeah.
- 15 Q. How did it feel compare to normal?
- 16 A. I don't recall that it felt -- I don't recall thinking like this feels heavy so --
- 17 Q. Okay, okay. So you're pulling back, you pitch the V bars and then he says V2, positive
18 rate?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. And then you say --
- 21 A. Gear up.
- 22 Q. -- gear up, all right. And then does he reach over and flips the gear or do you?
- 23 A. He does.
- 24 Q. He flips the gear up?
- 25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. Now here I think you said after the gear went up but before
2 --
- 3 A. 400 feet.
- 4 Q. -- that's when you said there was -- I don't want to put words in your mouth so was it a pop
5 and then something, anything else?
- 6 A. It was just a pop kind of like a muffled pop. I mean, I could hear it but it wasn't like a loud
7 explosion.
- 8 Q. Okay.
- 9 A. Yeah. And then I looked up and I saw the Number 1 engine gauges were winding down.
- 10 Q. Okay. And I just kind of right here I think you said when Bill was asking about it you said
11 the airplane yawed to the right, it left like it yawed, I'm not --
- 12 A. Yes, yeah.
- 13 Q. I don't want to put words in your mouth, forgive me. And what did you do?
- 14 A. Well, I started to put in the right rudder --
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. -- because, I mean, sorry, left rudder. So initially, I don't know why it yawed to the right.
17 It might have been my doing, I don't know.
- 18 Q. No, and it's, it's -- that's just part of what we're doing here is just -- it's those little details
19 that help us.
- 20 A. Sure.
- 21 Q. Try and figure out so we can keep this from maybe happening again.
- 22 A. Okay.
- 23 Q. So it yaws to the right. You may or may not have applied rudder, okay. Does it have an
24 auto -- a yaw dampener, an auto yaw?
- 25 A. Yes, yes.

- 1 Q. So it will pull it correct for you?
- 2 A. Yes, yes.
- 3 Q. Okay. So you get the yaw, you apply rudder, what happens next?
- 4 A. So our procedure is 800 feet we level off.
- 5 Q. Uh-huh.
- 6 A. And I think at that moment we might have been above 800 feet, I don't recall. I recall
7 Henry saying 800 feet and I don't remember if we were at it or above it at that point but so that's
8 where we level off and we increase our air speed.
- 9 And as the speed comes up we go from Flaps 5 to 1 and then 1 to 0 and then we climb out.
- 10 Q. Okay. So you're climbing out, get yaw, whether you put rudder in or not, and then he
11 starts giving you commands, I guess? Does he start talking to you, that's what I really want to ask,
12 does he start explaining what went on because you said or you implied, I shouldn't say you said,
13 that the Number 1 engine shutdown?
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. But you're basing that strictly on the gauges or are you basing it on anything else?
- 16 A. Initially just the gauges.
- 17 Q. Okay.
- 18 A. But then afterwards then I could feel it because then the airplane was pulling to the left.
- 19 Q. Okay.
- 20 A. So I could feel that the, that the Number 1 engine wasn't producing thrust.
- 21 Q. Perfect, that's what I was hoping --
- 22 A. Oh, okay.
- 23 Q. -- to get because I just wanted to make sure we had a right yaw and then you say the left
24 engine.
- 25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. And my brain wasn't focused on it so thank you. All right. So you're climbing out and
2 you're getting it to 800 feet. Is it 800 feet, do you have to make a turn?

3 A. So at 500 feet or 1.3 DME whichever comes first, then we're supposed to start making that
4 climbing right turn to 220 degrees and then we level off at 800 feet and accelerate going out that
5 way.

6 Q. Okay. You've been flying out of Honolulu for two years now give or take?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Have you ever seen birds flying at night?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. How do you know when you -- let me rephrase that, do you see them at night when
11 you're flying?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. How do you see them?

14 A. Very quickly as they rush past the airplane so we don't see them out in the distance we see
15 them after we've already passed them or they've passed us.

16 Q. Okay. Did you see any flicker that night?

17 A. I did not, no.

18 Q. Okay. I assume that's pretty quick them zooming by you?

19 A. It's very quick and at that part of the departure I'm focused on my instruments, you know,
20 in particular my attitude indicator to make sure I have the right climb altitude. So there I wouldn't
21 have been looking out the windows to see anything.

22 So Henry might have seen something, I don't know.

23 Q. Okay. So you, when you're the pilot flying you're -- even in VFR conditions you're on
24 your gauges?

25 A. Off takeoff I am, yeah. I mean, if it's VFR daytime, I mean, I'll kind of scan outside but I

1 want to make sure I'm holding the right --

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. -- climb out attitude at least until we get away from the runway.

4 Q. Okay, that makes sense. I appreciate that. So you guys are accelerating. Did it accelerate
5 like you remember in training?

6 A. It seemed to accelerate very fast because I think before too long like very quickly I looked
7 down and we were at -- I can't remember the speed but over 200 I think, which was pretty quick.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Okay. In your training I know we get beat up with V1 cuts on a regular basis, you pretty
11 much are guaranteed you're going to get a V1 cut on a training event. But this didn't happen at
12 V1, right?

13 A. It did not happen, right, at V1, no, correct.

14 Q. So it happened a little higher, your wheels were off the ground and you were climbing out?

15 A. Yes, yeah.

16 Q. Did you ever have that experience in training?

17 A. We've had so many I don't recall specifically but I'm sure we have (indiscernible).

18 Q. Okay and it's okay if you can't recall, that's understandable. They all blend after a while
19 so it's understandable. So you're accelerating and you call flaps, do you call flaps up as a pilot
20 flying on this event or was it the captain?

21 A. So captain normally calls the speed and then the flying pilot say, you know, Flaps 1, flaps
22 up.

23 Q. And is that kind of what happened here even though you lost an engine?

24 A. I believe Henry called the speed and put the flaps up at the same time.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Because I was flying so I think he was trying to manage the flaps and the air speed.

2 Q. Is that how you guys -- okay. Is that how you're trained?

3 A. Ordinarily the non-flying pilot will say, you know, 190 or whatever the speed is and then
4 the weight, then the flying pilot say flaps up or Flaps 1 or whatever it is. And then the non-flying
5 pilot will move in; here he said it and moved in at the same time.

6 I think just like I said, I don't know why but I think, I mean, he's very methodical he
7 follows the procedures so --

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. -- this time I think he was doing what he thought was appropriate.

10 Q. Okay. When he brought the flaps, did he bring in the one and then the up or did he --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So there was a little pause or was it pretty quick?

13 A. Pretty quick but there was a pause in between.

14 Q. Did that give you any controllability, you know, did you feel like it was sinking, losing lift?

15 A. No, we were -- because we were pretty fast and I recall pulling the power lever, thrust
16 levers back to try to slow down a little.

17 Q. Did you pull them both back or just the one?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. All right, all right. So flaps are coming up or they are up and you're accelerating in speed
20 or is your speed not accelerating now?

21 A. We definitely accelerated; we were going fast once we leveled off.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. I don't recall at what point we stopped and started decelerating, I don't know.

24 Q. Okay. And I just want to make sure I have it correct, when Bill had asked you something
25 about the captain had taken over --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- and you said it was sometime after you leveled off?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. All right. When he took over did he say my airplane or did he just take over?

5 A. No, he said -- he did say something but it was something like, why don't you let me fly and
6 you run the checklist or something like that, and that's just kind of his nature to, you know, but he
7 made it very clear he wanted control of the airplane and he's the PIC so I said, okay, and he took
8 control.

9 Q. Okay. Is that trained in training or is training -- when you're in training is it a positive
10 exchange of controls and typically the FO would continue flying?

11 A. It's always a positive change of controls but at a certain point. So if you're going to -- you
12 know, if we're going to do a briefing then we transfer control and there's a little script for that. It's
13 not normal that a pilot takes the controls away from another pilot.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. I mean, outside of what we normally do. So in that situation we don't really train for that
16 but as a pilot in command he felt that was appropriate and that was fine.

17 Q. All right. How did you feel, did that feel appropriate to you or were you (indiscernible)?

18 A. Yes, I mean, he's got much more experience than I do --

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. -- especially in that airplane so --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. -- it didn't cross my mind not to -- you know, I'm certainly not going to argue with him in
23 that situation and, you know, he's a very experienced pilot.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. More than I am, so if he wants control he certainly can have control.

1 Q. Okay. And I believe you said when Bill was talking that you looked out your right window
2 and you saw the airport?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Was that while you were still flying or was that while he had transferred control or while
5 he took controls?

6 A. It would have been right -- I don't recall exactly, we were in the turn to 220 degrees and I
7 said, I think we should go back, but I don't recall at this moment if I was still flying or I had
8 already --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I believe, no, no, I did -- I was flying because he said, no, 220 on the heading, that's right.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. So I was flying the first time.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. And he said to continue on the departure procedure.

15 Q. Okay. So he's got the controls and he tells you to run the checklist?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Where's your checklist located?

18 A. In a little cubby, a little compartment on the, on my left side between like my knee -- I'm
19 sorry, it's right around the trim wheel.

20 Q. Okay. Is it easy to grab?

21 A. Yes, very easy.

22 Q. Okay. Was, so you grabbed the checklist?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And you ran -- what checklist did you look for?

25 A. He said the engine, I believe he said engine fire failure or shutdown checklist.

1 Q. Okay. And I just want to make sure in my head there was no light indicated, lights
2 indicated in the cockpit, there was nothing that illuminated to say you had any fire?

3 A. Definitely not any fire lights. There were probably some amber lights at that point but
4 definitely no fire lights.

5 Q. Okay. So there were some -- maybe some amber lights at that time. Do you kind of
6 remember what they were?

7 A. I don't.

8 Q. Okay. Where were those lights located?

9 A. Well, we have a (indiscernible) panel in the middle of the dashboard so it would have been
10 those lights but I don't recall any specific lights that were on.

11 Q. Okay, all right. So you pull out the emergency checklist, is it a book or is it like a
12 laminated card?

13 A. It's a book.

14 Q. It's a book. Is the checklist on the inside cover or do you have to go through the checklist,
15 the book to find it?

16 A. So it's a QRH and so it's pretty thick and, yes, so we have to go to the appropriate tab to
17 find the actual checklist that we need.

18 Q. Is that easy to do or does that take a little bit of time to find it?

19 A. Pretty easy because we train a lot.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. And so we're pulling it out a lot in training.

22 Q. Okay. And you weren't sure how far through that checklist you got?

23 A. It couldn't have been more than a third of the way, a third down the page, it wasn't very
24 far?

25 Q. Okay, all right. Now I have a note here that you were talking about a red, red line on the

1 EGT?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And my question I think right now is the Number 1 engine red light or the Number 2?

4 A. Number 2.

5 Q. Number 2. When that happened were you flying or was it after he took control?

6 A. Well, I saw it several times. I don't recall if I saw it while I was flying, for sure I saw it
7 while he was flying.

8 Q. Okay. Did you bring up -- did you adjust the thrust at all when you were flying, bringing it
9 up or bringing it back, I think you said you were accelerating, you were thinking about pulling it
10 back but I don't, I don't remember?

11 A. I did start -- as we were accelerating I did, I did -- I do remember bringing the thrust levers
12 back a little.

13 Q. Okay. Did you ever advance the thrust levers?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. Why, why did you advance the thrust levers?

16 A. Because the air speed was bleeding off.

17 Q. Okay. So it had started to bleed off --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- while you were flying?

20 A. No, I think I had -- no, I think as we -- I pulled them back to start decelerating and then I
21 think I pushed them back up so we didn't get too slow.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. So but I think as we were decelerating I think Henry was the one who kept advancing the
24 thrust lever trying to push it to red line or beyond red line or, you know, something to get some
25 power out of it.

1 Q. Okay. You're getting ready for an upgrade, well, they're targeting you for an upgrade,
2 how's that. And I'm not trying to get you to Monday morning quarterback Henry at all. Don't, I
3 don't want you to think that.

4 If you were in the left seat, do you feel like the decisions he made were ones similar to
5 what you would have made?

6 A. No, I would have turned back to the airport but I would have done that knowing that that's
7 not the procedure.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. But I also would have done it.

10 Q. Why?

11 A. Because to me that was the safest course of action, we were low, you know, I want to get
12 back.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. But he followed the procedure.

15 Q. Okay, okay. So he's flying, you guys are getting a little bit away from the airport. Did you
16 ask the ATC to keep you within a certain range of the airport?

17 A. No.

18 Q. You were just on that 220 heading until you were ready to come back?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. What finally made Henry decide, okay, let's turn back?

21 A. Because I said it a second time.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Now we're even farther. I think we were -- I recall seeing we were 13 DME and I think
24 that's when. As I looked again we were even farther away now and we're low and I said, Henry,
25 we need to go back. He said okay, let's go back.

1 Q. Okay. When he's, when he's turning back to the airport, do you go with a full bank 28
2 degree turn or was it a less steep bank? Help me just -- I'm just trying to understand what you guys
3 were doing, again fly on the epaulet?

4 A. I don't recall specifically the bank but I don't recall being concerned that it was too steep
5 or not steep enough.

6 Q. Okay. When you started your turn back did you happen to look at the altitude?

7 A. I'm sure I did but I can't -- I recall seeing 2,000 I don't recall any --

8 Q. Okay, and that's all right.

9 A. Okay.

10 Q. When did you guys -- not you guys, when did you finally feel like, um, we might not make
11 it to the airport? Did you ever feel that way?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. When was that?

14 A. When we were about maybe 3, 400 feet above the water.

15 Q. Okay. All right. And I know you guys are busy obviously. Did you stop the checklist,
16 engine fire shutdown checklist, whatever, the one you were working; did you stop that and run any
17 other checklist?

18 A. No.

19 Q. No. So you didn't reach for -- is there a ditching checklist?

20 A. There is.

21 Q. Okay. All right. And you said with Bill I think you said something about you could see
22 the water kind of around that timeframe?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay, all right. But you couldn't see Honolulu or Rodgers' Airport?

25 A. We could see all the lights so I'm sure I could see --

- 1 Q. Okay.
- 2 A. -- their runway lights but I couldn't make them out.
- 3 Q. Okay.
- 4 A. I think because we were low and I'm just -- that's not a familiar vantage point for me.
- 5 Q. And that makes sense. I just -- I figured they were all lit up.
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. I just wanted to make sure.
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. Okay. As you guys, you're seeing the water coming up; you've now made it in your brain
- 10 that you guys are probably ditching. Have you ever been trained on ditching?
- 11 A. In the simulator we do run through the ditching checklist.
- 12 Q. Okay. And in the simulator do they actually have you land on the simulated water?
- 13 A. I don't recall ever doing that, no.
- 14 Q. Okay, all right. I think you said you got the stick shaker
- 15 --
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. -- at some -- at one point during the flare?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. And you had flaps out to one to try --
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. -- and give you a lift, am I --
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. -- paraphrasing correctly? All right. Did you ever just think of going to more flaps?
- 24 A. No, no.
- 25 Q. Did Henry, did Henry verbalize anything about give me more flaps or give me gear or

1 anything like that?

2 A. No, he did not say.

3 Q. Okay. Now this is probably the most terrible part of the interview is just as we're getting a
4 little bit close to the water here, you get the stick shaker, your nose is pointed up pretty steep I
5 assume?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. All right. Were you afraid at any point that the nose was going to drop?

8 A. Like as a stall?

9 Q. Yeah.

10 A. No.

11 Q. No, okay. When it landed on the water you said it was an abrupt -- a very quick stop. We
12 weren't there so again kind of help me feel what you're feeling, what do you mean by abrupt?

13 A. We hit the water and as soon as we did we almost instantaneously -- I had the shoulder
14 harness on so but I still went forward and my right shoulder rolled forward and my head went
15 down and then that's how I hit the top of my head on either the control column or the -- I don't
16 know what I hit on, I hit on something.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. But we -- so like all -- from the time we touched the water and I recall that it was maybe a
19 second, maybe two. It was pretty quick.

20 Q. So you hit your head during the sequence not -- you didn't cut your getting out of the
21 aircraft?

22 A. Oh, no, no, no.

23 Q. Okay. All right. So came to a stop. Was it floating on the water or was it -- did it feel like
24 it was sinking?

25 A. It felt like it was sinking and so that's why we jumped out.

1 Q. Okay. And what did it feel like, did it feel like the tail was going down, just -- it was just
2 going down like an elevator?

3 A. It felt like the nose, the nose cone was going down --

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. -- and the back was coming up.

6 Q. Okay. And then you -- I think you said you escaped out the windows?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So they popped open pretty easy?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. Well, that's good.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Got out of the water and then you guys -- he went out his side and then you went out yours
13 or did you guys --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- all go out one?

16 A. No, he went out his, I went out mine.

17 Q. Okay. So you guys get out, you realize you guys are in the water but still talking to each
18 other?

19 A. Uh-huh.

20 Q. You find the pallet and then you get rescued and taken to the -- okay. I just wanted to
21 make sure that kind of filled in some grey areas I had, so I appreciate that.

22 A. Sure.

23 Q. When we -- when you were running through that checklist, the emergency checklist to shut
24 it down, is there a procedure to verify that you would be shutting down the correct --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. How does that work?

2 A. So it's, it's -- the non-flying pilot will put his finger on the thrust lever and he'll say, you
3 know, left engine confirmed and then I would say confirmed and he would reduce it and then he
4 would say left, Number 1 cutoff confirmed. I'd say confirmed then he would, you know, close the
5 cutoff and then he'd grab the T handle for the fuel cutoff, he'd say Number 1, you know, T handle
6 confirmed. I'd say confirmed and he'd pull the T handle. And then if there's a fire indication we
7 would extinguish it.

8 Q. And is that a memory item or is that a --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. It is a memory item?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So did you guys get to that point at all?

13 A. No.

14 Q. You did not get to running any of the memory items?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Okay, all right. Okay. All right. Well, that helps me with a lot of the events.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. So thank you. I'm not saying it gives me all the answers we need, right, but it definitely
19 fills in a lot of blank areas.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. There was something you had said with Bill and I just wanted to make sure I understood it
22 right. This is nothing to do with the accident it was more dealing with management, to pilots and
23 all that, and you said the chief pilot was and I put here, very demanding, and I don't --

24 A. Oh, he's very demanding in terms of following checklists and following procedures.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. So I don't mean like overbearing or anything but he's -- you know, he's a stickler for doing
2 it the right way.

3 Q. Okay. That's, that I appreciate you open, you know, clarifying that. Just a few other
4 questions here and then I'll stop because I know you're probably tired of talking to me --

5 A. That's okay.

6 Q. -- and so I'll let somebody else ask some questions. Have you ever made a maintenance
7 write-up?

8 A. No, the PIC does and I can't think of a time. I have pointed out some things to
9 maintenance as I'm walking around but I've not actually done a written record.

10 Q. Okay, all right. Have you ever had, you know, pointed a maintenance discrepancy out to a
11 captain and they didn't want to write it up?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did they give you a reason?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. So what was the maintenance item that you were concerned about?

16 A. I can't -- it's happened quite a few times, I can't remember anything specific but it's
17 nothing that I felt would be a safety concern.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. But it was either an explanation that, you know, this engine just runs hot or, you know,
20 there's indication it's been kind of buggy and maintenance has ordered another one and, you
21 know, something like that but --

22 Q. Okay. All right. So if you ever brought a maintenance issue to a captain and he wouldn't
23 write it up but you thought it was a safety issue, what would you do?

24 A. Well, I guess my next, next in chain of command is Wallace. I've never had to do that but
25 I would call Wallace.

- 1 Q. Has anybody that you've heard of?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Okay.
- 4 A. This same one person I was referencing earlier.
- 5 Q. Okay, okay. Alrighty. These are the easy questions maybe, when was your last check
6 ride?
- 7 A. It would have been last July or so, I think.
- 8 Q. So you were getting ready to do another one?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. Do you do it every 12 months?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. Okay. Do you remember are you guys under the AQP Program or is it a 441 full just
13 normal check ride?
- 14 A. I don't --
- 15 Q. You don't know?
- 16 A. I don't know, sorry.
- 17 Q. That's okay. During any of your checking events have you ever had the FAA come and
18 observe them?
- 19 A. No, just my typeride that's the only one for me.
- 20 Q. And they came for your typeride?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. Was it an FAA person out of Honolulu --
- 23 A. No.
- 24 Q. -- or was it an FAA person somewhere else?
- 25 A. Somewhere else.

- 1 Q. Okay. Alrighty. Have you ever had them come out and fly in your jump seat with you?
- 2 A. Our, only our POI has been with us but nobody else.
- 3 Q. And you've had him on your jump seat?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. Okay. How was that interaction?
- 6 A. Good, very good, I like him.
- 7 Q. Oh, well, that's good.
- 8 A. Yeah.
- 9 Q. I don't think the FAA gets people, pilots saying that too often so that's, that's quite a
10 compliment. Have you ever failed a check ride?
- 11 A. No.
- 12 Q. No. Congratulations.
- 13 A. Thank you.
- 14 Q. That's a wonderful thing. I think that's what I have so far so, again, I appreciate it. Sorry
15 to take so long. Do you need a break or anything?
- 16 A. No, I'm fine. Thank you.
- 17 MR. ETHCER: Thank you so much. Bill.
- 18 MR. BRAMBLE: I'm good, you can pass onto Rich.
- 19 MR. LEE: Okay, sure, thanks. Great information.
- 20 BY MR. LEE:
- 21 Q. Just a couple things. On your -- on the departure did you guys use autopilot at all at any
22 time after you got stabilized and was running the checklist?
- 23 A. I did not and I don't recall that Henry --
- 24 Q. Okay.
- 25 A. I don't recall seeing Henry engage the autopilot.

1 Q. All right. Back down on the transition when the engine failed you mentioned that there
2 was a yaw that was abnormal; it was the wrong, wrong direction. Did you -- when you were doing
3 the takeoff did you feel that the captain was on the rudder with you on the pedals or how did -- is
4 that typical that the captain would ride on the pedals with you or did you feel anything different
5 with the rudder pedals?

6 A. No, I didn't.

7 Q. Okay. You mentioned a couple times about the captain flying out the engine out
8 procedure, the 220 heading, at what point does that end, the engine out procedure and then you
9 start coming back, because you, you mentioned that you suggested to turn back and he felt like it
10 was you were still on your procedure.

11 Would you fly at 220 until all checklists were done or --

12 A. No, you --

13 Q. What would happen, I mean, what's the -- once you're out of the -- you know, tell me how
14 you end that in general procedure?

15 A. There's a fix and we fly at that fix --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- and we'd enter a hold.

18 Q. Okay, all right.

19 A. Unless otherwise instructed by ATC.

20 Q. Okay. So once you weren't the pilot flying and the captain was flying the airplane, did you
21 recognize like a slip indicator or rudder pedal position, was there any rudder trim used, put in
22 sometimes to alleviate, you know, using your -- the leg was -- rudder trim, did you use rudder
23 trim?

24 A. I did not.

25 Q. Do you remember the captain putting any rudder trim in?

1 A. I did not see him do it.

2 Q. Okay. What about yoke position, did you remember seeing anything when you were flying
3 straight and level, was it displaced --

4 A. I don't remember.

5 Q. You don't remember any of that? I think that's all I have.

6 A. Okay.

7 MR. LEE: I appreciate it, thank you.

8 MR. RYAN: Okay.

9 MR. KATT: You're my favorite.

10 MR. BRAMBLE: Clarence.

11 BY MR. KANAE:

12 Q. Hi, Greg, I'm Clarence.

13 A. Hi.

14 Q. I also know your team, your CMO or your CMT Team at the, at the office, I'm from the
15 same office --

16 A. Okay.

17 Q. -- from Mark and Ray and Ace. So can you go over again your safety concern about the aft
18 cargo compartment? You made, you made a finding and that's -- I commend you for that but
19 could you just maybe explain it one more time?

20 A. I don't recall exactly what it was because there have been a few times things aren't loaded
21 properly and I'll usually point it out to the load supervisor and I don't recall what it was about that
22 time that I decided to file a safety report, I think it may have been one after too many or
23 something.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. But I think what I report on was that the aprons that separate the three belly compartments -

1 -

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. -- there's latches all the way around and they're all supposed to be secured so that the cargo
4 in one compartment doesn't slide into the other and they weren't and I believe that was the reason
5 I wrote the safety report.

6 Q. Okay. I commend you on that.

7 A. Thank you.

8 Q. Very good. So I'd like to take you back to the pre-flight of the airplane. Is it company
9 policy that either the first officer or the captain monitored the loading process of the cargo --

10 A. No.

11 Q. -- or it's only done by the load master or the load person?

12 A. Yeah, it's only done by the load supervisor is the policy.

13 Q. Load supervisor?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. And upon receiving the load manifest, does that information get plugged into FMS
16 at all?

17 A. No, we don't have an FMS.

18 Q. Okay. That's good, that's what my other question was. So how does the -- can you
19 explain then how does your air speed is calculated just off of a chart or do you have an electronic
20 weight and balance or performance method of doing that?

21 A. No, we just have laminated cards, they're about 3x5 or so with a spiral, you know, holding
22 them all together.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. So they call them flip cards. And so we just look at the takeoff weight and find the card
25 with that takeoff weight and that gives us the V speeds.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And so then we write those V speeds on the load manifest.

3 Q. Great, thank you. Now let's move out to the outer stations, the load manifest, is that
4 actually done at the outer stations or do you receive it prior to departure from Honolulu?

5 A. We do not take it with us so it's normally done as the outer stations but sometimes when
6 the outer stations can't do it they'll coordinate with flight following in Honolulu who will prepare
7 it and email it to them.

8 Q. And then do you have an outer station load manager --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- that actually confirms the load, weights and the positions, et cetera?

11 A. Yes, correct.

12 Q. Okay. And that's basically all I have. I appreciate your time.

13 A. Thank you.

14 Q. And great to have you back.

15 A. Oh, thank you.

16 MR. KANAE: Thank you.

17 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Just a few closeouts in case anybody has anything else that they,
18 that they missed.

19 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

20 Q. This is Bill Bramble again. The Coast Guard, notifying the ATC to call the Coast Guard,
21 whose idea was that?

22 A. Henry announced that on the radio, he asked tower to call the Coast Guard.

23 Q. Did you suggest he do that or did he just do that on his own?

24 A. He did that on his own.

25 Q. Do you recall before you left Honolulu how much fuel was on the gauges?

1 A. Yes, 14,000, that's -- we checked that as part of our checklist.

2 Q. Okay. And I think you said there was one person who has repeated concerns who
3 expresses a lot of concerns, can you tell me who that person is, is it a pilot or --

4 A. Yes, it's our first officer.

5 Q. First officer, who is that person?

6 A. Her name is Gina; she's our only female pilot.

7 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. That's all I have for specifics. I have three just sort of
8 general closeout questions before we get to the conclusion of the interview. Do you have anything
9 else, Shawn?

10 MR. ETCHER: I do, I just have a few more. It's only five pages, no, just kidding.

11 BY MR. ETCHER:

12 Q. I meant to ask you on the last one, you have your own law firm?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay. What type of law do you practice?

15 A. Divorce, family law.

16 Q. Okay. Are you busy doing that?

17 A. Our firm is busy but I'm not so busy myself. I have associate attorneys that work for me so

18 --

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. -- I have the common 9 to 5 job.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. And sometimes even part days so --

23 Q. Okay, all right. Is there a pilot's union at Transunion -- or TransAir?

24 A. No.

25 Q. No, okay. Has there ever been talk of a union?

- 1 A. No.
- 2 Q. Okay.
- 3 A. Or at least not that I've heard.
- 4 Q. Pilots talk so I figured, you know, you tell one pilot you told them all kind of --
- 5 A. Yeah.
- 6 Q. So it's okay. What's the policies on -- I know you're getting ready to upgrade and I think
- 7 you said you were about 100 hours short --
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. -- so I guess you have to have --
- 10 A. 1,000.
- 11 Q. 1,000 hours with company or in the seven, three?
- 12 A. Seven, three.
- 13 Q. Okay. Is that -- how do they decide who gets to be upgraded, is it based on seniority, is it
- 14 based on anything else?
- 15 A. I don't know exactly --
- 16 Q. Okay.
- 17 A. -- what the criteria is but I know there are a couple of first officers above me that they
- 18 skipped over but it might have been they don't want to upgrade. I don't know so --
- 19 Q. Okay, okay. Alrighty. Have you -- do they give you CRM training here?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. When do they do that?
- 22 A. I believe that's our initial ground school and then in our recurrent we also get -- we usually
- 23 watch a video.
- 24 Q. Okay. Do you feel that covers, educates you on CRM training or is it --
- 25 A. It does.

1 Q. Okay, okay. The last question I have, the one thing that kind of threw me a little bit and
2 Bill's question kind of brought it back to my mind, you said the captain was the flying pilot and
3 yet he still transmitted his radio?

4 A. Uh-huh.

5 Q. Is that a normal procedure for --

6 A. No.

7 Q. Okay. All right. I promise that was the last question so I'll --

8 A. It's okay.

9 MR. ETCHER: -- I'll keep to my promise. Thank you, Bill.

10 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Rich.

11 MR. LEE: Yeah, just one other thing. You mentioned that when you got the load sheet
12 that it was heavier than normal and you had a discussion about that. What, I mean, what's heavier
13 than normal and it's pretty, probably standard going to Kahului, you know, why did you feel it was
14 heavier?

15 MR. RYAN: I don't remember the specific numbers but they all usually run about 90,
16 90,000 pounds, something like this, and I think this might have been 103 or I just -- I can't
17 remember what it was but I remember saying, oh, we're heavy, but we were within the limits of
18 the load manifest.

19 MR. LEE: All right. That's all I have, thanks.

20 MR. RYAN: Okay.

21 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, Clarence.

22 MR. KANAE: Just a comment, I'm the only FAA person on the staff, on this panel; I just
23 wanted to let you know.

24 MR. BRAMBLE: Just one quick thing, Clarence, so is this something you want
25 transcribed for the record or is this --

1 MR. KANAE: Oh, no.

2 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

3 MR. KANAE: Don't need to, that's okay.

4 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, we'll do it after. Any other questions?

5 MR. KANAE: Oh, let's see, no, that's it. Thank you.

6 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. So just final closeout questions, is there anything that
7 we haven't asked you about that you think might be relevant to this accident investigation that
8 you'd like to volunteer at this time?

9 MR. RYAN: No, I don't think so.

10 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. And is there anyone else that you think we should speak to?

11 MR. RYAN: No, just Henry for sure. That's it.

12 MR. BRAMBLE: And do you have any suggestions for safety improvement as a result of
13 your experience in this accident? We always like to ask the people involved directly because they
14 went through it so perhaps they know something that generates an idea.

15 MR. RYAN: I don't think so.

16 MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. Well, that concludes the interview. It is 12:27 Hawaii
17 Standard Time and we are going off the record.

18 (Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII
ON JULY 2, 2021
Interview of Gregory Ryan

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FA174

PLACE: Honolulu, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript
which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.


Cheryl Farnier Donovan
Transcriber

Additional Statement from First Officer Gregory Ryan**Etcher Shawn**

From: Greg Ryan [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, July 12, 2021 3:02 AM
To: Etcher Shawn; Bramble William
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Rhoades 810 FO Restraint Use

[CAUTION] This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Mr. Bramble and Mr. Etcher:

Prior to engine start for every flight, I always secure my lap and bottom belt straps, and I secure the shoulder harnesses either immediately prior to taxi or during the taxi. While I do not recall when I secured my shoulder harnesses on this particular flight, I know for certain that I did secure both shoulder harnesses prior to departure, for two reasons: (1) I always secure my shoulder harnesses prior to departure, and I have never (ever) departed or landed without wearing my shoulder harnesses; and (2) I very clearly recall tightening the shoulder harnesses shortly before entering the water, as I was afraid of hitting my face/head on the instrument panel. There is not a locking mechanism besides the five-point connector where the five restraint straps connect. A turn of the connector's rotary dial releases all five restraint straps simultaneously. I did not notice any of the restraints failing upon impacting the water, but I suspect the right shoulder harness may have failed, as upon entering the water, my body bent forward at the waist, and my body twisted to the left, my right shoulder rolled forward, down and to the left, as if only the left shoulder strap was restraining me. Further, my head moved forward and down, with my face turned to the left. My head contacted either the control column or forward panel on the top rear part of my head on the right side. I would think that had both shoulder harnesses restrained me, I either would not have hit the control wheel and/or instrument panel at all, or I would have hit them face first or on the top front or center of my head. That was not the case. I did not have any difficulty releasing the restraints prior to existing the aircraft.

Please let me know if you have additional questions or requests for information. I will certainly and fully cooperate with your investigation in any way requested. Thank you.

Sincerely,
Greg Ryan

Second Interviews of Flight Crew

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of: *

*

TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH *
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, *
ON JULY 2, 2021 *

Accident No.: DCA21FA174

*

Interview of: HENRY OKAI, Pilot

Transair

Via Telephone

Thursday,
March 17, 2022

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN ETCHER, Air Safety Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

CLARENCE KANAE, Aviation Safety Inspector - Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

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INTERVIEW

(1:55 p.m. CDT)

1
2
3 MR. ETCHER: Good afternoon. This is a Transair interview with Captain Okai on March
4 17th at 1355 Central Time.

5 Captain Okai, again, I appreciate you taking the time to talk with us again to help us
6 understand and clarify a few things. I'm going to go around the room here in just a second and
7 have everybody introduce themselves, especially since you're on the phone and you can't
8 necessarily see everybody. But pretty much the folks you remember when -- you might've
9 remembered when we interviewed you before; however, I want to make sure we have their voice
10 on the recording as well. If you're okay with us recording this interview and having it transcribed?

11 MR. OKAI: Yeah. I'm good with that.

12 MR. ETCHER: All righty. And so we'll start around the room here.

13 Bill?

14 DR. BRAMBLE: Hi, Captain Okai. It's Bill Bramble. We met before in Hawaii. It's nice
15 to hear your voice again.

16 MR. OKAI: Nice to hear yours, too.

17 MR. ETCHER: Clarence?

18 MR. OKAI: Hi, Clarence.

19 MR. KANAE: Hello, Henry. How you doing, Henry? This is Clarence. As you know,
20 I'm with the FAA in the Honolulu office. Nice to hear from you again.

21 MR. OKAI: Yeah, nice to hear from you. How are you?

22 MR. KANAE: I'm good. Thank you.

23 MR. ETCHER: And Rich?

24 MR. LEE: Hello, Henry. Rich Lee, the Boeing representative.

25 MR. OKAI: Hi, Mr. Boeing, how are you?

1 MR. LEE: I'm well. I'm glad you're doing well, too.

2 MR. OKAI: Good. Okay. Nice to hear all of you.

3 MR. ETCHER: And it's great to hear you again as well, like everybody said. And that is
4 absolutely everybody that's on the call with us.

5 So before we get any -- start any further, I just want to make sure you did not want a
6 representative present with you during this interview?

7 MR. OKAI: No, unless you guys are going to charge on me, then I'm going to need
8 somebody there.

9 MR. ETCHER: Ah. We just want you to educate us.

10 MR. OKAI: Yeah, okay. Yeah, if it's going to be like we did before, we're all set.

11 MR. ETCHER: All righty. It's going to be the same type of -- you know, not the same
12 questions obviously, but it's going to be just questions so you can help us understand everything.

13 So I'll go ahead and start and then, just like out in Hawaii, once I figure you're tired of
14 hearing of me ask questions, I'm going to have Bill do some and then just kind of go around the
15 virtual room here so people can kind of follow up. Probably won't take us as long as did it out
16 there obviously, but the questions we have, your answers could really help us understand the
17 bigger picture.

18 MR. OKAI: Okay.

19 MR. ETCHER: So if you're ready, we will get started.

20 MR. OKAI: Yeah, I'm all yours.

21 MR. ETCHER: All righty.

22 INTERVIEW OF HENRY OKAI

23 BY MR. ETCHER:

24 Q. And just for the recording, Henry, could you say your name and spell your last name as
25 well?

1 A. Yeah. My name's Henry Okai. Last name spelled O-k-a-i.

2 Q. All righty. So we've got a lot of the preliminary questions answered when we were out
3 there before, so these are more pointed questions just to help us kind of zero in on them and
4 hopefully minimize some of our time together.

5 Can you recall -- I know it's been a while, but can you recall how many past engine failures
6 you have experienced while you were flying there at Transair or Rhoades? We'll call it Transair
7 for now, just to keep it kind of consistent.

8 A. Yeah. Oh, a few. Maybe about five of them.

9 Q. I'm sorry? You say about five total?

10 A. Yeah. Maybe. That's just a rough guess.

11 Q. All righty. And of those engine failures, can you recall were they -- kind of describe what -
12 - was it an engine fire? Was it damage? Was it just a rollback? Kind of help us understand what
13 caused the engine failures.

14 A. One was during takeoff. It was a boom; it just blew up. And then the others have been in
15 the air, just stopped. Another one, too, was a boom; it was a boom, just blew up in the air. And
16 another one, too, was -- what happened? Another one was a failure. In addition to this one.

17 Q. Okay. And so, the event in July is also part of that five, correct?

18 A. Yeah, the event in July.

19 Q. Okay. Perfect. And again, thinking back. I know it's been a little while, but how many
20 precautionary or emergency landings have you had to do there while flying at Transair/Rhoades?

21 A. It looks like each time you go to work you have to declare emergency to come home. At
22 Transair, I would say maybe about seven, maybe. That's just a rough idea. I cannot really count
23 them.

24 Q. Okay. Can you kind of give us some ideas of what caused you to need to do a
25 precautionary or emergency landing?

1 A. During takeoff, engine instruments came out of the attachment. They came out from the
2 panel. That was one. And then a number of mechanical issues. I don't quite remember them. I
3 think oil, oil pressure during takeoff. So many little, little things like that during takeoff. I cannot
4 really recall.

5 Q. Okay. No --

6 A. I didn't check --

7 Q. And no worries. If you don't remember, "I don't know" works or "I don't remember" works
8 just fine. We were just trying to get an idea of, if you will, how many and what were some of the
9 causes.

10 A. Oil pressure, oil quantity. Most of them dealing with oil.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. That issue.

13 Q. All righty. Did you have any of those that were due to a high EGT or a high indication of a
14 high temperature?

15 A. Yeah. Those too, yeah, high EGT during takeoff.

16 Q. And I know this is probably going to be a little tougher maybe. Do you remember what
17 aircraft or was it all aircraft?

18 A. I don't, I don't remember which. I wrote all of them up, so if you want to get into details,
19 you have to look at the logbooks. Q. Okay. All right. No problem.

20 When you had these precautionary emergency -- or emergency landings, if you will, did
21 you get any feedback from management, like from the chief pilot? Did he give you anything --

22 A. Oh, from Wallace? Wallace almost chewed me up. He told me next time I should do the
23 procedure. You know, they make us fly the airplane as if the airplanes are brand new, but they're
24 not, you know. That is the problem. This event that happened, we should have gone back to the
25 airport instead of going to do the checklist like a new brand new airplane, you know. We should

1 have landed immediately, but, you know, we learn from our mistakes.

2 Q. So did Wallace, and to use your phrase, chew you out, did he do that on every time you
3 returned to the airport or was that just on one specific occasion; do you remember?

4 A. Every occasion, but the last occasion was severe, very severe. So I told him, I promise him
5 next time I will do the checklist, and I told him this is a promise.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. So next time I did checklist.

8 Q. Okay. I know you -- how many rejected takeoffs have you done there at
9 Rhoades/Transair?

10 A. About three.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Or four maybe. Yeah, I don't keep track of it. Maybe three or four, give or take two.

13 Q. Okay. And I think you said -- and please don't let me put words in your mouth. I believe
14 you said at one point it was -- you had a bang. But can you recall what caused you to reject a
15 takeoff?

16 A. The first takeoff -- yeah, yeah, I think it was the first takeoff or the second takeoff that I
17 rejected there, the engine blew up. Number 2 engine blew up. There was pieces on the runway --

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. -- when we take off.

20 Q. Can you recall any of the other ones?

21 A. The last one I was with Gina, and the last one was -- it was a pop, yeah, also a pop. It was
22 like a compressor stall or something. I think that, too, was number 2. And we cancelled the
23 takeoff. It's kind of hard to remember all the things.

24 Q. And it's okay. You know, if you think of them, by all means we can discuss them a little
25 bit if you'd like, but it's okay. I know it's been a while, so, you know, I appreciate you

1 remembering the ones you have so far.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. When you did these rejected takeoffs, did you -- just like the landings, did you get any
4 feedback from the chief pilot on, you know, rejecting a takeoff?

5 A. Yeah. Yeah, they always get on my case. I'm very easy to get on, so they always get on
6 my case. And I told him, okay, next time I will follow the procedure.

7 And we have a takeoff procedure. I think it's -- how many things? Four things, four items.
8 If those four items don't show up during the takeoff run, you continue with the takeoff. Even if
9 that means high oil temperature, high engine temperature, any of the temperatures, you are taking
10 off, you don't stop, which I think should be changed.

11 But I stopped a few times on high EGTs and I got chewed up. And I said, okay, next time I
12 will follow the procedure. Because taking off with a high EGT, to me, it shouldn't be, and that is
13 not the procedure. You should takeoff with a high EGT according to Transair. So I was like,
14 okay, next time I will take off with a high EGT.

15 Q. Okay. Did you ever email the chief pilot or anybody about high EGTs if you didn't abort
16 or reject a takeoff?

17 A. We write it up. We write it up. We write it up.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. But nothing gets done to it. I am not the only one to have experienced this. Some of my
20 issues I don't even write it up because it's been written up already. So I just let it go.

21 Q. Okay. And just for the record, when you say you write it up, is that in the maintenance
22 aircraft logbook? Is that just a write-up to the chief pilot or the director of operations?

23 A. No, logbook. All my communications go through the aircraft logbook.

24 Q. Okay. All righty.

25 A. That is maintenance, you know, if it is maintenance wise, it goes through the aircraft

1 logbook. If I wanted a day off and like that, then that's different.

2 Q. Okay. When we were out there in July talking with you, you had -- you told us that you
3 had seen the EGT indication on the accident airplane kind of between the green and the yellow
4 range on the EGT indicators.

5 A. Yeah. Pretty normal for most of the airplanes, I think.

6 Q. Did the accident airplane, do you recall, did it run hotter than other airplanes at Transair?

7 A. Yeah, that airplane was running hot. I had it the day before and it was running pretty hot,
8 pretty much the same place it was. And that was the day before, and the day before, too. I think
9 each time I have flown it, I have seen that indication. Not only me, the other guys, too.

10 Q. Okay. But would you say it ran hotter than any other airplane there or do you -- are they
11 all running about the same temperature wise? Help us understand.

12 A. Some run cold, some run cold and some run hot. And each time, if I'm on the hot one, I
13 cannot tell you if that is the hottest. That I cannot tell you.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Yeah, but the airplane, though, it is the hot airplane.

16 Q. All righty. I'm just going through my list here.

17 Have you ever received an email from the chief pilots in regards to techniques when you're
18 using the thrust levers to avoid compressor stalls? Did you ever get an email about that?

19 A. We've gotten some emails from the director of operations regarding the best techniques to
20 fly the airplane. And let's see if anything regarding engine temperature. I might have. We've
21 gotten so many flight emails. I have to go through them. I have to find --

22 Q. And that's fine. But you said that was -- I just want to make sure I heard it correct. Sorry.
23 My headset's probably garbled a little bit. Was that from the director of ops, not the chief pilot?

24 A. Yeah -- no, not directly from the chief pilot, from director of operations.

25 Q. Okay. Perfect.

1 When we were talking to you out there in July, you described the initial event with the
2 engines, and I'll quote what you told us, and maybe that'll help you kind of remember it a little bit.
3 "At 900 feet, whoosh, then it was a roll and a yaw, and Greg counteracted that. I told him you lost
4 an engine. I immediately scanned the EPR -- the EPRs, and I realized both of them were not
5 where I had set them. They had dropped down a little bit. So first I told him, I think you've lost
6 number 1. Then I looked at number 2, and I think, no, never mind, I think it's number 2. Number
7 2 had come back maybe a few ticks lower than number 1."

8 Help me understand what ticks are you referring to?

9 A. The mark on the indicator, on the EPR indicator.

10 Q. Okay. And have the airplanes there at Transair/Rhoades, did they ever have -- did they
11 ever creep back, have some EPR creep on takeoff or anything like that you're aware?

12 A. Yeah, as you're working it, as you're climbing, I think you're climbing it goes up, I think.
13 And you have to keep -- you have to bring it back as you are climbing.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. It is like that for all the airplanes.

16 Q. And they would creep up not back; is that what you said?

17 A. No, I think it creeps up.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Oh, man, I think I have to -- you know, I cannot tell you if it goes up or it goes down. I'm
20 confused now. But it moves. You have to keep moving it either up or down.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. All right. Now, first, you thought you lost the number 1 with that statement, and then you
24 looked at number 2 and then you thought it was number 2. I know we kind of --

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. -- talked about it a little bit when we interviewed you, but I guess I'm still a little -- I would
2 like a little bit of clarification, if I could.

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. At that time, if you can remember back, what was indicating to you that it was number 2
5 versus number 1 that had failed? Was it -- was there something that you noticed that led you to
6 believe it was number 2 versus number 1?

7 A. The noise, the yaw and the roll, and the fact that the EPR was lower than what I had set, led
8 me to believe that the problem is number 2.

9 Q. Okay. So --

10 A. So that was when I told --

11 Q. I'm sorry. Go ahead, please.

12 A. Oh, no. So that was -- I passed that information on to Greg. I said number 1, and then I
13 go, no, I think it's number 2. And I left it -- I went -- I was talking to ATC.

14 Q. So just so I have it in my head a little clearer, so I apologize. So it was the number 2 EPR
15 that had crept back a few ticks or did they both creep back a few ticks? Do you remember?

16 A. They both crept back a few ticks, but number 2 was more than number 1.

17 Q. Okay. Okay.

18 A. The creeping, yeah.

19 Q. All right. That helps. I do appreciate that.

20 You had also mentioned that adjusting the max continuous thrust during the climb, but we
21 weren't -- in my mind I wasn't perfectly clear. How much do you remember adding -- how much
22 max continuous thrust did you have to add in during your climb; do you recall?

23 A. I didn't add. I had to take -- I had to decrease the power, so I brought both engines back
24 about, I think, two ticks or something like that.

25 Q. Okay. And it was both number 1 and number 2 that you brought back?

1 A. Yeah, number 1 and number 2.

2 Q. All righty. Did you do them -- did you reach up and grab them both and pull them back or
3 did you do like number 1 first and then number 2?

4 A. I did number 1 and number 2.

5 Q. Okay. So you didn't pull them back together, you pulled them back one at a time?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Okay. All righty. And when you pulled them back, did you happen to notice or can you
8 recall was the thrust levers in a different position? Like was the number 1 back a little further than
9 the number 2 or vice versa? Do you recall?

10 A. Oh. No, I don't remember.

11 Q. That's okay. I know it's been a long time, so -- I appreciate all you've remembered so far.
12 So I appreciate that.

13 Another question. In your first interview you mentioned that you were going to clean up
14 the airplane, climb to 2,000 feet, level off, and then you were going to engage the autopilot. But it
15 also --

16 A. Yeah, that is our --

17 Q. I'm sorry?

18 A. That is our procedure.

19 Q. Okay. But then you said you never engaged the autopilot because in your mind the
20 airplane wasn't stabilized at 2,000 feet. And --

21 A. No, we need stabilized flight.

22 Q. So help me understand. And I wish I would have asked you this that day, but what did --
23 what in your mind made you think that the airplane was not stabilized? What was giving you that
24 indication?

25 A. That the heading was changing. We had not nailed the altitude and we had not nailed the

1 speed. One of these three things was always moving. A stabilized flight would be heading is
2 nailed, speed is nailed, and altitude is nailed. All these three things are holding, then that means
3 we have attained stabilized flight. None of these three was there.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah, we never attained any of it. We either get this, but then we don't get that. We get
6 that and then we lose this.

7 Q. Okay. Okay.

8 A. Do you understand what I'm --

9 Q. I get what you're saying now. I wish I would've asked you that when we were out there,
10 because that was one of those questions that I just couldn't answer clearly. So I'm glad you could
11 clarify it a little bit for me. So I appreciate that.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. And I remember in your transcript there was a spot where you said when you took over --
14 you became the pilot flying for the FO and you said the airspeed was 210 knots and decreasing.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Can you recall back --

17 A. We were supposed to --

18 Q. Go ahead.

19 A. We were supposed to maintain 220 speed, and when I took over the speed was somewhere
20 around 210, something like that. And Greg had told me, number 1, that has failed. And so I reach
21 forward for number 2. And I looked at the EPR for number 1 and the EPR was gone, and so all I
22 had was number 2. And I go, okay, let's see, before we do anything, how is number 2 doing? So
23 he told me number 2 is running hot. And I looked and it was true, it was running hot. But we
24 needed speed, so I moved the power forward and it hit the stop. And the EPR kept coming down,
25 coming down. Became obvious we're going to take a swim. And that was it. We ended up in the

1 water.

2 Q. Okay. So you said the EPR was gone on the number 1. Was it zero? Was it all the way
3 down? Help me understand what you mean by gone.

4 A. I cannot tell you exactly the way it was, but wherever it was, it was not going to sustain
5 flight.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. It wasn't in a flight position.

8 Q. The EPR wasn't in the flight position or the thrust lever wasn't?

9 A. You know, those things, I just ignored it. We don't have number 1, we don't have number
10 1, so I didn't pay attention to number 1 engine. My focus was on the engine running, which was
11 number 2.

12 Q. Okay. All righty. Up until that point, had there been any point when either of you, that
13 you can recall, had reduced the thrust lever on either engine or started pulling back one engine,
14 anything like that? Do you recall?

15 A. Uh-uh. No.

16 Q. Okay. All righty.

17 A. No. Yeah, I was talking to ATC. It was a busy time for me. No, Greg was -- and then I
18 was flying and he didn't touch nothing. When he was flying, I just set the throttle, and that was it.
19 I didn't touch those again until I took over again.

20 Q. Okay. Kind of help me understand maybe just a little bit, if -- let's say you wanted to pull
21 back one of the engines because it was a problem engine you were diagnosing or preparing to shut
22 down or whatever, would you just pull the engine back or would you do like -- you know, touch
23 the thrust lever and say, confirm, I have number 2 engine, and --

24 A. Oh, before we do anything with the engines, we have to confirm.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Before we do anything, that's our training. No one person would move the thrust lever
2 without the other guy knowing. And that is what we were going to do. We didn't even get to do
3 that. We didn't get to the checklist, Greg just dropped it on the floor. I told him forget about the
4 checklist and he dropped it on the floor. I went to see the airplane when they took it out and the
5 checklist was right there on the floor right where he left it. And it became apparent, you know,
6 we're going to have to (indiscernible), to swim. So from there on, we're trying to find how far are
7 we from the water.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Until we hit the water.

10 Q. Can you just kind of remember back when you took the controls, when you became the
11 pilot flying, did you put your hand on the thrust levers at all? I mean, did you have your hand
12 there?

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Do you --

15 A. Yeah, I was --

16 Q. Please --

17 A. Yeah, I was there. I went for -- let me see. I went for number 2 thrust lever, because I
18 asked him -- he told me number 1 engine has failed. And I was like, okay, how's number 2 doing,
19 since that is all we have. And he said it's running hot. So about then I -- my hand went for number
20 2, and it was running hot.

21 Q. Okay. When you put your hand there -- you know, we all grab the thrust levers, there's that
22 feel; you can feel both of them or, if you're reaching specifically for one, you feel it. Do you
23 remember when you put your hand on the thrust levers could you feel both thrust levers up there or
24 just one? Kind of --

25 A. Just feel for number 2.

1 Q. I'm sorry. I might have stepped --

2 A. It was number 2 initially and it was number 2 all the way to the water.

3 Q. Okay. Did you feel the number 1 thrust lever anywhere at all where your hand was?

4 A. Oh, no, I didn't see number 1. It was dark. No, I didn't see number 1. But I was looking at
5 the engine gauges. No.

6 MR. ETCHER: Okay. Okay. Henry, I'm betting money you're tired of talking to me
7 already, so if it's okay with you, I'll -- if you're good for the moment, I'll let Bill -- he's probably
8 got a lot of really great questions that'll help us even more. Are you okay to continue on?

9 MR. OKAI: Yeah. I'm all yours. I'm all yours for the whole day.

10 MR. ETCHER: All righty.

11 Bill, do you have any questions?

12 DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah.

13 Captain Okai, can you hear me okay?

14 MR. OKAI: Yeah, I hear you.

15 BY DR. BRAMBLE:

16 Q. Okay. All right. So just kind of revisiting what Shawn was just going over with you.
17 When Greg told you engine number 1 was gone or had failed, did you recall initially thinking
18 number 2 had failed?

19 A. No. The thing -- this is with Greg now. The thing with Greg is I've flown with him so
20 many times. He never makes a mistake. If Greg says number 1 is gone, then number 1 is gone.

21 (Indiscernible) I'm flying with 2, and do the verification and stuff later. We never got to do the
22 verification. So when he said number 1 is gone, I didn't think number 2 is gone. I realized number
23 2 is going when I took over.

24 Q. Okay. All right. And do you recall looking at the instruments at that time and seeing any
25 difference between number 1 and number 2? I guess you said number 1 looked like it was gone.

1 Do you remember which indication that was you were looking at; was it EGT?

2 A. That was EPR initially, right? Yeah, that was the EPR. I was checking both EPRs.

3 Q. Okay. And then when Greg said it was number 1, then did you look again and you were
4 looking at the EPR?

5 A. Come again, the question?

6 Q. When you took control and you asked Greg what was going on and he said number 1 was
7 gone, do you recall which indications you might have looked at on the instrument panel for the
8 engines?

9 A. Yeah, the EPR. And the EPR was nowhere near flight.

10 Q. The EPRs were what?

11 A. The EPR was nowhere near flight, nowhere that would sustain flight. That is number 1
12 engine.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Yeah. And number 2, the EPR was within flight, but decreasing.

15 Q. All right. And when Shawn was asking you about when you put your hands on the thrust
16 levers, and you said -- and were they both up, and you said it was number 2 initially, does that
17 mean you felt number 2 was kind of forward in a flight position and you could feel it, but you
18 couldn't feel number 1?

19 A. No, I went for number 2 thrust lever. There is a procedure that we have to do, and that
20 procedure calls for me to guard the good running engine, which is the number 2. And I needed the
21 number 2 to sustain flight.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And number 2 engine was running, so I went for number 2 and -- to push it up. As soon as
24 I moved it, it hit the stop.

25 Q. Okay. So when you took control after you guys had leveled off, you -- the next lever that

1 you touched was the number 2?

2 A. Yeah. Yeah.

3 Q. Okay. And --

4 A. Because I needed the speed.

5 Q. Okay. And do you recall anyone touching either thrust lever after you set MCT?

6 A. Yeah, Greg would have them, would have both of them after I set MCT because he is
7 flying.

8 Q. So he could have adjusted the thrust levers in between; is that right?

9 A. Yeah. He could have done anything he wanted with the thrust levers, with both thrust
10 levers.

11 Q. Okay. All right. But when you took over, you can't -- do I understand correctly from what
12 you've already said that you don't recall whether or not the number 1 thrust lever was -- had been
13 moved back?

14 A. Number 1 thrust lever has moved back? Why would it move back?

15 Q. I'm just asking when you took control after the level off, I'm just wondering if you recall
16 the position of the number 1 thrust lever or if you don't recall because you were focused only on
17 the number 2?

18 A. Oh, I don't recall where it was.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Can I ask a question?

21 Q. Yeah.

22 A. Why are we talking about number 1 thrust lever?

23 Q. Well, I can't actually release information that hasn't already been released, but this will help
24 us understand -- interpret, I think, the data that we already had -- that we have with respect to the
25 engines, which is limited because the recorder doesn't have a lot of parameters. And so we have to

1 kind of try and eliminate all possibilities for why engine indications changed throughout the course
2 of the flight.

3 A. Okay. Now which engine is the problem after you guys looked into it?

4 Q. I can't actually disclose the findings of the engine examination. We can --

5 A. But this is (indiscernible) anyway.

6 Q. What's that?

7 A. And you've done all -- you've done all your investigation. I mean, this is continuing
8 investigation, but it's not going to change anything.

9 Q. Yeah. We can discuss, you know, what additional information we can release after the
10 interview, if you'd like. But would you be okay with just continuing with the rest of the questions
11 so that we can get through --

12 A. Yeah, yeah, that's fine.

13 Q. Okay. And then we can revisit what we, you know, what we can share.

14 A. I'm sorry. I cut you off. What did you say?

15 Q. Oh, I was saying that after the interview we can revisit what we can share. The thing is, I
16 don't want to affect your memory by --

17 A. Oh, I see.

18 Q. -- - telling you things. You know, I'd rather get your memories first --

19 A. That I don't -- okay.

20 Q. -- and then talk about it. So --

21 All right. You mentioned that you'd had a rejected takeoff with Gina that was a -- it was
22 like a pop and a rejected takeoff?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Was that -- I'm sure you don't remember the date, but do you remember was that within
25 days of the accident or was it much earlier than that?

- 1 A. Gina hasn't been working there too long, so that would be within maybe weeks at most.
- 2 Q. Within a week or --
- 3 A. Of the accident.
- 4 Q. -- multiple weeks?
- 5 A. No, maybe weeks.
- 6 Q. Within a week?
- 7 A. No, within weeks, with a plural.
- 8 Q. Oh, okay. I gotcha. Sorry. The audio isn't perfect.
- 9 A. No, I understand. No problem.
- 10 Q. All right. Do you recall if you had any RTOs -- any rejected takeoffs with Gina that
11 involved high EGT?
- 12 A. No. You know, all this rejected stuff, I remember only with one person, and the rest of the
13 guys I don't know who they are. Ms. Gina and Milan, these are the two people I remember. The
14 rest I don't recall who the FO was.
- 15 Q. Okay. But you don't recall specifically whether you rejected for a high EGT reading with
16 Gina?
- 17 A. No. No, Gina had been only one and that was compressor stall.
- 18 Q. Okay. All right. So the rejected takeoffs you did due to high EGT, were the readings that
19 you saw on the gauges for EGTs, were they similar to what you saw during the takeoff on the
20 accident flight?
- 21 A. No. They were higher.
- 22 Q. Okay.
- 23 A. They were much -- they were much higher than the accident airplane.
- 24 Q. So I think you mentioned that the accident takeoff, the needle went to between the green
25 and the yellow. How high did it go on the takeoffs that you rejected for high EGT?

- 1 A. Oh, it went off the scale.
- 2 Q. Okay. And the feedback from the chief pilot, Wallace, about the rejected takeoffs you did
3 because of those high EGT indications was what again?
- 4 A. Yeah, I got chewed for taking -- for canceling the takeoff because of EGT, and EGT is not
5 part of the things we have to cancel takeoff. So --
- 6 Q. Okay. But on those particular takeoffs, the EGT had gone off the scale or to the top of the
7 scale?
- 8 A. Yeah, it gone off the scale. I don't remember if we (indiscernible), but --
- 9 Q. Okay. And do you recall if that was the accident airplane?
- 10 A. Oh, no. I cannot tell you this one is the accident.
- 11 Q. Okay. And I think when Shawn asked you how many high EGTs or how many rejected
12 takeoffs you did for high EGTs, you said those two. I just want to make sure that -- whether that
13 was t-o-o or t-w-o. Were there two rejected takeoffs for high EGT that you recall?
- 14 A. Oh, (indiscernible). You know, I don't, I don't remember how many.
- 15 Q. Okay. But you do remember there was at least one; is that correct?
- 16 A. Yeah. Yeah.
- 17 Q. Okay. All right. Getting back to the chief pilot, how would you describe your relationship
18 with him? I know you mentioned that he would chew you out, it sounded like, more than one
19 occasion. I mean, how would --
- 20 A. Yeah, I get chewed a lot because I tend to do things differently from the way he liked
21 things to be done. But I think I --
- 22 Q. You're fading out there. I can't hear you very well.
- 23 A. Oh. He tends to chew me out because I tend to do things differently than the way he wants
24 things to be done.
- 25 Q. Okay.

1 A. And after he came, I think we are going to change things now. Be better, I hope.

2 Q. How do you think things will change now?

3 A. Well, like this takeoff, you know, they have this takeoff procedure where you don't cancel
4 the takeoff because the engine is running hot, you take off with hot engine. I think we're going to
5 stop that. So then I won't be chewed again for canceling a takeoff with hot engine, you know, stuff
6 like that.

7 Q. I see. Well --

8 A. Because I don't think that any of the takeoff with hot engines, you know.

9 Q. Yeah. If he hadn't chewed you out, would you have continued the accident takeoff or
10 would you have done anything differently from --

11 A. Oh, I wouldn't have taken the airplane to begin with. I wouldn't have -- as soon as I show
12 up and I see that airplane is loaded -- it would have been written up from the night before and if
13 that has not been corrected, I am not taking it.

14 Q. What was written up the night before?

15 A. No, I am saying 810, the hot engine on 810 would have been written up if we don't take off
16 with hot engines. It wouldn't be me who would have written it up. Somebody else would have
17 written it up.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. Is that because it was running hot the night before?

21 A. Yeah. Yeah. I had that same airplane with Gina the night before and it was running hot.

22 Q. How hot was running?

23 A. Oh, it was running the same as we took off, the same takeoff, between the green and the
24 yellow.

25 Q. Okay. And if Wallace hadn't chewed you out before, you would have written that up?

- 1 A. Yes. I would have written it up.
- 2 Q. Okay. I think you said you wouldn't have --
- 3 A. Airplanes don't run in the yellow.
- 4 Q. -- the airplane?
- 5 A. You know engines don't run in the -- is it normal to run in the yellow?
- 6 Q. Yeah, I can't give you an answer, but interested to hear your thoughts on it.
- 7 A. Yeah, yellow means -- it's caution. Caution means pull the thrust lever back, go back
- 8 around and let maintenance talk to it.
- 9 Q. Um-hum.
- 10 A. Yeah, that is yellow -- that's my definition of yellow. Everything has to be in the green.
- 11 That's the way these things are designed, you know.
- 12 Q. Uh-huh. All right. One other clarification from an exchange you had with Shawn. Shawn
- 13 asked about EPR creep and you said you thought both EPRs had crept back but number 2 was
- 14 more. And I think you meant number 2 had crept further back than number 1, and I just wanted to
- 15 confirm whether that is the case?
- 16 A. Yeah, that is the case.
- 17 Q. Okay. And --
- 18 A. And that was 800 feet, you know, at 900 feet, you don't want things creeping too far back
- 19 there, you know?
- 20 Q. Um-hum. And --
- 21 A. So that's why I lost number 2.
- 22 Q. Okay. And then when you adjusted the thrust, I think you were saying, initially right after
- 23 the event, you said you pulled back number 1 and then number 2? I think that was the upshot of
- 24 what -- the back and forth between you and Shawn; is that right, as you adjusted them?
- 25 A. Yeah, I did -- yeah, one thrust lever at a time.

1 Q. Okay. And how far apart was that? I mean, was it within seconds of one another that you
2 moved them or was it like 30 seconds apart?

3 A. Oh, the time I spent on it?

4 Q. Yeah.

5 A. No, it was not a whole 30 seconds. It was less than 30 seconds. It was brief, you know,
6 but deliberate.

7 Q. Okay. And had you finished adjusting the thrust levers by the time you reached 2,000 feet?

8 A. No. It took us forever to get to 2,000 feet. We overshoot 2,000 feet actually, and then we
9 had to come back to 2,000 feet.

10 Q. Okay. What altitude do you think the airplane was at when you were adjusting the thrust
11 levers to MCT?

12 A. Oh, let me see. 210 I was looking at the speed. No, 190 was the speed. I had to come 190
13 speed. The 190, I cannot tell you the altitude.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. But 190 speed, yeah.

16 Q. All right. So you finished adjusting the thrust levers to set MCT and the speed at that time
17 was 190 knots?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Okay. All right. All right. In your simulator training at Rhoades, how are you trained to
20 identify which engine had failed during an engine failure?

21 A. EPR and fuel flow.

22 Q. EPR and fuel flow?

23 A. N1. Yeah. And all the engine gauges, you look at both engines to figure out which one is
24 not working, and also the yaw.

25 Q. Okay. And so in the simulator when you were -- when you did the engine failure at V1

1 maneuver, what was that like in the simulator? Did you feel a yaw and then did the engine
2 instruments drop to zero on the engine indicators or how did it work in the simulator?

3 A. Yeah. Yeah, you feel the yaw and then the engine instruments drop. Whichever engine is
4 not working, which one is not working will not have the gauges showing flight.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. It will pretty much go to zero.

7 Q. Okay. So it's pretty clear usually in the --

8 A. Yeah. You know, what we had, I think, was partial failure. It was not a complete failure,
9 what we had. It was a partial failure. You know what I'm saying? So the gauges didn't go to zero.
10 The EPR didn't drop down to zero. There was still EPR on both engines, but it had reduced.

11 Q. Okay. So it wasn't -- it didn't look like the simulator exercise because both engines --

12 A. No, it didn't -- wasn't the same. No, what happened to 810 was not the same. It was a
13 partial failure.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. All right. And then in your interview you mentioned -- in your first interview you
17 mentioned that you asked the FO to run the engine failure shutdown checklist after you took
18 control.

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. And how did you decide --

21 A. We never did that -- we didn't do that checklist.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Can you hear me?

24 Q. Yes. Yes. Can -- yes.

25 A. Yeah, we never did that checklist.

1 Q. Okay. And is that because basically the parameters, the flight parameters were
2 deteriorating and --

3 A. Yeah. Now we're getting ready to ditch. We are looking -- we are going down. So I was
4 like, no, these engines are already shutting themselves down, you know, which one we going to
5 shutdown? Two engines, we've already lost one, which one we going to shut down? The other
6 one is shutting itself down, so just forget it. We have to think about getting out of this airplane.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. So that was the plan from there on.

9 Q. And which checklist was -- would you have done for the situation? The engine failure
10 shutdown or the engine fire, severe damage, or separation checklist?

11 A. Oh, if it had been just like in the sim, it would have been engine shutdown, which of course
12 -- engine failure shutdown checklist, that is what we were going to do.

13 Q. Did you guys do the other checklist in the simulator for engine fires or some other
14 scenario?

15 A. We did engine -- fire in the engine, fire and severe damage shutdown checklist.

16 Q. Uh-huh.

17 A. Yeah. But that was not our situation in this case.

18 Q. Uh-huh. And how would you know if that checklist was relevant? If you had fire lights on
19 or something else?

20 A. Yeah, the fire light; we have the bell, all the warning signs with the engine failure or engine
21 has separated, and we would have done that.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Now, if engine had separated, everything on the side of that engine will be zero. And of
24 course there's going to be a yaw, and it's going to be quite --

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. And what about severe damage? How would you know if that -- should lead you to do that
3 checklist?

4 A. Yeah, engine will be frozen.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Then we know severe damage and we'll do that checklist. It is the same checklist as the
7 fire checklist, just engine -- engine damage is the same as the fire checklist.

8 Q. Okay. And is the crosscheck on the -- you know, figuring out which engine to close
9 because it's bad, is that -- is it the same crosschecks for both checklists or --

10 A. Yeah, we do the verification. We have to verify we're shutting down the right engine, so I
11 have to guard the good engine, and then Greg moves on that. But -- yeah.

12 Q. And does that have callouts or you're supposed to point or anything like that or how does
13 that work?

14 A. Greg got callouts. We both do call and response.

15 Q. Okay. He didn't get to that point on this flight?

16 A. No. No, we didn't get to that point. We did not at all. The situation was more serious than
17 what we had now.

18 Q. Okay. Because you felt both engines were --

19 A. Yeah, because now we don't have engine. Yeah.

20 Q. Okay. All right. Let's talk a little bit about workload management. So you decided to take
21 control after the level off and asked the first officer to look at the gauges, and then at some point
22 asked him to run the checklist. I'd like to explore your thought process about how'd you decide
23 who should fly and who should run the checklists and do fault diagnosis, that kind of thing.

24 A. Okay. So the 737, when you have an engine failure, it's a lot of work on the guy flying,
25 especially his leg, his foot. Holding the rudder pedal, if he doesn't trim it quick, becomes a

1 problem physically. That is what I am trying to say. So it is nice for the guy who is not flying to
2 take over so he can relax and rest his foot while he reads the checklist. That is the way I do it so
3 you understand. So that was how I did it.

4 Q. Okay. All right. So that was okay as far as the company procedures go and so forth? That
5 was an acceptable --

6 A. Yeah, that, I wasn't chewed over it. Nobody said anything. I have done it in the sim so
7 many times. Wallace has said nothing.

8 Q. Okay. So there was no edict like, you know, the captain should always be the pilot
9 monitoring in an abnormal situation or anything like that?

10 A. No. The captain can choose to fly whenever he want or the first officer can fly whenever
11 he wants. You just have to know who is flying.

12 Q. Okay. All right. All right. Do you recall ever giving the control back to the first officer or
13 him taking control of the airplane before it hit the water?

14 A. No. When I took over, I didn't give it back to him.

15 Q. Okay. And did he ever intervene on the controls, like try to take control or --

16 A. No. No, he was not.

17 Q. Okay. All right. One of the things Shawn had wanted to explore was if you had any other
18 strategy in sight in terms of deciding to go out 15 nautical miles? I think basically your reasoning
19 was -- you know, to the hold. And I think basically your reasoning was that you wanted to stay out
20 of the way of the airport traffic; is that right?

21 A. Yeah, that's correct.

22 Q. Okay. And what would happen if you tried to hold at 5 nautical miles, for example, or just
23 ask for vectors?

24 A. Oh, too close to the airport. Then we're going to be checking vectors and ATC will be
25 disturbing us while we're doing the checklist. I just want to get out of everybody's way. And we

1 do our thing, we finish, we join the ILS come back and land.

2 Q. I see.

3 A. This is the routine. It's very routine. It's so routine. We've done it so many times. I have
4 done it with Greg, not in the airplane but in the sim, so many times. This is something we can do
5 and eat our lunch at the same time.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. I never -- you're going to go out and then you're going to have the other engine to crap up
8 on you. I never thought that would happen.

9 Q. Yeah.

10 DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. I'm just taking a last peek at my questions here to make sure I hit
11 everything.

12 All right. I think that's all I have for right now, Captain Okai. Thank you so much.

13 MR. OKAI: Okay. Thank you.

14 MR. ETCHER: Thanks, Bill.

15 Captain, you doing okay or do you need a break for a moment or two?

16 MR. OKAI: Oh, maybe in a little while I want to take a break, a pee break. Other than that
17 I'm --

18 MR. ETCHER: You tell us when you want to do that.

19 MR. OKAI: Okay. I'll let you know.

20 MR. ETCHER: Okay.

21 Are you ready to -- are you ready, Mr. Clarence, to ask some questions?

22 MR. KANAE: Yes, I am. I just have a couple for Henry.

23 MR. OKAI: Okay.

24 BY MR. KANAE:

25 Q. Okay, Henry, thank you. Again, appreciate your time today.

1 And so, my first question will be -- I'd like to take you back to your captain upgrade
2 training. During your upgrade captain training, was maintenance recording procedures covered in
3 your training? And if so, do you remember what those were?

4 A. Oh, I don't know what maintenance do. During training, it was just pilots in the class and
5 director of maintenance came there, waved his hand, sat in there for a while, and that was it as far
6 as maintenance is concerned.

7 Q. Did you all talk about if there is any logbook entries required?

8 (Phone interruption)

9 Q. Sorry about that.

10 A. Yeah, log -- most of us -- during my upgrade, most of us there were captains from a
11 previous airline, so we all knew the basics. So they didn't talk much about logbook entries. They
12 did mention it, you know, but it was just briefly. I didn't spend a whole --

13 Q. Oh, okay. Okay. Yeah, I was just wondering if that was taught in class and wanted to
14 compare what was taught in class and what was actually happening on the flightline when you
15 actually got to the flightline. So, anyway --

16 A. That's two different things. Happening on the flightline versus happen in class, two
17 different things for everything. This is my summation of the whole stuff there.

18 Q. I see. Did you ever express that to maybe the management staff, that, you know what,
19 don't really do the same as what we're taught in class? Have you ever brought that question up at
20 all?

21 A. They know it. They know it and -- you know, the thing is with life, right? And it's -- we
22 are always on the move, always on the move, always on the move. So they know what I'm talking
23 about. Sometimes I go, oh, this we got to write it. Sometimes maintenance comes to take the
24 book and I will take it back from them; I'll say, we'll write it after we are done. And sometimes I
25 take the book and they take it and they write it after you are done. It depends upon what it is, you

1 know.

2 You remember -- you recall during the interview there was a question about the landing
3 gear, something about a landing gear, and I said, no, I'm not going to write it up but we'll do it after
4 the shift is over. Things like that. So --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. We all know about it, right, and write enough things up. Sometimes we do, sometimes we
7 don't, depending upon what it is that needs to be written up.

8 Q. Okay, Henry. Thank you --

9 A. Did I answer --

10 Q. Yes, yes. Thank you very much, Henry, on that.

11 And I guess here's another question I have. Before taxiing out, the flying pilot, whoever
12 that might be, captain or first officer, will normally do the takeoff briefing; is that correct?

13 A. Yeah, that is correct, either the first officer or the captain depending upon who is flying.
14 That's correct.

15 Q. Is that done at the -- at parking or is that done just at the taxiway prior to getting onto the
16 active runway?

17 A. Oh, it depends on the airport and what your workload looks like, but it has to be done
18 before takeoff.

19 Q. Check. Okay. Do you recall by memory what the takeoff briefing would include?

20 A. Oh, it's been a while now, but let's see if I can give you a takeoff briefing.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 A. So I am flying now, so I would say this is going to be a left seat takeoff. Departure runway
23 is Runway 8-Left. I will reference the power, the takeoff power. I'll look from the sheet, we are
24 taking off at this weight. And then I say this, though: Any problem before V1, will cancel the
25 takeoff. After V1, we'll continue, we'll turn to a heading 220. Now this is standard procedure for

1 all the runways at Honolulu. Runway 8-Left -- oh, did I say 8-Left? No, 8-Right, 8-Right will be
2 a right turn to 220 heading. We'll intercept Victor -- forgotten what it is, to go to that section,
3 intersection, run the checklist and come back. This is my briefing.

4 And then, in addition to that, I would say, any changes in heading on takeoff will cancel the
5 takeoff. Engine fire during takeoff will cancel the takeoff. Engine failure during takeoff will
6 cancel the takeoff. Anything you want to add to it? And maybe he's going to say, yeah, it's raining
7 today so let's fly this heading after takeoff, request this heading, go this way, go that way. If he
8 has anything to add, he will add. That's about it, pretty much, for the takeoff. Might be something
9 --

10 Q. Okay. Okay.

11 A. -- I don't I have left in there, but these are the major issues.

12 Q. Okay. Okay. Great. And so you mentioned that on takeoff you noticed that the EPR or
13 actually the EGTs were into the yellow on some of the takeoffs, but company felt that it's okay --

14 A. It's a go.

15 Q. -- it's a go anyway, right? Yeah. In your opinion, though, you stated also that you would
16 not have done that?

17 A. No. There's no way on this planet I am going to take off with anything in the yellow.
18 Absolutely not. No way. But this is the procedure, is you go.

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. You know, one guy -- they give one guy -- I think, I think Victor; yeah, Victor it was -- I
21 think they suspended him or they did something to him for doing exactly this, canceling a takeoff
22 because of -- over the EGT temperature issue and he cancelled the takeoff. He got in trouble.

23 Q. I see.

24 A. This was for 810 though.

25 Q. I see. All right.

1 MR. KANAE: Well, you've answered my questions, Henry, very, very nicely. Thank you
2 very much. And that's all I have.

3 Back to you, Shawn.

4 MR. ETCHER: Thanks, Clarence.

5 Rich?

6 MR. LEE: All right. I just have a couple things.

7 But, Henry, do you need a pee break or are you good?

8 MR. OKAI: Yeah, I think I'll take you on the pee break now. Sorry I pulled that on you.

9 MR. LEE: Yeah, no problem. We can wait till you get back.

10 Shawn --

11 MR. OKAI: Okay. I'll be right back.

12 MR. LEE: Shawn, back to you.

13 MR. ETCHER: All right. I'll put it on pause for a little bit.

14 (Off the record.)

15 (On the record.)

16 MR. LEE: Okay. Great. Just a -- all right, just a couple things here.

17 BY MR. LEE:

18 Q. I think it was Bill asking about your training in the simulator and you mentioned both N1
19 and EPR. Does the simulator have EPR or N1's for your training?

20 A. Oh, it's been a while since I went to that thing. You know, I cannot give you a correct
21 answer. I think it's the same as the airplane. I think it's EPR.

22 Q. Okay. All right. Great. And the other question was about severe damage, and I think --
23 don't let me put words in your mouth, but you said what you think severe damage is, is that if the
24 engine seizes. Is that -- can you explain what you would expect severe damage would be?

25 A. Yeah. The EPR stops spinning, it goes to zero. No, not the EPR. The N1/N2, it stop

1 spinning, one of them or both. And --

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. -- that -- I mentioned that's what severe damage.

4 Q. So you said N1 or N2 or --

5 A. Yeah, the engine stops spinning.

6 Q. Okay. All right. And I think I remember asking you about coordinated flight once you
7 took over the aircraft, and you kind of mentioned your process, I think, is to allow the flying pilot
8 to rest their leg because it could be, you know, a lot of work holding the asymmetric thrust. Do
9 you --

10 A. Yeah, we don't have it --

11 Q. Okay. So do you remember during the accident flight needing to hold a lot of rudder?

12 A. No. It was trimmed. It was trimmed nicely.

13 Q. Okay. Do you know if the FO, Greg, actually put rudder trim in?

14 A. No, I couldn't tell. You know, Greg is a very good pilot. He's not the type you have to
15 watch over his shoulder, you know, see what he's doing, is he doing things right. No, no, he didn't
16 do anything wrong that I would see or I would characterize as being wrong so I have to take over.
17 That is not why I took over. I took over so he can rest his leg and just do the checklist and that's it.
18 You know, so the whole thing was very routine, routine stuff.

19 Q. So, so just to ask again. When you took over the aircraft, was the aircraft in coordinated
20 flight where you didn't have to hold a lot of asymmetric --

21 A. No --

22 Q. -- thrust with the rudder?

23 A. It was in coordinated flight. I didn't have to hold anything.

24 Q. Okay. And you're not absolutely sure if Greg, the FO, actually cranked in rudder trim or it
25 was coordinated for some other reason?

1 A. No. I didn't see him touch the trim tab. No. If he did, he did it quick. I didn't see it.

2 Q. Okay. And I think you mentioned to either -- it might have been Bill again, about stating
3 that number 1 is gone. And as far as confirming how you understood that number 1 was gone, I
4 think a part of it was a communication with the FO, Greg, but can you tell me what your -- what is
5 meant by number 1 is gone and, you know, what other indicators you would look at, what other
6 instruments on the engine, to confirm that the number 1 is gone?

7 A. Oh, if the number 1 engine is gone, it's not only the EPR. Then you'll get backup
8 information. It's not going to be only from Greg. You're going to get backup indication to confirm
9 that number 1 is gone. But we didn't get there. We didn't, we didn't get there. You know, right
10 now I think, as I'm sitting here and you're asking me about number 1 thrust lever, number 1 --
11 number 1, I'm beginning to wonder did we shut down the wrong engine, you know? Because I
12 don't know.

13 Q. So I just wanted a clarification. Did you actually shut down an engine?

14 A. No, we did not shut any engine.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. That was the thing, too. Nothing was shut down, nothing. No engine was shut down.

17 Q. Okay. And so back to the noise you heard. I think you said it was a whoosh. And was
18 there another --

19 A. Oh, the initial --

20 Q. Yeah, the initial noise.

21 A. No, that was the only noise I heard. No, I heard another noise, two noise: the initial, and
22 when Greg was flying somewhere close to 2,000, I heard the same noise again. And after that I
23 didn't hear it anymore, and soon after that I took over.

24 Q. Okay. Maybe one other question. So if you could explain where your level-off height
25 would be in your normal thrust reduction? Would that normally happen with your power settings

1 that you would use for takeoff, would there be a level-off and a power reduction, or would it be --
2 you know, talk me through that process of normal operation.

3 A. The second noise was a little before the power reduction, maybe about 1500. Don't hold
4 me to this number, sir, but roughly around 1500, that altitude.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And I heard -- yeah. But then I was talking -- you see, my mind was -- you know, ATC
7 trying to -- I had the radar picture in my head and I was trying to follow what she was saying and
8 all that stuff, where everybody else was. I was pretty busy.

9 Q. Oh, yeah.

10 A. And Greg was doing fine flying. Greg was flying, so I didn't -- if anybody -- if I had to fly
11 with anybody that night, it would be Greg, and he was there. Greg is pretty good guy. I mean, if
12 you flew with him before, you know what I'm talking about, and he was there. So we had this
13 thing -- this thing was nothing. We had it all taken care of until I took over and I realized, no,
14 there's more to it than one engine.

15 MR. LEE: Okay. I think that's good for me, Shawn.

16 So thank you, Henry. I appreciate it.

17 MR. OKAI: Okay. You're welcome.

18 MR. ETCHER: Thanks, Rich.

19 Henry, I just have a few questions and then, if you're okay with it, we'll just go around one
20 more time just to make sure everybody's got --

21 MR. OKAI: Oh, I'm all, I'm all yours.

22 MR. ETCHER: All right. Well, you know, it'll be over with maybe tomorrow. I'm just
23 kidding.

24 BY MR. ETCHER:

25 Q. Just -- I have just a few questions that as you were talking and things were popping into my

1 head. Initially when you and I were talking here earlier in this conversation, we talked about how
2 you, on the initial climb-out, you first thought it was the number 1 engine that did something and
3 then you thought it was the number 2 engine, and you guys -- you level off and everything's going
4 on, and then all of a sudden you switched -- I think, I want to say maybe the FO told you the
5 number 1 engine was bad or something. Please don't let me --

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. -- put words in your mouth. Did that --

8 A. You're not putting words in my mouth.

9 Q. -- when he told you it was the number 1 engine, did you remember thinking it was the
10 number 2 originally and why did it switch? Or did you even remember that you had first thought it
11 was the number 2?

12 A. Yeah, that came across my mind. I did think about that, you know. But Greg had been
13 flying the airplane. He would be the one who would know which engine has failed. He is the best
14 person to ask which one. So that was what I did, and he said number 1. And I looked --
15 immediately I looked at the EPRs, and number 1 was nowhere near flying power, so I went for
16 number 2 and it hit the stop.

17 Q. Okay. So for just a moment, let's pretend you and I were on that flight and I was your first
18 officer. I took off. I was climbing out. You were dealing with ATC. And then you came back
19 and, you know, said, okay, I'll take control to give my leg a break or, you know, whatever,
20 whatever you were wanting to give me a break for. If I was the pilot flying at that point
21 transferring controls to you, would there be anything you would expect me to tell you, like, our
22 heading's this, our speed's that, thrust is here --

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. -- you know? What do you expect -- what would you expect from me so you kind of get a
25 really quick briefing on how it's handling?

1 A. From you, I've not flown with you before, yeah, I'm going to go a little slower. We're
2 going to go a little slower, and you give me the whole briefing; this is that, this is that. Best if you
3 tell me the whole airplane, where everything is and it's been trimmed. I'll say, okay, I have
4 control. But with Greg --

5 Q. And is that something that is taught to you?

6 A. What is that?

7 Q. Is that something that Transair teaches to do or is that your procedure? Help me
8 understand, you know --

9 A. No, no, this is part of the training from Transair, from everywhere I have gone. If one pilot
10 is out of the loop and he comes back, the other guy tells him where he is.

11 Q. Okay. Now you said you -- because you've never flown with me, you would expect a full
12 briefing.

13 A. Yeah, exactly.

14 Q. But you have flown with the first officer before, so is there -- I don't want to say a
15 minimum briefing, but is there some -- anything that you would expect him to tell you when he
16 gave you the controls?

17 A. Yeah. He would tell me anything that moves -- that he can move, he has moved. He will
18 tell me, I moved this; this is that; this is that. Skid brakes are retracted. Minimum stuff. Anything
19 that he has touched, he will tell me. Other than that, not a whole lot to talk about.

20 Q. Okay. And just for the record, did he give you any of that information when he -- when
21 you took over the -- when you took control?

22 A. No, we pretty much knew -- we knew what was going on, you know. Except I ask him,
23 which engine is it? And he goes, number 1. I go, okay, I have control. Let's run the checklist.
24 But before you do the checklist, let's take a look at number 2 engine and see what's going on since
25 that is all we have, something to that effect. And he came back, he goes, number 2 is running hot.

1 I was like, okay. And I looked and I go, oh, boy, this is really hot and speed is low. So I pushed
2 the throttle forward and it hit the stop. And it kept decreasing and we took it all the way down to
3 the water.

4 Q. Okay. Just kind of help me -- I just want to get in your mind for a little bit, if you can, be
5 that -- remember, I always said I want to be that fly on your shoulder? I still want to be that fly on
6 your shoulder. I want to see what you're seeing, because that really helps me.

7 You said, you know, the number 1 was -- or, I'm sorry, the number 1 was back -- I
8 shouldn't say back. The number 1 EPR was down.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Was there anytime during that flight, from that point when you took over until you guys
11 were in the water, was there any point in that time where you thought, you know what, let me just
12 push the number 1 up just to see if there's anything? Was there -- did that ever go through your
13 mind at all?

14 A. No. Uh-uh. At this point I was wrestling the -- what's it called -- the stall, the -- I've
15 forgotten all these names. The stick shaker. The stick shaker. And I was trying to get the wings
16 level.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. So my hands were busy. The power has hit the stop and it was there, so I knew I didn't
19 have any more power. That was the only power I had. I didn't -- I never thought about that. Tried
20 to get the wings level.

21 Q. Okay. All right. Sorry. I just wanted to make sure you guys -- you guys ditch in the water
22 at night and you're here to talk to us about it, so I'm trying to learn everything I can from what you
23 were thinking and doing, just -- so I appreciate that.

24 A. Did we screw up? I mean, if we screwed up, you can tell me we screwed up, you know,
25 and then I -- what did we do, you know? And maybe that can help me help you guys.

1 Q. And, honestly, right now we're still -- believe it or not, we're still looking at a lot of things.
2 We're still trying to put it all together. We're not to any point where we can say this is what
3 happened or that's what happened. We want to make sure we put it all together before we jump to
4 any conclusions. And these are just some questions that we've had trying to get a better
5 understanding. You know, the bigger the holes, the harder it is to put the pieces together. So we
6 want to put as much of it together so we get a better understanding. And, you know, we haven't --
7 you know, there's no probable cause yet, so we haven't come out and said, oh, here's what
8 happened, because we're still looking at everything. That's part of the investigation. We've got to
9 really dig into this one because, you know, it was a success. You guys -- in that you guys ditched
10 at night and you're here to talk to us. And we want to learn from that and, you know, try and put it
11 all together.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. So just help me understand, when you're -- when you became the pilot flying on that flight,
14 and I think you said the first officer was going to run the checklist but you guys never got to that or
15 it was started or something -- please, don't -- again, don't let me put words in your mouth.

16 A. No, we're good.

17 Q. Was there ever a point in either at Transair or at any of your training where the company
18 expects the captain to become the pilot monitoring so they can kind of keep a global picture of
19 what's going on and run the checklist and all that while the FO flies? Was that ever trained to you?
20 Did that ever come into your mind on this event, anything like that?

21 A. One of the airlines, the captain always has the checklist, depending upon what happens.
22 Only one of the airlines that I ever worked for.

23 Q. Just for the record, was that Transair that had that or was that another airline other than
24 Transair?

25 A. Another airline.

1 Q. I'm sorry. I might have stepped on you. My apologies. What was that?

2 A. Another airline, not Transair.

3 Q. Okay. Did you think of doing that on this event? I'm just -- again, I'm just trying to have a
4 nice picture of everything that you were doing on this.

5 A. No, he was going to do the checklist because he did the initial flying. So he was going to
6 do the checklist and I'll do the next flying. Or if he wanted -- if he says no, then I'll do the
7 checklist.

8 Q. Okay. I just have a few more questions, if that's okay, and then we'll -- like I said, we'll go
9 back around here real quick.

10 Not this event, but other events you've had where you've had high EGTs, high oil
11 pressures, you know, all the other different events you've explained to us earlier --

12 A. Low oil pressure.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Not high. Low oil pressure.

15 Q. Low oil. Okay. Did -- I know this is weird and, you know, we all carry phones and
16 everything, but did you happen to take a picture of any of those issues that you had had? That you
17 can recall?

18 A. Yeah, hold on. Do you want me to send you a picture?

19 Q. If you -- I mean, do you have pictures of those events or of any of those events of what you
20 were looking at?

21 A. Yeah. I've taken some pictures. Let me see.

22 Q. And it's okay if you want to look after the interview here, and if you have pictures, it helps
23 us understand what you guys were seeing and things like that. You can email them to me.

24 A. Yeah, I --

25 Q. I can definitely get in touch with you to get those.

1 A. Okay. All right. That's fine.

2 Q. Okay. Perfect. The last question I have, and then I'll -- like I said, I'll let everybody else
3 go one more time. When you were talking with, I believe it was with Bill or -- I think -- you said
4 you looked up at the EGT and it was between the green and the yellow. Is that something -- do
5 you remember saying that?

6 A. Yeah, on the takeoff.

7 Q. Okay. Help me understand what you mean -- I don't have a gauge right here in front of me
8 looking at it, but doesn't the green go right into the yellow? What do you mean by between the
9 green and the yellow? Is that just both bands or is there a point in there that it was -- that you were
10 describing?

11 A. Yeah, between the green and the yellow, it's like -- like in the middle, in the middle
12 between the green and the yellow.

13 Q. Okay. So it's kind of right there on the line, if you will, between yellow and green?

14 A. Yeah, it's right there. You know, it doesn't, it doesn't belong, but he saying it belongs
15 there. I've seen it there so many times.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. It's kind of (indiscernible).

18 Q. All right. No, that -- I apologize. That seems like a weird question. I just wanted to make
19 sure because I didn't think there was like a big space between the greens and the yellows. So I just
20 wanted to make sure I knew what you were talking about.

21 A. Okay.

22 MR. ETCHER: But thank you so much. I'll let -- I'll see if --

23 Bill, do you have any questions?

24 DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah.

25 BY DR. BRAMBLE

1 Q. Captain Okai, so you had mentioned -- you mentioned when you were speaking with Rich
2 about hearing a second noise while you were still climbing and --

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. -- you were talking to ATC. Can you describe what that noise sounded like?

5 A. It was just like the first one. It was -- oh, man, it's been a while.

6 Q. So during your initial interview you described the first noise as a whoosh.

7 A. No, the whoosh is more like -- that was more like Shawn's description, the way we put it on
8 the computer. It was -- man, I can -- I never heard that noise before. I cannot describe it.

9 Q. Well, it's okay if you can't describe it. Was it more like a vibration or something else?

10 A. Oh, no, it wasn't a vibration. It was -- it was not a bang, too, you know? It was kind of
11 unique.

12 Q. Okay. When you came back from talking to ATC and you were asking what was up with
13 the engines and Greg told you that you lost number 1, you said you looked at the EGT and it was
14 way down for number 1. Do you recall anything -- I'm sorry, not the EGT. You looked at the
15 EPR and it was way down. Do you recall anything about the EGT?

16 A. The EGT for number 1? No, I didn't look at EGT. I just look at the EPR, and I was like,
17 okay --

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. -- (indiscernible) -- yeah. I looked at the EPR and I was like, okay, we've lost number 1,
20 okay. So all we have is number 2. I'll take over, check number 2, you know, how is that? And he
21 says it's running hot.

22 Q. Okay. One, just one last question. If the FO pulled back the number 1 thrust lever while
23 he was flying and you were talking with ATC -- if he did, if he happened to pull it way back,
24 would you expect him to tell you that before you took control?

25 A. Yeah. That's the next -- why would he tell me number 1 has failed if he has brought the

1 power back?

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. No. No, I didn't, I didn't even think about that. He says number 1 has failed; I see number
4 1 has failed. Okay.

5 Q. Yeah.

6 A. So I went with number 2.

7 DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. That's it for me.

8 I believe up next we have Clarence.

9 MR. KANAE: Thanks, Bill.

10 No, I don't have any other questions. Thank you very much, though. I appreciate your
11 time once again, Henry.

12 Back to you, Shawn.

13 MR. ETCHER: Thanks, Clarence.

14 Rich, do you have any additional?

15 MR. LEE: Just one question.

16 BY MR. LEE:

17 Q. For your takeoff procedures as a captain, as the pilot monitoring, when thrust is set -- talk
18 me through who has control of the thrust levers and at what point if there's changes and so on and
19 so forth.

20 A. Okay. So I'll taxi the airplane, line it up. And then right about there, I go, you are ready?
21 He goes, yeah. I say, you have control. Then I remove my hand, and he sets the takeoff power in
22 the region, you know, not exactly. Say, takeoff is 2.0, he would bring the power up and then
23 somewhere 1.5, I'll take over and move it forward to 2.0. And he will say, set thrust. And then
24 once I get 2.0, I verify everything and then I say, thrust set, and we are moving.

25 He removes his hand, puts both hands on the control column, and I'll put my right hand on

1 the power. And then 80 knots, when I call 80, he verifies with me and he goes, 80 check. And
2 then I move my eyes around the cockpit and outside and around the cockpit. And V1, rotate.
3 Positive rate, I call. And then he calls, gear up. And 400, and he goes select heading. And then
4 the next call is 1,000, flaps up, climb, set climb thrust. And that completes the takeoff.

5 Q. Okay. So go back to at the rotate call. What are you doing with your hand on the thrust
6 lever at that point?

7 A. I take my hands off.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. V1 I --

10 Q. All right. And you mentioned during the push-up you check that -- I forgot what you said --
11 -- everything is okay. So when you're setting --

12 A. We check the -- we check the engine instruments --

13 Q. Okay. What engine instruments do you look at when you're setting takeoff thrust?

14 A. All the instruments for the engine. I scan them real quick, real quick, look outside, look at
15 the airspeed indicator, come to the engine, look at the engine, look outside, look at the flight
16 indicator. I keep this cycle till V1 shows up.

17 Q. Okay. So fast forward a little bit to the point where you're cleaned up and you're ready to
18 set your climb power, whatever you determine that to be.

19 A. That's 1,000 feet.

20 Q. Okay. So at 1,000 feet, talk me through that process of -- or from after you clean up the
21 power, what happens? Is it reduced? Is it pushed up? How do you know what the max
22 continuous thrust is?

23 A. We completed all this before we taxied out, so I have it written off to the side. So I'll look
24 at it and I'll set it. Now I'm tweaking as we keep climb.

25 Q. Okay. So as the pilot monitoring, you would set the thrust levers?

1 A. Yeah. Well, failed engine, he can set it, whatever he wants to do.

2 Q. Okay. And in your normal operation at -- you're 1,000 feet, would that normally be an
3 increase in EPR or a decrease in EPR?

4 A. It depends on our weight, how much we weigh.

5 Q. Normally out of Honolulu, where you, you know, you have your first leg of the day where
6 you're loaded with cargo?

7 A. Yeah. I would bring it back. Usually, usually I'll bring it back.

8 Q. All right. So you, as the pilot monitoring, you would say, EPR 1-point whatever, and the
9 pilot flying would set that?

10 A. Yeah, if he wants to set it, he will set that. Or if he wants, he can tell me to do it.

11 MR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thanks.

12 That's all I have, Shawn.

13 And thank you, Henry.

14 MR. OKAI: Okay.

15 MR. ETCHER: And again, Henry, let me reiterate what Rich said; thank you so much. I
16 know we've kept you quite a while, but you definitely -- you've helped me a lot. I think I can
17 speak for all of us. But we appreciate the time you've given us. Again, sorry to have you go
18 through this again, but it -- you definitely -- you've helped me fill in some areas I had questions on,
19 so I appreciate that.

20 Just looking around, does anybody have any one last questions at all?

21 All right. Hearing nothing --

22 DR. BRAMBLE: No, not me.

23 MR. ETCHER: I'm sorry. Go ahead, Bill. What did you say?

24 DR. BRAMBLE: Not me.

25 MR. ETCHER: Okay. Sorry.

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So with that, we will call this interview concluded at 1543 Central Time.
(Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m. CDT, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII
ON JULY 2, 2021
Interview of Henry Okai

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FA174

PLACE: Via Telephone

DATE: March 17, 2022

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Kay Maurer
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of: *

*

TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH *
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, *
ON JULY 2, 2021 *

Accident No.: DCA21FA174

*

Interview of: GREG RYAN, Pilot

Transair

Via telephone

Wednesday,
March 30, 2022

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors
National Transportation Safety Board

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

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INTERVIEW

1
2 MR. BRAMBLE: Greg, this is going to be a follow-up interview for your -- from your last
3 interview in 2021 related to the accident in Honolulu involving Rhoades Air -- or Rhoades
4 Aviation. Sorry. And we've assembled the Operational Factors Human Performance Group. Let
5 me have these gentlemen just briefly introduce themselves you can recall who they are and so the
6 transcriptionist can recognize their voices.

7 Operational Factors Investigator is Shawn Etcher. Shawn, would you like to introduce
8 yourself?

9 MR. ETCHER: Aloha, Greg. And good to see you again, sir.

10 MR. RYAN: Thank you.

11 MR. BRAMBLE: And Rich?

12 MR. LEE: Yeah, Greg. How you doing? This is Rich Lee, Boeing representative.

13 MR. BRAMBLE: And Clarence?

14 MR. KANAE: Hi, Greg. Clarence Kanae, FAA, Honolulu office.

15 MR. BRAMBLE: And I'm Bill Bramble, human performance investigator with the NTSB.
16 So Mr. Ryan, you gave us your permission to record this interview so that we can transcribe it. Is
17 that correct?

18 MR. RYAN: Yes.

19 MR. BRAMBLE: For any NTSB interview, witnesses are entitled to have a representative
20 with them if they choose. Do you want to have somebody with you today or are you declining to
21 have somebody accompany you?

22 MR. RYAN: Decline.

23 MR. BRAMBLE: You're -- I'm sorry. I couldn't hear you.

24 MR. RYAN: Sorry. Decline to have a representative.

25 MR. BRAMBLE: Thank you.

INTERVIEW OF GREG RYAN

1
2 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

3 Q. The purpose of this follow-up interview is to try and clarify some unknowns that we have
4 based on recorder data and other information. I apologize for the lengthy delay. It took us several
5 months to recover the airplane from the water and then get the recorders out and read them out and
6 so forth.

7 And unfortunately, the recorder is an old recorder and so it only has, I don't know, a dozen
8 or 15 parameters on it. So there are a lot of things that we don't know about things like thrust lever
9 placement and other things that we're hoping we might be able to get some information from you
10 and from Captain Okai who we already reinterviewed just to help fill in some of the blanks for us.

11 In addition, we have a powerplants group that's examining the engines and who is going to
12 analyze what they find with the engines and try and interpret that evidence and eventually we'll try
13 to put it all together.

14 But that's the reason for the reinterview. It's because we have very limited information
15 from the recorders but we do have a bit better idea of the pattern of change in EPR at least. So
16 hopefully, this will allow us to look in a little more detail at some of the microlevel issues related
17 to crew inputs and so forth.

18 So that being said, we did read you the full NTSB interview preamble last time which
19 basically states about the recording and the representative and that, you know, it's not a
20 confidential interview and so forth. That eventually, the information will be part of the public
21 docket.

22 Is -- are you okay with the level of information you have about the purpose of the interview
23 and the nature of the interview?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay, great. One last thing that I probably should mention before we get started is that

1 because the docket is not open for the accident investigation yet which will only happen when we
2 have 75 percent of all the reports completed, I can't disclose the information from the recorders.
3 However, you know, eventually, that will be available to you. And I believe there's also a standing
4 invitation to you and the captain to come and listen to the cockpit voice recorder at any time if you
5 wish to do that.

6 A. Thank you.

7 Q. The questions are going to be much kind of narrower and maybe jump around a little bit
8 compared to last time. But I'm going to go ahead and start off and then we'll have -- give others a
9 chance to follow up as needed. If you can't hear me, just let me know. Or if you don't understand
10 a question, let me know. Or if you don't know, just say you don't know. This is purely to try and
11 help us better understand the accident scenario.

12 One -- let's start with one event during the initial climb. You guys were climbing out and
13 then you described some type of sound and then -- that initiated the event. And then, the -- during
14 the climb out, the captain gave you an altitude, a target altitude and so forth, and a heading. And
15 do you recall the captain adjusting the thrust to MCT during the climb?

16 A. I don't remember that he did. I was focused on the instruments ahead of -- or in front of
17 me. So I don't know what he with the thrust. But our procedure is -- at V1, if I'm the flying pilot,
18 my hand comes off the thrust levers and I have both hands on the yoke. So he would have been in
19 control of the thrust levers from V1. I don't know what he did with them.

20 Q. Do you recall immediately after the pop sound whether the captain stated that -- which
21 engine had failed at that time? Like immediately after the sound.

22 A. My best recollection is that he didn't say anything. And maybe the cockpit voice recorder,
23 you know, shows otherwise. But I recall when it -- I heard the pop sound, the airplane seemed to
24 yaw to the left. I don't recall he said anything. I'm almost 100 percent positive he didn't say it was
25 any particular engine.

1 Q. And at that time, what was your assessment of which engine was associated with the
2 sound?

3 A. My initial assessment was it was the left engine because the pop, I thought I heard from the
4 left side. And because airplane
5 -- the nose started to yaw to the left. And part of our training is that you're supposed to determine
6 the engine out based on the feel of the airplane. And so I do recall very clearly that my initial
7 thought was we've lost the number one engine.

8 Q. After you leveled at 2,000 feet, do you recall the captain asking you to examine the engines
9 or the engine indications to see what was going on with the engines?

10 A. I'm almost sure he didn't. That wouldn't have been our protocol. Because I was the flying
11 pilot, so it would have been his job to examine the instruments to see -- he wouldn't have asked me
12 to do that since I was the flying pilot. But even though that's not our training, I'm almost 100
13 positive he didn't. That would have been very unusual, I think I would have remembered that if
14 he'd asked me.

15 Q. Do you recall him taking over control after you leveled off?

16 A. He did at some point. He asked me first, I believe, during the climb if he wanted me to --
17 for him to take control. And I said, no. I mean, of course, if he said I have control, of course, I
18 would have said okay. But he asked and I said no at the moment. And then when we leveled off, I
19 believe that's where he did say -- he said, well, why don't you let me fly. And I said, of course.
20 Okay. So at some point he did. I believe it was after we leveled off but --

21 Q. Do you remember anything about a discussion about the status of the engines at the -- right
22 after he took over?

23 A. I do. I do. He -- I think he asked me what's going on with the engine. And at that point,
24 he was flying. Yes, I believe that was probably right after he took over or very shortly thereafter.

25 Q. And then, what -- do you recall what you saw in the engine instruments at that time?

1 A. I recall one -- and I don't know now which one it was but I do recall one set of instruments
2 was clearly -- I mean, the engine had failed because all the instruments were -- all the needles were
3 down where they should have all been up at normal operating. And they weren't. So it was very
4 clear there was something wrong with the engine.

5 Q. But you can't recall for certain which one at that time?

6 A. I can't.

7 Q. Do you recall where the thrust levers were at that time?

8 A. No, I don't know that I had looked. I mean, we were -- had just leveled off. So I would
9 just be guessing. I don't know. I was looking at the engine (indiscernible). I don't recall
10 noting --

11 Q. You don't recall noting the thrust lever positions?

12 A. I don't.

13 Q. And your assessment at that time was that which engine was the bad engine?

14 A. I just -- I don't remember exact -- I remember clearly there was one. And I remember lots
15 of stuff about that, about advancing. When Henry was advancing the thrust levers, the EGT went
16 up to the yellows. I mean, the needles were moving. But I've just -- I've gone over and over in my
17 head to try to remember which one and I don't know -- I would hate to say for sure because then
18 (indiscernible). I don't want to say -- I don't know for sure which one.

19 Q. And I think you -- I don't want to assert because I haven't reviewed it lately but when you
20 say, he was moving the thrust lever subsequently and you saw it go in the yellow, was that the
21 number two or both, or you don't recall?

22 A. I don't recall. I remember thinking it was the engine that had failed because that's what we
23 didn't understand. That the instruments seemed to be reacting appropriately. As he moved the
24 thrust lever forward, all the needles went up. But it didn't seem to keep us --

25 It seemed to be a normal reaction or normal indication on the gauges based on the thrust

1 lever position. But it didn't seem to be producing (indiscernible) enough power to sustain us.

2 Q. In your previous interview, you mentioned that you reduced thrust as you were accelerating
3 during the level off. So the airplane is leveling off. And we asked if you pulled back one or both
4 levers and you replied yes. And when we asked about it later in the interview, you said, I do
5 remember bringing the thrust levers back a little -- levers plural. And I just wanted to clarify, did
6 you reduce thrust on -- with both thrust levers or only one as you were leveling off or right after?

7 A. Both. It would have been both for sure. I mean, that's our training is we don't fly on one
8 thrust lever until we have identified which engine. And we don't do that until after we level off. I
9 surely wouldn't have grabbed one and pulled it back.

10 Q. So you're confident you would have moved both --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- thrust levers together.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay. In the simulator, when you guys have engine failure at V1, the procedure is move
15 both levers together until you identify the failed engine and -- or -- I don't -- I shouldn't be putting
16 words in your mouth. Tell -- walk me through how you used the thrust levers during that
17 procedure?

18 A. Yes. It's normal -- as though it's a normal takeoff. (Indiscernible) we -- so we climb out,
19 we level off. You know, we clean up as we're climbing. But throughout all of that, is though it's a
20 normal takeoff. And we just ignore that the engine has failed except for the use of the rudders. So
21 we are using both thrust levers moving forward and backward as normal. And it's only after we
22 level off that the non-flying pilot says, you know, what happened. And that's when we start
23 making the assessment. And only from that point do we then talk about retarding the particular
24 thrust. But we would not do it until.

25 Q. When you reduced the thrust at the level off to avoid accelerating, is that something that

1 you would normally verbalize or is that just sort of a routine action you'd make as the pilot flying?

2 A. Just a routine action. There's not a call for that. We don't verbalize that.

3 Q. Do you recall the captain asking you to run the engine failure shutdown checklist?

4 A. Yes, he did. He asked me to run the -- I don't remember if that's particular the checklist,
5 but he did ask me to run the checklist.

6 Q. He asked you to run a checklist but you can't recall which one. Is that what you're saying?

7 A. I think it was engine shutdown. I think that's what --

8 Q. Do you recall how far you made it through the checklist either verbally or kind of reading
9 silently in your head?

10 A. Not very far. Maybe a third or less, I think. I think at that point I noticed we were slowing
11 or we were low. And I became concerned and I recall -- I don't know now why, but I recall Henry
12 seemed to be focused on -- I guess I got the thought that he wasn't focused on flying the airplane.
13 And so I remember saying to him, Henry, fly the airplane. And I'm not being critical of him. I just
14 -- but I recall that's what I was thinking. And I think that's what -- I stopped the checklist at that
15 point and -- I shouldn't have. I mean, I should have continued on through with -- but we didn't --

16 Q. What was it that gave you the idea that maybe he wasn't focused on flying the airplane?

17 A. I don't remember now exactly what it was. Yeah, I'm sorry. I don't remember now what it
18 was. But I had a feeling that we weren't in control in the air. But I don't remember if it was the
19 speed, we were slowing. I don't remember what it was but something struck me as -- you know,
20 the number one rule is you fly the airplane first. And everything comes after that. And I just felt
21 we weren't flying --

22 Q. Do you remember any of the checklist items that you completed?

23 A. I don't.

24 Q. So there is an item at one point in the engine failure checklist that talks about thrust lever,
25 affected engine, confirm close. Is that -- did you guys get to that step or no?

1 A. We didn't.

2 Q. And do you recall anything about the number one engine thrust lever position during that
3 checklist reading or thereafter?

4 A. I don't. I'm sorry. I don't. I was -- I had the checklist in front of me. I was very focused
5 on the instruments on the monitor, what we were doing. And he was flying so his hands were on
6 the thrust levers. But I don't remember the position of either.

7 Q. Do you happen to recall if they were symmetrical or split or you just don't recall anything
8 about them?

9 A. I don't recall. It would be very unusual if they were split though because that's not our
10 training. Is to split them until we get the checklist where we identify the engine out. And only
11 then do we identify what we think is the inoperative engine. Then we agree on the thrust lever to
12 be retarded. And we didn't do -- we didn't get that far. So it would have been unusual for him to
13 take one thrust lever and just reduce it without kind of going through that checklist. But I -- I'm
14 sorry. I just -- I don't recall. I don't think I know --

15 Q. One other thing that we noticed when we were going over the checklist was that it refers to
16 another checklist. The engine fire severe damage or separation checklist. And we weren't exactly
17 clear on when you're supposed to run one or the other. What's your impression of the
18 circumstances when you would use the engine failure shutdown versus the engine fire severe
19 damage or separation checklist?

20 A. I'm sorry. I've been out of the flying and training for a while. I just -- I don't remember
21 now exactly when we're supposed to -- you know, he called for the checklist. And I must have
22 believed at the time that was the appropriate checklist or I would have asked him if he wanted a
23 different checklist. But I'm sorry. I just don't remember.

24 Q. Was there anything in the engine failure shutdown checklist that said refer to the other one?

25 A. If it does, we didn't get that far. Actually, I don't remember reading that and asking, should

1 we do a different checklist?

2 Q. Based on your recollection, the checklist you were doing seemed like the most appropriate
3 for the situation?

4 A. Yes. Yeah, I have a very good relationship with Henry. You know, I don't feel like I'm
5 intimidated by him or that -- I mean, he's one of the easiest people to fly with in terms of CRM and
6 being able to talk. And if I thought he had called for the wrong checklist, I would have said
7 something. So if it wasn't the appropriate checklist, that's on me as well as him because I didn't
8 say anything.

9 Q. Do you recall feeling any airframe vibration after the event?

10 A. No, no. In fact, I'm pretty sure there wasn't. I'm sure I would have remembered that. I
11 heard the pop and it seemed to get quiet as though we had lost -- not very quiet, but I mean, quieter
12 than what it was. So that -- but no, I don't -- I'm sure there wasn't any vibration.

13 Q. And I asked if you felt any airframe vibration. But I should also ask, did you hear any kind
14 of a vibration sound or anything like unusual sounds?

15 A. No. I'm sure I would remember that clearly if that was the case -- the pop, that was it. I
16 think everything after that (indiscernible) but I don't remember anything being abnormal.

17 Q. Just in terms of your past exposure to engine failures in training, as best you can recall, did
18 you have the opportunity to use both of those checklists, the engine failure shutdown and the
19 engine fire severe damage or separation checklist during your simulator training?

20 A. Yes. I can recall we usually used the engine failure -- the fire checklist when there's a fire.
21 Or they'll simulate -- our chief pilot Wallace will say, you know, there's a very loud vibration or
22 something like that. And so that's for sure when we would use that checklist. But in this case, we
23 didn't have a fire. We didn't get the red warning lights or the T handles didn't illuminate so there
24 was no indication for fire. And there certainly wasn't -- as best I recall, there wasn't a vibration. It
25 seems as though we just lost it --

1 Q. So in the simulator, those were the primary cues that you'd use to use the engine fire sever
2 damage or separation checklist is the red warning lights, the illuminated T handles, and that loud
3 vibration.

4 A. Yes, for sure. Yes.

5 Q. Did you encounter that scenario in initial training or recurrent simulator training or do you
6 remember?

7 A. The fire scenario?

8 Q. Yeah, yeah.

9 A. It seems like every time we were in the simulator, we had -- except for the first -- the first
10 time in the simulator was sort of a refamiliarization with the simulator because it was different
11 than the airplane in some respects. But after that, every simulator, training and recurrent, was --
12 involved numerous engine failures, fires.

13 Q. So but during an initial training, you got it. Right?

14 A. Oh, yes, absolutely. Yes. You mean the initial simulator training?

15 Q. Yes. Sorry, yeah. Sorry.

16 A. Oh, yes, absolutely. Yes, yes.

17 Q. And when you get to that confirmed close step or confirming which engine is the correct
18 engine to either shut down on the engine failure shutdown checklist or on the fire checklist, how
19 does that process go in terms of the cross check and confirmation and so forth?

20 A. In terms of shutting down everything or --

21 Q. Yeah. So let's start with the engine failure shutdown checklist. Does that have a
22 confirmation step like, you know, engine one is the bad engine, confirm, I'm closing -- is it
23 something like that or how do callouts work?

24 A. The -- that was always -- that was something that the company kind of went back and forth
25 on trying to identify the proper procedure that they wanted us to use. And one version was that the

1 flying pilot would put his or her hand on the thrust lever what they thought was a failed engine and
2 say number one, you know, confirm. And the non-flying pilot would say, confirm. And then the
3 flying pilot would retard the thrust lever. But then they change that and said it should be the non-
4 flying pilot who should be doing the mechanics of that because the flying pilot should be flying the
5 airplane.

6 And I think there was some confusion between crews as to what we were supposed to be
7 doing at any particular time because the procedure changed a few times. But the procedure would
8 be one of the pilots would put his or her hand or finger on the thrust lever and say, number one
9 thrust lever confirmed. And the other pilot would say, confirmed.

10 And whoever was touching, it would then retard to idle and then would say -- would put his
11 or her finger on the engine shutoff and say, number one and then shutoff confirmed. The other
12 pilot would say, confirmed. And then the first pilot who was touching it would shut off -- cut off
13 the fuel flow. And then the same thing with the T.

14 Q. When did that procedure change?

15 A. It was -- I don't remember exactly but it was within probably the last -- probably six
16 months prior to July. It was one of the more recent -- and I think it's just the company trying to
17 identify which would be the best procedure. But some pilots were hearing one procedure. Other
18 pilots were hearing another. So I think there's -- I mean, I know there's a bit confusion as to who
19 was supposed to do what when it came to that procedure.

20 Q. What was -- so when you went -- during the accident flight by that time, did you have an
21 impression of which procedure was in effect or -- in terms of who should be doing what, or were
22 you uncertain?

23 A. Oh, my understanding was the flying pilot would be the one moving the levers. So Henry
24 in that case would -- because his hands were already on the thrust levers, he would have identified
25 the engine and said confirm. And I would have confirmed. And then he would have moved the

1 thrust lever to idle. And the same with the engine shutoff and the T handle. So he would have
2 asked, I would have confirmed, and then he would have moved the levers. That was my
3 understanding of what our -- what we were supposed
4 to --

5 Q. During your training with these engine failure scenarios, did you have the opportunity to
6 participate in those both as the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring?

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 Q. For the engine failures at V1, you know, where you'd use the engine failure shutdown
9 checklist, did those always happen like immediately after V1 or did they sort of occur at different
10 times during the initial takeoff and climb?

11 A. It would be various. But for sure there were several times that Wallace, the chief pilot,
12 would fail the engine right at V1.

13 Q. Were there other times where he would fail it at other -- during other phases of the flight?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Were those like other major phases of flight or did he sometimes delay it during the takeoff
16 and do it at 500 feet or 1,000 feet or -- instead of on the ground roll or what have you?

17 A. When he would do it, it would almost -- unless he did it in cruise which was not too often.
18 But during takeoff, I think it was almost always before the 1,000-foot call. So anywhere from the
19 takeoff roll to the 1,000.

20 Q. It was always between takeoff roll and 1,000.

21 A. Then that's my best recollection. It was always -- it wasn't always on the ground but it was,
22 you know, usually well before
23 we leveled off.

24 Q. In the simulator, was there a noticeable yaw when that occurred?

25 A. I can't remember that there was. There might have been but I don't think so because I don't

1 recall that every time the engine

2 -- you know, he failed an engine, it always pulled one way or the other so I don't -- because I know
3 I used to determine -- yeah, I know that's right because I determined the engine that failed by
4 looking at the instruments and he would get on me for that. And he said, you don't look at the
5 instruments, you fly the airplane, and you determine the engine that failed by the yaw and by how
6 the airplane feels and by how the rudders feel. So yeah, if there was a yaw, I think I would have
7 been looking --

8 Q. So the primary way that you were supposed to determine which engine had failed was by
9 how the rudders felt?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Was that sort of how much input you needed to put in to correct the yaw or was it like
12 resistance or what was the -- sort of the main cue there?

13 A. Just the feel. You know, the dead foot, dead engine. You know, you end up having to put
14 more -- you could feel it in the rudders although I didn't -- I don't believe there was any sort of
15 yaw. But you could feel in the rudders that the rudder pressure would change. You would need to
16 put the rudder pressure in to keep the airplane straight. And that's what he wanted us to use and
17 not the --

18 Q. So you'd need to put -- so I talked over you there. So you need to put in more force, apply
19 more force to the rudder pedal than on the dead engine side. Is that correct?

20 A. Yes, correct. Yes.

21 Q. Did I do that right? I'm sorry. If engine one fails, then which side do you have to apply
22 more force to?

23 A. The right. The right rudder pedal.

24 Q. I think I had just stated it incorrectly so that's why I wanted to give you a chance to say
25 which one. Right pedal. Okay. Was there any company guidance about who was supposed to

1 serve as the pilot flying or the pilot monitoring during those takeoff engine failure scenarios or was
2 it just kind of whoever happened to be the pilot flying and pilot monitoring before it occurred?

3 A. Yeah, whoever --

4 Q. Were you --

5 A. Sorry. The pilot in command decided who would fly for every flight. And the training was
6 whoever was flying would continue flying until -- if it was the first officer, the first officer would
7 continue flying until the captain took control if that's what the captain wanted to do. But it
8 certainly was not the training as soon as an engine failed, the other pilot jumped in and took
9 control. That wasn't --

10 Q. Generally, the other pilot did not jump in and take control?

11 A. Correct. That would have been very unusual if that happened.

12 Q. What was your impression of why Captain Okai took control after -- at some point after the
13 level off?

14 A. He's kind of a hands-on pilot and I think maybe he just felt with his experience -- you
15 know, maybe he just wanted to be -- fly the airplane. I don't know. I don't know. But I mean, he -
16 - the first time, you know, he didn't say, I have control. Because I certainly would have
17 relinquished control. He said, do you want me to fly. And I said, no, I think I'm okay or
18 something like that. And then, he didn't say anything after that.

19 And then once we leveled off, he said, why don't you let me fly and you can run the
20 checklist or something like that, of course I said okay. But I think if he was concerned, he would
21 have just taken control. Because he -- I've heard he has done that with other pilots. And he's
22 assertive. If he wants the airplane, he'll take the airplane. And he didn't.

23 Q. When you went to simulator training, did you train with Captain Okai or other captains?

24 A. There's always different captains but I do recall I did train. I don't remember when but I
25 did -- I do remember being in the simulator with him on one -- at least one occasion, maybe more.

1 Q. On that occasion, would you have been paired together across multiple days or just for one
2 session or do you recall?

3 A. I don't recall specifically but it would have -- it would probably -- it usually would be
4 multiple days because there would just be one or two captains and one or two first officers. And
5 so, believe Wallace, our chief pilot, kept us on the same schedule so we were in the simulator with
6 the same person for that three or four-day training.

7 Q. The guidance on the callouts for confirming which engine had failed and which one to
8 close or which T handles to pull, had that guidance come from Boeing documents or Rhoades
9 specific documents?

10 A. Well, for sure from our training. I don't know if it's -- there's a Boeing document that is the
11 basis of the training but it's -- our training is where we get that.

12 Q. You mentioned that the captain seemed like -- something gave you a feeling that the
13 captain maybe wasn't as focused on controlling the airplane as you would have liked as you began
14 the checklist. Did that concern continue as you descended closer to the ocean?

15 A. No. I didn't have the concern he wasn't flying. I was concerned that we didn't know what
16 the problem was. And we -- the engines weren't producing enough thrust to keep us in flight. But
17 I don't remember thinking he's not flying the airplane after that.

18 Q. Do you recall having to prompt him on altitude or air speed as you were descending say,
19 you know, below 1,000 feet?

20 A. No, I don't. Because at that point, we were low because we just weren't able to stay in
21 flight. It wasn't anything he was doing. So I don't recall -- I don't know that -- why I would -- I
22 don't recall pointing anything like that because there wouldn't have been anything we could have
23 done at that -- I do remember saying I think we're low because we leveled off at 2,000. I think we
24 were supposed to level off at 3. So I do remember saying a couple times we were low and we
25 should go back. But I think once we realized we were going into the water, I don't recall that there

1 was --

2 Q. Was there ever a time when you were getting very low close to the ocean where you were
3 concerned about the captain -- I shouldn't even scope it to that. Was there ever a time when you
4 were descending toward the ocean where you were concerned about the potential for loss of
5 control of the airplane?

6 A. No. Seemed to be in control of the airplane except for the altitude and the air speed but I --
7 at no time did I think we were just going to lose the other control.

8 Q. So when you described the captain maybe not being as focused on flight control and it
9 seemed like you were saying maybe that was kind of distracting from the checklist, what was it
10 that -- I mean, there was no concern there but it was -- were you just trying to back him up but you
11 weren't concerned or what was your feeling about that?

12 A. I remember being concerned that we weren't flying the airplane. And now I don't know
13 why I felt that but it was something that hit me. That we were not -- I mean, you're supposed to fly
14 the airplane first and everything else comes after that. And for some reason, I was thinking he was
15 just distracted or he wasn't -- I just don't remember why. But I remember thinking we're not flying
16 the airplane. We need to be -- I said to him, Henry, we need -- you know, fly the airplane. But I
17 just -- I don't remember now exactly why I felt that way.

18 Q. Do you recall the captain talking on the radio during that period?

19 A. Yes. I mean, I don't remember exactly when but I do remember he was the one
20 communicating with ATC. I don't remember exactly when. But I don't -- I think I -- I don't think I
21 said anything to ATC. I could be wrong. But he did all or most of the communication --

22 Q. Did that -- did his control of the radio communications, did that appear to be distracting for
23 him?

24 A. He was very calm so I don't know if it was. I know that's not our procedure. The flying
25 pilot is not supposed to be on the radio. The non-flying pilot is supposed to make the radio calls.

1 But in that situation, I wasn't going to argue with him. You know, he seemed very calm. So it
2 didn't seem to be bothering him or distracting him to be making the radio call. And that's kind of
3 his history.

4 Sometimes he would be kind of quick to jump on the radios and -- but it didn't seem to be a
5 distraction I think or I would have said, why don't you let me handle the radios and you fly the
6 airplane but I don't remember ever feeling that I needed to say that. I would have said that. And I
7 didn't.

8 Q. At any point before you impacted the water and after the captain took control, do you recall
9 the captain offering you control of the airplane or you taking control of the airplane before the
10 water impact?

11 A. No, he didn't offer. And I wasn't flying the airplane.

12 Q. You were not flying it when you impacted the water?

13 A. Oh, no. No, no, no.

14 MR. BRAMBLE: Thanks very much, Greg. I appreciate all that information and
15 apologize for the somewhat repetitive nature and the delay and everything.

16 Next, I'd like to give Shawn Etcher an opportunity to ask any follow-up questions.

17 MR. ETCHER: Sure. Thanks, Bill.

18 BY MR. ETCHER:

19 Q. Greg, I have a few -- just a few questions. You've really helped me a lot giving Bill some
20 answers so I appreciate that. I just want to take you back, if you will, to when you heard the pop.
21 Right when you departed, you heard the pop. And please don't let me put words in your mouth but
22 you thought it was the number one. What did you do? You were the pilot flying so what did you
23 do? Help me -- walk me through what you did.

24 A. So I heard the pop and I kept focus on the instruments like we were -- the instrument panel
25 the flight instruments like we're trained to do. So I didn't look at the engine instruments at that

1 time. So I was focused on the rudder. I wanted to watch our speed, our altitude, and our course.
2 That's one thing Wallace gets on us about it. When we lose the engine is we drift off course or the
3 heading. And shortly after that, we were supposed to make our turn. So then I was focused on
4 making our departure turn. And that's where my focus was.

5 Q. Do you remember applying any rudder pressure or anything during that time?

6 A. I do. I applied the right. I'm 99 percent sure it was the right rudder pedal. And then
7 because I had heard the pop which sounded to me from the left, the airplane seemed to pull to the
8 left and so I think instinctively I started applying the right rudder.

9 Q. So you applied right rudder. So in your mind, the number one was potentially the
10 problem?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Did you ever think the number two was the problem at any point just generally?

13 A. I don't know. I don't remember which one. When I then looked at the engine instruments I
14 think at that time Henry was flying. I could see that one set of the instruments were down. And so
15 I knew that was the problem but I just -- I can't remember now which one it was.

16 Q. And it's okay. I know it's been a long time ago. Sorry to have you relive all these little
17 details. But I was just wondering if you'd remembered that. And it's okay. I don't
18 know --

19 A. And if I --

20 Q. -- works fine.

21 A. Okay. I said something in the prior interview, you know, that was right after the incident.
22 So I would certainly stand by whatever I said then. My recollection would have been much better
23 back then.

24 Q. No problem. So let's go back to the departure. And you added the right rudder to
25 counteract the yaw. Did you ever trim that rudder pressure out or was there that much pressure

1 you added?

2 A. There wasn't a lot of pressure. And our training is that you don't -- it's not really a training
3 but it's the suggestion from Wallace that you don't use the rudder trim because then you may tend
4 to forget which engine it is or he -- it's just more of a personal suggestion, I think, on his part was
5 that we use our feet to hold the rudder. And not use the trim. Or if we do the trim, it's not until we
6 are in cruise but we don't do -- we don't use the rudder trim during the climb.

7 Q. You're climbing out and you get -- I think -- forgive me, I think when Bill was asking, you
8 said something about you were going for 3,000 feet and you noticed you were at 2. Or did I get
9 that wrong? Please correct that.

10 A. Our -- The departure procedure is to level at 3,000 but Henry had said level at 2,000.
11 Maybe I should have questioned that and it's my fault that I didn't. But I think if I was too alarmed
12 by that, I would have said something. But he's the pilot in command. And it's my job to follow
13 him. But at the same time, if I was -- you know, he said do it, so I did it. But if I was concerned, I
14 think I would have said something to him. And he's the kind of person that I could say something.

15 Q. No. And that's great. I just -- I thought I heard you say 3,000 earlier so I just wanted to
16 make sure I didn't mishear you so I appreciate that. I just want to make sure I have the sequence
17 correct. You were the flying pilot at the time when the level off at 2,000. Is that correct? Do you
18 remember?

19 A. Yes. I'm pretty sure I had leveled off at 2,000 and then that's when Henry said, why don't
20 you let me fly. And I think he had done that in the simulator, too, or had offered to do that but
21 Wallace got on him and his explanation at that point was because you're holding the rudder. And
22 so you're not using the rudder trim so your leg might be tired. So to take a break, let the other pilot
23 fly. And that may have been why he did that. But that wasn't our training and I remember
24 Wallace had got on him for doing that or offering to take control.

25 Q. Is the rudder pressure -- does it take a lot of pressure when you lose an engine to hold it or

1 is it kind of like tiptoe touching pushing rudder?

2 A. It does in the simulator. But in the airplane, it didn't. It wasn't (indiscernible) that much. I
3 was surprised. I remember being surprised that it wasn't like the simulator.

4 Q. By not the simulator, I just want to make sure I in my head I have it correctly -- you're
5 saying in the simulator it took a lot of pressure. And in the --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- airplane, it did not. Correct?

8 A. (No audible response.)

9 Q. Okay. Do you recall -- and again, please -- I want to apologize. It's been a while. But do
10 you recall what air speed, when you leveled off, that you were kind of -- I know when you have an
11 engine issue you don't always maybe specifically look for a specific air speed. But was there an
12 air speed you were aiming for or trying to maintain close to?

13 A. 210 is what we're supposed to maintain after we clean up and leveled off. And I remember
14 we were past that. I think -- I remember thinking we were well past that when we leveled off.
15 Because I remember -- I'm pretty sure I remember pulling back the thrust levers to try to slow
16 down so we didn't -- you know, I didn't want to get too far away. But I remember we were fast or
17 it seemed like we were.

18 Q. Forgive me. You pulled back the thrust levers because you were -- let me rephrase that.
19 Bad question. You said you noticed that the air speed was higher than intended considerably or
20 however you said it. Were you the flying pilot at that time?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Did you reach over and pull the thrust back? You know, sometimes you have muscle
23 memory. If I pulled at this point, I'm good. Or did you kind of like ease it back over a period of
24 time? Kind of help me understand if you can recall.

25 A. I'm pretty sure I pulled it back pretty quickly, the thrust levers, because I remember

1 thinking we're fast. And we didn't need to be that -- I didn't want to be that fast. My hand were
2 I'm sure already on the thrust levers. So I don't know if I brought them back to idle. But I
3 wouldn't have tweaked it because I remember thinking we're fast, we need to slow down. Or I
4 didn't want to get faster.

5 Q. So as you were slowing down and the air speed was accelerating, did you have -- are you
6 able to trim it? Do -- are you okay to use the trim switch? I know you said the chief pilot doesn't
7 want you to use the rudder but is he okay with you trimming it?

8 A. Oh, yes. Yeah. And he tells us to trim. We're supposed to use the --

9 Q. During that time after you leveled off and pulling back the thrust and trimming, did you
10 ever think about engaging the autopilot? I'm just trying to make sure I understand what -- I know
11 your hands were full, it's dark, I get that. But just kind of -- trying to understand.

12 A. No. And at that -- I think shortly after I'd leveled off, that's when Henry asked if you
13 wanted me to fly. But that is something I thought about a million times that we should have been
14 on the autopilot. And why we didn't, I don't know. That would have helped out a lot.

15 Q. When Henry asked to get control or take control, however you want to word that, do you
16 guys -- I think some airlines call it a positive transfer of control. Like, okay, you know, your
17 airplane --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Do you have that? What would you normally expect to say to the guy taking control or be
20 said to you if you were taking control? What would you expect?

21 A. We do that when we read our checklist in flight. We always transfer control to do our
22 flight -- our briefings, our arrival briefings. So that was something else that was always -- not
23 always. But there was some confusion or change to procedure where the flying pilot -- one version
24 was the flying pilot would say, you have control. And the non-flying pilot would say, I have
25 control.

1 There's another version where the flying pilot would say, are you ready for control. And
2 then the other pilot would say, I have control. And then the non-flying pilot would say, you have
3 control. I mean, the company always, always, always stressed a positive transfer of control. There
4 always was a conversation that -- it varied as to what that was. But yes, we do --

5 Q. As part of that conversation -- I know there's the -- you have control, I have control, that.
6 But is there ever -- I don't want to call it a briefing but a status of the airplane from the pilot flying
7 saying, power is back, we're on the autopilot, heading this, on this course? Is there ever any kind
8 of -- I'll call it a very short brief so the guy knows what he's getting.

9 A. We do that on the return of control. So if I'm going to brief and I give the control to the
10 pilot in command and then I say okay, I do the brief and I say, I'm ready for control. And the pilot
11 in command would say, you have control. And then he would say, we're heading to such and such
12 altitude. So yes, there would be that. But that's when the control is returned. And in this case, it
13 wasn't returned --

14 Q. But there's never that when -- the initial transfer of control then that you can recall? And
15 it's okay. I just want to make sure I have it clear.

16 A. No, I think that -- yeah, I believe that is the training. Sorry. It's been a while since I've
17 done the training. We do it once a year but I believe that's the -- well, it is -- I think we do do that
18 on every flight. When we hand over the control, I think we do go through the briefing as to what
19 the heading is, the altitude. And I'm sure we do that.

20 I don't think we did that here. I think he said, do you want me to fly or he said, why don't
21 you let me fly. And I said, okay. I don't know that I went through all that. I just don't remember
22 that.

23 Q. Just so I make sure it's clear. You think it is during the initial transfer that you give a short
24 briefing also?

25 A. It is, it is. But I haven't flown now for a while. Sorry, I've forgotten some of that. But we

1 do do that when we hand over the airplane and the other pilot does the briefing when he hands the
2 airplane back.

3 Q. You said something with Bill and I'm trying to look at my words that I wrote down here
4 and I can't read my own chicken scratch but you said something about -- you looked at the engine
5 instruments and they were winding down or one was down.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. What do you mean by that? Just kind of help me understand. I want to make sure I
8 understand what you're saying by down.

9 A. So when we have normal takeoff power or just -- or normal, you know, in-flight power,
10 you know, most of the engine instruments are all at -- they're all up. I mean, towards the
11 maximum end of where they should be. So this set of engines, all the instrument -- the indicators
12 were closer to zero. And they weren't at zero. But I mean, they were sort of various positions.
13 But toward that end. I mean, they certainly weren't indicating that they were --

14 Q. That was just -- was it a specific engine that you noticed that stack --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- down or was it both engines?

17 A. No. It was one because I recall -- and that's how I knew there was a problem. Because you
18 see the two sets of instruments side by side. You know, one engine instrument is for each engine.
19 So it's very easy to compare one side to the other. And if a row is one side is different than the
20 other, it's very noticeable.

21 Q. Forgive me. There, you said it's one. Do you mean it's the number one engine or it's just
22 an engine?

23 A. Oh, an engine. Sorry. An engine.

24 Q. Sorry. I just didn't want to have that confusion later on when I'm reading this so I
25 appreciate that. Did these airplanes

1 -- do they ever have -- or have you ever seen them experience -- some people call it EPR creep.

2 Have you ever heard or seen that?

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. Do -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.

5 A. They do. So when -- that's part of our training is as we're climbing out, we have to -- the
6 non-flying pilot is supposed to monitor the engines while the flying pilot is flying the airplane
7 because we have to watch for that. We're always adjusting the thrust levers to reduce that because
8 it does increase. Especially on the climb up.

9 Q. So the EPR creep is always up in power?

10 A. Yes, it always --

11 Q. Or is it -- I just want to make sure --

12 A. I'm sorry.

13 Q. Nope. You're good. I just wanted to make sure that when I'm reading this four months
14 from now or whatever, I make sure I still understand what you're talking about so I appreciate that.

15 Have you ever -- some airlines do it and I just -- I'm not sure exactly because I know it
16 sounds like they make some changes here at Transair but have you ever been trained that when
17 you're on emergency situation that the pilot flying flies the airplane and does the radios while the
18 pilot monitoring does the checklist so they can focus on doing the checklist. Have you ever been
19 trained that way?

20 A. And that was another -- yes. So that was another -- and maybe that's why Henry did it now
21 that you say that. I'd forgotten about that. That was another confusion or change in the training I
22 think that Transair was trying to decide the best way to do it. Because one version of the training
23 was that the flying pilot would maintain the radios so that the non-flying pilot could focus on the
24 briefing.

25 And another version was, the non-flying pilot should -- and I think that was the most recent

1 -- it was different. In an ordinary flight, the non-flying pilot works the radios. And I think the
2 most recent version was during a briefing, the flying pilot works the radios and flies the airplane so
3 that the non-flying pilot can do the briefing. But I don't know that anybody
4 -- everybody was clear on what it was. Because it was something that had changed. And I think
5 just as -- the company is trying to determine the best way to --

6 Q. Have you ever been trained with the first officer being the pilot flying and the captain being
7 the pilot monitoring in all emergencies so that way the captain can monitor everything? Is that
8 something that was ever trained at Transair or is it whoever is the pilot flying will always be the
9 pilot flying?

10 A. The training was whoever was flying would be the pilot flying. Although I know Wallace
11 had suggested and some of the other captains, they had that belief that that made sense. That the
12 non-flying pilot even if they're inexperienced should fly the airplane so that the captain can
13 monitor and manage the cockpit.

14 Q. And you said the chief pilot said that and did you say other pilots also thought that way?

15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. Was that -- I guess that wasn't fleet wide? Not all pilots?

17 A. It wasn't -- I'm sorry.

18 Q. I'm sorry.

19 A. It wasn't fleet wide. And that wasn't the training. But I think that was a suggestion or --
20 not necessarily best practices but something to consider. For the pilot in command to consider
21 whether he or she should let the non-flying pilot fly and then manage the airplane or if the pilot in
22 command having more experience should fly and then direct. But the training was if you are the
23 flying pilot and you lose -- you have an emergency, you continue flying.

24 Q. Have you ever had -- in real life, not the sim. I know the sim is a whole different world.
25 We all get engine fires, engine failures every leg in a sim. But in real life, have you ever had an

1 engine issue where you had to run the engine shutdown in flight checklist?

2 A. No.

3 Q. You only experienced that in the simulator?

4 A. Yes. And I think that was a common problem. I think other -- I remember other pilots
5 have talked about having to do that. But me, myself, no.

6 MR. ETCHER: Perfect. Again, Greg, I appreciate you. Sorry to have to relive through
7 this. I'll turn it back to Bill. But I appreciate -- you've really helped me a lot so thank you.

8 MR. BRAMBLE: Clarence, do you have any questions?

9 MR. KANAE: Thank you, Bill. I do. I don't have that many questions for Greg. But yes,
10 I do.

11 BY MR. KANAE:

12 Q. Greg, again, thanks for your time today. Do you need a break by the way?

13 A. No. Thank you for asking.

14 Q. You're okay. Okay. Let me kind of take you out of the cockpit for now. And you were
15 assisting with company manuals and setting up -- or reviewing manuals. What manuals were you
16 working on and could you describe that?

17 A. Yes. David Seest, our -- had asked me to work on the weight and balance manual. I guess
18 we were behind on some updates or there was a problem with something. But with the FAA, I
19 guess, and so we -- that was a big focus on the company is to get our manuals in compliance or up
20 to date. So he had asked me to help with the weight and balance manual.

21 Q. Did you work on any other manuals like the flight operations manual or the training
22 manual by chance?

23 A. I don't believe I did. If I did, it would have been -- oh, no, I did actually. Yes. So at one
24 point, he had asked me to go through the -- I think it was our -- I can't remember now which
25 manual it was but it was a Boeing manual that had a recommended procedure for pre-flights and

1 then takeoffs, you know, taxiing and takeoff. So what -- I had noticed that that didn't conform to
2 our training. And I think maybe that was -- I think I thought that was probably part of the reason
3 there was some confusion among the crew as to what we're supposed to doing and different things.

4 So I believe I asked David if I could update that or if he wanted me to update that and he
5 said yes. And so I did do that. And I redlined, you know, for him to make the approval. But to
6 conform to how we actually do or how we're trained to do what we do. So I did do that but I
7 believe that's all. I think that's all.

8 Q. Okay, Greg. Great, thank you. Being that there was recommended change to the
9 procedure between non-flying pilot and flying pilots, was there a memo or a company memo that
10 went out which described the change? Do you recall?

11 A. There was a memo. I don't remember which -- there were a number of things though that
12 the procedures changed. But I'm pretty sure there was one memo that discussed one of those. But
13 I'm sorry, just -- I don't remember now which that was. It was more -- usually what would happen
14 is pilots would come back from training and they'd say, Wallace wants us to do, you know,
15 something this way. And so it would just sort of filter out through the crew that way. But I do
16 recall there was one memo about one of those.

17 Q. Great. Okay, Greg. Thank you. That evening -- I'll put you back in the cockpit. That
18 evening, you were the flying pilot out of Honolulu for Maui.

19 A. Yes, correct.

20 Q. Being the flying pilot, you actually gave the takeoff briefing? Do you recall your takeoff
21 briefing to Captain Okai? Just whatever you can recall.

22 A. Yes. I would have done -- I don't recall that specific one. But that is our procedure to --
23 before we even start the engines, the captain decides who will fly the airplane. So there's a
24 briefing we go through. So I -- yes, I would have done that.

25 Q. Would that include emergencies after takeoff or anything of that nature?

1 A. Yes. It includes the departure procedure if there's an emergency. So turning to the heading
2 of, I believe, it's 260, climbing to 3,000 feet, leveling off. So we do brief that
3 before --

4 Q. In your simulator training, was that revision even implemented that we were talking about
5 flying pilot, non-flying pilot? Did you experience that? Did you -- did the crew actually execute
6 that change in the simulator when you flew the simulator?

7 A. Yes. And I don't remember now what was decided. But I recall one time I was in the
8 simulator, that was what the discussion was; that there was inconsistency on the line as to how
9 we're supposed to do it. So Wallace, in the training, was trying to set everybody -- you know, get
10 everybody on the same page. I do recall that.

11 Q. Try to keep it standardized. Yeah?

12 A. Yes.

13 MR. KANAE: That's all I have, Greg. Thank you very much. Okay?

14 MR. RYAN: Thank you.

15 MR. KANAE: Back to you, Bill. Thanks.

16 MR. BRAMBLE: Next is Rich from Boeing.

17 BY MR. LEE:

18 Q. Yeah. Just a couple things. And I think maybe we've used the term differently. But pilot
19 flying and pilot not flying or pilot monitoring, what do you remember that your company uses? Is
20 it pilot monitoring or pilot not flying?

21 A. It's PM, pilot monitoring.

22 Q. Then as far as -- you were asked some questions about responsibility on who pulls the
23 thrust lever back and the confirmation. Do you remember area of responsibility charts in your
24 manuals?

25 A. I know there's a section that goes through all of that that says, flying pilot is this, flying

1 monitoring -- the pilot monitoring does this and it has the callouts and -- if that's what you mean.
2 There is a section there. And that was the section that I was revising to conform to how we
3 actually do it or how we're trained to do it.

4 Q. Oh, okay. And I think I'm going to get a clarification, as well. I think Shawn did it as far
5 as the needles down. And you said some were close to zero. So the -- it seemed like there was
6 still something moving. It just -- they weren't frozen that you remember. And the engines as you
7 leveled off and pulled the throttles back, do you remember seeing or looking at the instruments and
8 they were acting appropriately or what do you -- do you recall anything about that?

9 A. I don't recall what they did when I brought the power back. I think I was focused on the air
10 speed and our heading. What I do remember is when we -- when Henry had pushed the power
11 levers forward, you know, the engine indicators all went up and they went into the yellow. But it
12 wasn't producing thrust. So I noticed the engine instruments when he was advancing the thrust
13 lever. But I don't remember what happened as I pulled them back.

14 Q. You kind of led me into the next question. So you mentioned that the captain, after you
15 started flying, he pushed the thrust levers. Do you know that he pushed both thrust levers up? I
16 know we had a discussion earlier that normally you would use both thrust levers until you run
17 through the checklist that tells you to pull one back.

18 Do you remember actually seeing, during this discussion of the EGT, getting into red or
19 whatever, do you remember him actually pushing both thrust levers up?

20 A. I don't remember seeing that. I mean, that's not a memory I have that he -- I noticed or
21 took note that he was moving both thrust levers. But I think if he had moved one, I would have
22 remembered that because that would have been very unusual. And I would have said something to
23 him but I -- but no, I'm sorry. I don't remember -- that doesn't stick out as to what he was doing
24 with the thrust levers. But --

25 Q. So -- okay. What about looking at the EGT when you saw the EGT going into the yellow.

1 Do you remember seeing both engine instruments moving at that time or just one set of
2 instruments moving?

3 A. I was focused on the one set. It had -- yeah, I guess I don't remember exactly. Yeah, I'm
4 sorry. I guess I don't remember. I just remember we were commenting that it was -- at least I
5 think -- I recall thinking that it was in the yellow. And we didn't understand why it wasn't
6 producing thrust or enough thrust to keep us in flight and we were thinking the gear and the flaps.
7 And we had a conversation about that. Yeah, I'm sorry. I guess I don't remember.

8 Q. Do you ever remember seeing it go into the red, either engine?

9 A. I don't remember. It might have. I remember the yellow for sure. It might have. I guess I
10 don't remember for sure. I know we wouldn't have exceeded that. I just remember the yellow and
11 either getting close to or into the red. I'm sorry. I guess I don't have a clear memory of that.

12 Q. No problem. Back to kind of what Shawn was talking about, the use of rudder trim, and
13 the idea that your leg is going to get tired and the captain was wanting to give you a break. You
14 said that you noticed that there wasn't a lot of rudder required even at the higher power setting for -
15 - and then as you -- I assume once you leveled off and you're pulling the power back, there would
16 be less requirement for rudder. And you kind of discussed about Wallace didn't -- his technique
17 that he taught was not to use any rudder trim except possibly during cruise. Do you remember
18 ever using rudder trim at all or having a requirement to use rudder trim?

19 A. On that flight?

20 Q. Or I guess not just rudder trim -- yes, on the accident flight. Rudder trim or your typical,
21 from training, engine failure, the same amount. I think you mentioned that there seemed to be a
22 difference between the sim and the aircraft. If you can just kind of discuss that. Do you remember
23 actually needing trim or seeing that you had to hold rudder, that your leg was getting
24 -- going to get tired?

25 A. I don't remember exactly. Almost -- the only time I never reached for the trim is in cruise

1 sometimes. But I can't imagine I would have used it in climb. And I don't remember that my leg
2 was getting tired. And I certainly didn't say anything to Henry, you know, that my leg was getting
3 tired. I think that was just his thought; that that's a good way to manage an emergency like that.

4 Q. I think one other question here. I think you walked us through the engine failure shutdown
5 like scenario through training. Could you walk us through what you remember as the -- if you had
6 an engine fire or severe damage or separation, you know, at V1. Your typical training scenario
7 that you'd get -- the instructor is wanting you to use that checklist so they give you something in
8 the sim that -- either a fire which is easy. Obviously, you get the lights and the noise. Right. But
9 another scenario -- just talk us through what you would do in that case after V1.

10 A. So if we got the lights or fire or vibration after V1, we would cancel the horn so that that's
11 not blaring. And that's all we would do differently at that time. So we would continue a normal
12 climb out. We'd retract the gear and the flap on speed. We would level off. And only at that time
13 would we then say, you know, what's happened. And that would be the time that we would start
14 running checklists. We certainly would not do that during the climb out --

15 Q. Would the checklist be called for and then you get the QRH out or how would you -- how
16 would that be done?

17 A. So ordinarily, the flying pilot would direct a non-flying -- or the pilot monitoring to run the
18 checklist. So then the pilot monitoring would pull out the QRH and run the checklist.

19 Q. For the engine fire severe damage separation checklist, would you do anything before you
20 got the checklist out?

21 A. Yes. For that checklist, there are memory items. So bringing the thrust lever back, the
22 engine cut off to idle, pulling the T handle if -- pulling the T handle. And then if there's a fire, we
23 would twist the T handle to one side, hold it for a second, and see if the light goes out. Then we
24 would run the checklist after that. But none of that we would do until -- I don't remember now if it
25 was 5,000 feet but it certainly wasn't on takeoff or right after.

1 Q. But definitely you remember your training would be after level off.

2 A. Level off or -- yeah, I believe it was level off -- it certainly wasn't in the climb. But I think
3 in the simulator, they'd usually level us off at 5,000 feet (indiscernible). But yes, I definitely
4 remember it was not -- I remember thinking -- I remember Wallace several times saying it's --
5 Boeing doesn't consider it an emergency otherwise the procedure would be to do it right away.
6 And it wasn't. It was fly the airplane, level off, get it stabilized. Then work the emergency.

7 MR. LEE: Excellent. Thank you, Greg. And that's all I have, Bill. Thanks.

8 MR. BRAMBLE: Thanks, Rich.

9 BY MR. BRAMBLE:

10 Q. I just had a few clarifications I wanted to make sure that we had clear for the transcript.
11 Shawn mentioned were you able to trim during the level off and you said yes. And I presume you
12 were talking about elevator trim because you said you didn't use the rudder trim. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. Also, you mentioned that Wallace and some of the other captains had suggested that maybe
15 the procedure should be -- and the words you used were that the non-flying pilot should fly and
16 handle the radio so the captain could monitor. But I think what you meant was that the FO should
17 fly and handle the radio so the captain could monitor. Is that right?

18 A. Yes, correct.

19 Q. That was the suggestion. But it wasn't the SOP necessarily.

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Then the changes that you mentioned that you were -- that you worked on in the manual
22 pertaining to crew SOPs for taxi and takeoff I think it was, what changes did you -- well, first of
23 all, which manual was that just for the record?

24 A. I'm sorry. I can't remember which one that was. But there's a whole -- I think those were
25 the area of responsibility charts he initially was talking about. But it goes -- it starts at the pre-

1 flight walkaround. And then it talks about the engine starts and the taxiing and it has the -- sort of
2 like a script for a movie. It says the pilot flying says this and the pilot monitoring says that. And it
3 just -- it didn't conform to what we were doing. And so, I can't remember if I asked David Seest or
4 if he asked me to update it. I did -- I did it as redline so of course (indiscernible). But I think it
5 was the -- it must -- I bet it was the AOM, the -- volume 1 --

6 Q. And was it that the procedure didn't conform to what the crews were doing or was it that it
7 didn't match the Boeing documents? Oh, wait. The aircraft -- the AOM -- that is a Boeing
8 document. Is that correct or is there a company version?

9 A. I'm not sure. I believe it was -- I guess I don't know.

10 Q. So do you recall any changes pertaining to the takeoff procedure that you may have added
11 or modified?

12 A. I don't believe so. But all the modifications that they were redlined and those were given to
13 David Seest so he would still have that. I just -- it's been a long time since I did that. So I don't
14 remember exactly what changes --

15 Q. Had those changes migrated into the manual everyone was using by the time the accident
16 occurred, or no?

17 A. I don't know if they did or not. There was a ground school coming up and so David had
18 wanted to update the information for the new -- the incoming pilots. But I don't think they did
19 because the company always puts out updates for our manuals and we're responsible to update the
20 manuals and I never saw those. So I don't think they were approved or put out for the pilots.

21 Q. How long before the accident would you say that you were working on those?

22 A. I bet at least six months or longer. It was a Word document so it'll be dated. But I'm -- I
23 just don't remember. But the thing I was working on immediately before the accident was the
24 weight and balance manual. And I think it was about 10 days in a row I was working on that. I
25 hadn't flown. They took me off the line so that I could work on the weight and balance manual.

1 And I think it was -- I think my fight with Henry was the first flight in about 10 days, I think.

2 There was a really big push to get the manuals up to speed as quickly as possible.

3 Q. One last question. I think Shawn asked if you had ever experienced an engine fire in flight.

4 And I think you said no. Did you ever experience an engine failure in actual flight?

5 A. The only thing I ever experienced was some abnormal indications like an engine running
6 hot or something. But never a situation where we got a caution like an overheat or anything and
7 certainly never a shutdown. The only experience I had with that was --

8 Q. So you never had a shutdown either precautionary or otherwise in flight in the 737?

9 A. No. I'm sure I would remember that. The only thing I think is maybe a precautionary. But
10 I'm sure I would remember if we were single engine -- no, I never have flown single engine in the
11 actual airplane.

12 MR. BRAMBLE: Thanks. I'm going to pass it back over to Shawn again. Shawn?

13 BY MR. ETCHER:

14 Q. Hey, Greg. I just have one question. When you and I were talking earlier, you leveled off,
15 you saw your speed was higher than anticipated so you brought the thrust back. And I know
16 shortly thereafter, I believe you said you transferred controls to Captain Okai. Anytime from that
17 point on, did you ever see the thrust levers go forward?

18 A. I know they did. I can't remember if I saw his hands on the thrust levers but I vividly recall
19 he had increased the power because I was watching the engine indications. But I guess that's what
20 I took note of. And I don't remember anything unusual. If he had done anything unusual with the
21 power levers, I'm sure that would have stuck out to me.

22 Q. I know you were looking at the engine instruments. And sometimes we -- at least when I
23 fly, I fly with more than just my eyes. I hear, I feel, and all that. Did you hear the thrust increase,
24 did you feel the thrust increase in your back, anything like that?

25 A. I didn't feel it but I heard it. And that was part of my -- it didn't make sense that the

1 indications were going forward. It sounded as though the engines were running and yet we were
2 losing speed. So we had to decrease altitude to maintain the speed. And so it just -- it didn't make
3 sense to me why that was.

4 Q. I know I said I just had one question. But this is the last one. I promise.

5 A. That's okay.

6 Q. You said you saw him go forward. We all have a perception of where the thrust is just
7 because we've flown it a few times and whatever. From what you can recall, do you remember
8 thinking those thrust levers are a lot further forward than normal, about where they normally
9 would be, a little further back?

10 A. Must have been where they normally were because I remember when I would look at the
11 engine instrument, I would see that the EGT would climb into the yellow. And maybe even into
12 the red. And I don't remember for sure but I -- so they weren't there all the time. So they would
13 have had to have been somewhere below the yellow because I remember seeing them, you know,
14 that he would push them up and to try to get power out of them. But I don't recall we -- he -- that
15 instruments were in the yellow or the red all the time.

16 MR. ETCHER: Perfect. Thank you again so much. I promised that was my last one. So I
17 appreciate it. Back to you, Bill.

18 MR. BRAMBLE: Clarence, anything additional?

19 MR. KANAE: Yeah. Just one question, Greg. You mentioned you worked on the weight
20 and balance program. Was there a reason for a change in that program?

21 MR. RYAN: I don't know if the program changed. But it wasn't -- it didn't conform to the
22 regulation. And I can't remember now which one it was. But Mark, our POI, had talked with me
23 after David Seest asked me to work on the manual. So he sat down with me to tell me what
24 needed to be changed. And so he showed me the 8210, I think it was maybe. There's a regulation
25 that says the weight and balance manual has to have these certain things. And ours had half or less

1 of the things.

2 So Mark went through with me and said that the manual needs to conform to the
3 regulation. So that was the change. I don't think the -- I don't -- from a pilot perspective, the
4 weight and balance didn't change. It didn't change our procedure. If they did somewhere else with
5 the loaders perhaps or something maybe, but the change was -- the manual was not in compliance
6 with the regulation. So we were trying to get it into compliance.

7 MR. KANAE: That's all I have. Thank you. Thank you, Greg.

8 MR. BRAMBLE: Rich?

9 MR. LEE: Yeah, nothing else. Thanks.

10 MR. BRAMBLE: I don't have anything additional. And it looks like everybody else is
11 finished, as well. Greg, is there anything else that we didn't ask about that you particularly want to
12 volunteer at this time?

13 MR. RYAN: No, I don't think so.

14 MR. BRAMBLE: With that, we'll conclude the interview. We started at about 1400
15 Eastern Time. And it's now 1528. Shawn, can you stop the recording?

16 (Whereupon, at 3:28 p.m. Eastern, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

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
IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII
ON JULY 2, 2021
Interview of Greg Ryan

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FA174

PLACE: Via telephone

DATE: March 30, 2022

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.


Katie Leach
Transcriber