
### Proposed Causal Factors received from ARTCO (Cooperative Spirit).

### DCA20FM012





## **ERRATA**

### DCA20FM012 Marine Accident Brief

# CR Creppel, Cooperative Spirit and Glory First collisions DCA18MM028

Page	Original	Correction

12	
	Proposed Causal Factors / Probable Cause
	-M/v RC Creppel was traveling downriver at an exceptionally high rate of speed and failed to give the Cooperative Spirit room to make the one whistle meeting situation.
	-The M/v RC Creppel's unsafe speed did not allow for proper and effective action to avoid collision. (See RULE 6 and report of Doug Faust, Page 9)
	-Distractions at the change of watch could have led to a loss of situational awareness on the M/v RC Creppel.
	-Main Deck watertight doors not being secured on the M/v Creppel was a violation of USCG regulation (Sub M), and was the primary reason for the down flooding resulting in the vessel sinking in a short amount of time. (See report of Jack Leary, naval architect, Pages 2-4)
	-During the 2 minutes leading up to the collision the M/v RC Creppel crossed the sailing line (as seen in Rosepoint data replay). The M/v RC Creppel and its tow were entirely on the East bank side of the sailing line at the time of the collision.
	-Vessel speed, heading and size should be observed visually and with radar images and not solely ECS information. The TSMS that the RC Creppel was operating under (TSMS section 2.1.7) on the day of the accident instructed the mariner to use the radar on the shortest possible range

	scale possible when meeting a vessel (1/8 mile) which is inconsistent with RULE 7 requiring long range scanning to avoid collision. Ross Creppel admitted that it was not prudent to use the shortest range possible when meeting a towboat. (See RULE 7 and deposition of Ross Creppel, Pages 168-172)
	The magnetrons on the M/v RC Creppel were not changed in accordance with the manufacturer's
	recommendations. Magnetrons degrade over time to the point where they are not useful. (See deposition of Corporate Representatives of Seatrac, Pages 55-58 and report of Doug Faust, Page 11)
	-Elite Towing failed to train on safe speed and risk of collision, maintaining a lookout, and identifying radar targets, despite Corrective Actions in the Annual Sub M Survey which were supposed to be complete by December 23, 2019. (See deposition of Ross Creppel, Pages 280 and 342-343 and TVIB Subchapter M Annual Survey Checklist and CAP. Page 52)