National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations

Interview Regarding Investigation PLD20LR001
Enbridge Inc. Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire in Hillsboro, KY on May 4, 2020

Name: Joey Grimes

Department: Operations, Owingsville Station

Title: Station Operator

Date of Interview: May, 11 2020

I have reviewed my transcript(s) from the above referenced accident and:

☐ I have no comments to make.

☐ My comments are submitted herewith.

☒ My comments are marked on the attached copy.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
ENBRIDGE INC. NATURAL GAS	*	
PIPELINE RUPTURE AND FIRE	*	Accident No.: PLD20LR001
IN HILLSBORO, KENTUCKY,	*	
ON MAY 4, 2020	*	
	*	

Interview of: JOEY GRIMES, Station Operator
Enbridge, Inc.

Via teleconference

Monday,
May 11, 2020

APPEARANCES:

ALEXANDRIA COLLETTI, Investigator in Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

ALVARO RODRIGUEZ, Accident Investigator
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

THOMAS WOODEN, Vice President
Engineering and Asset Management
Enbridge, Inc.

DANE JAQUES, Attorney
Steptoe and Johnson, LLP

I N D E X

I N T E R V I E W

(1:08 p.m.)

MS. COLLETTI: We're on the record for the Joey Grimes interview. Good afternoon. Today is May 11th, 2020. It is now 1:08 p.m. Eastern Time. My name is Alex Colletti, the investigator in charge for this accident for the National Transportation Safety Board in Washington, D.C.

We're holding this interview remotely via audio conference call. This interview is being conducted as part of the investigation into the Texas Eastern Transmission natural gas release and fire that occurred on May 4th, 2020, in Fleming County, Kentucky. The NTSB case number for this accident is PLD20LR001.

This interview is being recorded and may be transcribed at a later date. A copy of the transcript will be provided to the interviewee for review prior to being entered into the public docket. This is your opportunity to correct things that that transcriber may have incorrectly transcribed; it's not your opportunity to add and elaborate on things. So if you have something that's factual that you'd like to add, during the interview is the best time.

You're permitted to have one other person present during the interview. This person is of your choice. It can be an attorney, spouse, supervisor, friend, family member, or nobody at all.

Joey, for the record, please state the spelling of your full

name, your job title, and who you've selected to be present with you during the interview.

MR. GRIMES: Okay, my name is -- my full name is Joseph Grimes. It's J-o-s-e-p-h, G-r-i-m-e-s. Date of birth is [redacted], and I requested Dane Jaques to be present (indiscernible).

MS. COLLETTI: Perfect. Now we're going to go around the call and do the usual spelling of name, title, and who you're with. So we'll start with PHMSA, then Enbridge, and then Mr. Jaques.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Alex. My name is Alvaro Rodriguez. Alvaro, A-l-v-a-r-o, Rodriguez, R-o-d-r-i-g-u-e-z. I'm an accident investigator with the Accident Investigation Division in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for PHMSA.

MR. WOODEN: Hi, this is Thomas Wooden. T-h-o-m-a-s, W-o-o-d-e-n. Vice President of Engineering and Asset Management for Enbridge, and also party coordinator for the investigation.

MR. JAQUES: My name is Dane Jaques, spelled D-a-n-e, last name J-a-q-u-e-s. I'm a partner with the law firm of Steptoe and Johnson.

MS. COLLETTI: Okay, great. Thank you all.

INTERVIEW OF JOEY GRIMES

BY MS. COLLETTI:

Q. All right. Well, Joey, thank you so much for agreeing to interview with us today. I really appreciate your time. It's an

important task we have to collect the information we can from your memory of that day. I'm going to ask you to provide a lot of details for us, as much as you can remember. Please don't speculate; just provide what you remember. If you don't remember or you don't know, it's completely fine to say I don't know. However, the more information you give us, the better.

I'd like to start off just by knowing a little bit about you. Can you talk to me about your background? Did you start with Texas Eastern Transmission? Did you start as a station operator? Can you walk me through that? What are your qualifications?

A. Okay, I started 4 years ago with Texas Eastern as a pipeliner, an entry pipeliner. I held that position for 6 months, and for the last 3½ years, I've been station operator here at the Owingsville station. All my time has been here in Owingsville, and then I think 4 years -- Saturday was my fourth-year anniversary. That's my time here as far as with Texas Eastern.

Q. Okay, great. So you're really familiar with the Owingsville station at this point?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that where you're normally stationed?

A. Yes, pretty much all my time is spent here at the Owingsville station.

Q. Okay, great. Okay. Well, this is the part where I'm going to ask you to really take your time and spend a lot of time talking. Again, I hope you have a glass of water handy. And just

walk me through your day, from where you were when you first got a call saying that there might be an accident, to when you were relieved at the end of the day to head home.

Again, don't assume that I know anything. So if you operated a valve, tell me how you did it. Was it via HMI or was it -- did you turn a valve? The more details you can give me, the better. You know, if you can explain your thought process behind things, that helps us a lot. So now I'll stop talking and let you talk.

A. Okay. Okay, starting at 16:45 -- and I'll just read all the times in military time just to keep them straight. Bart Johnson, which is our station supervisor, called me about the possible rupture. At the time, I was in Morehead leaving Lowes. I went to get some stuff to do at the house with my father. So I told him that I was in the next town over, which is about 15 to 20 minutes from Owingsville, so I told him I'd be on my way and get the work truck and head there as soon as I could get there.

As soon as I got off the phone with him, gas control called at 16:46, and I told them I was aware of the situation. They kind of asked, you know, what's going on? I said, Bart just called me; I'm headed down to the station. I'm in the next town over; it's probably going to be 25 or so minutes before I get down there, but I'm on my way.

About 10 minutes later, at 16:56, Dustin Bailey, which is a pipeliner here at the Owingsville station, called and asked me if there was a rupture at the station or somewhere around. He lives

about 4 or 5 miles, if that, from the station, and said he saw smoke coming from his house. So he asked me if he should go to the station, and I told him it wouldn't be a bad idea because there was something going on at that time. At that time, obviously, I was still in the car driving, so I didn't know if it was confirmed or what exactly it was.

At 16:57, Scott Trusty called trying to find out where I was. I guess he had heard, too, and I told him I was on my way, and I was going to be going down to the station. And that was at 16:57. Scott's the mechanic here at the Owingsville station, so he was being dispatch, too.

17:12 is when I actually arrived at the station. Billy Grimes and Dustin Bailey were both already here and had isolated the line. They actually isolated all three lines from the north section. I don't know if anybody knew at the time which section it was, or which line it was, so they had already had all the block valves on the north side, south side, and the bypasses closed, so everything was isolated.

At 17:13, Bryson Price, which is another pipeliner here at Owingsville, he called me to see if I could confirm -- I could confirm which line had ruptured, which I was still out there at the (indiscernible) kind of with Billy and Dustin. I told him as soon as I could, I knew everything was good, I'd run up to the control room and try to see if I could figure out on HMI which line it could be.

So 3 minutes later, 17:16, I called Bryson to tell him it was line 10. I had the opportunity to look at the HMI and see that line 10, I think at the time, was about 26 pounds, and the other two had more than 600. So it was pretty obvious that line 10 was the one that had the rupture.

17:20, Bart Johnson, again the station supervisor, called me. He told me we were -- I told him we were isolated and getting the lockout ready. At the time, me and Billy were up in the control room where we have a CSD up there on the (indiscernible) and we were looking, trying to make sure that we locked out anything we could to help double block, triple blocking the station, just try to isolate anything we could from line 10 and the other lines feeding over.

And then at 17:26, I went to -- I started closing all the DCOs and SCO valves, discharge crossovers and suction crossover valves. There's six of them in total, and I actually did that from the buckets up in the control room. They're electric motors, so I flipped the switch at 17:26. It was probably closer to 4 or 5 minutes before they were fully closed, but at that point, that was just for additional blocks, just to try to keep any chance of gas getting over off of line 10.

17:40, gas control confirmed that we had all the lines blocked in. There's a few different controllers on the call. I basically told them that all the blocks and bypass valves were shut. That's where we're at, and we're looking at the ~~CSE~~ CSD to try

to come up with a lockout, try to make sure everything's locked out to keep this from changing position.

At 17:53, Scott Trusty called me to let me know that he was at Muses Mill, and he wanted to confirm which line it was. And at that point, I told him it was line 10.

17:54, Billy called me to help him out in the yard. He was disabling the bypass valve to keep them from moving, and he just wanted to make sure that we got it disabled and locked out correctly. So I went down in the yard to help him with that.

18:00, Randy Dean (ph.), which is the area manager, called to confirm that we had the station -- called to confirm the station condition, what we were doing. He let me know at that time that help was on the way from Danville. And I told him that we were isolated, and we were in the process of locking the valves out when he was calling.

And then at 18:05, I had in my phone a call from the random 218 area code. It was someone within the company. I do not have -- I do not remember the name. There was a call. Obviously, it was about the situation, but I don't remember what was said. It was a very short conversation. I was out in the yard trying to get stuff locked out, and there was nothing to change what I was doing from that call.

At 18:10, Randy Dean called to inform me that we needed to blowdown lines 15 and 25 to 50 pounds, from Owingsville to Muses Mill, which is the next valve system north of the Owingsville

station. I wasn't part of making the decision to decide 50 pounds, but that's what I was told to do, so we went ahead and planned on doing that as soon as we got everything ready.

At 18:16, I closed GCI-1 and locked. I closed it from the station HMI, and Billy, who was down in the yard, confirmed that it actually closed, and then he proceeded to lock it out. And at 18:18, we did the same for GCBP-1, which is gas bypass 1. And I closed it from the station HMI, and Billy, who was out in the yard, confirmed it locked out. Both of those were done just as another double, triple -- it was just extra precaution just to make sure gas didn't get to 15 or 25.

At 18:32, Randy Dean called me to have me text him when we started blowing down on lines 15 and 25. At 18:50, I called [redacted] (ph.), which he's the neighbor right across the street from the station. Nobody answered, so I just went across the street and knocked on the door, told him that we were going to be blowing down the line, letting him know that there was going to be some, obviously, noise associated with that, but not to be concerned. This was something that we were doing, just a general notification.

At 18:50, I also called Bart to let him know that we were getting ready to start the blowdown. And right at 18:57, as Randy Dean requested, I texted him, too, that we were getting ready to open up.

So at 18:58, me and Daniel Lamb (ph.), which is a pipeliner

from Danville that was sent up here to help, we opened up valve 15-519 and 25-668, which were both blow off valves inside the station yard on the north side that were going to blow down the first valve section north for both lines 15 and 25.

At 19:00, Scott called me, and I let him know we were opened up on our side on the blow off. And he said he was waiting on Barry to get back to lock out and open up at Muses Mill.

19:33, Ashley Clemens (ph.), which is regional pipeline supervisor, called about the procedure. I couldn't really hear him because I was close to the gas being blown down in the truck. It was very loud. I couldn't hear him very much, so he got ahold of Billy to continue the conversation until I could get somewhere where I could hear.

20:46, I ended up going up to the control room, because Billy was up there, and he wanted me to come watch the pressures so he could go continue locking some valves out. I guess where they had been on the phone about the procedure, there was more valves that needed to be locked.

20:48, I closed RCO-1 from station HMI, and Billy locked it out. Again, I closed it from the HMI up in the control room, and that's the reverse crossover valve on line 10 inside the station.

21:05, Bart called for the lines 15 and 25 pressures. He was calling to see where we were at on the blow down. And at 21:16, he, through a text message I'm pretty sure, he informed us to go to zero pounds on lines 15 and 25, instead of the 50 that we were

shooting for. I think at that time, we were getting pretty close to the 50. So I don't -- again, this is -- I don't know why the decision went from 50 to zero. I wasn't part of the decision, but I was following orders from Bart. So that's what we did, we took it on down to zero.

At 21:20, Bart called to inform me about procedure that was emailed and blowing down line 10 from Flat Creek to the station in addition to the north side, I guess to double block and bleed all three valve sections on either side of the rupture. So the region had emailed a copy of the procedure for the isolation, and then had the blowdown on line 10 on the procedure.

And at 21:42, Ashley Clemens called again to confirm the procedure. I had printed it out at that point, and I started to go review it with Billy. He was the only one down at the office with me at the time.

And then at 22:07, I called Ashley with Billy beside me. We had looked over the gas handling procedures, and as company practice, we always review it, and being that there was limited people available and stuff going on, they actually wrote it at region for us. And me and Billy kind of reviewed it, and I think we made one slight change and just asked a couple questions on why something was done. We were all comfortable with it. So then, he made the changes, and we went with that for the time being.

22:21, ~~Mark~~ Bart called again and said, once we got the station taken care of and everything's good there, go down to Flat Creek

to start to isolate. At 22:25, I called Daniel to see when he would be available to go to Flat Creek. He was back up in the yard. I'm not 100 percent sure what he was doing; he was under someone else's instruction, so he was up in the yard. So I told him whenever he was available so we could go down to Flat Creek together and get that isolated, following the procedure.

22:49, ~~Mark~~ Bart called to see where we were, as far as the status of heading down to Flat Creek. 23:12, I called -- ~~Mark~~ Bart called again, and I told him we were actually getting ready to head on our way to Flat Creek.

23:28, Scott called to see what our location was. I think he was up in Muses Mill needing something, but where we were at with the other valve section south, I guess he contacted somebody else at that point.

23:30, 10-338 we check closed on a procedure. That's the line 10 crossover blowoff. 23:31, we checked, closed, and locked valve number 15-471, which is the line 15 crossover blowoff valve. 23:34, checked, closed, and locked out 25-732, which is the crossover blowoff for line 25.

At 23:36, we closed 10-337, which is line 10 block valve. Daniel Lamb actually did the operating on that valve. Once it was closed, we locked it out. At 23:40, we checked, closed, and locked 10-339, which is your gas operator ~~cap~~ tap valve. It supplies the gas to the operator. At 23:42, we checked, closed, and locked 10-335, which is the other operator ~~cap~~ tap valve tied to that ~~lock~~ block

valve.

And then 23:48, ~~Mark~~ Bart called. I told him Flat Creek, when we were done locking out there and got back to the station. Once we got back to the station, we just kind of waited on ~~Mark~~ Bart. I made some multiple phone calls and stuff and kind of hung out there. Didn't actually do any other valve manipulations or yard work until I left the station sometime after 1:00 a.m. the next morning.

So that's pretty much, from the time I got the call to the time I left the station that -- I guess the following morning, what my activities were.

Q. That's great. Thank you very much for walking me through that. I really appreciate it. I know that's a lot of talking straight. I want to -- I know, it's a lot. I appreciate it. I really do.

I want to step back to a couple things and ask you to elaborate on them just a little bit. But I really do appreciate the level of detail. That was exactly what I was looking for. When you came to the station, you said it was already isolated by the time you got there, I believe by Billy and -- was it Daniel?

A. Dustin.

Q. Dustin, sorry. Getting my names confused.

A. No, that's fine.

Q. There's a few of you. And then you and Billy started locking -- closing and locking out other valves just to be, essentially,

double blocking and triple blocking.
A. Right.
Q. How did you know which valves to do that? How did you choose which valves to close?
A. Well, basically, you know, working at the station, being dedicated to this station since I've been here, and I've been around through all the changes and stuff, we have a ~~CSE~~ CSD (indiscernible) at the station, too, to help us walk through and see any valves that would lead to the possibility of gas getting in to line 10. And that's -- the immediate was anything on the pipeline-side of the block valve.

And then after that, anything that could lead in on the station side, just as a double precautionary. So any valve that could have been loaded up, we just wanted to reduce the potential for any leak-throughs. That was the main objective at that point, just trying to make sure that if any one valve close failed, we minimized what could happen.
Q. Okay, and so you worked yourself from pipeline-side to station-side, essentially?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. That makes sense. Now, is that just kind of based on your knowledge of the station? Is there a specific set of valves -- is there a specific order to that that you guys are supposed to follow that you do for like ESD drills, for example?
A. Yes, if it was an ESD test, we have a set procedure to

follow. But in the case of an emergency, my main objective was to close any and all valves that could potentially -- I don't know of any procedure that would describe this exact scenario. So at that point, I just went off my knowledge and history of what could happen. And if I locked out one too many, I think I was going to err on the safety -- the safer side.

Q. Absolutely. That makes a lot of sense to me. If I were in your shoes, that's what I would have done.

You mentioned that you went across the street to let the neighbor know of the blowdown. That seems wise. I'm sure they would have made a few calls about it. I know it's quite loud when a pipeline blows down 650 PSI. Is that something you guys typically do, let folks know?

A. Yes, anytime we have any potentially -- when we're doing it and we know it's a planned release, to blowdown for any kind of work or anything, we always notify usually the dispatch in the county, and then also anybody close to the area that could hear it and potentially -- you know, because the first thing they would probably do is report it if they didn't know what was going on.

Q. Got you, and in this --

A. So I let them know that --

Q. I'm sorry, continue, continue.

A. No, I just let them know that we're performing work so they're not as alarmed when they hear the loud noise.

Q. That makes sense. And, in this case, you didn't call the

dispatch because they were already aware of an incident going on and would just assume that it was --

A. Right. I didn't personally; I guess somebody else did. Obviously, they were aware of the whole event.

Q. Okay, okay. So the pressure at the time of the rupture I have listed at around 657 PSI. Back when I worked, we used to run a lower differential across our compressor stations. Is that a normal -- 650, is that pretty normal for you guys on the suction side of the station?

A. It's not un-normal, but day-to-day, depending on the pipeline conditions, our suction side could be close to 800 or down to -- I've seen it down in the 500s. So it's almost -- there is no specific set range as normal. Obviously, below 500, we'd be alarmed. There's certain extremes, but 650 is not an un-normal suction-side pressure, no.

Q. Okay. So that's not outside the -- okay. Have you had any system alarms anytime recently prior to the accident? Like anything strange at the station in the weeks before the accident, or in the days before?

A. I don't remember seeing anything that was out of the ordinary, no.

Q. Okay. And then after the accident, I know Billy went in and cleared the alarm so that if a new alarm came in, it would call out. Was there anything else after that time that came in?

A. I think it was Friday morning I had an alarm. It was the

call attendant for the suction pressure, I think it was, on line 15, for units three and four. And that was just to, I guess, where we -- it was all blocked inside the station, and it had slowly leaked down to a certain -- I would have to (indiscernible) to see how far it leaked down. But that was just due to the fact that it was locked out, and there was -- it was slowly creeping off somewhere.

Q. Okay. Okay. And that's just because of the, essentially, that bottling that you guys had done for the anomaly work and all of that?

A. Right.

Q. Okay, okay. Okay, the last section that you talked about was the isolation at Flat Creek and all that work. Was that part of the blowdown? Can you explain what was being done there and why?

A. Well, at some point, they decided that they weren't going to blowdown that night on that line, and they'd wait until the morning because it was getting late. So what we did at that point that night, we just isolated it. So we check closed all three crossovers, locked the two on line 15 and 25. We didn't lock 10 because we figured the following day, we would be opening it up to release the pressure.

And then we lock closed the line 10's main line block valve, and the operator so it couldn't be moved. We were just getting it staged, set up, so at least it was limiting it again. We were double blocked. We didn't actually bleed until the next morning,

but we were locked out and double blocked that direction.
Q. Okay. Did you have any difficulty getting to the station? I know you weren't at your normal -- it wasn't your normal route because you were out and about in town.
A. No, I actually -- like I said, where my father was with me, I dropped him off at the house and jumped in my company truck because I didn't know -- all my tools are in there and anything I would need to respond. So I dropped him off, jumped in my company truck, and headed straight home -- or straight to the station. So really it wasn't -- it was interstate and then my normal route after that, so I didn't have any trouble getting down there besides some slow traffic.
Q. Okay. Did any part of the HMI not respond like it was supposed to during your work with Billy when you guys were kind of tag-teaming the lockout/tagout on all the double blocking and triple blocking?
A. No. At that point, everything worked just like it should have.
Q. Okay. I think -- oh, I know, sorry. Can you talk me through the isolation procedure process and what that looks like and how that review process works and all of that? Especially during an emergency, I'm sure it's very different than during a planned blowdown of a line.
A. Right. As far as what I did, me and Billy, our first concern, like I said, was to get what needed locked out to be, for

the safety aspect of it, locked out. At that point, luckily Ashley called and said he would handle writing the procedure for the line 10 isolation so we could get out there and do what needed to be done to get the pipeline in a safe condition.

Typically, we'll go through the PLDs, the ~~CSE~~CSDs, look at all the drawings, go through it, write it up step by step, everything that needs to be done, ~~blocked~~Locked and what position, and then we'll send it -- we would send it to region, and they would get it reviewed and make any corrections, changes, suggestions, whatever needed to be done, and then send it back. And then usually we review it again to make sure, what they changed, we're good with. Sometimes they'll just make some suggestions, and we'll go back and change it and then send it in for re-approval.

But that night, it was a little different because of the situation. They ended up writing it on their end, so they sent it to us. We went over it, because we had the ~~CSE~~CSDs down, the PLDs, pulled them out, made sure that everything they wrote down, the valve numbers, were correct and made sense to us as well.

So, like I said, we had a couple questions. I think one of them was a valve inside the station, we didn't know why he had it locked, if it needed to be -- standing back thinking when we had a few minutes. And then, at that point, we called him up, went through it, kind of expedited the situation. And he changed it right there and sent it back. And we all agreed on it once we looked at the final -- at that point, the final procedure.

Q. Okay, that makes sense. It sounds like this is a procedure you guys use every time you blowdown a line.
A. No, every one of them's a little different, you know, depending on what's going on with the pipeline at the time, because sometimes we have multiple procedures going on at one time. So like now, we would have to reference anything -- procedure we did today off what is already in place. But some of them are multiuse, the ones that are routine and everything's in normal operating condition. But then the other ones would be, you know, you have to see what works -- where, currently, the situation is, and then write it from there.
Q. Okay, I see. That makes sense.
MS. COLLETTI: Well, then that's my first-round questions. I'm going to pass you to Alvaro next. Thank you very much.
MR. GRIMES: Okay.
BY MR. RODRIGUEZ:
Q. Thank you very much for answering the questions and providing a very good, detailed timeline of the event. I have some questions. The first one is about, do you have any knowledge of the cause of the incident?
A. I do not. I'm not even, personally, myself, been out to the incident site. So I have no idea exactly what caused it.
Q. Okay. Is there anything different that you could have done?
A. Not to my knowledge. I feel like, as a whole, we did the best we could have done given the circumstances.

Q. All right. Did you receive any updates on the integrity on this pipeline or the (indiscernible)?
A. I, myself, have not, no. I'm mostly inside the station. That would be someone else that keeps up with that stuff.
Q. Okay. And do you have any knowledge of historic damage on this segment before?
A. That would be pretty much the same answer. I don't -- in my position, I wouldn't have any specific knowledge about that at all.
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. Well, thank you very much. Those are all the questions that I have for now.
MR. GRIMES: Thank you.
MR. WOODEN: Alex, this is Tom Wooden, I don't have any additional questions for Joey at this time. I thought he was very thorough and detailed in his recollection of his actions.
MS. COLLETTI: Great.
BY MS. COLLETTI:
Q. This is Alex. I just have a couple more questions. They'll be pretty quick.
A. Okay.
Q. Joey, when was the last ESD of the station that you can remember?
A. I would have to look it up. We do routine and we get scheduled ESD tests. But I would have to look up the last one's results and/or the last actual ESD. I could find that

information, but I don't have it right here for you right now.
Q. That's okay. That's okay. And then, what kind of training do you guys do for emergency responses, for stuff like this?
A. We do simulations throughout the year, just random times. And that's the thing, you know, when you get a call like that, you don't know whether -- you treat them all like they're the real deal, because we do simulations to mimic this to try to make sure we're ready for it at any time. And then we go over our responses, how long it took us to get somewhere, and what we could do better to try to make sure that when it really -- something, unfortunately, did happen, we respond in a timely fashion the best we can.
Q. That makes a lot of sense to me. And the last one, normally if you were at home and not in Morehead, how long would it take you to get to the station?
A. Usually, good traffic and stuff, I'd say about 12 minutes.
MS. COLLETTI: Okay, great. That's all of my questions.
Alvaro, do you have any more questions?
MR. RODRIGUEZ: I don't.
MS. COLLETTI: Tom, what about you?
MR. WOODEN: Yeah, I do have one.
BY MR. WOODEN:
Q. Joey, you know, you talk about the Flat Creek valves.
A. Yes.
Q. You know, earlier we heard valves closed in Owingsville and

valves closed in Muses Mill. Where's Flat Creek relative to Owingsville or Muses Mill, and why were you closing those valves?
A. Flat Creek valve is the first valve section south of the station. So the rupture was in the first valve section north. So those -- we closed them to insure the double block. And it's at Mile Post 491 -- no, I think the three line has different mile post markers, but it's the first one south of the station. So that's the reason we did that.

MR. WOODEN: Okay, thank you. I don't have any other questions.

MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Well, that -- in that case, I will thank you very much, Joey. This was very great answers to the questions. I appreciate you being so detailed, especially walking through everything with us. The Grimes brothers are very detailed, and I appreciate it. You guys made my job easy, so thank you. I really do appreciate it. I think you can tell the rest of your team that they've got to step up to the Grimes' standard for detail. But seriously, thank you very much for your time, I really appreciate it. And I hope you don't have to do a lot more talking today.

MR. GRIMES: Me, too.

MS. COLLETTI: That being said, I'll plan to send you the transcript in about a month, most likely. I'll send it to your email. You'll get a form. It'll have a checkbox on it with some legalese on the top. The checkbox you can check if there's no

errors on the transcript. If there are errors, you can either email me saying on line Y on page 7 it says that I turned right, and actually I said that I turned left. Or you can check the box saying there's no errors. Or you can just mark up the actual document itself, whatever's easiest for you. But I'll get your contact information from Bart, and I will email it out to you in about a month or so.

And that's really it, so thank you so much for your time. I really appreciate it. If you think of anything else, feel free to call me or email me at any time. That's really normal. A lot of memory is definitely not linear, and stuff comes back to people at odd times. So I'll be giving Bart my contact information, so hopefully he'll pass it on to all of you.

MR. GRIMES: Okay, sounds good.

MS. COLLETTI: With that being said, it is 1:45 p.m., and this concludes the interview. Thank you.

MR. GRIMES: Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	ENBRIDGE INC. NATURAL GAS PIPELINE RUPTURE AND FIRE IN HILLSBORO, KENTUCKY, ON MAY 4, 2020 Interview of Joey Grimes
ACCIDENT NO.:	PLD20LR001
PLACE:	Via teleconference
DATE:	May 11, 2020

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

Sarah Collins
Transcriber