National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations

Interview Regarding Investigation PLD20LR001
Enbridge Inc. Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire in Hillsboro, KY on May 4, 2020

Name: TOM ATKINSON

Department: GAS CONTROL

Title: DIRECTOR

Date of Interview: 5/30/20

I have reviewed my transcript(s) from the above referenced accident and:

- [X] I have no comments to make.
- [ ] My comments are submitted herewith.
- [ ] My comments are marked on the attached copy.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:	*	
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ENBRIDGE INC. NATURAL GAS	*	
PIPELINE RUPTURE AND FIRE	*	Accident No.: PLD20LR001
IN HILLSBORO, KENTUCKY,	*	
ON MAY 4, 2020	*	
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Interview of: TOM ATKINSON, Director of Gas Control
Enbridge, Inc.

Via teleconference

Wednesday,
May 13, 2020

APPEARANCES:

ALEXANDRIA COLLETTI, Investigator in Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

ALVARO RODRIGUEZ, Accident Investigator
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

THOMAS WOODEN, Vice President
Engineering and Asset Management
Enbridge, Inc.

DANE JAQUES, Attorney
Steptoe and Johnson, LLP

I N D E X

I N T E R V I E W

(10:09 a.m.)

MS. COLLETTI: We're on the record for the Tom Atkinson interview. Good morning. Today is May 13th, 2020. It is now 10:09 a.m. Eastern Time. My name is Alex Colletti. I'm the investigator in charge for this accident for the National Transportation Safety Board in Washington, D.C.

We're holding this interview remotely via audio conference call. This interview is being conducted as part of the investigation into the Texas Eastern Transmission natural gas release and fire that occurred on May 4th, 2020, in Fleming County, Kentucky. The NTSB case number for this accident is PLD20LR001.

This interview is being recorded and may be transcribed at a later date. A copy of the transcript will be provided to the interviewee for review prior to being entered into the public docket. This is your opportunity to correct things that the transcriber may have incorrectly transcribed; it's not your opportunity to add and elaborate on things. So if you have something that's factual that you'd like to add, during the interview is the best time.

You're permitted to have one other person present during the interview. This person is of your choice. It can be an attorney, spouse, supervisor, friend, family member, or no one at all.

Tom, for the record, please state the spelling of your full

name, your job title, and who you have selected to be present during the interview.

MR. ATKINSON: Tom Atkinson, T-o-m, A-t-k-i-n-s-o-n. Director, Gas Control, and I've chosen Dane Jaques to represent me, and he's currently on the phone.

MS. COLLETTI: Okay, great. Now we're going to go around the call, so to speak, to introduce ourselves. We'll start with Alvaro, then Tom Wooden, and then Dane. Per the usual, guys, please spell your name and titles. Thank you.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: It's Alvaro, A-l-v-a-r-o, Rodriguez, R-o-d-r-i-g-u-e-z. I'm an accident investigator with the Accident Investigation Division of PHMSA in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

MR. WOODEN: Good morning. This is Thomas Wooden, T-h-o-m-a-s, W-o-o-d-e-n, Vice President of Engineering for Enbridge, and also a party coordinator for the investigation.

MR. JAQUES: My name is Dane Jaques, spelled D-a-n-e, J-a-q-u-e-s. I am a partner with the law firm Steptoe and Johnson in Washington, D.C.

MS. COLLETTI: Okay, great.

Well, Tom, thank you for agreeing to be interviewed today. I really appreciate your time. It's an important task we have to collect the information we can from your memory of that day. I'm going to ask you to provide a lot of details for us, as much as you can remember. Please don't speculate; just provide what you can remember.

If I or someone else asks you a question and you don't know the answer to it, or you don't remember, it's completely fine to say, I don't know. However, the more information you can give us, the better.

INTERVIEW OF TOM ATKINSON

BY MS. COLLETTI:

Q. So, before we get started on the day of the accident, can you talk a little bit about your background? Did you start with Enbridge originally, or Texas Eastern? Where all have you worked? Just fill me in on how long you've been with the pipeline industry, and what you've been doing since you've been there.

A. Okay. I've been director -- I've been with Enbridge for 26 years. Prior to that, I was with another pipeline company, United Gas Pipeline Company here in Houston. I began my career with United Gas Pipeline as a pipeliner and then, and then over a short period of time, moved into gas control for them, where I was promoted up to a senior controller.

And in '93, I came on board with Texas Eastern as a senior controller, or Enbridge as we are known now. As a senior controller, I got hired on, I held different levels of responsibility in my 26 years. As I said, I started out as a senior controller. I was then a gas control coordinator, a systems manager for gas control, a manager for gas control, a director for gas control, and then a general manager for gas control. And then, when the Enbridge acquisition occurred, my

title is Director of Gas Control. So I've been in the industry since I got out of college.

Q. Okay, great. Well, it's always nice to talk to someone that knows what they're talking about. Thanks for filling me in on your history.

So I want to back up to the day of the event, the 4th, and I want you to really take a moment if you need to; I know it's been a few days. Think through where you were at the time, starting when you received any kind of notification to when things were essentially fully blown down. Just walk us through the entire day from when the control center was first notified to, like I said, when the lines were blowing down.

Take your time. As much detail as possible. This is a long talking stretch, so if you need a break, feel free to ask for one. We'll go back after that and I'll ask you some kind of procedural questions, but for right now, I'd just like to start with the event itself.

A Yes, can do. Let me just say several prefatory items. In my control room, under normal circumstances, pre-COVID, we operate six control desks that handle or are responsible for 13 pipelines across the continent.

Those areas of responsibility are delineated pretty, pretty -- from a workload perspective, pretty evenly. So any given day, pre-COVID, we would have six controllers in the control center. They work 12-hour shifts, what we refer to as modified

DuPont schedule.

When COVID came upon us, like everybody else, it changed how we viewed our operation to the extent that we, we determined that we did not want any of our staff to be sick and nor did we need any of the, you know, the virus to get anywhere near anyone in my control room.

So we decided to take the 6 feet distancing to a larger distancing. So I moved three control desks on a vacant floor on two, and then I left three control desks on three. So I have it split. It's one control center and, you know, we maintain physical distancing and that type of thing.

We're still in that configuration. So on the second floor, I've got three controllers operating, three consoles they're responsible for assets. And then three controllers working three consoles on the third floor, operating, you know, assets.

At the time of, on May 4th, in an effort to continue to make sure my management staff is not exposed to COVID, we had -- we began working from, just like everybody else, everybody was working from home. And the way I structured that is that I have, at any given day, one manager and two specialists on location every week.

So I have three managers that report up to me, plus two other specialists that are outside of operations reporting to me. Those managers have two specialists each that report up to them. So, over a three-week -- you know, we're on a rotation, so over three

weeks, I have one manager and two specialists in the office, including myself. I'm here every day.

And so I have a manager and two specialists every day. They're responsible for providing support on a daily perspective, on a -- or even a shift-by-shift perspective on operations. My job is merely to support them in the operation of all the pipelines from a 5,000-foot level, so to speak. And the managers and the specialists handle day-to-day operations.

So what you have in front of you is a timeline that was put together that came from different sources. It came from SCADA data. It came from controller's log notes. It came from phone call recordings. So all this is just an amalgamation of information.

As you can see, if you'll take notice on the right hand side of the outline, just for convenience sake, we've added line ten pressure, which is the, the line that ruptured on valve section one in (indiscernible). So all that, all the pressures at the corresponding times are there for just convenience sake.

Q. Okay. I'm going to stop you for just a second, Tom Atkinson. I'm going to take us off the record really quickly.

(Off the record.)

(On the record.)

MS. COLLETTI: We are back on the record for the Tom Atkinson interview. And Tom, I'll go back to you. And again, thank you for your patience.

MR. ATKINSON: Thank you. One last bit of information that I wanted to convey before we get into the timeline is give you a sense that the controller on Desk D, which is on the third floor, he was operating assets from Egypt, Mississippi, to Western Pennsylvania, and on into Indiana, including the pipeline that goes across Tennessee. So, again, all of my consoles have equal, equal workload, but to give you a sense of what kind of assets the controller was operating on that desk.

The first indication, the first -- at 3:39, gas control on Desk D received a call attendant alarm at Owingsville Station. A call attendant alarm is merely a notification that something needs attention to at Owingsville. Not necessarily a bad thing because we had call attendants all across our systems. It was just an alarm to come in that raises -- it allows -- it notifies the controller that something needs to be taken care of, or take a look at the compressor station.

At 3:40, we get our first call from a young lady, a lady in Hillsboro, Kentucky, and stating that the woods were on fire, that the gas blowing, and the person that took that call was on the second floor. Tim Winders (ph.), he took the call.

And while he was on the call talking to the lady, getting all her information -- we got blanks we need to fill in when we get calls from landowners, that type of thing. So he was receiving information from the lady, asking her things, and then on the same shift, on the second floor, one of my senior controllers overheard

the conversation with Tim Winders on the first call.

And he goes over to his desk and looks at the address that she gave, then went back to his desk -- so he went back to his desk and pulled up an application that we named EMAPS. EMAPS is a mapping tool, very, very, very similar to Google Maps or whatever, except this mapping tool has our pipelines as layers introduced to it. So Billy is entering the address of the initial call into EMAPS, while Tim, the other controller, is still on the phone.

At 3:42, we get another call reporting a fire over the hill. And then at the same time, at 3:42, Bart Johnson -- he's an area supervisor in transmission -- calls into the control room and states that his, his people in Hillsboro were wondering if there was a pressure drop on the pipeline.

He was talking to Joe Garza. He is my controller that is working that console where Owingsville -- you know, that set of assets that I spoke to earlier. He's talking to Joe Garza and he says, ask him the same thing about the pressure drop, and Joe confirmed at that time that there was a pressure drop on the sections of Owingsville and tells Bart that a stop timer is activated.

This is a different alarm than the call attendant. But a stop timer alarm is just a notification to the controller that there are some parameters at the station PLC that are, that the -- that they're unable to meet. And if the controller doesn't change some of those parameters, for example, suction or discharge, the

station, the programming is designed to take the station offline automatically.

At 3:43, my senior controller on floor two notifies a controller on three that we have a rupture on Owingsville suction and, you know, he used the EMAPS tool. He was able to validate where it was from the location perspective, and he notified Shawn Wilson (ph.), who's a controller on three, that we have a rupture. At 3:46, the same senior controller, Billy Davis, notifies the Owingsville operator to get back to the station.

Now, I'll pause here for just a minute, if I can do that, and say that the majority of the compressor stations that are being operated on this segment of pipe, and across a lot of our assets, are automated. What that means is that there might be someone, a station operator, at the station during the day, but at a particular time in the afternoon, whether that's 3:30, 4:00, whatever that might be, people leave.

So Owingsville is a remotely controlled station and has a station operator assigned to it, but they leave for the day. They're a date -- day people. Same as the compression station to the north of Wheelersburg -- of Owingsville. Wheelersburg is also remotely controlled and was unmanned at this time. Owingsville was unmanned at this time. And for -- to help maybe further understand where we're fixing to go is, within this larger segment of pipe, there are no remotely controlled valves.

So I say all that to begin the discussion about what the

controllers can or can't do in response to a rupture at Owingsville in valve section one. The only thing that we can do is notify personnel, field personnel. And so that's what you see at 3:46, a senior controller notified the operator for Owingsville, who is not on location, and he says by all the data he looks at, it appears -- and the address, it appears that we have a rupture in valve section one. And the operator then says, I'm 30 to 45 minutes away.

At 3:46, Steven Courtney (ph.) -- he's also one of my controllers on two -- notifies the manager on location and Bobby Pollard (ph.); Bobby Pollard is a specialist. So I had Bobby Pollard, Cody Fokes (ph.), two specialists were on duty here in the building, and Wayne Page (ph.) was manager on duty.

And then, at 3:47, Owingsville station goes offline. So exactly what I said, if the parameters aren't changed on a stop timer alarm, the unit will go off. Because typically, it just means the unit is not needed based on programming. It's not uncommon to have a stop timer alarm. It's not uncommon to have to change set points, or whatever that might be, to get a station out of stop timer. But again, at 3:47, the station goes offline. And at the same time, my other specialist, Cody, calls Bart Johnson -- he's a responding supervisor in the field -- and they talk about what's going on.

At 3:42, my second specialist that is here in the building calls the operator at Wheelersburg, which is the compressor

station, the unmanned compressor station to the north of Owingsville, and asks Luke, the operator, to head back to the station, the compressor station, because there's a belief that there's a possible (indiscernible) or rupture, and we're going to need to get some valves closed.

At 4:00, Joe Garza, the controller working Desk D, is already interacting with Tennessee or Kinder, at Hanging Rock, and we request them to shut in. It's a receipt point. Kinder was giving us gas, and Joe was merely working through preventing more product from entering that segment.

According to SCADA history, line 10 and line 25 were isolated at Owingsville at 4:04. Line 15 was already isolated. So that was at 4:04.

At 4:06, Joe Garza, my operator on Desk D, called the operator in Wheelersburg again, because Billy had called him earlier and requested him to isolate the station and block all flow heading south on all lines.

At 4:08, the area manager for Owingsville, Randy Dean (ph.), called and notified us that he was sending employees to the rupture site.

At 4:16, the operator at Wheelersburg -- again, the station to the north of Owingsville -- called and verified that the line, lines 10 and 15, were isolated at Wheelersburg.

At 4:19, we again made another call to Tennessee, or Kinder, and asked them to shut in Hanging Rock. Again, that's the receipt

from -- a receipt point in that area where Tennessee gives gas to us.

At 4:20, transmission, Blevins -- it's his last name; I don't recall his first name -- notifies us that the valves at Muses Mills, which is the first valve section north of Owingsville, where the valves were isolated, and you could see the times. So at 4:23, the last valve was closed, in effect, isolating valve section one.

At 4:29 -- now, let me just take a pause here and then kind of characterize what is transpiring in the control room. I had a second manager who lives about five minutes away, he -- well, probably ten. He also came up here to help and assist in the work. Because gas control in this segment of pipeline had no arrows in the quiver, in essence, other than stopping the stations, we had no ability to isolate. But once the line is isolated at 4:20, the valve sections on all three lines, that's when our job begins.

At the time, the controller that's responsible for Owingsville is also responsible for -- we were running nine other compressor stations at the time. Various amounts of horsepower, but we were running nine at the time. Once we enter into isolating the line, the controller then is responsible to work off all of the compressor stations south of the rupture, south of Owingsville, and all of the stations that are moving gas towards Owingsville, to the north of Owingsville.

At the time, we were moving about one -- somewhere in the neighborhood of 1.4 BCF, and the controller then had to do something with that 1.4 that's coming from the north and then augment that 1.4 with southern storage. So the coordination of southern storage, which is down here on the Gulf Coast, all of the compressor stations south of Owingsville, the compressor stations north of Owingsville, and our northern storage assets all had to be coordinated and shut down.

So once valve section one is isolated, we began to shut stations down. So at 4:29, Cody, my specialist, spoke to Bart, supervisor in the field, and confirmed what we already assumed, was that all lines were isolated. Then you see a series of calls by the controller regarding these activities I just kind of characterized. Joe Garza, the controller, calls Danville, which at the time was running three turbines. It is just south of Owingsville. He knocked them off, took them offline.

And then at 4:40, one of my other controllers got a confirming call from Owingsville verifying that the blocked valves were closed -- the tap valves -- the tap blocked valves were closed at Owingsville and confirmed that line 15 bypass was closed. These are just a confirming phone call. We already knew from SCADA that they were closed.

Then you see at 4:42, the controller calls Wheelersburg, once the line is isolated, and has him open the bypass on lines 10 and 15 to reestablish flow to Dean at Hanging Rock. So that's a power

plant that is in between Muses Mills and Wheelersburg. So he was -- so the controller was just bypassing Wheelersburg so that the power plant can stay online once valve section one was isolated.

The controller then, at 4:52, calls Gladeville, which is a compression station in Tennessee. They were operating, they were running horsepower, and he wanted them to shut down. At 4:55, he also spoke to the operator at Mount Pleasant, Tennessee, and asked him to shut down. And then there was a customer call to Deana (ph.) about resuming flow at the power plant. 5:04, we called Tompkinsville, which is in Kentucky, and have them shut down, which is south of Danville.

And then there were other stations taken offline to the north in similar timeframes. But by 7:11, my manager, my second manager that was here at the time, talked to Rob Bartels (ph.), who is an area supervisor, and confirmed that the desire for the field was to double block, or in essence, go to the next valve section and isolate there. And he talked to Bartels at 7:11, and Bartels confirmed that valve section two's isolated on all three lines.

And then, by 8:44, all of the lines are blown down at Owingsville. And that ends the timeline.

MS. COLLETTI: Well, thank you very much for walking me through that time. I appreciate it. I want to back up to a couple of specific things, and then I want to talk to you about some of the data that I received. And then just some general questions about how your control room operates.

BY MS. COLLETTI:

Q. If we go back towards the beginning of the event, 3:36, we see the pressure drop. If we're looking by the minute-by-minute data, it's about a five percent drop, minute-by-minute, it drops 100 pounds in about four minutes. Right? So the question from me there is what kind of rate of change alarms do you have around that? What are those set at? You know, I understand that you got a call attendant alarm, but it sounds like that's a very general alarm that can have various levels of urgency.

I'm wondering why we're not seeing some sort of essentially rupture alert, saying 100 pounds in four minutes is very significant, and that's a large drop. Now, I understand that you saw that on 10 and 25 at the same time, so it's hard to distinguish exactly which line, and that makes sense to me. But I think at that point, you know, we can tell that there's something, there's something going on. So I'm wondering why there aren't more alarms at, say, 3:37 and 3:38 and 3:39 and 3:40 and 3:41, aside from just one call attendant alarm.

So can you walk me through kind of how your alarms are set up around that, what rate of change alarms you have with regards to pressure and all of that?

A. Okay. If you'll give me a minute, Alex.

Q. Sure, that's fine. Take your time.

A. At the time of the rupture, we had rate of change alarms on the discharge. There are not rate of change alarms on the suction

because we, we found that running engines -- starting and stopping engines created false alarms into the control room, and every time we would start and stop an engine, the rate of change -- our rate of change alarms, if applied to the suction, would trigger a false alarm into the control room.

Q. Okay.

A. And we decided that we did not want false alarms coming into the control room. So subsequently, there weren't any rate of change alarms on line 10, or any of the three lines.

Q. Okay. So, something --

A. We did get low -- I'm sorry.

Q. No, that's okay. Go ahead. Go ahead, please.

A. Well, I was just going to say, we did get alarms on the suction of Owingsville once the pressure hit 425, is when we began getting alarms. So we did get alarms at 425, and the low level is set at 400.

Q. Right, yeah. And I get that. That's 225 pounds, right? Which is a pretty -- that's a pretty big drop. And this is an instantaneous fracture -- instantaneous rupture. So I guess my thought here -- and I understand, I completely get the need for reducing the number of alarms that are coming into the control station. Like I said, I've worked with control rooms before. I did measurement and gas quality, and a large part of my role was working with the control room and helping them deal with all of those kind of issues.

But something I've seen that's been successful on other pipeline operators is essentially a more complicated control logic, which is essentially, if we're making changes to the compressor station itself, then our rate of change alarm is essentially overridden. So you can still have a rate of change alarm when you're at a steady state, which is what we were doing -- what was happening at the time of this rupture, but --

A. Well, let me --

Q. Go ahead.

A. To add a little bit to that, Alex, we were heading down that exact path prior to COVID where we would, where we would force the algorithm to look at the engine status or engine speed, or a particular data point at the compressor station and suppress alarm notification until, until the recycle valve went closed.

Q. Right.

A. And we were looking at trying to work a more complicated scripting in SCADA, but we weren't successful. I mean, we're still -- I don't have anybody here in the office to be working on that.

Q. Yeah.

A. We are going down that road, we just got caught up with COVID.

Q. Yeah. It's interesting to me because rate of change alarms aren't necessarily new. Right? So I can see, I can understand working on it recently, and I get that. But like, when I left the

individual, we had them on the suction side of our compressor stations, at least on EPNG. But that's, but that's a different story. Okay. We've talked about that.

So I want to talk about -- a little bit more about the call attendant alarm. Can you explain to me in more detail as to what all we might, what all might cause a call attendant alarm to go off? What levels of urgency are we talking about? How large is the range?

A. Well, I'll give it a shot.

Q. Well, here's a better way, here's a better way to phrase it then. What are the triggers for the call attendant alarm?

A. I can't speak to all of the triggers. I can speak to just what I know.

Q. Okay.

A. I do know that, for example, high H2S -- I'm sorry, high hazardous atmosphere, fire, ESD, the critical alarms that are associated roll up into call attendant. So if there was a fire or hazardous atmosphere, I'd get both alarms. I'd get call attendant and hazardous atmosphere.

But then there are other alarms that rolled up into the call attendant stream that pertain to local issues like low lube oil, low glycol, no water, a booster pump didn't kick on. Those types of things roll up into call attendant, and it's merely an alarm for my guys, or gals, my controllers to call the person on call.

And we don't have any way to determine what causes the call

attendant, other than those few things I mentioned that were, you know, fire or UV or IR, that type of thing.

Q. Okay. So you said when Bart Johnson called in, he spoke to Joe Garza. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, and Joe was on the second floor?

A. He was on third.

Q. He was on third. Okay, and the call also came into the third floor? Or was that on the second floor?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. No, it came in on third.

Q. Okay, okay.

A. Understand, understand, Alex, that all calls ring on all floors.

Q. Yep.

A. So whatever calls come in, they ring simultaneous on two and three.

Q. Right, right. And it's just whoever picks it up.

A. Okay.

Q. I was mostly just trying to figure out where the guys were situated, who's on what floor. So --

A. I got you.

Q. -- if Joe Garza is next to Tim Winders and Billy Davis, or if he's on a separate floor and can't hear them discussing.

A. Joe Garza is on a separate floor, and Tim Winders, Courtney, and Davis are on second floor.
Q. Okay, okay. So he isn't hearing that conversation, essentially.
A. Correct.
Q. Correct, okay.
A. Correct.
Q. But on a non-COVID situation, he would normally be hearing that conversation.
A. Absolutely.
Q. Okay, okay. Just wanted to make sure I really had that clear in my mind. So can you, can you talk to me about that conversation between Joe and Bart, a little bit more detail, what you know? And I'm going to be talking to Joe later to get more detail from him, but your understanding of essentially, was Joe aware of what was going on at the time and all of that?
A. The only thing I can comment on is what's stated here.
Q. Okay.
A. This was, this was a recorded phone call.
Q. Okay.
A. And the information that's here comes directly from that recording.
Q. Okay, great. This is the nice thing about gas control, almost everything's recorded. It's a double-edged --
A. Yeah, sometimes --

Q. It's a double-edged sword. Right?
A. It's a double-edged sword. It sure is.
Q. It's a double-edged sword. I know, I know. It's definitely a double-edged sword. I always used to tell them, I was like, you don't call them and complain because they've got everything on record.
A. That's right.
Q. They don't forget there. Okay. Well, let's see. And then I want to go down to the stop timer. So I want to make sure I understand what set off the stop timer alarm and then how that worked. So the stop timer, that was started because they were seeing -- it was seeing pressure drop? Or was that another trigger that started that?
A. We typically run Owingsville, which moves the gas from the north to the south, on discharge control. So whatever that discharge was, the station was controlling on the discharge. Now, in the control schema, there's several loops at Owingsville: pressure discharge, pressure suction, and flow. For us to operate efficiently, we found for us, we operate on discharge, right? So most of our stations that are remote are operated on discharge.

At Owingsville, at the time, the suction set point was set, in essence, out of the way, and the pressure set point was at 565. So within normal ranges of operation, Owingsville would never get -- I mean, not never, but under normal operating scenarios, Owingsville would not see 565 on the suction on either 10 or 25.

So the stop timer engaged -- so as the pressure dropped, the PLC recognized the pressure on 10 and 25, and when it hit 565, the units started to slow down. That's what it's programmed to do.

But once the station got to where it could not slow down anymore and still hold the 565, once the pressure dropped below -- once the pressure dropped, I believe -- I can't -- I don't know for sure, for certain, but I believe if the program sees 10 pounds less than what is being asked, so if the pressure was 555, and the set point is 565, and the units cannot slow down anymore, the stop timer begins. It's a clock.

Q. Yeah. Okay.

A. It's kind of like a clock.

Q. Okay.

A. Does that make sense?

Q. Yep, that makes perfect sense.

A. Okay.

Q. Okay. That was my understanding the first time through, I just wanted to make sure that I had still gotten that. So, essentially, the turbines there were turned off remotely because of that timer.

A. Yes.

Q. So, essentially, and that was -- is that something where, in this case, the decision is made to allow that to happen because a rupture is suspected? Or is that because there's so much going on? Or what's the thought process behind that?

A. It was allowed to run until it fell off so that we can pull as much product away as we could.
Q. Okay, makes sense.
A. And so it was, it was -- you know, it doesn't hurt the engines to go off on stop timer, so the decision was made to leave them on and let it pull down as far as we could.
Q. Okay, that makes sense. That makes sense. Okay. So I want to go kind of off your timeline here, which I really appreciate -- and, again, I'm so sorry for taking us off the record for that -- and go to some of the data that I've gotten, which was the alarms.

There were -- and you may not know the answer to this, and if you don't, that's fine. It looks like the day of the rupture, there were at least -- yeah, the day of the rupture, that morning at 9:30 a.m., there's a call attendant alarm in Owingsville; 12:46 p.m., there's a call attendant; 1:16, call attendant; 1:20 -- yeah, so there's, you know, two or three of them coming in. Is that a normal number of call attendant alarms for any give station on any given day when they're running?
A. Well, the best I can tell you, Alex, is during the day, you know, there are a number of people at the station. That would be something that you would probably need to talk to the station people about. If they're doing work out there or it -- I mean, there could be a lot of things that the station is doing locally that would generate the call attendant.
Q. Okay.

A. I just, I can't -- I don't -- my answer is I don't know.
Q. Okay. That's fine. That's totally fine. I'd rather you say that than anything else.
Okay. What's a typical alarm set, alarm acknowledge kind of time for something that's not complicated? How does that, how does the process work? So like on a lot of these call attendant alarms, I'm seeing a -- it's set by OBCIS, which I'm assuming is your algorithm, or your software.
A. Yes.
Q. And then it's acknowledged within a minute, maybe two minutes. What's kind of a normal timeframe for setting and acknowledging alarms?
A. That depends on what the alarm is. We've got three different priorities of alarms. And generally, on -- you know, the call attendant is not a critical alarm. It's an alarm that needs attention. Without looking at the data, I mean, we track acknowledgments and acknowledge alarms that, for a warning -- I mean an urgent alarm, which would be call attendant alarm, to acknowledge that, I don't have the information in front of me. I was wondering where you were looking at -- what time are you looking at, Alex?
Q. I'm looking at -- so the first one I'm thinking -- looking at is -- let me see. The -- it's at 12:46 on 5/4.
A. Yeah, hang on just a minute.
Q. Yeah, sure.

A. I need to pull up the data.
Q. That's okay. I can send you the file I have as well, if that's easier.
A. It might be easier.
Q. Yeah. I know how long the audits sometimes can take.
A. Let's see, I got -- I got it. Let me open it up.
Q. Okay. Yeah, so essentially what I'm seeing is, at 12:46, an alarm set for call attendant, and then an alarm set for three stopped -- there's three stopped units right in a row. And then immediately, the alarm is acknowledged, all within the same minute.
A. Yes. That would be, that would be expected.
Q. Okay.
A. That would be expected. Now, you see at 12:46, you get a call attendant and the units drop off line.
Q. Yep.
A. Now, there was something going on that was not a controller action. That was something that was happening at the station that was causing those units to go offline. I wouldn't -- without doing some significant investigation, it'd be probably better to talk to the field as to why the units went offline. But that was not, it was not an action that the controller took at 12:46.
Q. Okay.
A. When the units went off.
Q. So, essentially, yeah. And I'm seeing that. It's just an

alarm that's showing up, essentially showing that the units are offline.

A. Yes.

Q. It's -- but he's -- is it, essentially, he gets the call attendant alarm, and he sees it in combination with the units off, and that helps him make a decision, in terms of acknowledging -- I'm trying to get through the thought process of how your folks acknowledge alarms when they come in.

A. They're required to acknowledge the alarm when it comes in.

Q. Okay.

A. As expeditiously as they can. But that may, that may -- there may be factors and they may want to trim some data, and there's some other tools that the controller may need before he acknowledges the alarm. Most of the time, on urgent -- I mean, on urgent and critical, it's pretty quick.

Q. Okay. Now, what would be the criteria for clearing an alarm? How does that work? How does that process work? Is there a standard procedure in terms of, we're talking to the field, we're confirming everything on that end before we're clearing the alarm?

A. Well, within our system, Alex, the controller cannot clear the alarm until it's returned to normal.

Q. Okay. Okay. That makes sense. All right. I want to step back to the configuration of the system at the time of the rupture and what you guys were able to see versus what the field knows. So we know line 15 is isolated, and I'm assuming you guys knew

that going in.
A. Yes.
Q. Yeah, because of the online work. Yeah, that's something that you would obviously keep gas control in the loop on. So, 15, or 10 and 25 are tracked fairly well together until valves start getting closed. Right? And then it's pretty apparent which, which line is the rupture line.
A. Correct.
Q. Are you -- can you see from the control room that crossovers are open or closed? Or do you know that those lines are essentially joined or not joined? What all do you see?
A. In this section of pipe between Owingsville and Wheelersburg, the controller -- there is nothing to see. There's no remote, there's no remote valves, there's no telemetric valves. We don't know whether the cross opens -- crossovers are opened or closed. That is the responsibility -- that knowledge is endemic to transmission.
Q. Okay, okay. So would that information be something that would assist you in making decisions in the control room?
A. Well, that'd be speculation, and I'd rather, I'd rather not get into that. I mean, it's speculation. I mean, all I can speak to is the timeline and what we can and what we can't do.
Q. Okay.
A. We -- the only thing we could do at the time was to request all three lines isolated and the upstream and downstream

compressor stations, and that's really the only arrow we had in the quiver.

MS. COLLETTI: Okay. I think that's going to be my first round of questions. So I'm going to pass you to Alvaro next. But thank you very much. I appreciate it.

MR. ATKINSON: Thank you.

BY MR. RODRIGUEZ:

Q. Hi Tom. This is Alvaro Rodriguez. I'm going to (indiscernible) investigation with (indiscernible). Thank you very much for your time and providing a detailed timeline. Can you please confirm some things for me: What do you mean by offline?

A. In regards to a compressor station?

Q. Yeah. I think you mentioned that in the timeline. Let me go back and see exactly the time. At 3:47.

A. Offline in gas, in our vernacular, is the engines are taking -- are stopped and are no longer pumping on those lines. And generally, when that happens, the engines go offline; they're no longer pumping. And then once the differential gets -- closes up between the suction and the discharge, the bypass valves open. That's kind of what I mean by offline. They're no longer pumping.

Q. Okay. Thank you very much for that.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Also I want to confirm, where is upstream and downstream? What is north, what is south -- which station is south, which

station is north from the rupture?
A. Okay, all right. Thank you. Owingsville, Wheelersburg -- Wheelersburg is north of Owingsville, directly, it's the next station downstream of -- well, it's north of Owingsville, and Danville compressor station, which is in Danville, Kentucky, is south of Owingsville.
Q. I see. And where is the rupture?
A. The rupture is just north of Owingsville.
Q. Okay. Thank you. And let me see what else I have. And so when, when the control room -- and I think Alex asked this question maybe. In the control room, can you see or even decide if any main valves are opened or closed?
A. We cannot.
Q. Okay. So you couldn't see the time -- or well, I will ask a better question. By looking at the pressure from SCADA, can you tell when line 10 was closed?
A. By looking at SCADA, we were able to determine when the, when the tap valves were closed in Owingsville, and by looking at SCADA, we were able to tell when the valves were closed at Wheelersburg, which is the compressor station to the north.
Q. Um-hum.
A. And but we could not -- while we supposed or, you know, guessed when the valves were closed in Muses Mills, we didn't know that until the person that went, the transmission personnel went to Mills, closed the valves, and notified us that the timing of

all those valves. We saw the pressure drop significantly on line 10 once the valves were closed at Muses Mills, but we didn't know that until the technician called.

Q. I see. All right. Thank you very much. Let's see what else I have. One more question for clarification. When you talk about isolated, means, when you receive a call from the technician confirming that the valve was closed, what do you mean by isolated? I saw it in the timeline at 4:04 p.m. and at 4:16, but I want to confirm what it is.

A. Where I used the term isolated, I'm using it in the context of either there's -- either we validate, verify, or we hear, get information from other people that there's no longer gas being pushed into that, into that segment. So we were looking to isolate valve section one, which is on line 10 north of Owingsville. But when we made the call to Owingsville and Wheelersburg, to the station attendants, and request them to isolate, by that, we man shut horsepower down and close all mainline block valves to prevent gas from moving through the station.

Q. I understand. Thank you very much for doing that.

A. Thank you, sir.

Q. And let me see if I have any other questions. When -- do you know, or what is the threshold for the pressure? I think it's something similar to Alex, Alex was asking, with the drop from 655 to 580, 3:36 to 3:39, is there any threshold or set point in the

control room?
A. I don't, I don't know. Can you ask the question again? I'm --
Q. Yeah, definitely. My question was, if I want to see or identify an alarm, how can I determine what is the pressure difference in order to start seeing an alarm? Do you think from -- going from 655 to 580 is enough or not? Or that's out of the control room?
A. As I mentioned to Alex, we had -- let me look at this. So the alarms, the low was 425, and the low level was set at 400. And that's where we had the alarm set.
Q. All right.
A. In the control room, just in context, right, the controller, no matter what desk or console you're operating on, is evaluating, monitoring, and controlling using a lot of data points. A lot of data points. It's a lot of information for the controller to monitor. And that's why we use alarms. The call attendant is not a critical alarm. The stop timer's not critical. But they are alarms that help a controller do his job, and that's where we had, that's where we had the alarms set both on line 25 and line 10.
MR. RODRIGUEZ: All right. Well, thanks a lot. At the moment, I don't have any other questions, but I really appreciate your time, but also describing very well what I was asking.
MR. ATKINSON: Thank you, sir.
MR. RODRIGUEZ: You're welcome.

MR. WOODEN: Hey, Tom. This is Tom Wooden. I maybe had just one or two questions for you.

BY MR. WOODEN:

Q. Tom, you talked about the compressor unit and stop timers. Kind of that call attendant, it kind of triggers that call attendant alarm. You know, and I think you described it as kind of a low suction pressure alarm in this instance. But are there a lot of other alarms that go, or a lot of other parameters that can trigger one of these stop timers? And if so, what types of alarms are they that'll take off the compressor unit?

A. Well, let me just see if I can clarify a little something. I don't know that the incident caused the call attendant alarm at Owingsville. The stop timer alarm does not necessarily generate a call attendant. So we have two separate, two separate notifications. One was a call attendant at 3:39. I don't know what caused that. For the stop timer alarm, the stop timer alarm, depending on -- there are a sundry of local actions that would cause -- can cause a stop timer alarm. Is that what you're asking, what those might be?

Q. Yeah. What's that range of operating parameters and other things like that that could cause that?

(Simultaneous speaking.)

A. In regards to Owingsville, who were running turbines, the stop timer is indicative of generally the compressor station not being able to meet the set points that are inputted.

The logic within the PLC, and I'm going to make sure I don't get up over my head here on programming, but the logic on most remote controlled stations is that there's several control loops. In Owingsville's case, there is a discharge control loop, there's a suction control loop, and there's a flow control loop.

On any one of these control loops, the controller could choose to operate. As I mentioned earlier, we chose to -- we choose to operate on discharge control. The stop timer at Owingsville, the turbines went into stop timer because the incoming pressure got lower than the suction set point, which was 565, and the units were not -- could not slow down anymore. And the pressure continued to drop.

As another example, at several of my electric stations, a stop timer is indicative of the units exceeding their electric demand, or electric set point, or how the -- the megawatt set point that I might put in there. So the stop timers across the enterprise are there to protect the station, whether it's electric or turbine or reciprocal, and it's a -- it's just a matter of local protection for the units.

Q. Okay. Thanks. I guess the other question I have for you is we looked at the incident -- the approximate pressure at the time of the incident on the north side, or suction side of Owingsville station was 655 on a system that had an MAOP of 936, I believe. So, as we've talked to the folks in the field and -- kind of was that, you know, quite -- 300 pounds below the MAOP, based on your

kind of oversight in the system, is that 655 a pretty -- is that in what you would call in the normal range of operations?

A. Yes.

Q. Just based on the fact that it's off the suction side of the station, I guess it -- you know, get that differential across the station to move the gas off.

A. Yeah, I mean, that's -- we were running three units at Owingsville, and like I said, I believe we were moving almost 1.4 billion cubic feet, and to do that, to do that and particularly with only one line coming out of Wheelersburg, 655 is pretty normal at moving that flow.

Q. Okay. Thanks. I just kind of wanted to clarify that.

MR. WOODEN: Alex, I don't have any other questions.

MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Thank you, Tom. That was the first -- this is Alex again. That was the first of my questions on my round two.

BY MS. COLLETTI:

Q. Tom, I want to talk to you really quick, back about the COVID procedures, just because I interrupted to take us off the record to try and get the timeline. To make sure I understand, the supervisor and two specialists, were they in the office? Or were they teleworking?

A. I had a manager and two specialists that were on location at the time.

Q. Okay, on location. Okay, great.

A. And then, and then maybe, I can't recall, maybe a short time after, after the phone call that I got telling me about the issue, I was not here. But I requested a second manager to come in.
Q. Okay.
A. Who lives about ten minutes from here.
Q. Okay.
A. So during the event and subsequent actions, I had two managers and two specialists working with the control room to coordinate all this activity.
Q. Okay, okay. I just wanted to make sure. I couldn't quite remember and wanted to make sure I had gotten that. I remembered you bringing a second person in, but I just wasn't sure if that was remote, over the phone, how that was working. It's a strange world these days.
A. Yes.
Q. Can you talk to me a little bit about what you guys do to onboard new controllers, how that training process works, and even for the veteran folks, what kind of training and drills they get on a yearly basis, especially as it relates to abnormal operations?
A. Yep. This may take a little bit.
Q. I was going to say, I know this is a big question.
A. Yeah.
Q. So sorry in advance.
A. No, that's okay. Just wanted to give you the heads up. So

if I don't mind saying, and I don't mind saying, I believe that we have probably one of the most stringent training programs in the industry. When a -- it doesn't matter whether or not a new hire has any experience or not, every new hire has to go through our training program.

So that training program consists of four modules. The first module is get to know Enbridge -- for the lack of a better term, get to know Enbridge, where we have checklists that speak to how to get your, how to get -- where things are, where security is, the mundane items, you know, passwords, email, code of business ethics has to be done in module one. So it's a -- it's probably -- it's a pretty extensive checklist and orienting the new employee to Enbridge. That's done before anything. We got to get everybody online and acclimated to the control room, where the restrooms are, fire escapes, that type of thing.

Module two to four is the substance of our training program. Module two is designed to have significant interplay between the manager and the trainer, which would be a controller, one of my FTEs, and the trainee. Now, there's an extensive checklist of actions or activities that have to be checked off in concert with a discussion with the manager and the trainer for that week. And it may be several weeks.

I mean, the first module is more about the manager talking about the systems or the system or that desk or wherever they might be. It's the first step in acclimating a new hire to our

assets. It's the first step in acclimating our new hires to our procedures, our standard operating procedure, to our control room management plan, to our alarm management plan, to our fatigue management plan; all of those procedures within the control room, how to make a phone call to the field, all of those are taught about in module one -- or module two. So if you can envision like a hire level, Alex, module two is more about the manager walking the trainee through an extensive checklist.

Module three is a -- more of a conversation between the controller and the trainee using the -- using a checklist as well. So that may -- that module duration may be a week before the controller can move -- or the new hire can move to module two, for example. Once you get to module two, there's an expectation that the trainee can speak with some intelligence about the itemized checklist that we have.

And in module four -- excuse me -- module four is not a discussion so much, or a conversation; rather, it's the trainee telling or walking the manager through that very set of checklists. And that may be we weeks and weeks. So, if you will, all of this is before (indiscernible).

So the trainee -- I keep saying trainee -- the new hire has extensive discussion with the manager, and at the same time, he or she is working with a controller to begin to acclimate themselves to console specific tasks, how to navigate -- I mean, even though, say, SCADA navigation is demonstrated in module one, two, and

three, while the controller sits side by side with the trainer, the expectation is that the trainer has the same checklist and knows what is expected from that, from the new hire, when they have the conversation with the manager.

So the trainee -- trainer is walking the new hire through some of those items on the checklist. Until the checklist is signed off by the manager, trainer, and the new hire, the new hire moves through understanding the pipeline and understanding the hydraulics, depending on their level of understanding, background knowledge. So that, that's months of work.

Once they've completed all the checklists and they are working, we then put them on a rotation. They go into rotation with a specific controller, and that specific controller is one of our more senior, more knowledgeable, and then they begin to work shift work now.

I've worked shift work and I know how difficult it is, and it's not cut out for everybody. So, during that period of time, it's not just about determining the knowledge level or the increasing knowledge level of the new hire, it's also trying to determine whether or not shift work is going to work for them and their families. We're pretty adamant about explaining and explaining and explaining and explaining about the need for familial understanding of what shift work means, not just the controller.

So that happens, and then there's a period of time farther on

down the timeline where the controller then, based on manager evaluation, is ready to be OQ, operator qualified. We have five covered tasks, and there is a review module for the controller. It's kind of a like a PowerPoint informational review, and then he's OQ'd.

Now, the OQ piece is twofold. One is a CBT, which is extensive. But the knowledge of skills piece of OQ is the -- really where you can determine whether or not the controller is ready to be operator qualified. That consists, generally, of an 8-hour period of question and answer -- questioned by the manager, answers by the controller -- and it hits for all of the items that were on the checklist are covered, as well as scenarios, tabletop scenarios, sequential actions, these types of things. How to, how to help the controller recognize and AO for example.

So all of that happens within the knowledge and skill section. That's pretty lengthy. It's about 8 hours or so. Sometimes it's longer. Sometimes it goes into two days. Once the controller then gets qualified, then they're, then they're put on shifts and they, they have responsibilities.

Now, since CRM, of course, our training, our -- oh, what's the word, continual training? I thought there was another adjective for it. But we also -- that was the onboarding, right, Alex, but we also have an extensive -- oh, shoot, I can't think of the name -- ongoing training program in the control room yearly. And in our training plan, we have a matrix of the items that we'll

be trained on and covered with all of my controllers, pre-COVID, twice a year. We typically had two controller meetings; sometimes they were -- sometimes I needed three meetings in the spring and the fall, just to get all of my staff in.

But the training, the training matrix that we have for continuous training, is pretty extensive. For example, even though we -- I mean, we're required to train on our SOPs once a year, not to exceed 15 months. We do that through a CBT. However, we additionally train on AO, emergency response, initial notification -- I can't think of the second one, but we train on our critical SOPs twice a year, plus what we do on the CBT, as an example.

We also have extemporaneous training with SCADA and ongoing, continuous training with CRM, for example. So as we have grown and evaluate the items that we need, we quickly determined that I need more meetings. So we have the two controller meetings yearly. We have desk meetings that are just specific to a particular console. That's only like four people. And then we also have, through the year, we have CRM training with all our guys, and we also have SCADA training. Because we found that, if you don't train them every year, regardless of what we need to do, people forget. And so we probably have more training than a lot of people.

That's kind of it in a nutshell. I know it was a long time, but it really was a nutshell.

Q. No, that's great. That's exactly what I was looking for. Thank you very much. I -- it just came to me, I think continued education? Continued education credits or CEUs?
A. Yes.
Q. Might have been what you were talking about. So what's the distribution of your team? Do you have a good mix of experienced folks, green folks? What's kind of how -- what's your control room staff look like in terms of experience?
A. Oh, well, anecdotally, and that's all I can -- you know, without -- all I can tell you, Alex, is anecdotally. I don't have any --
Q. That's fine.
A. -- hard facts. I do know that, if I was to compare the average years of service today versus what it looked like five years ago, we're significantly younger. With the merger -- or with the acquisition by Enbridge of Spectra, we lost a lot of people with the merger. And that's people choosing to leave, that's not --
Q. Right.
A. That's not, you know, production and head count or anything like that. People just found other jobs. They didn't want to work over here by the galleria. There was a lot of different -- but we lost a lot of people.

And so for the last couple of years, up until probably recently, we've been, we've been in a hiring mode. And we train

everybody the same, so I mean, you know, when you're in a bind, you're in a bind for months. I don't know what the average number is, but I will tell you it's younger than when it was, you know, 2016.

Q. Yeah, I understand. I've been on the merger side too. It's fun.

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. Yeah. It's a joy. It's always a great time for people to retire or get scalped and poached and that kind of thing.

A. Exactly.

Q. Yeah. Well, I've got one last question for you, and you touched on it a little bit in the training, but I want to talk on it in a little bit more detail. And I talked to the guys in the field about it, but tabletop simulations of accidents and ruptures, can you talk to me what that looks like from your perspective? I've got it from the field operations perspective, but I'd like to hear about it from the gas control side. You mentioned it in your training discussion, but I'd like more detail.

A. Simulations that the field do, they do that based on what they're required to do. Sometimes we are involved; sometimes we're not involved at all. Sometimes they don't even let us know because of the extensiveness of how they handle their training with the local agencies and that type of thing.

Q. Okay.

A. In the control room, though, we specifically, every controller meeting, so that's twice a year, we do tabletop exercises. And we additionally do every year, we do a -- it's not a tabletop, it's a simulation, but it's very similar to what the field does, where it's a gas control driven simulation, not a transmission driven simulation.

And it's designed to exercise our SOPs and our control staff, right? So they're getting training on, you know, how to evaluate what does a rupture look like, what asset can be brought to bear to isolate, and there's a myriad of things that we go through as we do this simulation in the control room.

So we do tabletops where we walk through abnormal operations through that quarter, or through that four or five months, whatever it is, and we walk through the tabletops with those talking about lessons learned, could have, would have, should have, those types of things. You know, equipment failure, that type of stuff.

And then, as I said, once a year, we have a pretty in-depth, involved gas control driven training scenario in the control room.

Q. Okay. Thank you very much. Talking -- and this is actually going to be my last question. I know I said the last one was, but something you said triggered a thought in my mind.

Talking about communications with the field, during an abnormal operations event, do you guys typically designate one point of contact between the control room and the field? So let's

say one controller is talking to one person out in the field, or is it lots of folks calling lots of people? How does that communication process work? Is there a standard? What's that look like?

A. It's more the latter, Alex, than the former. We have like ten lines per phone set. So what happens in this event, it's -- we don't -- people call into gas control, we answer the phone. There's no one point of contact. Generally, the person that's working the desk -- for example, in this case, it would be Garza was working the console for Owingsville.

But that doesn't mean that Garza would be taking all the calls, because Garza is responsible for helping manage the pipeline incident and not manage phone calls. So my controllers, I mean, I like the way we do it because it involves other controllers and other management, and they're able to take the burden of handling the phone calls off of the controller who's managing the incident.

Q. Okay. That makes sense. That makes sense to me.

MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Well, I don't have any more questions, so I'm going to pass you to Alvaro. Thank you very much, Tom. I appreciate it.

MR. ATKINSON: Thank you.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Alex.

My only question that I have is can you think of anything that could have been done differently?

MR. ATIKINSON: No. I'm satisfied that we did, we did what we needed to do in a timely fashion.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Excellent. Thank you very much.

MR. ATKINSON: Thank you, sir.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: I don't have any other questions. You're welcome.

MR. WOODEN: Hey, Tom, I just had what I think would be a simple clarification. In your training, you described training on AO or AOs. I know that's a common industry reference, but what does that stand for?

MR. ATKINSON: Yeah, sometimes I get caught up in acronyms. So AO is abnormal operation. And I think what's significant about abnormal operation is that we train on, you know, how to recognize that. That's part of our training across the year, our continuous training, whether sequential or however that might be. We train and help the controllers at least walk through on a tabletop exercise how to recognize an AO, or abnormal operation. Thank you.

MR. WOODEN: Thanks, Tom. I just, I know it's a real common regulatory term. I just want to make sure that it kind of got clarified.

MR. ATKINSON: Yes.

MR. WOODEN: So, Alex, I don't have any further questions.

MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Well, that's our two rounds, and though I may break my interrupt rule from time to time, I never break my

more than two rounds rule. So I want to thank you very much, Tom, for your time. Again, I appreciate your patience on the call where we had to go off the record and get the document. Thank you for being so cooperative. I think we've got a good picture of how your control room works.

Is there anything that I haven't asked you about that I should have? Any kind of detail or anything interesting that you'd like to share that's additional?

MR. ATKINSON: I can't think of anything, Alex.

MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Well, if anything comes to you at a later time, Tom Wooden has my contact information, so feel free to reach out to me at any time.

About a month from now, you'll get a transcript emailed to you. So I'll be getting your contact information from that. It'll come with a form at the front. If there's no issues with it, feel free to check the box that says no, no errors.

If there are errors, and a lot of times there's misspellings and things like that, which is just because it's audio versus written, feel free to write that up either on the document itself or over email. You can just refer to the page and line number, and we can make those corrections.

Aside from that, I just want to thank you for your time. I appreciate it. I know we've taken over two hours at this point, and your time is valuable, so thank you very much for your assistance.

MR. ATKINSON: Thank you, Alex. Appreciate that.

MS. COLLETTI: With that, it is 12:09 p.m., and this concludes the interview of Tom Atkinson.

(Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the interview was concluded)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	ENBRIDGE INC. NATURAL GAS PIPELINE RUPTURE AND FIRE IN HILLSBORO, KENTUCKY, ON MAY 4, 2020 Interview of Tom Atkinson
ACCIDENT NO.:	PLD20LR001
PLACE:	Via teleconference
DATE:	May 13, 2020

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Sandra Hirsch
Transcriber