Statement requested by FAA Inspector John Palmer from Michael Groner on accident in N465FL that occurred on 14 March, 2016 at KRMG Richard B. Russell Airport at approximately 1906Z.

This flight was an IFR Part 91 re-positioning flight on N465FL, a Beech jet converted to the Nextant modification. I, Michael Groner, was the flying pilot, flying from the port pilot seat. It was the third and final flight of the day. The flight was uneventful up until the actual landing with no known discrepancies that would have caused an accident.

On the decent check coming through 18,000 feet when it came to the "approach brief" the non-flying pilot, Jason Farmer, who was the Pilot in Command and in the starboard pilot seat, had already received the weather from the field. He briefed me that the winds were variable at 6 knots and he had selected a visual approach to runway 7 at KRMG. He programmed the FMS for a visual approach for runway 7 and we briefed the Ref speed as 107 and Vac speed as 129, based on the current weight of the airplane which was about 13,200 pounds.

We had the field in sight at approximately 15 miles out, having broken out of the lowest layer of clouds. Visibility was not restricted. Captain Farmer began making his uncontrolled airport position reports on radio Comm 2 as I took Comm 1. As we approached the field we were cleared by ATC for a visual approach at KRMG. I descended to a pattern altitude of 2000 feet at 200 knots and positioned the aircraft to enter the pattern at a 45 degree entry for a left downwind for runway 7. When entering the pattern I slowed the airplane to 170 knots and called for flaps 10 degrees, lights out, approach checks, which Jason performed. I noticed that the terrain to the west-southwest of the field was taller than I anticipated, and it was a little close to the field. I told Jason that we may receive a terrain warning from those hills as we turned base, and I scanned and did not see any towers or other obstacles. Jason stated that he would press the "Terrain inhibit" button, to silence any nuisance warnings, and he did that. To avoid getting any closer to the terrain I called for flaps 20 degrees a little early and started slowing to Vref+20 and started my decent from pattern altitude, and turned base. Right as I was doing that I recall that Jason canceled IFR with ATC. Jason continued with position reporting for the field and there were no other airplanes in the area.

As we turned final I had overshot final little and had to turn back toward final, pushed by the winds. By 500 feet above the ground we were in the "approach window," and both myself and Jason called "stabilized". Airspeed was around 112 to 115 knots due to gusty conditions. When we were approximately below 200 feet I noticed that the airplane began to sink and my airspeed started to slow towards Ref. Jason noticed it as well and said "add power". I did add power, and the last 200 feet of the approach was very gusty and required considerable power to maintain airspeed. There was a crosswind from my left, but I noticed our groundspeed seemed fast. I asked "What are the winds?" at approximately 100 to 75 feet above the ground. Jason responded I believe with "Variable. 160 at 6 gusting to 17." I knew the runway was over 4400 feet and that we only needed about 2900 feet or so for landing, and that the aircraft has a 10 knot tailwind allowance limitation. I continued to landing and we both noticed our ground speed was very fast. I touched down around Vref+5 and slightly well within the touchdown zone. I applied normal braking as Jason called the ground idle lights and applied the speed brakes. I did not feel the airplane decelerating so applied harder pressure to the brakes. Jason stated "Brakes." I think I said "I'm on it" or "I'm braking". We still were not decelerating and I was pressing very hard on the brakes. Jason then said "Max braking!" And I think I said "I am!" and he got

on the brakes with me. We did not feel like we were braking at all, our ground speed was still fast. I also never felt the Anti-Skid even activate. I do not think we were braking at all. It was evident as we approached half-way down the runway or so that we were going to go off of the end of the runway, at which point Jason applied the emergency nitrogen brakes. As we approached the other end of the runway I felt the right main tire brake. We hit the end of the runway hard and skidded straight ahead through the mud for several feet, still going fast and still not decelerating very much until the nose gear hit a small hill and we started to stop quickly, with the airplane skidding slightly nose left before it came to a stop. The jolt from the nose wheel striking the hill smacked me pretty good and I could feel immediate pain in my back and was slightly dazed. I then shut down the engines and we exited the airplane.

There was some swearing that took place as we tried to get a grasp on what happened. My back and knee was hurting, and Jason's forearm was hurting. Jason stated to me that he didn't think I got on the brakes. I told him I did and that I ended up standing very hard on them, even grunting aurally, I remember. I told him I thought that we had a wind shift which is why we had to add power on landing to maintain ref. I also, at that moment outside the airplane, could feel a fairly strong wind coming right down our runway in what seemed like a direct tailwind that was probably in excess of 10 knots, and noted that to Jason. He then stated that the winds were only supposed to be variable at 6 knots gusting to 17, and that they were supposed to be from about 160.

Upon looking at the aircraft the nose was crumpled and the nose gear had collapsed and was laying horizontal on the port side of the aircraft. The aircraft appeared to be a little more than 100 yards from the end of the runway. The right left main gear appeared intact and the right main tire was shredded. There was mud sprayed on the left forward fuselage and on both wings and the engine nacelles as the plane rested in very muddy grass.

The KRMG airport operator Mike Mathews was on scene within a few minutes and made sure we were OK. EMS also arrived about 15 minutes later, at which time Captain Farmer was already talking to our Company supervisors, and soon Mr. Mathews had FAA Inspector John Palmer on the phone, and Captain Farmer talked with him as well.

End of Report.

Signed: Michael A. Groner, First Officer, Flight Options Date; 3-15-2016

## Figure 7-26 Continued

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF PBR WRITTEN NOTIFICATION I acknowledge that I received the Pilot's Bill of Rights Written Notification of Investigation. Michael A. Crinas DATE: 03/15/20/6 Signature of Airman MM/DD/YYYY \*\*\*\*\* To Be Completed by the FAA Inspector I have personally delivered the Written Notification under the PBR to Michael A Gropen on 03/15/20/6 [print name of the individual] MM/DD/YYYY including notification that the nature of this investigation is to determine whether he/she Linkal Accident Lavests after [enter nature of investigation stated in item 1) of notification provided]

in violation of 14 CFR, and if so, what, if any, enforcement action should be taken.

Solution of 14 CFR, and if so, what, if any, enforcement action should be taken.

FAA Office: Solution Sol

Signature of FAA Inspector

This Is for Initial Accident INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT.

Details of accident that occurred in N465FL on March 14, 2016 at Russell Field in Rome Georgia.

My name is Jason Farmer, Flight Options L.L.C. employee # and was the Pilot in Command and assigned to aircraft N465FL. The aircraft is a converted Beechjet BE-40 manufactured and type certificated as an Nextant 400NXT. We were on a routine reposition leg from Jackson Michigan to Russell Field in Rome Georgia. The aircraft had no occupants other than the two crew at the pilot controls.

The flight was routine with a few minor deviations for thunderstorms in the vicinity of our intended track approximately 60 miles north of the field. I was occupying the copilot seat and my colleague Michael Groner was occupying the pilots seat and manipulating the controls during this reposition leg.

Prior to departing for Rome Georgia weather and notams were checked. There were no notams published for KRMG. The weather was reported as winds 240/05kts 10 statute miles visibility with a scattered cloud layer at 2,500 and a broken cloud layer at 3,400 and overcast at 5,500. Temperature was 19 and dew point was 13 degrees Celsius. Altimeter setting was 29.75.

We were approximately 30 miles north of the field and under the control of Atlanta Center when we descended below the cloud layers into visual meteorological conditions. I obtained the current ASOS field conditions on frequency 119.925. Winds were reported as variable at 06 knots, temperature 23 and dew point 13 and altimeter was 29.75. There was no reportable cloud coverage directly over the airport, however there were cumulous clouds at around 3,000 feet agl in the vicinity of the airfield.

During our in range descent and after obtaining the ASOS reported weather Atlanta Center had queried us about which approach we would like to utilize into Russell Field. I replied we would like the visual approach to runway 07. They replied with okay and to report when we obtain the field in sight. We obtained a visual sighting of the field at approximately 15 miles north and were cleared for visual approach into Russell Airport. At that time I believe Mr. Groner programmed the FMS for a visual approach for runway 07 with a 3.0 mile final fix. We had discussed the weather and what approach would be most appropriate for the field conditions. I believe in my verbal brief of the weather to Mr. Groner that the winds were reported variable at 06 knots. Later that evening in reviewing weather on the field over the course of the day the last recorded metar report for Russell field was recorded 13 minutes prior to landing at 1853Z to be variable at 04 knots.

We made position calls on CTAF frequency 123.0 stating our intentions to enter the pattern for a left hand downwind entry for runway 07. There was no other reported traffic in the vicinity of the airport of intended landing. We entered the downwind leg at

an altitude of 2,100 feet MSL and 200 knots indicated airspeed. No windsocks were visible from our position on the downwind leg.

We extended the flaps to 10 degrees and called for the approach checklist and slowed the aircraft to 170 knots indicated. At that time Mr. Groner mentioned the rising terrain to the west of final for runway 07. I said since we were visual I would inhibit the terrain alert and warning system and toggled the inhibit switch located on the rear center pedestal. This would alleviate the nuisance terrain warnings in visual conditions.

Mr. Groner called for flaps 20 and gear down before landing checklist which were completed abeam the numbers for runway 07. I made a CTAF position report and then called Atlanta Center and was approved for frequency change to common traffic advisory. We entered a left base leg, final flaps of 30 degrees was selected, and Mr. Groner slowed the aircraft to around 140 knots. I made a CTAF position report of our intentions as turning base to final for runway 07. The turbulence on final was moderate and I assumed that was in part due to the thermal activity from the rising terrain at the west end of the field. Mr. Groner was stabilized with a descent rate of less than 1,000 feet and target airspeed of Vref to Vref+5 knots. At approximately 300 agl and around a one mile final I noticed a sharp drop in Indicated airspeed and called for more power. Mr. Groner adjusted the power accordingly. We crossed the landing threshold at no more than 50 feet AGL and had an abrupt but not hard landing. I had my finger on the speedbrakes and applied the speed breaks at touchdown. I called "speed brakes extended" or possibly "boards extended" and looked at the glare shield and called ground idle. A second or two transpired and it was evident that normal deceleration with anti-skid braking was not being experienced. I called "brakes" and no other deceleration took place. I then yelled "Max brakes". Mr. Groner said "I am on the brakes". At that point I applied full braking pressure to my side of the rudder pedals and no deceleration was occurring. I would estimate there was 2,000 feet remaining at this point. I then proceeded to break the guard wire on emergency brake handle and apply constant pressure of the emergency brake handle. That was the first point on the landing rollout I actually felt the aircraft decelerate. At that time I estimated there was less than 1,000 feet of runway remaining to stop the aircraft. At that point I increased the pressure down on the emergency brake handle knowing full well it would result in one or both tires being blown and we would be departing the end of the runway into the unimproved area. There was a sudden jolt forward when we exited the runway and the yoke came back and smacked my forearm on my left arm while applying the emergency brake.

We came to rest at approximately 300 feet past the end of runway 07 in a grassy area and before a thicket of trees. I Immediately shut down the engines, retracted the brakes, shut the battery off, shut the standby power off, and turned the oxygen handle off. I asked if Mike was alright and I exited the pilot seat to the rear cabin of the aircraft. When we opened the door the winds were extremely gusty and not what would be expected with a report from the ASOS of winds variable at 06 knots. Within five minutes of that time winds were almost calm again.

Within a few minutes of the event the airport manager Mike Mathews was at the aircraft to ascertain if we were okay. I told him yes. Within a few minutes of that Mr. John Palmer with the Atlanta FSDO was on the phone with me obtaining a verbal report of the incident that transpired.

I acknowledge that the above statement Is factual and recalled to the best of my ability under the circumstances encountered.

Jason Drew Farmer March 15, 2016

## Figure 7-26 Continued

## [To Be Retained by the FAA Inspector] ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF PBR WRITTEN NOTIFICATION I acknowledge that I received the Pilot's Bill of Rights Written Notification of Investigation. JASON DIZEW FARMER Name (Print) I ACTIVOWLEDGE FRAT INFORMATION DIVULGED BY, HE IS FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGAT Signa To Be Completed by the FAA Inspector I have personally delivered the Written Notification under the PBR to JASON DREW FARME [print name of the individual] MM/DD/YYYY including notification that the nature of this investigation is to determine whether he/she In: fist Accident Investigation [enter nature of investigation stated in item 1) of notification provided] in violation of 14 CFR, and if so, what, if any, enforcement action should be taken. FAA Office: SO-//