NTSB | National Transportation Safety Board

Mitchell Gallo
Senior Aerospace Engineer, NTSB IIC
Aviation Safety – Central Region

Date: May 31, 2024

Subject: CEN24LA189, Record of Conversation

Contact: Chloe Graves, student pilot

During a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC and Thomas Farago, Aviation Safety Inspector, Little Rock Flight Standards District Office, Chloe Graves stated that her pilot logbook was burned in the accident of N6571J. She said that most of her flight time was with a different flight instructor and in a Cessna 172, which she flew several years ago. During the accident flight, Chloe Graves and Trishie McCaslin flew over Lake Ouachita where they practiced slow flight and performed two aerodynamic stalls. They then decided to return to Memorial Field Airport (HOT), Hot Springs, Arkansas, to practice takeoff and landings. They flew over the mid-field of HOT, flew a large teardrop, and returned to enter the downwind leg of the airport traffic pattern. They went through their checklist during downwind and then turned onto the base leg of the approach for landing. Chloe Graves said that during the base leg, and when they were about to turn onto the final approach, Trishie McCaslin said "we're a little low and a little slow so give it some power." Chloe Graves said she added some engine power but "it would just not go." Trishie McCaslin then "took over," and Chloe Graves "started to freak out" and could not remember the circumstances afterwords well.

When asked by the NTSB IIC, the type of stalls, whether power-on or power-off, performed, Chloe Graves said they "completely pulled the power off," the engine power was reduced to idle and engine power was not completely turned off. When the NTSB IIC asked Chloe Graves, if she heard the stall warning sound when they performed the stalls, Chloe Graves said no and "that did not work." Chloe Graves stated that she talked about the stall warning not sounding with Trishie McCaslin, during which Trishie McCaslin said it was "weird, it wasn't working." Chloe Graves said the stall warning did not sound for all the stalls they performed on the day of the

accident, and the stall warning sound "did not work" when they performed stalls in N6571J on the Friday before the accident.

When asked by Thomas Farago if they performed a GUMP [gas, undercarriage, mixture, propeller] check during the downwind leg of the approach, Chloe Graves said that she watched Trishie McCaslin perform the GUMPS check because Chloe Graves was still unfamiliar with the aircraft. When Thomas Farago asked if it was normal to change the aircraft fuel tank selection during the GUMP check, Chloe Graves said she could not remember but they talked about it for the takeoff, and Trishie McCaslin said the fuel selector should be on the left fuel tank. Chloe Graves said that she could not remember any additional details pertaining to the fuel selector and could not remember if the fuel selector position was changed during the accident flight.

When asked by the NTSB IIC what had been discussed about the stall warning not sounding, Chloe Graves said that when Trishie McCaslin performed the stalls they waited for the stall warning to sound, the stall warning light illuminated, and the aircraft nose "buffeted over" and they knew the aircraft stalled but there was no stall warning sound and Trishie McCaslin then said it was "weird."

When asked by the NTSB IIC if the auxiliary fuel pump was turned on for power-off stalls, Chloe Graves said yes and there was no problem with the engine while practicing stalls, and the engine "sounded fine." When asked if she remembered if the fuel tank selection was changed during the flight, she said no. When asked if the fuel selector was on the left tank for engine runup for takeoff, she said yes. When asked if the runup went well, she said everything was" fine," "in the green," and "everything looked perfect." When asked if the engine idle was checked during the runup, she said yes, and the engine continued to run while at idle.

When asked by the NTSB IIC, if the carburetor heat was turned on, Chloe Graves said she did not remember. When asked if the carburetor heat was turned on during previous flights of N6571J that she was on and she said she did not remember, and the previous flight was like a discovery flight, and she did not touch the controls and was getting familiar with the aircraft before flying it. She said that she was at a point in her training where she had her hands lightly on the controls while Trishie McCaslin was performing control inputs for the approaches and landings.

When asked by the NTSB IIC, if Trishie McCaslin told her that the aircraft was too low and/or too slow during the accident approach, Chloe Graves said that she has been trying to remember what was said and was "pretty sure" Trishie McCaslin said it was too low. When asked what the aircraft airspeed was, she said she did not remember any of the gauge indications. When asked where she was seated, she said

the left front seat. When asked if she remembered if the fuel selector was changed at this point in time, she said no and did not remember what the fuel selector looked like.

When Thomas Farago asked if Trishie McCaslin reached over to do anything, Chloe Graves said she moved her legs so that Trishie McCaslin could look at the fuel selector and Trishie McCaslin never reached over her.

When the NTSB IIC asked Chloe Graves if she added engine power when told to do so by Trishie McCaslin, Chloe Graves said yes. After Chloe Graves advanced the throttle control, she told Trishie McCaslin that "it's not working." Trishie McCaslin then told her "I have the flight controls." When asked to explain her meaning of its not working, Chloe Graves said she pushed the throttle full forward for full engine power and there was no power, there was no increase in "rpm" and the engine speed was" not going any faster," as if "it was stuck." When asked if there was in increase in engine noise when she pushed the throttle fully forward, she said she could not remember "any sounds." She said that she did not hear engine noise after the throttle was increased and the propeller was still turning. She said that after Trishie McCaslin took over the controls, her memory of what happened afterwards is blank because she was panicking. When asked if the stall warning light illuminated, she said yes. When asked to describe the aircraft's descent, she said that after Trishie McCaslin took the controls, the aircraft spun left. The aircraft was getting close to Oak Lawn (sic) and the aircraft was going toward the trees and she did not see the stall warning light illuminated because she was looking outside and did not see any of the "gauges." After the aircraft was on the ground, they were both were unconscious and woke up and the aircraft was on fire. They exited out of the aircraft and Trishie McCaslin rolled on the ground because she was on fire. There were people on scene.

When the NTSB IIC asked if N6571J had shoulder harnesses, Chloe Graves said that she had never seen them, and they were not wearing them. She said that she later learned that the aircraft was equipped shoulder harness and the reason they were not wearing them was because they could not reach the wing flap control. She said she had never seen the shoulder harnesses before the accident. She said that neither her nor Trishie McCaslin were wearing the shoulder harnesses and that she was never told to put the shoulder harness on for landing by Trishie McCaslin. She said they never wore the shoulder harnesses for takeoffs and landings, and they never talked about wearing shoulder harnesses.

When the NTSB IIC asked Chloe Graves if there was anything memorable about flying with Trishie McCaslin, she said the accident flight was her second flight with Trishie McCaslin and she enjoyed flying with Trishie McCaslin. Chloe Graves said

she did not feel comfortable flying a Piper PA-28 so she asked Trishie McCaslin if a Cessna 172 could be used for flight training. Trishie McCaslin told her that in talking to the mechanic at the airport, he no longer was performing maintenance on the Cessna 172, and he did not know who was performing that maintenance and suggested to use the Piper PA-28 for training. Chloe Graves said the Cessna 172 was still available for rental. Chloe Graves said she had about 18 hours of flight time most of which was in a Cessna 172 and 2 hours were in a Piper Cherokee 140, which was at a different flight school. Chloe Graves learned of Lord Aviation from her previous flight instructor, who became employed by the airlines, and he recommended she continue her flight instruction at Lord Aviation. Chloe Graves later flew a Piper PA-28 with a flight instructor from Lord Aviation, but she did not like the aircraft, and she did not like the flight instructor, and she lost her "passion for flying." Chloe Graves said the only reason she returned to Lord Aviation was because of Trishie McCaslin.

When asked by the NTSB IIC if Trishie McCaslin made any comments about Lord Aviation's aircraft maintenance, Chloe Graves said no. Chloe Graves said that the descent during the accident sequence did not feel like a stall but like a descending glide and a slow glide.

When asked by the NTSB IIC if Trishie McCaslin briefed her on the maneuvers that were going to be performed on the accident flight, Chloe Graves said they had a ground lesson in her office and they talked about stalls, like the ones they performed on the previous flight, the 45-degree downwind to base turning point, and the 1,000 ft markers. Chloe Graves said that Trishie McCaslin would demonstrate a maneuver then would have Chloe Graves perform the maneuver.

When asked by the NTSB IIC if carburetor heat was used during power-off stalls, Chloe Graves said that she did not remember. When asked if the carburetor heat was checked during the engine runup for the accident flight, she said the carburetor heat was checked and it worked fine. When asked by the NTSB IIC if carburetor heat was used prior to a reduction of engine power for approaches, Chloe Graves said she could not remember but thought Trishie McCaslin discussed it.

When asked if the auxiliary fuel pump was turning on for the accident approach, Chloe Graves said she thought they did turn it on.

NTSB | National Transportation Safety Board

Mitchell Gallo
Senior Aerospace Engineer, NTSB IIC
Aviation Safety – Central Region

Date: June 12, 2024

Subject: CEN24LA189, Record of Conversation

Contact: Gunner Jones, Lord Aviation part-owner/flight instructor

During a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC and Thomas Farago, Aviation Safety Inspector, Little Rock Flight Standards District Office, Gunner Jones was asked by the NTSB IIC when was the last time he flew N6571J. Gunner Jones stated he last flew N6571J about 3-4 months ago. When asked to describe his position at Lord Aviation, Gunner Jones stated that Mason Lord is his brother-in-law, has a percentage ownership in Lord Aviation, and is a flight instructor at Lord Aviation. Gunner Jones said he obtained all his flight ratings using N6571J and provided flight instruction at Lord Aviation for about 1 ½ years. He said that he provided flight instruction to Trishie McCaslin.

When asked by the NTSB IIC to describe the use of carburetor heat in N6571J, Gunner Jones stated that Piper Cherokee aircraft "say carburetor heat as needed or as required," and he said it "does not specifically say" that carburetor heat is "required." He said "usually" during the downwind leg of an approach, it is good practice to turn the carburetor heat on and on the base leg to final leg he would "like to have the carburetor heat on." When Gunner Jones was told by the NTSB IIC that Trishie McCaslin was told not to use carburetor heat in N6571J and in Lord Aviation's Piper Cherokee 140, Gunner Jones said that did not sound right and everyone is taught to use carburetor heat. Gunner Jones said he explains to pilots that what was meant in the checklist is that some Cessna checklists say you have to use carburetor heat but in the Piper checklist it says as required and they "would talk though what that meant," which was turn carburetor heat on in the downwind and "if you feel like you don't need it" or "if the engine is running good" to turn the carburetor heat off. He said on base to final, turn the carburetor heat on especially on final because there

is a lot going on and engine power is reduced. He said that last time he flew N6571J was October 7, 2023.

When asked who is responsible for aircraft maintenance, Gunner Jones said they maintain a group chat among himself, Mason Lord, and the flight instructors. Mason Jones said that any squawk in the group chat would be addressed by taxing the aircraft to Randy Jones at the airport. He said the medium for group chat was text messaging. When asked by the NTSB IIC if there were any open squawks for N6571J prior to the accident, Gunner Jones said no, and the aircraft was "running great."

When asked by the NTSB IIC if N6571J was equipped with shoulder harnesses, Gunner Jones said no, and it was never equipped with them since they purchased the aircraft on August 18, 2020.

NTSB | National Transportation Safety Board

Mitchell Gallo
Senior Aerospace Engineer, NTSB IIC
Aviation Safety – Central Region

Date: June 4, 2024

Subject: CEN24LA189, Record of Conversation

Contact: Quinten Knowles, witness

During a telephone conversation, Quinten Knowles stated that he did not see the accident airplane flying and was the first person on-scene after the accident. He said he was inside his house, which was located across the street and two houses away from the accident site. He said that he heard a noise louder than thunder that struck outside. He ran out the door and saw smoke and ran toward the smoke where he saw two women walking away from the airplane. When he arrived on scene, the two women were about 15-20 ft from the airplane walking toward the street. He said that he yelled to them about six times if there was anyone else in the airplane before he got a response from them. He said they were in shock looking at each other. They said they were the only ones in the airplane. He asked them if they needed anything, and they said they needed towels, so he ran back into his house to get towels. He said that the two women did not tell him what happened, and he did not get any information from them. He said that he did not hear any airplane engine sound. He said he hears airplanes flying over all the time but did not hear any engine sound from the accident airplane and if there was an engine sound from the accident airplane he would have heard it. He said the airplane was on fire when he arrived on scene. He said the noise he heard was louder than a lightning strike and did not hear any sounds prior. He said he did not have loud music playing in the house at the time.

NTSB | National Transportation Safety Board

Mitchell Gallo
Senior Aerospace Engineer, NTSB IIC
Aviation Safety – Central Region

Date: June 11, 2024

Subject: CEN24LA189, Record of Conversation

Contact: Trishie McCaslin, flight instructor

During a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC and Thomas Farago, Aviation Safety Inspector, Little Rock Flight Standards District Office, Trishie McCaslin stated that the accident flight was to be a normal instructional flight with her student Chloe Graves. Prior to the accident flight on the day of the accident, she provided a preflight briefing on how to perform a traffic pattern and how to perform aerodynamic stalls to Chloe Graves. Trishie McCaslin said she and Chloe Graves preflighted the aircraft, N6571J, prior to the accident flight. The aircraft was "topped off" with fuel. Trishie McCaslin said that they performed at least one aerodynamic stall and maybe a steep turn. Trishie McCaslin said they were not in the practice area for very long because Chloe Graves had not soloed yet and Trishie McCaslin wanted to Chloe Graves to spend time practicing takeoff and landings. They returned to the departure airport and crossed over the midfield of the airport at about 3,000 ft and flew a teardrop flight path to the enter at a 45 degree entry for a left downwind for runway 23. During midfield, they performed a CGUMPS, and Chloe Graves reduced engine power to 1,700 rpm and flaps were added. Trishie McCaslin told Chloe Graves to look over her left shoulder when the aim point was offset 45 degrees from her left shoulder and then to turn onto the base leg. Chloe Graves delayed the downwind leg to base leg entry turn and flew out farther than what was "typical. Trishie McCaslin said the aircraft was getting a "little lower" and they turned left base and crossed over Oak Lawn and the airplane "started to get low," and she told Chloe Graves to add engine power, to look at the runway aimpoint, and they were getting low. Trishie McCaslin felt that Chloe Graves's increase of engine power was "conservative." Trishie McCaslin said the airplane got lower and she told Chloe Graves to "add engine, add power." Chloe Graves told her that it was not doing anything and Trishie McCaslin said "are you serious." Trishie McCaslin added full engine power. Trishie McCaslin said

Oak Lawn was the largest area to land on and she turned the airplane toward Oak Lawn and within about 6 seconds she saw powerlines, saw a road, and that the aircraft impacted trees. Trishie McCaslin said both of them were flung forward during the impact and she hit her head and had to get stiches around her eye and Chloe Graves might have sustained a broken nose.

Trishie McCaslin said that on a previous flight in N6571J, with a female student pilot, they were taking off and the fuel pressure gauge indication dropped but remained in the green range on the gauge. They flew to Little Rock, Arkansas, and during takeoff from Little Rock, Arkansas, the fuel pressure dropped but remained in the green range of the gauge. Trishie McCaslin asked her student what she thought about the fuel pressure drop, and the student pilot said maybe it was due to the aircraft being in a pitch up attitude to which Trishie McCaslin said to the student pilot that they are pitch up now in the climb and the fuel pressure was not dropped. Trishie McCaslin stated that the fuel pressure drop did not occur again, and she was "not too concerned."

When the NTSB IIC asked to explain what a CGUMPS check was, Trishie McCaslin stated that it was carburetor heat hot, gas on both, undercarriage down and locked, mixture rich, power 1,700, seatbelts, switches, flaps, and fuel pump on. She said that the owners of the flight school said it was not necessary to use carburetor heat in N6571J for landing and therefore Trishie McCaslin and Chloe Graves did not use carburetor heat during the accident flight's approach to runway 23. When the NTSB IIC asked why she was told not to use carburetor heat, Trishie McCaslin stated she was not certain and could not remember what she was told on why to not to use carburetor and was not sure and that she has flown that aircraft for several years. She said she also flies the flight school's other Piper Cherokee and she did not use carburetor heat on that aircraft.

When the NTSB IIC asked if the fuel selector position was changed from the preflight of N6571J to its accident, Trishie McCaslin said yes. When asked to describe how the fuel selector position was changed, she said they turned the auxiliary fuel pump on and changed the fuel tank selection to the other fuel tank, the fuel pressure was "good," and they then switched the fuel pump off. She said that the fuel tank selection change was made during the return from the practice area to the departure airport and while they performed the descent checklist. She said the auxiliary fuel pump was on for landing and it was part of the landing checklist. When the NTSB IIC asked who changed the fuel selector position, Trishie McCaslin said Chloe Graves made that change. When Trishie McCaslin was asked if she changed the fuel selector position, Trishie McCaslin said that she could not reach the fuel selector because it was on Chloe Graves's side. When asked if she herself had ever changed the fuel

selector position on previous flights, Trishie McCaslin said she did when she was flying from the left seat. When asked if she felt detents in the fuel selector, Trishie McCaslin said there was nothing wrong with the fuel selector but when she was asked again and provided with an explanation of what a detent was, she said she did not feel a detent the last time she had flown from the left pilot seat in N6571J, which was in July 2023 during an aircraft checkout. When asked if she knew what a detent was prior to the explanation of what a detent was, Trishie said no and never heard the word detent before. When asked what the fuel selector position was on engine start, she said she could not remember.

When the NTSB IIC asked if the stall warning horn was working, Trishie McCaslin said the stall warning horn was working and she was "pretty sure" the aircraft did not experience an aerodynamic stall during the accident. When asked if the stall warning sounded while performing stalls in the practice area, she said yes but then said she could not remember.

When the NTSB IIC asked if they were wearing shoulder harnesses, Trishie McCaslin said N6571J was not equipped with shoulder harnesses and the flight school had the shoulder harnesses removed from the aircraft and did not know why they were removed. She said that she could not remember if the aircraft was equipped with shoulder harnesses when she had flown it during her aircraft checkout in July 2023.

When asked if she heard engine sound when the throttle was reduced to 1,700 rpm for the landing approach, Trishie McCaslin said she had no indication they had lost an engine. She said the only thing she knew was there was no throttle response. When asked if she heard engine sound just before she advanced the throttle control during the accident approach, Trishie McCaslin said she never heard any engine sound. She said she did not remember if the propeller was still rotating. She said that she was told the engine quit and that she did not remember.

When asked who told her not to use carburetor heat, Trishie McCaslin said it was the flight instructor she used toward her flight instructor instrument rating, who was Gunner Jones. She did not know if Gunner Jones was part owner of the flight school. She said that she did not know if it was a "common thing" not to use carburetor heat in all Piper Cherokee aircraft.

When asked by Thomas Farago if the aircraft was equipped with an audible stall warning, Trishie McCaslin said she could not remember and that she has flown so many different aircraft.

When asked by the NTSB IIC if she used carburetor heat when teaching power-off aerodynamic stalls and engine-out maneuvers, Trishie McCaslin said she did not but in every other aircraft she used carburetor heat.

When asked by the NTSB IIC how aircraft squawks are addressed, Trishie McCaslin said she would tell Gunner Jones who takes care of the maintenance, and he would call Randy Wood who is an aircraft and powerplant mechanic.

NTSB | National Transportation Safety Board

Mitchell Gallo
Senior Aerospace Engineer, NTSB IIC
Aviation Safety – Central Region

Date: June 12, 2024

Subject: CEN24LA189, Record of Conversation

Contact: Logan Orr, flight instructor

During a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC and Thomas Farago, Aviation Safety Inspector, Little Rock Flight Standards District Office, Logan Orr was asked by the NTSB IIC if there were mechanical problems with N6571J on May 15, 2024. Logan Orr said there were no mechanical problems with the aircraft when he last flew it on May 15, 2024.

When asked by the NTSB IIC what Lord Aviation's policy on the use of carburetor heat in N6571J was, he said they "typically" leave carburetor heat off, they check carburetor heat on runup, and they would not use carburetor heat unless atmospheric conditions would be favorable for carburetor ice. Logan Orr said the tachometer green arc is the normal operating range and it spanned "pretty much" the entire range of the "engine," and carburetor heat was not needed while operating in the tachometer green arc. He said they do not use carburetor heat on landing "standardized" but if there was visible moisture or high humidity with low temperature then he personally would use it.

When asked by Thomas Farago that in warmer months or at the time of the accident would it be normal not to use carburetor heat during instructional flights, Logan Orr said carburetor heat would "typically" not be used during those conditions/flights. Logan Orr said that he flew N6571 May 15, 2024, and he did not use carburetor heat.

When asked by the NTSB IIC if there was no requirement to use carburetor heat when engine power is reduced to idle or below the tachometer green arc, Logan Orr said right. Logan Orr said that the green arc extended down to no rpms and he

has been taught that the engine runs a little hot as opposed to other Lycoming engines, which have tachometer green arcs that extend down to about 2,000 rpm.

When asked by the NTSB IIC who at Lord Aviation told him not to use carburetor heat, Logan Orr said it was not anyone particular and the checklist that they use says to use carburetor heat "as required," and he has not read through the aircraft pilot operating handbook for landing and if the engine rpm is in the green arc then carburetor heat is not used.

When asked by Thomas Farago if he was told not to use carburetor heat, Logan Orr said he was "not necessarily told" not to use it and then said he was not told that.

When asked by the NTSB IIC based on his understanding on the use of carburetor heat based upon "as required," how does he know when to use it. Logan Orr said instances of required carburetor heat use would be in visible moisture such as rain on a colder day, during small temperature dewpoint spreads, or during very high humidity even with temperatures as high as 70-80 degrees. He said he looks at the temperature and dewpoint spread.

When asked by the NTSB IIC if he manipulated the fuel selector on N6571J, Logan Orr said that he always check that the fuel selector is on the proper tank when switched and monitors the fuel pressure gauge when he is the right seat. He would ask the student pilot to make the fuel selector changes because he cannot reach the fuel selector from the right seat. He said that he has not manipulated the fuel selector. When asked by the NTSB IIC if he changed the fuel selector on preflight, Logan Orr said he has moved it while on the ground and the last time he made that selection was in about the last month. He said he felt detents when changing the fuel selector position.

When asked by the NTSB IIC if he performed any aerodynamic stalls in N6571J on May 15, 2024, he said he did not because it was a cross-country flight, and they did not perform any stalls.

When asked by Thomas Farago if the fuel selector movement was stiff, Logan Orr said "it was fairly easy to move." Logan Orr said that he briefs his students and passengers that the fuel selector can be "easily moved or kicked." Once it is out of its detent, the fuel selector is easy to move. Logan Orr said the selector can be moved to the off position without going through a latch or a mechanical safeguard.

When asked when he last saw N6571J was equipped with shoulder harnesses, Logan Orr said the airplane was equipped with car shoulder harnesses and said there were shoulder harnesses present on May 15, 2024. Logan Orr then said he may be

getting confused with another Piper aircraft that Lord Aviation and doesn't remember if N6571J was equipped with shoulder harnesses.

NTSB | National Transportation Safety Board

Mitchell Gallo
Senior Aerospace Engineer, NTSB IIC
Aviation Safety – Central Region

Date: June 4, 2024

Subject: CEN24LA189, Record of Conversation

Contact: Sally Smith, witness

During a telephone conversation, Sally Smith stated that she did not see the airplane impact the ground and just heard it "flying low." She looked up and it sounded "terrible." She said she was outside in her yard pulling weeds when she looked up and thought that the airplane was "pretty low." She then turned her view away from the airplane because she was located along the airport traffic pattern. The airplane then made a "terrible terrible" sound that was prior to the impact. The airplane then impacted the ground, which was about three houses away from her position. She did not see the airplane impact with the ground, but it sounded like it was "falling apart" before it impacted the ground. She said she did not hear engine noise "as much as loose metal" as if it was "rattling around inside the engine," like "loose parts." She said there were workers cleaning a house that saw the airplane and they talked to law enforcement. She said the airplane was not descending in a steep nose down attitude. When she first saw the airplane, it was about 50 yds from her position. She said it sounded like "metal pieces inside the engine." She said there were no surveillance cameras that faced that accident flight path.

She was asked and agreed to provide my cellular phone number to anyone that witnessed the accident.

NTSB | National Transportation Safety Board

Mitchell Gallo
Senior Aerospace Engineer, NTSB IIC
Aviation Safety – Central Region

Date: June 3, 2024

Subject: CEN24LA189, Record of Conversation

Contact: Chloe Graves, student pilot

During a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC, Chloe Graves was asked how rapidly the throttle control was advanced when told to do so by Trishie McCaslin during the accident approach and recovery from a low altitude/airspeed. Chloe Graves stated that when Trishie McCaslin told her to push the throttle control forward, Chloe Graves pushed it forward and did not push it "super hard" but not "super slow." Chloe Graves was moving the throttle control "slow" at first because she did not want to "get it going too fast" and did not want to "overpower it" until Trishie McCaslin said push it all the way forward and repetitively said go forward/full. Chloe Graves advanced the throttle control fully forward and did not "slam" the throttle control forward, but the advancement of the throttle control was not "gentle" either.

When asked if that throttle control movement was similar to what was done during the accident flight takeoff and aerodynamic stalls, Chloe Graves said that the reason she was being cautious on the throttle control advancement during recovery from a low altitude/airspeed was because on the accident flight takeoff Chloe Graves accidently moved the throttle control forward "a little too rough," and Trishie McCaslin told her that you do not want to move the throttle control that quickly and to move it more gently. When asked by the NTSB IIC, how the engine responded during the little too rough throttle control advancement, Chloe Graves said that there was no hesitation of the engine, the engine accelerated normally, it operated fine, and Trishie McCaslin said nothing about the engine's performance. Chloe Graves did not slam the throttle control forward but moved is "too rapidly" on the accident takeoff.

When asked if the mixture control position was changed throughout the accident flgiht, Chloe Graves said that while performing aerodynamic stalls, they

changed the mixture control position. Chloe Graves said that the only thing she remembers about the mixture control position was that it was near the T-position of mixture spelled along the throttle quadrant. When asked if the mixture control position was advanced during the downwind leg of the accident approach/GUMP [gas, undercarriage, mixture, propeller] check, Chloe Graves said she could not remember.