



# National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations

**Interview Regarding Investigation PLD20LR001**  
**Enbridge Inc. Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire in Hillsboro, KY on May 4, 2020**

Name: JOSEPH GARZA  
Department: GAS CONTROL  
Title: GAS CONTROLLER  
Date of Interview: 5/15/2020

I have reviewed my transcript(s) from the above referenced accident and:

- I have no comments to make.
- My comments are submitted herewith.
- My comments are marked on the attached copy.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

\* \* \* \* \*

Investigation of: \*

\*

ENBRIDGE INC. NATURAL GAS \*

PIPELINE RUPTURE AND FIRE \* Accident No.: PLD20LR001

IN HILLSBORO, KENTUCKY, \*

ON MAY 4, 2020 \*

\*

\* \* \* \* \*

Interview of: JOSEPH GARZA, Gas Controller  
Enbridge, Inc.

Via teleconference

Friday,  
May 15, 2020

APPEARANCES:

ALEXANDRIA COLLETTI, Investigator in Charge  
National Transportation Safety Board

ALVARO RODRIGUEZ, Accident Investigator  
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

THOMAS WOODEN, Vice President  
Engineering and Asset Management  
Enbridge, Inc.

DANE JAQUES, Attorney  
Steptoe and Johnson, LLP

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I N T E R V I E W

(11:08 a.m.)

1  
2  
3 MS. COLLETTI: All right. We're on the record for the Joe  
4 Garza interview. Good morning. Today is May 15th, 2020. It is  
5 now 11:08 a.m. Eastern Time. My name is Alex Colletti. I'm the  
6 investigator in charge for this accident for the National  
7 Transportation Safety Board in Washington, D.C.

8 We're holding this interview remotely via audio conference  
9 call. This interview is being conducted as part of the  
10 investigation into the Texas Eastern Transmission natural gas  
11 release and fire that occurred on May 4th, 2020, in Fleming  
12 County, Kentucky. The NTSB case number for this accident is  
13 PLD20LR001.

14 This interview is being recorded and may be transcribed at a  
15 later date. A copy of the transcript will be provided to the  
16 interviewee for review prior to it being entered into the public  
17 docket. This is your opportunity to correct things that the  
18 transcriber may have incorrectly transcribed; it's not your  
19 opportunity to add and elaborate on things. So if you have  
20 something that's factual that you'd like to add, during the  
21 interview is the best time.

22 You're permitted to have one other person present during the  
23 interview. This person is of your choice. It can be an attorney,  
24 a spouse, a supervisor, a friend, family member, or no one at all.

25 Joe, for the record, please state the spelling of your full

1 name -- first and last is fine -- your job title, and who you have  
2 selected to be present during the interview.

3 MR. GARZA: My name is Joseph Garza, J-o-s-e-p-h, Garza,  
4 G-a-r-z-a. I am a gas controller and I work for Enbridge, and my  
5 representative that I have with me is Dane Jaques.

6 MS. COLLETTI: Perfect. Okay. Great. Now we're going  
7 around the call, so to speak, to introduce ourselves. We'll start  
8 will Alvaro from PHMSA, then Tom from Enbridge, and then Dane.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you. Good morning. My name is Alvaro  
10 Rodriguez. Alvaro, A-l-v-a-r-o, Rodriguez, R-o-d-r-i-g-u-e-z. I  
11 am an accident investigator with the Accident Investigation  
12 Division of PHMSA in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

13 MR. WOODEN: Good morning. This is Thomas Wooden,  
14 T-h-o-m-a-s, W-o-o-d-e-n. I am Vice President of Engineering and  
15 Asset Management for Enbridge and party coordinator for the  
16 investigation.

17 MR. JAQUES: And this is Dane Jaques, D-a-n-e, J-a-q-u-e-s.  
18 I am a partner with the law firm of Steptoe and Johnson in  
19 Washington, D.C.

20 MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Great, thank you everyone.

21 INTERVIEW OF JOSEPH GARZA

22 BY MS. COLLETTI:

23 Q. Well, Joe, thank you for agreeing to interview with us today.  
24 I really appreciate your time. It's an important task we have to  
25 collect the information we can from your memory of that day. I'm

1 going to ask you to provide a lot of details for us, as many as  
2 you can remember.

3 Please don't speculate. If I or someone ask you a question  
4 you don't know the answer to, it's completely fine to say, I don't  
5 know. However, the more information you can give us, the better.

6 A. Yes, ma'am.

7 Q. Now, before we get started on the rupture day, can you talk a  
8 little bit about your background, where all you've worked, and did  
9 you start with Enbridge or Texas Eastern? Did you start somewhere  
10 else? How long have you been a controller? Just trying to get a  
11 sense for your background.

12 A. Well, before I started working with Enbridge, I was with a  
13 company called Sermatech (ph.), and what we did is we worked with,  
14 we worked with turbines, rotors, diaphragms, and that kind of gave  
15 me a little bit of knowledge of them.

16 Later on, I started working with Duke, which it was  
17 originally called when I first got there, and that is when I got  
18 into gas control, transmission, gas transmission. And it changed  
19 names, which -- a couple of times, and now it's Enbridge, and I've  
20 been there for 14-plus years.

21 Q. Okay. Well, that's great. I love, I love talking to people  
22 that have experience and know what they're talking about. So  
23 that's wonderful. Thank you for that.

24 A. Yes, ma'am.

25 Q. So now I want to -- and this is the, this is the long part of

1 talking, so apologies in advance. But I want you to go back to  
2 the day of the 4th, and take a moment if you need to, but think  
3 through where you were at the time, starting when you received any  
4 kind of notification of what was going on.

5 And then walk me through the entire day, from when you were  
6 first notified to when all three lines were fully blown down.  
7 Take your time, add as much detail as possible. Again, this is  
8 going to take a little while, and if you need any breaks for a  
9 glass of water or just to stop talking for a minute, feel free to  
10 ask for one.

11 A. Okay. Well, I was at my desk working on my system, and it  
12 was at around 3:39 I received a call attendant from the  
13 Owingsville station. And I looked over to see if I still had my  
14 horsepower, my units running, and I saw that they were running.  
15 And during this time, I was on the call from the field -- not from  
16 the field, but from a caller that called in wanting to try to get  
17 some information in regard to an abandoned line that we had on the  
18 system. They -- he was part of a group that was building homes in  
19 the area, and he was just trying to find out what he could do in  
20 the area. So I was on the EMAP system trying to get this  
21 information for him and find out who the area supervisor was in  
22 the area, so that way I could get him in touch with him.

23 And it was during this period of time that other calls had --  
24 the calls started coming in from -- which were for my pipeline,  
25 but because I was on the phone with a call already, my coworkers



1 started answering the calls. And at 3:40, the initial call came  
2 in, in regard to it and we -- they, I should say, had started  
3 taking the information, and I was unaware of what was going on  
4 because I was on the phone at the time. And later on, the  
5 information started -- after that, the information started  
6 filtering in of our situation.

7 At 3:41, one of my coworkers, Billy Davis -- well, let me  
8 take a step back. At 3:40, the initial call from the public, a  
9 lady by the name of Vicky Smedley (ph.) called in, reported of the  
10 woods on fire and blowing gas -- of a blown gas line on 4838  
11 Watson Road, out in Hillsboro, Kentucky. And my coworker, Tim,  
12 had received that call. And then later on -- oh, I just -- at  
13 3:41, while Tim was on that call, my other coworker, Billy Davis,  
14 was looking up the location on the EMAPS in regard to the  
15 location.

16 And at 3:42, another caller, Jean McDaniels (ph.), called in  
17 to report a fire over the hill at 1392 Watson Road, which is in  
18 Kentucky. And she suspected it was on Tom Ishmael Road. At 3:42,  
19 I received a call from Bart Johnson, and he states that his guys  
20 in the Hillsboro area are asking if there's a pressure drop, and I  
21 confirmed that we did have a pressure drop that had just started  
22 to drop on the section of Owingsville, and the station just  
23 activated a stop timer alarm.

24 3:43, Billy Davis notified one of our other coworkers and  
25 states that we have a rupture on the Owingsville section. And

1 we're in there trying to get our -- get all of our information  
2 together to deal with that during this period of time. And 3:46,  
3 Billy notified Joey Grimes, the Owingsville operator, to get back  
4 to the station; a rupture appears to be in Gulf Section 1. And  
5 the operator states that he is 30 to 45 minutes away.

6 Just curious, do you want this timeline or -- hello?

7 Q. I'm there. I'm listening, I'm listening.

8 A. Oh, I'm sorry.

9 Q. No, you're --

10 A. I thought I lost you.

11 Q. -- you're fine. I was just waiting for the rest of the  
12 question. Do I want this timeline or --

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. Go ahead.

15 A. No, you can, you can ask the question.

16 Q. Oh, no. I'm waiting for you to finish your question. What  
17 was the rest of your question?

18 A. Oh, I was just -- the timeline that I'm giving you, are you  
19 wanting the timeline or what I'm -- well, I don't know how to, how  
20 to ask that. Still -- okay, so at 3:46 --

21 Q. So it --

22 A. -- Stan Courtney (ph.) --

23 Q. Maybe I'll stop you.

24 A. I'm sorry. Go ahead.

25 Q. What I'm really looking for is your perspective on the

1 accident, so what you remember --

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. -- activities that you took, that kind of thing. So I've  
4 been through the general timeline, and I have it, by the way, as  
5 well.

6 A. Okay.

7 Q. So I'm just really looking for, you know, what decisions you  
8 made, how you made them, who you were talking to, the situation in  
9 the control room, what the atmosphere is like, all of those kind  
10 of things. So I'm looking for essentially things that aren't on  
11 the timeline itself, more of your perspective of what that was  
12 like being there, if that makes sense.

13 A. Yes, ma'am. Okay.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. That's what I was wondering if --

16 Q. Yep.

17 A. -- that's what you had wanted. But yes, ma'am.

18 So when I had received -- when I was done with that phone  
19 call that I had, that is when I went back and continued with my  
20 phone call that I had received, my alarms that I'd received. And  
21 Bart Johnson, who is one of our field guys, in his call, he called  
22 in to report if we had received any calls. At that particular  
23 time, we had received calls, but I hadn't received them directly,  
24 so I was unaware of exactly what was going on.

25 And when he called me in -- when he called in, he asked if I

1 had received any calls from anybody or from the field in regard to  
2 a situation that could be occurring. And I told him no, but that  
3 I did have a call attendant and stop timers at the station, and  
4 that I was losing pressure. So it was during -- I believe it was  
5 during that period of time where one of my coworkers, Billy Davis,  
6 had told me that we could have a rupture out there.

7 And from there, we started gathering all the information that  
8 we had from outside sources up to that moment, and while we were  
9 gathering that information, we were also gathering information in  
10 our control room on the area and what needed to be executed to  
11 take care of the issue as quickly as possible.

12 And it wasn't -- how would you say -- a moot, mote of  
13 hysteria. You know, these are things that we have been taught and  
14 drilled and discussed before. So once we were -- everyone in  
15 there was calm, trying to stay together, work together. And as --  
16 like I said, as we were gathering the information, we were  
17 formulating a plan.

18 And as the information came in, that's when phone calls were  
19 being made to different areas while we were still receiving phone  
20 calls. But as we were making our phone calls to our different  
21 personnel out in the field, we were telling them what needed to be  
22 done so that way we could get the situation under control as  
23 quickly as possible.

24 Hello?

25 Q. Yeah. I'm just waiting for you to continue. Just keep on

1 going.

2 A. Oh.

3 Q. Just keep giving me details. Yeah. I'm not -- so I'm sorry,  
4 I'm not going to interrupt you.

5 A. Okay. Okay.

6 Q. I'm going to do my very best not to. So it's one of my  
7 golden rules. Normally I'd be here in person shaking my head, so  
8 it's a little more awkward over the phone. I apologize. Instead  
9 you're just getting radio silence.

10 A. It's okay.

11 Q. Yeah. So --

12 A. Okay. So --

13 Q. -- please, please go on, yeah.

14 A. So what -- I'm sorry, what was that?

15 Q. I said, just please continue. Sorry.

16 A. Okay. So once we started to talk to our field personnel, we  
17 started taking stations down that were on the north side of the  
18 incident, and we were speaking with stations on the south side in  
19 regard to continue running so that way we could deplete the area  
20 as quickly as possible of gas.

21 We were speaking with the personnel that were closest to the  
22 areas as far as the valves, which valves to shut down, talking  
23 with customers that are in the area about stopping their flow of  
24 gas to us if at all possible because we had an incident. And for  
25 the most part, we also spoke with customers that were taking gas,

1 just to inform them that they might see a reduction in pressure so  
2 that way they could be aware of it so that way it wouldn't damage  
3 their equipment.

4       After we had made phone calls to the different people, then  
5 everything was being executed, and once we got the area isolated,  
6 that's when the process of getting rid of the gas as quickly as  
7 possible occurred. And afterwards, after we were able to get that  
8 isolated, we then continued with the phone calls to isolate lines,  
9 isolate stations, letting which -- letting customers know, the  
10 ones that were able, where they could start flowing again, letting  
11 customers know that -- who were taking gas from us that they would  
12 be able to continue to take it because we should be able to keep  
13 them in a good condition.

14       And we just tried to put everything together. All the guys  
15 that were on that particular day, like normal, we all came  
16 together to help each other, to help me to resolve the issue as  
17 quickly as possible. And after we had the situation under  
18 control, we just started continuing with our work.

19       Is there anything else that you would like to know about?

20 Q.   Well, I'm going to back to a couple of sections and ask for  
21 some more details and clarification, but thank you very much.

22 A.   Okay.

23 Q.   That's what I was looking for.

24 A.   Okay.

25 Q.   I'm sorry. I know this is awkward over the phone. Normally

1 I'd be sitting next to you, nodding my head, saying, yep, yep.

2 A. That's okay. It's all right.

3 Q. But thanks for bearing with us. So yes, that's what I as  
4 looking for was kind of your perspective on how things went and  
5 what all you were doing and how that goes.

6 So I want to back up up to just prior to the rupture. So you  
7 said that the -- when the call attendant alarm came on, you  
8 checked to make sure the units were still running. Were they  
9 running --

10 A. Yes, ma'am.

11 Q. -- at a, you know, was it kind of operations as normal prior  
12 to the rupture at that station?

13 A. Yes, ma'am. Operations were normal prior to the -- well,  
14 prior to it if you're looking quite a bit in front of that, but  
15 during the call attendant, I -- like I said, I was on the phone.  
16 I saw the call attendant. The call attendant came in; I  
17 acknowledged it, looked over real quick to check the horsepower to  
18 see if I had lost anything, because in the process, depending on  
19 your operations for the day, if you lose horsepower, gas will back  
20 up on to the downstream station, and it could cause issues for  
21 them.

22 So when I saw that all my horsepower at the time was still  
23 running, I went back to my phone call to try to take care of it as  
24 quickly as possible so I could get back to my call attendant and  
25 start digging into why that had happened, if I could find out.

1 Because usually, when we get a call attendant, we call the field  
2 to let them know. And it was while I was still on the phone, if I  
3 remember correctly, that I got the stop timers. So after I'd  
4 gotten the stop timers, that's when I noticed that I was losing  
5 pressure over there.

6 And then that's when Bart Johnson called in to ask me if any  
7 calls or anything had been reported to me. And unbeknownst to me,  
8 I had not received them personally, but my coworkers had received  
9 some calls. And the process was starting to get taken care of as  
10 I was speaking to Bart. And I informed him, I have not received  
11 any phone calls, Bart, but I am losing pressure over there, and I  
12 don't know exactly what's going on. I have stop timers, so if you  
13 could look into and let me know, you know, it'd be great. And  
14 that's when, you know, everything kind of started rolling from my  
15 point from there.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Even though some other -- some calls had already come in  
18 which I was not able to receive because of the call that I was on.

19 Q. Now, I understand that your station, your control center  
20 normally has six desks in the same floor, same control room, so  
21 you can kind of overhear conversations as they're happening, as  
22 long as you're not on your conversation at the same time, which  
23 adds a whole other level of complexity. Were the folks that  
24 received the call from Ms. Smedley, were they on the same floor as  
25 you, a different floor?



1 A. One of my coworkers, Brian, had received a call, and he was  
2 writing the information down, so of course I couldn't hear what  
3 was being said. It really wasn't any speaking on his part. He  
4 was just, for the most part, I would think -- I'm not positive  
5 because I -- he's a little bit away from me, so I could not hear  
6 it, so I don't know how much speaking he was doing, but he was  
7 writing information down. He is with me, and the other call that  
8 had come in was on the other floor.

9 Q. Okay. Okay. Yeah. I mean, and different control rooms  
10 operate differently. The one where I used to work, they relied  
11 really heavily on kind of the, so to speak, eavesdropping while  
12 going to pick up on stuff.

13 A. Yes, ma'am.

14 Q. Yeah.

15 A. That is normally the case, yes, ma'am, especially when you're  
16 not on the phone, if you hear of a situation that might be going  
17 on, we will gather so that way we can start working as a unit to  
18 take care of it. But under this situation, ma'am, I was, like I  
19 said, I was on the phone and --

20 Q. Right.

21 A. -- I wasn't able to hear what was going on, or like it didn't  
22 hit me until the information was passed on to me.

23 Q. That makes sense. Okay. That makes sense. Yeah, you can't  
24 hear two things at once, or at least not either well.

25 I want to back up a little bit to earlier in the day. I was

1 given the alarm audit for the day of the rupture, and earlier that  
2 morning, and earlier that afternoon, there were a few call  
3 attendant alarms. Under the understanding that those can be  
4 triggered for a number of reasons, can you talk me through call  
5 attendant alarms in general? You know, how urgent they are, what  
6 kind of things can trigger a call attendant alarm, and then the  
7 specifics of the alarms that happened the day of the rupture, if  
8 you can remember?

9 A. Okay. You're right, ma'am, the call attendant do cover a  
10 wide range of alarms, and they are different for stations -- for  
11 the stations in regard to not all the stations are the same. They  
12 have different type of horsepower. They could be turbines, they  
13 could be refits (ph.), there could be electrical. They're  
14 different ones. So yes, ma'am, call attendant is something that  
15 we won't get specifically what has happened, so because of that,  
16 it is something that we have to follow up on as quickly as  
17 possible. We're unsure of what they are, they cover so much.

18 And whether it be night or day, during the day, there's  
19 usually people that we can get straight in contact with that are  
20 at the station, and during the night, if it's manned -- if it's a  
21 manned station, yes, ma'am, we can get in touch with them also  
22 right away. And if they're not manned, we have to go to the on-  
23 call and call out the person that is in charge of looking into  
24 what the issue may be.

25 And in regard to what they could be, as we were saying,

1 there's just such a wide variety. You could have an electrical  
2 breaker that might trip. You could have generators, you could  
3 have gas kemp (ph.), you could have kemp, you could have filter  
4 pumps and self-pumps; you could have so many different ones that  
5 come in that, when they -- when you do get the call attendant,  
6 because you're not aware of what it is, that's the reason why you  
7 have to look into it right away. Those alarms have to be looked  
8 into. The alarms have to be cleared so that we can get back to a  
9 normal operation mode.

10 Q. Okay. So essentially, just to make sure I'm understanding  
11 this correctly, when those alarms are coming in, it's hard to know  
12 the exact level of urgency behind it, so you kind of have to treat  
13 it as urgent until you know otherwise?

14 A. Yes, ma'am, exactly.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Because we're unaware. That's exactly what we have to do.

17 Q. Okay. That makes sense to me. So and just for my knowledge,  
18 when you're talking about looking into it right away, are we  
19 talking about, you know, within a minute or two, or are we talking  
20 about within 5, 10, 15 minutes? What does that look like in terms  
21 of --

22 A. Oh, no, ma'am.

23 Q. -- timeliness?

24 A. No, ma'am. No, ma'am.

25 Q. Yeah.

1 A. It's as quickly as you can. You try -- if you have something  
2 that you are taking care of in regard to another station or a  
3 phone call or something, you try to take care of that as quickly  
4 as possible, so that way you can get into your call attendant.  
5 Now, you might have a few minutes that go by, but you don't let  
6 this extend into a long period of time. No, ma'am.

7 Q. Okay. Now, do you remember, the day of the rupture, there  
8 were a few. It looks like there was one at 9:30 -- or 9:29,  
9 another one at 12:46, and another one at 16 -- or 13:16. Do you  
10 remember any call attendant alarms prior, you know, earlier in the  
11 day and what those might have been for?

12 A. In all honestly, ma'am, no, ma'am.

13 Q. That's okay.

14 A. We get alarms for so many different things, not just call  
15 attendants but for so many different things that, unless it's a,  
16 you know, situation that just sticks in your mind, then it sticks  
17 in your mind. But as far as the other call attendants, no, ma'am,  
18 I don't. I cannot recall what they were for, where they were at,  
19 what they were for.

20 Q. That's okay. That's totally okay. Now, when you do get an  
21 alarm, what does that look like on your screen? You know, what  
22 does it -- how does -- how it is showing you? Are we seeing  
23 different colors? Are we seeing sound -- are we hearing sounds?

24 A. It's different colors.

25 Q. Yeah.

1 A. They're different colors, yes, ma'am. It comes in as an  
2 orange color.

3 Q. Okay. Is it flashing? I mean, how -- talk to me --

4 A. It looks like --

5 Q. -- about what it looks like on your screen visually. Yeah.

6 A. When the alarms initially come in, they will come in at the  
7 top of your alarm page, and they will come in flashing. And then  
8 you'll -- whichever particular alarm it may be will be signified  
9 by the color and by the remarks. You have critical safeties. You  
10 have urgent. You have informational. You have warnings. So they  
11 will come in flashing, and as you see your alarms come in, you are  
12 reading them and you are acknowledging them by clicking on to  
13 them. And by acknowledging them, you are stating that you are  
14 aware of the alarm. And from there, you go about taking care of  
15 your alarms.

16 Q. Okay. And what would be your criteria, when would you  
17 consider it safe to clear an alarm?

18 A. I would say it would be safe to clear an alarm -- different  
19 operators I would say are different, but in my view, I would say  
20 it's safe to clear an alarm when you know you can get to it as  
21 quickly as possible.

22 Q. Okay. Let me go back --

23 A. Now --

24 Q. Go ahead. I'm sorry.

25 A. Now, I just want you to understand that if you -- when I say

1 get to it as quickly as possible, you might leave that alarm  
2 blinking for a few minutes -- a few seconds because you're on  
3 something, and then you want to go right back to it. Others may  
4 click on to it right away. I try my best to always click on to it  
5 right away and to acknowledge it and get to it as quickly as  
6 possible, because as far as my screens are concerned, my alarms  
7 sit as close to my face as possible in regard to the rest of the  
8 system.

9 Q. Okay. And how large of an area do you cover on a normal  
10 basis? Do you cover the same lines every week on shift? And what  
11 do your shifts look like?

12 A. On my shift, I cover the same systems. I have what we call  
13 the D Desk, and under my normal schedule, which is days and nights  
14 -- we don't work just days or just nights; we work both of them --  
15 I cover that desk under my normal shift. I will cover other desks  
16 when needed, when a slot needs to be filled or -- but for the most  
17 part, I cover my desk.

18 Q. Okay. So it's a system --

19 A. I have a schedule.

20 Q. Okay. So it's a system you're very familiar with then?  
21 You've spent a fair amount of time with, is that safe to say?

22 A. Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am. I would say that's safe to say.

23 Q. Okay. Now, in this segment between Muses Mill and  
24 Owingsville compression station, what all can you see?

25 A. I'm sorry. Could you repeat that please?

1 Q. I'm sorry. In this segment between -- in the segment where  
2 the rupture occurred, between Muses Mill valve station and  
3 Owingsville compression station, what all can you see? What  
4 transmitters are you seeing? What values are you seeing? What  
5 data do you have available to you to analyze the situation?

6 A. On the overall screen, I have my station, in that area --  
7 that's what you're asking about?

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. How do you see the station? I can see the units. I can see  
10 which units are running and which are not running -- excuse me --  
11 I can see the pressures, if there are any -- or if there are any  
12 pressure reductions in the area, I can see that. I can -- well,  
13 the temperature, the ambient temperature, I can see that. And  
14 then, if I need more information for that station, I can drill  
15 down on the station and I can look in detail of how -- for  
16 instance, how fast, how many, how much RPM there -- the unit is  
17 running at.

18 I can see my set points, and I can see the temperature of the  
19 units. There's -- when you drill down onto it, there's  
20 information that's given to you that you also can put that, or a  
21 crew puts in to where, if you might have a lead or a lag unit,  
22 maximum megawatts, that might be in there. We can drill down onto  
23 it so we can see what minimum suction pressures can be put in  
24 there to keep the units from falling offline.

25 I can also -- if I go back to, you know, the overall screen,

1 I can drill down onto the line segments and do the line segments.  
2 I can see valves that are there. I can see customers that are  
3 there, whether they are giving us gas or receiving gas. I can see  
4 our pressures. I can see their pressures. I can drill down onto  
5 those customers, and some of those customers are controlled on our  
6 side in regard to, let's say, OPPs (ph.) or set points, pressures,  
7 and then there are others that are controlled by their side, and  
8 even with those I can see pressures. I could see different things  
9 like that, ma'am.

10 Q. Okay. So at Muses Mill, you can see the valves. Can you  
11 operate any of them from your desk?

12 A. There are some that we can operate and there are others that  
13 we cannot operate.

14 Q. Okay. Now, Muses Mill specifically, can you remotely operate  
15 anything at that station?

16 A. I'm sorry?

17 Q. At Muses Mill --

18 A. Can you say it again? I'm sorry.

19 Q. No, that's okay. At Muses Mills specifically --

20 A. Where?

21 Q. At Muses Mill, where they closed the valves out in the field  
22 for the rupture.

23 A. I'm sorry. That's what I was trying to hear that. Okay.  
24 You're talking about that valve?

25 Q. Yes. Is there anything that you can --



- 1 A. Yes, ma'am.
- 2 Q. -- do remotely at that valve location?
- 3 A. No, ma'am.
- 4 Q. Okay.
- 5 A. No, ma'am.
- 6 Q. Okay. Now for as far as controlling the station, what all  
7 can you do remotely during an emergency response like this? Can  
8 you -- you know, it sounds like you can turn turbines on and off.  
9 What else can you do?
- 10 A. Yes, ma'am.
- 11 Q. Can you close valves at the station?
- 12 A. You can turn --
- 13 Q. Or --
- 14 A. No, ma'am.
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. You can turn valves on and -- sorry, you can turn units on  
17 and off. You can control suction set points, discharge set  
18 points. At that particular station, we -- well, for the most  
19 part, we have control of the stations and we can operate them.
- 20 Q. Okay. So really your controls around -- the remote controls,  
21 your capabilities are centered around the actual compression  
22 abilities of the station?
- 23 A. Yes, ma'am.
- 24 Q. Okay.
- 25 A. There are locations that have the operator there 24/7, and

1 they control them. We communicate with them, and they control  
2 them. And the ones that are not covered at night, for the most  
3 part, we control them. And during the day, they are there, so  
4 they can control them. We just have to communicate with them.

5 Q. Okay. Great. Thank you. Now, you said -- you were talking  
6 about the suction pressure, and you essentially implied that  
7 having a significant enough suction pressure to keep the units  
8 from dropping offline -- were you talking about a stop timer  
9 there?

10 A. Yes, ma'am. There was a stop timer.

11 Q. Okay. Can you talk a little bit more about the stop timer at  
12 Owingsville and how that works and what might set that off?

13 A. Well, it is a drop in the pressure for the most part, and  
14 when you get a stop timer -- well, it's not just a drop in the  
15 pressure. It could be where you're getting too high on your  
16 pressures, and the units could be recycling, and you might need to  
17 stop them, you know, for that.

18 But the stop timer that I received, I was looking into it,  
19 and I had informed Bart about it. I had already looked at it and  
20 was trying to figure out, why am I getting a stop timers? And I  
21 was checking my set points to see if I had something that would  
22 have not (indiscernible) and when I was doing that, I had received  
23 a call from Bart and had told him about it and told him that, you  
24 know, I got an issue that I'm not sure exactly what's going on,  
25 but I have an issue over there because I have stop timers, and I

1 told him that I was losing pressure over there.

2 So, you know, I wasn't sure what the issue was. I didn't  
3 know if the issue was at the station, if the issue was on, you  
4 know, the line, if it was downstream pressure or downstream  
5 horsepower. You know, I was looking into it to try to figure out,  
6 you know, why am I getting these stop timers because of, you know,  
7 this pressure that I was losing.

8 Q. Okay. That makes sense. Thank you.

9 A. Yes, ma'am.

10 Q. Now, you talked about four different categories of alarms:  
11 critical safety, urgent, informational, and warning. Can you give  
12 me some examples of what might fall in -- what kinds of alarms  
13 might fall into each category and what cues you might take  
14 depending on --

15 A. I'm sorry. What was that last part?

16 Q. Oh, and I was going to say, and what actions you might take  
17 as a result when you receive those kind of alarms?

18 A. Okay. Let's see here.

19 Q. I know it's a big question, so yeah --

20 A. Yes, ma'am, I'll try my best to answer it for you. Our  
21 critical safety alarms, we can get those alarms, MOPs and the  
22 point option of that also, low pressures. We can get them for,  
23 you know, H2S gas in the building. You know, we can get critical  
24 safety alarms for situations like that.

25 We can get urgent alarms for a unit that has fallen off call

1 attendant. Quite a few different ones, water content. We can get  
2 warning alarms for post-comm issues, AC issues, temperature.

3 We can get informational alarms when there's been a big drop  
4 in the pressure; those are informational alarms that we can get.  
5 Those will flash for us up there also. They're blue on  
6 informational alarms.

7 Q. Okay. Perfect. Thank you. That's exactly what I was  
8 looking for.

9 A. Yes, ma'am.

10 Q. Now, on the -- how involved are the controllers and the alarm  
11 development criteria process? Is that something you guys are  
12 consulted on? Is that something that's made at a higher level or  
13 a different group? Or do specialists work on or --

14 A. Oh, I would say it's at a higher group, or I should -- maybe  
15 I should say it's just within a different department that  
16 coordinates the alarms, knowing what should be -- how would say a  
17 result of triggering an alarm.

18 And as far as the controllers, I would have to say that  
19 management takes our information, also, if we believe that, you  
20 know, there's an alarm that should be in there for something, then  
21 we could put it in. But, for the most part, it's not the  
22 controllers that are, I would say, deciding and executing the  
23 implementation of the alarms.

24 Q. Okay. Yeah. I was just getting to, back when I worked at  
25 industry, about annually we did an alarm management review, which

1 is a whole --

2 A. Yeah, ma'am.

3 Q. -- field in itself. So wondering how involved you guys were  
4 in that process and if that's something you guys didn't --

5 A. With that management, I don't want to say that we're not  
6 involved, because management -- I would like to -- in my mind,  
7 management involves us with as much as possible, you know, for the  
8 benefit of being able to operate our pipeline as well as possible,  
9 as safely as possible, as efficiently as possible.

10 Q. Right. Okay. Now, when you saw the pressure drop and you  
11 were talking with Bart on the phone, what was the -- what was your  
12 first interpretation of that 100 pounds in about 4 minutes?

13 What's going through your head?

14 A. Well, I believe that when the pressure first started dropping  
15 off, I was on the phone call, so I actually didn't see the drop  
16 from where it started to where -- when I looked into it, when I  
17 looked, when I started drilling down into it, after looking into  
18 it, the pressures, they had -- I was scanning them. I was  
19 scanning them, and at that time, there was -- I don't want to say  
20 this incorrectly, but there wasn't that drastic of a drop.

21 I didn't -- the first thing that would have caught me would  
22 have been an informational alarm, but -- because I believe the way  
23 the units worked by slowing themselves down, it kind of -- I would  
24 say that it made the drop a little bit less in the sense that it  
25 wasn't dropping as much as fast. And then, after the two units

1 were off, it was even less of a drop. So it was something that I  
2 knew I had to look into.

3 And by chance, that's when Bart had called, and I passed the  
4 information on to him, because I knew I had to look into why this  
5 situation was happening and try to figure it out and get in touch  
6 with the field and let them know. And that's when Bart called in,  
7 and that's when I passed on to him, we've got an issue over there.  
8 I'm not too sure what -- exactly what's going on, but something's  
9 happening.

10 Q. Okay. Now, did you pull up a -- you know, when you were on  
11 the phone talking to Bart, did you pull up a trend of the pressure  
12 at any point, or just look at the --

13 A. Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am. I was trending it to start looking  
14 into it, and it was through the trend that you -- you know, a  
15 little bit, how would you say, clarification was seen on the drop.  
16 Yes, ma'am.

17 Q. Okay. Yeah. Because that rate of change is really the  
18 easiest way to take a look at it, right? Especially if --

19 A. Yes, yes, ma'am.

20 Q. -- especially if you're talking about the suction site of a  
21 compressor station. So, speaking of rate of change, do you  
22 have -- do you get rate of change alarms on any of your systems  
23 from time to time?

24 A. Yes, ma'am. They will come in as the informational alarms  
25 when we have a major drop on the pressure.

1 Q. Okay. How often do you see those?

2 A. Not often, ma'am, not often.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Well, let me rephrase that. When you're adjusting  
5 horsepower, you can get them then.

6 Q. Yeah.

7 A. So I will -- I don't want to say not often, but they don't  
8 come in very much.

9 Q. Right. Except for when you're making changes of the station,  
10 which makes sense.

11 A. Yes, ma'am.

12 Q. Okay. And on this one, you hadn't received one of those  
13 informational-only rate of change alarms when Bart called?

14 A. Yeah, the stop, the stop timers is what I had received.

15 Q. Okay. Now, is it normal to let a stop timer run out in a  
16 situation like this? What are you trained to do? What's the  
17 thought process behind it?

18 A. Well, once again, it goes back to the stations, ma'am. When  
19 you get stop timers, you definitely want to start looking into it  
20 as quickly as possible. And, depending on the stations, there are  
21 different amounts of times where you're able to work with the  
22 system to be able to get yourself out of the stop timers. Under  
23 normal circumstances, you're -- once again, depending on stations,  
24 stations have different, a lot of times, because of their makeup,  
25 that you have to work with the stop timer.

1           So yes, ma'am, it's -- when you get the stop timer, for the  
2 most part, you're working on it right away because it varies on  
3 the time. But, for the most part, for most of the stations that I  
4 can remember, they're like 15 minutes. You know, so you start  
5 looking to see what you can do in regard to the horsepower that  
6 you have there, the horsepower upstream, the horsepower  
7 downstream. You start looking at customers to see what they're  
8 doing, if there's been an incident there. You would do different  
9 things like to try to see what you can do to remedy that stop  
10 timer.

11 Q.    Okay. Now, in this particular case, did the stop timer bring  
12 the units down or did you bring the units down?

13 A.    No, ma'am, the stop timer had brought the units down before I  
14 could get the situation set up. As I said, I was looking into it,  
15 trying to find out, you know, why I was getting the stop timers,  
16 and then it was the stop timers that had brought the units down.

17 Q.    Right. Okay.

18 A.    But -- well, yes, ma'am.

19 Q.    Go ahead. I apologize. Please go ahead.

20 A.    You know, I was just -- well, you know, I would want to say  
21 it was the stop timers, but it could also be, you know, that  
22 the -- I -- kind of hard to phrase this. Even though I got the  
23 stop timers, I think the units protected themselves. Because like  
24 I said, when you get two low, you have to feed that unit. That  
25 unit has to run in one form or another, and that unit was not



1 satisfying its criteria, so that's what took it offline.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. So it's not like the stop timer elapsed. As much as I can  
4 recall, the stop timer did not elapse, you know, to cause the  
5 units to go to down. It was just they weren't meeting their  
6 criteria.

7 Q. It's within the programming of the turbines themselves?

8 A. Yes, ma'am.

9 Q. Okay. That makes sense. That makes sense to me. I'm going  
10 to ask you a more general question here, and then I'm going to  
11 pass you off for a little bit. Can you --

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. -- about abnormal operations training, AO training, and what  
14 that looks like and how often you do that?

15 A. Well, we usually have our controllers meeting every year and  
16 it is discussed. We discuss situations that -- I'm not saying  
17 that could occur, but you have to bring up things that you can use  
18 as an example, I would say.

19 Q. Right. Right.

20 A. You use -- you know, that is brought out, and then there's  
21 also previous existing abnormal operations that have occurred that  
22 we discuss, and we talk over in regard to how it was taken care  
23 of, if there could be a different way to take care of it, or even  
24 maybe a better way to take care of it, you know, what process was  
25 done to work on the ones that have occurred and if there could be

1 any kind of change to what was done. You know, all that is kind  
2 of spoken about so that way we could try to be on top of our game  
3 as much as possible.

4 MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Great. Well, I'm going to -- thank you  
5 very much for your answers. I appreciate it. I'm going to --

6 MR. GARZA: Yes, ma'am.

7 MS. COLLETTI: -- pass you to Alvaro for his first round of  
8 questions.

9 Alvaro, please introduce yourself per the usual.

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Alex.

11 BY MR. RODRIGUEZ:

12 Q. Again, this is Alvaro Rodriguez. I am an accident  
13 investigator with the Accident Investigation Division of PHMSA.  
14 You know, thank you very much for your time in providing your  
15 timeline for this incident. What was your (indiscernible) on the  
16 day of the incident?

17 A. I'm sorry, what was my what?

18 Q. Your --

19 A. Do you mind if I call you Alvaro?

20 (Simultaneous speaking.)

21 Q. -- (indiscernible). Yeah, that's correct. Yeah, that's  
22 fine.

23 A. Okay. What was my schedule?

24 Q. Yeah. For the day of the incident.

25 A. For the day of the incident, I was working my day shift from

1 5 in the morning to 5 in the evening.

2 Q. Okay. Did you work until 5 p.m. that day or did you stay  
3 longer?

4 A. No, sir. I was -- I stayed there longer. I was there until  
5 about 7 o'clock because, after making sure that we got the  
6 situation under control as quickly and as efficiently as possible,  
7 you then would have to hang out for your drug and alcohol testing.

8 Q. Okay. I understand. And could you clarify something for me?  
9 During this incident, how did you isolate lines? And how did you  
10 isolate stations?

11 A. The station and the lines were isolated by us calling --  
12 after finding out the location of the incident, that is when calls  
13 were made to make sure field -- the field guys called in. But  
14 phone calls were made to isolate the station and the valves, the  
15 line valves.

16 Q. Okay. And can you tell me the approach of the north side of  
17 that rupture and the approach of the south side of the rupture?  
18 Do you know that?

19 A. Well, as far as the north side is concerned, that's where we  
20 spoke with the field reps and determined where it was at, and they  
21 then went to execute the closure of the valve. And that would,  
22 you know, would be the same as far as the station. Communication  
23 was made between the operator about blocking off the station and  
24 isolating this situation as quickly as possible. And then the  
25 same thing in regard to the first valve on the south side of the

1 station.

2       So the north side was -- the calls were made to isolate the  
3 first valve in that section and then also the second one to make  
4 sure that nothing went wrong. And then, as I said, the -- and,  
5 you know, and it wasn't -- I don't want you to think that we're  
6 doing, you know, one and then the other with the same personnel.  
7 We're calling out all the personnel that can take care of the  
8 situation in regard to the closest ones there to get on it as  
9 quickly as possible. So all these calls were being made from --  
10 all the calls were being communicated to close so-and-so north  
11 side valve, station so-and-so south side valve on the lines. And  
12 that was how we were able to get that done.

13 Q. Perfect. And from the controller room, can you see and  
14 identify if any main valve are open or closed?

15 A. No, because they're not RCVs. On the RCVs, we can see if  
16 they're open or closed. But we get confirmation from the field  
17 once they have everything closed up.

18 Q. Okay. And I have one more question. Can you think of  
19 anything that could have been done differently?

20 A. No, sir.

21       MR. RODRIGUEZ: All right. Well, thank you very much for  
22 your cooperation, and that's everything I have for that one.

23       MR. GARZA: Okay. You're welcome, and thank you, sir.

24       MR. WOODEN: Hi, Joe. This is Tom Wooden. You know, I  
25 really don't have any questions at this time. I appreciate you

1 walking through how you responded to the alarms and helping us  
2 understand that.

3 So, Alex, I don't have any questions at this time.

4 MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Great.

5 BY MS. COLLETTI:

6 Q. This is Alex, and I just want to make sure I cover this, Joe.  
7 And I may have already, so if I'm repeating myself, please forgive  
8 me. Prior to the --

9 A. It's okay.

10 Q. Prior to the rupture, the pressure was in the 650s, 655 or  
11 657 is what I heard. I think that's still being looked into a  
12 little bit. But would you say that was normal operating pressure  
13 for this station on the suction side?

14 A. Yes, ma'am, for the most part. Our pressure can vary  
15 depending on what our course of plan is, but for the most part,  
16 yes, ma'am.

17 Q. Okay. And do you run all of your stations at that same, you  
18 know, 250-pound differential or does it really just depend on what  
19 your setup is?

20 A. No, ma'am, it basically -- that's the range of what you would  
21 run. It might be less; it could be more. But you have to have a  
22 certain amount of differential for the units to -- for the whole  
23 system of the units to operate in an efficient manner.

24 Q. Right.

25 A. So you're usually looking at getting some decent differential

1 there. Yes, ma'am.

2 MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Great. That's all I have. I want to  
3 thank you very much.

4 Alvaro, do you have any more questions?

5 MR. RODRIGUEZ: No, I don't have anything else.

6 MS. COLLETTI: Tom?

7 MR. WOODEN: No, Alex, I don't have any other questions.  
8 Thank you.

9 MS. COLLETTI: Okay.

10 Well, Joe, that's the end of our two rounds, and I never go  
11 more than two. Thank you so much. Yeah. Thank you so much for  
12 your time today. I really appreciate it. Thanks for --

13 MR. GARZA: Not a problem, ma'am.

14 MS. COLLETTI: -- letting me ask so many detailed questions  
15 about the specifics of gas control. Every control room is  
16 different for every operator, so I appreciate your take on it.

17 In about a month, I will be emailing you a transcript of this  
18 interview. It'll come with a form in the front that will have two  
19 checkboxes. One is for if there are errors and one is if you  
20 check if there's nothing wrong with it, if there aren't errors.  
21 And if there are any -- which generally there aren't, but if there  
22 are any, they're generally misspellings, things like that --  
23 please -- you can write up on the document itself, or you can send  
24 me an email that says, on page 5, line 6, this needs to be  
25 changed.

1 Do you have any questions for me?

2 MR. GARZA: No, ma'am.

3 MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Is there anything that I should have  
4 asked you about that I neglected to?

5 MR. GARZA: Nothing I'm aware of, ma'am.

6 MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Well, thank you so much for your time,  
7 Joe. I really appreciate it.

8 With that, we're off the record with the Joe Garza interview.  
9 This concludes the interview at 12:10 p.m. Thank you.

10 (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: ENBRIDGE INC. NATURAL GAS  
PIPELINE RUPTURE AND FIRE  
IN HILLSBORO, KENTUCKY,  
ON MAY 4, 2020  
Interview of Joseph Garza

ACCIDENT NO.: PLD20LR001

PLACE: Via teleconference

DATE: May 15, 2020

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed  
to the best of my skill and ability.



---

Romona Phillips  
Transcriber