



**Survival Factors Emergency Response and Communications**  
**Attachment 6: JBLM After-Action Report (AAR)**

**DuPont, Washington**

**RRD18MR001**

(23 pages)



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MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) Amtrak Cascades Train Derailment Response  
After Action Report (AAR)

1. SUMMARY: This AAR provides an overview of basic incident details as well as the response and recovery efforts conducted and supported by the Joint Base Garrison (JBG). Observations made by responding organizations were included in the document and categorized into major focus areas. These observations will form the basis of an incident improvement plan that will be published separately.

2. SCOPE: Many agencies from all levels of government participated in and supported response and recovery to the incident and may publish their own AARs. However, this AAR is limited to those support actions conducted by the JBG and those actions of other Adjacent Commands (ACOMs) directly related to the JBG response.

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I Corps G34  
62 AW XP/IG

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Thanks to the JBLM responders whose actions immediately following the derailment saved lives and mitigated suffering.

Thanks to the JBLM personnel from across the installation who supported the incident response and recovery.

Special thanks to Police Captain Tom Ciota for his photographic contributions and to Battalion Chief Dave Wilhelm, Fire and Emergency Services, whose initial efforts help shape the format and content of this report.

**JOINT BASE LEWIS-MCCHORD**  
**AMTRAK CASCADES TRAIN DERAILMENT**  
**INCIDENT RESPONSE AND SUPPORT**  
**JOINT BASE GARRISON**  
**AFTER ACTION REPORT**



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## Executive Summary

On 18 Dec 17 at approximately 0734, the Amtrak Cascades passenger train carrying 77 passengers and 6 crew derailed at high speed off an overpass bridge onto I-5 in Pierce County, south of Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) near the Eagles Pride Golf Course. The train consisted of 12 cars and 2 locomotives. At least 4 civilian motor vehicles traveling on I-5 were also involved. There were 95 casualties in all, including 3 fatalities, due to the accident. One Airman from the 627th Airbase Group (627 ABG) was injured in the accident. At the time of this writing the investigation into the cause of the accident remains under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

JBLM responders were among the first on scene and quickly established a Unified Command (UC) with local responders. Madigan Army Medical Center (MAMC) provided emergency medical resources to support mass casualty triage, treatment, and transport. Rescue operations were divided geographically north and south of the rail trestle with a casualty collection point established just north of the train trestle. Emergency responders completed triage and patient transport for all 95 patients within 90 minutes of the first dispatch calls.

Following the initial response, JBLM continued to support the UC and the follow on Incident Management Team (IMT) through the Joint Base Garrison (JBG) Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Directorate of Emergency Services (DES) liaisons at the Incident Command Post (ICP). Support consisted of the provision of food and water, sanitation services, facilities, communications and transportation capabilities amongst others. The JBG also coordinated detour routes for southbound I-5 traffic through JBLM as well as an agreement with the NTSB to house the railcars on JBLM through the ongoing period of investigation but not to exceed 15 Mar 18.

The JBG EOC began activating at approximately 0830 on 18 Dec 17 and remained activated until it was determined that the responsibility for incident support should transition exclusively to outside agencies. The JBG EOC deactivated at 1700 on 19 Dec 17. DES maintained liaison at the ICP and staged fire service resources for the safety of investigators and crews working to clear the scene throughout the entire incident period.

Observations captured following the incident through collective after action review efforts are included in the body of this report. For the purposes of this report, the observations will fall into several general categories. These are: Communications; Emergency Operations; Plans, Training, and Exercises; Public Affairs; Resources; and EOC. The observations captured in this report will be included in the improvement planning document which will be published separately from this report.



## Purpose

The purpose of this report is to describe the events related to the emergency response and short-term recovery actions of JBLM responding personnel, evaluate and assess tactical and operational actions, and identify the unique issues and challenges faced by first responders, EOC personnel, and others during the events of 18-20 Dec 17. The intent is to provide responding personnel with information upon which useful recommendations for improving the response and support to an event of this or similar nature can be made.

It is not the intent of this report to discuss the cause of the derailment of the Amtrak Cascades train. NTSB is conducting an investigation into the cause and will publish its results at the appropriate time.

## Scope

The scope of this review is primarily limited to the operational actions and tactical response of the JBLM first responders and supporting personnel during the two-plus days during which this event unfolded. This document does not examine the actions of the multiple other non-JBLM-affiliated responding agencies such as Washington State Patrol (WSP), Washington Department of Transportation (WSDOT), DuPont Fire, and Pierce and Thurston Counties, among others, except as they directly affected or influenced JBLM's actions. These agencies are conducting their own reviews as required. Madigan leadership conducted an exhaustive after action review identifying multiple observations and concerns. Many of these relate to internal hospital processes and are outside of the scope of this document. Elements of Madigan's after action review relating to the unified response and integrated Joint Base operations have been included in this report.

This report addresses the following aspects of the event during the incident period:

- Initial notification and dispatch
- JBLM Fire and Police response at the scene
- Mass casualty operations
- EOC and support activities
- Public Information and communications
- Initial recovery
- Impact to installation operations

## Methodology

The after action review team collected and examined numerous source documents and internal agency hotwash and after action review notes. The review team also conducted an installation-wide hotwash to capture lessons learned and best practices, while at the same time ensuring a shared understanding of the events of 18-20 Dec 17. The information presented here would not be possible without the cooperation of these agencies and their dedication to excellence and continuous improvement.

## Incident Overview



On 18 Dec 17 at approximately 0734, the Amtrak Cascades passenger train carrying 77 passengers and 6 crew derailed at high speed off an overpass bridge onto I-5 in Pierce County, south of JBLM near the Eagles Pride Golf Course. The train consisted of 12 cars and 2 locomotives. At least 4 civilian motor vehicles traveling on I-5 were also involved. The Joint Base

Emergency Communications Center (JBECC) received the first 911 call at approximately 0737. Other dispatch centers across the region reported receiving calls within 3-5 minutes of the derailment.

City of DuPont Police, JBLM DES - Fire and Emergency Services (FES), and JBLM Police personnel were first to arrive at the scene of the incident. JBLM police and fire established UC and were rapidly joined by law enforcement and fire services personnel from neighboring communities and State Agencies. The UC quickly transitioned to consist of leaders from Thurston County Fire District #3, JBLM FES and DuPont Fire. The UC was established in the Battalion-31 command vehicle from Thurston County.



The UC team consisted of a Thurston County Battalion Chief (B-31), a JBLM FES Assistant Chief (C-101) and the DuPont Fire Chief (Battalion-25). This effort enabled all 3 radio frequencies (Thurston, Pierce and JBLM) to be in the same vehicle and reduce some of the communication issues that surfaced during the initial minutes of the incident response. It also allowed all 3 agencies to efficiently work on the same incident objectives and strategies.

The JBECC requested mutual aid and dispatched additional Fire Service resources to the scene. More than 14 JBLM emergency vehicles and over 60 personnel were dispatched to the scene. Off-base agencies (DuPont, West Pierce, Thurston County and others) were also dispatched via their dispatch centers. Madigan Hospital dispatched medic units and MASCAL support to the incident scene at approximately 0741.



The UC integrated follow-on responders and resources into the overall incident action plan. The response was centrally managed by the UC at the onsite Incident Command Post but was divided into two distinct operational divisions; North and South. North Side Operations were run by JBLM FES Battalion Chief (B-101). South Side Operations were run by Lacey Fire Department's Fire Chief. The railroad trestle bridge served as the divider between North and South Operations. JBLM Police, WSP, and WSDOT coordinated and synchronized the law enforcement support to rescue operations.



The medical unit established a casualty collection point between the North and South operational areas in the highway median which allowed for access by responders from both directions and where patient triage was conducted. Initially, Eagles Pride Golf Course was used as a reunification point for ambulatory patients and the

uninjured. The reunification point quickly transitioned to the DuPont Fire Station where additional medical support was staged. The JBG Directorate of Personnel and Family Readiness (DPFR) deployed two emergency family assistance center team members to the reunification site to provide assistance as required. The team members remained on site to provide assistance

until American Red Cross, Amtrak, and Pierce County IMT personnel were on site and the reunification center was fully operational.

Patients were transported to hospitals across the region using the State's regional Disaster Medical Coordination System. One of the injured was a JBLM Airman from the 627 ABG. The Airman underwent surgery and is expected to make a full recovery. In addition to providing significant support and resources to the medical response at the incident scene, MAMC received and treated 19 patients as a member of the local health region (Region #5). In all, 95 patients were triaged and transported from the incident scene within 90 minutes of the first 911 calls.

At approximately 0912, the UC determined no more emergency resources were required and cancelled calls for any further first responder dispatch. At approximately 1000 the Incident Command Post was relocated from the incident site to the Eagles Pride Golf Course. Lack of clarity with regard to jurisdiction and responsibility for ongoing incident management led to some confusion among the stakeholder agencies as to whom should lead the recovery phase of the incident. Leadership of the UC transitioned several times during this period while jurisdictional issues were being addressed. However this did not affect the ongoing secondary searches of the incident scene and rail cars for additional casualties (ground searches and thermal imaging). Nor did it inhibit coordination

between agencies to ensure the accident information was preserved, hazardous material inspections were completed, and the scene was properly secured.



between agencies to ensure the accident information was preserved, hazardous material inspections were completed, and the scene was properly secured.

In addition, during this time period, the UC stood up a Joint Information Center (JIC) to manage public information and external affairs. Public Information Officers from the locally impacted jurisdictions, state and federal agencies, and Amtrak co-located to coordinate unified messaging, press releases and media affairs. Joint Base Garrison (JBG) Public Affairs supported the effort remotely from the JBG headquarters. The JIC coordinated the first press conference which occurred at approximately 1330.

During that time, members of Pierce County's Type III Incident Management Team (IMT) began to arrive. By 1300 hours the IMT was fully operational and formally assumed command of the incident. Early on, JBLM FES and Police had integrated into the UC Operations, Logistics and Command Staff sections of the UC. The Pierce County IMT retained JBLM emergency personnel in those roles as they oversaw the remainder of the incident.

Recovery phase operations consisted primarily of coordinating the removal of the train cars and engines from the incident site and the preservation of information at the scene for investigation purposes. Amtrak entered into an agreement with JBLM to house the wreckage within the cantonment area. Engineers and crews worked throughout the night to plan and prepare for the



removal of the train. Amtrak officials began coordinating for the movement of the train cars on the evening of 18 Dec 17, and started moving the cars to the holding area on JBLM throughout the day on 19 Dec 17. The removal of the two engine cars was significantly more problematic due to their size and weight. Complete removal of the wreckage was not completed until early in the morning on 20 Dec 17. JBLM personnel remained integrated with the IMT through demobilization and assisted in recovery coordination with the NTSB, Amtrak, State and Federal Agencies, and JBLM until the I-5 Corridor was re-opened.

JBLM first responders provided around-the-clock stand-by crews and IMT liaison long after the last ambulance departed. FES crews rotated to provide protection to the WSDOT, AMTRAK and other workers during cleanup and recovery operations. Between initial dispatch and when the wash-down occurred to reopen 2 of the 3 lanes of I-5, a total of almost 57 hours had elapsed.

## **Installation Support to the Incident**

### **Initial Garrison Actions**

On the morning of the incident, JBLM Emergency Management (EM) personnel within the Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security (DPTMS) - Plans, Operations, and Emergency Management (POEMM) Division, heard the JBECC dispatch JBLM emergency responders to the incident scene over the Land Mobile Radio (LMR) System. EM staff informed the POEMM Division Chief who began to coordinate with Senior Garrison Leaders regarding activation of the JBG EOC. EM personnel began to prepare the EOC for a possible activation and made informal notifications to key garrison staff that an activation might occur and began to proactively collect incident information.

Simultaneously, Garrison leadership began to confer regarding the incident. Information flooded the senior leaders from multiple sources. Early on in this period, Garrison leadership was approached by the Washington State Patrol and the Washington State Department of Transportation regarding the use of JBLM to divert traffic flow from I-5 around the accident site. In addition, leadership from the Directorate of Family, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (DFMWR) immediately directed the staff at Eagles Pride Golf course to make resources available to the first responders. Eagles Pride staff provided food, beverages, restrooms, facilities, golf carts, and other items to the response operations.

### **JBG EOC Activation**

In the initial 20-30 minutes following establishment of the UC, there was some ambiguity as to which agency had incident command on the scene. Once it was established that JBLM FES was a lead agency in the UC, the Joint Base Garrison Commander (JBGC) directed the activation of the JBG EOC. JBG leadership then began informing their organizations of the activation order. The Installation Operations Center (IOC) issued an EOC activation and Recall message to EOC personnel at approximately 0840. DPTMS staff in the vicinity of the EOC were already on site and began actively working response support, information management, reporting, and other EOC operations.

EOC personnel from around the installation continued to report to the EOC which became fully operational by 0930. Organizations responding to the EOC included:

- DES
- DPMR
- Directorate of Public Works (DPW)
- Network Enterprise Command (NEC)
- Resource Management Office (RMO)
- 62AW
- I Corps G3
- DFMWR
- DPTMS
- Logistics Readiness Center (LRC)
- JBG Public Affairs Office (PAO)
- Religious Support Office (RSO)
- 627 ABG
- Madigan

EOC Operations Staff established 12 hour operational periods with the 1<sup>st</sup> operational period (OP) ending at 1800 on 18 Dec 17. Late in the afternoon on the 18<sup>th</sup> it became apparent that no further life safety issues would emerge and that the IMT and outside agencies had assumed the majority of incident support activities. The majority of EOC personnel were released at the end of the 1st OP. The JBG EOC reduced staffing requirements for the 2<sup>nd</sup> OP (1800-0600) to only include members of the EOC General Staff (EOC Manager, Supervisor, Operations, and Planning). Personnel working in the EOC continued to monitor activities at the incident site and coordinated a critical teleconference between key agencies to secure a storage site on JBLM for the train wreckage. During the 3<sup>rd</sup> OP (19 Dec 17 0600-1700) EOC staff monitored the status of the wreckage movement throughout the day and coordinated the full transition of active incident support from JBG EOC to Pierce County. In all, the JBG EOC remained operational through three incident operational periods, demobilizing at 1700 on 19 Dec 17.


Throughout the activation, EOC personnel executed critical EM functions and coordinated a

number of requests for support from the UC and later the IMT. Examples of these were securing the JBG Declaration of Emergency memorandum to allow for emergency purchase authority, coordination of temporary flight restrictions, the provision of light sets, pop-up tents, pallets of water, and sanitary services for responders and the IMT. Of note, were the support provided by NEC in activating additional phone lines at the Golf Course for use by the IMT and transportation resources and food supplies provided by the LRC.

In addition to the continued use of the facilities at Eagles Pride Golf Course, two other high profile requests for support were coordinated through the JBG EOC. These were the coordination of alternate routes through JBLM around the accident site and the use of JBLM property to store the train wreckage.

### Traffic Diversion

As mentioned earlier, the JBG senior leaders were approached early on by State agencies regarding the use of JBLM roads to divert southbound I-5 traffic around the accident site. DES activated the Ready Platoon to support the access and traffic control operations. Garrison senior leaders, DES liaisons at the UC, and DES representatives in the EOC coordinated the planning and execution of the bypass route as well as extended gate operations to facilitate egress from the installation by the joint base population. By 1230 on the day of the accident the bypass route was opened to South-bound traffic coming from I-5.



Gate operations were extended at DuPont, D-Street, Integrity, and McChord North gates to allow personnel living south of the Nisqually River to return home. Information regarding



recommended routes south and the traffic diversion along the freeway were disseminated using installation mass warning and notifications systems as well as social media. However, traffic volumes along the routes caused significant traffic delays. In an effort to relieve the pressure from traffic entering and leaving JBLM, the 62AW commander curtailed operations on 19 Dec 17 for Air Force personnel. In addition, the JBG opened another gate for

outgoing traffic near the tank crossing bridge for installation personnel exiting JBLM.

### Wreckage Storage Site

Late in the 1<sup>st</sup> EOC OP, DES liaisons at the ICP began to informally notify the EOC that the IMT might request space on JBLM to store wreckage. At approximately 2145 on 18 Dec 17, during the 2<sup>nd</sup> EOC OP, the NTSB contacted the JBLM EOC to formally request a location on JBLM to store the derailed train. JBLM EOC staff coordinated a teleconference with the JBGC, an SJA



representative, Amtrak Personnel, and the POEMM Division Chief. The teleconference was conducted at approximately 2315 hours and an agreement was reached to store the accident wreckage for a period of 60-90 days. Participants to the teleconference agreed that the train cars and engines would be drained of hazardous materials and that the wreckage storage

site would be included in regular security patrols while the cars were stored on JBLM. EOC staff coordinated with the IMT to conduct site selection and route reconnaissance. The D Block Motor Pool Site on Lewis-North along the eastern perimeter of the installation was selected as it provided adequate space for the rail cars with relatively easy access along public roads from the accident site.

Amtrak contractors, in coordination with the IMT and DES began moving rail cars to the storage site late in the morning on 19 Dec 17. Movement of the cars continued throughout the day. The process was time consuming as access to and movement of the respective train components required separate planning and unique approaches by the crane equipment operators. In addition, each individual car was searched again after being loaded onto its transport. In the late afternoon on the 19<sup>th</sup>, DPW utilities engineers identified a concern that the extreme weight of the two engine cars could potentially damage water mains in the vicinity of the storage area. The JBG EOC coordinated for a DPW utilities





representative to deploy as a site liaison and provide subject matter expertise to the wreckage transport crews. Late in the evening on the 19<sup>th</sup>, the two engine cars were transported to the storage area without damaging the waterlines.

### **Declined Requests for Support**

Throughout the incident the JBG EOC declined several requests for support. For example, early in the incident the UC requested a crane to move rail cars. LRC made available a large crane, but the resource was eventually cancelled for legal and safety reasons as there was no longer an immediate threat to life or health at the time of the request. Another declined request for support originated with the NTSB which requested a facility on JBLM with space and parking for 50 personnel that was also near the incident site. This request was also denied and the NTSB redirected to commercially available resources.

## **Observations**

The observations collected below are representative of the collective input from responders and installation support organizations. Corrective actions to issues and problems identified below will be included in the improvement plan to be published separately.

### **Communications**

**Interoperability:** Communications between DES first responders and their counterparts in the region were not interoperable during the initial response. During the initial response, the UC had to collocate personnel in a single vehicle to relay communications and coordinate activities. Runners also were used to relay information from the incident site to the incident command post.

**JBLM LMR System:** The JBLM LMR system was almost immediately overwhelmed by the quantity of communications generated by the incident. The system was not able to support the demand placed on it and simply shut down leaving JBLM responders unable to communicate amongst themselves. JBLM first responders adapted to the condition by using line of sight communications, runners and golf carts to carry messaging as needed.

### **Emergency Operations**

**Mutual Aid:** Several phone calls were made by the JBECC to both Thurston County and Pierce County. Thurston County responded and immediately upgraded their response to a Level 2 Mass Casualty Incident. Pierce County sent DuPont's Engine, medic unit, and a Chief Officer. The Pierce County Chief Officer later requested an additional medic unit and the mass casualty trailer from West Pierce. As part of the West Pierce medic unit response, a Chief Officer from West Pierce also responded. However, JBECC personnel did not make specific resource requests in accordance with the 2017 Pierce County Fire Resource Plan and did not follow up to determine by unit designation which resources were responding.

**Move Ups:** The JBECC dispatched a significant number of FES resources (Stations 101-106), stripping the base of resources to handle any additional emergencies that may occur. A request

was made to close down both airfields so that remaining fire department personnel could regroup and staff reserve engines to provide coverage. Under the direction of a Station Captain, these crews responded to 6 other emergencies (at the same time as the train derailment) to include a significant medical emergency for a patient with signs of a heart attack.

**Situational Awareness for the JBLM Community:** There are limited mechanisms to inform the JBLM public who are not subscribers to the AtHoc/JBLM ALERT or have access to Facebook. The public was calling the Police Desk, the JBECC, the IOC, and the EOC asking for information about gate closures, routes home and general information concerning the effects of the derailment on JBLM.

**Installation Access:** The extensive traffic delays and difficulty traversing the region around JBLM generated some concern with regard to the ability of mission critical personnel (Medical, FES, LE, Command Staff, Air Field Ops, etc.) to access JBLM for duty. As the majority of military personnel and all civilians live off the installation, there were concerns that mission critical personnel would not be able to make it on to the installation. If an increase in Force Protection Condition had occurred, access onto the installation would have become even more difficult.

**Detour Routes:** To support the I5 bypass route laid out on the southwest part of installation, JBLM Police had to block part of the road used, lay out traffic cones and emplace signage. JBLM Police also did this for the tank bridge detour route. This utilized the already strained and extremely limited JBLM Police assets that were on the installation.

### **Planning, Training, & Exercises**

**Emergency Planning:** Joint regional planning prior to the derailment would have helped responders by identifying preset staging areas and facilities that could be used for incident command posts, victim assistance centers, etc. In addition, planning efforts should include common resource typing terminology to create a common understanding among regional responders as to the capabilities available by each of the partnering jurisdictions.

**Amtrak Training:** DES had participated in familiarization and emergency procedure training with AMTRAK as well as a train derailment and mass casualty exercise in the months leading up to this derailment. Crews cited this training as being very helpful during this emergency response. Two areas that showed the most help were the emergency shutdown button for the locomotive and the emergency window access to the train cars.

**Installation Events and Exercises:** DES support to all major installation events is planned and operated using IMTs. Because of this experience DES was able to transition quickly between UC and supporting the Pierce County IMT during the incident response and recovery efforts.

### **Public Affairs**

**JBG PAO in synch with JIC:** The JBG PAO was not physically represented in the IMT JIC operations; however, the JBG Public Affairs maintained contact with, and supported the effort remotely from the JBG headquarters to ensure all public information officers delivered a unified message in news releases, social media, or other communications. Whereas the IMT JIC was heavily focused

on incident response, and then recovery operations, JBG Public Affairs was primarily focused—through the use of social media—on assisting JBLM and regional commuters on navigating around and through JBLM on various detour routes. The JBLM social media manager published 23 separate posts in three days on Facebook and Twitter with a reach of more than 340,000 persons to assist commuters. She also responded to numerous individual messages on Facebook from commuters who needed assistance.

**Public Relations:** Immediate actions taken by JBLM first responders saved lives, prevented injuries and set the stage for an extremely successful incident response. Madigan staff responding to the incident were instrumental in affecting a rapid and highly effective mass casualty response. Also, JBLM Good Samaritans—Service members and civilian employees who happened to be on the highway—provided immediate support. JBLM provided support to the incident and the IMT throughout the response and recovery phases; however, the extent of JBLM activities during the incident went largely unreported on day one because the news media primarily focused on the accident scene. JBLM responding personnel did not participate in JIC press conferences throughout the incident, which allowed other organizations to become the face of the incident response, especially on day one. After day one, the JBG, I Corps and Madigan PAOs executed a press conference at Madigan AMC for regional media so Madigan first responders, Madigan leadership, and JBLM Good Samaritans could tell their story of immediate response and support for the accident. On day two and three, the JBLM FES Assistant Fire Chief who was the initial Incident Commander, was authorized to conduct one-on-one interviews with regional media, which he did.

### **Resources**

**Vehicles:** There are not enough organic DES transportation assets to support daily operations and special missions. Use of assigned vehicles for additional missions during this operation left the guard force short during shift changes, which extended the amount of time it took to get personnel out to their assigned gates.

**Federal-Local Resource Support Limitations:** Initial JBLM resources and personnel that were supporting the incident could only be provided for a limited time due to federal law and statutory regulation. The Incident Management Team (IMT) wanted to tap into other JBLM resources, but was unable to due to jurisdictional issues.

**Resource Management:** There is no centralized database of resources (construction equipment, light sets, reader boards, buses, etc.) that are on the installation. Having this information collected into a single reference source would help improve the efficiency of response to future incidents.

### **EOC**

**WebEOC:** WebEOC is the Army's Program of Record for use in EOC operations. Among other capabilities, it is intended to provide a single source common operating picture for leaders and stakeholders engaged in incident response and support. The Army contractor responsible for WebEOC had pushed out a software upgrade in the days prior to the derailment incident. Notification of the update was made to the technical community but not the end user system

administrators. As a result, the software was visually different to the users in the EOC with access to key menu boards relocated. Some of the user boards had been removed altogether. While EOC staff quickly modified EOC operations to accommodate limited WebEOC functionality, the situation caused confusion and detracted from mission response in the first hour of the EOC activation.

**Information Sharing:** Information sharing between the IOC and the EOC was limited after the EOC became fully functional. In previous events and exercises, the IOC has been collocated or immediately adjacent to the EOC, facilitating information exchange and reporting. The separation of the IOC from the EOC increased the time required for the EOC to become fully operational and also hampered information flow between the two agencies. This limitation was especially apparent in sending out Mass Warning Messages and communicating detour routes to the public and base population.

**Physical Layout:** Many of the EOC after action comments referenced the limited size of the physical work areas available to the EOC Staff. Personnel were constricted by the small desk size and were not able to utilize the desk reference materials and laptop computers simultaneously.

**EOC Personnel Requirements:** Several observations were made by EOC staff regarding the necessity to recall all of the EOC staff during the activation. Certain EOC members were less actively utilized during the 1<sup>st</sup> OP than others.



## Integrated Incident Timeline

### 18 DEC:

- 0734 Amtrak 501 Derails vicinity of DuPont, WA
- 0736 Initial 911 Call to JBECC
- 0737 JBECC dispatches JBLM FES Stations 101, 102, 103, 104 and Madigan Medics 1 and 2 0737 C-101 (JBLM FES Chief Officer) responding
- 0740 DuPont Fire Department (Engine, Medic, Chief Officer) dispatched via Firecomm
- 0743 C-101 Arrives On Scene and establishes I-5 Command
- 0744 JBECC dispatches JBLM FES Stations 105 and 106
- 0747 B-25 (DuPont Chief Officer) on-scene – linking up with JBLM Command C-101
- 0758 B-31 (Lacey Battalion Chief), JBLM C-101 and DuPont B-25 now UC
- 0758 UC requests West Pierce Mass Casualty Trailer to the scene
- 0759 SAC-D implements modified Access Control along Mounts and DuPont ACPs
- 0806 WSDOT and JBLM PM begin discussion on using JBLM as traffic bypass route
- 0807 West Pierce Chief 316 on scene
- 0809 Madigan Medic-3 staffed and responding to the scene

JBLM AMTRAK CASCADES TRAIN DERAILMENT INCIDENT RESPONSE AND SUPPORT – JBG AAR

- 0814 Madigan Mass Casualty Van on-scene
- 0826 Locomotive shut down using emergency button
- 0828 JBLM Police coordinate Eagle's Pride as Reunification "Green" patients collection point
- 0841 Eagle's Pride becomes Incident Management Team and new Incident Command Post
- 0850 JBLM EOC Activated
- 0857 Responders on scene conducted full accountability; secondary search crews entered train  
- Relief crews assigned to conduct secondary search with Thermal Image Cameras
- 0900 DES IC CMD operational to support JBLM DES assets
- 0906 Total: 95 patients triaged, treated and transported in approximately 90 minutes
- 0912 Command advises no more resources needed on scene; cancel all other units responding
- 0916 Firecomm cancels all additional responding units
- 0930 JBLM EOC is operational
- 1000 Tactical Response Complete, 2d and 3d sweeps completed
- 1230 JBLM Bypass Opened
- 1300 IC CMD at Eagle's Pride, IC Brief
- 1314 Pierce County
- 1330 First Incident Press Conference
- 1400 Governor briefed on traffic reroute through JBLM
- 1600 IC CMD synch and Press Conference
- 1614 EOC Began reduced manning shift two
- 1800 ACP hours extended for DuPont, Integrity, McChord North, D-Street
- 2142 NTSB put in request to JBLM for a large enough holding area to hold up to 12 railcars and one locomotive for 60-90 days.

19 DEC:

- 0600 EOC Shift change to shift three.
- 1038 5 rail cars are on route to the holding area on JBLM. Temporary traffic shut down in effect during car movement
- 1102 50 sandbags and 550 provided to support IC tents.
- 1103 Contractor requested to service chemical latrines and hand wash stations at Eagles Pride golf Course.
- 1240 The EOC initiating demobilizing actions
- 1306 IC requested Lyle Fogg DPW Water Rep to assist with train car route assessment to ensure no pipes would be crushed due to the weight of the cars and engine.
- 1500 1<sup>st</sup> 5 rail cars moved to storage site
- 1600 IMT IC CMD redeploys, new IC CMD: JBLM Police, WSP, WSDOT, and Amtrak
- 1700 JBLM EOC notifies other agency EM centers and operational centers of deactivation. EOC deactivated.

20 DEC:

- 1900 I-5 Bypass through JBLM closed and assets recovered
- 1900 IC CMD redeployed

## Summary

Throughout the incident JBLM responders and agencies played a number of critical roles in leading and supporting the incident response and recovery. Responding crews overcame communications challenges and jurisdictional issues to affect a timely and efficient incident response. That JBLM assets triaged, extricated and transported 95 patients in just over 90 minutes was already recognized in the local responder community as an outstanding example of excellence in mass casualty operations. After the emergency response phase was terminated, every emergency responder that worked on the scene went home safely to be with their family at the end of their shift. The above points alone indicate that the emergency actions taken at the scene were successful. In addition, the installation continued to support the IMT and recovery following the initial period of exigency with garrison and mission supporting command resources and capabilities. Even though the overall incident mitigation efforts were successful, as with any emergency response, we can always look at what occurred during the response and discuss ways to improve for the next major emergency.