

1 National Transportation Safety Board

2 Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials

3 Washington, DC 20594

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

RRD24MR002

19

TRACK AND ENGINEERING FACTUAL REPORT

20

21

Group Chair's Factual Report

22

January 28, 2024

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

2 A. ACCIDENT ID..... 3

3 B. TRACK AND ENGINEERING FACTUAL REPORT GROUP 3

4 C. ACCIDENT SUMMARY..... 3

5 D. FACTUAL INFORMATION 3

6 1.0 TRACK DESCRIPTION 3

7 2.0 TRACK STRUCTURE 4

8 3.0 TRACK INSPECTIONS..... 5

9 4.0 TRACK EQUIPMENT 5

10 5.0 S500 PLANNED WORK 6

11 6.0 INTERVIEWS..... 7

12 6.1 CTA Machinist 7

13 7.0 COLLECTED SAMPLES..... 7

14 7.1 Examination Results..... 8

15 APPENDIX A - PHOTOS..... 9

16



17
18

Figure 1: Aerial view of accident location. (Source: Local Media)

1 **A. ACCIDENT ID**

2 Location: Chicago, IL
3 Date: November 16, 2023
4 Time: 1031 (local)
5 Train 1: Yellow Line Train 593
6 Equip 1: S 500
7 Railroad: Chicago Transit Authority
8 Line: Yellow Line

9 **B. TRACK AND ENGINEERING FACTUAL REPORT GROUP**

10 Group Chair Darius Mack
11 NTSB
12 Rail Accident Investigator
13
14 Party Spokesman Bill Mooney
15 Chicago Transit Authority
16 Chief Infrastructure Officer
17
18 Party Spokesman Ryan Kelly
19 IAM Local 126
20 Investigative Team Member
21

22 **C. ACCIDENT SUMMARY**

23 See *Accident Summary* in the docket.
24

25 **D. FACTUAL INFORMATION**

26 **1.0 TRACK DESCRIPTION**

27 CTA's Yellow line train travels from stations, Howard and ends at station
28 Dempster-Skokie for a total of 9.9 track miles. 3% of this route is elevated open deck
29 track, and the remainder is on ballasted track with wood cross ties. AREMA 115 RE rail
30 is standard across the CTA's Yellow Line and the entire rail system. This line has 14
31 curves (including compound curves) with a curve radius ranging from 1718.88' to

1 8,399.88' feet. On average daily commuter train counts over the Yellow Line are 80
2 (during week) / 60 (on weekend). The maximum authorized speed for CTA's yellow
3 line is 55 mph (some areas have the geometry which permit 70mph civil speeds, but
4 trains are restricted by cab signaling to 55mph). The yellow line uses standard 56-½"
5 gage track and an electrified third rail system.

6 In a third rail system, an additional rail (known as a conductor rail) is added to
7 the railway. This rail carries up to 750 volts in most systems. Electricity is sent from
8 substations placed along the track at varying distances depending on various factors,
9 including power requirements, headways, and allowable voltage drop. A collector or
10 contact shoe contacts the third rail as the train moves along the track. This transmits
11 the electricity that powers the train. The return current flows back through the main
12 rails, completing the electrical circuit.

13 **2.0 Track Structure**

14 The collision occurred on the main track near Howard yard at marker 7+00.
15 The accident occurred in a 1189.5 ft. long right-hand curve which had a radius of
16 2122.26' (8 degree 46 minutes). This was also on an ascending grade of 3.88',
17 meaning the train was climbing from lower ground to higher ground. The segment
18 CTA's Yellow Line consists of above ground ballasted single main track.
19

20 The rail at this location was 115 lb. RE (CF 1985). The rail was fastened to
21 6x8x8.5' hardwood crossties using double-shoulder tie plates and cut spikes. The rail
22 was box anchored every other crosstie throughout the track segment. The ballast was

1 made of crush limestone with no evidence of insufficient or fouled ballast. The
2 location of the accident was in a curve which had 3" of superelevation. The track
3 gauge at this location was 56 1/2". The fasteners were holding effectively with no
4 evidence of lateral movement on the crossties.

5

6 **3.0 Track Inspections**

7 CTA inspects the yellow line twice per week with at least a two-day interval
8 between inspections. The last inspection conducted on this segment of track was
9 completed on the day of the accident, November 16, 2023. No defective conditions
10 were recorded during this inspection. The CTA also completes automated track
11 geometry testing once a year on the yellow line. The last defective condition
12 identified in this segment using the geometry car was on April 6, 2021. This condition
13 was a "rail (wheel) burn" on both rails.

14 **4.0 Track Equipment**

15 The equipment struck in the accident was a diesel snow locomotive identified
16 as S500. S500 is a specialized piece of maintenance equipment purchased by CTA
17 from Mitsubishi International Corporation and built by Niigata Engineering Company
18 Limited of Japan in 1981. The S500 weighs 89,500 and has a total length of 59'-3/8".
19 The S500 consists of two cabs, one on each end of the machine and can be operated
20 in either direction. The machine has a total of 6 axles and is equipped with a spring
21 applied, air released disc braking system. The machine is equipped with a plow on
22 the South end and a brush assembly on the North end. There was one Instructor and

1 one machinist on the north end of the machine where the impact occurred and one
2 Instructor and three machinists on the south end of the machine training. The
3 machine was traveling southbound approaching Howard Yard when the collision
4 occurred. Prior to the accident the equipment had come to a stop while slowly
5 traversing an ascending grade as it waited for a signal (X34) to enter the yard. S500
6 was not equipped with internal or external video cameras.



7
8 Figure 1: Photo of S-500 Diesel Snow Locomotive. (Source: rrpicturearchives.net)
9

10 **5.0 S500 Planned Work**

11 The equipment was being used to conduct training by 4 maintenance
12 machinist (operators of the machine) and 2 Instructors (Pilots). The equipment was
13 tasked with making multiple trips between station Dempster and Howard yard. The
14 instructors' duties included obtaining authority to occupy the main track and line
15 switches as needed. The four machinists were training to operate the equipment. The

1 lead Instructor of S500 was granted a rail service bulletin to operate northbound and
2 southbound between station Dempster and station Howard on Thursday, November
3 16, 2023, at 0900 hrs. until 1400 hrs. The accident occurred on the first return trip
4 from Dempster to Howard.

5 **6.0 Interviews**

6 **6.1 CTA Machinist**

- 7 • The track and engineering group interviewed the CTA Machinist that
8 was operating the S500 as part of the investigation.
- 9 • This operation was for the purpose of training two other machinists on
10 how to operate the S500.
- 11 • The training was being conducted in the south cab at the time of the
12 accident and was traveling southbound towards Howard yard.
- 13 • There were no issues with the machine at the beginning of the shift and
14 no issues with the equipment at the time of the accident.
- 15 • Before impact the equipment stalled and stopped on an ascending
16 grade, due to there low speed as they approached the signal.

17 **7.0 Collected Samples**

18 During the field investigation, NTSB noted that a black substance was on top of
19 the rails. The substance was found to exist in various locations on this segment of
20 track and at the location of the collision. Samples of this unknown black substance
21 were collected for analysis. These samples were sent to NTSB's materials laboratory in

1 Washington D.C. for testing and identification. The area also had high amounts of
2 fallen leaves on the track and identifiable leaf matter on the rails.

3 **7.1 Examination Results**

4 Material removed from the rail surface at the accident scene was submitted to
5 the Materials Laboratory. The sample was examined using an Agilent Fourier
6 Transform Infrared (FTIR) Model 610 bench spectrometer with a diamond attenuated
7 total reflectance (ATR) accessory in accordance with ASTM E1252-98 (American
8 Society for Testing Materials E1252-98: *Standard Practice for General Techniques for*
9 *Obtaining Infrared Spectra for Qualitative Analysis and American Society for Testing*
10 *Materials*). The spectrometer(s) were used to collect and process infrared wavelength
11 absorbance spectra of the unknown material.

12
13 The spectrum for the unknown material contained spectral peaks that
14 corresponded to particular functional groups found within molecular structure of the
15 unknown material. The presence of a broad peak at $\sim 3330\text{ cm}^{-1}$ indicative of an
16 oxygen-hydrogen stretching bond. A doublet peak at $\sim 2920\text{ cm}^{-1}$ and $\sim 2850\text{ cm}^{-1}$
17 corresponds to a carbon-hydrogen stretching bond. Peaks at 2450 cm^{-1} and 2285
18 cm^{-1} are indicative of a carbon-carbon (elemental) bond. A single peak at $\sim 1730\text{ cm}^{-1}$
19 is indicative of a carbonyl (C=O) bond (in phase and out of phase). A peak at and
20 $\sim 1600\text{ cm}^{-1}$ is indicative of a carbon-nitrogen (C=N) double bond. A single peak at
21 $\sim 1430\text{ cm}^{-1}$ is indicative of a carbon-hydrogen₂ (C-H₂) bond. A single peak at ~ 1380
22 cm^{-1} is indicative of a carbon-carbon aromatic double bond. Peaks at $\sim 1065\text{cm}^{-1}$ is

1 indicative of a carbon-oxygen-carbon (C-O-C) bond. A peak $\sim 804\text{ cm}^{-1}$ is indicative of
2 a nitrogen-hydrogen bond. The spectrum was consistent with an amino
3 carbohydrate. A spectral library search was performed on the unknown spectrum.
4 The spectral search found spectral similarities to cellulose. Cellulosic material is found
5 in natural plant fibers and leaves. A mixture search was also performed. There were
6 matches to several other natural nitrogen-containing material sources.

7
8 The combination of spectral patterns and similarities to several natural amino-
9 carbohydrates and other materials, the unknown material was most likely plant
10 material. Plant or leaf material consists of a combination of carbon, nitrogen,
11 carbohydrates, organic acids, mineral substances, and water. Molecular bonds for
12 these materials were all present within the unknown spectrum. The presence of the
13 elemental carbon in the sample indicates that the material had sustained some type
14 of thermal exposures carbonizing the material.

15

16

17

18

19

20

21 **APPENDIX A - PHOTOS**

1
2
3



4
5
6

Figure 3: Photo of black substance found on top of the rail. (Source: NTSB)



1
2
3

Figure 3: Photo of inside south cab of S-500. (Source: NTSB)