



I, Michael Tuck, have read the foregoing pages of a copy of my interview that was held on June 28, 2022. These pages constitute a true and accurate transcription of same with the exception of the following amendments, additions, deletions or corrections:

<u>PAGE NO:</u>	<u>LINE NO:</u>	<u>CHANGE AND REASON FOR CHANGE</u>
Pg 1	Cover - Opening box	Mendon, Missouri NOT Mississippi
2	Bottom of Appearances	Division 17 NOT Division Center Team
5	8-9	Division 17 NOT Division Center Team
6	15	7:28 NOT except 28
7	9	amps NOT ears
9	11	Should be a comma after emergency
9	14	toned NOT turned

I declare that I have read my statements and that it is true and correct subject to any changes in the form or substance entered here.

Date: 8-16-2022

Witness: 




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<u>PAGE NO:</u>	<u>LINE NO:</u>	<u>CHANGE AND REASON FOR CHANGE</u>
10	13	jostling NOT Jocelyn
13	7	at NOT it
16	21	bulletins NOT wooltons
21	14	Kenner NOT Caron
25	"In the matter of"	Missouri NOT Mississippi

I declare that I have read my statements and that it is true and correct subject to any changes in the form or substance entered here.

Date: 8-16-2022

Witness: 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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FATAL AMTRAK GRADE CROSSING
COLLISION & DERAILMENT IN MENDON,
MISSISSIPPI ON JUNE 27, 2022

Accident No.: RRD22MR010

* * * * *

Interview of: MICHAEL TUCK, Locomotive Engineer
Amtrak

Mendon, Missouri

Tuesday,
June 28, 2022

APPEARANCES:

ZACH ZAGATA, Operations Group Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board

STEVE FACKLAN, Party Spokesman
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen

DAN BONAWITZ, JR., Party Spokesman
Smart Transportation Division

JOE MORRIS, Superintendent of Operations
Amtrak

PAUL OMARA, System Vice-President of Transportation
Amtrak

MICHAEL COOK, Director of Safety
BNSF Transportation

CHRIS GROOM, Operating Practices Inspector
Federal Railroad Administration

MICHAEL BACHMEIER, Office of the Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

BRIAN PORTER, Division Center Team, Local Chairman
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen

I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Michael Tuck:	
By Mr. Zagata	5
By Mr. Facklan	11
By Mr. Bonawitz	14
By Mr. Morris	16
By Mr. Omara	17
By Mr. Zagata	18
By Mr. Facklan	19
By Mr. Bonawitz	22
By Mr. Zagata	22

I N T E R V I E W

(2:10 p.m.)

1
2
3 MR. ZAGATA: Good afternoon. My name is Zach Zagata and I am
4 the NTSB Operations Group Chairman for this accident. We're here
5 today on June 28th, 2022, at 2:10 to conduct an interview with
6 Michael Tuck who works for Amtrak.

7 This interview is in conjunction with NTSB's investigation of
8 the grade crossing accident near Mendon, Missouri. The NTSB
9 accident reference number is RRD22MR010. The purpose of this
10 investigation is to increase safety and not to assign fault, blame
11 or liability.

12 Before we begin our interview and questions, let's go around
13 our table and introduce ourselves. Please spell your last name,
14 who you're representing and your title. I would like to remind
15 everybody to speak clearly so we can get an accurate recording.

16 I'll start off and then pass it to my right. Again my name
17 is Zach Zagata, Z-a-g-a-t-a, and I'm the NTSB Operation Group
18 Chairman.

19 MR. FACKLAN: Steve Facklan, F-a-c-k-l-a-n, Brotherhood of
20 Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, Party Spokesman.

21 MR. BONAWITZ: Dan Bonawitz, Jr., B-o-n-a-w-i-t-z, Smart
22 Transportation Division, Party Spokesman.

23 MR. MORRIS: Joe Morris with Amtrak. I'm sorry, M-o-r-r-i-s,
24 Amtrak, Superintendent of Operations.

25 MR. OMARA: Paul Omara, O-m-a-r-a, Amtrak, System Vice-

1 President of Transportation.

2 MR. COOK: Michael Cook, C-o-o-k, BNSF Transportation,
3 Director of Safety.

4 MR. GROOM: Chris Groom, G-r-o-o-m, FRA Operating Practices
5 Inspector.

6 MR. BACHMEIER: Michael Bachmeier, B-a-c-h-m-e-i-e-r, NTSB,
7 Office of the Investigator.

8 MR. PORTER: Brian Porter, P-o-r-t-e-r, BLET Division Center
9 Team, Local Chairman.

10 MR. TUCK: Michael Tuck, T-u-c-k, Amtrak Locomotive Engineer
11 at Kansas City.

12 MR. ZAGATA: Okay, thank you. Do we have your permission to
13 record our discussion with you today?

14 MR. TUCK: Yes, sir.

15 MR. ZAGATA: Okay. Do you understand that transcripts will
16 be part of the public docket and as such we cannot guarantee any
17 confidentiality?

18 MR. TUCK: Yes, sir.

19 MR. ZAGATA: Okay.

20 INTERVIEW OF MICHAEL TUCK

21 BY MR. ZAGATA:

22 Q. To start off with, if you could just give us an overview of
23 your railroad career.

24 A. I started with Amtrak 30 years ago and I've worked for Amtrak
25 for 30 years.

1 Q. Okay. Have you worked in this location the entire time or --

2 A. No, I've worked in several different locations. I actually
3 started out in the station for six months, then worked as a
4 conductor for three years, and the rest of my time has been as a
5 locomotive engineer. I've worked out of Kansas City, Chicago,
6 Milwaukee, Omaha.

7 Q. Okay, I appreciate it. Now, if you could give us a
8 description of your day, the day of the accident leading up to the
9 event.

10 A. From starting at what point?

11 Q. When you went on duty.

12 A. I went on duty at 9:00 a.m. that morning. Our train was late
13 and we got the job briefing. Nothing out of the norm. I wait
14 around for the train to get there, I think it departed at like
15 11:09 that morning, except 28 was supposed to be on time.

16 Q. Okay. And then once it departed, how did the rest of it go?

17 A. It was a busy day, but other than that, it was just a normal
18 trip.

19 Q. Okay. No issues with the train or anything?

20 A. No, sir. The train ran well. It was a good train.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Good equipment.

23 Q. Okay. How about the weather? Was it --

24 A. Clear, I mean, it wasn't hot that day, so --

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. -- it was nice.

2 Q. All right. Now, as you're approaching that crossing, let's
3 just say starting at a mile back, do you remember what throttle
4 you're in, approximate speed, and what you're doing with the
5 brakes and horn and that kind of stuff as you were coming up to
6 the crossing?

7 A. A mile back, I couldn't tell you what throttle position I was
8 in. It's kind of a slight downhill going into that, so I didn't
9 have any ears up at that time. It's pretty flat -- that's pretty
10 flat going through there.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. So --

13 Q. And then how about as you were coming in to the whistle board
14 there? Did you start blowing for the crossing?

15 A. Yes, sir, prior to or at the whistle board.

16 Q. Okay, all right. Then what were you doing as you were coming
17 up to that as far as throttle and before you start blowing the
18 horn? Do you remember?

19 A. I cannot say.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I'm sorry.

22 Q. That's all right, yes. So, as you were approaching that, do
23 you recall about how far back you were when you first noticed that
24 truck approaching that crossing?

25 A. Probably pretty close to the whistle board.

1 Q. Okay. Is it normal to see a lot of traffic going into that
2 area?

3 A. Not for me.

4 Q. Okay. Have you ever had any close calls there before?

5 A. Not that I recollect.

6 Q. Okay. So, as you saw that truck started coming, you started
7 blowing right at the whistle board or whereabouts?

8 A. Prior to.

9 Q. Okay, prior to. Did you realize at a certain point as you
10 were approaching that that he wasn't going to make it through the
11 crossing there?

12 A. Repeat that one more time, please.

13 Q. Was there a point when you realized, you thought that he
14 wasn't going to make it all the way through the crossing, that you
15 were going to impact, or did you think the entire time that he was
16 going to get through there?

17 A. It was questionable.

18 Q. Okay. As far as the brakes at that point, what were you
19 doing with the brakes?

20 A. I'm whistling. I don't know if I had set a minimum; I would
21 have set a minimum, if anything, just to see but I really can't
22 tell you.

23 Q. Okay. Did you put the train into emergency --

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. -- at any point? Okay.

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Was that before impact or after?

3 A. Prior to.

4 Q. Prior to. Do you remember about how far prior to?

5 A. I speculate three seconds.

6 Q. Okay. Does that happen quite a bit where when you see trucks
7 trying to -- or vehicles trying to run crossings and you're not at
8 this location, but just in general in crossings like this?

9 A. I would say no.

10 Q. No, okay. After the accident, what did you do? You put the
11 train into emergency after the impact and then can you kind of
12 talk us through what happened there?

13 A. I got on the radio and called out emergency three times and
14 gave them a mile post location. I turned up the dispatcher at
15 911. I didn't really know what was happening behind me at that
16 point. I just knew that we had an impact, and both mirrors were
17 tucked in so I couldn't see anything on either side. And I told
18 the dispatcher that we went into emergency and hit a dump truck, I
19 would have said,.

20 Q. How long did you sit on the train for after that?

21 A. In the locomotive?

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. Not very long because I know when I talked to him, he of
24 course wanted information. I can't see anything behind me. I --
25 my mirror, I can actually see out a little bit and I can see the

1 other engine and the baggage car leaning. So, at that point I had
2 just told him that we had two cars on the ground. I couldn't get
3 out on the fireman's side because the door was compacted and I
4 couldn't get it open.

5 So, I mean, at that point I climbed off the engine and looked
6 and I could see at that point, you know, I had to walk around both
7 sides of the train and see that we were no longer on the rails.

8 Q. Okay. What did you do after that? Did you assist
9 passengers?

10 A. I went back up on the engine and let him know what we had as
11 far as all the cars on the ground. And I didn't know -- I mean,
12 eventually, I talked to our conductor on the radio and you could
13 kind of just hear Jocelyn (ph.) back there and I told the
14 dispatcher, I said, listen, there's -- we need all the personnel
15 you can get and I'm going back. There was nothing more I could do
16 from the engine.

17 Q. Okay. I appreciate it. As far as the speed on that, what's
18 the max speed at that location?

19 A. 90.

20 Q. 90. And do you recall how approximately how fast you were
21 going? Do you remember looking?

22 A. About close to 90.

23 Q. About 90?

24 A. There was no beeps or anything going off, so it wasn't --

25 Q. Okay. I appreciate that.

1 MR. ZAGATA: That's all I've got for now. I'm going to pass
2 it to my right.

3 MR. FACKLAM: Steve Facklan, F-a-c-k-l-a-n, BLET Safety Task
4 Force, Party Spokesman.

5 BY MR. FACKLAM:

6 Q. Let's see, you went on duty at your -- 9:00 a.m. is that your
7 normal start time or do you get a call?

8 A. I got a call the night before for one setback and then I took
9 another setback in the morning because the train had lost more
10 time. 6:43 is my normal sign up time.

11 Q. Okay. When did you get this second call? Before work?

12 A. I could look at my phone, I don't know.

13 Q. And --

14 A. It was early, it was probably 4:00. I know I had set my
15 alarm and it was before my alarm even went off for the first call.
16 So, it's probably 5:30 in the morning.

17 Q. Okay. And how long did they move your start time back then?

18 A. I think I had a 7:00 start time. No, that wouldn't be right.
19 I would have to look at my phone. I took the first call at
20 probably 10:30 the night before and then they set me back again in
21 the morning because the train had lost more time.

22 Q. Now, the first time, how far did they set you back?

23 A. An hour.

24 Q. And --

25 A. So, it probably would have been -- I would say it was an

1 hour. I get setback so much anymore I can't remember the day or
2 the times.

3 Q. I work in the same line so I understand that. The second
4 time --

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. -- they called you, how far did they set you back then?

7 A. If they set me back an hour the first time, then set me back
8 probably another hour and a half --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I went on duty at 9:00. I was supposed to go on at 6:43,
11 so --

12 Q. Does that affect your sleep?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Okay. And you're saying it's pretty much a normal day, maybe
15 a little busy with train traffic out there?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Okay. Good equipment. When you're approaching the crossing,
18 you started whistling either at the whistle board or before?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. And you're whistling before you even notice the track?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Okay. And as you're coming up to the crossing, it's just --
23 you said right at the whistle board you kind of started noticing
24 the truck or right after the whistle board?

25 A. Probably right around there. Yes, sir.

1 Q. Okay. Did he look like he was going to -- did he look like
2 he even saw you or was he -- did he see you and maybe tried to
3 race you to get over the crossing or he --

4 A. I don't believe that.

5 Q. You don't think he even saw the train?

6 A. That would be -- I can't answer for that. All I can tell you
7 is I saw him and he was moving it, you know, whatever the country
8 road speed was.

9 Q. Did he -- I think there was a stop sign there -- did he stop
10 before he went across the tracks?

11 A. I can't answer that either.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. I don't know. I can't say for sure so I won't say.

14 Q. Okay, all right. As you were -- you went about -- you said
15 it was about three seconds when it looked like you were going to
16 impact when he wasn't going to make it across?

17 A. I'm guessing that --

18 (Crosstalk)

19 A. When I put into emergency, I didn't -- just from working at
20 the railroad, I thought he would clear. I thought it would just
21 be a near-miss and I don't know what -- by the time I put it in
22 emergency knowing what it was, I got on the floor.

23 Q. You hit the floor?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. And the impact, did it toss you around, did you --

1 A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Okay, okay.

3 MR. FACKLAM: Well, that's all I have for right now.

4 MR. BONAWITZ: Dan Bonawitz, B-o-n-a-w-i-t-z, Smart
5 Transportation Division, Assistant Coordinator for the National
6 Safety Team.

7 BY MR. BONAWITZ:

8 Q. First and foremost, thank you for all you did. I think you
9 guys did a great job and I'm sorry that anybody has to go through
10 a critical incident like this. So, I want you to know that, you
11 know, we feel for what you've had to go through.

12 I want to go back to what you said about being set backed,
13 that your normal on duty time was 6:43. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. And, so, you recall the first time -- and we're all
16 approximate here, about 10:30 p.m. and you got set backed
17 approximately an hour and then what was the time approximately the
18 second call came to you?

19 A. I guessed 5:30, but I --

20 Q. It's all approximate.

21 A. Yes, I'm guessing. The crew --

22 (Crosstalk)

23 A. I can -- if you want me to get my phone out --

24 Q. No --

25 A. -- I can turn it on.

1 Q. So, the first time, it's eight hours before you're supposed
2 to go on duty and the second time would be two hours before you're
3 supposed to go on duty from the first setback. So, if I
4 understand this correct, your normal duty's at 6:43 and your first
5 call was at 10:30 p.m., approximately eight hours before your on-
6 duty time, setback an hour to 7:43, we'll just say, or next call
7 approximately 5:30 and it's set back a little more. So, now
8 you're two hours from that first --

9 A. Um-hum.

10 Q. -- setback call time.

11 A. Um-hum.

12 Q. And you said that that happens a lot.

13 A. At times.

14 Q. So, it's infrequent, you know, you go to work normally and
15 then some days it'll just -- you'll get setbacks. With -- how do
16 you get your rest on something like that?

17 A. I just do.

18 (Crosstalk)

19 A. -- the night before, how the train's looking and there's --
20 we're at the mercy of the other railroads right now getting across
21 the road. So --

22 Q. I understand completely. The only other question I'd like to
23 go towards is when you got off, you went back to see what was
24 going on and help out. Were you physically on any of the cars or
25 were you from the ground helping?

1 A. I was on the cars.

2 Q. Was it easy to get people out or was it -- how did that
3 transpire?

4 A. The ones I helped get out, they were -- and most of what I
5 was doing was getting people off the cars and getting them over --

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. -- to the -- so I kind of went up from the bottom and climbed
8 up the bottom.

9 Q. Okay. So, you came in from the bottom and you were able --

10 A. And I got to the top and would get people down from there.

11 Q. Okay. For now that's it. Thanks for all you did.

12 A. Thank you.

13 MR. MORRIS: Joe Morris, I'm the Amtrak Superintendent.

14 BY MR. MORRIS:

15 Q. Mike, with the setbacks, how did you feel? Did you feel
16 rested?

17 A. I was fine.

18 Q. Fatigue didn't factor in in any way?

19 A. No, sir.

20 Q. All right. And there wasn't anything temporary on your track
21 wooltons (ph.) and then very -- within the vicinity of the
22 incident?

23 A. There was about to be.

24 Q. About to be.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. But --

2 A. Prior to?

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. No.

5 Q. Okay. And did you put the train in emergency as soon as you
6 knew that there was a danger of impact?

7 A. When I thought the potential was there, yes, sir.

8 Q. Okay. And after you went back, you just remained back and
9 rendered aid for the rest of the time?

10 A. I would go back to the engine and periodically check in with
11 the dispatcher and let him know what we were up against, you know,
12 just essentially assessed the situation and moved on from there
13 because it would change frequently. And so, I would go back and
14 forth. I was on people's cellphones, you know, different people,
15 passengers because they would call 911, they would want me to
16 speak, but I would still go back to the engine, talked to dispatch
17 and said this where we are, this is what we need.

18 Q. That's all I have.

19 MR. OMARA: Paul Omara, O-m-a-r-a, Amtrak.

20 BY MR. OMARA:

21 Q. Mike, you said you had -- as far as you felt the equipment
22 was in good shape --

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. -- good equipment?

25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. Okay. You were operating with PTC --

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. -- on?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. No issues? And it was braking okay throughout the trip, no
6 exceptions to the brakes? Okay. Nothing else.

7 MR. COOK: Michael Cook, C-o-o-k, NSF Transportation Safety
8 Director. I don't have any questions, but I would like to
9 complement you on how professional and calm you were when you were
10 talking to the dispatcher. That was very, very good.

11 MR. TUCK: Thank you.

12 MR. GROM: Chris Groom, G-r-o-o-m, FRA Operating Practices
13 Inspector. And I just want to say job well done from our
14 standpoint. On the radio, you were very professional in helping
15 out in the situation that you were going into. But I think all
16 the gentlemen in front of me had covered all the questions I was
17 looking at, so I don't have anything at this time.

18 MR. TUCK: Thank you.

19 MR. ZAGATA: Zach Zagata, NTSB, Z-a-g-a-t-a.

20 BY MR. ZAGATA:

21 Q. In regards to the emergency response, how do you think that
22 was falling? Pretty quick as far as response time?

23 A. I thought everything was -- I mean, all things considered.
24 We had scouts on the train, they helped out. We had -- as chaotic
25 as maybe the scene looked, it wasn't chaotic out. The people were

1 responding as you hoped human beings would respond in a situation
2 like that. And that includes all the emergency personnel and
3 passengers helping each other. People weren't getting -- they
4 weren't panicking.

5 Q. How long did you think it was before the local responders
6 showed up?

7 A. I can't say.

8 Q. That's --

9 (Crosstalk)

10 A. It's never going to be fast enough.

11 Q. But you felt like when they arrived, it was all pretty
12 organized? They seemed like they were -- they knew what they were
13 doing?

14 A. I can't say. That's not my position.

15 Q. I got you. Understood, understood. Okay. That's all I've
16 got.

17 MR. FACKLAN: Steven Facklan, F-a-c-k-l-a-n, BLET, Party
18 Spokesman.

19 BY MR. FACKLAN:

20 Q. Going into some of the emergency response, I couldn't quite
21 remember about how long the first -- it took for the first
22 responders to get out there. I mean, are we talking 10 minutes or
23 half hour or --

24 A. You know what, I can't say because it's not like the
25 emergency responders were wearing a specific uniform that says I'm

1 here to help. I mean, they were -- probably a lot of volunteers
2 that showed up looking like we're sitting here at the table. And
3 so, I don't know who the emergency responders are or I don't know
4 who the passengers are. I was also -- I started at the front and
5 from where that road crossing is, they were starting towards the
6 rear. So, it was probably a work --

7 (Crosstalk)

8 Q. Do you recall if it was like the local Mendon area?

9 A. They were -- I would be speculating -- but I mean it was a
10 lot of counties there. I saw a lot of different county shirts,
11 so --

12 Q. Did more response keep coming?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Okay. And you were talking about your going back and forth
17 to the engine. I work in freight and I'm sure it's similar. The
18 engine has the more powerful radio --

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. -- to communicate with.

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Correct? And that's --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- kind of why you go and forth because you're probably the
25 main conduit with the dispatching?

- 1 A. Yes, he can --
- 2 Q. Can he hear that? Can he hear the radio --
- 3 (Crosstalk)
- 4 A. He can hear the portable, but they're very faint. And the
5 other thing, too, is anything I'm transmitting over our radio,
6 other people around can hear. So, I mean, other freight, you
7 know, I mean, it was probably pretty critical once I said
8 emergency and where we were at that another freight train doesn't
9 go by on main track number 1 at that point because then you'd have
10 a second disaster on your hands.
- 11 Q. Yes. Okay. After the response, about how long from after
12 the accident happened to -- how long was it -- how long did you
13 remain on scene?
- 14 A. Ben Caron {ph.} would be the person to ask about that because
15 we left with him, and once again, time froze that day.
- 16 Q. Yes, I imagine.
- 17 (Crosstalk)
- 18 A. So, I can't tell you from the day it happened to the time it
19 left, it was all still the same time and running on adrenaline.
- 20 Q. And then was it Amtrak that picked you up?
- 21 A. Yes, sir.
- 22 Q. And they -- where did they take you after that?
- 23 A. Provided lodging.
- 24 Q. Provided lodging over there?
- 25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. Okay. And you got fed and everything --

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. -- treated well?

4 A. Yes, yes, treated well.

5 Q. Okay. That's all I have. Thank you.

6 MR. BONAWITZ: Dan Bonawitz, B-o-n-a-w-i-t-z, Smart TD.

7 BY MR. BONAWITZ:

8 Q. Did you receive any emergency response training from Amtrak?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. How to respond?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. And how is that done? What -- is it computer-based, is it
13 classroom? Is it --

14 A. Classroom, yearly.

15 Q. Okay. That's all I have.

16 A. Okay.

17 MR. ZAGATA: All right, NTSB, Zagata.

18 BY MR. ZAGATA:

19 Q. Last question for you. So, as far as the equipment, did you
20 feel like you had everything you needed to assist those
21 passengers?

22 A. Ladders would have been nice, but other than that, yes. I
23 mean, we had -- I took the first aid kits off the engines we had
24 up there. We had -- I mean, it's kind -- we had two engines that
25 had refrigerators full of water, so we took all the water off the

1 engines and we're distributing it before BNSF showed up and they
2 had -- they provided plenty of water for the responders and
3 everybody. But as far as, you know, we had plenty of -- I mean, a
4 ladder would have been very handy for some of the -- I mean, we
5 still managed to unload them and I don't think anybody got hurt
6 while unloading. But kind of tricky with some of the, you know,
7 older and not mobile people.

8 Q. You feel like you had enough first aid kits and all that?

9 A. Sure.

10 Q. Okay. What about the lighting?

11 A. It was -- train was on the side and the doors were open, so
12 the sun was shining right in, the top of the cars were hot and --

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. -- plenty of lighting.

15 Q. All right. No, I appreciate it and I appreciate you helping
16 us out with this. Last question. Is there anything you think
17 could be done to prevent something like this from happening again?

18 A. I mean, it was an accident. So, I don't have an answer for
19 that.

20 Q. Okay, I appreciate it.

21 MR. ZAGATA: Well, if nobody else has any additional
22 questions, we'll conclude the interview. I appreciate it.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thanks for your time, Mike.

24 MR. TUCK: Thank you, guys.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I appreciate all you do.

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(Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: FATAL AMTRAK GRADE CROSSING
COLLISION & DERAILMENT IN MENDON,
MISSISSIPPI ON JUNE 27, 2022
Interview of Michael Tuck

ACCIDENT NO.: RRD22MR010

PLACE: Mendon, Missouri

DATE: June 28, 2022

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Maria Socorro R. Abellar
Transcriber