

## EXAMINATION NOTES

### WRECKAGE AND IMPACT

The C-152 came to rest on the north side of runway 25L, about 150 feet west of the left outboard wing. The T-28 was 450 feet further west from the C-152. The collision between the airplanes occurred at the “1/2” runway remaining sign. The marks on runway revealed no indications of braking by the T-28 prior to the collision.



Figure 1: Wreckage Distribution




Figure 2: Distance the Airplanes Came to Rest

The C-152 was consumed by fire. The T-28 had damage to the lower right nose cowling. A portion of the nose cowling and inboard left flap were entrapped on the right wheel pant of the T-28.



*Figure 3: Cessna Wreckage*



*Figure 4: T-28 Wreckage*



Figure 5: T-28 Debris Field

The T-28 pilot's seat forward visibility was unobstructed with two thick black seams in front. The windshield exhibited a light coating of dark soot and fiber consistent with post-impact fire.



Figure 6: Cockpit View

## RADIO

People interviewed on the airport did not hear either of the airplanes making radio calls. There was no common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) recording ability the airport.

The radio settings on the C-152 could not be determined because of the thermal damage. The T-28 was equipped with a Garmin GTR SL40 communications radio which was located immediately below a Garmin 327 transponder that was mounted

to the bottom of the panel. After the electrical system was powered on, the investigator observed that the active radio frequency was 125.00 and the standby frequency was 121.50. The CTAF for Compton was 123.05 and at Whiteman (the departure airport) was 135.00; the ground control frequency at Whiteman was 125.00. The aircraft emergency frequency is 121.5 MHz. Commonly referred to as GUARD, this frequency is reserved for emergency communications for aircraft in distress, as well as the frequency utilized by earlier generation ELT's as a means of locating downed aircraft.

When positioned in the pilot seat in the T-28, investigators noted that the radio frequencies were partially obscured from the pilot's field of vision. To completely read the frequency screen, the pilot would have to drop their head left and lower their eyesight. While in a normal flying position, an investigator (of similar height of the T-28 pilot) could only see the bottom half of the frequencies.



Figure 7: Radio Setup in T-28

A review of the Air Traffic Control package disclosed that the T-28 pilot requested to taxi to runway 30 at 1824. Five minutes later, a controller cleared the airplane for takeoff and asked if he was planning to fly through the Class C airspace. The T-28 pilot responded that he was not going through that airspace, but instead planned to fly north and then east. At 1831 the controller issued a frequency change. The control that was positioned at ground control was also at the local control position, consistent with the pilot not having to change frequencies.

POSITION LOG									
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER		(3) POS TYPE	(4) DATE					
WHP	LC			03/13/19					
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	Where Combined					
1500	HT	1759	C	(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER (10) TYPE					
1800	RM	2059	C						
1800	QT	2059	T						
2100	HT	2359	C						
0000	RM	0300	C						

POSITION LOG									
(1) FACILITY ID	(2) POSITION IDENTIFIER		(3) POS TYPE	(4) DATE					
WHP	GC/FD			03/13/19					
(5) TIME ON	(6) INITIALS	(7) TIME OFF	(8) CODE	Where Combined					
1500		1714		(9) POSITION IDENTIFIER (10) TYPE					
1715	QT	1759	C						
1800	HT	2059	C						
2100	QT	2359	C						
0000	HT	0045	C						
0046		0300		LC					

Figure 8: Air Traffic Controller Position Log

Compton Woodley Airport, Compton, CA”

<b>COMMUNICATIONS</b>	
UNICOM:	123.05 MHz
CTAF:	123.05 MHz

Whiteman Airport, Los Angeles, CA

<b>COMMUNICATIONS</b>	
UNICOM:	122.95 MHz
CTAF:	135. MHz
ATIS:	132.1 MHz
RADAR SERVICE:	Approach / Departure
Other - (CLASS C):	120.4 MHz
	134.2 MHz
SOCAL APPROACH/DEPARTURE:	120.4 MHz
	134.2 MHz
WHITEMAN GROUND:	125 MHz
WHITEMAN TOWER:	135 MHz

**RADAR DATA**

Recorded radar data covering the area of the accident was examined for the time frame, and two discreet secondary beacon code targets were observed that matched the anticipated flight track of the T-28 en route from Whiteman to Compton and the C-152 en route from Long Beach to Compton.



Figure 9: Radar Data of Both Airplanes

The radar data from Long Beach to Compton consisted of about 19 minutes of returns from 1831:47 to 1850:14. The returns were consistent with the C-152 departing the airport and heading northwest, continuing in that direction for about 5nm west of Compton Airport at which point it turned right heading southeast. The track then turned north and at 1847:33, adjoined the left downwind about 950 feet agl. The returns showed a northerly track again starting about 1848:11 and then a westerly track about 1848:58 until it ended at the airport perimeter at 1850:12; this was consistent with the C-152 making a base and final leg of the traffic pattern to runway 25L. The radar data consistent with the T-28 starts around Monrovia, California and proceeds to Compton containing about 13 minutes of returns from 1837:36 to 1850:20. The returns were consistent with the T-28 approaching Compton from the east. As the returns approached the airport, they were consistent with the airplane then circling the airport at an altitude of about 700-750 feet above ground level (agl) starting at speeds over 170 kts and while adjoining a left base for runway 25L reduced down to 130 kts.



Figure 10: Radar Data at Compton



Figure 11: Airplanes' Positions at 1849:00



Figure 12 Airplanes' Positions at 1849:52




Figure 13: Airplanes' Positions at 1850:12

## PILOTS

The Los Angeles Sheriff Department Aero Division, interviewed the pilot about 2100 and concluded that based on the pilot's condition, there was insufficient probable cause to perform a field sobriety test.

The T-28 pilot, stated that he used his "Flight Guide" book for determining airport frequencies. Examination of the actual guide found at the airplane revealed that the Compton and Whiteman pages were both missing, and that a paper note in place of the Compton page read, "Pg 34, Aug 2017 Compton a/d removed".






Figure 14: Airport Directory in Airplane