

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

SAN FRANCISCO GAS RELEASE AND FIRE * Accident No.: PLD19MR001
FEBRUARY 6, 2019 *

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Interview of: KEVIN SOUZA

Saturday,
February 9, 2019

APPEARANCES:

ALEX COLLETTI, Investigator in Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

NATHAN SARINA, Utilities Engineer
California Public Utilities Commission

TERENCE ENG, Senior Utilities Engineer Supervisor
California Public Utilities Commission

KIM WEST, Senior Accident Investigator
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA)

MICHAEL COCHRANE, Assistant Deputy Chief
Homeland Security, San Francisco Fire Department

CHRISTINE COWSERT, PE
Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E)

LISE JORDAN, Attorney
Pacific Gas & Electric Company
(On behalf of Mr. Souza)

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I N T E R V I E W

(7:32 a.m.)

1
2
3 MS. COLLETTI: Okay. We're on the record for the Kevin Souza
4 interview. Good morning. Today is February 9th, 2019. It is now
5 8:30 -- 7:32 a.m. Pacific Time. My name is Alex Colletti, the
6 investigator in charge for this accident for the National
7 Transportation Safety Board in Washington, D.C. We're at the
8 Richmond Station Police Department Community Room in San
9 Francisco, California.

10 This interview is being conducted as part of the
11 investigation into the Pacific Gas & Electric Company natural gas
12 release and fire that occurred on February 6th, 2019 in San
13 Francisco, California. The NTSB case number for this accident is
14 PLD19MR001.

15 This interview is being recorded and may be transcribed at a
16 later date. A copy of the transcript will be provided to the
17 interviewee for review prior to being entered into the public
18 docket. This is your opportunity to correct things that the
19 transcriber may have incorrectly transcribed. It's not your
20 opportunity to add and elaborate on things. So if you have
21 something that's factual that you'd like to add, now would be a
22 great time.

23 You're permitted to have one other person present during the
24 interview. This person is of your choice, an attorney,
25 supervisor, friend, family member, or nobody at all.

1 Kevin, for the record, state the spelling of your full name,
2 your job title, and who you have selected to be present during
3 this interview.

4 MR. SOUZA: Kevin Souza, K-e-v-i-n S-o-u-z-a, PG&E gas
5 superintendent for San Francisco and North Bay Divisions. I have
6 requested Lisa, our attorney to be present.

7 MS. JORDAN: Jordan.

8 MR. SOUZA: Jordan.

9 MS. COLLETTI: All right. Okay. Now we're going to go
10 around the room, and we're going to introduce everybody we have in
11 this room today. So, to my right.

12 MR. SARINA: Do we spell our name at this point?

13 MS. COLLETTI: Yes, please.

14 MR. SARINA: Nathan Sarina, CPUC. N-a-t-h-a-n S-a-r-i-n-a.

15 MR. ENG: Terence Eng, from the California Public Utilities
16 Commission. T-e-r-e-n-c-e E-n-g.

17 MS. WEST: Kim West from the U.S. Department of
18 Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
19 Administration. I'm an incident and accident -- I'm sorry. I'm
20 an accident investigator. My name is Kim West, K-i-m, last name
21 West, W-e-s-t.

22 MR. COCHRANE: Michael Cochrane, Assistant Deputy Chief,
23 Homeland Security, San Francisco Fire Department. M-i-c-h-a-e-l
24 C-o-c-h-r-a-n-e.

25 MS. COWSERT: Christine Cowsert, Pacific Gas & Electric

1 Company. C-h-r-i-s-t-i-n-e C-o-w-s-e-r-t.

2 MS. JORDAN: Lise Jordan, from Pacific Gas & Electric
3 Company, an attorney for the company. L-i-s-e J-o-r-d-a-n.

4 MS. COLLETTI: We're going to briefly go off the record.

5 (Off the record.)

6 (On the record.)

7 MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Back on the record for the interview of
8 Kevin Souza.

9 INTERVIEW OF KEVIN SOUZA

10 BY MS. COLLETTI:

11 Q. Thank you for agreeing to interview with us today. We really
12 appreciate your time. It's an important task we have, to collect
13 the information we can from your memory of that day. We're going
14 to ask you to provide a lot of details for us, as much as you can
15 remember. Please don't speculate. Please just provide what you
16 can remember. If I ask you a question and you don't remember,
17 it's okay to say, I don't know. As much as you can give us,
18 though, the more information the better.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. Before we start, can you talk a little bit about your
21 background, where you've worked, your qualifications and
22 everything?

23 A. Sure. I started in the gas industry in 1999, in Boston,
24 Massachusetts, as a gas laborer on a main and service replacement
25 crew. In 2002, I accepted a job with Southwest Gas in Phoenix,

1 Arizona, as a construction technician. In 2004, I became a gas
2 crew leader, and our major roles as construction technician and
3 gas crew leader was emergency response and leak repair, in the
4 field, firsthand, shutting down broken mains and services, and
5 utilizing ICS, Incident Command System, pretty much right from the
6 beginning, and in the field.

7 In 2008, I became a field supervisor with Southwest Gas in
8 Phoenix. And my responsibilities were supervising crews that were
9 responding directly to gas incidents, and communicating with the
10 fire department, acting as IC on-scene. And in 2011 --

11 (Interruption at the door.)

12 MS. COLLETTI: I'm sorry. That's -- please continue. Thank
13 you.

14 MR. SOUZA: Okay. Not a problem. 2011 I accepted a job with
15 PG&E, in Hayward, California, as a supervisor, leak survey and
16 line locate supervisor, and 6 months into that year, a gas
17 superintendent for PG&E of Mission Division, which consisted of
18 managing the GPOM groups, Corrosion, Locate, Survey and
19 Construction in the Hayward, Fremont and Livermore cities.

20 And in 2013, accepted the role as gas superintendent for East
21 Bay Division and Mission Division, so I accepted East Bay as well,
22 which covered Oakland area, Alameda, Richmond, all the way up to
23 the Carquinez Bridge, for emergency response. And in 2017, at the
24 end of 2017, accepted the role as gas superintendent for San
25 Francisco and North Bay Divisions, for Corrosion, Leak Survey and

1 Construction, which covers San Francisco and North Bay, San
2 Rafael, Napa offices.

3 BY MS. COLLETTI:

4 Q. So, I'm going to take from this, just summarize it real
5 quick, you are very qualified. You've been supervising for quite
6 a while. You know what you're doing. I mean, from what I've got,
7 you've been a supervisor since at least 2008, it sounds like maybe
8 even a little bit earlier.

9 A. A little earlier.

10 Q. And you've been working for gas distribution for --

11 A. All my life. It's been --

12 Q. Yeah, yeah. I mean, we're talking over 20 years here, so.
13 So, that's great. It's really great to talk to someone that knows
14 what they're doing. I appreciate that. Thanks. Thanks for
15 walking through us --

16 A. Thank you.

17 Q. -- walking through that. So I want to back up a little bit
18 to the day of the event, the 6th, and I want you to really, take a
19 moment if you need to, think through where you were at the time,
20 starting with when you received any kind of notification of what
21 was going on.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. And then walk us through how you ended up being incident
24 commander, how we -- how that whole process worked, everything you
25 can think of, I would say, up till the -- let's start with up

1 until the fire was out.

2 A. Okay. Just walk through --

3 Q. Just walk me --

4 A. -- the whole day?

5 Q. Just walk me through the whole day.

6 A. Sure.

7 Q. I know it's going to be a lot of talking --

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. -- so I appreciate it.

10 A. Sure. I was -- when I received notification, it came via
11 EPage on my phone. I had just gotten in my vehicle, finishing
12 lunch. It was approximately between 1:15 and 1:30, in that time
13 frame, when I read it. The very first -- once I saw fire with gas
14 release, my initial response was to call my lead supervisor, Bill
15 Russo, tell him, we need to mobilize immediately, send everybody
16 to this job site. I'm heading there right now. Send the other
17 two supervisors to the job site, and you stay in the office. So I
18 have three supervisors onsite that day.

19 I sent two to the job site. I'm going there directly,
20 myself, and I have Bill hanging back in the event we need to open
21 the OEC, to run that for me.

22 So, as you can imagine, in that time period, it took me
23 probably -- when I put it on my GPS, I was probably 20 minutes
24 away from the job site. A lot of phone calls coming in, a lot of
25 phone calls already, media, customer reps, person -- directors,

1 what's going on? I can't provide them anything until I got there.

2 So, I arrive on scene. I'm coming down the hill on Parker,
3 and I -- the view that you see in the newspaper is what I was
4 looking at, the downhill view of the flames. And just that
5 initial gut feeling wasn't very good.

6 So, I parked safely, arrived onsite, and the first thing I
7 did was check in with Fire Command, the IC Command. Introduced
8 myself, let her know my name and role. And actually, she was a
9 deputy. It was a -- she had short, curly hair. She was wearing a
10 darker jacket that was actually somebody she reported to. She
11 introduced me to her. She was in a tan jacket. She was on the
12 news. This woman was on the news. She was the one that was
13 speaking.

14 So I then introduced myself to her as well, so I had two
15 contacts with the fire department. Let her know that I was her
16 point of contact for PG&E, that anything she needed, to ask me,
17 and I would keep her informed as I knew and this incident
18 progressed, what our plan was.

19 My next call was to GDCC, the Gas Distribution Control, let
20 them know that I was onsite, that I was in command. This was --
21 we're going to open up the OEC, because the GEC, I think, had
22 already activated, and that question was asked of me, do you want
23 to activate immediately. I said yes. And to the best of my
24 memory, in this same conversation, if not, within minutes, get me
25 a valve isolation plan. I need to know how to shut this in.

1 When I checked in with my on scene supervisors, Ricky Cano
2 and Mike Enright were on scene, there was already a crew digging
3 on the 4-inch plastic. They had already started digging on the 4-
4 inch plastic that we saw on scene. I asked them to show me how
5 they came to that. They have maps on their phones. They pulled
6 it up and they said, this is a two-way feed right here. We have a
7 crew digging on the 4-inch. And at that time, it was early. We
8 were looking to locate the 6-inch crosstie that crossed Geary and
9 tied into a 12-inch steel main.

10 So my second isolation was either on a 12-inch steel main,
11 which we cannot squeeze. It's too large. That -- their only
12 options for that is to weld fittings on, or a valve, or the 6-inch
13 steel, which we do have steel squeezers for, hydraulic steel
14 squeezers. That is -- that's also a timely, very timely process,
15 and we didn't know how deep the line was.

16 So there was -- locators were onsite. I asked the locators
17 to immediately start bugging that -- locating that line out, and
18 once we had our mark on the 6-inch, we started excavation. We
19 started excavation on the 6, just started breaking ground, getting
20 down. We knew there was going to be a lot of hand digging.

21 In that time we had 6-inch steel squeezers en route, because
22 that's not something that we carry on our trucks, and shoring as
23 well, because we weren't sure how deep that hole was going to be.

24 So, while we're working on the 6-inch, we had an issue with
25 locating the 12-inch line that that tied into. And it took time

1 for the locator to give us an accurate locate on that 12-inch. He
2 was -- he did his best with the equipment that he had and
3 measurements. And, you know, to this day, we never exposed it, so
4 we are -- you know, whatever we know from his locate is where we
5 assumed it was, because it was never daylighted.

6 But when he ended up putting paint on the ground for the 12-
7 inch, we noticed that the hole that we had started was on the
8 wrong side of the 12-inch. We needed to go on the other side,
9 which was close to the fire. If you -- it was close. Yeah, it
10 was not where we would have preferred to dig. It was closer.

11 So when I noticed that, I went back and checked in with Fire
12 IC, and asked her what her thoughts were about us working in that
13 proximity, and asked -- base -- I asked for her permission to work
14 there. I said, are you okay with us working here? Can you keep a
15 hose on our guys, and keep an eye on the flames? And let me know
16 if we need to pull back, and I'll get them out. But I needed to
17 have that plan going. That was our only option.

18 The valve that would have isolated that line that we -- it
19 was in the flames. It was in the burn zone. If that was
20 accessible, we would have had this thing off at the time that 4-
21 inch plastic was squeezed. If that valve would have been turned
22 right away, we'd have had -- you know, it would have been -- we
23 would have known, right now, get somebody here, turn this valve
24 and squeeze. But unfortunately, it wasn't, so.

25 All this is going on in conversation with GDCC. Valve

1 isolation plan had been created. The initial valve isolation plan
2 was 14 valves. It was around 600 customers. With the large
3 customer count, I contacted my director, per our protocol, and let
4 him know that the valve plan is 600 customers. I'm recommending
5 that we go for it.

6 So we were ready to go with the 1,400 valves -- of the 14
7 valves, 600 customers, get -- let's go. Get them out there. Get
8 me as many people as you can, right now, and close these valves.
9 I'm going to continue working on the squeeze. Whatever comes
10 first will be -- it should, you know, be the plan we use, you
11 know, whatever happens first. Get this going, we'll get this
12 going, whatever shuts down this line fastest is the plan that
13 we're going to use.

14 So that -- the valve plan -- and, you know, and forgive me,
15 my -- the time that everything had been happening, you know, I
16 can't tell you 5 minutes from 15 minutes. It's -- a lot was
17 happening. But the valve plan changed from 14 valves to 6 valves,
18 and this was because of the 4-inch squeeze.

19 When we squeezed that 4-inch plastic line, that eliminated,
20 like eight valves. Like what, eight valves. That eliminated
21 eight valves, which in a customer count, cut our customer count
22 down to 300, in the low 300s.

23 So once I had the revised valve plan, saying, you know,
24 just -- all right, get Rusty Henderson, he's our GPOM, get me an
25 ETA, get as many people on these valves right now, and shut the

1 valves. And I was in contact with Rusty's manager, Matt
2 McLaughlin (ph.), and he was my point of contact for the valves.
3 I said Matt, I need you to tell -- to text me, and I have it on my
4 phone, as each valve is being turned off.

5 And he was. He was -- I have time for each valve on my
6 phone. He was texting me when he was turning them off. And the
7 reason why I asked him for that is because I wanted to track
8 progress of the valves versus the 6-inch, because we weren't
9 making very good progress on the 6-inch.

10 And the valves, once they got on them, it happened really
11 fast. It started happening really fast. And actually, I think,
12 you know, there was two that were very close to each other, that I
13 think we were all surprised when the line shut down. We were a
14 little concerned, because we didn't want the fire department to
15 put the fire out. So we -- there was an initial, you know, the
16 fire's out, is that good or bad? Is there gas still coming out?
17 Do we have another issue here to where we have a flame?

18 So we started to back up, back up. And then I finally heard
19 from Matt, we got them all. I called in immediately to the GDCC
20 and let them know that the fire was out, the gas had been turned
21 off. And I asked them for a critical customer list of anybody,
22 any hospitals, elderly homes, things like that, that we needed to
23 know about, that we had turned off in that isolation zone. They
24 had that going.

25 So I'm going to -- that's beginning to end. In the middle,

1 there was other conversations with Fire. They had concerns about
2 the electric lines that were involved. The fire captain had asked
3 me if electric was onsite, and if the electric lines had been
4 isolated. I did not know. There was a lot of people onsite, a
5 lot of PG&E employees I did not recognize. I couldn't tell Gas
6 versus, you know, Electric at some times, versus -- you know,
7 exactly which department.

8 So I called GDCC and asked them for electric response. They
9 were on it. The trouble-man was there. The line was shut in. I
10 just couldn't answer the -- I couldn't tell by looking at the
11 electric line whether it was energized or not. So I finally got
12 that information for the fire department and informed them of
13 that.

14 As far as unified command, I think it was pretty clear, Fire
15 was in command of the scene. I was supporting the incident by
16 controlling the gas. They knew I was point of contact. I knew
17 who point of contact was for Fire. I was on scene the entire
18 time. And, you know, as I think back and reflect on this, you
19 know, I know that, you know, through my training, you know, in
20 ICS, emergency response, and with the tools, the training, and
21 equipment that we had onsite, that we did the best job that we
22 could do. That's how I'm sleeping at night, so.

23 Q. Thank you very much. That's exactly what we're looking for
24 here. That's exactly the level of detail we're looking for.
25 Thank you. I appreciate it.

1 A. Welcome.

2 Q. It's really nice not to have to pull that out of you. So,
3 I'm going to back up to a couple of the things, and ask you a
4 little bit more specific information. And then later we'll
5 discuss a little bit about what happened after the fire was out.

6 A. Okay.

7 Q. So, I want to talk about the, when you requested for
8 additional valve folks.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So, from what I'm understanding, and please correct me if I'm
11 wrong --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You guys had already started the squeeze-off. You'd already
14 started the 4-inch and you were working on --

15 A. On the 6-inch.

16 Q. -- on the 6-inch.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. All right. Is there a reason why, when you had started
19 those, that you didn't call the valve, request valve folks at that
20 time?

21 A. No. The -- I requested the valve folks once I had the plan.

22 Q. Once you had the plan. So you were waiting for the plan?

23 A. I requested the plan first.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Once I had the plan --

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. -- I requested --

3 Q. So --

4 A. Because I needed -- I just, I guess the reason I did that was
5 because I needed to know, how many, you know, how many valves?
6 What are we looking at here?

7 Q. Right.

8 A. Is it three? Is it two? Is right behind me? You know, is
9 there something I'm not seeing in this area? So then I requested
10 personnel, and the reason why I requested additional personnel is
11 because there are, there's certain qualifications that we hold to
12 turn those valves. Not every valve is the same. They have
13 different hubs. They have different turns. Some are in vaults.
14 Some are in, just smaller valve boxes.

15 There are certain valve keys and OQs that is required to shut
16 those valves down. As much as inside, you just want to send
17 somebody that is, you know, physically able to go and just --
18 because the valve's right there, to shut that valve off, you can
19 make matters worse. They could -- when we walked onsite, there
20 was service valves, there was main valves.

21 And you can have a service valve next to a main valve, and if
22 you don't know what you're looking for, you could turn a service
23 valve off, call that in and say, I'm off, and we're, we got a
24 problem. This person didn't know what they were doing. And then,
25 we're in a totally different conversation. This goes longer. I'm

1 then sending people to check each location, that are qualified,
2 that should have gone in the first place.

3 And then you're asking me, why did you send somebody that
4 wasn't qualified to turn this valve off, and they didn't know what
5 they were doing? Did you -- and then, you know, and then I'm in
6 this seat, going -- hell this, you know, this was on fire, I just
7 wanted to do -- you know, I just, it was there, the guy had a key,
8 said he knew what he was doing and shut it off.

9 But that's, that could go south really quick, you know, if
10 we're, you know, completely honest here. And that's why I
11 specifically requested that personnel to come from the department
12 that maintains the valves, knows the valves, know the location.
13 Get me those people right now, because our -- my area of focus, my
14 expertise is with the construction O&M crews right now, and we
15 need to focus on the task of digging and squeezing here.

16 We have one isolation -- one more isolation point we're
17 working on, get every shovel and backhoe in here and start digging
18 this as quickly and safely as possible.

19 Q. Okay. That makes a lot of sense to me. Thank you for
20 explaining that thought process.

21 A. Okay. You're welcome.

22 Q. For your communications, you mentioned requesting -- you're
23 requesting different crews for different jobs, right. You're
24 coordinating a lot of different things. Who are you doing that
25 through?

1 A. So, once we opened up OEC, Bill Russo, my direct supervisor
2 was OEC commander. He was in Harrison Street office, in the OEC
3 with our IC advisor. I was in a lot of communication with Bill.
4 A lot was going to Bill from the field, too. A lot of the crews
5 were calling in progress and things like that, but a lot of my
6 updates, I was going through the OEC Command.

7 Like, we basically had kind of a reverse role. Typically,
8 I'm in there, and a supervisor will be out on a, you know, a
9 normal incident. But this was an event that I felt I needed to be
10 on, to be able to answer these questions firsthand. So I said,
11 you just stay back, I'll take this. And my communications with
12 Bill, he was helping with the valve isolations. He was in with
13 the planner. They were giving me updates as far as, you know, the
14 change of scope from, you know, the 14 to the 7, or 6 and why.

15 And so a lot of communication with Bill, asking him for
16 squeezers. Get me the squeezers here. Get me the shoring here.
17 Get me crews. Get Rusty to send -- you know, he's -- you know,
18 get everybody going right now. And he was great. He was on top
19 of it. You know, he was -- you know, we were making it happen in
20 real time as fast as we could.

21 I would like to mention for the record, you know, the 6-inch
22 squeezers and one of our supervisors was delayed in traffic.
23 There was a lot of traffic. We did ask a police officer for an
24 escort. He told our supervisor, Ricky Cano that he wasn't sure
25 that they did that anymore.

1 One thing, in hindsight, that if we look at that, this
2 incident, you know, as far as access to valves, if you go out and
3 walk these valves, a lot of them are in lanes of traffic. I would
4 queue up PD to meet these valve responders, escort them to the
5 valves, clear the lane, put flashers on, because people see PG&E
6 with orange lights, and it's not in the area, necessarily, of the
7 fire, these valves are remote, they're not as fast to get of the
8 way as they would be for flashing red and blues.

9 So that could have cut some time right there, if we said,
10 give me seven or six cruisers, one for each valve. Have them meet
11 my valve responder here and escort him to these valves. Clear the
12 lane. Let them, let my guy do whatever he needs to do but get him
13 there as fast as possible. We can't run red lights. We can't --
14 you know, we can't just scoot into traffic, you know.

15 And we're not reporting directly from the office. Our field
16 personnel are out in the field, working. So in San Francisco, it
17 could take you a half hour to go, you know, 9 blocks sometime,
18 depending on what time of the day it is. You know, so it's not --
19 it wasn't for a lack of trying, that's for sure.

20 You know, so that -- in hindsight, when I think about it,
21 that would have been really nice to have that. I think their main
22 focus, which is great, was traffic and the immediate site. But --
23 and maybe that could have been communicated, you know, a little
24 better. Maybe we, as going forward, have some conversations with
25 PD, and get a point of contact and a protocol for specifically,

1 valves. Because, you know, one of them had, could have had a car
2 sitting on top of it at a red light. We saw a few of those that
3 could have been. So we had, we could have had to wait for some of
4 those to clear.

5 Q. Okay. I'd like to back up -- excuse me. I'd like to back up
6 a little bit to the two different squeeze-off sites.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. The 4-inch, from what I understand, you didn't encounter any
9 difficulties, any issues with that excavation and squeeze-off?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Okay. Walk me through the 6-inch in a little bit more
12 detail.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. I believe we saw the two patches there?

15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. And that was what we're talking about. Essentially, the
17 initial hole was on the wrong side of the 12, you said, and then
18 went back --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- to the 6.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. If you could talk about that whole process in a little bit
23 more detail.

24 A. Okay.

25 Q. And specifically, what details you were -- what difficulties

1 the locator was having in finding that 12-inch line.

2 A. Sure.

3 Q. What was making it difficult, and just elaborate a little
4 bit.

5 A. Sure. So, we were able to get a good signal on the 6-inch
6 crossing the street. That was the line that we needed to squeeze
7 off. The locator was having a difficult time locating the 12-inch
8 where that tied in. He still had very weak signal. A strong
9 signal for us on a locate machine is up around 800. When he
10 finally put, he gave us, you know, his best, the best information
11 that he had, he had a 300 signal, and he was going off mapping
12 dimensions.

13 And mapping dimensions, you know, depending on what year they
14 were taken, if this -- you know, off this line, you know, when it
15 was installed, can change based off property lines changing, lanes
16 of, you know, lanes of traffic widening. You know, so there was a
17 little -- there was some, you know, some uncertainty on, you know,
18 that 12-inch.

19 So we started with the best information that we had at the
20 time, but the, as the locator continued to work through it, wheel
21 off dimensions, check his machine, check other locations where he
22 could hook up, to bug out the serve, the main, he then said okay,
23 I'm getting a better signal on the 12-inch here. I'm pretty sure
24 it's right here. Let's -- I'm going to put paint down on the 12-
25 inch.

1 We immediately stopped, jumped about 4 feet on the other side
2 of the 12-inch and started digging again. We never -- we made it
3 down to the original hole. We were probably down 3-1/2 feet. And
4 then we continued to dig on the other side, and we never got down
5 to where the line -- I mean, we started, we got down a couple of
6 feet. You know, USA law is, you know, take the top off and hand-
7 dig down. So we were doing a lot. There was a lot of shovels in
8 that hole.

9 If you see on the news, everybody was in there with a shovel,
10 because last thing we wanted to do, knowing that we had suspect
11 locates, was hit something else, make the matter worse. You know,
12 we already have an ignition. We're very close. If we hit a 6-
13 inch gas line trying to find -- so we need to be very careful
14 here, because if something goes wrong, then this is going to get
15 really bad.

16 So, took the heavy stuff out with the machine, and we started
17 just digging down with hand. And it's hard.

18 Q. And so, the attempt to dig down to that 6-inch line, that was
19 abandoned because the valves were closed first?

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. We -- yeah. It was -- we stopped digging when the fire went
23 out.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. We didn't stop. We worked straight through until that fire

1 was off. We didn't take a break. And unfortunately, that was the
2 only squeeze option, the only squeeze option. Couldn't squeeze a
3 12-inch, and you couldn't -- we weren't going to weld fittings on.
4 That was a -- that's a hour-long -- hours-long process, and you
5 don't want welders in that area anyways with gas release and fire.

6 Q. Okay. That make sense. Talking about depths of cover, so it
7 seems -- and correct me if I'm wrong, that you felt like you had a
8 very good grasp on where different things were located, where the
9 lines were, aside from that difficulty to locate on the 12, where
10 the valves were located.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. And you mentioned not knowing how deep the lines were
13 located.

14 A. Uh-huh.

15 Q. Do you feel that if you'd known the depth of how far you had
16 to dig on the 4-inch or the 6-inch, that that would have aided you
17 in making decisions, or --

18 A. So the 4-inch wasn't a problem. We had a good locate on
19 that. We were able to get down to that. The thing with having
20 depth given to you, right, if the -- it's good to know a ballpark.
21 But like I said, that can -- that changes with grade change, so we
22 can only guarantee what that line was installed at. That's it,
23 that day. We can't guarantee the depth of that line after that.

24 We don't know if that road has come up a couple of feet. We
25 don't know if grade had been taken out, to where that grade has

1 changed over time. The locate machine can sometimes give you --
2 but the signal was poor anyways. It can sometimes give you a
3 depth on it, and he probably gave a -- and, I didn't ask.

4 It might have been conversation between the two, but even
5 when they do say hey, it's 3 -- you know, it's 4 -- we take -- we
6 can't -- we don't take that and say okay, I can dig down with a
7 machine to this depth because his locate machine said it's 6 feet
8 deep. You know, that's not how it goes. That is reference only.
9 We still have to follow safe practice, digging rule laws when we
10 go down to that. And that's why we don't give depth out to
11 contractors that are digging, because we can't guarantee the
12 depth.

13 Q. Okay. Okay, great. So regardless, even if you had known,
14 let's say the 6-inch was 4 feet deep, you would have still only
15 taken the top off mechanically --

16 A. Absolutely.

17 Q. -- and hand dug the rest?

18 A. There are fittings that come off mains. Yeah, there -- until
19 you daylight it and see for yourself, that's the only time that
20 you can really kind of change your, the way you're digging that
21 hole now. Until then, you have -- we have a procedure and process
22 to dig down to that line safely, and there's laws around that.

23 Q. Okay, great. I feel like we've covered up through the fire
24 stopping pretty well. I'd like you to go walk me through the rest
25 of the night --

1 A. Sure.

2 Q. -- until you feel that the situation had stabilized and
3 gained a pretty --

4 A. Okay. All right.

5 Q. Maybe until hand-off.

6 A. Yeah, absolutely. So, I got -- the fire was out.
7 Notifications were made to GDCC, and we had a mess on our hands.
8 We had two holes in the street, that were no good, that we needed
9 to start backfilling. We had a bell hole full of water, with gas
10 mains in it, potential -- we still didn't know what line was
11 struck.

12 We had a -- we knew the area, but in that area there was a 2-
13 inch plastic, a 4-inch plastic, and a possible 6-inch plastic
14 tying in there, so we didn't know. So next steps were, we had
15 crews to have some water, take a break. And that lasted 5 or 10
16 minutes, and then they started backfilling the holes, and then we
17 started pumping water out of the line to see what we had.

18 And behind the scenes, GSRs, our gas service reps, are the,
19 is the department that turns off meters and does relights, it was
20 their job now to turn off all the affected customers. So I asked
21 for an affected customer list. We got that to Matt Ramirez,
22 manager of Field Services, to his group, and they mobilized and
23 started turning off gas meters.

24 And that is, that's a long process. So that was ongoing. I
25 want to say they didn't have all meters turned off until 10:30 at

1 night, somewhere around there, give or take. It was later in the
2 night, to when they had them turned off. There was a lot of media
3 onsite. There was PIOs. There was a lot of questions about when
4 will our gas be turned back on, and we still didn't even really
5 know what we had.

6 So the -- we finally got the hole backed out. We were able
7 to see that piece of 4-inch with a hole in it, with a 2-inch T
8 coming off the top of it, and the 2-inch plastic had -- you could
9 see that there was a crease, so you could tell that this had been
10 hooked one way or another by a machine. There was, at the time, a
11 mini excavator sitting right in that spot.

12 So we didn't -- we cleared everything out. We cleared the
13 marks off. We wanted to see what the, where the locate marks
14 were. The DERT team was there to assist us with that
15 investigation. You know, swept the street, wet it down, looked
16 for marks. Cleaned up around the main, took very good pictures,
17 documented the marks, the main, and told both my supervisors and
18 gas crew foremen that we need that piece of pipe, that make sure
19 you cut off enough of that pipe and lock it in your truck. Don't
20 lose site of that pipe. That is a very important piece of
21 evidence.

22 But we didn't -- we had -- I believe we waited until we --
23 when did we -- I'm trying to think of when we actually cut that --
24 that line got cut out later in the night. But once we got that
25 piece out safely, we put that in the truck and held that as

1 evidence.

2 And then, we were able to isolate the two systems, with that
3 one valve that would have helped us through this whole thing. We
4 had an INR employee come out and turn that for us, and that
5 separated the 4-inch system from the 6-inch going into the 12.
6 And we introduced -- once we had confirmation that -- and this is
7 all through Planning. This is with -- this isn't -- I'm just not
8 making this up.

9 With -- once confirmation that all of the affected customers
10 were off, either at curb valve, the riser valve, then with the
11 damaged section being isolated, we came up with a purge plan.
12 Once everything's off, next step is restoration. So we came up
13 with a purge plan from -- at this time, I'm in the OEC at Harrison
14 Street with Planning, IC advisor and my OEC commander. And we
15 sent a GPOM personnel to start a purge.

16 We had purge points that we went to, and first one we went to
17 was full of water. Had -- it might as well have been on a water
18 main. There was nothing but water coming out of this line. That
19 was because once pressure died in our line, that open hole that
20 was -- it was an open hole in the 4-inch, all of the water that
21 the fire department had been spraying, and they also, I believe,
22 hit a water line. The contractor when they hit us, broke a water
23 line. Our line just started filling up with water. So we were in
24 for the long haul.

25 We thought that -- I don't know. I don't know what we

1 thought we were going to get, but we -- yeah, it was water. We
2 were hoping for gas, but we got water. So we had to stop. We
3 started -- we kept purging the water until we, you know, until we
4 had a sense of, you know, like some mist and some, you know, some
5 gas. We were starting to make progress. And this was throughout
6 the night. I had gone remote.

7 Field Supervisors Mike Enright and Ricky Cano were out there
8 all night. I got a call from Ricky Cano, field supervisor in the
9 morning at 5 a.m., and he said that he had a problem. The purge
10 plan -- I'm going to try to -- so the lowest elevation riser was
11 about 250 feet from our lowest elevation valve. And on a 12-inch
12 main, that's a lot of water that we did not get. Okay.

13 So our lowest riser was good. We thought we were good. But
14 then, kudos to Ricky, because that wasn't even in, it wasn't in
15 the plan, but he said okay, the riser's here, but our valve is
16 over there, we still have water in the line. We need to dig up,
17 physically dig up that line, weld a saber valve on, which is a
18 fitting that we use to purge or equalize gas, so it's basically
19 just a small fitting that we weld on, and we tap, and we can, you
20 can use it as a gauge point, or as a purge point, or as an
21 equalizing point.

22 We have to weld a fitting on this 12-inch and purge the rest
23 of this water out, because it's going to be a lot. It's probably
24 all just sitting in here. Everything that's been downhill is
25 sitting here.

1 So we opened the GEC back up for this reason, to help us with
2 the purge plan to get the rest of this water out. We mobilized
3 C&G as a backup. They were preparing. We -- Plan B, if purging
4 did not, was not successful, we had our pigging team ready to go.
5 They were building a pigging operation, which would have consisted
6 of a 16-foot trench just to get this thing in there, in that
7 intersection, on the south point there.

8 So everything -- they -- GEC was great. They were helping us
9 with pigging, C&G. We were looking at possible trenching, short
10 trench bypasses, and putting road plates on them to get gas to
11 customers, really, really wanted to get gas back as safe and
12 quickly as possible.

13 So as we were purging it was, we had the fitting welded on
14 the 12-inch. It was around 10:30, 11 in the morning, and we
15 started to purge. There were some environmental precautions we
16 had to take, because you can't just empty water into the sewer.
17 So we had a sample kit. We took a sample of the water that was
18 coming out, and we matched it against the back of the kit.

19 It's like a, it's like three pictures. It's like, very
20 clear, drinkable water, kind of middle, murky water and then like
21 black water. And we took the cup, we held it up, and it was in
22 the middle. The middle was green. It was green, green, red. So
23 we're good to go on that with a sock. So I got approval from our
24 environmental specialist, said we're good, it's been in the pipe,
25 it hasn't been in a trench. Then she's like, good to go.

1 Put the sock on. And what the sock is, it's just a big
2 filter that we put on the end of the hose, and it filters out
3 anything that's in the water that could be hazardous or not clean.
4 So we started the purge, and that purge process took about, that
5 went to about 3:30, till we started getting some good gas.

6 Had very good readings. The water had been purged out, felt
7 really good. It felt really good to get that gas coming out of
8 there. And once we had that, all of the water out of the line,
9 the next step was to continue with the rest of the purge plan,
10 which was nine risers on the system at different points.

11 So I mobilized -- this was all communicated through check-in
12 calls, through our IC process, with the GEC, you know, what our
13 next -- this -- everything we were doing, we were on hourly calls,
14 checking progress and tracking progress. Once we had the go for
15 that, we started purging out risers, and it was going really well.
16 All the risers up the hill were good, gas, gas, gas. And
17 everything went really well.

18 That was completed around 4:30. Our goal was to make the
19 evening news with restoration in progress, at least going, you
20 know, moving forward. And we made that. They started relights
21 that night around 4:30. That continued, they continued till about
22 10 o'clock at night, and that final report for that night was all
23 addresses visited.

24 We had 60 or so CGIs, which stands for cannot get in. Either
25 the customer was not home, out of town, and we had 10 that were,

1 buildings that were red-tagged, that weren't going to get gas
2 anyways. They were turned off at the curb valve. So that was --
3 once everything was relit -- actually, I'm sorry. I'm going to
4 back up.

5 I turned -- once we were pressurized, once we were
6 pressurized with gas, and the purge was complete, yeah, I turned
7 over IC to Matt Ramirez because, you know, it was just in relay
8 mode then. We were restored. And that's typically how it goes.

9 We get pressurized, we get gas up to the risers.
10 Construction's job with providing service is complete on their
11 end. That then gets transitioned to the Field Service department,
12 who had mobilized 30 -- 35 or 36 GSRs in the area, only focus was
13 for relights. And they working out of the MCV vehicle that we
14 were at, onsite. They were tracking, calling, you know, that was
15 what they were doing. You know, they were, they're all
16 relighting.

17 And we decommissioned OEC at, it was, I would say, once we
18 hit every address, 10 o'clock, you know, around 10 o'clock, maybe
19 11:30 that night, which was Thursday, because it was just CGIs
20 now. It was just back to normal operations. Once we get -- we
21 leave door hangers. They call us when they get back in and we'll
22 go out and relight them, but there's no need to have a MCV vehicle
23 or operating structure for that. So that's how that went down.

24 Q. Thank you very much. It's great. With regards to the purge
25 plan, who develops that?

1 A. That comes from our Planning group.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Yeah. It can -- the purge plan, it can come local. It can
4 come -- and I believe this one came from our local planner, Wei
5 (ph.). It can come from the -- we have planners in our GDCC,
6 which is our Gas Distribution and Control Center. Depending on
7 time of day that, you know, if it's after hours, and there's not a
8 planner in the office, they can come up with purge plans and
9 isolation plans for us.

10 They probably worked together. They were probably
11 communicating. But yeah, that came -- two local planners in San
12 Francisco probably came up with that. It wasn't very -- it was
13 only nine services. They had elevation. They took it off. They
14 had elevation layers on there, so we wanted to make sure we were
15 getting low points on furthest, you know, risers at the end of the
16 system, to make sure that we were purging everything out.

17 Q. Okay. And you had mentioned that one of your guys caught the
18 fact that there was a difference in elevation between the valve
19 and the riser for that plan. Do you know --

20 A. Yes. Yeah.

21 Q. -- how he managed to do that?

22 A. Eyeball it. It wasn't -- yeah. He could just tell --

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. -- by looking at it. It was a visible hill. It wasn't much,
25 but it was still a slope down. Yeah. I mean, he was -- yeah. It

1 was --

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. It was eyeballed.

4 Q. Okay. Okay. How did your transfer over of command once you
5 had the gas back up, how --

6 A. Uh-huh. Phone call, Matt Ramirez. Matt, this is Kevin. Gas
7 is in the line, pressurized. Purge plan is complete. You're good
8 to start relights. I am turning over IC to you. I am available
9 remotely. I'll be on -- actually, I was onsite the night I met
10 you. I didn't go anywhere. I was there, but --

11 Q. Right.

12 A. As far as -- the reason why we do that is because there was a
13 lot of progress updates that need to be made. I am not going to
14 have all that information. He's the manager of that department.
15 It's his responsibility to take that on and answer those questions
16 as far as how relight progress is going.

17 Q. Okay. So --

18 A. And I -- back up. I also notified IC advisor of change of
19 command as well.

20 Q. Okay. As far -- I'm looking at the timeline here, and it
21 looks like -- let's see, looks like an -- so how many straight
22 hours were you serving as IC?

23 A. Well I had a couple hours' sleep in between, so are you
24 asking, include -- because I was remote, with the phone on. You
25 know, the only time I left is when I knew that the two supervisors

1 onsite, you know, could take that, and that was in the --

2 Q. Right.

3 A. That was from like 12 till 4 or 5 in the morning.

4 Q. I was thinking of fatigue management point. At some point
5 you had to sleep, obviously.

6 A. I did, yes.

7 Q. Who picked that up for you? How did you do that, and --

8 A. That was communication to two supervisors onsite. I let them
9 know. I said, listen, I'm going home. You're in command right
10 now. You are the point of contact. If you need me, if there's
11 something you can't answer -- we were in just purging water out,
12 and that was their command for that night. Call me, anytime. I'm
13 going to try to get a few hours' sleep.

14 And then Bill Russo also went home and got some sleep. And
15 then when we came in, we relieved the two supervisors that were
16 out there, so they could go home and get sleep. And then Bill and
17 I took over operations in the field. So Bill assumed field
18 command, and I took OEC command or IC. So I was more of the -- he
19 took the -- he came out of the office and went into the field and
20 relieved them, and I was in the field as well, throughout the
21 whole thing. I just went right out there.

22 Q. Right. Okay.

23 A. So we got the two supervisors out there. We relieved crews
24 with general construction crews. So our crews had also been
25 working through the night. And through our OEC structure, we

1 requested, through the GEC, four General Construction crews. And
2 General Construction is a division of PG&E that primarily focuses
3 on larger main installation. So they're our dig crews, you know,
4 our heavy -- and that's what we needed.

5 We needed crews that could dig holes, backfill, you know,
6 bring equipment and really take care of business. So they came in
7 and relieved our field crews as well. So we managed, you know,
8 with everything that we had going, at the best transition time for
9 all that, you know, I think was good.

10 Q. Okay, good. I just have one last question, and then I'm
11 going to finally open it up for the rounds.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. With regards to the portion that you replaced after the
14 cutout --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did you replace that like for like?

17 A. Yes. Yeah, no changes.

18 Q. No changes?

19 A. Yeah. Except for, as far as material and size was the same.
20 The pipe, obviously, was newer. It wasn't the same -- you know,
21 it was, wasn't the same year, but it was like for like.

22 Q. Okay. That's fantastic. Thank you very much.

23 A. You're welcome.

24 Q. You'll get a little break from me now.

25 A. Okay.

1 MS. COLLETTI: So, I pass it off. As a reminder, folks,
2 please introduce yourself before -- you don't have to spell your
3 name, but please make sure to introduce yourself before you speak.

4 MR. SARINA: Hello. This is Nathan Sarina, CPUC.

5 BY MR. SARINA:

6 Q. I guess I'm not fully understanding the timeline for when the
7 4-inch plastic main was squeezed on Parker versus when you guys
8 got the valve isolation plan for the 14 valves. I guess I'm
9 not -- if you could expand further on how the timing of that
10 squeezing, the --

11 A. Sure.

12 Q. -- squeezing for the 4-inch.

13 A. Absolutely. So once the 4-inch plastic line was squeezed,
14 they called -- so it was originally a 14. I asked for both.
15 There were two separate plans. There was a squeeze plan and a
16 valve plan. Once we squeezed the 4-inch plastic, they called in
17 to the OEC where we had Planning and Bill Russo, IC command -- OEC
18 commander at the time, and they told him that they had the 4-inch
19 line squeezed off. And then they changed that to reduce the valve
20 count, knowing that.

21 A. Okay.

22 Q. To the best of my understanding, as -- you know, that's how
23 it was done.

24 MS. COLLETTI: Nathan, are you done?

25 MR. SARINA: Yeah.

1 MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Go ahead, Kim.

2 MS. WEST: All right. Question --

3 MS. COLLETTI: Introduce -- make sure to introduce yourself.

4 MS. WEST: I'm sorry.

5 MS. COLLETTI: That's okay.

6 MS. WEST: This is Kim West.

7 BY MS. WEST:

8 Q Following up on what Nathan was saying, on the -- I'm still a
9 little confused about the valves themselves. You had two
10 different plans, it sounds like. But when you looked at your
11 valve plan, did it include this 12-inch line as well as the 4-inch
12 line and the 6-inch line, and how they interrelated? So you went
13 to the 4-inch line to squeeze it off first?

14 A. That was the very, very first thing that the crews did when
15 they arrived onsite was start digging on that hole. And how we
16 came to that decision was, on our phones, we have maps. And the
17 supervisor onsite and the foreman onsite were able to come up with
18 their own localized isolation plan that they could handle with
19 what they had there. And they saw the 4-inch line, and they were
20 able to trace that to a dead end, to -- it dead-ended right there,
21 which was very rare, but nice for us, that it 90'd. It didn't T,
22 or it would have been -- that wouldn't have worked.

23 So they were able to -- they went, oh my gosh, we could just
24 squeeze this right here. And if we shut that 6-inch off -- I
25 mean, if there was a valve there, we would have been golden, but

1 it was in the fire. Then they were like, we can just -- let's get
2 going on this right now. We're here. Start digging. We're going
3 to need that. So they started on that. And that's how that went
4 down.

5 Q. That makes sense. And then you went further out to expand to
6 cut off the rest of the system?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Yes.

10 MR. COCHRANE: Mike Cochrane, San Francisco Fire.

11 BY MR. COCHRANE:

12 Q. Good morning, sir.

13 A. Good morning.

14 Q. You answered one of my questions. You said you checked in to
15 the chief. I want to state the importance of that, and thank you
16 for doing that, number one. Just a quick question. Was a
17 notification made of the possible size of the pipe and the
18 approximate time that it would take to shut that down?

19 A. Yes. I did have a discussion with her. I told her what
20 possible sizes were in there, that we weren't able to see it
21 because of what was going on, that there was three different size
22 and types. And I gave her about two -- I want to say it was
23 around a 2-hour estimate, is what I estimated from looking at that
24 situation that we had. I think we were -- when it comes down to
25 it, I think we came in around 2:26. We went over.

1 MR. COCHRANE: Thank you.

2 MS. COWSERT: This is Christine Cowsert. I don't have any
3 questions.

4 MS. COLLETTI: This is Alex Colletti again. You've done an
5 excellent job of being very thorough. I don't have any more
6 questions.

7 MR. SOUZA: Great. Thank you.

8 MS. COLLETTI: Nathan?

9 MR. SARINA: Can I take a --

10 MS. COLLETTI: Oh, let's go off the record real quick.

11 (Off the record.)

12 (On the record.)

13 MS. COLLETTI: Okay. We're going to be back on the record
14 for the interview of Kevin Souza.

15 MR. SARINA: Again, this is Nathan Sarina with the CPUC.

16 BY MR. SARINA:

17 Q. Can you describe some of PG&E's typical procedures that would
18 relate to the isolation zones that would be formed? And I realize
19 Planning is involved in that as well, but along your guys' end.

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. The crews.

22 A. I'll walk you through the normal process for isolation plans.
23 First person, you know, the crew leader would arrive on scene, or
24 a supervisor, or a superintendent and once they assess the
25 situation, you know, make safe life and property, then they ask

1 for an isolation plan from the GDCC directly over the phone.

2 The GDCC then creates an isolation plan for us with their
3 models and local planning engineers onsite with them in GDCC.
4 Then they email us on our phones the isolation plan, with two
5 isolation plans. They give us a primary and a secondary. And the
6 primary is usually squeeze points, and the secondary is usually
7 valves. And with that, they also give us customer outages.

8 So they'll give us, Plan A, squeeze point, A and B or C if
9 it's three, and they'll tell us how many customers, and then Plan
10 B, seven valves, a thousand customers. We feel -- you know, we --
11 you know, in a normal situation, we'll go with Plan A. If that
12 doesn't work, go Plan B, depending on the severity of the
13 incident.

14 This -- in this incident, we went with both at the same time,
15 because we just -- we didn't know what -- we needed to go with the
16 fastest one. Sometimes valves are faster; sometimes squeezing's
17 faster. If that, you know, 6-inch line, or it was a 2-inch
18 plastic that was, you know, right -- you know, newly installed and
19 was right there, we would have had that squeezed off before the
20 valves, and then we would have stood down the valves operation.

21 But that's emailed to our phones. And we're able to review
22 them, and call in and ask for questions. We call back in if
23 there's any discrepancies that we see in the field, that didn't
24 match with that. And that usually doesn't happen, but that's how
25 that's -- that's the procedure for that.

1 And then as we're squeezing, or shutting off, you know, we'll
2 call in and let them know that valve's been closed, or it's
3 slacking off, and keep them updated as we go.

4 Q. And then, on your -- I guess you're, obviously don't --

5 MR. SARINA: This is still Nathan Sarina. CPUC --
6 (indiscernible) is appropriate.

7 MS. COLLETTI: No. As long as you continue. You --

8 MR. SARINA: Oh, okay.

9 MS. COLLETTI: Yeah.

10 BY MR. SARINA:

11 Q. And so I understand, when -- we're moving way back to the
12 beginning as you're responding.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. Obviously you're not able, how on PG&E site is -- so you're
15 saying that you're going to the scene to take over an incident.
16 How is PG&E managing that, kind of, while you're moving towards
17 the scene? And then --

18 A. I know what you're asking. What's happening in PG&E before
19 I'm there? Is that what you're asking?

20 Q. Yeah, till you're getting there.

21 A. Okay. So this was -- this was on the news, I think this --
22 before I even got there, I think it was -- people were able to see
23 this, so to the best of my knowledge and the communications that I
24 had, GEC was activating, you know, the isolation plans. They
25 hopefully were starting on that. But that's -- you know, that --

1 in the back scenes, that's what should have been happening before
2 I got there.

3 Q. Okay. And then, as part of that, how -- as you become
4 incident commander on -- or not incident commander, the head of
5 PG&E when you're on the scene, how is that getting brought to the
6 attention of all the crews and supervisors and any PG&E personnel?
7 That's --

8 A. How do they know?

9 Q. Yeah. How is that communicated to them?

10 A. I tell them.

11 Q. You tell them. Okay.

12 A. Yes. I tell -- because usually it's the supervisors onsite.
13 And then since I was onsite, I told Mike and Ricky, you focus on
14 the incident. I'm handling the calls, I'm handling communication,
15 and you focus on getting this line shut off and that line shut
16 off. And then all communications through the GDCC and through OEC
17 comes through me. And I let them know that as well.

18 I said, you need to contact me. Don't call Ricky, don't call
19 Mike. Call me. I'm standing here, with my phone on. I'm the
20 person taking the calls. Don't bother them.

21 MR. SARINA: I think we're --

22 MS. COLLETTI: Okay. Kim.

23 MS. WEST: This is Kim West. I have no more questions.

24 MS. COLLETTI: Okay.

25 MR. COCHRANE: Mike Cochrane, no more questions.

1 MS. COWSERT: Christine Cowsert, no more questions.

2 MS. COLLETTI: Well in that case, we'll conclude the
3 interview, with our thanks. Thank you for your time. We really
4 appreciate it. This has been invaluable.

5 MR. SOUZA: Okay. You're welcome. Thank you.

6 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: SAN FRANCISCO GAS RELEASE AND FIRE
 FEBRUARY 6, 2019
 Interview of Kevin Souza

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA19MR001

PLACE: San Francisco, California

DATE: February 9, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Pamela Jacobson
Transcriber