## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:

\*

NATURAL GAS-FUELED EXPLOSION OF

RESIDENCE, DALLAS, TEXAS \* Accident No.: PLD18FR002

FEBRUARY 23, 2018

\*

Interview of: TED PADGETT, Chief of Staff

Dallas Fire-Rescue

Walnut Hill Recreation Center Dallas, Texas

Tuesday, February 27, 2018

#### APPEARANCES:

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# 1 INTERVIEW 2 (1:05 p.m.)3 DR. JENNER: Good afternoon. My name is Stephen Jenner. Ι'm 4 an investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board out 5 of Washington, DC. Today is Tuesday, February 27, 2018, and the 6 time is 1:05 p.m., Central Daylight Time. We are currently at the 7 Walnut Hill Recreation Center in Dallas. We are here in response to the house explosion on Espanola Drive in Dallas that occurred 8 9 on February 23, 2018. We will be talking to Mr. Padgett, Padgett. 10 MR. PADGETT: Padgett. DR. JENNER: 11 I made you French for a second. 12 But before we do that, we'll have each of us introduce 13 ourselves with our spelling and who we're with. 14 I'm Stephen Jenner, S-t-e-p-h-e-n, J-e-n-n-e-r, a human 15 performance investigator with the NTSB. 16 MS. GUNARATNAM: Rachael Gunaratnam, R-a-c-h-a-e-l, 17 G-u-n-a-r-a-t-n-a-m, a hazmat investigator with NTSB. 18 MR. COLLINS: Jim Collins, J-i-m, C-o-l-l-i-n-s, regional 19 manager for the Railroad Commission of Texas. 2.0 MR. CHEVEREZ: Jose Cheverez, J-o-s-e, C-h-e-v-e-r-e-z, 21 pipeline inspector for the Railroad Commission of Texas. 22 MS. COLLETTI: Alex Colletti, PHMSA, Accident Division, 23 A-1-e-x, C-o-1-1-e-t-i. 24 Mr. MURDOCK: Phillip Murdock, P-h-i-l-l-i-p, M-u-r-d-o-c-k, 25 Director of Engineering and Compliance, Atmos Energy.

1 MR. PADGETT: I'm Ted Padgett, T-e-d P-a-d-g-e-t-t. I'm the 2 Chief of Staff of the Dallas Fire-Rescue Department,

P-a-d-g-e-t-t. We have an operator standing by.

DR. JENNER: Terrific. Thank you.

## INTERVIEW OF TED PADGETT

### BY DR. JENNER:

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- Q. Chief, if you would, just let us know about your background.
- 8 Start from day 1 when you got interested in fire and rescue, and
- 9 work your way up to your present position.
- 10 A. Okay. You going to let me say what I want to say? I grew up
- 11 | in the booming metropolis of Strawberry Plains, Tennessee, which
- 12 the big industry was taking bottles back to the store. And since
- 13 we came up with plastic, ruined my career choice.
- So after college, I went to the Air Force. I was in the Air
- 15 | Force. Go out of the Air Force January 17, 1985. I was a pilot.
- 16 I was headed home to Tennessee, and stopped with a friend that my
- 17 dad had flown with when he was in the service, and their son was
- 18 my age. Didn't really know him that well from when we were
- 19 younger, but had said he went to work for the fire department. I
- 20 | said tell me about this. He said they work 1 day, and they're off
- 21 2 days. So that was the hook that got me in.
- I don't have family in Texas other than my wife. And I
- 23 joined. I had security clearance from the Air Force. So I was
- 24 | sitting in rookie school on February 6, 1985; so 2 weeks after
- 25 getting out of active duty.

As I stated, I have -- I went to college, played football.

The school called Carson Newman University. It's in east

Tennessee. I got my master's from the University of Tennessee. I got another master's from Columbia, and I got a doctorate from the University of Texas at Arlington.

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I have been with the fire department now -- I've started my 34th year February 6th, as I stated earlier. I have done everything there is in this department. I have been a paramedic. As everyone here, you have to hire on to be a paramedic. the box for the first 13 years, I guess. I was assigned to special ops stations, hazmat, search and rescue, swift water. Came up through the ranks. We used to have a rank back in the day it was called a second driver. And you had a driver engineer operator, a lieutenant, captain, battalion chief, deputy chief, assistant chief. My position now is that I'm 801, which is the number 2 to the chief of the department. So I'm the, I quess, power behind the throne. I have four assistants that report to me. So even though I'm an assistant chief rank, I don't know what the -- I guess, I'm 800.5 because 800 is the chief of the department.

Our Chief, Chief Coatney, just took the job here 18 months ago. So he came here, and I've been, I won't say his confidant, but I've been kind of the keeper of all things of record, and how things are done or were done. And I'd like to go on the record to say that I've worked for a lot of chiefs over the years. This is

the first leader I've actually worked for. So I'm excited to say that, and that wasn't paid for, obviously.

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I was the -- I guess, pertinent to this, I've had all kind of training, and -- Harvard fellowships. I've had fire officers all the way up. I've been at Texas A&M Mays Center. Gotten degrees and certificates all over the place: Master Firefighter, Master Inspector, Master Instructor, Master Investigator. I'm hazmat technician, special skills, subject matter expert on WMD. And do a lot of things for some of the governmental contracts -- SAIC, EAI -- contracting here and there for whatever it may be.

I've been on Texas Task Force One, so I've worked at big events, from the Winter Olympics all the way to Republican,

Democratic conventions, all kind of -- more hurricanes and things than I can mention -- Katrina, Rita, 9/11. Been there, done that. Right place, wrong time, I guess.

And I ran the hazmat program here. Actually got it off its feet, started it. I left that in '05, I want to say, and we've had others that have kind of taken the ball and run with it. But I stayed with hazmat until really 2010 on the fringes, and then I was -- our chief at our time -- I was considered, I'll say this myself, I was considered Mr. Fix It. So I was sent from the fire operations side to the arson investigations side. I was over there as a deputy, and then promoted to assistant chief January of 2017. So I've been the assistant chief for 5 years and some change.

My wife

- 1 And I enjoy movies. I'm a scratch golfer. I used to be an 2 athlete. Now I'm just athlete -- athletic supporter, I guess.
- 3 That's pretty much. My wife, I've been married 30 years.
- 4 is a nurse at the ER Baylor here, which is a major trauma center.
- I have one daughter. She's got a job in Columbus. Works for the 5
- -- Amazon has taken over the world. So she's a TCU person, so go 6
- 7 Frogs. That's all. All right.
- 8 All right. Q.
- 9 More than you needed there.
- 10 Terrific. I appreciate that. Okay. You know why we're
- 11 here.
- 12 Yes, sir. Α.
- And I understand that you had some level of involvement in 13
- 14 the most significant of these incidents. And if you would, just
- 15 walk us through your level of involvement from the moment you were
- 16 notified.
- 17 Okay. As I think you heard earlier, we have rotating on-call
- 18 just so one of the individual assistants or the deputies don't get
- 19 their teeth kicked in, quite frankly, for the number of calls that
- 2.0 So in this particular case, I was not on call, but I was
- 21 because the chief of the department had a death in the family and
- 22 had flown out of state. Was gone since Thursday morning --
- 23 actually, Wednesday night, Thursday morning. So as we say, I had
- 24 the con.
- 25 I knew that the deputy on call -- actually it was to be

Assistant Chief Bret Stidham, who is over our emergency operations, EMS. He was out of town for his daughter's something down in San Antonio. And so Deputy Chief Lauren Johnson, who is very capable, assumed his, what we call the 101, the on-call.

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So where I came into this, long story short, when the chief is gone -- let me kind of back up. My job as chief of staff is primarily twofold. One, it allows the chief of the department to be a figurehead that deals with city council, mayors, government entities, you name it. And then that allows me to operate in a roundabout way the department through the other assistant chiefs.

So I handle the day-to-day stuff and/or anything that's too weird, wet and sticky, it kind of drops on my desk. Not that we don't have a capable chief, but that seems to work really well, and I've never had aspirations to be the guy. I'm kind of just falling into this, and it shows you that any nut can become an oak if you just hold your roots long enough. Side commentary. Sorry. The fact is, through that, that allows him to stay free and clear, and have an objective view. And I'm a sounding board, as I stated, confidant.

So once he was out of town, obviously, all that came to me.

So I started getting inundated with just things here and there,
typical routine things for a city manager, mayor. Friday morning,
however, at about, I want to say it was around 7:00, 10 minutes to
7, maybe, I got bumped by the -- or paged by the dispatch, our
communications, that said that they had a fire. Well, the way

they put out what's called a 211 page, not meaning that we had a two alarm fire, but it's a significant event. And so I got bumped on that, and from that I'll get information that I can pass to city council members, mayor, press, whatever it may be. And it said that we had a fire, and then it said -- came back, and said, correction, explosion or believed explosion on Espanola.

So at that particular time, this is about 7:25. I was leaving the house at 6:45, so I was en route to Dallas just as I do every morning. And I live approximately 20 miles outside the city limits of Dallas, off Interstate 20, which is the town of Talty. So it's a straight shot for me to hit 20 to 175, and I'm downtown. You all may not be familiar with that, but it's easy driving except for dead man's curve down there.

So I've got my Bluetooth on the phone, and I'm listening to the radio dispatches, and hearing what's going on. So I hear 806, which is our deputy chief that controls the north half of the city on any day, and it's Ray O'Dell. He's a friend of mine. He's been on about 30-something years. And I called Ray, and I said, Ray, what do we have? He said, well, it looks like we had a explosion, but we've got the people en route to the hospital. He gave me an update on how many we had, and I'll give you those specifics in a minute.

But I said, Ray, I've heard on the dispatch reports they're thinking explosion. He said, yeah, you know, he said, Atmos is all out here, he said, but I think we've got a handle. I said,

here's what I want you to do. I said, did hazmat roll on this?

And he said they did, but I turned them back around. And I said,
all right, Ray, I just want to tell you, I'm not going to make it
look like I've overrun you, but I'm calling dispatch and having
them kick out hazmat back there just for several reasons. One, I
want to get some readings that our techs understand. I know Atmos
does a percent per volume of air on their readings. And I said
our guys are used to doing parts per million. Now we can convert
that, but -- we have some people working today that are very good
at that. I want to get our field diagnostics out there just to
see what we have.

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Okay. So I called dispatch. Hazmat rolled. Obviously, I called Captain Baker by phone and said, hey, I need you to head out to the scene and head up the hazmat part. I said, let me know when you get there what Atmos is say, and then fill me in. I headed to the office.

So I got to City Hall. I had three assistants that were off that day. So I had a deputy chief, Chris Williford, who is kind of my -- was my go-to guy that day. Because I'm getting everything in the world from the city managers, and now hearing it in the press, and the news they're wanting information. So I'm typing up some situation reports at the same time thinking about all the things I need to do. So we had a bad weather situation that day. I had Greg, who -- not Greg, Chris Williford. Chris Williford, Deputy Chief Williford, go down a list that I was

spouting things off, and I had him and another gentleman Thornton, Chief Thornton, Ben Thornton, that were in the office that were kind of my runners and making calls and doing things while I was trying to get operations.

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I called our GIS and told him make me some maps, poster-size, where I could put them in my office, and see what we have where I can start plotting things. I called for DART to send a bus because I was already thinking evacuation. Police also. Police had responded, but I asked for them to send several more elements.

I got -- somewhere in there, probably around, I don't know, 8:15, 30, maybe, I got a phone call from Captain Baker. Told me what he had as far as some readings, and I said, okay, here's what I want to do. He -- well, he said Atmos is talking about a potential 2, maybe 3-block evacuation. And I said, okay, I'm looking at this. In the meantime, I had asked dispatch to run me any reports of gas leaks, calls, anything that had been in that area over the past couple of days. And in this particular case, they just went back to Wednesday, I believe, the 21st. I think Friday was the 23rd. Yeah. And two particular incidents popped up on Durango, which is -- actually shares an alley.

As firefighters, you know, we have a little saying, when you're looking at street addresses especially if you don't know, you know, it's always east is even, south's the same, north and west are odd. So when you're looking at -- when I saw all the odd numbers for the alleyway I knew that we were talking about the

side of the street there for Durango, and the even numbers on Espanola, et cetera.

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So we -- I said, that's interesting because they're a street apart; then I saw the alleyway. So all this is going on while I've got other people on the line. I'm typing. And so he says 2 to 3 blocks, and I said, okay, here's my thing: I've dealt with Atmos many times before over the years, and before that it was Lone Star Gas. And I said, whatever they're saying, I want you to double it, possibly triple it. So I made the decision to go with what Atmos had on readings, but I expanded it in the auspice of public safety just until I knew what we had. I didn't have eyes. I'm listening through my command, and kind of doing an incident command off-site, obviously. I can't see it from my house kind of thing.

So then it came to me that, okay, we've got a grid. Atmos is telling us there's a grid that has this many streets. Okay. That was, as you all have seen, kind of one of the maps that was a grayed-out area. And I saw the elementary school, and I asked -- I know Captain Baker was saying he didn't know who told him to go up to the school or whatever. But at that particular time, I was talking to -- just spaced out. Rutledge.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Benning.

MR. PADGETT: Not Rosenberg.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Kyle.

MR. PADGETT: Tyler.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Slaughter.

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MR. PADGETT: Slaughter, yeah. I don't know what -- what did I say. Anyway, I had gotten on the -- let me back up on that. Hold that point.

Probably 7, 8 months ago, I went down to the Atmos office on Oak, and -- I believe it's Oak, right there in southeast Dallas, and went in and met Mr. Slaughter, Mr. Rosenberg, Ms. Harris, several of the higher-ups, I guess, that do the operations stuff.

Just as I do typically -- I used to do that in hazmat, get to know who is around what, special utilities, and just had a time just to sit and talk, kind of see what they were doing. They were -- at that time Mr. Slaughter was the head guy. Mr. Rosenberg was in there, and I think Mr. Rosenberg is this -- the area operations manager or something. You know, they were asking me anything we need, whatever.

We have, in the past, Atmos has -- as Captain Baker talked, we knew -- when I was running hazmat, we knew that there was an issue with the Atmos repair techs and our hazmat techs talking on the same page. As I alluded to earlier, parts per million versus percent per volume of air. So Atmos was actually the one that suggested -- they used at that time those SENSITs. And so they were the ones that suggested, hey, we'll get you -- they actually got us some monitors that would communicate same stuff as theirs, and we would use those as backups. And I've heard we're still using those, which is good. We also use the SENSITs now for Freon

detection, any of the other whacko.

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So we had a relationship, we, the special operations side of the fire department had a pretty -- and I hate using that word robust -- a good relationship with Atmos as far as training and response to questions we've had. We've taught a number of hazmat schools around this north Texas area, and have had utilized Atmos and other department utilities, Encore, name some others, that have brought out props, valving, things of that nature that people can actually play with without having actual -- at the suggestion of Atmos years ago, probably 10, 12, we started carrying Mustang tools on the hazmat rig so we could crimp polyethylene line. black pipe. We have plugs and things for that, but that pipe is so brittle now we just -- but anything that was basically a 2-inch down we could get there and dig and have the thing grounded, bonded, and crimp it off to save. Because Atmos, that's one thing, they don't -- they can't run Code 3. So sometimes it's a long wait when calling them. And so sometimes you feel like a one-legged man in a butt kicking contest when you're out there waiting. So we carry those tools.

Typically, most of our techs, we try to not touch anything until we know where the back pressure is going. Especially, unless it's a 1-inch maybe smaller we may do -- or especially a residential or something.

Okay. So back to where we were. So out of precaution because they didn't know where the grid exactly went, and this was

in conjunction with Mr. Slaughter by proxy, we determined that let's evacuate the school. It was also a good I don't want to say practice, but a training drill for the elementary school. Ι believe it's Foster Elementary. We had 738 kids, ages pre-K to the fifth grade. So DISD came. That went really smooth. Again, I wasn't on-site, but I'm getting intel updates. They said they had no readings in the school. And so, again, that was a precaution, but I also knew that should something, like it typically does, creep, I didn't want that to be an issue that I had to deal with later. So out of precaution, I went ahead and pulled that trigger. And I've heard a lot of the interviewees say this person or that person, whatever -- it fell in my lap.

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I communicated that with the city manager and the mayor. Told them what we were doing. At that time, Atmos, for whatever reason, kind of went dark as far as returning calls and things. So the mayor was getting a little frustrated. He, I believe, reached out to the TRCC, and actually may have even gone higher than that. They were trying to get some pressure on some Atmos folks to return calls, PIO and all that stuff. And I know they were overwhelmed. I honestly believe that Atmos was trying to do right. I think they failed in the initial issue on Friday, if not before, but I believe it's because they've never had anything like that here in Dallas, and they didn't — the people in place, it took them a while to get their running legs back up under them. I think they're doing a excellent job now, but at the time there

were some -- just like everybody, you know, it takes a while to get up to game speed when you're going.

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So from that, we rock along with notifications here and there. I'm getting readings. I take Chief Williford and myself, we came to the actual command scene on Friday at about -- I got there probably 11:30-ish, and took a picture of the house with my personal phone, just a front shot, just to see what it was I was hearing. And based on everything I had heard, and what I saw, and what my knowledge base was, I could tell this was a explosion of some form. No fire damage, walls pushed out, brick veneer off the front, Celotex and Styrofoam everywhere, siding, fences blown.

Damage would appear to be the majority on the delta -- alpha delta corner really, maybe more on the delta side, but that's what presented on the front.

The chief on-site the command post at this particular was
Battalion 7, which was a captain riding up, Combs, Mark Combs.

And I was confident with his ability. He's a squared away
firefighter. He's a good captain, knows his work. He's been one
of our training lieutenants back in the day, and he's real close
to making battalion chief permanent. So this is right up his
alley. So I was confident what he had done.

I came and spoke to him just to get a sit rep. Dallas police had Deputy Chief Watson on location. He came down, and I talked with him. We've known each other over the years. And asked him what he was doing. I told him the evacuation area we had. I

wanted him to cordon off the streets, you know, DPD protection, which he had already set up. But I asked him, I said, how many officers do you have? He said I got 14 to 16. I said, how many avenues are in this 4-block area? He said, about 16. I said, are you counting the alleys? He said, no. I said, let's get people on that. We had streets come out and bring barricades. When I pulled up to the scene, I did kind of a 360 of the back. I came up Larga. I went all the way down to, I believe, it area. was -- let's see -- I need to look at something. Do I even have Was it Mixon to the north? Or actually that would be west. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Fontana. MR. PADGETT: Excuse me. East. I'm sorry? UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Fontana. It was just past Fontana. Anyway, I went --MR. PADGETT:

MR. PADGETT: It was just past Fontana. Anyway, I went -- did a 360 around that, came in. We came in from the south side or southwest side right there off of Larga and --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Gaspar?

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MR. PADGETT: Yes. Thank you. Worked our way up, and then I showed up at command. When I got there hazmat techs were just putting up their monitors. They had been monitoring. And that's when I came down and talked to Mr. Combs. Now back to that.

I told him I wanted to make sure he was keeping track of -we call it a 214 on deployments. But Mark understood that a lot
of fire service, our incident command, they'll keep boards and
things like that, but I told him just keep track. I want you to

take pictures of your command board. And the only reason I say all that, this is a significant event when you have a fatality related to something as out of the norm. It's the same as when we have fire fatalities. City of Dallas, you get -- I say you get like there's some magic number, but the average fire fatalities, fire fatalities in a city over a million is 1 per 100,000. have, depending on what you read, 1.3, 1.4 million. So 13 or 14 fire fatalities a year. I think we had seven last year. before that we had 16, 14. I can show you the tracking. So those are considered significant events. Anything here in the City of Dallas that's a multiple alarm fire, large property loss, something weird, it's going to hit the press, that's when we get involved. So because of that, I was telling him, especially with line-of-duty death and things I've had, just keep track of what you're doing just for documentation later. Got it.

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I spoke with -- there was Atmos guy, a contractor actually. I can't -- I can just remember it looked like a drilling rig on the back of his, I guess, safety vest, was kind of dirty. He was talking to Chief Combs. Police, I had Box 4 there, which is our response rig that brings refreshments, and they had just -- I came really at lunchtime, not only to see the scene, but to ask if any of the guys on the scene needed something. I was going to go get them some food, water, whatever. The rehab van was already there, and they had just dropped off McDonald's burgers and some other things. So they were good to go there.

So we decided to formulate a plan of here's what I want. Hazmat at that time we thought we had a handle on it. The readings, we weren't getting anything. No one smelled -- I didn't smell anything; no one else smelled anything in that area. There were, I want to say, and I'm just shooting this number out, but I want to say there was about 20 to 30 crews it looked like. When I say crews, two to four people that had punched holes all around this area. There are backhoes, shovels, you name it, in different areas all around there. And I just thought, wow, this is bigger than what we thought when we pulled in. I never smelled anything at all though.

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So hazmat, as I stated, they were clearing up to go because we were being told, hey, we got a handle on it. It's a leak in this alleyway. Obviously, this was an unfortunate issue, but we're good. So Scott Clumpner, Battalion 9, was at the -- what we set up as the command post at the corner of Larga, Story Lane, Webb Chapel extension, right in that area. And it's a parking lot shopping center thing across from the graveyard. And at that time we didn't have an Atmos van or trailer that they have there. They had been up the street somewhere, I think, and then Chief Clumpner had got with them to bring them. Now they were about 30 feet apart so they could talk.

That's when I, like I said, we started -- I got a call, I guess, from NTSB, Mohammed somebody, telling us that you all coming in. They had reported that to Mr. Slaughter. I told them

I had to talk to Mr. Slaughter. He's obviously been busy. And we were told -- actually, let me back up. I'm wrong on that. I didn't talk to Mohammed till Saturday. Friday night -- getting those confused. Friday night, as I told hazmat, we were clearing up, and I said, all right, hang here until the operations are done or finished digging here. We'll shut this down, say 5:00, 1700 hours, and we'll go from there.

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Well, I cleared, went back to the office finishing all the other stuff that we do, and about 6:30 I got a call that they were running again on gas odor or something, and it really wasn't in this grid, but it was close enough kind of perk your ears up. And then I get a call said, hey, they found some more things. fixing now to evacuate neighbors and stuff. And we knew we were going to evacuate this little 4-block area that was really expanding. And I remember Atmos, I finally got a hold of, I want to say it was Ms. Harris, and she stated, you know, that they had -- needed a place. We set up the rec center here to kind of have a holding area because -- they hadn't had a lot of people come and ask for things around 3:00, but I told them, this is a blue collar neighborhood and come 5:30 to maybe 7:30, it's going to be quite lengthy. And I remember telling her, do you speak Spanish? she said, no. I said, you'd better get somebody speaks Spanish, you're going to have a problem. And I said, I speak enough to get you in trouble so you really want somebody that's going to be on their p's and q's. So we opened up the rec center.

That was done through OEM. That's when I contacted them. As I stated, we had a DART bus on-site in case we needed evacs. I cut them loose at probably 3. And all this kind of ramped back up after that. We thought we had it handled. So Friday night, I kept the hazmat -- you know, get your stuff, make sure you're on call, you're at the station.

Let's go on to Saturday morning. This is where -- Saturday morning I came back in to Dallas. I got into downtown around 9:30, got call from Lauren Johnson, the deputy chief. She was having trouble getting any information back from Atmos. told her, okay, let me call some people. I called. I finally called -- I went down the higher-ups order, and I got down to Benny Rosenberg. He picked up immediately, and said, hey, I'm here at their little incident command place, which at that time I was thinking he was over off of Oak. I didn't know that he had actually -- and I believe that's where he told me. I don't remember all the conversation, but he said he was at the command post, which now that I think, it was probably here. I was in east Dallas, and I was going to go by and talk to him if I didn't get any more calls. I was actually going to their office.

So he called, and he had Ms. Harris with him. He had a lady named -- yeah, just spaced out. I got the name somewhere but -- what's --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ocham?

MR. PADGETT: I'm sorry.

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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ocham from Atmos?

2 MR. PADGETT: Beacham. Is it Beacham?

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It is Beacham.

MR. PADGETT: Beacham.

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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Beacham.

MR. PADGETT: Beacham. So I got Ms. Beacham. She came on in the mix, and I asked her what's going on, and she explained to me it wasn't vouchers that they were going to be giving, but they had some, I quess, cards where they could get incidentals or whatever. And so we had decided -- this was Saturday. I got a hold of Captain Baker again. I said, okay, here's what I need you to do. We're going to split your team. I want you to hire back an officer and three technicians to be a scout team so to speak. maintain the two in and two out. But I want you to set them up with a Suburban and some monitors, and whenever Atmos punches a hole, I want you right there in their hip pocket getting some readings. Or if they have a house that they want to clear, I think he's alluded to that, go in and make sure we have the right diagnostics, we're talking apples to apples.

So that has been going on since Saturday afternoon, I guess. And then seemed like every time we started to gear it down it would expand. And so really my extent has now been, well, really from the beginning, has been oversight and just kind of juggling the balls to make sure everybody is talking to each other and getting on the same page. In my opinion, as I stated earlier, it

was like most things, you have something you have to grab by the tail and reel it in, put it in a little box with a bow on it, and that's kind of what happened in the first few times, days, hours, I guess. I'd says days, hours into Saturday. As I expressed now, I've had a lot of dealings with Atmos and -- both good and bad, but I will say that Mr. Slaughter and Mr. Rosenberg and the people I've talked to, other than that brief period where I'm sure they were overwhelmed, have been pretty responsive.

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Now I feel like at first they were trying to keep a lid on things because I understood from the business side this thing could get out of whack and it's dollars flying out the door. I get that. I also knew our side it's the public safety. That's what I'm employed to do. And those two have to mirror each other and marry up. But, like I said, since they've gotten their runner legs under them, I think it's been going really well. And as I alluded to earlier, last update is we don't have any citizens with any unmet needs other than a lot of them want to just throw rocks and holler, and so we're going to have a town hall tonight where they can get that off their chest, I guess.

That was a long-winded round the world in 365 days. There's a lot of stuff I probably left out. But when the Shiites are hitting the fan -- I'm sorry. I hope nobody is Shiite. If it's hitting the fan it's kind of -- I will offend everybody, and I don't mean it out of prejudice or malfeasance. I grew up in east Tennessee. I still have my own teeth and my shoes, but I do make

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- 1 fun of everybody. That's kind of my way. Firemen, we make fun of
- 2 | things just to keep from crying and stuff. So --
- 3 BY DR. JENNER:
- 4 Q. Terrific. Thank you.
- 5 A. I'm sorry. Around the world in 20 days, right? I told you
- 6 | it would only take 20 minutes.
- 7 Q. Okay. Terrific. Just a couple questions.
- 8 A. Okay.
- 9 Q. You gave us a lot of stuff, but that's good. I made note you
- 10 had a conversation with Ray about the hazmat decision, and it
- 11 | sounded that they --
- 12 A. With Bobby Baker you mean? With Ray?
- 13 Q. With -- I wrote down Ray. You can correct me.
- 14 A. It was Bobby Baker that I called. That morning?
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. You talking about? Yes, sir.
- 17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ray O'Dell.
- 18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No. You spoke to Ray.
- MR. PADGETT: Oh, Ray O'Dell, yes. I'm sorry. Ray O'Dell.
- 20 | He's the deputy chief. I'm sorry. I was thinking there's a
- 21 | hazmat tech Ray Thompson that is Bobby Baker's underling, and he
- 22 may have been on the call. But, no, I was speaking to Ray O'Dell,
- 23 yes.
- 24 BY DR. JENNER:
- 25 Q. Great. So a decision was made to send hazmat and a decision

- 1 was made to recall, and then you gave your opinion of that. Can
- 2 you --
- 3 A. Yes, sir.
- 4 Q. -- shed a little light on that?
- 5 A. I talked to Ray, and I said, okay, what happened here? And
- 6 he said, well, I think they had an explosion, but there's no fire.
- 7 The patients have been transported. We've got a handle on it.
- 8 It's good. Atmos is on location. And I said, what readings did
- 9 hazmat get? And he said, well, hazmat was en route, but I turned
- 10 them around. And I said, okay. Man, again, this is a teaching
- 11 thing. I mean, Ray is an experienced battalion chief, but not
- 12 | necessarily experienced on hazmat.
- And so my first thing is when we have protocols on how
- 14 natural gas responses, all these different grades are to be
- 15 responded to and their inner MOPs, but a lot of officers out
- 16 there, I think the common culture is, you know, we see this enough
- 17 | we have -- well, they're used to possibly a meter in the back
- 18 alley being backed over and whatever, and they, okay, we can solve
- 19 this, and we're on the road. They don't usually call us until we
- 20 | see a 2 or 6-inch main with concrete going 50 feet in the air.
- 21 You know, they go, we need hazmat here now. So I think that was
- 22 | the mentality.
- 23 And Ray, in his defense as a deputy chief that day, thought
- 24 the situation is over. Atmos is here. They got it. That's 99
- 25 percent of the time, Atmos comes in, we stand around. If we need

to protect some of their guys to get down in holes or whatever, we'll stand by with a charged hose line or some type of a CO or something that we can protect them in case it goes fa-voomp.

Because, you know, gas when it goes fa-voomp, that's a bad day, and we've had that happen a few times.

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So when he said he turned them around, I said, Ray, just from a PR standpoint, and I mean, that's what I said, I want hazmat out there. If nothing else, because I know there's going to be cameras on this, they can get B roll of the rig there, but I want them out doing monitoring. And I said, I want to verify what Atmos is saying. And I remember saying this, I said, because I've been with Atmos enough times that when their mouth's moving, they're lying, so I want to make sure -- and I didn't mean that ugly. What I'm saying is take what they're telling you as a grain of salt, and I always -- I trust everybody, but I'm going to verify. Does that make sense? So I said, I want someone that understands what we're looking at, and what they're looking at. I'm not here to protect any individual or company, but I want to make sure I'm protecting the people that I'm sworn to serve.

So he said, I understand. And I said, plus, I said, Ray, this is something else. We have to make reports to the TCQ and the TRCC. I said, these reports that we send, not only to federal partners and all of this just part of when we have a release, a significant event, a fuel spill, whatever may be, we have thresholds that we have to push out. And he said, I wasn't aware

of that, Chief. And I said, again, I'm not chewing on you. I'm just telling you why I'm fixing to call dispatch, and I'm calling Bobby directly on the phone, and I'm rolling them back out there, so when they get there, you're not going, hey, why are they here? And he said, I've just left the scene. Mark Combs is chief onsite. And I said, okay. I said, I need you to go back, coordinate that with Bobby and all because Bobby, as you all have seen, he's probably a lot like me, unfortunately, but he is a ball of energy. And so he loves hazmat as you all can tell, and he's like the little energized bunny. If you give him something, he's all over it. So -- and that's not a bad thing. I mean, he's the guy that sits around, will call me and say, hey, what if? What if we had -- okay. But that's good. Keeps you on your toes.

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So that's how hazmat got back involved right at about 8:00 that morning after they had been brought and sent back. And so even the hazmat guys, when I pulled up on the scene at 11, and they were loading things, some of them that I know, and I won't give their names -- you know, I rolled the window down a little bit as I was pulling in. This was after we had done a 360. And I asked them, I said, can I walk up there without any clothes on? They go, yeah. They go, Chief, we don't have any. Then they started MF-ing me and all that stuff about why they were out there, which is agitation. I told them, oh -- you know. And then when they realized it was a big deal, they called me later, said Chief, we're sorry. I said, I don't ever take it personal. You

know, I pick on myself.

2.0

But they had come out there, and because they had not gotten anything on the readings, you know, they're, like, why are we back out here? So that's part of the culture too is when you have certain hazmat teams members that are a little more vocal, they get there and they browbeat if they think it's insignificant type event or maybe over, they will browbeat some of the other firefighters into, why are you calling me? We're the hut-hut team that needs to be over here cleaning up a diesel spill right now and whatever. But so that's kind of the thought on why and how they came back.

And so that's all I was doing with Ray. Ray O'Dell, Chief O'Dell was -- and I know he had a background. He actually, when he first hired on was a fire inspector, and realized that he wanted to fight fire. He came over after about a year or two to the fire side, and he's loved it. But he couldn't get on the firefighting side because you had to have 20/20 vision, and he had glasses back then or something. So but he is very knowledgeable on fire code things. So he has expertise in a lot of things. Hazmat is not one of his. And so I just explained why. That's all that was, a teaching moment for him in the future, maybe some of his other chiefs. So that's how they got involved.

Is that what you asked me?

DR. JENNER: Um-hum.

MR. PADGETT: Again, engaged just out of precaution.

## BY DR. JENNER:

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Q. Right. What I might take away from your reply there was that he thought perhaps the situation was under control because -A. Yes, sir. No, he even told me that. He said, he said, I didn't -- he said, Ted -- of course, we know each other so it's first name, you know, on the phones and all this. And I don't ever go by Chief. I'm Ted. Ted-o. But he said, Ted-o, he said, I didn't see a need for them. He said, I turned them around, get them back in service.

As you all heard earlier, our hazmat team is not a full-time hazmat team. It has 10 personnel assigned to it every day, minimum staffing, but they are assigned to trucks and engines and ambulances. And then when a call comes in, they get off their rigs and go. Captain Baker alluded to when they have an event right downtown Engine 3, Truck 3, Rescue 3, Battalion 1, they all respond. The hazmat rig is sitting back at the station. So it has to be a fill-in or someone bring those diagnostics and tools and decon, all that stuff to the scene. So that's problematic in our current configuration.

I've even through this made a number of notes for Chief
Coatney because he's tackling a lot of things. He's kind of like
chewing on an elephant, and take a little bit every day. But this
is on his radar screen because, again, I like hazmat. I
understand hazmat. It was in my blood forever, still is, and
that's kind of where the fire service is going now. We don't just

fight fire anymore. It's a lot of not only EMS, here in Dallas, like I say, we'll push 300,000 plus runs, and 200,000 of them will be EMS calls. So the rest are fire and weird stuff, you know, hazmat, ARF, swift water. Today even maybe it will be water rescues, high angle, you name it. So that's kind of what the citizens expect from us now is -- we even get called now because the police officers here in Dallas, people want lights and sirens, and we have under a 4-minute response to pretty much anywhere and so they will call us. And we actually get to scenes before

But that's what the citizens expect of the fire department. It's not just -- you know, now it's fire prevention and code enforcement and education and EMS and all the specialty things. Firefighting is kind of going this way, and that's a good thing. But we have to evolve with it.

police, which sometimes is not good.

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So really hazmat, especially for this region because they're a regional partner, our hazmat team is engaged in the 16 counties of North Central Texas Council of Governments. A lot of their equipment is -- has been purchased through everything from state homeland security grants, UASI grants, even the Council of Governments. So we have a commitment not only to Dallas but many times we roll outside our city limits, primarily to the east, Kaufman County, southern Dallas County, even to Ellis County, places like that. So -- took you down the road there.

Q. Okay. Great. Second question is, you mentioned you had a

- 1 good relationship with Atmos in terms of training and other
- 2 | things. If -- just get you to expand on that.
- 3 A. Yes, sir. Atmos, they've built a Disneyland for gas workers
- 4 and firefighters up in -- it's on the, I guess, Richardson Frisco
- 5 border. I think it's more in Frisco. But it -- I could probably
- 6 | be wrong on that. I could tell you how to get there. I'd have to
- 7 shoot you after I got there though.
- 8 Q. Okay.
- 9 A. No. It's a gas leak training facility. And we've had our --
- 10 our hazmat team has gone through there a number of times. We've
- 11 had a couple of engine companies that have gone outside the city
- 12 limits just to see. But I, myself, have been there. It's
- 13 something that periodically -- matter of fact, I think they have
- 14 another awareness, you know, even tying in with dig tasks and some
- 15 of those other things coming up here probably -- usually it's the
- 16 end of March, first of April.
- 17 But no, any time -- and to my knowledge any time we have
- 18 asked Atmos can we X, Y, Z, they're all over it. Yeah, let's do
- 19 that, just tell us when. We'll make it available, and we'll have
- 20 people there. So that has never been a problem to my knowledge
- 21 | with our hazmat team of cooperation and/or -- I mean, I even said
- 22 earlier that we had monitors there for a number of years that
- 23 Atmos had purchased and had given to us to utilize in an
- 24 agreement. And they kept them serviced. Just kind of like we
- 25 | were the users; they were the owners. And then ultimately we got

our own stuff and all just because we realized how much -- we didn't first think we were going to use those that much, but it's become beneficial because of being able to talk apples to apples.

So, no, we've had -- like I said, we've had training over the years. We've taught hazmat tech classes for the Texas Commission of Fire Protection. We've done a number of classes that have firefighters from the Council of Governments come in, and we've had Atmos representatives come out and speak on gas, you know, what's required on signages, and where -- buried lines, things -- all, everything that goes with that, what to look for, bubbles, smells, all the stuff that new operational and even technicians that may not have seen, and they have I won't say war stories, but they have things to show.

So we've had the pipeline group come out. There's a group around Dallas called the Danielle Dawn Smalley. We had a -- I want to say it was explorer pipeline. They had a isobutylene, I think, that blew up in Kaufman County. So they bring out stuff and show all that. So it's Atmos has been there.

DR. JENNER: Okay, great. That's all the questions I have for your involvement in this. So I'll go around the room, and see if anyone has questions, follow-up questions. But I -- after we do that, I'd like to get your impressions about the first two incidents. And so that's part two. But let's address any follow-up questions for this area.

BY MS. GUNARATNAM:

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- 1 Q. I had a question regarding -- because one thing I'm not clear
- 2 about is the decision making of the evacuations, and who from the
- 3 | fire department was the one directly involved in that decision
- 4 making? Because I --
- 5 A. Directly involved? Because that --
- 6 Q. Sorry. Authorizing.
- 7 A. From me.
- 8 Q. Okay.
- 9 A. I mean, it -- I gave authority to our commanders.
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. But ultimately I pulled the trigger. I mean, I -- it's the
- 12 buck stops with me simply because, again, this was in conjunction
- 13 with information I received not only from Atmos, but also from my
- 14 troops. Once I had hazmat there, the more I thought about it, I
- 15 | thought just historically based on experiences I've had over 30
- 16 some odd years now, I know how these things tend to escalate. And
- 17 | I, as I alluded to earlier, I'd just as soon get a perimeter on
- 18 | it, and then choke it back down than I would to always keep
- 19 playing catch up. This is kind of knowing what I know today even,
- 20 this is bugging me that it keeps leapfrogging in places, and I
- 21 can't really put my thumb on it.
- 22 Q. Right.
- 23 A. That's problematic, especially in something of this type.
- 24 But that's just hazmat training, as you well know. You surround
- 25 the troops, choke it down, and get it, like I said, put it in a

- 1 nice little package in a box for somebody to take care of, finish
- 2 | the mitigation, whatever it may be.
- 3 Q. So --
- 4 A. So I did not say, you guys, right now I'm at command, you go
- 5 do this. That was me doing that verbally on the phone saying,
- 6 here's what I want you to do.
- 7 Q. Okay. So because Captain Combs -- Captain, right?
- 8 A. Um-hum.
- 9 Q. Yeah. He was the first one to make the -- do the 4-block
- 10 radius?
- 11 A. Correct.
- 12 Q. Okay. So he was -- when those evacuation decisions were
- 13 being discussed, he would then communicate back to you about
- 14 those?
- 15 A. He didn't communicate to me directly. These, at this time,
- 16 | were coming from Ray O'Dell --
- 17 Q. Okay.
- 18 A. -- and coming from Lauren Johnson. So she's -- the way we do
- 19 our incident command, there's several little steps. But Lauren
- 20 was actually my go-to that I was saying here's what I need you to
- 21 do. Because she was on call. Therefore, I hate to say she had
- 22 | the button, as we call it, and the button was on her. But when
- 23 | she said 4 blocks, I said, I want to double that, and I told her
- 24 why. And then they're saying, well, this involves a school. And
- 25 I said, I understand that. Let's get up there, get readings, but

- 1 let's be proactive just in case.
- 2 Q. Right. Okay. And then, because from what I understand, on
- 3 Friday there was four, in total, like, decisions made for -- like
- 4 | to constantly expand, right?
- 5 A. It kept going. I believe so. Yes, ma'am. And those were
- 6 dependent on once we had a true incident command set up.
- 7 Q. Right.
- 8 A. We start calling it a unified command because we realized
- 9 this is going to be bigger than what it started off as. Like I
- 10 said, deputy chief went home. And so I said, okay, this is going
- 11 to be something that's going to be drawn out so let's set up a
- 12 formal command here.
- 13 Q. Sure.
- 14 A. I want you all to start -- number one, we had cordoned off
- 15 | the area to where, when people come, we're going to put them in a
- 16 | choke point where they have to come here.
- 17 Q. Okay.
- 18 A. And if they need pets, tools. I was already getting phone
- 19 calls, heck, before even 10:00, I got pets there. I got -- heck,
- 20 I had city attorneys calling me. Hey, I live over there. I have
- 21 a dog. Can you tell me what's going on? So it's not just them.
- 22 It's everybody.
- 23 Q. Yes.
- 24 A. And I know there's a lot of elderly here. Like I said, it's
- 25 a working community, so I knew it was really going to expand at

- 1 | night. So that's why I was saying, let's get a handle on this,
- 2 get a choke point, have them funnel through that. That frustrated
- 3 | a lot of citizens, but I think it was the right thing to do.
- 4 That's one reason I ordered buses to come out there because of the
- 5 rain, things got bad, where they could at least just get up on a
- 6 bus out of the weather. It wasn't to take them anywhere. It was
- 7 to --
- 8 Q. Right.
- 9 A. We opened up the rec center where they could get some
- 10 information. You all kind of heard how that worked for a while
- 11 and then kind of waned in the midnight hours, so to speak. So --
- 12 Q. So with each decision of those four would you -- they would
- 13 update you, and say we did this or --
- 14 A. Yes, ma'am.
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. Yeah. I'd given them carte blanche.
- 17 Q. Right.
- 18 A. I told Lauren, I said, I trust our commanders out there. I
- 19 knew it was Chief Clumpner. I'm very familiar with his work and I
- 20 know how diligent he is. Mark Combs, even though he's a captain,
- 21 I know how diligent he is. Lauren Johnson, outstanding. Even
- 22 Captain Baker, hazmat, as quirky as he is, he's very good. And
- 23 his troops are good.
- 24 Q. Okay.
- 25 A. Sometimes you got to light a fire under them, but there's a

- 1 lot on different shifts that have done really, really well.
- 2 Q. Okay. So when Atmos wanted to lift that evacuation on
- 3 | Saturday, so Lauren was able to make that decision, say, yeah,
- 4 okay?
- 5 A. Correct.
- 6 Q. Okay.
- 7 A. And, again, based on as she would even say, these are the
- 8 subject matter experts for this particular product. So I don't
- 9 want to say that. I gave them free reign to make decisions under
- 10 my authority on behalf of the fire chief who was gone. Of course,
- 11 | I'm communicating things to him in North Dakota or wherever he
- 12 was. This whole time, everything I'm doing or they're doing, I'm
- 13 communicating to the city manager and mayor and our PO so he can
- 14 get on it. I also asked our PIO to coordinate with Atmos. He was
- 15 having a little trouble getting with her. I know her phone was
- 16 blowing up like everybody's, but making sure they're putting out
- 17 | the same statements.
- And I was hearing things on the radio that sounded good, but
- 19 | in actuality they weren't occurring. And there was frustration
- 20 with the citizens about where do we go? Where do we stay?
- 21 Nobody's -- and a lot of them don't say anything because, quite
- 22 | frankly, a lot of them are -- don't know if you want to say
- 23 Dreamers or whatever, but they're here and not maybe citizens.
- 24 And, therefore, I think that's a lot of reason a lot these calls
- 25 didn't come into 911 potentially. I'm just guessing. Because we

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- 1 have seen even crimes over here they go unreported because of just
- 2 | the fear of authorities and what may happen to me, and that's
- 3 unfortunate, but that's the reality.
- 4 Q. So you said you went to Espanola --
- 5 A. Espanola, yes, ma'am.
- 6 Q. -- on at around 11:30 a.m. that morning --
- 7 A. Yes, ma'am.
- 8  $\mathbb{Q}$ . -- to the actual house, and you took photos of the front.
- 9 A. I took a photo, one photo.
- 10 Q. One photo, okay. And you observed the damage there. Did you
- 11 | interact with any Atmos people then?
- 12 A. No, ma'am. Like I said, I saw a, what I believe was a
- 13 contractor that was on that block that kind of walked up that --
- 14 and I just remember when he turned around he had on a safety vest.
- 15 I didn't talk with him, but he had a safety vest that I can still
- 16 see. It was kind of like a -- looked like a drilling rig. Had a
- 17 pole. It didn't look like an A-frame drilling platform or
- 18 something. It just looked like maybe an auger company or
- 19 something. But I can't even remember the name of it. It didn't
- 20 say Atmos. I just knew it was like a third-party contractor.
- 21 Q. Okay.
- 22 A. And I assumed that that was an Atmos contractor, not
- 23 | necessarily Atmos representative. But he was obviously doing
- 24 something at the end of the street with his crew. Like I said,
- 25 there were holes being punched.

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- 1 Q. Okay.
- 2 A. At least what I saw all over the place.
- 3 Q. And how long did you stay?
- 4 A. I was there probably an hour.
- 5  $\|Q$ . Okay. All right. And then you went to the command post
- 6 after that?
- 7 A. I drove to the command post. I actually did not go into the
- 8 command post. I -- because this time we thought we had it done.
- 9 I was the same way. I told Mark Combs, who was the battalion
- 10 | there, I said, I'm leaving you with this. He said Clumpner is
- 11 down at the command post. They've moved it together. I said,
- 12 great. And I said -- he said, it sounds like we're fixing to wrap
- 13 this up. And I said, okay, just jot -- dot your i's and cross
- 14 your t's. Let me know what you have. Anything changes give me a
- 15 | call. I'm headed back to City Hall.
- 16 Q. Okay.
- 17 A. And I left it with him and, like I said, that's kind of where
- 18 things went from there.
- 19 Q. Okay. And so when exactly did the mayor get involved?
- 20 A. This is going to sound great. City of Dallas, we are a city
- 21 manager run government. So the mayor is a figurehead, but he is
- 22 | over the City Council. So just like, well, Saturday is when I
- 23 knew -- let me back up. Friday night I was getting some
- 24 information from his front man. I call him the armor bearer,
- 25 Scott Goldstein. He's the guy that the mayor's coming, and the

- 1 mayor comes in. Going to get fired after -- and he was sending me
- 2 | notes on, hey, what's up, what's the update? What's this and
- 3 | that? And then I want to say it was Saturday morning Scott sent
- 4 something that he had given my information to, I think, it was
- 5 Mohammed, and I guess they heard the NTSB, you all were coming,
- 6 which I had a hunch you all were coming anyway when this thing
- 7 started. It didn't end that one time.
- 8 The next morning I was going, okay -- that's why I got
- 9 dressed and came back in. It's interesting because my daughter
- 10 had flown in for her birthday Sunday, and we had planned all this
- 11 stuff. That was all kind of crapped. But that's how it happens.
- 12 When Ted's on call weird things happen. They're not going to let
- 13 me do this anymore, which has happened, they say that, and they
- 14 still continue. But as you can tell, I have a little problem with
- 15 ADD, focusing on what you asked me.
- 16 Q. The mayor, he --
- 17 A. So Scott Goldstein was how he reached out to me. I never
- 18 talked to the mayor directly. It was through his email to his
- 19 underling to me.
- 20 Q. Okay.
- 21 A. There have been some times where I've talked to him on the
- 22 phone, not with this event. And then our assistant city manager,
- 23 John Fortune, after that he kind of started taking the heat off of
- 24 | me from those higher-ups, and I started communicating everything
- 25 directly to him. And they were pumping us for information because

- 1 | the City Council members in this area, Medrano and Narvaez.
- 2 | Narvaez, I can't say that right. He -- they're, you know, they
- 3 were getting all kind of -- wanting updates. And then they were
- 4 getting reports. It was kind of like playing post office. You
- 5 had people that were coming up with, oh, we had a fire over here,
- 6 | a call over here. None of that was verified, but it was
- 7 everything from Hidalgo, and then even all the way over off of
- 8 | Winnetka and West Dallas. It's in his district. Councilman
- 9 Medrano's district, and Councilman Narvaez district are long and
- 10 slender, and so they run almost from downtown city, all the area
- 11 | all the way up to the northwest side of Love Field. So this is
- 12 his area.
- 13 Q. And that was Friday night they started inquiring about --
- 14 A. Friday night.
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. Yes, sir. Actually, it really started Friday. I quess when
- 17 | the second round of evacuations kind of started when it -- they
- 18 | had it cordoned, and then it, I don't want to say it jumped, but
- 19 really when it changed was when they decided they were going to
- 20 | have to evacuate those apartments on Bolivar, and I think it's
- 21 | called Bolivar Place and Over the Rainbow or something, and that
- 22 was 200 and some units. And we were, like, oh, goodness, here we
- 23 go. And then we get that kind of contained, and the next morning,
- 24 I quess, it jumped to -- and I may have my times off on that, but
- 25 it jumped to the other side of Marsh to the couple of streets that

- 1 | are kind of parallel or linear in line with Espanola and Durango.
- 2 | It's the other side, but it's a little bit south, I think, or
- 3 west, I guess that would be.
- 4 Q. All right. Okay.
- 5 A. Yeah. So mayor is a figurehead, city manager runs it. You
- 6 know, council members, people, press wearing you out. So it was
- 7 just trying to get everything even on our end wrapped up and
- 8 figured out and -- and that's why, you know, I don't want to sound
- 9 like I'm kicking Atmos because I'm going to kick ourselves too as
- 10 far as the fire department, but I knew there was a dark period.
- 11 There literally was a dark period where maybe they thought it was
- down turning. Maybe we all did. I know we did. And then I think
- 13 they got their game legs back up under them, and kind of going
- 14 from there.
- 15 Q. Friday, was it raining then?
- 16 A. It was kind of like it's doing right now, misting and
- 17 | raining. We had rain that came in really hard, I want to say
- 18 around 7:30. That's why I was glad -- we had some cold weather so
- 19 that's why I was glad we had buses out there just because at that
- 20 | time we had people lined up trying to get in.
- 21 There's a lot of frustration over that. People were going to
- 22 | the various, I don't want to say checkpoints, but barricades, and
- 23 then being routed all the way around to that northwest, west
- 24 corner where the command post was so they could feed in from
- 25 there. So, and at that time I was asked, what do we let them do?

- And I said, all I want to do is allow them to get their pets, any necessary medicines, and if there's any -- something of significance. It's not to go get your clothes and cousin's toys and all that. Because I was thinking of the pure volume of how many people that would be.
  - Something else that I had told the Chief Johnson, I said get with our shop, which is where our maintenance facility is, and get their extra Suburbans that we have in reserve. Bring those out there where we can pony people in, not have to -- I even thought about, and I didn't -- I spoke with Mark Combs when I was at the scene saying you think I need to get our all terrain vehicles in here? We have those Gators that can run up and down. Because of the alleys, I didn't know where a people had houses. A lot of these have been cut up and redone. And he said, I don't think we're going to be here that long. I said, okay, because I was already thinking long term streets being closed because the dirt and stuff. We can get over that a lot easier than a Suburban. And I knew there's a lot of elderly that we weren't going to be able just to walk up to their house. So that's kind of the thought process. But I didn't intend on it to be a -- at least in my mind a extended, let me go get my socks and underwear and 15 different garments and --
- Q. Last question for this. Did you -- have you ever seen something similar? Like have you ever seen an incident like this?
- 25 A. Yes, ma'am.

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- 1 Q. Similar to the Friday incident?
- 2 A. Yes, ma'am. I've seen houses pop. I've seen -- I've been on
- 3 deployments up in -- we've had some in Garland. We had some in
- 4 McKinney. I've been on Task Force 1 when we had, heck, Katrina
- 5 and Rita. We had gas lines blowing and stuff everywhere. I --
- 6 yes, ma'am. I've seen stuff like that all over.
- 7 Q. Okay. So it wasn't really a surprise like?
- 8 A. Not to me, no.
- 9 Q. All right.
- 10 A. I mean, when I got there, you know, I'm listening to what's
- 11 going on. When I got there, there was no doubt in my mind that we
- 12 had had a gas explosion.
- 13 Q. Okay.
- 14 A. Just due to the lack of fire damage. There was none. And
- 15 | what I had seen of an implosion/explosion inside. It wasn't
- 16 | imploded. It was pushed out. And just the force of the debris
- 17 and things. It -- no doubt to my mind.
- 18 Q. Okay.
- 19 A. And that's what, like I said, that's one reason I came to the
- 20 scene when I'm -- all the things I was telling you, I had kind of
- 21 | checklist in my head. That morning on Friday I was asking
- 22 dispatch to run me some reports over what was -- been in that area
- 23 related to that. Because when I heard explosion, I was thinking
- 24 was it a fire or what? Then when I start seeing, well, they had a
- 25 | couple other fires.

And so on the fire side, I'm already making mental notes going why wouldn't A plus B equal C, kind of put together in this area. And then do we have several different companies? Which happened. I see who is answering what. Are they not communicating? Are we not getting a picture of that? You start having clusters, just like with fire fatalities, you go, okay, why am I having so many here?

I've seen that -- you know, when I got over to arson we had -- (indiscernible) we had a area northwest of Dallas up off Odelia and all that I noticed we had a lot of geriatric fatalities in probably a 10-block area. And I did some more investigation, chased it down. Well, all those homes were built in the late '70s. A lot of them have aluminum wiring. They had Federal Pacific fuse panels that had been recalled, and most of that area are retired and geriatric, actually widows, and having fires at night and unable to get out. And so we were able to go in the neighborhood, do a home safety and do some checks and things.

So but you look for clusters of why. Things don't just -- you don't have things like this that just happen, and go, oh, God's green earth. That's what happened.

21 Q. Okay.

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- 22 A. There's a reason.
- 23 Q. All right, thank you.
- 24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No questions.
- MR. PADGETT: 20 minutes. I went too far.

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don't have any. 2 Oh, good. Look at that. MR. PADGETT: 3 DR. JENNER: Tell you what. Why don't we take a 5, 10-minute 4 break, and we'll regroup. 5 (Off the record.) 6 (On the record.) 7 DR. JENNER: We're back on the record. BY DR. JENNER: 8 Okay. You've been a group member in the last couple of days 9 10 in several interviews, and you've heard what we've heard, and as 11 much as you're comfortable with, we'd like to go back and get your 12 -- sort of your opinion and your impression of the two other 13 incidents that are sort of related to this. And there's one that 14 occurred on February 21st and one on February 22nd. So I'll just 15 throw it over to you. 16 Okay. 17 About the February 21st incident, and based on what you've 18 learned, and what's your take away from all that? 19 Well, as chief of staff, my job again is to always look for 2.0 needs and improvements and things that maybe we need to shore up 21 on our end as far as fire and rescue. So I'll start with that. 22 Based on what I saw -- can we hang on one second? Take this from 23 Chief --

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(Off the record.)

(On the record.)

1 MR. PADGETT: All right, so we're back.

DR. JENNER: We're back.

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MR. PADGETT: We're fixing to get jukebox (indiscernible) out of the way, so you can't go wrong, play your song here on WTOP.

Dallas area weather today partly cloudy 20 percent chance of rain.

Overnight low 43, high today 65 and damp.

Back to -- the ADD issue, squirrel. So what I have seen related to the fire department, as I stated earlier, I asked our dispatch, our communications to go back and pull runs that are kicked out by our computer assisted dispatch, CAD. To go back and research CAD, and find me codes that we roll on that are gas leaks, gas in the area, investigations, fires in this parameter. And off the top of my head, I want to say -- I've got some PDS of that now, but I want to say there's been -- and I had them run that back to Friday, I believe, the 16th, if that's right. And so essentially I went back a week, and I want to say I had 12 hits, 11 or 12. I say that. I'd have to count but on the top of my head. And they ranged everything from a gas smell to some fires to the three in particular that you're asking me about.

BY DR. JENNER:

- Q. And I'm sorry. Just what time period did you go --
- 22 A. I went back to -- I asked them to roll back to Friday, I
- 23 believe, it was February 16th. I think that's the exact week from
- 24 Friday, wasn't it? Yeah. Friday was the 23rd. So, yeah. And
- 25 CAD came back with -- this area that we had highlighted came back

with -- and, again, this is off the top of my head, 11 or 12 incidents, including the 2 that you had -- that actually were on Durango behind the house on Friday.

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So I'm thinking, what would I do? And so when you ask me, I'm being introspective here. Number one, I need to reprioritize the fact that hazmat rolls on unknowns and gas leaks of any consequence. They can always be turned around by the companies, if you know Atmos is there, and I hate to say it, if it's a meter in the back alley or something that — not that that's insignificant, but that can be handled better than a full-scale. Atmos knows what they're doing. And I think some of our troops have just assumed — you know, so we have protocols for that.

I made a note to actually make sure that we get that pounded home. Because something I may not have said on the record, but City of Dallas, we lose around 80, 85 firefighters a year. We have close to 2,000. I think our authorized strength is 2163 to be exact. But this past year we've lost a little over 260 in the last calendar year, and our -- excuse me -- fiscal year. Our calendar year, as of January, we're already 65 in the hole, and it's typically because of some changes on the pension and an older fire crew.

So we've had a number of promotions lately. So as you all have maybe seen, we have a lot of new captains, new deputies, new chiefs, a lot of youngers that are coming up, and the olders are

kind of rotating out. Firefighting is not a young man or a young woman's job for sure. So if you're out there on the rig and climbing ladders and stuff it's difficult. So I don't know.

We've been doing a lot of officer in-service training. So this is something that needs to come up on things that are outside of normal fire calls and EMS calls. I'm very confident they can handle that, but hazmat and USAR and swift water and things are -- and this just as a teaching point that hazmat -- whether they'd have made a difference or not, I don't know, but on the initial call that I was aware of Friday, I think they should have been there and not turned back.

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Now the second part is, I'm a little -- and I'll be honest, I'm a little disappointed and irritated that the arson investigators, their job is to determine origin and cause, and they utilized a legalese, if you will, to say undetermined on a couple fires that happened on Durango, which is proper, but in my opinion they're paid to make decisions and they have the knowledge to make decisions. And it seemed that they did everything but say it was this or that. And, again, I can't get in their head and say that, but based on the interviews and what I've heard and what I have read, there's no doubt in my mind that we had an issue with gas. And, therefore, it should have -- the pieces should have been put together potentially sooner.

And I will even say that based on -- and I can't tell you who I had the conversation with, but we had -- Atmos has had crews out

here, whether they were replacing some lines or whatnot, at least that I know of Sunday or Monday prior to the fire. So that would have been around the 17th, maybe 18th. Because I thought it was odd that, well, it's a city holiday -- Presidents Day, I think, was the 18th -- and they had crews that were out in this area.

So a good arson investigator will do a canvass of the neighborhood. What's going on? Here's kind of the stuff. And I think they thought it was a routine fire. It wasn't. We had a back end burned out. We have a lot of fires every day. I mean, I say a lot literally, and a lot of them are single-frame residence like this, and you're kind of in and out. And I think they got -- in my opinion, they got complacent, maybe not individually, but as collectively as a whole, that they didn't share the information.

I know I heard one of the arson investigators, Captain
Westbrook, say -- I heard the Friday thing comment. I thought,
oh, yeah, I've had a fire over there, and I told such and such.
Well, especially not that they're short staffed, and they got
younger crews there, I would think they would be communicating
even more because a lot of them are doing double shifts and
things, and they should be able to put those pieces together.
Maybe I'm wrong on that, but I know historically the arson
investigators, every day they get up and they pull the evening
runs that they were not dispatched on, maybe car fires because we
have a lot of insurance claims. A lot of people dump cars here
and burn. So we're always having cases that we're working because

the insurance agencies and all.

2.0

And lot of counties around this don't investigate car fires. People don't know that. But they come to Dallas and all of a sudden because we have the paying entities that are in the city of Dallas, it becomes our case. And so we have a lot of cases, arson cases working. Very proud of their clearance rate. But in this case, I guess since it wasn't arson, it was kind of -- you know, maybe that's not important. I don't know. I do know that needs to be drilled home: I need more communication sharing and information sharing between the respective arson investigators.

I will tell you that Chief Coatney and, I since this has occurred, have had personal discussions of putting firefighters paired with arson investigators in the thought process to make them arson investigators, just to give more tools to the existing young people we have over there. Because firefighters are well versed in building construction. They're well versed in — typically have a working knowledge, let me put it that way, of electrical, gas, things of that nature. Whereas, I didn't feel like I heard that from the arson investigators that we heard from. They may know that. I didn't feel like that was expressed. I felt like you got more detail from the officers that are in the field than you did from those that really should have more details, with the exception of a few.

I thought Rene Molina was very good at what he did. His job was interviewing and getting questions. I thought he asked

pertinent questions and pointed questions, and had good answers for that, but that was the extent. It was like the military.

This is my lane, I'm not getting out either side. This is what I was tasked to do, I did it. And he's very good at that. At his current rank, he's not allowed to be the lead investigator. Rank sometime -- I don't know, anyway.

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So that needs to be looked at, the dynamics of that, and how we do things. And even our promotional of their career path as inspectors, code enforcement officers, fire marshals and then into arson. I'm not sure that's the best path to go. A lot of cities do that. Apparently Dallas has done it for years. I just feel like as a firefighter, I know when I got over there as an arson investigator, I was, you know, the first non-fire code guy that came over there I had to learn all this. But lot of stuff that it took them a long time to learn was just natural for a firefighter. I mean, you see and process things without even realizing you're doing it. So that was the second thing that I noticed.

I also wanted to, since we have new chiefs -- I know I made some notes. I wanted to have a chiefs training. They already have task books for those that are coming up. And I wanted -- I don't know, little more maybe ownership of incidents and following up instead of just coming back. And I don't know if they do this, but kind of, you know, putting your feet up, and waiting on the next call. Because in the fire service, we don't have the luxury of making excuses or mistakes, quite frankly. And whether -- I

don't want to say mistakes, but some things were -- or some oversight that didn't get done or some follow-ups that I think in the best case would have occurred on the fire side.

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Because I made some notes about how they make decisions.

Some things are planned, and other things are automatic. I want them to be automatic where they're trained on things. You've heard that from some of the officers we had, some of the others, maybe not. Just the who, what, why, I thought that should have been done under arson investigators.

I had a note here about leadership. Everybody's got a bad day, but I wrote fix the problem. Don't become complacent and quit or just that's not mine; I'll go home today, punch a clock. It's fix it. I want everybody to take on that role. So lot of it has to do with leadership. I won't get into all that.

Has to do with expectations. I wrote a note here that I have expectations from whether it's the person you're riding with in the rig as an officer, what they have for you, the person in the jump seat next to you, from your driver, your assistant on the fire scene, from that officer, even what that officer expects from his crew, and what we as command expect from our subordinates to come from us. There's no gray line in our job, and I wrote that in here. We have protocols, MOPs and SOPs for a reason. They're not there just when we get in trouble to go look, but it needs to be studied. And so that's something — that's part of what I said about acting versus reacting, planned and automatic. That needs

to be second family.

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It's important as a leader, I said I want -- some of these that I saw did not have -- and maybe I don't have that, did not have a command presence. I had notes that I wrote that it's -- as a leader you always look to have that command presence. And I feel like when everything, as I stated, is kind of going to pot, it's my job to be the steady rock, and kind of -- and I've been blessed. God's blessed me when things are flying, everything kind of slows down for me, and I -- just tells you how old I am, I go to a Rolodex in my head, you know, kind of seen that, done that. Here, it's going here. Or never seen that, let me write that down. But it's all about being easy going, remaining positive, confident, in control at all times.

Some of our arson personnel came across with that persona, but I think that was a guise because I don't think there's a lot of depth there. Even what's their confidence level, and what -- and their comfort level at what they do? I had a note there. How -- that's something else. Our arson people, I want them to get their curriculum vitae, however you say that, get that listed. Because some of them came in here, and they said I did this or this. I think it's important for them to be able to punch to their training records or whatever it is.

There's a lot of stuff I'll provide for you all for the people that have asked, hazmat and things like that. But that ought to be something, because maybe they have never testified in

court, but I have for a number of things, and that's something they're going to dig into, and it's important to get it out there and then make yourself a -- hate that word -- subject matter expert, but you can at least be confident in what you're doing, and know that you've done it right.

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They should also know -- going back to arson. I was amazed that none of them told about the scientific method and how they -- I heard them talk about we go from least burned to most burned. And maybe they knew that, but I think it was imperative for them to delineate the steps on how they do investigations, and had they had followed that, in my opinion, they would have come to these conclusions that I think were glaringly obvious, at least in my mind. So maybe they need to brush up on their deal.

A whole list of notes here. I'm sorry. Everybody is accountable for the action of their subordinates, and this includes everything starts and ends with you. It's just like I've told our officers, I can only control what I can control. But as I alluded to earlier, I trust everybody. There are some people that have taken so many withdrawals that I have to verify everything they say. And I alluded to that earlier, I feel the same way with a lot of contractors and vendors and/or in this case Atmos. I trust what they say, but I want to verify just because I'm making decisions not just for Ted, but for basically 2100 firefighters in the city in that particular case.

We have a breakdown on communications. We have a lot of

things going in different areas, and not really explaining why or what on both sides, but with our fire operations personnel and our arson personnel, and even command staff. It just goes back to the three C's, and I jotted them here, clear, concise and confirmed. I always want to make sure that they heard that because they -- kind of like this center here on Grundy, I had OEM, Kevin Oden, which I know is a great guy, said, yeah, I got it. Okay. I didn't worry about that because Kevin's always been Johnny on the spot.

2.0

But then when I -- Lauren and I were here sitting there doing twiddle thumbs, I called Ms. Ross, who is department representative. She works downtown. I said -- she goes, well, our people don't show up until 9. I said, well, didn't Kevin call you? Yeah, but he never really gave me a time; I didn't know. So, again, got to confirm that, all right, you told me you got -- I have people here at such and such time. Just like yesterday. And obviously they moved us from here to there. That happened just by somebody here, but I was told B. I didn't know they had the Roxy jumpers or whatever doing their EMS or flip-flopping.

So SOPs, making sure everything is standardized. I wrote in here is it lack of experience or training? If it's training, that's my obligation. If it's -- if they're on the job, it's their obligation. But I offered it to them because fire and death and all that, that's not stupid; firefighters are, but we can learn.

Some of the signs, I don't know if -- just one thing I think in the history of this department that has changed, but when I came on, rookies and nozzle men/women, were to be on the line and not to speak about anything they saw or whatever. You pass that through your chain of command. You don't even talk unless I talk to you. That's old school. And all the companies I have throughout -- we have a rank structure for a reason. Take the hits, but they also get the glory when it's something they've done right. But everybody that worked for me knew they can speak freely, and I don't take offense to that. I learn just as well as anybody, but I expect them -- because that's the only way they're going to learn, and lot of times they'll see things that maybe I don't see as an incident commander.

2.0

I heard Horacio Garcia here saying, did you see Atmos running around in the back? Well, all he knew was the guy came back and said the gas was off. Well, I also knew that Mark Combs, that's the first thing the truck company captain does. He went -- when he thought he had gas, he cut the gas off himself. That's why the Atmos guy didn't take too long. He went around, probably verified, yeah, it's off, did his thing, came around. But Horacio, like he said, I got a lot of other things going on. Well, in this particular case he had already -- I got ambulances. I got this and that. What else was there, other than following some steps and clearing up and getting back? So I want to make sure that everybody is on the page with what their

responsibilities are for the various rank structures. Because the buck does stop with them. And we have people, public, industry, whoever, looking at us, and even your own personnel that are going, okay, I want to be like that, I don't want to be like that.

2.0

And so I think we should have picked up on the gas odor calls in the neighborhood, number of calls just from these stations that answered. They work with each other so much, I think there should have been something like that.

The utility notifications on the fire alarms, we call them boxes, that has been being made. Maybe that needs to be an automatic, and then we can turn them back around. Because I know in this case Atmos or even Encore they don't run Code 3. So lot of times we're still fighting fire with lines arcing and gas going, things. And that's one reason we do carry gas tools. That's a little easier to take care of. We can find a meter at industrial park or whatever. We're shutting off everything we have.

Gas meters, we at one time had them on all our chiefs cars.

We still now do. I didn't hear a battalion chief, one, say that
they utilized -- they have 4-gas meters on there specifically for
incidents like this, and/or overhaul where they can come in and -you know, we put in specially gas meters for carbon monoxide.

Obviously that's standard on 4-gas, but also for hydrogen cyanide
for after overhaul activities, just because of the influx of
cancer and other problems. I didn't hear any of them say that.

At one time we pulled them off all the rigs. We had them on engines and stuff. They were never being used. We had people that were pulling 4-gas meters thinking it was a methane detector. And we had -- hazmat has the PIDs because methane is up on that higher scale on the ionization potential. So they have the special bulbs. I think it's an 11-7. Most of them run with a 10-3 or something, and that can see pretty much everything except those higher ends. But none of that was utilized. I didn't hear that.

2.0

They may have carbon monoxide detectors, and I have seen even when I've ridden out in the field just to stay up, crews pull things off, and I go, why are you taking that in? Oh, yeah, we got a gas leak. You taking carbon monoxide in because you think maybe we got carbon monoxide buildup? And then they'll realize, yeah, that's why I'm doing it. And that's fine. Because carbon monoxide lot of times when gas is out -- it's kind of like I was concerned, I still am, what's going on in the neighborhood is the minute we let them back in their house, if they don't have gas and it's going to be cold tonight, they're going to cook one way or the other. And I've seen everything from charcoal in the house to bringing in their turkey fryer or whatever and using propane tanks, and carbon monoxide goes out the door. And we've had issues with that.

Matter of fact, one of those calls that has happened recently was a carbon monoxide off of one of the streets north of here.

And I think it might have been because they turned something off, and I don't know, I didn't follow up on that in particular. I just noticed that the other day.

2.0

All right. I think there should have been a better sketch of the home and layout, and I'm hoping that when I get the arson reports that they will have better layouts on the individual structures. One of the structures, the one on Friday, I understand, because it was compromised that they weren't comfortable going in. Again, that goes back to understanding building construction. But the other two, in my opinion, there wasn't an excuse.

I am dismayed that -- a heater doesn't just miracle itself out of the world. I've heard that come up. No one knows where that is. If the individual didn't have fragmentation on him, a heater didn't just dissolve itself. I mean, if it's a typical, and making assumption, space heater that was in the wall, gas fed from the '50s and '60s like they were, I should see some ceramic debris. I should see some, you know, some of the braiding that's in there. I should see some of -- even the vermiculite blocks that are in there to keep the -- I should see that somewhere. A good arson investigator should have chased that down.

I heard them describe the bathroom and this, that and the other, but I don't know where it is. And they said everything is up on the roof. You get a ladder set off a truck. Even if you're using a arrow you don't have to get in the structure. Get up

there and get a picture. But, again, this was a, quote/unquote, routine fire. So that's something.

2.0

I want every one of our arson investigators, I want the ignition source determined. And the way to do that -- I didn't hear any of them say I ruled out all the possible -- when you have an undetermined, that also means you've ruled out every other possible alternative or -- I get our protocol here is if you have a fatality they'll leave it undetermined just by the chance -- in this case, I think it was very obvious. They said the person had no obvious external injuries, little cuts and scrapes, but the young lady on Friday died from the concussion wave of a blast. It just tore up her insides. And she was a little petite thing, so that was reasonable. And I heard -- I didn't know that, but the protection, the fact there was no wall there from where the, I assume, water heater was, et cetera. I don't know.

So I also heard, and I wrote this quote down from one of our arson investigators that they said this was the third incident in that area so I paid more attention. I wrote that down as a quote. That's concerning to me because you should be paying more attention to everything if that's the case. I need -- we're going to get that. Talked about the layouts, photos, interior sketches, just case files, you know, just origin and cause. I hate to keep pounding on that, but --

Understanding fire dynamics from arson investigators, even firefighters on what flames mean. I heard no opinion a lot of

times. Okay. They're asking you for your opinion, you have an opinion, good, bad, indifferent. That's how we learn. And I heard an arson investigator say that they couldn't take pictures or they did take pictures, I heard both, because the ground was all snowed up. Meaning, we had foam on-site. That foam dissipates after a while. That's their job as an arson investigator to maintain the scene until you get what you need, and then you can release it.

2.0

Oh, just food for thought. For our department, we had a breach in our battalion chief's MDCs. You kind of heard that. So we had a period where, like Scott Clumpner, they were going into this fire blind, didn't have all the data lot of times they have. We had just had that on Wednesday. So we had a malware that got into some of the battalion chiefs here on their mobile computers just because they used a generic password. They got hacked. And that was a case in point that firefighters will run through that wall for you, but they're not the smartest knives in the drawer. It' just easy to just -- "Station 35" or "password" or whatever it is, you know, a third grader could hack into this stuff.

So we've -- just a note for us. We've gotten with our communication information services and made sure that that's been shored up. Changed passwords and things, and given new edicts on that. But I heard that kind of come into play with Scott. It didn't impact his decision making, but he was not able to see normally what he would see, comments or maybe some old calls.

There's a lot of information that gets pushed out to them on the mobile data terminals, and that's on all of our rigs.

2.0

I was very pleased with the fire officers that you did interview. I thought they were -- I won't say rock stars, but I thought they explained everything that they did very well. It was a logical progression, systematic with what they were doing. A lot of them told you I've never seen this before, that's to be explained, but I thought even based on those circumstances did very well. And to a T most of them said I'm relying on Atmos because they're the subject matter experts. We encourage that. If there's something that you're not sure about or you don't have personal knowledge of, you still put that in the back of your head, but you follow what's here. They did that to a point all the way through.

I think we've learned here that it's not over till it's over. I realized how many other city entities have been involved.

There's been parks, DART, PIOs, streets. Even to the point where, I guess, it was Saturday when I got called, and heard people were going back in their house unescorted, and that was one thing I remember telling Captain Combs is that I wanted some of those street barricades there. And we had police there. That that house wasn't to be entered, just because of the structural integrity. And the I hear -- it's kind of like when people think we're leaving, street comes picks up their barricades. I need this back on the shelf, and this looks good here, so let's go.

And so maybe it's good to communicate to whoever they may be that you don't pull anything off until the fire department comes to you and says we're out of here 100 percent. That's some more communications. Okay. So that's fire department. That's a lot.

2.0

On the other side, I felt as I alluded to earlier, and I'm not trying to kick anybody. I'm just being honest here, because I've poked our own self in the eye. I felt like as I've stated it took Atmos a while to get on top of this. I understand the contacts I had, they weren't meant to be the down and dirty on the scene, but the people that our troops spoke with on the scene, a lot of them were contractors and didn't really have -- you know, who am I reporting to? They probably know where to get their paycheck from, but they don't know who is the Grand Puba. And so it may have been that that dark period was just them trying to get up. But I need to reiterate I need somebody that's at my hip to be able to answer questions whether from myself or underlings.

I thought that Atmos is doing outstanding now. I felt that they had dropped the ball probably just due to fatigue and the lack of personnel with the public relations aspect coming out of the gate. The fact that we had this center open here, and it — they kind of just handed it to Red Cross and walked away as far as the PR part. Now I know the troops are out there working, but we had a public that had all kind of questions and answers they wanted. I didn't have those to give them. The City Manager didn't have those to give them because I wasn't given anything,

and I wasn't getting anything from Atmos. And I didn't want to burn Atmos in the press, and say we're not getting anything from them. And I'm telling you all that in here because these have been very good partners at least in my tenure. So we all have bad days, and like I said, I felt like it was just a while for them to get up to speed on what's going on.

2.0

I'm not sure that I was given the whole truth from the start. That bothers me because I think it was much bigger or they had an assumption it was much bigger because of the amount of work I saw going on prior to the event being — the event I call as Friday. They didn't just dig those holes an hour before I got there. There was a lot of work going on in a big area prior to Friday. So whether that was planned pipeline change-outs, I don't know. I just think it's awful convenient. Let's put it that way.

I admire Atmos because this is poking them in the eye really for taking care of these people, putting them in hotels. It probably -- some of them have never been in before. It's probably nicer digs than they've ever had. But they're doing everything they can to take care of them, and so I applaud them for that.

They've been very forthright with information since. And that's being filtered in different ways. It's still, like anything of this magnitude, which just started as a little mole hill and now it's big, there's all kind of things to fix on the communications side. Getting ahead of it, as I stated, I've learned that over the years. Just getting the press and the PR

groups together, and then getting them on your side to pump out information is a lot better than invoking what sells. And I said earlier, if you have a picture of a dog and the Pope and something about a fire, that's going to be the evening news. And around here, especially when people -- English is not their first language, and I'm using that just kind of generically -- that's troublesome. Because now it's just what I know is word of mouth, and what you're telling me, by the time it gets around there is something worse.

2.0

So I think we were very lucky both -- everyone involved that we had one fatality, and luckily not any super serious injuries. I mean, we had people injured, we had people burned, but the fact that we lost a life, little bit here or there that may not have occurred, that's going to bother me just because I'm wondering what on the fire department's side could we have done to prevent that.

Other entities. I think the police department has been very responsive, as they always are. That's one thing here in Dallas I'm proud of. Police and fire work together real well. DART, Parks Department, the city managers up top, they all have different specialties. Our city manager that we deal with -- assistant city manager, he deals with police, fire, the criminal court system and the Office of Emergency Management. So we had a handle on knowing who we are. It's always good to put faces with names. And I think this is an experience that you've heard it

works.

2.0

Kind of like Captain Baker said, something I've always believed in, that's why I've told them kind of go forth and prosper, you build those relations before things happen. That way you know when you're hearing something from someone that you know you don't have to sit there and go what's this guy all about or what's this girl all about or what's their angle? You just take what they're saying and go. And like I said, if something comes out of that where it's different, that's when I go back to that I got to verify. And that's why, and this is not reflective of the current management of Atmos, but even back Lone Star days, Lone Star Gas days, we -- I used to have guys that would come out and just jump down in there with their blue jeans and Wrangler boots and work on a line. I'm getting readings that are just astronomical, we're all in bunker gear.

And then years ago, we had a explosion on Eads and Eight
Street over in south Dallas, and burned one of the Atmos guys. I
guess actually it was Lone Star then, I think. Burned him up
pretty good. Actually, I think, he ended up dying. And from then
on they're always wearing Nomex and all their protective gear. So
it takes something to change, but people, kind of like little
kids, they just kind of keep -- okay, I don't need this, I don't
need this.

So what can we fix? Lots of things. Fire department has got a lot of shoring up to do; MOPs, training records. I'm very proud

- 1 of the fact that we do have a lot of toys and a lot of things to
- 2 | bring to the party. I feel like some of those were not utilized
- 3 here in a timely fashion. But overall I'm happy with what we did.
- 4 We can always improve, everybody. And that comes through
- 5 | communication and making sure that we know what the focus is. I
- 6 think that's about it.
- 7 Q. Great. Really appreciate that.
- 8 A. That was a lot.
- 9 Q. Right. I just want to hit on just a couple things that you
- 10 didn't mention. And we, of course, we've only interviewed on the
- 11 fire and rescue side. We haven't interviewed any on the gas
- 12 | company side. But from what you've heard so far in the interviews
- 13 and in other venues, how was the -- at least for the first two
- 14 incidents, how do you rate the communication between the gas
- 15 | company and the fire department and arson?
- 16 A. I don't have personal knowledge of that. So, again, I'm
- 17 going to make an assumption, and you know how that works. But it
- 18 sounded like it was routine typically like we have. Now I don't
- 19 | want to put words in anyone's mouth, but in my mind, and you're
- 20 asking me my opinion, I think there were some balls dropped on
- 21 both sides. I think there was communication from the parties that
- 22 | were there, maybe the worker bees together, but nobody kind of --
- 23 I'm sure -- well, I know for a fact on our side a lot of the same
- 24 and then different and nobody really put pieces together. The one
- 25 thing that was constant was Atmos is a company, fire department is

a company, we were both there. Now why pieces weren't put together, I don't know.

2.0

But communication, that's always a problem. So can I say that was great? No. Obviously, in retrospect things could maybe be followed up a little better. It looks like we had this. Was it on the homeowner's end or was it something you're doing? Maybe if there -- and I'm not saying there was -- if there was some knowledge beforehand by in this case Atmos that there's something else that was a little hinky, that should have been shared with at least the higher-ups.

Kind of like I'll use this analogy. When the police department when their drug crews are doing a raid, they will reach out to a commander in the fire service, keep tight lip -- you just don't want it to get out, and we'll stand by it. So if it's something like that, hey, if you got something going, you can tell us on the down-low. We don't need to put it out in the wind for the public. But some of the higher-ups may need to know that we may have something here, and we could have maybe figured out a way to work that a little better, hand-in-hand. I'm not saying that's the case here, but in retrospect I think we could have some pieces put together on both sides.

- Q. Okay. With the advantage of retrospect and hindsight, are you convinced or your opinion that each of the first two incidents was gas related?
- 25 A. There's no doubt in my mind, no. Based on what I heard it's

a common denominator. And just the proximity. Like I said, I haven't reviewed all of the 11 or 12 of the calls that were just for that week. That's a pretty good indicator that there's something that's out of whack. Because unless there's a -- just like last night, a contractor that's maybe putting in some fiberoptic or something and the line gets hit. You know, the one last night was a 6-inch line. That's a good size line. There's a lot of pressure on that. That happens a lot all over the city with the growth. And we have people that are contracted to put in -- heck, we've had city workers to hit lines that have been there. Or maybe some old plats will show this, and actually the line is over here.

2.0

That's one thing I've learned in my years here in Texas is it's not like where I grew up. This clay soil down here, it goes up and down, expands and contracts, and you can bury something 4, 5 feet down, and the next week it's up at the top. It blows my mind how that happens. So that may have just been the case here with all the rain and cold. And then we went from 20 degrees one day literally to the next day it was 78. That's a lot of up and down. So that's to be expected.

And that's why in my opinion polyethylene and the modern piping systems are much better than the old ductile iron and cast pipe and all the other things they just shoved in there just to figure it out. So and that's the problem. This neighborhood is old.

Q. Okay. And again with the advantage of hindsight just after the first incident, if things went perfectly the way you would have wanted them to go, was there enough information there to be concerned and sort of put out a communication with the gas company

that you have something significant here?

2.0

A. I don't think so. And I say that because of this. Because we have incidents involving a flash or a fire in a house that occurs for who knows what reasons, and it is not by fault of any provider. Maybe user error. Maybe I thought I had the pilot light on or a fan blew the pilot out or something. Who knows. Or I thought I had clicked it, and the igniter didn't come on. I answered a phone call, and then we had some pop.

So one -- but then when you say that to me you've got to look at the totality of everything that was around in that area. So if I'm an officer on the rig, and I'm on my p's and q's, which again one time to me is not out of the ordinary. So my ears really don't perk up on that. Had it been a fatality, yes, you start digging. Fatalities we -- or significant serious injury, which I'm not downplaying a second degree burn, but the -- when you say explosion and a roof is gone and things, that doesn't make sense. So you go, okay, what's the common denominator?

So I would have been well served, I think, from our officers to kind of -- they know that district. What's different today that wasn't the other week? Oh, I see. Looks like the -- holes where they're digging out in the desert or whatever for gold or

- something, there's a lot of holes there, there's a reason. Do we think there's a leak? That I would have either pushed -- if I was in the field I'd have pushed to my command or I would have made calls myself just to try to find out. But, no, I wouldn't have, based on the first one.
  - The second one was just two houses down. Now my ears have perked up. Even after the fact with a fire, and I look and two houses down I see, oh, B shift was there. Even if I'm on another shift, that doesn't happen unless we have an arsonist around, and that has happened. You have things, those Molotov cocktails, whatever, they set things, and it goes up. But typically it's in it's a reason. You see it during tax time. Okay. We're not quite there. End of the year, holidays. You see vengeful, spiteful fire. There's all kind of reasons, but there's got to be something there that precipitates that.
  - And in this case I'm here in this house, and I look just two houses down we got a problem. Then I see in the alley there's some digging going on. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to go something's up. So it's a lot different from having an electrical range than it is to have a gas stove. That's the best to cook on, by the way. So --
- Q. Okay. So let's say, again, if things went perfectly the way you would have liked them, after the second incident, you --
- 24 A. The second incident.

2.0

25 Q. Yes. And so now you have the second and the first.

A. Okay.

1

- Q. What actions would you have taken from that point on?
- 3 A. Personally, if things went well, the second one, like I
- 4 stated just a minute ago, having seen a house two doors down,
- 5 literally two doors down, that had a fire that had an injury that
- 6 was transported, and then having an explosion, injury at this
- 7 house, and then hearing the statements from what the arson
- 8 investigators got or even the guys that were putting him in the
- 9 ambulance, you know, this thing rolled over, flashed over, this
- 10 one blew up, whatever, yeah, your head should have been on swivel.
- 11 And that should have then caused somebody to reach out, whether it
- 12 was up the chain, even to my level or at least to the deputy's
- 13 level or at least to the battalion chief's level to say chase down
- 14 what's going on.
- 15 And so, yeah, if all things worked perfectly, I would have
- 16 had arson investigators that would have done a ringdown. I would
- 17 have had a redundancy where the troops in the field had
- 18 communicated, and then put that together to realize there's
- 19 something a little bit different here. And since that was 2 days
- 20 | before the fatality, who knows. But in my mind, you put those two
- 21 pieces together, maybe we can -- just like we've done now, shut
- 22 | the gas off, make an evacuation, figure out what's quite there,
- 23 get some readings, what's going on. It's not a normal -- that is
- 24 not normal.
- 25 Q. Right.

- 1 A. In a city this large to have fires that are similar in what
- 2 | caused them, and, again, cause and origin, had that been
- 3 communicated, bam bam. So --
- 4 Q. Right. Because we have incidents 21st, 22nd --
- 5 A. Yes, sir.
- 6 Q. -- 23rd.
- 7 A. Third, all --
- 8 Q. So this was the day before the big one. So --
- 9 A. Actually it was --
- 10 O. All that --
- 11 A. Actually it was -- yes. Yes, sir. You're right.
- 12 Q. Could all of that what you've just described been done on the
- 13 22nd and elevated up the chain? I'm just trying to get a reading
- 14 what's your perspective.
- 15 A. Yes, sir. I think that could have -- it would have caused
- 16 some, I want to say at least some exploratory discussions on
- 17 | what's going on. And I think it would have been pertinent, not
- 18 only for the neighborhood, but even for the fire crews to know
- 19 this is an anomaly.
- Now is that on any one individual? No. It's a totality of
- 21 things that were just -- it's kind of like I hate to use that
- 22 adage the old Swiss cheese, when you got all the holes, until
- 23 everything lines up and somebody gets bit, it's not a problem.
- 24 But in this case, weather, issues, it just all lined up, and none
- 25 of that was seen until after the fact.

Now we're on top of it. And, unfortunately, that's life. I wish it would have been caught sooner though at least in communications, some talks.

2.0

And really, again, another bad thing is this is a weekend.

Most people, City Hall, 4:00, they're gone. I was down there late because things were still going on. It's hard. And, I mean, in this case Atmos that's a business. They probably already got their marching orders, here's what we're doing. It's hard to get people that can pull strings, because what we have seen on scenes you'll get people, and they're not the supervisor that can authorize whatever it is. We're talking about money. That's what -- that's why people are in business. I get that. I'm not saying that was the driving factor, but weekends it's hard to get things done on a weekend.

Q. Going to change directions just a bit, and we heard three unusual observations. And if I can get your comment on or your expertise. One was the red flame where there should have been a blue. One was this flash fire when the person was cooking that was unexpected. And the third was sort of a fire under the floorboard. And could you just talk about those?

A. Yeah. Okay. So red flame. Anybody that's had fire school or even hazmat you know the different color flames, which what are the heats, what's caused it. But in this case when you're dealing with something, especially all of them the common denominator dealing with a stove and burning or a space heater, when you have

a red flame or a orange flame even, that's incomplete combustion.

It tells you you've got an issue there either with gas flow or

you've got some type of oxygenation that's been, I guess, put in

there in pressure, and you're not getting a true flow of gas,

natural gas. When the gas is pure, you'll have a nice pretty blue

flame with a nice white tip and kind of a black circle, if you

will, at the top of the flame. That's a good hot flame. That's

8 the way gas should burn.

The individual said he saw a red flame, and then it just flashed over him. That tells me that he had probably a high level of gas per volume in his house or area, confined space, and that it was too rich at one time to flash. I think he had actually, as we would say in the industry, finally sucked air and got what it needed to do the fa-voomp, and then all the fuel is gone. So now it's just building up again waiting to get another breath of whatever is out there. So you go from that flammable range down to where it's too lean, too rich. I think it was too rich. It got back in that flammable range, and it lit off.

19 Q. Okay.

2.0

A. On the fire underneath the pier and beam, I think that should have been, and I think that was alluded to, that's a very -that's different. You don't see that unless you've got some type of hydrocarbon or flammable liquid. Typically hydrocarbons that you have poured -- because the specific gravity of hydrocarbon is obviously when the water and all that's going to float on the

liquid. So here in Texas it's dirt. You're going to have mud and water under there. It's going to typically pool to the top. It could have been that burning off. Could have been a hydrocarbon.

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But in this particular case, one thing I heard on that house was they saw the gas feeder line to the residence that had been displaced. And I think the flame that they may have been seeing once that initial kaboom went, it disjointed that, and I think they had that void that had filled up maybe with gas again because it was free flowing, I'm assuming. And the fact that the officer said they got a call for a fire, and they saw a little smoke, and then nothing. All of a sudden they had 40-foot flames or 20-foot flames, whatever he said. That's unusual to go from zero to 100. And then to see fire under the floorboard, that tells me something Is either -- because then he said it went is feeding it there. They put water on it, boom. And as we know, if it's free flowing that's why it was important to get the gas cut off. It's probably just building up in that void, and it's just looking for an ignition source.

So could that have happened before? Sure. I don't know.

Maybe they had -- maybe something had gotten disjointed before for whatever reason. Especially in those areas, older homes, that's just a void waiting to be filled with gas. It's trying to get up.

It's lighter than air. It's trying to get up and get out of there, but it's confined by whatever box it's in.

DR. JENNER: Okay. Appreciate that, and I'm going to pass it

around.

- 2 MR. PADGETT: I went more than 20 minutes.
- MS. GUNARATNAM: This is Rachael. I did have a question. I qot sidetracked.
- 5 BY MS. GUNARATNAM:
- Q. Oh. In many of the interviews that we heard, we heard people did not smell gas. Do you think that was influenced by the
- 8 weather?
- 9 A. I think it was, but that's also -- that's puzzling to me. I
- 10 mean, there's a couple of things out of this that are puzzling to
- 11 me. One, where's the heater? Two -- it was kind of like Wendy's.
- 12 Where's the beef? Two, why was there no mercaptan smell? And I
- 13 know there's a small percentage of the public that cannot smell
- 14 that. That's why you do the banana oil test and different things.
- 15 But that's a classic. I mean, the whole reason that we have those
- odors put in there is because of the fire that occurred at the
- 17 | elementary school here in Texas. And back then they didn't put
- 18 odor in it, and nobody knew it was in the void. So we -- a
- 19 history lesson just here in Texas.
- 20 But that should have -- I think that should have been
- 21 | something. And only thing I can put that to is (a) when it rains
- 22 here not only could that knock down the vapors, but it also
- 23 compacts the sand that gas lines are typically running in, which
- 24 is kind of like that's the whole reason we have all these oil
- 25 companies coming back and fracking those old oil holes because

- they're busting up that sandstone and all to get the gas out. So the fact that it's capped at one time, that doesn't mean it's not
- 3 there. You can pop it up again, it comes out.
- 4 So we start having -- it's wet again today. We get a heavy
- 5 | rain tonight or maybe tomorrow, and then we have 80 degrees come
- 6 Sunday, we may have a lot smelling. So I truly think because of
- 7 the rain we had, and the fact that it was either suppressing those
- 8 fumes or knocking them down. Because there is no way under God's
- 9 green earth that transmission lines from any company, in this case
- 10 Atmos, would be flowing through there without the odor in it. I
- 11 mean, I can see that on the front end before it gets to the
- 12 distribution hubs, but once that's added, that's not normal. So
- 13 that's the only thing I can equate that to is the weather.
- 14 Q. Right.
- 15 A. And the rainy time frame.
- 16 Q. Okay. And you said you gathered odor calls since February
- 17 | 16th. What was the area?
- 18 A. I had them -- I pushed it out. It was to the original -- I
- 19 don't know why I don't have my map here. I guess I left it in the
- 20 car. Oh, actually, you know what, I can pull it up on this.
- 21 Stand by here. Give me a second. I had our computer group pull
- 22 | the runs that were from -- let me get it, let me get it, let me
- 23 get it. I apologize. I got --
- 24 Q. It's okay. You pulled it from February 16th to the 23rd?
- 25 A. Yes, ma'am. Let's see -- yesterday. Was yesterday Monday?

- 1 I've lost track of days.
- 2 Q. Yesterday was Monday.
- 3 A. Okay. Thank you. That's bad. Where am I? Did I wake up?
- 4 What's your name? I know that like the back of my hand. Whose
- 5 | hand is that? Got all those one-liners, right.
- 6 Well, I didn't realize how many emails I had coming in. I
- 7 | think it's interesting that Paradigm liaison is offering their dig
- 8 test class now. Just sent it out this week. Let's see here.
- 9 Q. You can get it to me afterwards. That's okay.
- 10 A. Okay.
- 11 Q. Yeah. Yeah.
- 12 A. Anyway, it was the 8-block area that I initially had asked it
- 13 to expand outside of what Atmos was saying.
- 14 Q. Right.
- 15 A. And it went up to -- basically went up to Foster Middle
- 16 School or Elementary School all the way down to Webb Chapel to
- 17 Larga over to Marsh.
- 18 Q. Okay.
- 19 A. And so I told them if there's anything that's closer than
- 20 | that because when they put a GIS circle they can kind of pull it
- 21 out if anything popped up kind of relative. Because at that time
- 22 | we hadn't expanded it to Chapel Creek and across Marsh. So I just
- 23 told them in that area.
- Now they're flagging everything that comes in. They're
- 25 notifying us, and saying, hey, we're making a run over here. Like

- 1 | this morning, they had a car fire down there on Northwest Highway,
- 2 | and they're just alerting Webb Chapel Command, they're calling it,
- 3 | we got a car fire in case, you know, it's not related to what you
- 4 all are doing. So --
- 5 Q. Okay. And you said it was 12?
- 6 A. I'm sorry?
- 7 Q. You said it was 12 that --
- 8 A. I think, I think.
- 9 Q. Okay.
- 10 A. I got the PDFs actually, and I'm going to have all that for
- 11 you all.
- 12 Q. Okay.
- 13 A. It was either 11 or 12, and I've got numbers in my head that
- 14 are going everywhere. So don't guite me on that, but yes, ma'am.
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. It was more than a handful.
- 17 Q. All right.
- 18 A. That's just for a week.
- 19 Q. Yeah. So if your staff had maybe seen that number, and then
- 20 February 21st happened, do you think maybe they would've had
- 21 | communication --
- 22 A. Yeah. But, you know, and I don't --
- 23 Q. -- of a gas issue?
- 24 A. -- know if that's out there, but I don't know if there's a
- 25 program that can behind the scenes -- you know, like I told you

- 1 how many calls we make. I don't know if there's a program in our
- 2 | computer assisted dispatch or out in the dispatch world of other
- 3 cities that can look at quantitative information, and then go
- 4 loops, we got an anomaly here. Kind of like Watson or whatever.
- 5 And go, hey, you've got a cluster here of something. This needs
- 6 | -- danger, Will Robinson, need to look at that. I don't know if
- 7 | that's there.
- 8 That would be nice for you or I to invent and sell it to
- 9 somebody. I think that would just help anybody. I mean, heck,
- 10 anybody would want that, but I don't think we have that
- 11 | capability. It's only until I would say draw a box around this,
- 12 and give me --
- 13 Q. Right. Okay. Just last question. Do you have any
- 14 experience with methane or natural gas alarms?
- 15 A. Alarms?
- 16 Q. Yeah.
- 17 A. Yes, ma'am. Fixed or handheld?
- 18 O. Fixed.
- 19 A. Fixed sites. We have places, Praxair, we have
- 20 (indiscernible), places like that that have fixed sites that have
- 21 monitoring equipment that's rolling 24/7. Worker safety and/or
- 22 | the public, but yes, ma'am.
- 23 Q. And do you -- have you ever seen them used in residential --
- 24 A. As far as methane, I know there's some on the market by Kidde
- 25 and some of the others. I don't know if I hold a lot of stock in

- 1 that.
- 2 Q. Okay.
- 3 A. Simply because of, I won't say user error, but same thing on
- 4 | the carbon monoxide side when they first came out, said we're
- 5 going to have a dual carbon monoxide and ionization detector for
- 6 smoke or whatever. Those didn't seem to work. They're better
- 7 | standalone. But I have not seen any in residential areas that
- 8 were a fixed methane detector. I know they're out there. I don't
- 9 even have them in my house but --
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. So --
- 12 Q. Thank you.
- 13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No questions.
- MR. MURDOCK: I have one.
- 15 MR. PADGETT: Okay. Yes, sir.
- 16 MR. MURDOCK: Phillip Murdock, Atmos Energy.
- 17 BY MR. MURDOCK:
- 18 Q. You mentioned communications, communications, communications.
- 19 And we heard Captain Baker talk about he wished that hazmat would
- 20 | be called on more gas calls. And he went so far as to say that he
- 21 | would like to see Atmos either text or email hazmat when they were
- 22 | rolling on a gas call. And you mentioned that as well, you wished
- 23 hazmat rolled on more gas calls. What's your opinion around at
- 24 what point does communication become so burdensome that it becomes
- 25 noise?

A. Yeah, I think that's a very, very good point. Because as I can imagine how many lines that you all go on because I know how many we go on. There's many that we probably do not know about. I think that's the problem is it's noise. And I can use an example to kind of answer your question.

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Storm water management herein in Dallas, we have a zero hydrocarbon tolerance. So we have car wrecks, whatever, if we have over 2 gallons that hits the ground, we make notification stormwater, wherever it is, where they can make the proper switches, if you will, to cut off inflows and things.

And then we had fires. We use a product -- used to use a product AFFF, which is found to have carcinogens in it. But the storm water management wanted to be notified on every time we had a fire where we utilized foam. We said, okay. I told the lady, you're just going to want our two alarm fires. You're not going to want all of them. Well, after a week and she had a little over 12,000 calls she -- it's like you said noise. I don't want those. So, yes, sir, I think it's noise.

I think the key of communication here, maybe not so much Atmos notifying us, hey, we're going on here and here and here, because it will become noise, but it's the fire crews, which are responsible for that, giving a heads up when it's something more than just I backed over a gas line, and we're here to stand by a meter. So there's got to be a sweet spot there where we don't wait until the world is coming to an end, and we don't go out on

- 1 every time somebody smells -- somebody pass gas from a cow or
- 2 | whatever it is. So I agree with that 100 percent. You can be
- 3 overwhelmed with anything. And in this case, yes, the fatigue and
- 4 | the noise would end up creating, I think, more problems than the
- 5 | information that potentially could be gleaned from that.
- 6 MR. MURDOCK: Thank you.
- 7 MR. PADGETT: That's it?
- 8 DR. JENNER: Just about. You -- we're very close. I just
- 9 want to make the observation about 5 minutes ago you said danger
- 10 Will Robinson. And I just want to make the observation there are
- 11 only three people in this room old enough to get that reference.
- 12 MR. PADGETT: Oh, yeah. Lost in Space.
- 13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Lost in Space.
- DR. JENNER: The original Lost in Space. Okay. The
- 15 original.
- 16 MR. PADGETT: I'm sorry. I should have clarified.
- 17 DR. JENNER: No, that's fine. We can clear that --
- 18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You want that on the transcript?
- DR. JENNER: Yes, I do. Because we may be looking, who is
- 20 | this Will Robinson guy?
- 21 MR. PADGETT: That's true. That would be hard to explain.
- 22 BY DR. JENNER:
- 23 Q. Next to that, my last question though I'm going to ask --
- 24 A. Yes, sir.
- 25 Q. -- if there's any thoughts you have that can help us with the

- 1 investigation that we haven't already discussed either between you 2 or anyone else we talked to the last couple of days?
- 3 A. Off the top of my head, again, I'm not privy to that. I know
- 4 | we'll see things after it, but I'm curious to hear kind of from
- 5 the Atmos side operational folks, kind of if there's this -- we
- 6 have blinders on because of our jobs. We're doing our job.
- 7 | They're doing their job. And apparently we weren't looking at
- 8 this, that and the other. Be interesting to see where those two
- 9 pieces tie up.

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In your investigation, I think, we've heard common denominators and things that, as I alluded to earlier, the Swiss cheese where it's finally just lined up where all the holes came out with a bad outcome. I heard one of our investigators say this is not a common type of call. I would disagree with that, as we have especially in an aging infrastructure anywhere, but here in Dallas with the movement, as I alluded to, I think that is something that needs to be focused on by you all.

So you're kind of asking me the weather dynamics, the fact of the hot, cold, lots of rain. Just, I mean, as I call it in Tennessee a septic tank overflow rain. Literally we've had the fire station closed because of some of the other collapses of sewer lines and all here in Dallas. So this area is not immune to having movement. We're right on the edge of the Barnett Shale right here at the Dallas County Line to Tarrant County. There's a lot of movement. And I'm not an engineer on that aspect, but

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    we've had, ever since the fracking and stuff started we've had
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    earthquakes, all kind of things. So there is movement. We talked
 3
    about the clay soils. I think that has a bearing on everything
 4
    involved.
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         So that's the only kind of bit I can throw out there that
 6
    maybe we haven't chased down. I don't know if that's a factor,
 7
    but it's just something that's kind of in the back of my head.
 8
                      Terrific. Okay. Looking around the room there
         DR. JENNER:
 9
    are no additional questions. So I want to thank you very much for
10
    your --
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         MR. PADGETT: You're very welcome. Entertainment --
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         DR. JENNER:
                      -- all your --
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         MR. PADGETT: -- for the last --
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                      Terrific. It is 3:35, and we're done with this.
         DR. JENNER:
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          (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)
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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: NATURAL GAS-FUELED EXPLOSION OF

RESIDENCE, DALLAS, TEXAS

FEBRUARY 23, 2018

Interview of Ted Padgett

ACCIDENT NO.: PLD18FR002

PLACE: Dallas, Texas

DATE: February 27, 2018

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

Katherine Motley Transcriber

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:

\*

NATURAL GAS-FUELED EXPLOSION OF

RESIDENCE, DALLAS, TEXAS \* Accident No.: PLD18FR002

FEBRUARY 23, 2018

\*

Interview of: TED PADGETT, Chief of Staff

Dallas Fire-Rescue

Walnut Hill Recreation Center Dallas, Texas

Tuesday, February 27, 2018

#### APPEARANCES:

STEPHEN JENNER, Human Performance Investigator National Transportation Safety Board

RACHAEL GUNARATNAM, hazmat Investigator National Transportation Safety Board

JIM COLLINS, Regional Manager Railroad Commission of Texas

JOSE CHEVEREZ, Pipeline Inspector Railroad Commission of Texas

ALEX COLLETTI, Accident Investigator
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA)

PHILLIP MURDOCK, Director of Engineering and Compliance Atmos Energy

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# 1 INTERVIEW 2 (1:05 p.m.)3 DR. JENNER: Good afternoon. My name is Stephen Jenner. Ι'm 4 an investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board out 5 of Washington, DC. Today is Tuesday, February 27, 2018, and the 6 time is 1:05 p.m., Central Daylight Time. We are currently at the 7 Walnut Hill Recreation Center in Dallas. We are here in response to the house explosion on Espanola Drive in Dallas that occurred 8 9 on February 23, 2018. We will be talking to Mr. Padgett, Padgett. 10 MR. PADGETT: Padgett. DR. JENNER: 11 I made you French for a second. 12 But before we do that, we'll have each of us introduce 13 ourselves with our spelling and who we're with. 14 I'm Stephen Jenner, S-t-e-p-h-e-n, J-e-n-n-e-r, a human 15 performance investigator with the NTSB. 16 MS. GUNARATNAM: Rachael Gunaratnam, R-a-c-h-a-e-l, 17 G-u-n-a-r-a-t-n-a-m, a hazmat investigator with NTSB. 18 MR. COLLINS: Jim Collins, J-i-m, C-o-l-l-i-n-s, regional 19 manager for the Railroad Commission of Texas. 2.0 MR. CHEVEREZ: Jose Cheverez, J-o-s-e, C-h-e-v-e-r-e-z, 21 pipeline inspector for the Railroad Commission of Texas. 22 MS. COLLETTI: Alex Colletti, PHMSA, Accident Division, 23 A-1-e-x, C-o-1-1-e-t-i. 24 Mr. MURDOCK: Phillip Murdock, P-h-i-l-l-i-p, M-u-r-d-o-c-k, 25 Director of Engineering and Compliance, Atmos Energy.

1 MR. PADGETT: I'm Ted Padgett, T-e-d P-a-d-g-e-t-t. I'm the 2 Chief of Staff of the Dallas Fire-Rescue Department,

P-a-d-g-e-t-t. We have an operator standing by.

DR. JENNER: Terrific. Thank you.

# INTERVIEW OF TED PADGETT

## BY DR. JENNER:

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- Q. Chief, if you would, just let us know about your background.
- 8 Start from day 1 when you got interested in fire and rescue, and
- 9 work your way up to your present position.
- 10 A. Okay. You going to let me say what I want to say? I grew up
- 11 | in the booming metropolis of Strawberry Plains, Tennessee, which
- 12 the big industry was taking bottles back to the store. And since
- 13 we came up with plastic, ruined my career choice.
- So after college, I went to the Air Force. I was in the Air
- 15 | Force. Go out of the Air Force January 17, 1985. I was a pilot.
- 16 I was headed home to Tennessee, and stopped with a friend that my
- 17 dad had flown with when he was in the service, and their son was
- 18 my age. Didn't really know him that well from when we were
- 19 younger, but had said he went to work for the fire department. I
- 20 | said tell me about this. He said they work 1 day, and they're off
- 21 2 days. So that was the hook that got me in.
- I don't have family in Texas other than my wife. And I
- 23 joined. I had security clearance from the Air Force. So I was
- 24 | sitting in rookie school on February 6, 1985; so 2 weeks after
- 25 getting out of active duty.

As I stated, I have -- I went to college, played football.

The school called Carson Newman University. It's in east

Tennessee. I got my master's from the University of Tennessee. I got another master's from Columbia, and I got a doctorate from the University of Texas at Arlington.

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I have been with the fire department now -- I've started my 34th year February 6th, as I stated earlier. I have done everything there is in this department. I have been a paramedic. As everyone here, you have to hire on to be a paramedic. the box for the first 13 years, I guess. I was assigned to special ops stations, hazmat, search and rescue, swift water. Came up through the ranks. We used to have a rank back in the day it was called a second driver. And you had a driver engineer operator, a lieutenant, captain, battalion chief, deputy chief, assistant chief. My position now is that I'm 801, which is the number 2 to the chief of the department. So I'm the, I quess, power behind the throne. I have four assistants that report to me. So even though I'm an assistant chief rank, I don't know what the -- I guess, I'm 800.5 because 800 is the chief of the department.

Our Chief, Chief Coatney, just took the job here 18 months ago. So he came here, and I've been, I won't say his confidant, but I've been kind of the keeper of all things of record, and how things are done or were done. And I'd like to go on the record to say that I've worked for a lot of chiefs over the years. This is

the first leader I've actually worked for. So I'm excited to say that, and that wasn't paid for, obviously.

2.0

I was the -- I guess, pertinent to this, I've had all kind of training, and -- a Harvard fellowship. I've had IFSAC fire officer certs all the way up. I've been at Texas A&M Mays Center. Gotten degrees and certificates all over the place: Master Firefighter, Master Inspector, Master Instructor, Master Investigator. I'm hazmat technician, special skills, subject matter expert on WMD. And do a lot of things for some of the governmental contracts -- SAIC, EAI -- contracting here and there for whatevereatomayers Task Force One, so I've worked at big events, from the Winter Olympics all the way to Republican, Democratic conventions, all kind of -- more hurricanes and things than I can mention -- Katrina, Rita, 9/11. Been there, done that. Right place, wrong time, I guess.

And I ran the hazmat program here. Actually got it off its feet, started it. I left that in '05, I want to say, and we've had others that have kind of taken the ball and run with it. But I stayed with hazmat until really 2010 on the fringes, and then I was -- our chief at the time -- I was considered, I'll say this myself, I was considered Mr. Fix It. So I was sent from the fire operations side to the arson investigations side. I was over there as a deputy, and then promoted to assistant chief January of 2017. So I've been the assistant chief for 5 years and some change.

- And I enjoy movies. I'm a scratch golfer. I used to be an athlete. Now I'm just athlete -- athletic supporter, I guess.
- 3 That's pretty much. My wife, I've been married 30 years. My wife
- 4 is a nurse at the ER Baylor here, which is a major trauma center.
- 5 I have one daughter. She's got a job in Columbus. Works for the
- 6 -- Amazon has taken over the world. So she's a TCU person, so go
- 7 Frogs. That's all. All right.
- 8 Q. All right.
- 9 A. More than you needed there.
- 10 Q. Terrific. I appreciate that. Okay. You know why we're
- 11 here.
- 12 A. Yes, sir.
- 13 Q. And I understand that you had some level of involvement in
- 14 | the most significant of these incidents. And if you would, just
- 15 | walk us through your level of involvement from the moment you were
- 16 notified.
- 17 A. Okay. As I think you heard earlier, we have rotating on-call
- 18 just so one of the individual assistants or the deputies don't get
- 19 their teeth kicked in, quite frankly, for the number of calls that
- 20 come in. So in this particular case, I was not on call, but I was
- 21 because the chief of the department had a death in the family and
- 22 | had flown out of state. Was gone since Thursday morning --
- 23 actually, Wednesday night, Thursday morning. So as we say, I had
- 24 the con.
- I knew that the deputy on call -- actually it was to be

Assistant Chief Bret Stidham, who is over our emergency operations & EMS. He was out of town for his daughter's something down in San Antonio. And so Deputy Chief Lauren Johnson, who is very capable, assumed his, what we call the 101, the on-call.

2.0

So where I came into this, long story short, when the chief is gone -- let me kind of back up. My job as chief of staff is primarily twofold. One, it allows the chief of the department to be a figurehead that deals with city council, mayors, government entities, you name it. And then that allows me to operate, in a roundabout way, the department through the other assistant chiefso I handle the day-to-day stuff and/or anything that's too weird, wet and sticky, it kind of drops on my desk. Not that we don't have a capable chief, but that seems to work really well, and I've never had aspirations to be the guy. I'm kind of just falling into this, and it shows you that any nut can become an oak if you just hold your roots long enough. Side commentary. Sorry. The fact is, through that, that allows him to stay free and clear, and have an objective view. And I'm a sounding board, as I stated, confidant.

So once he was out of town, obviously, all that came to me.

So I started getting inundated with just things here and there,
typical routine things for a city manager, mayor. Friday morning,
however, at about, I want to say it was around 7:00, 10 minutes to
7, maybe, I got bumped by the -- or paged by the dispatch, our
communications, that said that they had a fire. Well, the way

they put out what's called a 2-11 page, not meaning that we had a two alarm fire, but it's a significant event. And so I got bumped on that, and from that I'll get information that I can pass to city council members, mayor, press, whatever it may be. And it said that we had a fire, and then it said -- came back, and said, correction, explosion or believed explosion on Espanola.

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So at that particular time, this is about 7:25. I was leaving the house at 6:45, so I was en route to Dallas just as I do every morning. And I live approximately 20 miles outside the city limits of Dallas, off Interstate 20, which is the town of Talty. So it's a straight shot for me to hit 20 to 175, and I'm downtown. You all may not be familiar with that, but it's easy driving except for dead man's curve down there.

So I've got my Bluetooth on the phone, and I'm listening to the radio dispatches, and hearing what's going on. So I hear 806, which is our deputy chief that controls the north half of the city on any day, and it's Ray O'Dell. He's a friend of mine. He's been on about 30-something years. And I called Ray, and I said, Ray, what do we have? He said, well, it looks like we had a explosion, but we've got the people en route to the hospital. He gave me an update on how many we had, and I'll give you those specifics in a minute.

But I said, Ray, I've heard on the dispatch reports they're thinking explosion. He said, yeah, you know, he said, Atmos is all out here, he said, but I think we've got it handled. I said,

here's what I want you to do. I said, did hazmat roll on this?

And he said they did, but I turned them back around. And I said,
all right, Ray, I just want to tell you, I'm not going to make it
look like I've overrun you, but I'm calling dispatch and having
them kick out hazmat back there just for several reasons. One, I
want to get some readings that our techs understand. I know Atmos
does a percent per volume of air on their readings. And I said
our guys are used to doing parts per million. Now we can convert
that, but -- we have some people working today that are very good
at that. I want to get our field diagnostics out there just to
see what we have.

2.0

Okay. So I called dispatch. Hazmat rolled. Obviously, I called Captain Baker by phone and said, hey, I need you to head out to the scene and head up the hazmat part. I said, let me know when you get there what Atmos has to say, and then fill me in. I headed to the office.

So I got to City Hall. I had three assistants that were off that day. So I had a deputy chief, Chris Williford, who is kind of my -- was my go-to guy that day. Because I'm getting everything in the world from the city managers, and now hearing it in the press, and the news they're wanting information. So I'm typing up some situation reports at the same time thinking about all the things I need to do. So we had a bad weather situation that day. I had Greg, who -- not Greg, Chris Williford. Chris Williford, Deputy Chief Williford, go down a list that I was

spouting things off, and I had him and another gentleman Thornton, Chief Thornton, Ben Thornton, that were in the office that were kind of my runners and making calls and doing things while I was trying to get operations.

2.0

I called our GIS and told him make me some maps, poster-size, where I could put them in my office, and see what we have where I can start plotting things. I called for DART to send a bus because I was already thinking evacuation. Police also. Police had responded, but I asked for them to send several more elements.

I got -- somewhere in there, probably around, I don't know, 8:15, 30, maybe, I got a phone call from Captain Baker. Told me what he had as far as some readings, and I said, okay, here's what I want to do. He -- well, he said Atmos is talking about a potential 2, maybe 3-block evacuation. And I said, okay, I'm looking at this. In the meantime, I had asked dispatch to run me any reports of gas leaks, calls, anything that had been in that area over the past couple of days. And in this particular case, they just went back to Wednesday, I believe, the 21st. I think Friday was the 23rd. Yeah. And two particular incidents popped up on Durango, which is -- actually shares an alley.

As firefighters, you know, we have a little saying, when you're looking at street addresses especially if you don't know, you know, it's always east is even, south's the same, north and west are odd. So when you're looking at -- when I saw all the odd numbers for the alleyway I knew that we were talking about the

side of the street there for Durango, and the even numbers on Espanola, et cetera.

2.0

So we -- I said, that's interesting because they're a street apart; then I saw the alleyway. So all this is going on while I've got other people on the line. I'm typing. And so he says 2 to 3 blocks, and I said, okay, here's my thing: I've dealt with Atmos many times before over the years, and before that it was Lone Star Gas. And I said, whatever they're saying, I want you to double it, possibly triple it. So I made the decision to go with what Atmos had on readings, but I expanded it in the auspice of public safety just until I knew what we had. I didn't have eyes. I'm listening through my command, and kind of doing an incident command off-site, obviously. I can't see it from my house kind of thing.

So then it came to me that, okay, we've got a grid. Atmos is telling us there's a grid that has this many streets. Okay. That was, as you all have seen, kind of one of the maps that was a grayed-out area. And I saw the elementary school, and I asked -- I know Captain Baker was saying he didn't know who told him to go up to the school or whatever. But at that particular time, I was talking to -- just spaced out. Rutledge.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Benning.

MR. PADGETT: Not Rosenberg.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Kyle.

MR. PADGETT: Tyler.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Slaughter.

2.0

MR. PADGETT: Slaughter, yeah. I don't know what -- what did I say. Anyway, I had gotten on the -- let me back up on that. Hold that point.

Probably 7, 8 months ago, I went down to the Atmos office on Oak, and -- I believe it's Oak, right there in southeast Dallas, and went in and met Mr. Slaughter, Mr. Rosenberg, Ms. Harris, several of the higher-ups, I guess, that do the operations stuff. Just as I do typically -- I used to do that in hazmat, get to know who is around what, special utilities, and just had a time just to sit and talk, kind of see what they were doing. They were -- at that time Mr. Slaughter was the head guy. Mr. Rosenberg was in there, and I think Mr. Rosenberg is this -- the area operations manager or something. You know, they were asking me anything we need, whatever.

We have, in the past, Atmos has -- as Captain Baker talked, we knew -- when I was running hazmat, we knew that there was an issue with the Atmos repair techs and our hazmat techs talking on the same page. As I alluded to earlier, parts per million versus percent per volume of air. So Atmos was actually the one that suggested -- they used at that time those SENSITs. And so they were the ones that suggested, hey, we'll get you -- they actually got us some monitors that would communicate same stuff as theirs, and we would use those as backups. And I've heard we're still using those, which is good. We also use the SENSITs now for Freon

detection, any of the other whacko aerosols.

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So we had a relationship, we, the special operations side of the fire department had a pretty -- and I hate using that word robust -- a good relationship with Atmos as far as training and response to questions we've had. We've taught a number of hazmat schools around this north Texas area, and have had utilized Atmos and other department utilities, Oncor, to name some others, that have brought out props, valving, things of that nature that people can actually play with without having actual hazardous environments -- at the suggestion of Atmos years ago, probably 10, 12, we started carrying Mustang tools on the hazmat rig so we could crimp polyethylene line. Not black pipe. We have plugs and things for that, but that pipe is so brittle now we just -- but anything that was basically a 2-inch down we could get there and dig and have the thing grounded, bonded, and crimp it off to save. Because Atmos, that's one thing, they don't -- they can't run Code 3. So sometimes it's a long wait when calling them. sometimes you feel like a one-legged man in a butt kicking contest when you're out there waiting. So we carry those tools.

Typically, most of our techs, we try to not touch anything until we know where the back pressure is going. Especially, unless it's a 1-inch maybe smaller we may do -- or especially a residential or something.

Okay. So back to where we were. So out of precaution because they didn't know where the grid exactly went, and this was

in conjunction with Mr. Slaughter by proxy, we determined that let's evacuate the school. It was also a good I don't want to say practice, but a training drill for the elementary school. I believe it's Foster Elementary. We had 738 kids, ages pre-K to the fifth grade. So DISD came. That went really smooth. Again, I wasn't on-site, but I'm getting intel updates. They said they had no readings in the school. And so, again, that was a precaution, but I also knew that should something, like it typically does, creep, I didn't want that to be an issue that I had to deal with later. So out of precaution, I went ahead and pulled that trigger. And I've heard a lot of the interviewees say this person or that person, whatever -- it fell in my lap.

2.0

I communicated that with the city manager and the mayor. Told them what we were doing. At that time, Atmos, for whatever reason, kind of went dark as far as returning calls and things. So the mayor was getting a little frustrated. He, I believe, reached out to the TRCC, and actually may have even gone higher than that. They were trying to get some pressure on some Atmos folks to return calls, PIO and all that stuff. And I know they were overwhelmed. I honestly believe that Atmos was trying to do right. I think they failed in the initial issue on Friday, if not before, but I believe it's because they've never had anything like that here in Dallas, and they didn't have the people in place, it took them a while to get their running legs back up under them. I think they're doing a excellent job now, but at the time there

were some -- just like everybody, you know, it takes a while to get up to game speed when you're going all out.

2.0

So from that, we rock along with notifications here and there. I'm getting readings. I take Chief Willeford and myself, we came to the actual command scene on Friday at about -- I got there probably 11:30-ish, and took a picture of the house with my personal phone, just a front shot, just to see what it was I was hearing. And based on everything I had heard, and what I saw, and what my knowledge base was, I could tell this was a explosion of some form. No fire damage, walls pushed out, brick veneer off the front, Celotex and Styrofoam everywhere, siding, fences blown.

Damage would appear to be the majority on the delta -- alpha delta corner really, maybe more on the delta side, but that's what presented on the front.

The chief on-site at the command post at this particular call was Battalion 7, which was a captain riding up, Combs, Mark Combs. And I was confident with his ability. He's a squared away firefighter. He's a good captain, knows his work. He's been one of our training lieutenants back in the day, and he's real close to making battalion chief permanent. So this is right up his alley. So I was confident what he had done.

I came and spoke to him just to get a sit rep. Dallas police had Deputy Chief Watson on location. He came down, and I talked with him. We've known each other over the years. And asked him what he was doing. I told him the evacuation area we had. I

wanted him to cordon off the streets, you know, DPD protection, which he had already set up. But I asked him, I said, how many officers do you have? He said I got 14 to 16. I said, how many avenues are in this 4-block area? He said, about 16. I said, are you counting the alleys? He said, no. I said, let's get people on that. We had streets come out and bring barricades. When I pulled up to the scene, I did kind of a 360 of the back. I came up Larga. I went all the way down to, I believe, it area. was -- let's see -- I need to look at something. Do I even have Was it Mixon to the north? Or actually that would be west. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Fontana. MR. PADGETT: Excuse me. East. I'm sorry? UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Fontana. It was just past Fontana. Anyway, I went --MR. PADGETT:

MR. PADGETT: It was just past Fontana. Anyway, I went -- did a 360 around that, came in. We came in from the south side or southwest side right there off of Larga and --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Gaspar?

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MR. PADGETT: Yes. Thank you. Worked our way up, and then I showed up at command. When I got there hazmat techs were just putting up their monitors. They had been monitoring. And that's when I came down and talked to Mr. Combs. Now back to that.

I told him I wanted to make sure he was keeping track of -we call it a 214 on deployments. But Mark understood that a lot
of fire service, our incident command, they'll keep boards and
things like that, but I told him just keep track. I want you to

take pictures of your command board. And the only reason I say all that, this is a significant event when you have a fatality related to something as out of the norm. It's the same as when we have fire fatalities. City of Dallas, you get -- I say you get like there's some magic number, but the average fire fatalities, fire fatalities in a city over a million is 1 per 100,000. have, depending on what you read, 1.3, 1.4 million. So 13 or 14 fire fatalities a year. I think we had seven last year. before that we had 16, 14. I can show you the tracking. So those are considered significant events. Anything here in the City of Dallas that's a multiple alarm fire, large property loss, something weird, it's going to hit the press, that's when we get involved. So because of that, I was telling him, especially with line-of-duty death and things I've had, just keep track of what you're doing just for documentation later. Got it.

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I spoke with -- there was Atmos guy, a contractor actually. I can't -- I can just remember it looked like a drilling rig on the back of his, I guess, safety vest, was kind of dirty. He was talking to Chief Combs. Police, I had Box 4 there, which is our response rig that brings refreshments, and they had just -- I came really at lunchtime, not only to see the scene, but to ask if any of the guys on the scene needed something. I was going to go get them some food, water, whatever. The rehab van was already there, and they had just dropped off McDonald's burgers and some other things. So they were good to go there.

So we decided to formulate a plan of here's what I want. Hazmat at that time we thought we had a handle on it. The readings, we weren't getting anything. No one smelled -- I didn't smell anything; no one else smelled anything in that area. There were, I want to say, and I'm just shooting this number out, but I want to say there was about 20 to 30 crews it looked like. When I say crews, two to four people that had punched holes all around this area. There are backhoes, shovels, you name it, in different areas all around there. And I just thought, wow, this is bigger than what we thought when we pulled in. I never smelled anything at all though.

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So hazmat, as I stated, they were clearing up to go because we were being told, hey, we got a handle on it. It's a leak in this alleyway. Obviously, this was an unfortunate issue, but we're good. So Scott Clumpner, Battalion 9, was at the -- what we set up as the command post at the corner of Larga, Story Lane, Webb Chapel extension, right in that area. And it's a parking lot shopping center thing across from the graveyard. And at that time we didn't have an Atmos van or trailer that they have there now. They had been up the street somewhere, I think, and then Chief Clumpner had got with them to bring them together. Now they were about 30 feet apart so they could talk.

That's when I, like I said, we started -- I got a call, I guess, from NTSB, Mohammed somebody, telling us that you all were coming in. They had reported that to Mr. Slaughter. I told them

I had to talk to Mr. Slaughter. He's obviously been busy. And we were told -- actually, let me back up. I'm wrong on that. I didn't talk to Mohammed till Saturday. Friday night -- getting those confused. Friday night, as I told hazmat, we were clearing up, and I said, all right, hang here until the operations are done or finished digging here. We'll shut this down, say 5:00, 1700 hours, and we'll go from there.

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Well, I cleared, went back to the office finishing all the other stuff that we do, and about 6:30 I got a call that they were running again on gas odor or something, and it really wasn't in this grid, but it was close enough kind of perk your ears up. And then I get a call that said, hey, they found some more things. We're fixing now to evacuate neighbors and stuff. And we knew we were going to evacuate this little 4-block area that was really expanding. And I remember Atmos, I finally got a hold of, I want to say it was Ms. Harris, and she stated, you know, that they had -- needed a place. We set up the rec center here to kind of have a holding area because -- they hadn't had a lot of people come and ask for things around 3:00, but I told them, this is a blue collar neighborhood and come 5:30 to maybe 7:30, it's going to be quite lengthy. And I remember telling her, do you speak Spanish? she said, no. I said, you'd better get somebody that speaks or you're going to have a problem. And I said, I speak enough to get you in trouble so you really want somebody that's going to be on their p's and q's. So we opened up the rec center.

That was done through OEM. That's when I contacted them. As I stated, we had a DART bus on-site in case we needed evacs. I cut them loose at probably 3. And all this kind of ramped back up after that. We thought we had it handled. So Friday night, I kept the hazmat -- you know, get your stuff, make sure you're on call, you're at the station.

Let's go on to Saturday morning. This is where -- Saturday morning I came back in to Dallas. I got into downtown around 9:30, got call from Lauren Johnson, the deputy chief. She was having trouble getting any information back from Atmos. told her, okay, let me call some people. I called. I finally called -- I went down the higher-ups order, and I got down to Benny Rosenberg. He picked up immediately, and said, hey, I'm here at their little incident command place, which at that time I was thinking he was over off of Oak. I didn't know that he had actually -- and I believe that's where he told me. I don't remember all the conversation, but he said he was at the command post, which now that I think, it was probably here. I was in east Dallas, and I was going to go by and talk to him if I didn't get any more calls. I was actually going to their office.

So he called, and he had Ms. Harris with him. He had a lady named -- yeah, just spaced out. I got the name somewhere but -- what's --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ocham?

MR. PADGETT: I'm sorry.

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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ocham from Atmos?

MR. PADGETT: Beacham. Is it Beacham?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It is Beacham.

MR. PADGETT: Beacham.

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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Beacham.

MR. PADGETT: Beacham. So I got Ms. Beacham. She came on in the mix, and I asked her what's going on, and she explained to me it wasn't vouchers that they were going to be giving, but they had some, I quess, cards where they could get incidentals or whatever. And so we had decided -- this was Saturday. I got a hold of Captain Baker again. I said, okay, here's what I need you to do. We're going to split your team. I want you to hire back an officer and three technicians to be a scout team so to speak. Wе maintain the two in and two out. But I want you to set them up with a Suburban and some monitors, and whenever Atmos punches a hole, I want you right there in their hip pocket getting some readings. Or if they have a house that they want to clear, I think he's alluded to that, go in and make sure we have the right diagnostics, so we're talking apples to apples.

So that has been going on since Saturday afternoon, I guess. And then it seemed like every time we started to gear it down it would expand. And so really my extent has now been, well, really from the beginning, has been oversight and just kind of juggling the balls to make sure everybody is talking to each other and getting on the same page. In my opinion, as I stated earlier, it

was like most things, you have something you have to grab by the tail and reel it in, put it in a little box with a bow on it, and that's kind of what happened in the first few times, days, hours, I guess. I'd says days, hours into Saturday. As I expressed now, I've had a lot of dealings with Atmos and -- both good and bad, but I will say that Mr. Slaughter and Mr. Rosenberg and the people I've talked to, other than that brief period where I'm sure they were overwhelmed, have been pretty responsive.

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Now I feel like at first they were trying to keep a lid on things because I understood from the business side this thing could get out of whack and it's dollars flying out the door. I get that. I also knew our side it's the public safety. That's what I'm employed to do. And those two have to mirror each other and marry up. But, like I said, since they've gotten their runner legs under them, I think it's been going really well. And as I alluded to earlier, last update is we don't have any citizens with any unmet needs other than a lot of them want to just throw rocks and holler, and so we're going to have a town hall tonight where they can get that off their chest, I guess.

That was a long-winded round the world in 365 days. There's a lot of stuff I probably left out. But when the Shiites are hitting the fan -- I'm sorry. I hope nobody is Shiite. If it's hitting the fan it's kind of -- I will offend everybody, and I don't mean it out of prejudice or malfeasance. I grew up in east Tennessee. I still have my own teeth and my shoes, but I do make

- 1 fun of everybody. That's kind of my way. Firemen, we make fun of
- 2 things just to keep from crying and stuff. So --
- 3 BY DR. JENNER:
- 4 Q. Terrific. Thank you.
- 5 A. I'm sorry. Around the world in 20 days, right? I told you
- 6 | it would only take 20 minutes.
- 7 Q. Okay. Terrific. Just a couple questions.
- 8 A. Okay.
- 9 Q. You gave us a lot of stuff, but that's good. I made note you
- 10 had a conversation with Ray about the hazmat decision, and it
- 11 sounded that they --
- 12 A. With Bobby Baker you mean? With Ray?
- 13 Q. With -- I wrote down Ray. You can correct me.
- 14 A. It was Bobby Baker that I called. That morning?
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. You talking about? Yes, sir.
- 17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ray O'Dell.
- 18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No. You spoke to Ray.
- MR. PADGETT: Oh, Ray O'Dell, yes. I'm sorry. Ray O'Dell.
- 20 He's the deputy chief. I'm sorry. I was thinking... there's a
- 21 hazmat tech Ray Thompson that is Bobby Baker's underling, and he
- may have been on the call. But, no, I was speaking to Ray O'Dell,
- 23 yes.
- 24 BY DR. JENNER:
- 25 Q. Great. So a decision was made to send hazmat and a decision

- 1 was made to recall, and then you gave your opinion of that. Can
- 2 | you --
- 3 A. Yes, sir.
- 4 Q. -- shed a little light on that?
- 5 A. I talked to Ray, and I said, okay, what happened here? And
- 6 he said, well, I think they had an explosion, but there's no fire.
- 7 The patients have been transported. We've got a handle on it.
- 8 It's good. Atmos is on location. And I said, what readings did
- 9 hazmat get? And he said, well, hazmat was en route, but I turned
- 10 them around. And I said, okay. Man, again, this is a teaching
- 11 thing. I mean, Ray is an experienced battalion chief, but not
- 12 | necessarily experienced on hazmat.
- And so my first thing is when we have protocols on how
- 14 natural gas responses, all these different grades are to be
- 15 responded to and their inner MOPs, but a lot of officers out
- 16 there, I think the common culture is, you know, we see this enough
- 17 | we have -- well, they're used to possibly a meter in the back
- 18 alley being backed over and whatever, and they, okay, we can solve
- 19 this, and we're on the road. They don't usually call us until we
- 20 | see a 2 or 6-inch main with concrete going 50 feet in the air.
- 21 You know, they go, we need hazmat here now. So I think that was
- 22 | the mentality.
- 23 And Ray, in his defense as a deputy chief that day, thought
- 24 the situation is over. Atmos is here. They got it. That's 99
- 25 percent of the time, Atmos comes in, we stand around. If we need

to protect some of their guys to get down in holes or whatever, we'll stand by with a charged hose line or some type of a CO or something that we can protect them in case it goes fa-voomp.

Because, you know, gas when it goes fa-voomp, that's a bad day, and we've had that happen a few times.

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So when he said he turned them around, I said, Ray, just from a PR standpoint, and I mean, that's what I said, I want hazmat out there. If nothing else, because I know there's going to be cameras on this, they can get B roll of the rig there, but I want them out doing monitoring. And I said, I want to verify what Atmos is saying. And I remember saying this, I said, because I've been with Atmos enough times that when their mouth's moving, they're lying, so I want to make sure -- and I didn't mean that ugly. What I'm saying is take what they're telling you as a grain of salt, and I always -- I trust everybody, but I'm going to verify. Does that make sense? So I said, I want someone that understands what we're looking at, and what they're looking at. I'm not here to protect any individual or company, but I want to make sure I'm protecting the people that I'm sworn to serve.

So he said, I understand. And I said, plus, I said, Ray, this is something else. We have to make reports to the TCQ and the TRCC. I said, these reports that we send, not only to federal partners and all of this is just part of when we have a release, a significant event, a fuel spill, whatever may be, we have thresholds that we have to push out. And he said, I wasn't aware

of that, Chief. And I said, again, I'm not chewing on you. I'm just telling you why I'm fixing to call dispatch, and I'm calling Bobby directly on the phone, and I'm rolling them back out there, so when they get there, you're not going, hey, why are they here? And he said, I've just left the scene. Mark Combs is chief onsite. And I said, okay. I said, I need you to go back, coordinate that with Bobby and all because Bobby, as you all have seen, he's probably a lot like me, unfortunately, but he is a ball of energy. And so he loves hazmat as you all can tell, and he's like the little energized bunny. If you give him something, he's all over it. So -- and that's not a bad thing. I mean, he's the guy that sits around, will call me and say, hey, what if? What if we had -- okay. But that's good. Keeps you on your toes.

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that morning after they had been brought and sent back. And so even the hazmat guys, when I pulled up on the scene at 11, and they were loading things, some of them that I know, and I won't give their names -- you know, I rolled the window down a little bit as I was pulling in. This was after we had done a 360. And I asked them, I said, can I walk up there without any clothes on? They go, yeah. They go, Chief, we don't have any readings. Then they started MF-ing me and all that stuff about why they were out there, which is agitation. I told them, oh -- you know. And then when they realized it was a big deal, they called me later, said Chief, we're sorry. I said, I don't ever take it personal. You

know, I pick on myself.

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But they had come out there, and because they had not gotten anything on the readings, you know, they're, like, why are we back out here? So that's part of the culture too is when you have certain hazmat teams members that are a little more vocal, they get there and they browbeat if they think it's insignificant type event or maybe over, they will browbeat some of the other firefighters into, why are you calling me? We're the hut-hut team that needs to be over here cleaning up a diesel spill right now and whatever. But so that's kind of the thought on why and how they came back.

And so that's all I was doing with Ray. Ray O'Dell, Chief O'Dell was -- and I know he had a background. He actually, when he first hired on was a fire inspector, and realized that he wanted to fight fire. He came over after about a year or two to the fire side, and he's loved it. But he couldn't get on the firefighting side because you had to have 20/20 vision, and he had glasses back then or something. So but he is very knowledgeable on fire code things. So he has expertise in a lot of things. Hazmat is not one of his. And so I just explained why. That's all that was, a teaching moment for him in the future, maybe some of his other chiefs. So that's how they got involved.

Is that what you asked me?

DR. JENNER: Um-hum.

MR. PADGETT: Again, engaged just out of precaution.

BY DR. JENNER:

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Q. Right. What I might take away from your reply there was that he thought perhaps the situation was under control because -A. Yes, sir. No, he even told me that. He said, he said, I didn't -- he said, Ted -- of course, we know each other so it's first name, you know, on the phones and all this. And I don't ever go by Chief. I'm Ted. Ted-o. But he said, Ted-o, he said, I didn't see a need for them. He said, I turned them around, to get them back in service.

As you all heard earlier, our hazmat team is not a full-time hazmat team. It has 10 personnel assigned to it every day, minimum staffing, but they are assigned to trucks and engines and ambulances. And then when a call comes in, they get off their rigs and go. Captain Baker alluded to when they have an event right downtown Engine 3, Truck 3, Rescue 3, Battalion 1, they all respond. The hazmat rig is sitting back at the station. So it has to be a fill-in or someone to bring those diagnostics and tools and decon, all that stuff to the scene. So that's problematic in our current configuration.

I've even through this made a number of notes for Chief
Coatney because he's tackling a lot of things. He's kind of like
chewing on an elephant, and take a little bit every day. But this
is on his radar screen because, again, I like hazmat. I
understand hazmat. It was in my blood forever, still is, and
that's kind of where the fire service is going now. We don't just

fight fire anymore. It's a lot of not only EMS, here in Dallas, like I say, we'll push 300,000 plus runs, and 200,000 of them will be EMS calls. So the rest are fire and weird stuff, you know, hazmat, ARRF, swift water. Today even maybe it will be water rescues, high angle, you name it. So that's kind of what the citizens expect from us now is -- we even get called now because the police officers here in Dallas, people want lights and sirens, and we have under a 4-minute response to pretty much anywhere and so they will call us. And we actually get to scenes before police, which sometimes is not good.

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But that's what the citizens expect of the fire department. It's not just -- you know, now it's fire prevention and code enforcement and education and EMS and all the specialty things. Firefighting is kind of going away, and that's a good thing. But we have to evolve with it.

So really hazmat, especially for this region because they're a regional partner, our hazmat team is engaged in the 16 counties of North Central Texas Council of Governments. A lot of their equipment is -- has been purchased through everything from state homeland security grants, UASI grants, even the Council of Governments. So we have a commitment not only to Dallas but many times we roll outside our city limits, primarily to the east, Kaufman County, southern Dallas County, even to Ellis County, places like that. So -- took you down the road there.

Q. Okay. Great. Second question is, you mentioned you had a

- 1 good relationship with Atmos in terms of training and other
- 2 things. If -- just get you to expand on that.
- 3 A. Yes, sir. Atmos, they've built a Disneyland for gas workers
- 4 and firefighters up in -- it's on the, I guess, Richardson Frisco
- 5 border. I think it's more in Frisco. But it -- I could probably
- 6 be wrong on that. I could tell you how to get there. I'd have to
- 7 shoot you after I got there though.
- 8 Q. Okay.
- 9 A. No. It's a gas leak training facility. And we've had our --
- 10 our hazmat team has gone through there a number of times. We've
- 11 had a couple of engine companies that have gone outside the city
- 12 limits just to see. But I, myself, have been there. It's
- 13 something that periodically -- matter of fact, I think they have
- another awareness, you know, even tying in with Dig Test and some
- of those other things coming up here probably -- usually it's the
- 16 end of March, first of April.
- 17 But no, any time -- and to my knowledge any time we have
- 18 asked Atmos can we X, Y, Z, they're all over it. Yeah, let's do
- 19 that, just tell us when. We'll make it available, and we'll have
- 20 people there. So that has never been a problem to my knowledge
- 21 with our hazmat team of cooperation and/or -- I mean, I even said
- 22 earlier that we had monitors there for a number of years that
- 23 Atmos had purchased and had given to us to utilize in an
- 24 | agreement. And they kept them serviced. Just kind of like we
- 25 | were the users; they were the owners. And then ultimately we got

our own stuff and all just because we realized how much -- we didn't first think we were going to use those that much, but it's become beneficial because of being able to talk apples to apples.

So, no, we've had -- like I said, we've had training over the years. We've taught hazmat tech classes for the Texas Commission of Fire Protection. We've done a number of classes that have firefighters from the Council of Governments come in, and we've had Atmos representatives come out and speak on gas, you know, what's required on signages, and where -- buried lines, things -- all, everything that goes with that, what to look for, bubbles, smells, all the stuff that new operational and even technicians that may not have seen, and they have I won't say war stories, but they have things to show.

So we've had the pipeline group come out. There's a group around Dallas called the Danielle Dawn Smalley foundation. We had a -- I want to say it was Explorer pipeline. They had a isobutylene, I think, that blew up in Kaufman County. So they bring out stuff and show all that. So Atmos has been there.

DR. JENNER: Okay, great. That's all the questions I have for your involvement in this. So I'll go around the room, and see if anyone has questions, follow-up questions. But I -- after we do that, I'd like to get your impressions about the first two incidents. And so that's part two. But let's address any follow-up questions for this area.

BY MS. GUNARATNAM:

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- 1 Q. I had a question regarding -- because one thing I'm not clear
- 2 | about is the decision making of the evacuations, and who from the
- 3 | fire department was the one directly involved in that decision
- 4 making? Because I --
- 5 A. Directly involved? Because that --
- 6 Q. Sorry. Authorizing.
- 7 A. From me.
- 8 Q. Okay.
- 9 A. I mean, it -- I gave authority to our commanders.
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. But ultimately I pulled the trigger. I mean, I -- it's the
- 12 buck stops with me simply because, again, this was in conjunction
- 13 with information I received not only from Atmos, but also from my
- 14 troops. Once I had hazmat there, the more I thought about it, I
- 15 | thought just historically based on experiences I've had over 30
- 16 some odd years now, I know how these things tend to escalate. And
- 17 | I, as I alluded to earlier, I'd just as soon get a perimeter on
- 18 | it, and then choke it back down than I would to always keep
- 19 playing catch up. This is kind of knowing what I know today even,
- 20 this is bugging me that it keeps leapfrogging in places, and I
- 21 can't really put my thumb on it.
- 22 Q. Right.
- 23 A. That's problematic, especially in something of this type.
- 24 But that's just hazmat training, as you well know. You surround
- 25 the troops, choke it down, and get it, like I said, put it in a

- 1 | nice little package in a box for somebody to take care of, finish
- 2 | the mitigation, whatever it may be.
- 3 Q. So --
- 4 A. So I did not say, you guys, right now I'm at command, you go
- 5 do this. That was me doing that verbally on the phone saying,
- 6 here's what I want you to do.
- 7 Q. Okay. So because Captain Combs -- Captain, right?
- 8 A. Um-hum.
- 9 Q. Yeah. He was the first one to make the -- do the 4-block
- 10 radius?
- 11 A. Correct.
- 12 Q. Okay. So he was -- when those evacuation decisions were
- 13 being discussed, he would then communicate back to you about
- 14 those?
- 15 A. He didn't communicate to me directly. These, at this time,
- 16 | were coming from Ray O'Dell --
- 17 Q. Okay.
- 18 A. -- and coming from Lauren Johnson. So she's -- the way we do
- 19 our incident command, there's several little steps. But Lauren
- 20 was actually my go-to that I was saying here's what I need you to
- 21 do. Because she was on call. Therefore, I hate to say she had
- 22 | the button, as we call it, and the button was on her. But when
- 23 | she said 4 blocks, I said, I want to double that, and I told her
- 24 why. And then they're saying, well, this involves a school. And
- 25 I said, I understand that. Let's get up there, get readings, but

- 1 let's be proactive just in case.
- 2 Q. Right. Okay. And then, because from what I understand, on
- 3 Friday there was four, in total, like, decisions made for -- like
- 4 to constantly expand, right?
- 5 A. It kept going. I believe so. Yes, ma'am. And those were
- 6 dependent on once we had a true incident command set up.
- 7 Q. Right.
- 8 A. We start calling it a unified command because we realized
- 9 this is going to be bigger than what it started off as. Like I
- 10 said, the deputy chief went home. And so I said, okay, this is
- going to be something that's going to be drawn out so let's set
- 12 up a formal command here.
- 13 Q. Sure.
- 14 A. I want you all to start -- number one, we had cordoned off
- 15 the area to where, when people come, we're going to put them in a
- 16 choke point where they have to come here.
- 17 Q. Okay.
- 18 A. And if they need pets, tools. I was already getting phone
- 19 calls, heck, before even 10:00, I got pets there. I got -- heck,
- 20 I had city attorneys calling me. Hey, I live over there. I have
- 21 a dog. Can you tell me what's going on? So it's not just them.
- 22 It's everybody.
- 23 Q. Yes.
- 24 A. And I know there's a lot of elderly here. Like I said, it's
- 25 a working community, so I knew it was really going to expand at

- 1 | night. So that's why I was saying, let's get a handle on this,
- get a choke point, have them funnel through that. That frustrated
- 3 | a lot of citizens, but I think it was the right thing to do.
- 4 That's one reason I ordered buses to come out there because of the
- 5 | rain, things got bad, where they could at least just get up on a
- 6 bus out of the weather. It wasn't to take them anywhere. It was
- 7 to give shelter.
- 8 Q. Right.
- 9 A. We opened up the rec center where they could get some
- 10 information. You all kind of heard how that worked for a while
- and then kind of waned in the midnight hours, so to speak. So --
- 12 Q. So with each decision of those four would you -- they would
- 13 update you, and say we did this or --
- 14 A. Yes, ma'am.
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. Yeah. I'd given them carte blanche.
- 17 Q. Right.
- 18 A. I told Lauren, I said, I trust our commanders out there. I
- 19 knew it was Chief Clumpner. I'm very familiar with his work and I
- 20 know how diligent he is. Mark Combs, even though he's a captain,
- 21 I know how diligent he is. Lauren Johnson, outstanding. Even
- 22 Captain Baker, hazmat, as quirky as he is, he's very good. And
- 23 his troops are good.
- 24 O. Okav.
- 25 A. Sometimes you got to light a fire under them, but there's a

- 1 lot on different shifts that have done really, really well.
- 2 Q. Okay. So when Atmos wanted to lift that evacuation on
- 3 Saturday, so Lauren was able to make that decision, say, yeah,
- 4 okay?
- 5 A. Correct.
- 6 Q. Okay.
- 7 A. And, again, based on as she would even say, these are the
- 8 subject matter experts for this particular product. So I don't
- 9 want to say that. I gave them free reign to make decisions under
- 10 my authority on behalf of the fire chief who was gone. Of course,
- 11 I'm communicating things to him in North Dakota or wherever he
- was. This whole time, everything I'm doing or they're doing, I'm
- communicating to the city manager and mayor and our PIO so he can
- 14 get on it. I also asked our PIO to coordinate with Atmos. He was
- 15 having a little trouble getting with her. I know her phone was
- 16 blowing up like everybody's, but making sure they're putting out
- 17 | the same statements.
- 18 And I was hearing things on the radio that sounded good, but
- 19 in actuality they weren't occurring. And there was frustration
- 20 with the citizens about where do we go? Where do we stay?
- 21 Nobody's -- and a lot of them don't say anything because, quite
- 22 | frankly, a lot of them are -- don't know if you want to say
- 23 Dreamers or whatever, but they're here and not maybe citizens.
- 24 And, therefore, I think that's a lot of reason a lot these calls
- 25 didn't come into 911 potentially. I'm just quessing. Because we

- 1 have seen even crimes over here they go unreported because of just
- 2 | the fear of authorities and what may happen to me, and that's
- 3 unfortunate, but that's the reality.
- 4 Q. So you said you went to Espanola --
- 5 A. Espanola, yes, ma'am.
- 6 Q. -- on at around 11:30 a.m. that morning --
- 7 A. Yes, ma'am.
- 8  $\mathbb{Q}$ . -- to the actual house, and you took photos of the front.
- 9 A. I took a photo, one photo.
- 10 Q. One photo, okay. And you observed the damage there. Did you
- 11 | interact with any Atmos people then?
- 12 A. No, ma'am. Like I said, I saw a, what I believe was a
- 13 contractor that was on that block that kind of walked up that --
- 14 and I just remember when he turned around he had on a safety vest.
- 15 I didn't talk with him, but he had a safety vest that I can still
- 16 see. It was kind of like a -- looked like a drilling rig. Had a
- 17 pole. It didn't look like an A-frame drilling platform or
- 18 something. It just looked like maybe an auger company or
- 19 something. But I can't even remember the name of it. It didn't
- 20 say Atmos. I just knew it was like a third-party contractor.
- 21 Q. Okay.
- 22 A. And I assumed that that was an Atmos contractor, not
- 23 necessarily Atmos representative. But he was obviously doing
- 24 something at the end of the street with his crew. Like I said,
- 25 there were holes being punched.

- 1 Q. Okay.
- 2 A. At least what I saw all over the place.
- 3 Q. And how long did you stay?
- 4 A. I was there probably an hour.
- 5 Q. Okay. All right. And then you went to the command post
- 6 after that?
- 7 A. I drove to the command post. I actually did not go into the
- 8 command post. I -- because this time we thought we had it done.
- 9 I was the same way. I told Mark Combs, who was the battalion
- 10 there, I said, I'm leaving you with this. He said Clumpner is
- 11 down at the command post. They've moved it together. I said,
- great. And I said -- he said, it sounds like we're fixing to wrap
- 13 this up. And I said, okay, just dot your i's and cross your t's.
- 14 Let me know what you have. Anything changes give me a call. I'm
- 15 headed back to City Hall.
- 16 Q. Okay.
- 17 A. And I left it with him and, like I said, that's kind of where
- 18 things went from there.
- 19 Q. Okay. And so when exactly did the mayor get involved?
- 20 A. This is going to sound great. City of Dallas, we are a city
- 21 manager run government. So the mayor is a figurehead, but he is
- 22 over the City Council. So just like, well, Saturday is when I
- 23 knew -- let me back up. Friday night I was getting some
- information from his front man. I call him the armor bearer,
- Scott Goldstein. He's the guy that shouts the mayor's coming, and the mayor comes in. Going to get fired after this, and he was

- me notes on, hey, what's up, what's the update? What's this and 1 that? And then I want to say it was Saturday morning Scott sent 2 something that he had given my information to, I think, it was 3 Mohammed, and I quess they heard the NTSB, you all were coming, 4 which I had a hunch you all were coming anyway when this thing 5 started. It didn't end that one time.
- The next morning I was going, okay -- that's why I got 7 dressed and came back in. It's interesting because my daughter 8 had flown in for her birthday Sunday, and we had planned 9 all this stuff. That was all kind of scrapped. But that's how it 10 happens. When Ted's on call weird things happen. They're not going 11 to let 12
- me do this anymore, which has happened, they say that, and they 13 14 still continue. But as you can tell, I have a little problem with 15 ADD, focusing on what you asked me.
- 16 The mayor, he --
- 17 So Scott Goldstein was how he reached out to me. 18 talked to the mayor directly. It was through his email to his 19 underling to me.
- 2.0 Ο. Okay.

6

21 There have been some times where I've talked to him on the 22 phone, not with this event. And then our assistant city manager, 23 John Fortune, after that he kind of started taking the heat off of 24 me from those higher-ups, and I started communicating everything 25 directly to him. And they were pumping us for information because

- 1 | the City Council members in this area, Medrano and Narvaez.
- 2 | Narvaez, I can't say that right. He -- they're, you know, they
- 3 were getting all kind of -- wanting updates. And then they were
- 4 getting reports. It was kind of like playing post office. You
- 5 had people that were coming up with, oh, we had a fire over here,
- 6 | a call over here. None of that was verified, but it was
- 7 | everything from Hidalgo, and then even all the way over off of
- 8 | Winnetka and West Dallas. It's in his district. Councilman
- 9 Medrano's district, and Councilman Narvaez district are long and
- 10 | slender, and so they run almost from downtown city, all the area
- 11 | all the way up to the northwest side of Love Field. So this is
- 12 his area.
- 13 Q. And that was Friday night they started inquiring about --
- 14 A. Friday night.
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. Yes, sir. Actually, it really started Friday. I quess when
- 17 | the second round of evacuations kind of started when it -- they
- 18 | had it cordoned, and then it, I don't want to say it jumped, but
- 19 really when it changed was when they decided they were going to
- 20 | have to evacuate those apartments on Bolivar, and I think it's
- 21 | called Bolivar Place and Over the Rainbow or something, and that
- 22 was 200 and some units. And we were, like, oh, goodness, here we
- 23 go. And then we get that kind of contained, and the next morning,
- 24 I quess, it jumped to -- and I may have my times off on that, but
- 25 it jumped to the other side of Marsh to the couple of streets that

- 1 | are kind of parallel or linear in line with Espanola and Durango.
- 2 | It's the other side, but it's a little bit south, I think, or
- 3 west, I guess that would be.
- 4 Q. All right. Okay.
- 5 A. Yeah. So mayor is a figurehead, city manager runs it. You
- 6 know, council members, people, press wearing you out. So it was
- 7 just trying to get everything even on our end wrapped up and
- 8 figured out and -- and that's why, you know, I don't want to sound
- 9 like I'm kicking Atmos because I'm going to kick ourselves too as
- 10 far as the fire department, but I knew there was a dark period.
- 11 There literally was a dark period where maybe they thought it was
- down turning. Maybe we all did. I know we did. And then I think
- 13 they got their game legs back up under them, and kind of going
- 14 from there.
- 15 Q. Friday, was it raining then?
- 16 A. It was kind of like it's doing right now, misting and
- 17 | raining. We had rain that came in really hard, I want to say
- 18 | around 7:30. That's why I was glad -- we had some cold weather so
- 19 that's why I was glad we had buses out there just because at that
- 20 | time we had people lined up trying to get in.
- 21 There's a lot of frustration over that. People were going to
- 22 | the various, I don't want to say checkpoints, but barricades, and
- 23 then being routed all the way around to that northwest, west
- 24 | corner where the command post was so they could feed in from
- 25 there. So, and at that time I was asked, what do we let them do?

And I said, all I want to do is allow them to get their pets, any necessary medicines, and if there's any -- something of significance. It's not to go get your clothes and cousin's toys 3 and all that. Because I was thinking of the pure volume of how 4 5 many people that would be.

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Something else that I had told to Chief Johnson, I said get with our shop, which is where our maintenance facility is, and get their extra Suburbans that we have in reserve. Bring those out there where we can pony people in, not have to -- I even thought about, and I didn't -- I spoke with Mark Combs when I was at the scene saying you think I need to get our all terrain vehicles in here? We have those Gators that can run up and down. Because of the alleys, I didn't know where the people had houses. A lot of these have been cut up and redone. And he said, I don't think we're going to be here that long. I said, okay, because I was already thinking long term streets being closed because the dirt and stuff. We can get over that a lot easier than a Suburban. And I knew there's a lot of elderly that we weren't going to be able just to walk up to their house. So that's kind of the thought process. But I didn't intend on it to be a -- at least in my mind an extended, let me go get my socks and underwear and 15 different garments and so forth.

Q. Last question for this. Did you -- have you ever seen something similar? Like have you ever seen an incident like this? Yes, ma'am. Α.

- 1 Q. Similar to the Friday incident?
- 2 A. Yes, ma'am. I've seen houses pop. I've seen -- I've been on
- 3 deployments up in -- we've had some in Garland. We had some in
- 4 McKinney. I've been on Task Force 1 when we had, heck, Katrina
- 5 and Rita. We had gas lines blowing and stuff everywhere. I --
- 6 yes, ma'am. I've seen stuff like that all over.
- 7 Q. Okay. So it wasn't really a surprise like?
- 8 A. Not to me, no.
- 9 Q. All right.
- 10 A. I mean, when I got there, you know, I'm listening to what's
- 11 going on. When I got there, there was no doubt in my mind that we
- 12 had had a gas explosion.
- 13 Q. Okay.
- 14 A. Just due to the lack of fire damage. There was none. And
- 15 | what I had seen of an implosion/explosion inside. It wasn't
- 16 | imploded. It was pushed out. And just the force of the debris
- 17 and things. It -- no doubt to my mind.
- 18 Q. Okay.
- 19 A. And that's what, like I said, that's one reason I came to the
- 20 scene when I'm -- all the things I was telling you, I had kind of
- 21 | checklist in my head. That morning on Friday I was asking
- 22 dispatch to run me some reports over what was -- been in that area
- 23 related to that. Because when I heard explosion, I was thinking
- 24 was it a fire or what? Then when I start seeing, well, they had a
- 25 | couple other fires.

And so on the fire side, I'm already making mental notes going why wouldn't A plus B equal C, kind of put together in this area. And then do we have several different companies? Which happened. I see who is answering what. Are they not communicating? Are we not getting a picture of that? You start having clusters, just like with fire fatalities, you go, okay, why am I having so many here?

I've seen that -- you know, when I got over to arson we had -(indiscernible) we had a area northwest of Dallas up off Audelia
and all that I noticed we had a lot of geriatric fatalities in
probably a 10-block area. And I did some more investigation,
chased it down. Well, all those homes were built in the late '70s.
A lot of them have aluminum wiring. They had Federal Pacific fuse
panels that had been recalled, and most of that area are retired
and geriatric, actually widows, and having fires at night and
unable to get out. And so we were able to go in the neighborhood,
do a home safety and do some checks and things.

So, but you look for clusters of why. Things don't just -you don't have things like this that just happen, and go, oh,
God's green earth. That's what happened.

21 Q. Okay.

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- 22 A. There's a reason.
- 23 Q. All right, thank you.
- 24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No questions.
- 25 MR. PADGETT: 20 minutes. I went too far.

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1
         UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don't have any.
 2
                       Oh, good. Look at that.
         MR. PADGETT:
 3
         DR. JENNER:
                      Tell you what. Why don't we take a 5, 10-minute
 4
    break, and we'll regroup.
 5
         (Off the record.)
 6
          (On the record.)
 7
         DR. JENNER: We're back on the record.
 8
         BY DR. JENNER:
                You've been a group member in the last couple of days
 9
10
    in several interviews, and you've heard what we've heard, and as
    much as you're comfortable with, we'd like to go back and get your
11
    -- sort of your opinion and your impression of the two other
12
    incidents that are sort of related to this. And there's one that
13
    occurred on February 21st and one on February 22nd. So I'll just
14
    throw it over to you.
1.5
         Okay.
16
         About the February 21st incident, and based on what you've
17
    learned, and what's your take away from all that?
18
         Well, as chief of staff, my job again is to always look for
19
    needs and improvements and things that maybe we need to shore up
2.0
    on our end as far as fire and rescue. So I'll start with that.
21
    Based on what I saw -- can we hang on one second? Can I take this
22
23
    from Chief Coatney?
24
          (Off the record.)
25
          (On the record.)
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MR. PADGETT: All right, so we're back. 1 DR. JENNER: We're back. 2 We're fixing to get jukebox jerking, the percolator 3 perking, get out of the way 'cause you can't go wrong. I'm gonna 4 play your song here on WTOP. Dallas area weather today, partly 5 6 cloudy 20 percent chancerain. Overnight low 43, high today 65. 7 Back -- the ADD issue, squirrel. What I have seen related to 8 the fire department, as I stated earlier, I asked our dispatch, our communications to go back and pull runs that are kicked out by 9 10 our computer assisted dispatch, CAD. Go back and research CAD, and find me codes that are gas leaks, gas in the area, investigations, 11 12 fires in this parameter. And off the top of my head, I want to say -- I've got some .pdfs of that now, but I want to say there's been 13 14 -- and I had them run that back to Friday, I believe, the 16th, if that's right. And so essentially I went back a week, and I want to 15 say we had 12 hits, 11 or 12. I say that. I'd have to count but 16 off the top of my head. And they ranged everything from a gas 17 smell to some fires to the three particular that you're asking me. 18 19 2.0 BY DR. JENNER: 21 And I'm sorry. Just what time period did you go --22 I went back to -- I asked them to roll back to Friday, I 23 believe, it was February 16th. I think that's the exact week from 24 Yeah. Friday was the 23rd. So, yeah. Friday, wasn't it?

CAD came back with -- this area that we had highlighted came back

with -- and, again, this is off the top of my head, 11 or 12 incidents, including the 2 that you had -- that actually were on Durango behind the house on Friday.

2.0

So this is where I shifted into my arson investigator mode.

So I'm thinking, what would I do? And so when you ask me, I'm being introspective here. Number one, I need to reprioritize the fact that hazmat rolls on unknowns and gas leaks of any consequence. They can always be turned around by the companies, if you know Atmos is there, and I hate to say it, if it's a meter in the back alley or something that -- not that that's insignificant, but that can be handled better than a full-scale. Atmos knows what they're doing. And I think some of our troops have just assumed -- you know, so we have protocols for that.

I made a note to actually make sure that we get that pounded home. Because something I may not have said on the record, but City of Dallas, we lose around 80, 85 firefighters a year. We have close to 2,000. I think our authorized strength is 2163 to be exact. But this past year we've lost a little over 260 in the last calendar year, and our -- excuse me -- fiscal year. Our calendar year, as of January, we're already 65 in the hole, and it's typically because of some changes on the pension and an older fire crew.

So we've had a number of promotions lately. So as you all have maybe seen, we have a lot of new captains, new deputies, new chiefs, a lot of youngers that are coming up, and the olders are

kind of rotating out. Firefighting is not a young man's or a young woman's job for sure. So if you're out there on the rig and climbing ladders and stuff it's difficult. So I don't know.

We've been doing a lot of officer in-service training. So this is something that needs to come up on things that are outside of normal fire calls and EMS calls. I'm very confident they can handle that, but hazmat and USAR and swift water and things are -- and this just as a teaching point that hazmat -- whether they'd have made a difference or not, I don't know, but on the initial call that I was aware of Friday, I think they should have been there and not turned back.

2.0

Now the second part is, I'm a little -- and I'll be honest,
I'm a little disappointed and irritated with the arson
investigators, their job is to determine origin and cause, and
they utilized a legalese, if you will, to say undetermined on a
couple fires that happened on Durango, which is proper, but in my
opinion they're paid to make decisions and they have the knowledge
to make decisions. And it seemed that they did everything but say
it was this or that. And, again, I can't get in their head and
say that, but based on the interviews and what I've heard and what
I have read, there's no doubt in my mind that we had an issue with
gas. And, therefore, it should have -- the pieces should have
been put together potentially sooner.

And I will even say that based on -- and I can't tell you who I had the conversation with, but we had -- Atmos has had crews out

here, whether they were replacing some lines or whatnot, at least that I know of Sunday or Monday prior to the fire. So that would have been around the 17th, maybe 18th. Because I thought it was odd that, well, it's a city holiday -- Presidents Day, I think, was the 18th -- and they had crews that were out in this area.

2.0

So a good arson investigator will do a canvass of the neighborhood. What's going on? Here's kind of the stuff. And I think they thought it was a routine fire. It wasn't. We had a back end burned out. We have a lot of fires every day. I mean, I say a lot literally, and a lot of them are single-frame residence like this, and you're kind of in and out. And I think they got -- in my opinion, they got complacent, maybe not individually, but as collectively, as a whole, that they didn't share the information.

I know I heard one of the arson investigators, Captain
Westbrook, say -- I heard the Friday thing comment. I thought,
oh, yeah, I've had a fire over there, and I told such and such.
Well, especially not that they're short staffed, and they got
younger crews there, I would think they would be communicating
even more because a lot of them are doing double shifts and
things, and they should be able to put those pieces together.
Maybe I'm wrong on that, but I know historically the arson
investigators, every day they get up and they pull the evening
runs that they were not dispatched on, maybe car fires because we
have a lot of insurance claims. A lot of people dump cars here
and burn. So we're always having cases that we're working because

the insurance agencies and all.

2.0

And lot of counties around Dallas don't investigate car fires. People don't know that. But they come to Dallas and all of a sudden because we have the paying entities that are in the city of Dallas, it becomes our case. And so we have a lot of cases, arson cases working. Very proud of their clearance rate. But in this case, I guess since it wasn't arson, it was kind of -- you know, maybe that's not important. I don't know. I do know what needs to be drilled home: I need more communication sharing and information sharing between the respective arson investigators.

I will tell you that Chief Coatney and I since this has occurred, have had personal discussions of putting firefighters paired with arson investigators in the thought process to make them arson investigators, just to give more tools to the existing young people we have over there. Because firefighters are well versed in building construction. They're well versed in — typically have a working knowledge, let me put it that way, of electrical, gas, things of that nature. Whereas, I didn't feel like I heard that from the arson investigators that we heard from. They may know that. I didn't feel like that was expressed. I felt like you got more detail from the officers that are in the field than you did from those that really should have more details, with the exception of a few.

I thought Rene Molina was very good at what he did. His job was interviewing and getting questions. I thought he asked

pertinent questions and pointed questions, and had good answers for that, but that was the extent. It was like the military. This is my lane, I'm not getting out either side. This is what I was tasked to do, I did it. And he's very good at that. At his current rank, he's not allowed to be the lead investigator. Rank sometime -- I don't know, anyway.

2.0

So that needs to be looked at, the dynamics of that, and how we do things. And even our promotional career path as inspectors, code enforcement officers, fire marshals and then into arson. I'm not sure that's the best path to go. A lot of cities do that.

Apparently Dallas has done it for years. I just feel like as a firefighter, I know when I got over there as an arson investigator, I was, you know, the first non-fire code guy that came over there I had to learn all this. But lot of stuff that it took them a long time to learn was just natural for a firefighter. I mean, you see and process things without even realizing you're doing it. So that was the second thing that I noticed.

I also wanted to, since we have new chiefs -- I know I made some notes. I wanted to have a chiefs training. They already have task books for those that are coming up. And I wanted -- I don't know, little more maybe ownership of incidents and following up instead of just coming back. And I don't know if they do this, but kind of, you know, putting your feet up, and waiting on the next call. Because in the fire service, we don't have the luxury of making excuses or mistakes, quite frankly. And whether -- I

don't want to say mistakes, but some things were -- or some oversight that didn't get done or some follow-ups that I think in the best case would have occurred on the fire side.

2.0

Because I made some notes about how they make decisions.

Some things are planned, and other things are automatic. I want them to be automatic where they're trained on things. You've heard that from some of the officers we had, some of the others, maybe not. Just the who, what, why, I thought that should have been done under arson investigators.

I had a note here about leadership. Everybody's got a bad day, but I wrote fix the problem. Don't become complacent and quit or just that's not mine; I'll go home today, punch a clock. Let's fix it. I want everybody to take on that role. So lot of it has to do with leadership. I won't get into all that.

Has to do with expectations. I wrote a note here that I have expectations from whether it's the person you're riding with in the rig as an officer, what they have for you, the person in the jump seat next to you, from your driver, your assistant on the fire scene, from that officer, even what that officer expects from his crew, and what we as command expect from our subordinates to come from us. There's no gray line in our job, and I wrote that in here. We have protocols, MOPs and SOPs for a reason. They're not there just when we get in trouble to go look, but it needs to be studied. And so that's something — that's part of what I said about acting versus reacting, planned and automatic. That needs

to be second nature.

2.0

It's important as a leader, I said I want -- some of these that I saw did not have -- and maybe I don't have that, did not have a command presence. I had notes that I wrote that it's -- as a leader you always look to have that command presence. And I feel like when everything, as I stated, is kind of going to pot, it's my job to be the steady rock, and kind of -- and I've been blessed. God's blessed me when things are flying, everything kind of slows down for me, and I -- just tells you how old I am, I go to a Rolodex in my head, you know, kind of seen that, done that. Here, it's going here. Or never seen that, let me write that down. But it's all about being easy going, remaining positive, confident, in control at all times.

Some of our arson personnel came across with that persona, but I think that was a guise because I don't think there's a lot of depth there. Even what's their confidence level, and what is their comfort level at what they do? I had a note there. How — that's something else. Our arson people, I want them to get their curriculum vitae, however you say that, get that listed. Because some of them came in here, and they said I did this or this. I think it's important for them to be able to punch to their training records or whatever it is.

There's a lot of stuff I'll provide for you all for the people that have asked, hazmat and things like that. But that ought to be something, because maybe they have never testified in

court, but I have for a number of things, and that's something they're going to dig into, and it's important to get it out there and then make yourself a -- hate that word -- subject matter expert, but you can at least be confident in what you're doing, and know that you've done it right.

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They should also know -- going back to arson. I was amazed that none of them spoke about the scientific method and how they investigate. I heard them talk about we go from least burned to most burned. And maybe they knew that, but I think it was imperative for them to delineate the steps on how they do investigations, and had they had followed that, in my opinion, they would have come to these conclusions that I think were glaringly obvious, at least in my mind. So maybe they need to brush upon their skills. A whole list of notes here. I'm sorry. Everybody is accountable for the action of their subordinates, and this includes everything starts and ends with you. It's just like I've told our officers, I can only control what I can control. But as I alluded to earlier, I trust everybody. There are some people that have taken so many withdrawals that I have to verify everything they say. And I alluded to that earlier, I feel the same way with a lot of contractors and vendors and/or in this case Atmos. I trust what they say, but I want to verify just because I'm making decisions not just for Ted, but for basically 2100 firefighters in the city in that particular case.

We have a breakdown of communications. We have a lot of

things going in different areas, and not really explaining why or what on both sides, but with our fire operations personnel and our arson personnel, and even command staff, It just goes back to the three C's, and I jotted them here, clear, concise and confirmed.

I always want to make sure that they heard that because they -- kind of like this center here on Grundy, I had OEM, Kevin Oden, which I know is a great guy, said, yeah, I got it. Okay. I didn't worry about that because Kevin's always been Johnny on the spot.

2.0

But then when I -- Lauren and I were here sitting there doing twiddle thumbs, I called Ms. Ross, who is the Parks department representative. She works downtown. I said -- she goes, well, our people don't show up until 9. I said, well, didn't Kevin call you? Yeah, but he never really gave me a time; I didn't know. So, again, got to confirm that, all right, you told me you got it. I have people here at such and such time. Just like yesterday. And obviously they moved us from here to there. That happened just by somebody here, but I was told B. I didn't know they had the Rec Centers or whatever doing their EMS or flip-flopping.

So SOPs, making sure everything is standardized. I wrote in here is it lack of experience or training? If it's training, that's my obligation. If it's -- if they're on the job, it's their obligation. But I offered it to them because fire and depth and all that, that's not stupid; firefighters are, but we can learn.

Some of the signs, I don't know if -- just one thing I think in the history of this department that has changed, but when I came on, rookies and nozzle men/women, were to be on the line and not to speak about anything they saw or whatever. You pass that through your chain of command. You don't even talk unless I talk to you. That's old school. And all the companies I have throughout -- we have a rank structure for a reason. Take the hits, but they also get the glory when it's something they've done right. But everybody that worked for me knew they can speak freely, and I don't take offense to that. I learn just as well as anybody, but I expect them -- because that's the only way they're going to learn, and lot of times they'll see things that maybe I don't see as an incident commander.

2.0

I heard Horacio Garcia here saying, did you see Atmos running around in the back? Well, all he knew was the guy came back and said the gas was off. Well, I also knew that Mark Combs, that's the first thing the truck company captain does. He went and when he thought he had gas, he cut the gas off himself. That's why the Atmos guy didn't take too long. He went around, probably verified, yeah, it's off, did his thing, came around. But Horacio, like he said, I got a lot of other things going on. Well, in this particular case he had already assumed I got ambulances. I got this and that. What else was there, other than following some steps and clearing up and getting back? So I want to make sure that everybody is on the page with what their

responsibilities are for the various rank structures. Because the buck does stop with them. And we have people, public, industry, whoever, looking at us, and even your own personnel that are going, okay, I want to be like that, I don't want to be like that.

2.0

And so I think we should have picked up on the gas odor calls in the neighborhood, number of calls just from these stations that answered. They work with each other so much, I think there should have been something like that.

The utility notifications on the fire alarms, we call them boxes, that has been being made. Maybe that needs to be an automatic, and then we can turn them back around. Because I know in this case Atmos or even Oncor they don't run Code 3. So lot of times we're still fighting fire with lines arcing and gas going, things. And that's one reason we do carry gas tools. That's a little easier to take care of. We can find a meter at industrial park or whatever. We're shutting off everything we have.

Gas meters, we at one time had them on all our chiefs cars.

We still now do. I didn't hear a battalion chief, one, say that they utilized -- they have 4-gas meters on there specifically for incidents like this, and/or overhaul where they can come in and -- you know, we put in specially gas meters for carbon monoxide.

Obviously that's standard on 4-gas, but also for hydrogen cyanide for after and overhaul activities, just because of the influx of cancer and other problems. I didn't hear any of them say that.

At one time we pulled them off all the rigs. We had them on engines and stuff. They were never being used. We had people that were pulling 4-gas meters thinking it was a methane detector. And we had -- hazmat has the PIDs because methane is up on that higher scale on the ionization potential. So they have the special bulbs. I think it's an 11-7. Most of them run with a 10-3 or something, and that can see pretty much everything except those higher ends. But none of that was utilized. I didn't hear that.

2.0

They may have carbon monoxide detectors, and I have seen even when I've ridden out in the field just to stay up, crews pull things off, and I go, why are you taking that in? Oh, yeah, we got a gas leak. You taking carbon monoxide in because you think maybe we got carbon monoxide buildup? And then they'll realize, yeah, that's why I'm doing it. And that's fine. Because carbon monoxide lot of times when gas is out occurs it's like I was concerned, I still am, what's going on in the neighborhood is the minute we let them back in their house, if they don't have gas and it's going to be cold tonight, they're going to cook one way or the other. And I've seen everything from charcoal in the house to bringing in their turkey fryer or whatever and using propane tanks, and carbon monoxide goes out the door. And we've had issues with that.

Matter of fact, one of those calls that has happened recently was a carbon monoxide off of one of the streets north of here.

And I think it might have been because they turned something off, and I don't know, I didn't follow up on that in particular. I just noticed that the other day.

2.0

All right. I think there should have been a better sketch of the home and layout, and I'm hoping that when I get the arson reports that they will have better layouts on the individual structures. One of the structures, the one on Friday, I understand, because it was compromised that they weren't comfortable going in. Again, that goes back to understanding building construction. But the other two, in my opinion, there wasn't an excuse.

I am dismayed that -- a heater doesn't just miracle itself out of the world. I've heard that come up. No one knows where that is. If the individual didn't have fragmentation on him, a heater didn't just dissolve itself. I mean, if it's a typical, and making assumption, space heater that was in the wall, gas fed from the '50s and '60s like they were, I should see some ceramic debris. I should see some, you know, some of the braiding that's in there. I should see some of it, even the vermiculite blocks that are in there to keep the heat I should see that somewhere. A good arson investigator should have chased that down.

I heard them describe the bathroom and this, that and the other, but I don't know where it is. And they said everything is up on the roof. You get a ladder set off a truck. Even if you're using a arrow you don't have to get in the structure. Get up

there and get a picture. But, again, this was a, quote/unquote, routine fire. So that's something.

2.0

I want every one of our arson investigators, I want the ignition source determined. And the way to do that -- I didn't hear any of them say I ruled out all the possible -- when you have an undetermined, that also means you've ruled out every other possible alternative or not? I get our protocol here is if you have a fatality they'll leave it undetermined just by the chance new info. In this case, I think it was very obvious. They said the person had no obvious external injuries, little cuts and scrapes, but the young lady on Friday died from the concussion wave of a blast. It just tore up her insides. And she was a little petite thing, so that was reasonable. And I heard she slept in the LR. I didn't know that, but the protection, the fact there was no wall there from where the, I assume, water heater was, et cetera. I don't know.

So I also heard, and I wrote this quote down from one of our arson investigators that they said this was the third incident in that area so I paid more attention. I wrote that down as a quote. That's concerning to me because you should be paying more attention to everything if that's the case. I need to know we're going to get that. Talked about the layouts, photos, interior sketches, just case files, you know, just origin and cause. I hate to keep pounding on that, but come on! Understanding fire dynamics as arson investigators, even firefighters on what flames mean. I heard no opinion a lot of

times. Okay. They're asking you for your opinion, you have an opinion, good, bad, indifferent. That's how we learn. And I heard an arson investigator say that they couldn't take pictures or they did take pictures, I heard both, because the ground was all snowed up. Meaning, we had foam on-site. That foam dissipates after a while. That's their job as an arson investigator to maintain the scene until you get what you need, and then you can release it.

2.0

Oh, just food for thought. For our department, we had a breach in our battalion chief's MDCs. You kind of heard that. So we had a period where, like Scott Clumpner, they were going into this fire blind, didn't have all the data lot of times they have. We had just had that on Wednesday. So we had a malware that got into some of the battalion chiefs cars on their mobile computers just because they used a generic password. They got hacked. And that was a case in point that firefighters will run through that wall for you, but they're not the sharpest knives in the drawer. It' just easy to just put "Station 35" or "password" or whatever it is, you know, a third grader could hack into this stuff.

So we've gotta learn just a note for us. We've gotten with our communication information services and made sure that that's been shored up. Changed passwords and things, and given new edicts on that. But I heard that kind of come into play with Scott. It didn't impact his decision making, but he was not able to see normally what he would see, comments or maybe some old calls.

There's a lot of information that gets pushed out to them on the mobile data terminals, and that's on all of our rigs.

2.0

I was very pleased with the fire officers that you did interview. I thought they were -- I won't say rock stars, but I thought they explained everything that they did very well. It was a logical progression, systematic with what they were doing. A lot of them told you I've never seen this before, that's to be explained, but I thought even based on those circumstances did very well. And to a T most of them said I'm relying on Atmos because they're the subject matter experts. We encourage that. If there's something that you're not sure about or you don't have personal knowledge of, you still put that in the back of your head, but you follow what's here. They did that to a point all the way through.

I think we've learned here that it's not over till it's over. I realized how many other city entities have been involved.

There's been parks, DART, PIOs, streets. Even to the point where, I guess, it was Saturday when I got called, and heard people were going back in their house unescorted, and that was one thing I remember telling Captain Combs is that I wanted some of those street barricades there. And we had police there. That that house wasn't to be entered, just because of the structural integrity. And then I hear -- it's kind of like when people think we're leaving, streets comes picks up their barricades. I need this back on the shelf, and this looks good here, so let's go.

And so maybe it's good to communicate to whoever they may be that you don't pull anything off until the fire department comes to you and says we're out of here 100 percent. That's some more communications. Okay. So that's fire department. That's a lot.

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On the other side, I felt as I alluded to earlier, and I'm not trying to kick anybody. I'm just being honest here, because I've poked our own self in the eye. I felt like as I've stated it took Atmos a while to get on top of this. I understand the contacts I had, they weren't meant to be the down and dirty on the scene, but the people that our troops spoke with on the scene, a lot of them were contractors and didn't really have intel you know, who am I reporting to? They probably know where to get their paycheck from, but they don't know who is the Grand Puba. And so it may have been that that dark period was just them trying to get up. But I need to reiterate I need somebody that's at my hip to be able to answer questions whether from myself or underlings.

I thought that Atmos is doing outstanding now. I felt that they had dropped the ball probably just due to fatigue and the lack of personnel with the public relations aspect coming out of the gate. The fact that we had this center open here, and it was like they kind of just handed it to Red Cross and walked away as far as the PR part. Now I know the troops are out there working, but we had a public that had all kind of questions and answers they wanted. I didn't have those to give them. The City Manager didn't have those to give them because I wasn't given anything,

and I wasn't getting anything from Atmos. And I didn't want to burn Atmos in the press, and say we're not getting anything from them. And I'm telling you all that in here because these have been very good partners at least in my tenure. So we all have bad days, and like I said, I felt like it was just a while for them to get up to speed on what's going on.

2.0

I'm not sure that I was given the whole truth from the start. That bothers me because I think it was much bigger or they had an assumption it was much bigger because of the amount of work I saw going on prior to the event being started, the event I call as Friday. They didn't just dig those holes an hour before I got there. There was a lot of work going on in a big area prior to Friday. So whether that was planned pipeline change-outs, I don't know. I just think it's awful convenient. Let's put it that way.

I admire Atmos because this is poking them in the eye really for taking care of these people, putting them in hotels. It probably was a room some of them have never been in before. It's probably nicer digs than they've ever had. But they're doing everything they can to take care of them, and so I applaud them for that. They've been very forthright with information since. And that's being filtered in different ways. It's still, like anything of this magnitude, which just started as a little mole hill and now it's big, there's all kind of things to fix on the communications side. Getting ahead of it, as I stated, I've learned that over the years. Just getting the press and the PR

groups together, and then getting them on your side to pump out information is a lot better than invoking what sells. And I said earlier, if you have a picture of a dog and the Pope and something about a fire, that's going to be the evening news. And around here, especially when people cannot speak and English is not their first language, and I'm using that just kind of generically — that's troublesome. Because now it's just what I know is word of mouth, and what you're telling me, by the time it gets around there is something worse.

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So I think we were very lucky both for everyone involved that we had one fatality, and luckily not any super serious injuries. I mean, we had people injured, we had people burned, but the fact that we lost a life, little bit here or there that may not have occurred, that's going to bother me just because I'm wondering what on the fire department's side could we have done to prevent that.

Other entities. I think the police department has been very responsive, as they always are. That's one thing here in Dallas I'm proud of. Police and fire work together real well. DART, Parks Department, the city managers up top, they all have different specialties. Our city manager that we deal with actually assistant city manager, he deals with police, fire, the criminal court system and the Office of Emergency Management. So we had a handle on knowing who we are. It's always good to put faces with names. And I think this is an experience that you've

heard it works.

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Kind of like Captain Baker said, something I've always believed in, that's why I've told them kind of go forth and prosper, you build those relations before things happen. That way you know when you're hearing something from someone that you know you don't have to sit there and go what's this guy all about or what's this girl all about or what's their angle? You just take what they're saying and go. And like I said, if something comes out of that where it's different, that's when I go back to that I got to verify. And that's why, and this is not reflective of the current management of Atmos, but even back Lone Star days, Lone Star Gas days, we -- I used to have guys that would come out and just jump down in there with their blue jeans and Wrangler boots and work on a line. I'm getting readings that are just astronomical, we're all in bunker gear.

And then years ago, we had a explosion on Eads and Eight
Street over in south Dallas, and burned one of the Atmos guys. I
guess actually it was Lone Star then, I think. Burned him up
pretty good. Actually, I think, he ended up dying. And from then
on they're always wearing Nomex and all their protective gear. So
it takes something to change, but people, kind of like little
kids, they just kind of keep thinking okay, I don't need this, I
don't need this.

So what can we fix? Lots of things. Fire department has got a lot of shoring up to do; MOPs, training records. I'm very proud

- of the fact that we do have a lot of toys and a lot of things to
- 2 | bring to the party. I feel like some of those were not utilized
- 3 here in a timely fashion. But overall I'm happy with what we did.
- 4 We can always improve, everybody. And that comes through
- 5 communication and making sure that we know what the focus is. I
- 6 think that's about it.
- 7 Q. Great. Really appreciate that.
- 8 A. That was a lot.
- 9 Q. Right. I just want to hit on just a couple things that you
- 10 didn't mention. And we, of course, we've only interviewed on the
- 11 fire and rescue side. We haven't interviewed any on the gas
- 12 | company side. But from what you've heard so far in the interviews
- 13 and in other venues, how was the -- at least for the first two
- 14 incidents, how do you rate the communication between the gas
- 15 | company and the fire department and arson?
- 16 A. I don't have personal knowledge of that. So, again, I'm
- 17 going to make an assumption, and you know how that works. But it
- 18 | sounded like it was routine typically like we have. Now I don't
- 19 want to put words in anyone's mouth, but in my mind, and you're
- asking me my opinion, I think there were some balls dropped on
- 21 | both sides. I think there was communication from the parties that
- 22 were there, maybe the worker bees together, but nobody kind of
- 23 talked. I'm sure -- well, I know for a fact on our side a lot of
- 24 the same and then different and nobody really put pieces together.
- 25 The one thing that was constant was Atmos is a company, fire

a company, we were both there. Now why pieces weren't put together, I don't know.

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But communication, that's always a problem. So can I say that was great? No. Obviously, in retrospect things could maybe be followed up a little better. It looks like we had this. Was it on the homeowner's end or was it something you're doing? Maybe if there -- and I'm not saying there was -- if there was some knowledge beforehand by in this case Atmos that there's something else that was a little hinky, that should have been shared with at least the higher-ups.

Kind of like I'll use this analogy. When the police department when their drug crews are doing a raid, they will reach out to a commander in the fire service, keep tight lip -- you just don't want it to get out, and we'll stand by it. So if it's something like that, hey, if you got something going, you can tell us on the down-low. We don't need to put it out in the wind for the public. But some of the higher-ups may need to know that we may have something here, and we could have maybe figured out a way to work that a little better, hand-in-hand. I'm not saying that's the case here, but in retrospect I think we could have some pieces put together on both sides.

- Q. Okay. With the advantage of retrospect and hindsight, are you convinced or your opinion that each of the first two incidents was gas related?
- 25 A. There's no doubt in my mind though. Based on what I heard its

a common denominator. And just the proximity. Like I said, I haven't reviewed all of the 11 or 12 of the calls that were just for that week. That's a pretty good indicator that there's something that's out of whack. Because unless there's a -- just like last night, a contractor that's maybe putting in some fiberoptic or something and the line gets hit. You know, the one last night was a 6-inch line. That's a good size line. There's a lot of pressure on that. That happens a lot all over the city with the growth. And we have people that are contracted to put in -- heck, we've had city workers to hit lines that have been there. Or maybe some old plats will show this, and actually the line is over here.

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That's one thing I've learned in my years here in Texas is it's not like where I grew up. This clay soil down here, it goes up and down, expands and contracts, and you can bury something 4, 5 feet down, and the next week it's up at the top. It blows my mind how that happens. So that may have just been the case here with all the rain and cold. And then we went from 20 degrees one day literally to the next day it was 78. That's a lot of up and down. So that's to be expected.

And that's why in my opinion polyethylene and the modern piping systems are much better than the old ductile iron and cast pipe and all the other things they just shoved in there just to figure it out. So and that's the problem. This neighborhood is old.

1 Okay. And again with the advantage of hindsight just after 2 the first incident, if things went perfectly the way you would 3 have wanted them to go, was there enough information there to be 4 concerned and sort of put out a communication with the gas company that you have something significant here?

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I don't think so. And I say that because of this. we have incidents involving a flash or a fire in a house that occurs for who knows what reasons, and it is not by fault of any provider. Maybe user error. Maybe I thought I had the pilot light on or a fan blew the pilot out or something. Who knows. Or I thought I had clicked it, and the igniter didn't come on.

answered a phone call, and then we had some pop.

So one -- but then when you say that to me you've got to look at the totality of everything that was around in that area. I'm an officer on the rig, and I'm on my p's and q's, which again one time to me is not out of the ordinary. So my ears really don't perk up on that. Had it been a fatality, yes, you start digging. Fatalities we -- or significant serious injury, which I'm not downplaying a second degree burn, but the -- when you say explosion and a roof is gone and things, that doesn't make sense. So you go, okay, what's the common denominator?

So I would have been well served, I think, from our officers to kind of -- they know that district. What's different today that wasn't the other week? Oh, I see. Looks like the -- holes where they're digging out in the desert or whatever for gold or

- something, there's a lot of holes there, there's a reason. Do we think there's a leak? That I would have either pushed -- if I was in the field I'd have pushed to my command or I would have made calls myself just to try to find out. But, no, I wouldn't have, based on the first one.
  - The second one was just two houses down. Now my ears have perked up. Even after the fact with a fire, and I look and two houses down I see, oh, B shift was there. Even if I'm on another shift, that doesn't happen unless we have an arsonist around, and that has happened. You have things, those Molotov cocktails, whatever, they set things, and it goes up. But typically it's in it's a reason. You see it during tax time. Okay. We're not quite there. End of the year, holidays. You see vengeful, spiteful fire. There's all kind of reasons, but there's got to be something there that precipitates that.
  - And in this case I'm here in this house, and I look just two houses down we got a problem. Then I see in the alley there's some digging going on. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to go something's up. So it's a lot different from having an electrical range than it is to have a gas stove. That's the best to cook on, by the way. So --
- Q. Okay. So let's say, again, if things went perfectly the way you would have liked them, after the second incident, you --
- 24 A. The second incident.

2.0

25 Q. Yes. And so now you have the second and the first.

A. Okay.

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- Q. What actions would you have taken from that point on?
- 3 A. Personally, if things went well, the second one, like I
- 4 stated just a minute ago, having seen a house two doors down,
- 5 literally two doors down, that had a fire that had an injury that
- 6 was transported, and then having an explosion, injury at this
- 7 house, and then hearing the statements from what the arson
- 8 investigators got or even the guys that were putting him in the
- 9 ambulance, you know, this thing rolled over, flashed over, this
- 10 one blew up, whatever, yeah, your head should have been on swivel.
- 11 And that should have then caused somebody to reach out, whether it
- 12 was up the chain, even to my level or at least to the deputy's
- 13 level or at least to the battalion chief's level to say chase down
- 14 what's going on.
- 15 And so, yeah, if all things worked perfectly, I would have
- 16 had arson investigators that would have done a ringdown. I would
- 17 have had a redundancy where the troops in the field had
- 18 communicated, and then put that together to realize there's
- 19 something a little bit different here. And since that was 2 days
- 20 | before the fatality, who knows. But in my mind, you put those two
- 21 pieces together, maybe we can -- just like we've done now, shut
- 22 | the gas off, make an evacuation, figure out what's quite there,
- 23 get some readings, what's going on. It's not a normal -- that is
- 24 | not normal.
- 25 Q. Right.

- 1 A. In a city this large to have fires that are similar in what
- 2 | caused them, and, again, cause and origin, had that been
- 3 | communicated, bam bam. So --
- 4 Q. Right. Because we have incidents 21st, 22nd --
- 5 A. Yes, sir.
- 6 Q. -- 23rd.
- 7 A. Third, all --
- 8 Q. So this was the day before the big one. So --
- 9 A. Actually it was --
- 10 Q. All that --
- 11 A. Actually it was -- yes. Yes, sir. You're right.
- 12 Q. Could all of that what you've just described been done on the
- 13 22nd and elevated up the chain? I'm just trying to get a reading
- 14 what's your perspective.
- 15 A. Yes, sir. I think that could have -- it would have caused
- 16 some, I want to say at least some exploratory discussions on
- 17 | what's going on. And I think it would have been pertinent, not
- 18 only for the neighborhood, but even for the fire crews to know
- 19 this is an anomaly.
- Now is that on any one individual? No. It's a totality of
- 21 things that were just -- it's kind of like I hate to use that
- 22 adage the old Swiss cheese, when you got all the holes, until
- everything lines up and somebody gets bit, it's not a problem.
- 24 But in this case, weather, issues, it just all lined up, and none
- 25 of that was seen until after the fact.

Now we're on top of it. And, unfortunately, that's life. I wish it would have been caught sooner though at least in communications, some talks.

2.0

And really, again, another bad thing is this is a weekend.

Most people, City Hall, 4:00, they're gone. I was down there late because things were still going on. It's hard. And, I mean, in this case Atmos that's a business. They probably already got their marching orders, here's what we're doing. It's hard to get people that can pull strings, because what we have seen on scenes you'll get people, and they're not the supervisor that can authorize whatever it is. We're talking about money. That's what -- that's why people are in business. I get that. I'm not saying that was the driving factor, but weekends it's hard to get things done on a weekend.

Q. Going to change directions just a bit, and we heard three unusual observations. And if I can get your comment on or your expertise. One was the red flame where there should have been a blue. One was this flash fire when the person was cooking that was unexpected. And the third was sort of a fire under the floorboard. And could you just talk about those?

A. Yeah. Okay. So red flame. Anybody that's had fire school or even hazmat you know the different color flames, which what are the heats, what's caused it. But in this case when you're dealing with something, especially all of them, the common denominator dealing with a stove and burning or a space heater, when you have

a red flame or a orange flame even, that's incomplete combustion.

It tells you you've got an issue there either with gas flow or

you've got some type of oxygenation that's been, I guess, put in

there in pressure, and you're not getting a true flow of gas,

natural gas. When the gas is pure, you'll have a nice pretty blue

flame with a nice white tip and kind of a black circle, if you

will, at the top of the flame. That's a good hot flame. That's

The individual said he saw a red flame, and then it just flashed over him. That tells me that he had probably a high level of gas per volume in his house or area, confined space, and that it was too rich at one time to flash. I think he had actually, as we would say in the industry, finally sucked air and got what it needed to do the fa-voomp, and then all the fuel is gone. So now it's just building up again waiting to get another breath of whatever is out there. So you go from that flammable range down to where it's too lean, too rich. I think it was too rich. It got back in that flammable range, and it lit off.

Q. Okay.

2.0

the way gas should burn.

A. On the fire underneath the pier and beam, I think that should have been, and I think that was alluded to, that's a very -that's different. You don't see that unless you've got some type of hydrocarbon or flammable liquid. Typically hydrocarbons that you have poured -- because the specific gravity of hydrocarbon is obviously when the water and all that's going to float on the

liquid. So here in Texas it's dirt. You're going to have mud and water under there. It's going to typically pool to the top. It could have been that burning off. Could have been a hydrocarbon.

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But in this particular case, one thing I heard on that house was they saw the gas feeder line to the residence that had been displaced. And I think the flame that they may have been seeing once that initial kaboom went, it disjointed that, and I think they had that void that had filled up maybe with gas again because it was free flowing, I'm assuming. And the fact that the officer said they got a call for a fire, and they saw a little smoke, and then nothing. All of a sudden they had 40-foot flames or 20-foot flames, whatever he said. That's unusual to go from zero to 100. And then to see fire under the floorboard, that tells me something Is either -- because then he said it went is feeding it there. They put water on it, boom. And as we know, if it's free flowing that's why it was important to get the gas cut off. It's probably just building up in that void, and it's just looking for an ignition source.

So could that have happened before? Sure. I don't know.

Maybe they had -- maybe something had gotten disjointed before for whatever reason. Especially in those areas, older homes, that's just a void waiting to be filled with gas. It's trying to get up.

It's lighter than air. It's trying to get up and get out of there, but it's confined by whatever box it's in.

DR. JENNER: Okay. Appreciate that, and I'm going to pass it

1 around. MR. PADGETT: I went more than 20 minutes. 2 3 This is Rachael. I did have a question. MS. GUNARATNAM: Ι 4 got sidetracked. 5 BY MS. GUNARATNAM: Oh. In many of the interviews that we heard, we heard people 6 did not smell gas. Do you think that was influenced by the 7 weather? 8 I think it was, but that's also -- that's puzzling to me. 9 10 mean, there's a couple of things out of this that are puzzling to One, where's the heater? Two -- it was kind of like Wendy's. 11 Where's the beef? Two, why was there no mercaptan smell? And I 12 know there's a small percentage of the public that cannot smell 13 that. That's why you do the banana oil test and different things. 14 But that's a classic. I mean, the whole reason that we have those 1.5 odors put in there is because of the fire that occurred at the 16 elementary school here in Texas. And back then they didn't put 17 odor in it, and nobody knew it was in the void. So we now have a 18 history lesson just here in Texas. 19 But that should have smelled. I think that should have been 2.0 something. And only thing I can put that to is (a) when it rains 21 here not only could that knock down the vapors, but it also 22 23 compacts the sand that gas lines are typically running in, which is kind of like that's the whole reason we have all these oil 24

companies coming back and fracking those old oil holes because

- they're busting up that sandstone and all to get the gas out. So
  the fact that it's capped at one time, that doesn't mean it's not
  there. You can pop it up again, it comes out. So we start having
  rain and it's wet again today. We get a heavy rain
- tonight or maybe tomorrow, and then we have 80 degrees come
- 6 Sunday, we may have a lot smelling. So I truly think because of
- 7 the rain we had, and the fact that it was either suppressing those
- 8 fumes or knocking them down. Because there is no way under God's
- green earth that transmission lines from any company, in this case
- 10 Atmos, would be flowing through there without the odor in it. I
- mean, I can see that on the front end before it gets to the
- distribution hubs, but once that's added, that's not normal. So
- 13 that's the only thing I can equate that to is the weather.
- 14 Q. Right.
- 15 A. And the rainy time frame.
- 16 Q. Okay. And you said you gathered odor calls since February
- 17 16th. What was the area?
- 18 A. I had them dated and I pushed it out. It was to the original
- date. I don't know why I don't have my map here. I guess I left
- 20 it in the car. Oh, actually, you know what, I can pull it up on
- this. Stand by here. Give me a second. I had our computer group
- pull the runs that were from the 16th. let me get it, let me get
- 23 it, let me get it. I apologize. I got --
- Q. It's okay. You pulled it from February 16th to the 23rd?
- 25 A. Yes, ma'am. Let's see -- yesterday. Was yesterday Monday?

- 1 I've lost track of days.
- 2 Q. Yesterday was Monday.
- 3 A. Okay. Thank you. That's bad. Where am I? Did I wake up?
- 4 What's your name? I know that like the back of my hand. Whose
- 5 | hand is that? Got all those one-liners, right.
- 6 Well, I didn't realize how many emails I had coming in. I
- 7 | think it's interesting that Paradigm liaison is offering their dig
- 8 test class now. Just sent it out this week. Let's see here.
- 9 Q. You can get it to me afterwards. That's okay.
- 10 A. Okay.
- 11 Q. Yeah. Yeah.
- 12 A. Anyway, it was the 8-block area that I initially had asked it
- 13 to expand outside of what Atmos was saying.
- 14 Q. Right.
- 15 A. And it went up to -- basically went up to Foster Middle
- 16 School or Elementary School all the way down to Webb Chapel to
- 17 Larga over to Marsh.
- 18 Q. Okay.
- 19 A. And so I told them if there's anything that's closer than
- 20 | that because when they put a GIS circle they can kind of pull it
- 21 out if anything popped up kind of relative. Because at that time
- 22 | we hadn't expanded it to Chapel Creek and across Marsh. So I just
- 23 told them in that area.
- Now they're flagging everything that comes in. They're
- 25 notifying us, and saying, hey, we're making a run over here. Like

- this morning, they had a car fire down there on Northwest Highway,
- and they're just alerting Webb Chapel Command, they're calling it,
- 3 | we got a car fire in case, you know, it's not related to what you
- 4 all are doing. So --
- 5 Q. Okay. And you said it was 12?
- 6 A. I'm sorry?
- 7 Q. You said it was 12 that --
- 8 A. I think, I think.
- 9 Q. Okay.
- 10 A. I got the PDFs actually, and I'm going to have all that for
- 11 you all.
- 12 Q. Okay.
- 13 A. It was either 11 or 12, and I've got numbers in my head that
- 14 are going everywhere. So don't quote me on that, but yes, ma'am.
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. It was more than a handful.
- 17 Q. All right.
- 18 A. That's just for a week.
- 19 Q. Yeah. So if your staff had maybe seen that number, and then
- 20 February 21st happened, do you think maybe they would've had
- 21 | communication --
- 22 A. Yeah. But, you know, and I don't --
- 23 Q. -- of a gas issue?
- 24 A. -- know if that's out there, but I don't know if there's a
- 25 program that can behind the scenes -- you know, like I told you

- 1 how many calls we make. I don't know if there's a program in our
- 2 | computer assisted dispatch or out in the dispatch world of other
- 3 cities that can look at quantitative information, and then go
- 4 loops, we got an anomaly here. Kind of like Watson or whatever.
- 5 And go, hey, you've got a cluster here of something. This needs
- 6 attention. Danger, Will Robinson, need to look at that. I don't
- 7 know if that's there.
- 8 That would be nice for you or I to invent and sell it to
- 9 somebody. I think that would just help anybody. I mean, heck,
- 10 anybody would want that, but I don't think we have that
- 11 capability. It's only until I would say draw a box around this,
- 12 and give me some perspective.
- 13 Q. Right. Okay. Just last question. Do you have any
- 14 experience with methane or natural gas alarms?
- 15 A. Alarms?
- 16 Q. Yeah.
- 17 A. Yes, ma'am. Fixed or handheld?
- 18 Q. Fixed.
- 19 A. Fixed sites. We have places, Praxair, we have Air-Liquide
- 20 (indiscernible), places like that that have fixed sites that have
- 21 | monitoring equipment that's rolling 24/7. Worker safety and/or
- 22 the public, but yes, ma'am.
- 23 Q. And do you -- have you ever seen them used in residential --
- 24 A. As far as methane, I know there's some on the market by Kidde
- and some of the others. I don't know if I hold a lot of stock in

- 1 that.
- 2 Q. Okay.
- 3 A. Simply because of, I won't say user error, but same thing on
- 4 the carbon monoxide side when they first came out, said we're
- 5 going to have a dual carbon monoxide and ionization detector for
- 6 smoke or whatever. Those didn't seem to work. They're better
- 7 standalone. But I have not seen any in residential areas that
- 8 were a fixed methane detector. I know they're out there. I don't
- 9 even have them in my house but never seen then in place.
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. So --
- 12 Q. Thank you.
- 13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No questions.
- 14 MR. MURDOCK: I have one.
- 15 MR. PADGETT: Okay. Yes, sir.
- 16 MR. MURDOCK: Phillip Murdock, Atmos Energy.
- 17 BY MR. MURDOCK:
- 18 Q. You mentioned communications, communications, communications.
- 19 And we heard Captain Baker talk about he wished that hazmat would
- 20 be called on more gas calls. And he went so far as to say that he
- 21 | would like to see Atmos either text or email hazmat when they were
- 22 | rolling on a gas call. And you mentioned that as well, you wished
- 23 | hazmat rolled on more gas calls. What's your opinion around at
- 24 what point does communication become so burdensome that it becomes
- 25 noise?

A. Yeah, I think that's a very, very good point. Because as I can imagine how many lines that you all go on because I know how many we go on. There's many that we probably do not know about. I think that's the problem is it's noise. And I can use an example to kind of answer your question.

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Storm water management herein in Dallas, we have a zero hydrocarbon tolerance. So we have car wrecks, whatever, if we have over 2 gallons that hits the ground, we make notification stormwater, wherever it is, where they can make the proper switches, if you will, to cut off inflows and things.

And then we had fires. We use a product -- used to use a product AFFF, which is found to have carcinogens in it. But the storm water management wanted to be notified on every time we had a fire where we utilized foam. We said, okay. I told the lady, you're just going to want our two alarm fires. You're not going to want all of them. Well, after a week and she had a little over 12,000 calls she said calf-rope. it's like you said noise. I don't want those. So, yes, sir, I think it's noise.

I think the key of communication here, maybe not so much Atmos notifying us, hey, we're going on here and here and here, because it will become noise, but it's the fire crews, which are responsible for that, giving a heads up when it's something more than just I backed over a gas line, and we're here to stand by a meter. So there's got to be a sweet spot there where we don't wait until the world is coming to an end, and we don't go out on

- 1 every time somebody smells -- somebody pass gas from a cow or
- 2 | whatever it is. So I agree with that 100 percent. You can be
- 3 overwhelmed with anything. And in this case, yes, the fatigue and
- 4 | the noise would end up creating, I think, more problems than the
- 5 information that potentially could be gleaned from that.
- 6 MR. MURDOCK: Thank you.
- 7 MR. PADGETT: That's it?
- 8 DR. JENNER: Just about. You -- we're very close. I just
- 9 want to make the observation about 5 minutes ago you said danger
- 10 Will Robinson. And I just want to make the observation there are
- 11 only three people in this room old enough to get that reference.
- 12 MR. PADGETT: Oh, yeah. Lost in Space.
- 13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Lost in Space.
- DR. JENNER: The original Lost in Space. Okay. The
- 15 original.
- 16 MR. PADGETT: I'm sorry. I should have clarified.
- 17 DR. JENNER: No, that's fine. We can clear that --
- 18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You want that on the transcript?
- DR. JENNER: Yes, I do. Because we may be looking, who is
- 20 | this Will Robinson guy?
- 21 MR. PADGETT: That's true. That would be hard to explain.
- 22 BY DR. JENNER:
- 23 Q. Next to that, my last question though I'm going to ask --
- 24 A. Yes, sir.
- 25 Q. -- if there's any thoughts you have that can help us with the

- 1 investigation that we haven't already discussed either between you 2 or anyone else we talked to the last couple of days?
- 3 A. Off the top of my head, again, I'm not privy to that. I know
- 4 | we'll see things after it, but I'm curious to hear kind of from
- 5 | the Atmos side operational folks, kind of if there's this -- we
- 6 have blinders on because of our jobs. We're doing our job.
- 7 | They're doing their job. And apparently we weren't looking at
- 8 this, that and the other. Be interesting to see where those two
- 9 pieces tie up.

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In your investigation, I think, we've heard common denominators and things that, as I alluded to earlier, the Swiss cheese where it's finally just lined up where all the holes came out with a bad outcome. I heard one of our investigators say this is not a common type of call. I would disagree with that, as we have especially in an aging infrastructure anywhere, but here in Dallas with the movement, as I alluded to, I think that is something that needs to be focused on by you all.

So you're kind of asking me the weather dynamics, the fact of the hot, cold, lots of rain. Just, I mean, as I call it in Tennessee a septic tank overflow rain. Literally we've had the fire station closed because of some of the other collapses of sewer lines and all here in Dallas. So this area is not immune to having movement. We're right on the edge of the Barnett Shale right here at the Dallas County Line to Tarrant County. There's a lot of movement. And I'm not an engineer on that aspect, but

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1
    we've had, ever since the fracking and stuff started we've had
 2
    earthquakes, all kind of things. So there is movement. We talked
 3
    about the clay soils. I think that has a bearing on everything
 4
    involved.
 5
         So that's the only kind of bit I can throw out there that
 6
    maybe we haven't chased down. I don't know if that's a factor,
 7
    but it's just something that's kind of in the back of my head.
 8
                      Terrific. Okay. Looking around the room there
         DR. JENNER:
 9
    are no additional questions. So I want to thank you very much for
10
    your --
11
         MR. PADGETT: You're very welcome. Entertainment --
12
         DR. JENNER:
                      -- all your --
13
         MR. PADGETT: -- for the last --
14
                      Terrific. It is 3:35, and we're done with this.
         DR. JENNER:
15
          (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)
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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: NATURAL GAS-FUELED EXPLOSION OF

RESIDENCE, DALLAS, TEXAS

FEBRUARY 23, 2018

Interview of Ted Padgett

ACCIDENT NO.: PLD18FR002

PLACE: Dallas, Texas

DATE: February 27, 2018

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

Katherine Motley Transcriber