On the night of December 20, 2020, I acted as Pilot in Command (PIC) of civil aircraft N412JA, a Hawker 800 (HS-125), conducting a Part 91 repositioning flight for Talon Air from KOPF to KFRG. Only myself and the second-in-command (SIC) were on board the aircraft. The SIC served as the "Pilot Flying" and I served as the "Pilot Monitoring." We began an ILS approach to Runway 14 at Republic airport by receiving vectors to final from ATC. Prior to beginning the approach, the ATIS weather report was 200ft overcast ceiling and ¾ of a mile visibility. Upon contacting the ATCT that weather was confirmed by the ATCT based on a PIREP from the aircraft that landed just ahead of us.

Tracking in-bound on the Localizer course and with movement of the glide slope the Pilot Flying requested "Landing Gear Down," and I placed the landing gear lever in the down position. Just prior to glideslope capture the Pilot Flying called for "Flaps 25" and I set the flaps at 25 degrees. Subsequently, while on the final approach segment to achieve a stabilized approach the Pilot Flying called for "Flaps 45" and I lowered the flaps to the full down position in preparation for landing.

After beginning the final approach segment, the ATCT advised us of an updated weather report. The new conditions reported a 200ft indefinite ceiling and ¼ mile visibility. I acknowledged the new weather. Since the flight was on the final approach segment when the new weather was received, we discussed continuing the approach to minimums, as company policy requires. The crew decided to continue the approach after discussing the change in conditions and reviewing a plan of action should the runway not be acquired at or prior to the decision altitude. That plan of action was that a missed approach would be initiated by the Pilot Flying, followed by a diversion to KTEB. As the aircraft continued its descent, I made standard callouts of 500, 400, 300, 200. I saw the sequenced flashers of the approach lighting system at or just before decision altitude, followed in quick succession by the High Intensity Runway Lights (HIRL), and the runway itself. I advised the Pilot Flying of having visually acquired runway environment and he acknowledged positive identification of the runway. As the aircraft transitioned from approach descent to visual landing I noticed that the aircraft was drifting off centerline. I told the Pilot Flying to make a correction and the Pilot Flying made a correction that arrested the drift but did not return the aircraft to center line.

At this point the Pilot Flying (SIC) suggested that I take the controls. Since my practice, which is consistent with company policy, is not to transfer aircraft controls so close to the ground, I ordered a Missed Approach. The Pilot Flying acknowledged by loudly stating 'Missed Approach' three times while simultaneously advancing the throttles and pressing the Go Around button. A "Flaps 15" call out was made, and the flaps were brought to 15 degrees for the missed approach. The aircraft, however, continued to settle downward for a few moments and ground contact was made. Shortly after ground contact a strong force caused the aircraft to veer to the right. The aircraft spun upright on the ground. After coming to a stop the throttles were closed and the engines shut down. I made a mayday call on tower frequency asking for assistance. The aircraft was shut down and secured.

Yunatan Yakubov

