

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COLLISION

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GRANITE CANYON, WYOMING

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Accident No.: RRD19FR001

OCTOBER 4, 2018

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Interview of: JOHNATHAN POWELL
Engineer

Plains Hotel
Cheyenne, Wyoming

Saturday,
October 6, 2018

APPEARANCES:

TED T. TURPIN, Railroad Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DONALD MAI, Operating Practices Safety Inspector
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

JOHN ALLBERRY, General Director Safety
Union Pacific Railroad

JON ELLEFSON, Manager Operating Practices
Union Pacific Railroad

BRIAN FRANSEN, Primary Investigator
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen
(BLET)

CARL SMITH, Safety Team Member
SMART Transportation Division

KOREY McDANIEL, Safety Team Member
SMART Transportation Division

BRIAN GRADY, President
BLET Local 103
(On behalf of Mr. Powell)

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I N T E R V I E W

1
2 MR. TURPIN: Good morning. My name is Ted Turpin and we're
3 conducting interviews in connection with an accident that happened
4 near Granite Canyon, Wyoming on October 4th, 2018. The accident
5 number is RR19FR001. Today is October 6th, 2018, and we're at the
6 Plains Hotel in Cheyenne, Wyoming and we're interviewing the
7 engineer from the standing train. Correct?

8 MR. POWELL: Yes.

9 MR. TURPIN: Mr. Powell. Can you state your name and spell
10 it, please?

11 MR. POWELL: Jonathan, Powell, P-O-W-E-L-L. Do you need the
12 first.

13 MR. TURPIN: All right. Thank you.

14 MR. POWELL: Jo-n.

15 MR. TURPIN: Jon -- Jonathan. Jon.

16 MR. POWELL: Yeah.

17 MR. TURPIN: And by the way, you understand this is being
18 recorded?

19 MR. POWELL: Okay.

20 MR. TURPIN: Okay. Thank you. And your name?

21 MR. GRADY: My name is Brian Grady.

22 MR. TURPIN: Uh-hum.

23 MR. GRADY: I forgot what --

24 MR. TURPIN: Spell it.

25 MR. GRADY: B-R-I-A-N, G-R-A-D-Y.

1 MR. TURPIN: And your position?

2 MR. GRADY: I'm the BLE 103 Local's president.

3 MR. TURPIN: All right. Good. We'll go on around the room.

4 MR. ALLBERRY: John Allberry, A-L-L-B-E-R-R-Y. Operating
5 practices for Union Pacific.

6 MR. FRANSEN: Brian Fransen, B-R-I-A-N, F-R-A-N-S-E-N,
7 primary investigator, BLET Safety Task Force.

8 MR. McDANIEL: Korey McDaniel, K-O-R-E-Y, M-C-D-A-N-I-E-L,
9 SMART TD Safety Team.

10 MR. SMITH: Carl Smith, C-A-R-L, S-M-I-T-H, SMART TD Safety
11 Team.

12 MR. ELLEFSON: Jon Ellefson, J-O-N, E-L-L-E-F-S-O-N, manager
13 of operating practices, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

14 MR. MAI: Donald Mai, M-A-I, OP safety inspector, FRA,
15 Denver, Colorado.

16 MR. TURPIN: Very good. Also, I'm going to ask you if
17 there's anybody in the room you're uncomfortable with being here?

18 MR. POWELL: Not right now.

19 MR. TURPIN: Okay. You're allowed to throw them out except
20 for me.

21 MR. POWELL: Okay.

22 INTERVIEW OF JONATHAN POWELL

23 BY MR. TURPIN:

24 Q. We start with just a -- I just want to start with a
25 general -- just tell me what happened.

1 A. Okay. There was a westbound that had a break in two on 2
2 track, about milepost 526, roughly. And all these numbers won't
3 be exact, but it's close as I can tell. And we had had to stop
4 because there was a train ahead or eastbound on 1 track. We
5 stopped about milepost 527. Because we're so far away from the
6 signal, PTC had us going restricted speed to the next
7 intermediate.

8 We talked to the crew. They were in a red zone, so we
9 decided to wait till they were out of the red zone to proceed
10 since we were following a train anyway. And as soon as we got
11 them out the way, they were all clear of their train, they started
12 building up air, we proceeded at restricted speed.

13 We probably got about a half a mile, if that, and heard on
14 the radio -- that would be channel 27 -- I thought it was a
15 dispatcher but I'm not sure, repeating emergency, emergency,
16 emergency, runaway equipment. He started out saying that it was
17 at CPW530, and just seconds later CPW528. So we didn't know if it
18 was just going really fast or he hadn't noticed until it hit 528.
19 And my first thought was to ask the crew that was facing west if
20 they could see anything. I don't remember what I said on the
21 radio, but I was trying to get some information about that so I
22 could decide -- for a split second, I was thinking, should I pull
23 up; should I try get out of the way, in case they are slowing down
24 so that they have time?

25 And when I couldn't get enough information to tell for sure

1 if that was happening, we went ahead and plugged the train. And
2 we got out and took off. We had hazmat. We didn't know how big
3 the impact was going to be, so we got as far -- as much distance
4 as we could. So we went up towards the interstate and hung out
5 for a few, maybe a minute or two. And that's about, that's about
6 it.

7 Q. Okay. Good. With the eastbound or -- excuse me -- the
8 westbound broke in two, you assumed that the runaway was on your
9 track?

10 A. Well, the dispatcher did say 1 track runaway equipment, so
11 that's how we -- or whoever was on the radio.

12 Q. One track runaway. Okay. We are going to get that, the
13 tapes, so --

14 A. Yeah. And also, we never heard them because apparently they
15 were still on channel 24, which is up until 528, so -- where the
16 split happens with the radio stations. So we never heard the
17 actual crew.

18 Q. Okay. So on the Cheyenne side, it's what channel?

19 A. 2727.

20 Q. Uh-huh.

21 A. And then above Granite it's 2424.

22 Q. Okay. So you never did hear the striking train crew at all?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Okay. Did you know they were following you at any time
25 earlier?

1 A. I figured they might be eventually because we'd caught trains
2 and they were at Laramie when we went through Laramie and we saw
3 them finishing up their work. But I --

4 Q. Okay. They were doing their pick-up when you went --

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. -- at Laramie?

7 A. They were just coming back to their train. I saw the
8 conductor riding cars to get his train back together.

9 Q. Uh-hum.

10 A. So we met them there.

11 Q. You know what time that was, or about?

12 A. Hard to say. It was still light.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Probably 2, 3 hours. Because we went up to Hermosa and sat
15 for a good hour at the CPW549 waiting for Z trains and that kind
16 of stuff. So it could've been at 4:30, 5, somewhere in there.

17 Q. Okay. We can find that through data.

18 A. Oh, yeah.

19 Q. So, you know, PTC is pretty much brand new now for a lot of
20 places and I haven't had a lot of exposure to it, but I'm -- I
21 just want you to kind of explain to me down here, as you approach
22 Cheyenne, how you came into town. You hit a -- I'm assuming you
23 hit a CP and had to stop, to start with.

24 A. Down the hill you mean?

25 Q. Yeah.

1 A. Oh. No, we actually just caught trains ahead that were
2 moving, as far as I remember. We were getting lights as they were
3 clearing up. But the train ahead of us had stopped for the, I
4 believe, the train that was in an emergency; they either stopped
5 or slowed down. That's why we were catching their blocks.

6 Q. Okay. So what was the first restrictive signal you got?

7 A. I believe it was the signal east of CPW528. I'm not a
8 hundred percent on that.

9 Q. Was it a flasher?

10 A. I think 528 was an approach. And the next signal was red
11 restrict and proceed, because it was an intermediate signal.

12 Q. Okay. Do you have to stop at restrict and proceeds?

13 A. No. Not right now, we don't.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Unless they change the rule again.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You would've had to and they changed
17 it to where you don't.

18 MR. POWELL: A long time ago, yeah, they changed that.

19 BY MR. TURPIN:

20 Q. So they're proceed at restricted speed?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. But at that point we already knew we were following a train
24 and we just stopped, because we knew that crew was working on
25 their train and there's no need to rush on blocks, especially down

1 the hill. So I figured it was a good opportunity to stop and get
2 my air back when I could eventually pull.

3 Q. You can hold them there, with the engines?

4 A. No. Not with that train. It was too big, too heavy.

5 Q. So how did you get your air back?

6 A. Well, I start low and slow. Start out in heavy dynamics and
7 it gives you enough time to build your air.

8 Q. Okay. Low and slow. You don't put it in reverse or -- no,
9 never mind.

10 A. No. I probably could've because we're all ACs, but I didn't
11 think that was necessary.

12 Q. Okay. So when you leave the intermediate, it never did
13 clear; it stayed red. You leave that. You say you're working in
14 a PTC situation, right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So you know that it's overriding if -- you can't exceed what?

17 A. Twenty. Twenty-one, I think, is when it will put you in
18 penalty.

19 Q. Penalty?

20 A. Because -- yeah, restricted speed.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. And I believe the signal probably cleared up and the screen
23 was showing it, because other train had pulled forward. But we
24 stopped more than 1500 feet back from the intermediate, so it's
25 not going to tell you you're okay to go above restricted speed

1 until you pass that next signal.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. And plus, after you're already stopped your restricted speed,
4 we were watching for any kind of test flag, any kind of problems,
5 plus the crew was working on the train making sure they're out of
6 the way. So we were going pretty slow.

7 Q. Okay. So what was the tonnage on your train?

8 A. 13,400 some, I think.

9 Q. Okay. Is that heavy? Normal?

10 A. It's not out of the usual, I don't think.

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. It's a lot -- they're getting a lot longer lately, but --

13 Q. Yeah. What's the biggest train you've had?

14 A. Over 12,000 feet.

15 Q. And tonnage?

16 A. I don't remember.

17 Q. But bigger than this one?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. So let's go back to the top of the hill, and walk me through
22 how you bring these big trains down off the hill and into
23 Cheyenne.

24 A. Okay. Well, we have a speed chart for -- that takes into
25 account our tons per operative brake and our dynamics, our tons

1 per equivalent dynamic brake axle, and the chart tells you your
2 max speed. And we also have a rule that at 536, CPW536, even
3 though is not at the top of the hill, that -- the cresting grade
4 rule, you have to meet that at 5 under.

5 Q. So what did this train, this day qualify for?

6 A. Thirty-five.

7 Q. And that's because of?

8 A. It was -- the tons per operative was too high. It was
9 like -- I can't remember what it was, but it was higher.

10 Q. All right. Is there a lower speed you have to go sometimes?

11 A. Twenty is the lowest, I believe, and 25 is pretty normal for
12 a real heavy train.

13 Q. How were you able to qualify for 35?

14 A. The tons per operative, it's -- do you have a chart? It's in
15 there probably. The green one.

16 It's in the middle. Where did you put this at? Oh, it just
17 kind of breaks in the middle. Are we missing -- let's see.

18 Laramie --

19 BY MR. TURPIN:

20 Q. So how did -- while he's looking -- how did they base this
21 equivalent dynamic brake?

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Here's the latest general order.

23 MR. POWELL: Oh -- that's our chart. There's an eastbound
24 chart for going east down the hill, then there's another chart for
25 the other side of the hill on 3 track going into Laramie. You

1 have to --

2 BY MR. TURPIN:

3 Q. All right. So maximum speed table between milepost -- that's
4 7060 --

5 A. Let me check. I think it's the next page. Oh, here it is.
6 Well, this is the actual, sorry.

7 Q. Go ahead.

8 A. This is the actual chart right here --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. -- on there. We were over 250 on our tons for equivalent
11 dynamic; we were between 251 and 500. And we were less in 99 tons
12 per operative. So that made us --

13 Q. Got you. Okay. So you're working your dynamic against your
14 tons per operative brakes to come up with the speed?

15 A. A combination, yes.

16 Q. I got you. So what do you think they mean equivalent dynamic
17 brake, though? What do they base that on?

18 A. That's based on your total dynamic brake power on your motors
19 against your weight of your train. So it's your tonnage divided
20 by your dynamic power.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. The best I can explain it. So --

23 Q. All right. No, that's fine, that's fine. So this day, this
24 particular train, let's take you back up. You're at 537, you know
25 you're going to shoot for 35, so you tipping over, I'm assuming,

1 at 30?

2 A. Yeah, right around there.

3 Q. All right. Walk me through how you brought her down the
4 hill.

5 A. I'll have to think about this because that's not the biggest
6 event of the night. With that train, with its length, you try to
7 wait as long as you can to set the air because 536 is kind of --
8 it's not really flat but it's a break in the grade, and if you set
9 your air to soon it'll really bog you down, which is why I don't
10 like to -- going 500, but --

11 Q. So you stay in power first?

12 A. Yeah. Well, I stayed in dynamics, and I held it with
13 dynamics as long as possible.

14 Q. Okay. So you go dynamics first and then you set air?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. Okay.

17 A. On that train. That's not every train, but on that train.

18 Q. Uh-hum.

19 A. Then I just -- from there, it was just working with the air
20 system. I had a lot of empties, so those always stick pretty good
21 and sometimes you have to adjust your air as you go.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. This train wasn't so heavy on the tons per operative that I
24 would've felt uncomfortable kicking the brakes off if I needed to,
25 to reset them, as long as I have my speed down, you know.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. -- you know?

3 Q. What do you think your -- just estimate, your target would
4 be? How slow would you try to get it?

5 A. I don't -- it just depends on the feel at the time, and I'm
6 having a hard time remembering. But probably 20, 25.

7 Q. Okay. You never dip all the way down like to 10 or
8 something?

9 A. No, not usually. Not unless it's a real heavy train and I
10 know I'm really going to need more time to build up my air.

11 Q. Okay. So you don't recall if you cycled on this guy, or --

12 A. I think I had to because it was -- it's hard to -- I can't
13 remember if I had to up above or I just had to after I stopped.

14 But up above I might've had to, and I had to use my DP to
15 push on me a couple of times because the air was a little too
16 much. So it was probably fighting it. It was a little -- this is
17 the kind of train that it's not heavy enough to keep you going but
18 heavy enough you have to use the air. So it just kind of is
19 fighting --

20 Q. How deep were you in it? How big a set?

21 A. Just the minimum, I'd imagine. After we stopped I had to get
22 a deep set because it took off a lot of quicker than I thought it
23 would, so I made a deeper set. And I hadn't had as much time as I
24 wanted to get the air back --

25 Q. Yep.

1 A. -- so I made it, I don't know, 12 to 14 pounds set to hold it
2 at restricted speed.

3 Q. Okay. Plus you were close to the bottom anyway, right?

4 A. Well, no, we're still, what --

5 Q. Oh, yeah, you're --

6 A. -- 15 miles from the bottom.

7 Q. That's right. I'm sorry.

8 A. Yeah. I was thinking as soon as I was out of the restricted
9 speed I was going to have to kick the air off again, because I'd
10 set enough -- it was picking up speed quick enough that I had to
11 address it, but -- so I had to set more air than I would've liked.
12 So it would've been a fight the rest way down the hill. I
13 would've had to slow down, kick the air off, hold the dynamics as
14 long as I could again.

15 Q. Get it -- get a wider bite.

16 A. Yeah. It was just one of those trains that's -- you kind of
17 have to do multiple different things down the hill on it.

18 Q. So when you go to power on the DPU, that's when they talk
19 about putting the fence up?

20 A. Yeah, putting the fence up.

21 Q. Okay. How did you -- prior to that, did you have the fence
22 down and everything was just dynamic?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Yep. I think so.

1 Q. Is that handy with the -- in the middle of the train?

2 A. It can be. On this train it wasn't. It was so long that,
3 only one DP, it was always dropping main reservoir below the 100
4 mark, where's starts to turn red on you, and it was slow to pump
5 the train. So, I mean, it was faster than if it would've been a
6 conventional train, but it was -- it took quite a while for it to
7 catch up with the air on the rear portion of the train and then
8 whatever is in between the head in there. Did that answer the --

9 Q. Yeah. No, that's good. No, that's real interesting. I
10 wasn't around DP as much.

11 A. Yeah, it wasn't till about '06 they started those here.

12 Q. Yeah. Well, we actually had something called remote
13 locomotives, and they were kind of the grandfather to them.

14 And I had something else -- oh, in the PTC situation, you
15 know, if you exceed one of the parameters, it's going to go to
16 full service?

17 A. Yeah. I think that's the first step of it, isn't it?

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You'll go into penalty.

19 MR. POWELL: Yeah.

20 BY MR. TURPIUN:

21 Q. Penalty. Like PC, like an overspeed?

22 A. Yeah. It does have the capability of putting it in
23 emergency, from my understanding, but --

24 Q. And what would cause that?

25 A. Probably when it thinks there's no chance you stopping for --

1 at the rate you're going for a red block, I imagine.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There's an algorithm for speed and
3 distance --

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don't think there's a program.

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- (indiscernible) those together, and
6 if it exceeds that algorithm, it'll stop the train.

7 MR. TURPIN: Now does it try the full service first, like in
8 a double hit?

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It goes right to it.

10 MR. TURPIN: Or it just goes right to it, if it recognizes
11 that there's no --

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Right, as possible second, it goes to
13 penalty to get you stopped.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Braking force -- yeah.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.

16 MR. TURPIN: Okay.

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Never heard of one going in an
18 emergency though --

19 MR. POWELL: Not yet. I've never seen one --

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's because you're running good.

21 MR. TURPIN: Yeah. You're staying in, you're staying inside
22 the --

23 MR. POWELL: Running slow, yeah.

24 MR. TURPIN: I don't think that's a big problem, to tell you
25 the truth.

1 MR. POWELL: No, especially if you're working on red blocks,
2 so --

3 MR. TURPIN: Yeah.

4 All right. Now I'll go around the room and see if anybody
5 else has any questions? Don?

6 MR. MAI: Why don't you go that way?

7 MR. TURPIN: Yeah, I can go that way.

8 Do you want to clarify anything? John?

9 MR. ALBERRY: I liked hearing how you take trains down that
10 hill. Interesting.

11 MR. POWELL: Thank you.

12 MR. FRANSEN: Yeah, I don't have anything, Jon, that Ted
13 didn't hit on it, anyways. I mean, it seems like you guys did a
14 real good job, so --

15 MR. TURPIN: Korey?

16 MR. McDANIEL: Yes, we don't -- I can't say anything here.
17 There's -- had them on mountain grade.

18 MR. POWELL: Yeah.

19 MR. ELLEFSON: I could just say I was there when Mr. Powell
20 came by and he was exercising extreme caution coming by that
21 train, so -- he did a nice job that night.

22 MR. TURPIN: Cool.

23 MR. MAI: I've got two questions.

24 MR. TURPIN: Say your name first.

25 MR. MAI: Don Mai, FRA.

1 BY MR. MAI:

2 Q. So you came to a stop by putting your train in emergency,
3 right?

4 A. Yeah, when we couldn't figure out how close that train was or
5 how fast it was going.

6 Q. Okay. And then you got off and went up by the interstate and
7 stood?

8 A. Yeah, we jumped over the fence and got as much up the hill we
9 could. There was a bank up to the interstate.

10 Q. Did you go back to the train?

11 A. Yes. We -- the thing I don't understand is if it hit before
12 we came off the train or after. And I don't know if it was just
13 adrenaline, but I never heard anything. So I don't know if I was
14 still in the cab is why, or -- I'm not -- I have no idea. I'm
15 sure the tapes will show the times, but -- we just waited because
16 we didn't hear anything.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And the PTI van, I think is -- maybe a minute or two later,
19 came up to our head end, and I went and talked to him and that's
20 when we realized that it had impacted. Our view was obscured by
21 the overpass, but when we came back to our train we could see dust
22 and a cloud at that time.

23 Q. And I don't think this really matters, but just a point of
24 interest is, did you reset the air on your engine, on your train?

25 A. No. I left it --

1 Q. Do you know who might have?

2 A. If they did it, it was after I left. Because I left it in
3 emergency. We looked at the brake chart and did secondary
4 securement as best we could. We didn't want to get -- I didn't
5 want my conductor too close to -- we didn't know what kind of
6 hazmat was involved, so we tied it as best we could and then
7 notified the Cheyenne yardmaster and managers of what we left it
8 with.

9 MR. MAI: Okay. That's all I have.

10 MR. TURPIN: Good.

11 MR. GRADY: Brian Grady.

12 BY MR. GRADY:

13 Q. Were you instructed to get off the train?

14 A. I don't know if we were or not. At that point in time it was
15 "we're getting off this train." We heard there was a cloud and
16 there's a lot of hazmat and some of that stuff wasn't good to
17 breath in. We didn't want to be any closer than we had to be.

18 So as far we were concerned, securing it the best we could
19 and getting out of there was the right thing to do. Plus, the
20 other crew, the westbound crew, we picked them up before to get
21 them out of there too.

22 MR. GRADY: Okay.

23 MR. FRANSEN: Brian Fransen. I do have one question, and
24 it's just for my own notes.

25 BY MR. FRANSEN:

1 Q. When did you hire out and when did you become an engineer?

2 Did you guys already say that or --

3 MR. TURPIN: No.

4 BY MR. FRANSEN:

5 Q. Just out of curiosity.

6 A. No. February 2004, and July of '06 I became an engineer.

7 Q. July of '06.

8 A. But I didn't hold a seat till 2014 sometime.

9 Q. Off and on at all between '06 and '14?

10 A. No. Just --

11 Q. Wow.

12 A. It was 8 years, so --

13 Q. Okay. Thanks.

14 A. Uh-hum.

15 Q. I meant to ask and I spaced it.

16 BY MR. TURPIN:

17 Q. All right. I do have one more. Are there limits; do you
18 know of any limits, like in how much air you can use without being
19 required to bring the train to a stop or any speed limits or
20 anything like that? Do you know if there's restrictions?

21 A. As far as rules?

22 Q. Yeah.

23 A. Yeah, there is. I think 5 over. Yeah, you're supposed to
24 plug it if you get 5 over.

25 Q. Just a flat absolute?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And that -- so this train at 35, but if you hit 40 you'd big
3 hole it?

4 A. Yeah. And PTC would put you in penalty before you ever got
5 to that point because -- what is it, 3 or 4 over, PTC --

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Probably between 3 and 4, yeah,
7 depending on the distance.

8 BY MR. TURPIN:

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. So you --

11 Q. How about limits on the air? How much?

12 A. If you set it over 18 pounds or more, you have to bring your
13 train to a stop and either secure it and kick it off or determine
14 if you can hold it or what you have to do, if it's safe to do so.
15 I think you have to call -- if you have to do anything more than
16 that, you have to call a manager before you can proceed, if you
17 had to use that much air to stop on the hill.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. So that's where the manager would come out and help you
20 determine if it was safe to kick them off and proceed or if there
21 is a problem that you needed to address.

22 Q. Okay. Very good. You've got -- now you've got something
23 else started.

24 A. Uh-oh.

25 Q. This is kind of detailed, kind of difficult. PTC has, you

1 know, a lot of data in it. Does it have this variable of data as
2 well? So there's --

3 A. No.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I can't answer that.

5 MR. POWELL: It doesn't.

6 BY MR. TURPIN:

7 Q. Okay. So what you said is it would put you in emergency if
8 you exceeded by 3?

9 A. And that's a good point, because --

10 Q. It wouldn't if it's 35 by a ton per operative brake chart,
11 rather than by maximum track speed.

12 A. Well, PTC goes off of tons per operative because the other
13 railroads use that; they don't use our system, I've been told. So
14 sometimes PTC is wrong on your max speed, so that's why we have
15 the charts. I can't remember what PTC was saying that night
16 because I'm so used to it being wrong I don't even look at the top
17 speed on it going down that hill.

18 Q. Okay. Other than stay under it?

19 A. Yeah. Since the other railroads don't using that same
20 system, they're not going to -- we can't put it in that system to
21 tell us the speed. They don't take into account the dynamics,
22 like --

23 MR. TURPIN: Okay.

24 MR. GRADY: When you -- Brian Grady. When you select what
25 railroad you're operating on, 9 times out of 10 the PTC screen

1 will reflect the speed that it's configured at.

2 MR. TURPIN: Okay.

3 MR. POWELL: Especially on a long, full train.

4 MR. TURPIN: Okay. And we'll dig into that and ask the PTC
5 experts how they built it here at UP.

6 John put a note down. He says, I'm going to ask this
7 question.

8 All right. I think that's it.

9 Go around the room, anybody else? Anything else?

10 All right. Let me conclude this, get this turned off and we
11 can talk about real stuff.

12 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COLLISION
 GRANITE CANYON, WYOMING
 OCTOBER 4, 2018
 Interview of: Johnathan Powell

ACCIDENT NO.: RRD19FR001

PLACE: Cheyenne, Wyoming

DATE: October 6, 2018

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Katia Toniolo
Transcriber