

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

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████████ FIRE ABOARD OCEAN *

NAVIGATOR IN PORTLAND, MAINE *

ON OCTOBER 18, 2023 *

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Accident No.: DCA24FM004

Interview of: VLAD ENE, Captain
ALEXANDER GELLGAF, Chief Engineer
Ocean Navigator

DIETRICH GILES, Marine Superintendent
American Queen Voyages

Aboard the Ocean Navigator

Wednesday,
October 25, 2023

APPEARANCES:

██████████ Assistant Chief of Investigations
Sector Northern New England
United States Coast Guard

BRIAN YOUNG, Marine Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

KRISTYN JESCHELNIK, Marine Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DAN ROSEN, Marine Surveyor
Marine Safety Consultants, Inc.

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I N T E R V I E W

(1:15 p.m.)

MR. YOUNG: Okay. The recording is on. This is Brian Young aboard the *Ocean Navigator*. It is 1:15. It is October 25th, 2023. My last name is Young, Y-o-u-n-g. We're conducting an interview of the captain, the chief engineer, and a company representative aboard the *Ocean Navigator*. And with us today is --

MS. JESCHELNIK: Kristyn Jeschelnik, K-r-i-s-t-y-n; Jeschelnik, J-e-s-c-h-e-l-n-i-k. NTSB.

MR. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Coast Guard Investigations.

MR. ROSEN: Dan Rosen, R-o-s-e-n, Marine Safety Consultants, insurance investigation.

MR. GILES: Dietrich Giles, marine superintendent for American Queen Voyages, G-i-l-e-s.

MR. ENE: Vlad Ene, V-l-a-d, E-n-e, the captain of *Ocean Navigator*.

MR. GELLGAF: Alexander Gellgaf, chief engineer, G-e-l-l-g-a-f.

MR. YOUNG: Thank you. Thank you.

INTERVIEW OF VLAD ENE, ALEXANDER GELLGAF, AND DIETRICH GILES

MR. YOUNG: Let's just start, Dietrich, with if you could just give us a history of this vessel, maybe as to when it was built and when your company had taken possession of it. Do you

1 have any sort of a timeline for that for our understanding?

2 MR. GILES: I do. The vessel was built -- or the keel was
3 laid in 1999. It was actually put into service in 2004. We
4 took -- we bought the vessel in 2019, but it was still technically
5 managed by another company that had owned it prior to us. We took
6 over technical management in October of 2020. And so, American
7 Queen Voyages has managed the ship since that time.

8 When Covid came, so we were out for all of 2020 and I guess
9 most of -- all of '21 as well. So we were laid up down in --

10 MR. ENE: Port Royal.

11 MR. GILES: Port Royal in South Carolina, for that period, at
12 a facility where we had a crew on board to maintain the vessel
13 within in class requirements and -- or we did a sailing season in
14 2022 without incident, and then this season, 2023. So --

15 MR. YOUNG: What's a standard sailing season?

16 MR. GILES: From April through the 1st of November, about a
17 6-month period. And the off period -- in January of '22, this
18 vessel went through a 20-year dry docking, if you will, where we
19 overhauled the Z drives, the propulsion pods, did some engine
20 work, a lot of repairs, painting, windows, just the basic
21 maintenance and just some things that were deferred while we were
22 in the Covid period that were higher dollar. And then in January
23 of 2023, the engines were due -- three of the engines on this
24 vessel were due for a standard top-end service overhaul, and we
25 did -- we performed those top-ends. That generator was one of

1 them.

2 MR. YOUNG: The starboard main generator?

3 MR. GILES: Yeah.

4 MR. YOUNG: Was the other generator done as well?

5 MR. GILES: No. The other one was not done. It's due this
6 year.

7 MR. YOUNG: So the two mains and the starboard generator had
8 top-ends in January?

9 MR. GILES: That's correct.

10 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And this sailing season would've ended
11 after one more cruise after the incident?

12 MR. GILES: The 27th of November was the last day for the
13 sailing season.

14 MR. YOUNG: Of November?

15 MR. GILES: October.

16 MR. YOUNG: October. Wow. And then what would the plans be
17 if this incident hadn't happened after the final --

18 MR. GILES: The vessel would have transited to Jacksonville,
19 Florida and laid up until another job. The two vessels are now
20 for sale. We cancelled all of our '24 season for both vessels.
21 The company as a whole is concentrating more on the riverboat
22 service than the ocean service, so --

23 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And was that a previous decision or did
24 this incident cause that?

25 MR. GILES: Yeah, it was already in the works.

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay. Thank you. That's good.

2 And if we could move on to the captain. Captain, can you
3 tell us a little bit about your experience and how much maritime
4 experience you have?

5 MR. ENE: Yes, of course. I start my career back in 2010,
6 and since then I was working only on the passenger ships. And I'm
7 with my recruiting company from 2012, and until now with American
8 Queen Voyages, but still my recruiters are the same main company,
9 the CMI. Then actually they are recruiting us as an international
10 group for American Queen Voyages. Then, yeah, mostly all my
11 career was with them all these years, growing up, let's say,
12 apprentice or (indiscernible) till what I am now as a captain.
13 And I'm captain since, what, October? Yeah, October last year.

14 MR. YOUNG: And were you captain on this ship?

15 MR. ENE: Yes.

16 MR. YOUNG: Since October last year?

17 MR. ENE: Yeah. Yeah.

18 MR. YOUNG: And you have sailed as third mate, second mate,
19 chief mate?

20 MR. ENE: Everything.

21 MR. YOUNG: Everything on this -- with this company?

22 MR. ENE: With this company, yeah. Yeah. I never change
23 company.

24 MR. GILES: I think it's important, when did you come over to
25 these vessels?

1 MR. ENE: To those vessels -- to this one and to the sister
2 ship, 2000- -- first time I join, 2015, February 2015. And since
3 then, I miss only 6 months, I was to another ship in Europe with
4 the same company. But after that, always here.

5 MR. YOUNG: So you worked on --

6 MR. ENE: On this one or on the other one.

7 MR. YOUNG: So even when the previous company was running
8 these ships, you were working on these ships?

9 MR. ENE: Yeah. Yeah. I was working on as safety officer,
10 chief officer.

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Understood.

12 MR. ENE: A couple of years, 7, 8 years with those ships.

13 MR. YOUNG: And do you typically work the entire sailing
14 season straight?

15 MR. ENE: Yeah. Yeah, every year. And also, I'm working a
16 lot in layup period. I or the chief officer are supervisor,
17 however you want to call it. But yeah, a lot of maintenance of
18 the ship, I was here with both ships.

19 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And during a normal day during the sailing
20 season, do you typically work days --

21 MR. ENE: Yes.

22 MR. YOUNG: -- or do you stand a watch --

23 MR. ENE: I'm a dayworker.

24 MR. YOUNG: Dayworker?

25 MR. ENE: Yeah, no watch.

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

2 MR. ENE: The watch, I perform -- due to the season, I
3 perform a couple of watch once we are passing through the rivers.
4 Then I'm sharing the watch with my chief mate and still we have
5 the officers on watch, just for a precaution, double-safety
6 safety. Safety -- it's not a rule, it's just implemented by us
7 just to be sure that everything is going well.

8 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right.

9 MR. ENE: And, yeah, other than that, all the maneuverings
10 passing through the locks, I'm the one who is doing it. And,
11 yeah, except for that, only normal work like daywork.

12 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then do your mates do 4 hours on/8
13 hours off watches?

14 MR. ENE: Yes. That's correct.

15 MR. YOUNG: And then what's a standard watch at sea? They
16 have a second and third mate and a lookout on the bridge?

17 MR. ENE: Yes, yes. Always.

18 MR. YOUNG: Always.

19 MR. ENE: Yeah.

20 MR. YOUNG: And on the day of the incident, can you just talk
21 about where you had been coming from or sailing from and --

22 MR. ENE: Yeah.

23 MR. YOUNG: -- where you were coming into?

24 MR. ENE: We are coming from -- our last port of call was
25 Halifax, Canada, and we departed on the date of 16, arriving here

1 on the 18 of October early in the morning, was -- 5 o'clock was
2 the pilot, 6:30 -- I think 6:30 we were alongside on the passenger
3 terminal of Ocean Gate. Tied up the ship, secure, stop the
4 engines, stop the bow thruster, and pilot disembark already. And
5 then, then everything was normal after arrival with the CBP to
6 come to clear us. It was like they were scheduled somewhere, I
7 want to say 1:30 in the morning.

8 And I was heading down from the bridge going to take my
9 breakfast. I had the breakfast actually, and then I pick up a
10 coffee and I was just sitting on the balcony on deck 3 just having
11 the coffee, waiting for the announcement from the gangway to tell
12 me -- to hear when the CBP will show up. And then suddenly I
13 heard something, like a boom or some -- not exactly a boom. It
14 was more like a shake of the ship, you know. I said, okay,
15 something wrong, you know.

16 And being on the deck 3 balcony, I was just looking on the
17 outside, you know, and I saw that the smoke come from the funnel.
18 Then I was thinking in that time that that's not a normal smoke.
19 Even they start to do -- I mean, they start an engine to do a
20 maintenance or something or to check something, that's not
21 possible. Once I open the door to get inside, it was already
22 blackout.

23 Then in the meantime, I was going to the stairs up to the
24 bridge and I called actually from -- by radio, I called the bridge
25 to see what's happening. The officer on watch inform me that we

1 have a chain of fire alarms in the engine room. And once I arrive
2 there, he already got the report that the starboard generator get
3 a crack, explosion, and it's a fire down there. Then the next
4 step was just to go to our usual emergency, calling the
5 [REDACTED] alarm. What mean [REDACTED], who is here, in case
6 of fire, damage, or collision. And told them the location.

7 And after that, knowing that already the fire down there, I
8 didn't need another confirmation. Then the second step, the
9 general alarm activate to activate the entire ship crew.

10 Then everybody was present. What they normally do, they
11 report to the bridge, to the command center. In the meantime,
12 they evacuate the -- the engine room was empty. They reposition
13 their secondary assemble station. And the fire teams getting
14 ready, the stairway guys -- the whole crew.

15 Then after that, I inform the Coast Guard by the VHF radio.
16 And after that -- or in the meantime, I call by telephone the
17 agent because I knew he is down there -- he was down there on the
18 pier. And immediately he called for the shore firefighters and
19 ambulance. And I found out in the meantime that we have the
20 casualty, the gentleman, the motorman on duty who was next to
21 the -- or close to the generator, and he got burned and he was
22 running by himself to the hospital, the ship hospital. He got
23 there. What I know, that the doctor immediately applied his --
24 the first aid to him.

25 And then after everybody report, on-scene commander was on

1 the scene, area was isolated by the watertight door being closed,
2 the fire screen door being closed on the no-go area as well.
3 No-go area was properly evacuated, nobody around. Then finally we
4 knew that we have only one casualty on that time.

5 And in the meantime, the passengers been mustered to their
6 muster station for the first step, evacuate from their cabins or
7 (indiscernible) wherever they were in that time. And this
8 procedure was done quickly, fast, and they perform pretty well
9 from my point of view. Then everybody was gathering the muster
10 stations.

11 In the meantime, the fire group number 2 was down to the
12 scene. They asked for permission to get inside to see the
13 situation, if it's still a fire or not. The no-go area was full
14 of fire -- or full of smoke, sorry. Then they got a permission
15 from the command center. They passed through the watertight door.
16 They get inside. They check the area. They reported that it's
17 not any fire anymore, the fire in control and actually it's
18 extinguished by itself. And then it's a lot of smoke down there.

19 In the same time, I -- after they reported the passenger was
20 gathered to the muster station, it was kind of -- in the same time
21 the people -- the firefighter from the shore side arrive. They
22 came on board. In that same time, I give the order to evacuate
23 the passengers to the pier just to be on the, you know, on the
24 safe look in case of something were happening again down there.
25 Being so -- such a lot of smoke, you don't know, maybe the fire

1 was ignite or not, never know.

2 Then we succeed to evacuate the passengers, all of them on
3 the pier. And the next step, I evacuate all crew members on the
4 pier, except myself, chief mate, chief engineer, the fire teams,
5 and the on-scene commander. Plus we have on on board two -- I
6 think that they were two fire squads from the shore.

7 Then fire squad from the shore, one of them together with one
8 of my fire teams, going through all the cabins to double check one
9 more time for somebody, in case just -- but in the gangway and the
10 guys which evacuate the people, they already report that everybody
11 is evacuated. But for a double checking, they just go all around
12 the ship to have a closer look again.

13 And the other team, fire squad from the shore, with my team,
14 which they were on the scene, they double check as well the engine
15 room and they confirm that the fire it is extinguished, it's only
16 smoke inside. It's just don't forget when the blackout, I come
17 back when the blackout occur, the emergency generator just start
18 automatically directing the fire dampers was closed, fire screen
19 doors and, as I said, the area was isolated.

20 And then they decide, the firemen from the shore, they said
21 that -- they were asking me if the -- they were asking if there's
22 any possibility to start to ventilate the area. Then what we did,
23 according how our engine room is builded, we have the two bunker
24 stations which they are going through engine room. Then we open
25 the doors, the outside doors, to flow the air and to try to get

1 away with the smoke down there. In the meantime, the chief
2 engineer, he start -- he try to start the pumps. In that time, he
3 didn't succeed, only after a while. But being with the door open,
4 in, let's say, 1 hour, 1 hour and a half, or whatever, all the
5 smoke was out. We keep that door for the whole ship open. I
6 mean, also the step tower doors to the balcony or gangways, they
7 were open, totally open just to provide as much flow, you know, of
8 the air to pass through.

9 And, yeah, I think also the Coast Guard arrive in the
10 meantime, the QI arrive in the meantime. After the smoke was out,
11 we got all the passenger in the terminal, we got the crew in the
12 terminal. All the crew finally, together with me, we are out with
13 the -- also with the guys from the firefighters from the shore,
14 just waiting a little bit for the ship to -- the smoke of the ship
15 to get out and to leave and to clear the smoke.

16 Then I don't remember exactly the time, I have the note, but
17 I do believe it was like 10:30 or 11 when the ship was considered
18 safe again. Then, in that time I was with Mr. [REDACTED] here. We
19 came back on board. We check again -- I was down there again, we
20 checking there. We checked the area. Everything looks safe, no
21 sign of smoke, no sign of fire. Everything was, let's say, back
22 to normal.

23 And after discussing with the U.S. Coast Guard, they allowed
24 us to let the passenger by groups to get on board guided by our
25 crew members to pick up their luggage, pack their luggage, pick

1 up, and go back to the terminal. Then it was like 15 or 20 by
2 group back and forth, back and forth. Everything, all the process
3 perform like fine, safely, no casualty, no injured person, no --
4 like was like on the line, you know. Everything was step by step
5 but perform it well. And except the casualty, no more trauma, was
6 only -- other than that, that was pretty much the whole story.

7 MR. YOUNG: That's very good memory of the whole story.
8 That's great. That's great. It's a lot to remember.

9 Can you remember, and I'm sure you have it written down, how
10 many passengers you had on board?

11 MR. ENE: Yes. We had in that time 128, 1-2-8, passengers
12 and 82 crew on board, 8-2, the crew members who were on the boat.

13 MR. YOUNG: And when the passengers originally came aboard,
14 had you done any sort of drills with the passengers?

15 MR. ENE: Yes. Well, every embarkation we do -- before
16 departure we do a safety drill with the passengers. We -- on the
17 safety drill what we really do, we got everybody from their cabin
18 to their muster station to be familiar in case of an emergency
19 where they supposed to go when they hear the general alarm. And
20 we demonstrate them how to wear a life jacket. And then we guide
21 them to their abandon ship stations, which are the lifeboats on
22 deck 4, port and starboard. Having two muster station, muster
23 station A, which is exactly here in the conference lounge, the are
24 the largest one, and the muster station B, which is on deck 4 up
25 we call the grill, over there.

1 MR. YOUNG: And is that where you, on the day of the
2 incident, the passengers mustered at A and B --

3 MR. ENE: Yes. Correct. Correct.

4 MR. YOUNG: -- muster stations?

5 MR. ENE: Yes. Exactly.

6 MR. YOUNG: And then it's typical to train to do an
7 evacuation to go to the lifeboats, but have you ever done some
8 sort of drill or exercise where you've --

9 MR. ENE: For my crew member, yes.

10 MR. YOUNG: -- evacuated the passengers?

11 MR. ENE: Yes, on the pier. Yeah. We did that -- you know,
12 being in layup, we do a little drill. We keep up with our
13 maintenance, but we keep with out safety training. And being
14 there always on the pier, we do the drills and we really do --
15 they have operation on the pier, not only with the lifeboats or
16 life raft. Then the good thing was that even with this
17 experience, being on layup was helpful for everybody because the
18 crew, they were like just -- they have implemented, let's say, in
19 mind. It was like something normal for them. It was not
20 something new. Okay, maybe something new for some of hotel crew
21 members, but few of them, and of course a real emergency was for
22 all of us, you know. But as I said, everybody perform very good
23 their duties without any kind of panic or shock or -- nothing. No
24 screamings around, no -- it was like just a normal -- it was like
25 a drill.

1 MR. YOUNG: And that's one of my questions. Do you feel that
2 your drills helped you --

3 MR. ENE: A lot.

4 MR. YOUNG: -- coordinate the evacuation?

5 MR. ENE: A lot. Once -- what I observed during my, even my
6 career, and I been a lot of time safety officer, once you consist
7 with your training and drills, maybe not all the personnel of the
8 ship they like it because I understand sometimes you have to work
9 and to have safety trainings, but in the end, everybody realize
10 that everything what we did till that moment was helpful for
11 everybody.

12 MR. YOUNG: Right.

13 MR. ENE: And the circumstances show this thing, you know.

14 MR. GILES: One thing that we have, too, just to add to that,
15 not only do we drill to get passengers off the gangway -- we know
16 there's only one gangway, so we drill to get them off the
17 lifeboats and the rafts waterside, should that be compromised,
18 so --

19 MR. YOUNG: And are all these drills part of a safety
20 management system? Is that some sort of a --

21 MR. ENE: Yes.

22 MR. YOUNG: -- package that -- do you have that here?

23 MR. GILES: I don't know if the gangway drills are. We --

24 MR. ENE: No, the gangway drills actually no.

25 MR. GILES: That's just something that we started doing in

1 layup and --

2 MR. ENE: Yeah.

3 MR. GILES: -- it just kind of took.

4 MR. ENE: Yeah.

5 MR. GILES: Right. It's something we should put it in there.

6 MR. ENE: Yeah. Because actually this -- exactly, as I
7 started to say, this -- and I said this was -- those drills,
8 special drills that they would special have operation on the pier
9 was only on the layup. And also on the layup, there being not
10 full crew on board, we have this temporary muster list. And on
11 that temporary muster list we add even like a note, remember, like
12 first primary evacuation on the pier. If that's not working,
13 we'll go for the lifeboat, depends on the size of the ship. And
14 if suddenly we cannot lower the lifeboat, we go for the life raft,
15 depend on which side of the ship. Then we have three ways for
16 evacuation in case of emergency on board.

17 MR. YOUNG: And I know you drill when you have new passengers
18 come on, but is the drilling part of a requirement for your safety
19 management system?

20 MR. ENE: The passengers are ready, yes. Yes.

21 MR. YOUNG: Do you have a safety management system for the
22 ship?

23 MR. ENE: Each passenger embarkation, the drill should not be
24 postponed more than 24 hours after the embarkation. That way
25 we -- immediately when they embark on the port, after half hour,

1 until they, you know, set up in their rooms, feel comfortable,
2 then we proceed with the drill before we depart the port.

3 MR. YOUNG: Excellent.

4 MR. ENE: And make, I mean, for -- we always do that. I
5 don't think I did it anytime after the departure because I saw
6 everybody is more focused, everybody -- I mean, they don't care
7 what is outside. They don't care if the ship is sailing or not.
8 They know the ship is at port and they concentrate on the drill
9 also. And for us, it's work -- was working perfect for them. I
10 see them happy.

11 MR. YOUNG: And where did this voyage start for these
12 passengers?

13 MR. ENE: Montreal.

14 MR. YOUNG: Montreal?

15 MR. ENE: Yes. Montreal, 10 October.

16 MR. YOUNG: And at the time of the incident was the bridge
17 still attended or was it --

18 MR. ENE: Yes.

19 MR. YOUNG: It is?

20 MR. ENE: Yeah.

21 MR. YOUNG: Even though you're alongside, you had people on
22 the bridge?

23 MR. ENE: Yeah. Always.

24 MR. YOUNG: Even in port you have people on the bridge?

25 MR. ENE: Even in port, yes.

1 MR. YOUNG: And would there be a mate and a --

2 MR. ENE: (Indiscernible) mate.

3 MR. YOUNG: One mate?

4 MR. ENE: One mate in the port alongside. Just the mate
5 that's supervising the bridge 24 hours.

6 MR. YOUNG: And then that mate would receive any alarms
7 which, it sounds like the fire detection system --

8 MR. ENE: That's correct.

9 MR. YOUNG: And does the general alarm automatically signal
10 or does it have to be manually --

11 MR. ENE: If nobody will attend the fire alarm over to me,
12 then the general alarm will start sounding by itself. Being the
13 mate over there, he already attend the alarms, mute them, and
14 inform us call to the engine to see what the -- call the fire
15 button to, in the same time, to send him to check the alarm
16 actually because nobody know if it's a fire or maybe could be a
17 false alarm or, you know --

18 MR. YOUNG: Right.

19 MR. ENE: But in that time of the incident, he call me
20 directly on the radio, he called the engineer down there by
21 telephone, and also the chief mate was around and he call the
22 bridge that he heard like an explosion down there and he see a
23 lot of smoke. Then, yeah, that why actually the general alarm
24 didn't start until I start it from the bridge because everything
25 was attended before that to me.

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So you manually sounded the general alarm?

2 MR. ENE: Yes. Yes.

3 MR. YOUNG: And you did that prior to the automatic 2-minute
4 start?

5 MR. ENE: Oh, yes. Yeah.

6 MR. YOUNG: Would you say the communication between you and
7 your crew was effective?

8 MR. ENE: Yes.

9 MR. YOUNG: You were able to communicate with the engine room
10 and your safety officer and --

11 MR. ENE: Right.

12 MR. YOUNG: -- and you mentioned an incident commander?

13 MR. ENE: On-scene commander we call it there.

14 MR. YOUNG: On-scene commander.

15 MR. ENE: It's actually the safety officer of the ship. He
16 have this emergency duty. He is on-scene commander, that mean he
17 will be on the scene outside of no-go area and he will meet the
18 fire teams once they are ready and he will explain briefly the
19 situation.

20 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

21 MR. ENE: And in the meantime he prepare the fire hose to be
22 ready for the fire team once they arrive so don't lose the time.

23 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

24 MR. ENE: That's -- and also he's, after that, he's keeping
25 the communication with the fire teams and he's reporting to the

1 command center just to avoid miscommunication passing through and
2 also to make, let's say, more effective the fire teams on their
3 performance of whatever incident is down there. Then just
4 communicate closing -- closing, the communication, and the on-
5 scene commander is the one which give every reports to the command
6 center.

7 MR. YOUNG: And is the command center on the bridge?

8 MR. ENE: Yes.

9 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And that's a separate bank of computers on
10 the aft bulkhead?

11 MR. ENE: Pardon?

12 MR. YOUNG: I know there are some computers that have a fire
13 protection system on the aft bulkhead.

14 MR. ENE: Yeah.

15 MR. YOUNG: Is that considered the --

16 MR. ENE: Yes, yes.

17 MR. YOUNG: -- incident command?

18 MR. ENE: We call it -- it's the bridge, but we call it the
19 command center for the emergency.

20 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay. As you are maneuvering in to
21 Portland, Maine, you -- were you running both main engines for
22 propulsion?

23 MR. ENE: Yes.

24 MR. YOUNG: And then how does the bow thruster get powered?

25 MR. ENE: The bow thruster is separate. Then before entrance

1 to the narrow channel, entrance to the river, entrance to the
2 port, we start the bow thruster a half hour prior.

3 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And does that have its own engine or is it
4 electric --

5 MR. GELLGAF: Only electrical.

6 MR. ENE: It's electric engine powered.

7 MR. YOUNG: So do you have to start two diesel generators?

8 MR. GELLGAF: We have to start two diesel and we power up the
9 bow thruster.

10 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then on your entrance in was there any
11 excessive use of power that may have --

12 MR. ENE: No.

13 MR. YOUNG: -- increased the electrical load on the ship?

14 MR. ENE: No.

15 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And while you are maneuvering you have two
16 main engines that have shafts coming out and what do they -- what
17 do you use for propulsion on the ship? Do you have Azipod?

18 MR. ENE: Azipods, yeah. Yeah.

19 MR. YOUNG: So two Azipods?

20 MR. ENE: Two Azipods and one bow thruster.

21 MR. YOUNG: And one bow thruster?

22 MR. ENE: Yeah.

23 MR. YOUNG: At the -- and this is more for my report, but at
24 the time of the incident do you know what the draft was of this
25 vessel?

1 MR. ENE: Yeah, 4.2 meters.

2 MR. YOUNG: 4.2.

3 MR. ENE: 4.2 or 4.3. I have it noted.

4 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

5 MR. ENE: But this is -- this was 4.2 or 4.3.

6 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And as you are maneuvering in was there
7 any excessive current or wind or anything notable with the
8 weather?

9 MR. ENE: In that day, no. No, the weather condition were
10 pretty good.

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Since you have two Azimuth and thrusters,
12 do you have a rudder or no?

13 MR. ENE: No.

14 MR. YOUNG: No steering other than your --

15 MR. ENE: Yeah.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And I know you said the mate on watch had
17 heard some fire detection and also -- do you have anything else
18 other than smoke and fire detectors down there? Do you have flame
19 sensors?

20 MR. ENE: Flame detectors, smoke detectors, manual call
21 points and --

22 MR. YOUNG: Manual call points as well?

23 MR. ENE: Yeah.

24 MR. YOUNG: And was -- were both flame and smoke detectors
25 activated down below?

1 MR. ENE: Yes.

2 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Several?

3 MR. ENE: Several, yeah. Like six or eight, something.

4 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So I had some questions about how your
5 department responded and you did the general alarm. You used the
6 VHF to call --

7 MR. ENE: The Coast Guard.

8 MR. YOUNG: -- the Coast Guard. You used your phone to call
9 the agent. The agent called the fire department.

10 MR. ENE: And the ambulance. Yeah, he call actually the 911
11 before me. Because I was in the same time with the Coast Guard on
12 the VHF, and the same time I talk to agent, if you can call 911,
13 just do it or I will do it after 1 minute after I talk -- because
14 with the Coast Guard I report our position, you know, the whole
15 steps. I cannot -- I couldn't tell them I'm in Portland, layup --

16 MR. YOUNG: Right.

17 MR. ENE: Of course they -- and then he just say, don't
18 worry, I just called the 911. I said, okay, perfect.

19 MR. YOUNG: Right. That's great. And all these steps, it
20 seems like it's very -- you took the steps. Was that some sort of
21 a obviously training or --

22 MR. ENE: Yes.

23 MR. YOUNG: -- drills that you have done to understand all
24 these?

25 MR. ENE: Yes. Yes. Because actually our procedure on the

1 drill, on case of the -- of course, on the emergency, you can
2 change some things in the meantime. But the procedure is very,
3 very clear. Once you have an alarm on the bridge, you
4 (indiscernible) that alarm, you check it, you send the fire
5 department to check that specific area and then he report. If
6 it's a fire, the fire patrol evacuate and close the area. Or if
7 somebody else report directly -- let's say we have a fire in the
8 galley and some cooks are there, they report the fire and they are
9 already trained to evacuate and isolate the area and wait outside
10 of the affected area for the on-scene commander/safety officer to
11 come and to take over. Then once those things are reported to the
12 bridge, it's myself or chief officer or the officer on duty take
13 on the PA microphone and make the -- give the alarm, the [REDACTED].
14 [REDACTED] three times plus the location plus the
15 incident, it's a fire, a collision, or damage.

16 MR. YOUNG: And that's your code to talk to the crew, right?

17 MR. ENE: That's our code to, exactly, to talk with the crew
18 because the passengers they are not involved in that. Once we
19 discover that the fire -- and in this [REDACTED] are just such
20 things to be activated, like fire teams, like engine control team,
21 bridge team, stairway guides, and for safety, search and rescue,
22 and that's more or less -- boat preparation. Then the rest of
23 them, they just are aware that something happen, because everybody
24 as a crew member know what [REDACTED] means. But they just to
25 don't create panic between the passengers, maybe it's a small fire

1 and everything will be finalized in 5 minutes, then no necessary
2 to create a lot of panic on board.

3 MR. YOUNG: Right.

4 MR. ENE: Okay. And then, after the teams are ready, they
5 report to the bridge. They are -- first of all, they report it's
6 like a radio check with the command. Second, they report present
7 and -- or missing persons from their teams. Then once they are
8 ready, fire groups are dressed, wearing the mask, the suit or the
9 whole gear, they report -- they report readiness to the bridge and
10 the bridge coordinate them where to proceed to the on-scene
11 commander, the safety officer. Once they arrive next to him, they
12 will be split. Fire group 1 will go perform boundary cooling or
13 (indiscernible) and the fire group 2 to go do -- they will be the
14 attacking team.

15 Once those teams -- in the meantime, the engine control room,
16 they -- depends of the area, they will cut off electricity, shut
17 down ventilation, and -- sorry. And after that, once everything
18 is done, the fire teams getting inside, whatever is the fire team
19 get the permission to go inside of the affected area. They report
20 back to on-scene commander what is inside, if there are casualty
21 or not, that's the first thing what they are doing. They report,
22 depend of the area, if the sprinkler system is activate or not.
23 They report again electricity, if it's cut off on shore or not,
24 the ventilation if it's shut down or not. Then they, if it's a
25 fire, they start to attack it, depend of the -- they report also

1 the class of fire first. And depend on the class of fire, they
2 wills start attacking the fire. Then if they succeed to
3 extinguish the fire, they will say, okay, the fire is coming under
4 control and, in the end, the fire is extinguished.

5 In the meantime, if necessary, the other fire team will start
6 boundary cooling or not, again, depending of the fire. Then if
7 the fire is out of control, then that's the time when we sound the
8 general alarm because they realize, okay, the fire is getting
9 bigger and bigger, okay, let's sound the general alarm. The other
10 emergency teams will be activated like muster station teams,
11 evacuation teams. It's a central group for the reception desk,
12 you know. And then they will guide the passengers -- the
13 passengers will have heard the general alarm as well. They will
14 be guided to their muster stations, A and B, as I said.

15 And the emergency teams -- emergency evacuation teams, they
16 are going to each cabin to be sure that everybody's evacuated and
17 to their muster station. The muster station report to the bridge
18 the number of the passengers or the missing ones. In case
19 somebody's missing, we have cabin 1-1-1 missing. It depends of
20 the area, where is located the fire. We have either -- we send
21 the search and rescue team if the area is a no-go area. Or if
22 it's, let's say, like a normal safe area, the emergency teams --
23 emergency evacuation team, which are there double check that cabin
24 to see if the persons are inside or not.

25 Then once everything is done and everybody is on their muster

1 stations, then -- now depends. While we are underway, of course
2 everybody will be guided to their lifeboats. After that, the
3 guests and all the crew which are not assigned to the lifeboats to
4 have duty on the lifeboats, they are coming on the life raft
5 station. And yeah, that's the whole --

6 MR. GILES: Elaborate on the shoreside communication element.
7 I think, there's a little bit more that you could add to that.

8 MR. ENE: Oh, yeah. Call my superintendent, call my DPA what
9 was --

10 MR. GILES: Back to the Coast Guard to notify local
11 authority, then he calls me --

12 MR. ENE: Yeah.

13 MR. GILES: -- or the DPA, and then we call the QI. I called
14 SMS Resolve to get them going and -- whether we need them or not,
15 let's get everybody rolling.

16 MR. YOUNG: Right.

17 MR. GILES: And then I let our corporate crisis team know
18 what's going on, and then we immediately start having crisis
19 meetings. We'll have an initial meeting and then there's -- every
20 30 minutes there's another meeting. So and in that, I'm the
21 communication link, myself or the DPA, depending who's available.
22 We were actually both on planes --

23 MR. YOUNG: That's right.

24 MR. GILES: -- getting planes. We were tag teaming him that
25 morning. But we'll be the direct link and then update the crisis

1 team. And then they're, you know, doing what they need to as far
2 as what we do with the guests, who do we interface with, do we
3 need to get hotel rooms, buses, blah, blah, blah. So --

4 MR. YOUNG: And that is a lot of information. Do you have a
5 checklist that would help you remember all this stuff or some sort
6 of a guide that would help you?

7 MR. ENE: I do have a checklist, but in that time the only
8 checklist which we recorded was exactly what was happening on
9 board with the fire, passengers, and casualty, all of these
10 things. The phone calls, I didn't record them, but I have them on
11 my telephone.

12 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right.

13 MR. ENE: You know?

14 MR. YOUNG: Right.

15 MR. ENE: I have a guidance of who I need to call and
16 (indiscernible), but the timing being up and down, there and
17 there, we have to be sure that everything is under control and
18 everything was going smooth and fine. I was on the telephone and
19 with Mr. Dietrich and with our DPA as well. And all the time --

20 MR. GILES: Our system is set up to where his hands are full,
21 notify local authority, notify the Coast Guard, or vice a versa,
22 depending on where he's at. And then let us know, and then we
23 take care of all the heavy lifting because he can't be calling the
24 QI or anything like that, so --

25 MR. YOUNG: Right.

1 MR. ENE: Yeah.

2 MR. GILES: And response center or whatever.

3 MR. YOUNG: I guess what I'm getting at with this, too, is do
4 you have a safety management system that gives you guidance when
5 there's a fire?

6 MR. ENE: Yeah.

7 MR. YOUNG: What you need to do for abandon ship, is that --
8 that's what I was asking.

9 MR. GILES: We do. We have an emergency response booklet
10 that details different crises and what to do.

11 MR. YOUNG: It spells out what to do. Okay.

12 MR. GILES: Open it up and --

13 MR. YOUNG: And is that a booklet or a sheet that's on the
14 bridge that you can access?

15 MR. ENE: Yes.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Great. I know -- I'm trying to just
17 remember some of things you said. But did you say there was a
18 sprinkler system in the engine room or no?

19 MR. ENE: No. No, no, no.

20 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay.

21 MR. ENE: No, no, no.

22 MR. YOUNG: When the emergency teams are assembling was at
23 any time any water applied or boundary cooling?

24 MR. ENE: No.

25 MR. YOUNG: It wasn't necessary, right?

1 MR. ENE: It wasn't necessary.

2 MR. YOUNG: And did any of your crew go on air to go in?

3 MR. ENE: Yes, all of them. I mean, whoever was going in,
4 all of them was on air.

5 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then you had a backup team?

6 MR. ENE: Yes. And we have backup -- we have their oxygen
7 mask as well.

8 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then was there ever a discussion to
9 prepare or be prepared to release CO2 in the engine room?

10 MR. ENE: Yes. The engine control room, they are secondary
11 assemble station, it's by the CO2 room.

12 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

13 MR. ENE: Then will prepare anytime, if I will give the
14 order, to release the CO2.

15 MR. YOUNG: Okay. But it didn't get to that point --

16 MR. ENE: No.

17 MR. YOUNG: -- and you never released it, right?

18 MR. ENE: Correct.

19 MR. YOUNG: Did you -- from the bridge, did you take any
20 isolation procedures down such as starting a fire pump?

21 MR. ENE: No. I didn't start any fire pump because our main
22 fire pump is in automatic position. I mean, once we start the
23 hydrant, then the hose -- the fire pump will start automatically.

24 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And no one opened any hydrants so there
25 was no need to start it?

1 MR. ENE: Correct.

2 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

3 MR. ENE: And in case of that one will not start, then I have
4 the emergency fire pump which I can start it from the bridge.

5 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Interesting.

6 MR. GILES: And the fire pumps constantly charge.

7 MR. ENE: Yeah.

8 MR. GILES: The fire system is always charged, so --

9 MR. YOUNG: How is that being charged?

10 MR. ENE: It's under pressure all the time.

11 MR. GELLGAF: Under pressure all the time.

12 MR. GILES: Yeah, the pump, when it -- if it leaks down, the
13 pump will come on and pump it back out.

14 MR. YOUNG: So as soon as you open up a nozzle, it's on?

15 MR. GELLGAF: It's on, yeah.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. How about ventilation? Had that been
17 secured, the engine room ventilation?

18 MR. ENE: Due to the blackout, I think already all the
19 dampers been closed.

20 MR. GELLGAF: The damper been closed and the guys should
21 check and (indiscernible) -- if there's some leak from one
22 (indiscernible), the dampers are tightened.

23 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So electrically, when you lose electrical
24 power, the fans electrically stop. Are the dampers held open
25 electrically as well?

1 MR. GELLGAF: No. No, they are opened electrically, but
2 they're closed by springs.

3 MR. YOUNG: Springs.

4 MR. GELLGAF: When we lose the power, they're closing by
5 springs.

6 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

7 MR. GILES: They only close.

8 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And watertight doors, are they typically
9 closed underway?

10 MR. ENE: Yes. Always underway they are closed.

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And fire screen doors?

12 MR. ENE: Fire screen doors, you can close them manually or
13 you can -- locally or you can close them from the bridge by
14 automatic.

15 MR. YOUNG: And did that happen on the day of the fire? Were
16 they closed as well?

17 MR. ENE: The fire screen doors, because of the affected area
18 was in the main engine room, we have only the watertight doors
19 over there, which they were closed. The fire doors were closed
20 manually locally because they were in no-go area and they were
21 just closing that day.

22 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

23 MR. GILES: I'd like to add that the fire screen doors are
24 really a judgment call because it impedes evacuation --

25 MR. YOUNG: Got it.

1 MR. GILES: -- as well because all the doors close.

2 MR. YOUNG: Oh, throughout the entire vessel?

3 MR. GILES: Yes.

4 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

5 MR. GILES: If you hit the button in the bridge, they all
6 close. So --

7 MR. YOUNG: Got it. So it sounds like by closing the
8 watertight doors, which are closed already, and the dampers, the
9 engine room is completely isolated.

10 MR. ENE: Isolated, yeah.

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

12 MR. GILES: When they made entry into the engine room, they
13 did it through a watertight door, but they isolated the fire doors
14 behind them so they created a no-go boundary. So should
15 things -- the smoke come in, which it did, it wouldn't go anywhere
16 else, you know, so --

17 MR. YOUNG: Right. And I know you've talked a lot about
18 evacuation drills with the passengers. Do you -- can you talk
19 about some of the firefighting drill you do with your crew? Do
20 you do frequent firefighting drills?

21 MR. ENE: Weekly.

22 MR. YOUNG: Weekly?

23 MR. ENE: Fire and emergency drills.

24 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And have you ever done an engine room fire
25 drill?

1 MR. ENE: Yes. Like maybe two times a month in the engine,
2 in the engine room.

3 MR. YOUNG: And do people get suited up and charge hoses and
4 everything, that kind of a drill where you have a scenario?

5 MR. ENE: I have a scenario, I did it, but it's not a weekly
6 to charge these hoses.

7 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

8 MR. ENE: Yeah.

9 MR. YOUNG: Good. I don't have any more questions for you,
10 Captain. You answered most of my questions by one giant answer,
11 so I appreciate it.

12 MR. ENE: Yeah. Thank you.

13 MR. [REDACTED] My only question -- this is [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Coast
14 Guard. Who is the sister ship to this vessel?

15 MR. GILES: *Ocean Voyager*.

16 MR. [REDACTED] Is she the same configuration?

17 MR. GILES: Yes.

18 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Have you guys talked to them about this
19 and are they doing anything to kind of look at that generator on
20 board that vessel to make sure -- I mean, are they on the same
21 schedule as far as maintenance or are they totally different?

22 MR. GILES: They're a little bit different, but we've
23 notified them of it. The nature of this is not something that you
24 can really look at and say, oh, there's a problem --

25 MR. [REDACTED] Yeah.

1 MR. GILES: -- without tearing into it.

2 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

3 MR. GILES: What happened here, whether it was a piston
4 failure or a head failure or a rod -- a bearing failure, is
5 something you could only know by opening up the engine and really
6 looking at it. So --

7 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. I was just wondering if this engine had
8 more hours on it than the other vessel or if it's -- or if they
9 have --

10 MR. GILES: It had less.

11 MR. [REDACTED] This had less than -- okay. So, for the record,
12 the *Ocean Voyager* has more hours on its generator than the
13 *Ocean* -- than this one.

14 MR. GILES: Since it -- since they had the in-frame overhaul,
15 yes.

16 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Yeah. All right. That's all the
17 questions I had.

18 MR. YOUNG: Do you have any?

19 MR. ROSEN: Yeah. I just had a general question about --
20 you said that you put on another generator when you came into
21 port. Was the starboard generator -- which one did you put on?
22 Did you put on the port or the starboard?

23 MR. ENE: When we came to port we used both generators.

24 MR. ROSEN: Right. Were you running one coming -- when you
25 were out in blue water were you running on one generator?

1 MR. ENE: Yes. Out in -- yeah, at sea we run one.

2 MR. ROSEN: Okay. So which one did you turn on coming into
3 Portland? Do you remember? Do you recall?

4 MR. ENE: Yeah, the 2, the number 2.

5 MR. ROSEN: The number 2?

6 MR. ENE: Usually run number 2.

7 MR. ROSEN: Okay.

8 MR. YOUNG: That's -- number 2 is the starboard?

9 MR. ENE: Yes, starboard side.

10 MR. YOUNG: We can shift our gears to the chief and ask some
11 engineering questions now, if you're prepared. Or if you need a
12 break or some water or --

13 MR. ENE: No, no, no.

14 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you guys need some water or
16 something?

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm okay.

18 MR. GELLGAF: Okay, I (indiscernible).

19 MR. YOUNG: So this is Brian Young with the NTSB again,
20 speaking with the chief. Chief, can you talk to us about how many
21 years you have been sailing as a chief engineer?

22 MR. GELLGAF: I started as work as engineer in 1992 and as
23 chief engineer 2004, 2006, I don't remember exactly. And this
24 is -- I see my ISP, ISPC my report, and since 2010.

25 MR. YOUNG: 2010?

1 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah.

2 MR. YOUNG: And how long have you been working on these
3 vessels?

4 MR. GELLGAF: On this vessels I came in 2019.

5 MR. YOUNG: 2019?

6 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah.

7 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And with your engine crew on this ship do
8 you have manned watches in the engine room or do you go unmanned?

9 MR. GELLGAF: We have manned watches, one duty engineer and
10 one motorman.

11 MR. YOUNG: And they're on watch all the time you're on
12 board?

13 MR. GELLGAF: They're all the time on watch, yeah, 24 hours.

14 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And do they do 4 hour watch, 8 --

15 MR. GELLGAF: Four, that's usually the standard. Four hour
16 watch is --

17 MR. YOUNG: And when you're maneuvering --

18 MR. GELLGAF: When -- I am up -- me and chief electrician, we
19 are always in engine room for maneuvering.

20 MR. YOUNG: In the control --

21 MR. GELLGAF: And control room for maneuvering and also for
22 the locks for rivers.

23 MR. YOUNG: Right. Okay. And when your crews do a
24 changeover of watch, say, at the 8 o'clock or the noon, do they do
25 a checklist?

1 MR. GELLGAF: They complete (indiscernible) checklist. And
2 my (indiscernible) engine logbook.

3 MR. YOUNG: In the logbook, too. Okay. And I think we had
4 talked a little bit about as you are at sea typically you'll run
5 two main engines?

6 MR. GELLGAF: We're at sea, yes, typically we run two main
7 engine and one DG.

8 MR. YOUNG: One DG. And what's your -- and this might be
9 more for the captain, but what's your normal cruising speed?

10 MR. ENE: Ten knots.

11 MR. YOUNG: Ten knots? And what kind of an engine load does
12 that have for the mains?

13 MR. GELLGAF: For the mains, the main engine has around 65
14 percent -- 65, 70 percent of load. It depends (indiscernible)

15 MR. YOUNG: And when you're at sea at 10 knots and you have a
16 hotel load of crew and passengers, is it okay to run one
17 generator?

18 MR. GELLGAF: Yes. It's more than enough. The generator is
19 designed for 1 mega and our maximum load is 400, 450 kilowatts;
20 600 in summertime when AC line is full power.

21 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And the two mains and the two auxiliaries,
22 are they all the same 35/16 engines?

23 MR. GELLGAF: 35/16 engines, exactly same.

24 MR. YOUNG: Right. And the generators run at constant speed?

25 MR. GELLGAF: Generator run at constant speed and main engine

1 variable speeds.

2 MR. YOUNG: Variable speed, yeah. And did you have any
3 excessive load on the way into Portland before the incident with
4 the generator?

5 MR. GELLGAF: No.

6 MR. YOUNG: No?

7 MR. GELLGAF: No, just everything as usual, the bow
8 thruster and --

9 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then when you do run the bow thruster
10 for maneuvering, you do start a second engine typically?

11 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah. Also we do -- we can start only with
12 two -- start bow thruster with two DG online.

13 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then after you arrive in port, the bow
14 thruster shuts down and you can shut down the main engines and go
15 to one --

16 MR. GELLGAF: When we arrive in port, yeah, we shut down main
17 engines. Usually we have to, we shut down bow thruster, main
18 engine. After, shut down one DG.

19 MR. YOUNG: One DG. And then for a hotel load sitting in
20 port one DG is okay?

21 MR. GELLGAF: One is okay because we have in port 400
22 kilowatts.

23 MR. YOUNG: So about 400 kilowatts is a normal load?

24 MR. GELLGAF: Yes. It's every, every (indiscernible)

25 MR. YOUNG: And about what percent is that? Maybe --

1 MR. GELLGAF: It's 40 percent.

2 MR. YOUNG: Forty percent load on the engine?

3 MR. GELLGAF: Forty percent load.

4 MR. YOUNG: And was that about the load at the time of the
5 incident?

6 MR. GELLGAF: Yes.

7 MR. YOUNG: Nothing excessive?

8 MR. GELLGAF: Nothing excessive, no.

9 MR. YOUNG: Do the DGs put out 450 volt? Are they 450 volt
10 generators or how high?

11 MR. GELLGAF: 480.

12 MR. YOUNG: 480?

13 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah.

14 MR. YOUNG: And then the morning after arriving and singling
15 up on the one DG, were there any alarms leading up to the
16 incident?

17 MR. GELLGAF: In the morning we have during maneuvering, we
18 have high -- we seen an alarm because we have exhaust gets alarm
19 on starboard side DG.

20 MR. YOUNG: Starboard DG?

21 MR. GELLGAF: Oh, sorry, not starboard. Port side DG.

22 MR. YOUNG: Port side DG.

23 MR. GELLGAF: On port side DG. When we finish with the
24 engine at 6:30, after that I inspect both generator myself just to
25 see what it is and to compare parameters between DG generator. I

1 couldn't see any abnormality. The temperature on exhaust gas,
2 yes, on the port side exhaust gas was higher than the ones on
3 starboard side.

4 MR. YOUNG: So the port generator had a high exhaust
5 temperature?

6 MR. GELLGAF: (Indiscernible), yeah, one cylinder.

7 MR. YOUNG: On one cylinder?

8 MR. GELLGAF: One cylinder was low, another one was high.
9 After we do, I decide to stop the port side DG and start to
10 investigate what is the reason.

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay. But no problems on the starboard
12 generator?

13 MR. GELLGAF: Was on the starboard was -- starboard was at a
14 normal. The DG parameters were here and compare it with this port
15 side.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

17 MR. GELLGAF: All exhaust was around 300, 320 degrees.

18 MR. YOUNG: Is that normal?

19 MR. GELLGAF: It's normal.

20 MR. YOUNG: Do you know what the normal bearing temperatures
21 are underway for a generator running?

22 MR. GELLGAF: Well, generator running the temperature should
23 be around 186 Fahrenheit.

24 MR. YOUNG: 180-?

25 MR. GELLGAF: 186.

1 MR. YOUNG: And did you see any elevated bearing temperatures
2 on the starboard generator?

3 MR. GELLGAF: On the starboard generator is bearing --
4 actually we don't have bearing reading. We have general lube oil
5 temperature.

6 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So you don't -- you can't see each
7 individual bearing?

8 MR. GELLGAF: You cannot see individual bearing because they
9 are just -- have just (indiscernible) checking, we're checking it
10 with (indiscernible) was some -- no any division between.

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And was the lube oil temperature, the
12 general lube oil temperature --

13 MR. GELLGAF: Then the general lube oil temperature was a
14 little bit high. It was something 190, 192 degrees, but it's
15 (indiscernible) clean it.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And was that different than any other day
17 or is it --

18 MR. GELLGAF: It always, it always has difference with lube
19 oil temperature. On the starboard side usually it's
20 (indiscernible).

21 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

22 MR. GELLGAF: We clean coolants and everything because to
23 make a judgment, you know, of the bearing. But it was still safe
24 in the limit, safe limit.

25 MR. YOUNG: Okay, still within the limit?

1 MR. GELLGAF: Still within the limit.

2 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then after arriving in port the ship's
3 electrical load is on the starboard generator.

4 MR. GELLGAF: Yes.

5 MR. YOUNG: The port generator was secured.

6 MR. GELLGAF: (Indiscernible) was just -- yes, we put lube
7 oil on the -- disconnect generator from the bus bar. I sent
8 motorman, my engineer to put it to cool down load. And just went
9 to also open deck when -- just went out from engine room to open
10 deck because captain called me. After this, this is, yes, some
11 ship preparation and look out at same time.

12 I just ran back when is (indiscernible) station, I have my
13 third engineer, he report (indiscernible) engineer at the fire. I
14 just went, same time I went down to control room to check the
15 security and close -- to check security because to be sure the
16 area is isolated, I close main engine watertight doors same --
17 between the engine control room and I see the, I see it was -- the
18 engine room zero visibility. You know, some smoke was coming, was
19 coming because this was a very little bit to the control room.

20 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right.

21 MR. GELLGAF: After, went up, check the shutdown of -- we
22 closing 12 and the engine fans. And then we had to prepare --
23 check evacuation of engine personnel, and they report to command
24 center that engine, that engine space has evacuated and CO2
25 have -- they are ready to release.

1 MR. YOUNG: Ready to release?

2 MR. GELLGAF: Yes.

3 MR. YOUNG: And so you did activate the quick closing valves
4 for the fuel system?

5 MR. GELLGAF: For the fuel system, actually, yes. But
6 actually they was closed automatically when I went down.

7 MR. YOUNG: They do automatically close?

8 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah, but just to be sure, I was a manual,
9 manual -- check the manual activation of all engine room system.

10 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And is that activated from the control
11 room?

12 MR. GELLGAF: No. We have emergency station on port side
13 to -- inside muster station was a way -- after the weather door to
14 control room.

15 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And so the quick closing valves had
16 automatically closed?

17 MR. GELLGAF: Everything. Everything. Yeah, quick closing
18 valve, all engine pumps -- all engine pumps, and also the zone for
19 zone of what will be the response for all ships, evacuation will
20 be started from there.

21 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then the CO2, you said you had prepare
22 to go, right?

23 MR. GELLGAF: It depends, I open the door to CO2 room and
24 keep it open to -- if in case it needed to dump faster.

25 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

1 MR. GELLGAF: We were at 19 to 20 percent (indiscernible) and
2 we can pull the (indiscernible) in command center, command
3 center --

4 MR. YOUNG: Understood. Understood.

5 MR. GELLGAF: But, yes, we all try -- when fire team told us
6 that we need to start evacuation, it was to open the -- the door
7 was open, and door from starboard side muster station. I was
8 trying to put emergency DG generator on the bus bar but load was
9 too high.

10 MR. YOUNG: Um-hum. You're trying to back feed the emergency
11 generator?

12 MR. GELLGAF: Back feed the emergency DG.

13 MR. YOUNG: To provide power to the ship's (indiscernible)

14 MR. GELLGAF: To provide power. This was, yes, result
15 (indiscernible). Because later when we have chance to enter to
16 control room, I switch off all breakers which remains on and we
17 provide power to main switchboard and we start establish it and
18 engine fans.

19 MR. YOUNG: Okay. The starboard generator, we understand
20 that a connecting rod exited the crank case and --

21 MR. GELLGAF: Yes.

22 MR. YOUNG: -- damaged the block. What cylinder area was it?

23 MR. GELLGAF: Cylinder number 13, and it's exactly we should
24 (indiscernible), it's in number 13.

25 MR. YOUNG: Thirteen?

1 MR. GELLGAF: Thirteen. And the crank case door broken.

2 This is same, is considered the number 14 (indiscernible)

3 MR. YOUNG: The crank case door was --

4 MR. GELLGAF: Crank case door, yeah.

5 MR. YOUNG: And can you recall the last time that any work
6 had been done on the main bearings?

7 MR. GELLGAF: On the main bearings you have -- I have -- of
8 running hours, they came just last month. It's around
9 90,000 -- 13,900 plus 400. Last month it was 13,900 plus 400.
10 From this month's it will be 14,300 running hours.

11 MR. YOUNG: So about 14,300 hours since the last time the
12 bearings were --

13 MR. GELLGAF: Yes.

14 MR. YOUNG: -- inspected or --

15 MR. GELLGAF: Inspect (indiscernible)

16 MR. YOUNG: And how many hours are on the engines now? Or
17 the generators, the --

18 MR. GELLGAF: Generator you used to run about -- something
19 like 2,000 -- (indiscernible) this is 3,000 running hours.

20 MR. GILES: In 2019, a main in-frame overhaul was done and
21 that's where that 13 hour -- 13,000 hours, since that in-frame.

22 MR. GELLGAF: Since the in-frame.

23 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

24 MR. GILES: And then we did -- the beginning of this year, we
25 did a top end.

1 MR. GELLGAF: Top end.

2 MR. GILES: Which has got like 3500 hours on it.

3 MR. YOUNG: Since the top end?

4 MR. GILES: Since the top end.

5 MR. GELLGAF: One half of estimated service period for
6 (indiscernible)

7 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And during the top end overhaul were any
8 of the conrod bearings or main bearings opened or inspected
9 whatsoever? They don't --

10 MR. GELLGAF: No.

11 MR. YOUNG: -- touch them for that --

12 MR. GELLGAF: Usually no.

13 MR. YOUNG: And do you base your maintenance, engine
14 maintenance on engine hours or fuel consumption?

15 MR. GELLGAF: Fuel consumption.

16 MR. YOUNG: Fuel consumption.

17 MR. GELLGAF: But actually we do have between (indiscernible)

18 MR. GILES: It's (indiscernible)

19 MR. GELLGAF: We have thousand, a thousand (indiscernible)
20 between fuel consumption.

21 MR. GILES: We're less than what fuel consumption says, but a
22 little bit more than the hours, so --

23 MR. GELLGAF: Yes.

24 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

25 MR. GILES: But the --

1 MR. GELLGAF: Something, something manual.

2 MR. YOUNG: Some things. So when would the bearings be due
3 next to have inspection on the main bearings?

4 MR. GILES: Next? They're -- from around 30,000 hours.

5 MR. YOUNG: Thirty. So you're about halfway to any bearing
6 maintenance?

7 MR. GILES: Yeah.

8 MR. YOUNG: And the in-frame in 19- -- do you have the
9 service records from it, history?

10 MR. GILES: (Indiscernible)

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

12 MR. GILES: It's in that file that I --

13 MR. YOUNG: And was that done by ship's crew or by some sort
14 of service type --

15 MR. GELLGAF: No, it was --

16 MR. GILES: Force Power out of Houma, Louisiana.

17 MR. GELLGAF: Force Power in Louisiana.

18 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then the top end, how about that?

19 MR. GILES: Blanchard Machinery out of Sellersberg [sic],
20 South Carolina. Sellersberg.

21 MR. GELLGAF: I don't think --

22 MR. GILES: Charleston.

23 MR. GELLGAF: Charleston.

24 MR. YOUNG: I think we talked the other day, but you do a
25 regular lube oil analysis?

1 MR. GELLGAF: Yes. By a monthly basis.

2 MR. YOUNG: Every -- monthly?

3 MR. GELLGAF: Every month.

4 MR. YOUNG: And I think you had shown me the most recent and
5 there were --

6 MR. GELLGAF: (Indiscernible) but the result -- let me see.
7 Oh, for the meters, the (indiscernible) is contaminate -- have one
8 contamination going down.

9 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And I think it came back as good or no
10 issues on the last one. Have you had any issues with any lube oil
11 reports that you can remember?

12 MR. GELLGAF: No. Never. Two years ago, we have high copper
13 contained in oil because we put new coolant.

14 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

15 MR. GELLGAF: We cannot found what it is the reason after.
16 If we put new coolant, then we have to wash cap from the coolant
17 pipe.

18 MR. YOUNG: Yeah. Okay. That makes sense.

19 MR. GILES: I will add, too, these engines have a Alfa Laval
20 bowl centrifuge that's tied to all the engines, and you can select
21 one at a time. So we run that all day for 2 or 3 days, and then
22 we go to another engine and then another. So that lube oil is
23 constantly getting purified.

24 MR. YOUNG: Purified. Okay. And that's running whether the
25 engine is running or not --

1 MR. GILES: Right.

2 MR. YOUNG: -- the purifier? So the main engines and the
3 generators --

4 MR. GELLGAF: Once a day we --

5 MR. YOUNG: -- are purified?

6 MR. GELLGAF: Once a day we put one of main engines and --
7 port or starboard, and one of auxiliary engines.

8 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

9 MR. GILES: And the generators, too, are fitted with pretty
10 good pumps.

11 MR. YOUNG: They are?

12 MR. GELLGAF: Yes. It fitted to a pumps, so it cannot -- in
13 automatic mode you cannot start the engines before putting the
14 pump brings the pressure up.

15 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So when you hit the start sequence, the
16 pre-lube comes on?

17 MR. GELLGAF: Pre-lube pump, right. We pre-lube before --
18 before start the engine, we run pre-lube pump in manual mode.

19 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

20 MR. GELLGAF: One minute, 2 minutes, (indiscernible) to after
21 start, and it's -- it's starting for 5 seconds and after because
22 already it has pressure and it's easy, you know, to start.

23 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay. That's good. And how often would
24 you say the engines get purified? Is it every few days?

25 MR. GELLGAF: Every few days. This was -- this is already

1 are falling. It can -- was getting better and better.

2 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right.

3 MR. GELLGAF: Usually you have opposite like.

4 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right.

5 MR. GELLGAF: You have to repair it.

6 MR. YOUNG: And on the fuel, do you burn like diesel fuel?

7 MR. GELLGAF: Diesel (indiscernible) also for --

8 MR. YOUNG: MDO or MGO or something?

9 MR. GILES: MDO.

10 MR. YOUNG: MDO. Do you have any records of any of the -- on
11 the starboard generator of the journals on the crank shaft being
12 cut down?

13 MR. GELLGAF: No. Unfortunately, no.

14 MR. YOUNG: You don't know?

15 MR. GELLGAF: We don't have any measurement position.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

17 MR. GILES: I have a note to request that from the firm that
18 did the in-frame.

19 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

20 MR. GILES: They can provide that information.

21 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Just one of the things to check off to
22 rule out.

23 MR. GILES: That was prior to us taking over technical
24 management, so we're able to deal with the previous company and
25 that firm to get that.

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Great.

2 MR. GILES: Hopefully they have it.

3 MR. YOUNG: And your engine monitoring system down in the
4 control room, I think it was called IMax?

5 MR. GELLGAF: It was EMax.

6 MR. YOUNG: EMax. Does that have the ability to graph or
7 trend any temperatures or -- of the engines?

8 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah, but they need to do it with it running.

9 MR. YOUNG: With it running. Okay.

10 MR. GILES: No, we can pull history.

11 MR. GELLGAF: We have a list of (indiscernible)

12 MR. YOUNG: And you can do exhaust temperatures, right, on
13 each cylinder?

14 MR. GELLGAF: No, exhaust to temperature not connected to
15 EMax.

16 MR. GILES: Oh, it's not?

17 MR. GELLGAF: It's not.

18 MR. YOUNG: And you said for bearings there were no sensors
19 on the bearings?

20 MR. GELLGAF: No sensors on the bearings. Noise, we don't
21 have (indiscernible), we don't have noise detector.

22 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

23 MR. GILES: There's a common exhaust temperature that we can
24 trend and then there's the, you know, the whole temperature we can
25 trend, but the pyrometers are restricted to the LOPE.

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And did these have any ECMs on it that
2 might have recorded any abnormalities within the engines?

3 MR. GILES: We -- maybe the Cat guys downloaded those reports
4 and I put them in that folder. But yeah, so whatever's in
5 there -- whatever it picked up is in that report, so --

6 MR. YOUNG: And were you or was the service tech able to look
7 at them and say they noticed anything or have they not yet been
8 accessed?

9 MR. GILES: We haven't got that far.

10 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay.

11 MR. GILES: Maybe he did. He didn't share it with me. But I
12 didn't see -- nothing jumped out at me on a quick review.

13 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

14 MR. GILES: But I haven't had a chance to really dive in.

15 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right. And do you have a port engineer
16 that you work with, someone shore side?

17 MR. GILES: Here he is.

18 MR. GELLGAF: He's --

19 MR. YOUNG: So if you need maintenance on the engine and if
20 it's coming due for, say, some maintenance that requires shoreside
21 assistance, how would you --

22 MR. GELLGAF: Well, if you need (indiscernible) from
23 Dietrich, you can (indiscernible) shoreside assistance.

24 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And you usually send an email or does your
25 maintenance system automatically --

1 MR. GELLGAF: No, send in command.

2 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And do you have a computerized maintenance
3 system?

4 MR. GELLGAF: No.

5 MR. YOUNG: No. So how do you know when it's time to --

6 MR. GELLGAF: Oh, the Excel tables.

7 MR. YOUNG: Excel?

8 MR. GELLGAF: Excel tables.

9 MR. YOUNG: Based on running hours, maybe it's time to check
10 the filters or --

11 MR. GELLGAF: The running hours. The filter is, yes, yes,
12 but covered also by pressure differential.

13 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay.

14 MR. GELLGAF: I think that was in place 10 -- 10, 12 days ago
15 and was inspected. Was no way knowing if crack of (indiscernible)
16 metal or something.

17 MR. YOUNG: Right.

18 MR. GELLGAF: But usually before -- if you have bearing
19 (indiscernible) first to track its pressure differentials on
20 computer, have to go (indiscernible). It was in the morning, 11
21 or (indiscernible) or 20 percent. I don't remember.

22 MR. YOUNG: Okay. I think just -- when the engine failed,
23 you said you were out of the engine room getting coffee, maybe.

24 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah.

25 MR. YOUNG: Other than the sound of the connecting rods

1 leaving the engine, were there any other sounds that people
2 reported that they heard prior to the incident?

3 MR. GELLGAF: No. It was just -- I was came from -- was
4 called to the engine room. Came to control room, switch off from
5 the generator from the generator panels. Told (indiscernible) put
6 the engine to cool down to see (indiscernible) number 2 has
7 (indiscernible). Put it to cool down and went -- I went exactly,
8 it was 4 minutes or something. I say, okay, (indiscernible) stop
9 it, stop engine number 1. And after sudden -- 1 minute, I can see
10 on the alarm, it is very close.

11 MR. YOUNG: And the two -- the engineer and the motorman were
12 in the engine room.

13 MR. GELLGAF: Yes.

14 MR. YOUNG: What was their job?

15 MR. GELLGAF: Prior to the explosion, they start preparing
16 tools for number 1, and at that time they observe smell of oil and
17 leaks from crank case door of cylinder number 12.

18 MR. YOUNG: A smell of fuel and?

19 MR. GELLGAF: Oil.

20 MR. YOUNG: Oil. They smelled oil?

21 MR. GELLGAF: Smell oil and found the bolts from
22 (indiscernible) was come out. And they start to tighten the bolts
23 so don't have oil leak.

24 MR. YOUNG: On the starboard engine? On the starboard
25 generator?

1 MR. GELLGAF: Starboard generator, yeah.

2 MR. YOUNG: And is that --

3 MR. GELLGAF: One of -- the motorman which has injury, she
4 was to to stay exactly on the front of -- on the number 14
5 cylinder. And the engineer, he was on the number 12 cylinder
6 (indiscernible).

7 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And it might have been lube oil that was
8 leaking out of the crank case door?

9 MR. GELLGAF: It was bolt -- yes, crank case door was
10 spraying lube oil.

11 MR. YOUNG: And has that -- is that a new leak that has
12 suddenly come or how --

13 MR. GELLGAF: No, just sudden this door (indiscernible) leak.

14 MR. YOUNG: It just started --

15 MR. GELLGAF: Sudden, just suddenly appear.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And was that the only place it was leaking
17 or there were other places where there was oil?

18 MR. GELLGAF: No. Only here.

19 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And was it spraying out or just dripping?

20 MR. GELLGAF: It just was a drip, dripping.

21 MR. YOUNG: Dripping. But they initially had gone to the
22 engine room to prepare to work on the port generator?

23 MR. GELLGAF: Yes, yes.

24 MR. YOUNG: But while they were down there, they noticed --

25 MR. GELLGAF: Yes. So prepare two -- priority, of course we

1 need to explain this starboard side -- or, sorry, this port side.

2 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

3 MR. GELLGAF: This point is number 1 and we need to see
4 what's happened.

5 MR. YOUNG: Understood. And it was at that time when they
6 were changing or --

7 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah, yeah, starting looking for the tools, for
8 the spare parts, and --

9 MR. YOUNG: Okay. I have all my questions. Thank you.
10 Thank you for your time.

11 MR. [REDACTED] Just two questions for me, Chief. What was the
12 motorman working on the number 1 generator, what was he doing to
13 that? Planning to do to that?

14 MR. GELLGAF: We was planning to -- number 1, I was planning
15 to open the charger unit, open one already.

16 MR. [REDACTED] Yeah.

17 MR. GELLGAF: To check the condition, to check
18 (indiscernible) the charger condition of the compressor.

19 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Checking the compressors?

20 MR. GELLGAF: Checking the condition of the compressor part.

21 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. So there was nothing wrong that you knew
22 of on that generator?

23 MR. GELLGAF: No.

24 MR. [REDACTED] They were just checking it?

25 MR. GELLGAF: Just checking it to found what the

1 (indiscernible) and the other one to -- because all engines was
2 higher.

3 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

4 MR. GELLGAF: The was to open the cooler to check condition
5 of air coolant.

6 MR. [REDACTED] Air coolant.

7 MR. GELLGAF: After proceed to this -- if don't succeed to
8 this one, proceed to cut out (indiscernible). But it was not
9 reusable.

10 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. And the last question is, you said the
11 starboard generator is running in port. Is that always the
12 generator that used when it's in port or do you alternate?

13 MR. GELLGAF: Some -- mostly we use to run starboard side to
14 bring the running hours to (indiscernible)

15 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. So you do alternate generators in port?

16 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah. Mostly we use to run starboard, yeah.

17 MR. [REDACTED] But mostly the starboard?

18 MR. GELLGAF: Mostly the starboard.

19 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Okay.

20 MR. GELLGAF: We change it, sometimes we change it to do
21 maintenance on the --

22 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. That's all I have.

23 MR. ROSEN: Yeah, I just have one. I didn't see it down
24 there, but there's no oil mist detector on --

25 MR. GELLGAF: No oil mist detector on this kind of engine and

1 no bearing temperature sensor.

2 MR. ROSEN: Right. Right.

3 MR. YOUNG: The time is 2:29 and if there's no further
4 questions, we'll secure the recording. Thank you all for your
5 time and your assistance with us, so --

6 (Whereupon, at 2:29 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: [REDACTED] FIRE ABOARD *OCEAN NAVIGATOR*
IN PORTLAND, MAINE ON OCTOBER 18, 2023
Interview of Vlad Ene, Alexander Gellgaf,
and Dietrich Giles

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA22FM040

PLACE: Aboard *Ocean Navigator*

DATE: October 25, 2023

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

[REDACTED]

Kay
Transcriber

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay. Thank you. That's good.

2 And if we could move on to the captain. Captain, can you
3 tell us a little bit about your experience and how much maritime
4 experience you have?

5 MR. ENE: Yes, of course. I start my career back in 2010,
6 and since then I was working only on the passenger ships. ~~And I'm~~
7 with my recruiting company from 2012, and until now with American
8 Queen Voyages, but still my recruiters are the same main company,
9 the CMI. ~~Then actually~~ they are recruiting us as an international
10 group for American Queen Voyages. Then, yeah, mostly all my
11 career was with them all these years, growing up, let's say,
12 apprentice ~~or (indiscernible)~~ ^{OFFICER} till what I am now as a captain.
13 And I'm captain since, what, October? Yeah, October last year.

14 MR. YOUNG: And were you captain on this ship?

15 MR. ENE: Yes.

16 MR. YOUNG: Since October last year?

17 MR. ENE: ^{YES.} ~~Yeah. Yeah.~~

18 MR. YOUNG: And you have sailed as third mate, second mate,
19 chief mate?

20 MR. ENE: ~~Everything.~~ ^{ALL ABOVE.}

21 MR. YOUNG: Everything on this -- with this company?

22 MR. ENE: With this company, ^{YES} ~~yeah. Yeah.~~ I never change
23 company.

24 MR. GILES: I think it's important, when did you come over to
25 these vessels?

1 MR. ENE: To those vessels -- to this one and to the sister
2 ship, ~~2000~~ ²⁰¹⁴ first time I join, ~~2015~~ ²⁰¹⁴, February ~~2015~~. And since
3 then, I miss only 6 months, I was to another ship in Europe with
4 the same company. But after that, always here.

5 MR. YOUNG: So you worked on --

6 MR. ENE: On this one or on the other one.

7 MR. YOUNG: So even when the previous company was running
8 these ships, you were working on these ships?

9 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah.~~ ^{YES} Yeah. I was working on as safety officer,
10 chief officer.

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Understood.

12 MR. ENE: A couple of years, 7, 8 years with those ships.

13 MR. YOUNG: And do you typically work the entire sailing
14 season straight?

15 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah.~~ ^{YES} Yeah, every year. And also, I'm working a
16 lot in layup period. I or the chief officer are supervisor,
17 however you want to call it. But yeah, a lot of maintenance of
18 the ship, I was here with both ships.

19 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And during a normal day during the sailing
20 season, do you typically work days --

21 MR. ENE: Yes.

22 MR. YOUNG: -- or do you stand a watch --

23 MR. ENE: I'm a dayworker.

24 MR. YOUNG: Dayworker?

25 MR. ENE: Yeah, ~~no watch.~~ ^{NOT A} WATCHKEEPER

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

2 MR. ENE: The watch, I perform -- due to the season, I
3 perform a couple of watch once we are passing through the rivers.
4 Then I'm sharing the watch with my chief mate and still we have
5 the officers on watch, just for a precaution, ~~double safety~~ **AND**
6 safety. ~~Safety~~ it's not a rule, it's just implemented by us
7 just to be sure that everything is going well.

8 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right.

9 MR. ENE: And, ~~yeah~~ **YES**, other than that, all the maneuverings
10 passing through the locks, I'm the one who is doing it. And,
11 ~~yeah~~ **YES**, except for that, only normal work like daywork.

12 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then do your mates do 4 hours on/8
13 hours off watches?

14 MR. ENE: Yes. That's correct.

15 MR. YOUNG: And then what's a standard watch at sea? They
16 have a second and third mate and a lookout on the bridge?

17 MR. ENE: Yes, yes. Always.

18 MR. YOUNG: Always.

19 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah~~ **YES**

20 MR. YOUNG: And on the day of the incident, can you just talk
21 about where you had been coming from or sailing from and --

22 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah~~ **YES**

23 MR. YOUNG: -- where you were coming into?

24 MR. ENE: We are coming from -- our last port of call was
25 Halifax, Canada, and we departed on the date of 16, arriving here

1 on the 18 of October early in the morning, was -- 5 o'clock was
2 the pilot, 6:30 -- I think 6:30 we were alongside on the passenger
3 terminal of Ocean Gate. Tied up the ship, secure, stop the
4 engines, stop the bow thruster, and pilot disembark already. And
5 then, then everything was normal after arrival ~~with the~~ ^{WAITING THE} CBP to
6 come to clear us. It was like they were scheduled somewhere, ~~I~~
7 ~~want to say 1:30~~ ^{AT 07:30 AM,} in the morning.

8 And I was heading down from the bridge going to take my
9 breakfast. I had the breakfast actually, and then I pick up a
10 coffee and I was just sitting on the balcony on deck 3 just having
11 the coffee, waiting for the announcement from the gangway to tell
12 me -- to hear when the CBP will show up. And then suddenly I
13 heard something, like a boom or some -- not exactly a boom. It
14 was more like a shake of the ship, you know. I said, okay,
15 something wrong, ~~you know.~~

16 And being on the deck 3 balcony, I was just looking ~~on the~~
17 outside, you know, and I saw that the smoke come from the funnel.
18 Then I was thinking in that time ~~that~~ that's not a normal smoke.
19 Even they start to do -- I mean, they start an engine to do a
20 maintenance or something or to check something, that's not
21 possible. Once I open the door to get inside, it was already
22 blackout.

23 Then in the meantime, I was going to the stairs up to the
24 bridge and I called actually from -- by radio, I called the bridge
25 to see what's happening. The officer on watch inform me that we

1 have a chain of fire alarms in the engine room. And once I arrive
2 there, he already got the report that the starboard generator get
3 a crack, explosion, and it's a fire down there. Then the next
4 step was just to go to our usual emergency, calling the
5 [REDACTED] alarm. What mean [REDACTED] ^{IT IS OUR SIGNAL} ~~who is here,~~ in case
6 of fire, damage, or collision. And told them the location.

7 And after that, knowing that already the fire down there, I
8 didn't need another confirmation. Then the second step, the
9 general alarm activate to activate the entire ship crew.

10 Then everybody was present. What they normally do, they
11 report to the bridge, to the command center. In the meantime,
12 they evacuate ~~the~~ the engine room was empty. They reposition
13 their secondary assemble station. And the fire teams getting
14 ready, the stairway guys -- the whole crew.

15 Then after that, I inform the Coast Guard by the VHF radio.
16 And after that -- or in the meantime, I call by telephone the
17 agent because I knew ~~he is down there~~ -- he was down there on the
18 pier. And immediately he called for the shore firefighters and
19 ambulance. And I found out in the meantime that we have the
20 casualty, the gentleman, the motorman on duty who was next to
21 the ~~-- or close to the~~ generator, and he got burned and he was
22 running by himself to the hospital, the ship hospital. He got
23 there. What I know, that the doctor immediately applied ~~his~~
24 the first aid to him.

25 And then after everybody report, on-scene commander was on

1 the scene, area was isolated by the watertight door being closed,
2 the fire screen door being closed on the no-go area as well.
3 No-go area was properly evacuated, nobody around. Then finally we
4 knew that we have only one casualty on that time.

5 And in the meantime, the passengers been mustered to their
6 muster station for the first step, evacuate from their cabins or
7 ~~(indiscernible)~~ wherever they were in that time. And this
8 procedure was done quickly, fast, and they perform pretty well
9 from my point of view. Then everybody was gathering the muster
10 stations. OH

11 In the meantime, the fire group number 2 was down to the
12 scene. They asked for permission to get inside to ~~the~~ ^{CHECK} see the
13 situation, if it's still a fire or not. The no-go area was full
14 ~~of fire~~ ^{THE} or full of smoke, sorry. Then they got a permission
15 from the command center. They passed through the watertight door.
16 They get inside. They check the area. They reported that it's
17 not any fire anymore, the fire in control and actually it's
18 extinguished by itself. And then it's a lot of smoke down there.

19 In the same time, I -- after ^{THE CREW} ~~they~~ reported the passenger was
20 gathered to the muster station, it was kind of -- in the same time
21 the people -- the firefighter from the shore side arrive. They
22 came on board. In ^{THE} ~~that~~ same time, I give the order to evacuate
23 the passengers to the pier just to be on the, you know, on the
24 safe ^{SIDE} ~~look~~ in case of something ^{WILL} ~~were~~ happening again down there.
25 Being so -- such a lot of smoke, you don't know, maybe the fire

1 was ignite or not, never know.

2 Then we succeed to evacuate the passengers, all of them on
3 the pier. And the next step, I evacuate all crew members on the
4 pier, except myself, chief mate, chief engineer, the fire teams,
5 and the on-scene commander. Plus we have on on board two -- I
6 think that they were two fire squads from the shore.

7 Then fire squad from the shore, one of them together with one
8 of my fire teams, going through all the cabins to double check one
9 more time for somebody, in case ^{Just} ~~just~~ -- but ~~in~~ the gangway and the
10 guys which evacuate the people, they already report that everybody
11 is evacuated. But for a double checking, they just go all around
12 the ship to have a closer look again.

13 And the other team, fire squad from the shore, with my team,
14 which they were on the scene, they double check as well the engine
15 room and they confirm that the fire it is extinguished, it's only
16 smoke inside. It's just don't forget when the blackout, I come
17 back when the blackout occur, the emergency generator just start
18 automatically directing the fire dampers was closed, fire screen
19 doors and, as I said, the area was isolated.

20 ~~And then they decide,~~ the firemen from the shore, ~~they said~~
21 ~~that -- they were asking me if the --~~ they were asking if there's
22 any possibility to start to ventilate the area. Then what we did,
23 according how our engine room is builded, we have the two bunker
24 stations which they are going through engine room. Then we open
25 the doors, the outside doors, to flow the air and to try to get

1 away with the smoke down there. In the meantime, the chief
2 engineer, ~~he start~~ ^{FANS} he try to start the ~~pumps~~. In that time, he
3 didn't succeed, only after a while. But being with the ~~door~~ ^{DOORS} open,
4 in, let's say, 1 hour, 1 hour and a half, or whatever, all the
5 smoke was out. We keep ~~that door~~ ^{THE DOORS} for the whole ship open. I
6 mean, also the ~~step~~ ^{STAIR} tower doors to the balcony or gangways, they
7 were open, totally open just to provide as much flow, you know, of
8 the air to pass through.

9 And, ~~yeah~~ ^{YES}, I think also the Coast Guard arrive in the
10 meantime, the QI arrive in the meantime. After the smoke was out,
11 we got all the passenger in the terminal, we got the crew in the
12 terminal. All the crew finally, together with me, we are out ~~with~~
13 ~~the~~ -- also with the guys from the firefighters from the shore,
14 just waiting a little bit for ~~the ship to~~ ^{FROM THE} the smoke ~~of the ship~~
15 ~~SHIP TO BE OUT, CLEARED,~~
~~to get out and to leave and to clear the smoke.~~

16 Then I don't remember exactly the time, I have the note, but
17 I do believe it was like 10:30 or 11 when the ship was considered
18 safe again. Then, in that time I was with Mr. [REDACTED] here. We
19 came back on board. We check again -- I was down there again, we
20 checking there. We checked the area. Everything looks safe, no
21 sign of smoke, no sign of fire. Everything was, let's say, back
22 to normal.

23 And after discussing with the U.S. Coast Guard, they allowed
24 us to let the passenger by groups to get on board guided by our
25 crew members to pick up their luggage, pack their luggage, pick

1 up, and go back to the terminal. ~~Then it was~~ ^{THEY WERE} like 15 or 20 by
2 group back and forth, back and forth. Everything, all the process
3 perform like fine, safely, no casualty, no injured person, ~~no~~
4 ~~like was like on the line, you know.~~ Everything was step by step
5 ~~but perform it~~ ^{PERFORMED} well. And except the casualty, ^{OF MOTORMAN,} ~~no more trauma, was~~
6 ~~only -- other than that,~~ ^{NOBODY ELSE GOT INJURED.} that was pretty much the whole story.

7 MR. YOUNG: That's very good memory of the whole story.
8 That's great. That's great. It's a lot to remember.

9 Can you remember, and I'm sure you have it written down, how
10 many passengers you had on board?

11 MR. ENE: Yes. We had in that time 128, 1-2-8, passengers
12 and 82 crew on board, 8-2, the crew members who were on the boat.

13 MR. YOUNG: And when the passengers originally came aboard,
14 had you done any sort of drills with the passengers?

15 MR. ENE: Yes. Well, every embarkation we do -- before
16 departure we do a safety drill with the passengers. We -- on the
17 safety drill what we really do, we got everybody from their cabin
18 to their muster station to be familiar in case of an emergency
19 where they supposed to go when they hear the general alarm. And
20 we demonstrate them how to wear a life jacket. And then we guide
21 them to their abandon ship stations, which are the lifeboats on
22 deck 4, port and starboard. Having two muster station, muster
23 station A, which is exactly here in the conference lounge, ^{THIS IS} ~~the are~~
24 the largest one, and the muster station B, which is on deck 4 up
25 we call the grill, over there.

1 MR. YOUNG: And is that where you, on the day of the
2 incident, the passengers mustered at A and B --

3 MR. ENE: Yes. Correct. Correct.

4 MR. YOUNG: -- muster stations?

5 MR. ENE: Yes. Exactly.

6 MR. YOUNG: And then it's typical to train to do an
7 evacuation to go to the lifeboats, but have you ever done some
8 sort of drill or exercise where you've --

9 MR. ENE: For my crew member, yes.

10 MR. YOUNG: -- evacuated the passengers?

11 MR. ENE: Yes, on the pier. Yeah. We did that -- you know,
12 being in layup, we do a little drill. We keep up with our
13 maintenance, but we keep ^{UP} with ~~our~~ safety training. And being
14 there always ^{ALONGSIDE} ~~on the pier~~, we do the drills and ^{PROPERLY} ~~we really do~~ --
15 they have operation on the pier, not only with the lifeboats or
16 life raft. Then the good thing was that even with this
17 experience, being on layup was helpful for everybody because the
18 crew, they were like just -- they have implemented, let's say, in
19 mind. It was like something normal for them. It was not
20 something new. Okay, maybe something new for some of hotel crew
21 members, but few of them, and of course a real emergency was for
22 all of us, you know. But as I said, everybody perform very good
23 their duties without any kind of panic or shock or -- nothing. No
24 screamings around, no -- it was like just a normal -- it was like
25 a drill.

1 MR. YOUNG: And that's one of my questions. Do you feel that
2 your drills helped you --

3 MR. ENE: A lot.

4 MR. YOUNG: -- coordinate the evacuation?

5 MR. ENE: A lot. Once -- what I observed during my, ~~even my~~
6 career, and I been a lot of time safety officer, once you consist
7 with your training and drills, maybe not all the personnel of the
8 ship ~~they~~ like it because I understand sometimes you have to work
9 and to have safety trainings, but in the end, everybody realize
10 that everything what we did till that moment was helpful for
11 everybody.

12 MR. YOUNG: Right.

13 MR. ENE: And the circumstances show this thing, ~~you know.~~

14 MR. GILES: One thing that we have, too, just to add to that,
15 not only do we drill to get passengers off the gangway -- we know
16 there's only one gangway, so we drill to get them off the
17 lifeboats and the rafts waterside, should that be compromised,
18 so --

19 MR. YOUNG: And are all these drills part of a safety
20 management system? Is that some sort of a --

21 MR. ENE: Yes.

22 MR. YOUNG: -- package that -- do you have that here?

23 MR. GILES: I don't know if the gangway drills are. We --

24 MR. ENE: No, the gangway drills actually no.

25 MR. GILES: That's just something that we started doing in

1 layup and --

2 MR. ENF: ~~Yeah~~ ^{YES}

3 MR. GILES: -- it just kind of took.

4 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah~~ ^{YES}

5 MR. GILES: Right. It's something we should put it in there.

6 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah~~ ^{YES}. Because actually this -- exactly, as I

7 started to say, ~~this -- and I said this was~~ -- those drills,
8 special drills that they would special have operation on the pier
9 was only on the layup. And also on the layup, there being not
10 full crew on board, we have this temporary muster list. And on
11 that temporary muster list we add even like a note, remember, like
12 first primary evacuation on the pier. If that's not working,
13 we'll go for the lifeboat, depends on ~~the size~~ ^{WITCH-SIDE} of the ship. And
14 if suddenly we cannot lower the lifeboat, we go for the life raft,
15 depend on which side of the ship. Then we have three ways for
16 evacuation in case of emergency on board.

17 MR. YOUNG: And I know you drill when you have new passengers
18 come on, but is the drilling part of a requirement for your safety
19 management system?

20 MR. ENE: The passengers ~~are ready~~ ^{DRILL}, yes. Yes.

21 MR. YOUNG: Do you have a safety management system for the
22 ship?

23 MR. ENE: Each passenger embarkation, the drill should not be
24 postponed more than 24 hours after the embarkation. That way
25 we -- immediately when they embark on the port, after half hour,

1 until they, you know, set up in their rooms, feel comfortable,
2 then we proceed with the drill before we depart the port.

3 MR. YOUNG: Excellent.

4 MR. ENE: ~~And make, I mean, for --~~ we always do that. I
5 don't think I did it anytime after the departure because I saw
6 everybody is more focused, everybody -- I mean, they don't care
7 what is outside. They don't care if the ship is sailing or not.
8 They know the ship is at port and they concentrate on the drill
9 also. And for us, it's work -- was working perfect for them. I
10 see them happy.

11 MR. YOUNG: And where did this voyage start for these
12 passengers?

13 MR. ENE: Montreal.

14 MR. YOUNG: Montreal?

15 MR. ENE: Yes. Montreal, 10 October.

16 MR. YOUNG: And at the time of the incident was the bridge
17 still attended or was it --

18 MR. ENE: Yes.

19 MR. YOUNG: It is?

20 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah.~~ ^{YES}

21 MR. YOUNG: Even though you're alongside, you had people on
22 the bridge?

23 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah.~~ ^{YES} Always.

24 MR. YOUNG: Even in port you have people on the bridge?

25 MR. ENE: Even in port, yes.

1 MR. YOUNG: And would there be a mate and a --

2 MR. ENE: ~~(Indiscernible) mate.~~ MATE.

3 MR. YOUNG: One mate?

4 MR. ENE: One mate in the port alongside. Just the ~~mate~~ ^{MATES}
5 that's supervising the bridge 24 hours.

6 MR. YOUNG: And then that mate would receive any alarms
7 which, it sounds like the fire detection system --

8 MR. ENE: That's correct.

9 MR. YOUNG: And does the general alarm automatically signal
10 or does it have to be manually --

11 MR. ENE: If nobody will attend the fire alarm ~~over to me,~~
12 then the general alarm will start sounding by itself. Being the
13 mate over there, he already attend the alarms, mute them, and
14 inform us, ~~call to the engine to see what the --~~ call the fire
15 ~~button to,~~ ^{PATROL TOO} in the same time, to send him to check the alarm
16 actually because nobody know if it's a fire or maybe could be a
17 false alarm or, you know --

18 MR. YOUNG: Right.

19 MR. ENE: But in that time of the incident, he call me
20 directly on the radio, he called the engineer down there by
21 telephone, and also the chief mate was around and he call the
22 bridge that he heard like an explosion down there and he see a
23 lot of smoke. Then, ^{YES} ~~yeah,~~ that why actually the general alarm
24 didn't start until I start it from the bridge because everything
25 was attended before that ~~to me.~~

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So you manually sounded the general alarm?

2 MR. ENE: Yes. Yes.

3 MR. YOUNG: And you did that prior to the automatic 2-minute
4 start?

5 MR. ENE: Oh, yes. ~~Yeah.~~ ^{YES}

6 MR. YOUNG: Would you say the communication between you and
7 your crew was effective?

8 MR. ENE: Yes.

9 MR. YOUNG: You were able to communicate with the engine room
10 and your safety officer and --

11 MR. ENE: Right.

12 MR. YOUNG: -- and you mentioned an incident commander?

13 MR. ENE: On-scene commander we call it, ~~there~~.

14 MR. YOUNG: On-scene commander.

15 MR. ENE: It's actually the safety officer of the ship. He
16 have this emergency duty. He is on-scene commander, that mean he
17 will be on the scene outside of no-go area and he will meet the
18 fire teams once they are ready and he will explain briefly the
19 situation.

20 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

21 MR. ENE: And in the meantime he prepare the fire hose to be
22 ready for the fire team once they arrive so don't lose the time.

23 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

24 MR. ENE: That's -- and also he's, after that, he's keeping
25 the communication with the fire teams and he's reporting to the

1 command center just to avoid miscommunication passing through and
2 also to make, let's say, more effective the fire teams on their
3 performance of whatever incident is down there. ~~Then just~~
4 ~~communicate closing -- closing, the communication,~~ and the on-
5 scene commander is the one which give every reports to the command
6 center.

7 MR. YOUNG: And is the command center on the bridge?

8 MR. ENE: Yes.

9 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And that's a separate bank of computers on
10 the aft bulkhead?

11 MR. ENE: ~~Pardon?~~ *CAN YOU REPEAT, PLEASE?*

12 MR. YOUNG: I know there are some computers that have a fire
13 protection system on the aft bulkhead.

14 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah.~~ *YES*

15 MR. YOUNG: Is that considered the --

16 MR. ENE: Yes, yes.

17 MR. YOUNG: -- incident command?

18 MR. ENE: We call it -- it's the bridge, but we call it the
19 command center for the emergency.

20 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay. As you are maneuvering in to
21 Portland, Maine, you -- were you running both main engines for
22 propulsion?

23 MR. ENE: Yes.

24 MR. YOUNG: And then how does the bow thruster get powered?

25 MR. ENE: The bow thruster is separate. Then before entrance

1 to the narrow channel, entrance to the river, entrance to the
2 port, we start the bow thruster a half hour prior.

3 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And does that have its own engine or is it
4 electric --

5 MR. GELLGAF: Only electrical.

6 MR. ENE: It's electric engine powered.

7 MR. YOUNG: So do you have to start two diesel generators?

8 MR. GELLGAF: We have to start two diesel and we power up the
9 bow thruster.

10 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then on your entrance in was there any
11 excessive use of power that may have --

12 MR. ENE: No.

13 MR. YOUNG: -- increased the electrical load on the ship?

14 MR. ENE: No.

15 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And while you are maneuvering you have two
16 main engines that have shafts coming out and what do they -- what
17 do you use for propulsion on the ship? Do you have Azipod?

18 MR. ENE: Azipods, ~~yeah.~~ ^{YES} Yeah.

19 MR. YOUNG: So two Azipods?

20 MR. ENE: Two Azipods and one bow thruster.

21 MR. YOUNG: And one bow thruster?

22 MR. ENE: ~~yeah.~~ ^{YES}

23 MR. YOUNG: At the -- and this is more for my report, but at
24 the time of the incident do you know what the draft was of this
25 vessel?

1 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah~~ ^{YES} 4.2 meters.

2 MR. YOUNG: 4.2.

3 MR. ENE: 4.2 or 4.3. I have it noted.

4 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

5 MR. ENE: But ~~this is~~ this was 4.2 or 4.3.

6 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And as you are maneuvering in was there
7 any excessive current or wind or anything notable with the
8 weather?

9 MR. ENE: In that day, no. No, the weather condition were
10 pretty good.

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Since you have two Azimuth and thrusters,
12 do you have a rudder or no?

13 MR. ENE: No.

14 MR. YOUNG: No steering other than your --

15 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah~~ ^{YES}

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And I know you said the mate on watch had
17 heard some fire detection and also -- do you have anything else
18 other than smoke and fire detectors down there? Do you have flame
19 sensors?

20 MR. ENE: Flame detectors, smoke detectors, manual call
21 points and --

22 MR. YOUNG: Manual call points as well?

23 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah~~ ^{YES}

24 MR. YOUNG: And was -- were both flame and smoke detectors
25 activated down below?

1 MR. ENE: Yes.

2 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Several?

3 MR. ENE: Several, ^{YES} ~~yeah~~. Like six or eight, something.

4 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So I had some questions about how your
5 department responded and you did the general alarm. You used the
6 VHF to call --

7 MR. ENE: The Coast Guard.

8 MR. YOUNG: -- the Coast Guard. You used your phone to call
9 the agent. The agent called the fire department.

10 MR. ENE: And the ambulance. ^{YES} ~~Yeah~~, he call actually the 911
11 before me. Because I was in the same time with the Coast Guard on
12 the VHF, and the same time I talk to agent, if you can call 911,
13 just do it or I will do it after 1 minute after I talk -- because
14 with the Coast Guard I report our position, you know, the whole
15 steps. ~~I cannot -- I couldn't tell them I'm in Portland, layup --~~

16 MR. YOUNG: Right.

17 MR. ENE: Of course they -- and then he just say, don't
18 worry, I just called the 911. I said, okay, perfect.

19 MR. YOUNG: Right. That's great. And all these steps, it
20 seems like it's very -- you took the steps. Was that some sort of
21 a obviously training or --

22 MR. ENE: Yes.

23 MR. YOUNG: -- drills that you have done to understand all
24 these?

25 MR. ENE: Yes. Yes. Because actually our procedure on the

1 drill, ~~on case of the -- of course~~, on the emergency, you can
2 change some things in the meantime. But the procedure is very,
3 very clear. Once you have an alarm on the bridge, you
4 ^{ATTEND} (indiscernible) that alarm, you check it, you send the fire
5 ^{PATROL} ~~department~~ to check that specific area and then he report. If
6 it's a fire, the fire patrol evacuate and close the area. Or if
7 somebody else report directly -- let's say we have a fire in the
8 galley and some cooks are there, they report the fire and they are
9 already trained to evacuate and isolate the area and wait outside
10 of the affected area for the on-scene commander/safety officer to
11 come and to take over. Then once those things are reported to the
12 bridge, it's myself or chief officer or the officer on duty take
13 on the PA microphone and ~~make the~~ give the alarm, the [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] three times plus the location plus the
15 incident, it's a fire, a collision, or damage.

16 MR. YOUNG: And that's your code to talk to the crew, right?

17 MR. ENE: That's our code to, exactly, to talk with the crew
18 because the passengers they are not involved in that. Once we
19 discover that the fire -- and in this [REDACTED] are just such
20 things to be activated, like fire teams, like engine control team,
21 bridge team, stairway guides, and for safety, search and rescue,
22 and that's more or less -- boat preparation. Then the rest of
23 them, they just are aware that something happen, because everybody
24 as a crew member know what [REDACTED] means. But they just to
25 don't create panic between the passengers, maybe it's a small fire

1 and everything will be finalized in 5 minutes, then no necessary
2 to create a lot of panic on board.

3 MR. YOUNG: Right.

4 MR. ENE: Okay. And then, after the teams are ready, they
5 report to the bridge. They are -- first of all, they report it's
6 like a radio check with the command. Second, they report present
7 and -- or missing persons from their teams. Then once they are
8 ready, fire groups are dressed, wearing the mask, the suit or the
9 whole gear, they report -- they report readiness to the bridge and
10 the bridge coordinate them where to proceed to the on-scene
11 commander, the safety officer. Once they arrive next to him, they
12 will be split. Fire group 1 will go perform boundary cooling or
13 *Will be the attack Team* (indiscernible) and the fire group 2 *WILL PERFORM BOUNDARY COOLING*
14 *OR will be the attack Team. Depends of the FIRE LOCATION.* to go do -- they will be the
15 attacking team.

16 ~~Once those teams~~ in the meantime, the engine control room,
17 ~~they~~ -- depends of the area, they will cut off electricity, shut
18 down ventilation, and ~~REPORT TO BRIDGE~~ ~~sorry~~. And after that, once everything
19 is done, the fire teams getting inside, ~~whatever is~~ the fire team
20 get the permission to go inside of the affected area. They report
21 back to on-scene commander what is inside, if there are casualty
22 or not, that's the first thing what they are doing. They report,
23 depend of the area, if the sprinkler system is activate or not.
24 They report again electricity, if it's cut off ~~on shore~~ or not,
25 the ventilation if it's shut down or not. Then they, if it's a
fire, they start to attack it, ~~depend of the~~ they report also

1 the class of fire first. And depend on the class of fire, they
2 wills start attacking the fire. Then if they succeed to
3 extinguish the fire, they will say, ~~okay~~, the fire is coming under
4 control and, in the end, the fire is extinguished.

5 In the meantime, if necessary, the other fire team will start
6 boundary cooling or not, again, depending of the fire. Then if
7 the fire is out of control, then that's the time when we sound the
8 general alarm because they realize, okay, the fire is getting
9 bigger and bigger, ~~okay~~, let's sound the general alarm. The other
10 emergency teams will be activated like muster station teams,
11 evacuation teams. ~~It's a central group for the reception desk,~~
12 ~~you know~~. And then they will guide the passengers -- the
13 passengers will have heard the general alarm as well. They will
14 be guided to their muster stations, A and B, as I said. **BEFORE.**

15 And the emergency teams -- emergency evacuation teams, they
16 are going to each cabin to be sure that everybody's evacuated and
17 to their muster station. The muster station report to the bridge
18 the number of the passengers or the missing ones. In case
19 somebody's missing, we have cabin 1-1-1 missing. It depends of
20 the area, where is located the fire. We have either -- we send
21 the search and rescue team if the area is a no-go area. Or if
22 it's, let's say, like a normal safe area, the emergency teams --
23 emergency evacuation team, which are there double check that cabin
24 to see if the persons are inside or not.

25 Then once everything is done and everybody is on their muster

1 stations, then -- now depends. While we are underway, of course
2 everybody will be guided to their lifeboats. After that, the
3 guests and all the crew which are not assigned to the lifeboats to
4 have duty on the lifeboats, they are coming on the life raft
5 station. ~~And yeah, that's the whole --~~

6 MR. GILES: Elaborate on the shoreside communication element.
7 I think, there's a little bit more that you could add to that.

8 MR. ENE: Oh, ~~yeah~~ ^{YES}. Call my superintendent, call my DPA ~~what~~
9 ~~was --~~

10 MR. GILES: Back to the Coast Guard to notify local
11 authority, then he calls me --

12 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah~~ ^{YES}.

13 MR. GILES: -- or the DPA, and then we call the QI. I called
14 SMS Resolve to get them going and -- whether we need them or not,
15 let's get everybody rolling.

16 MR. YOUNG: Right.

17 MR. GILES: And then I let our corporate crisis team know
18 what's going on, and then we immediately start having crisis
19 meetings. We'll have an initial meeting and then there's -- every
20 30 minutes there's another meeting. So and in that, I'm the
21 communication link, myself or the DPA, depending who's available.
22 We were actually both on planes --

23 MR. YOUNG: That's right.

24 MR. GILES: -- getting planes. We were tag teaming him that
25 morning. But we'll be the direct link and then update the crisis

1 team. And then they're, you know, doing what they need to as far
2 as what we do with the guests, who do we interface with, do we
3 need to get hotel rooms, buses, blah, blah, blah. So --

4 MR. YOUNG: And that is a lot of information. Do you have a
5 checklist that would help you remember all this stuff or some sort
6 of a guide that would help you?

7 MR. ENE: I do have a checklist, but in that time the only
8 checklist which we recorded was exactly what was happening on
9 board with the fire, passengers, and casualty, all of these
10 things. The phone calls, I didn't record them, but I have them on
11 my telephone.

12 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right.

13 ~~MR. ENE: You know?~~

14 MR. YOUNG: Right.

15 MR. ENE: I have a guidance of who I need to call and
16 ~~(indiscernible)~~ ^{INFORM} ^{ON THAT MOMENT}, but ~~the timing~~ being up and down, there and
17 there, we have to be sure that everything is under control and
18 everything was going smooth and fine. I was on the telephone ~~and~~
19 with Mr. Dietrich and with our DPA as well. ^{MOSTLY} ~~And~~ all the time --

20 MR. GILES: Our system is set up to where his hands are full,
21 notify local authority, notify the Coast Guard, or vice a versa,
22 depending on where he's at. And then let us know, and then we
23 take care of all the heavy lifting because he can't be calling the
24 QI or anything like that, so --

25 MR. YOUNG: Right.

1 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah.~~ ^{YES}

2 MR. GILES: And response center or whatever.

3 MR. YOUNG: I guess what I'm getting at with this, too, is do
4 you have a safety management system that gives you guidance when
5 there's a fire?

6 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah.~~ ^{YES}

7 MR. YOUNG: What you need to do for abandon ship, is that --
8 that's what I was asking.

9 MR. GILES: We do. We have an emergency response booklet
10 that details different crises and what to do.

11 MR. YOUNG: It spells out what to do. Okay.

12 MR. GILES: Open it up and --

13 MR. YOUNG: And is that a booklet or a sheet that's on the
14 bridge that you can access?

15 MR. ENE: Yes.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Great. I know -- I'm trying to just
17 remember some of things you said. But did you say there was a
18 sprinkler system in the engine room or no?

19 MR. ENE: No. No, no, no.

20 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay.

21 MR. ENE: No, no, no.

22 MR. YOUNG: When the emergency teams are assembling was at
23 any time any water applied or boundary cooling?

24 MR. ENE: No.

25 MR. YOUNG: It wasn't necessary, right?

1 MR. ENE: It wasn't necessary.

2 MR. YOUNG: And did any of your crew go on air to go in?

3 MR. ENE: Yes, all of them. I mean, whoever was going in,
4 all of them was on air.

5 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then you had a backup team?

6 MR. ENE: Yes. And we have backup -- we have their oxygen
7 mask as well.

8 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then was there ever a discussion to
9 prepare or be prepared to release CO2 in the engine room?

10 MR. ENE: Yes. The engine control room, they are secondary
11 assemble station, it's by the CO2 room.

12 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

13 MR. ENE: Then will prepare anytime, if I will give the
14 order, to release the CO2.

15 MR. YOUNG: Okay. But it didn't get to that point --

16 MR. ENE: No.

17 MR. YOUNG: -- and you never released it, right?

18 MR. ENE: Correct.

19 MR. YOUNG: Did you -- from the bridge, did you take any
20 isolation procedures down such as starting a fire pump?

21 MR. ENE: No. I didn't start any fire pump because our main
22 fire pump is in automatic position. I mean, once we start the
23 hydrant, then the hose -- the fire pump will start automatically.

24 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And no one opened any hydrants so there
25 was no need to start it?

1 MR. ENE: Correct.

2 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

FIRE PUMP NO. 1

3 MR. ENE: And in case of that ~~one~~ will not start, then I have
4 the emergency fire pump which I can start it from the bridge.

5 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Interesting.

6 MR. GILES: And the fire pumps constantly charge.

7 MR. ENE: ^{YES} Yeah.

8 MR. GILES: The fire system is always charged, so --

9 MR. YOUNG: How is that being charged?

10 MR. ENE: It's under pressure all the time.

11 MR. GELLGAF: Under pressure all the time.

12 MR. GILES: Yeah, the pump, when it -- if it leaks down, the
13 pump will come on and pump it back out.

14 MR. YOUNG: So as soon as you open up a nozzle, it's on?

15 MR. GELLGAF: It's on, yeah.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. How about ventilation? Had that been
17 secured, the engine room ventilation?

18 MR. ENE: Due to the blackout, ~~I think~~ already all the
19 dampers been closed.

20 MR. GELLGAF: The damper been closed and the guys should
21 check and (indiscernible) -- if there's some leak from one
22 (indiscernible), the dampers are tightened.

23 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So electrically, when you lose electrical
24 power, the fans electrically stop. Are the dampers held open
25 electrically as well?

1 MR. GELLGAF: No. No, they are opened electrically, but
2 they're closed by springs.

3 MR. YOUNG: Springs.

4 MR. GELLGAF: When we lose the power, they're closing by
5 springs.

6 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

7 MR. GILES: They only close.

8 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And watertight doors, are they typically
9 closed underway?

10 MR. ENE: Yes. Always underway they are closed.

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And fire screen doors?

12 MR. ENE: Fire screen doors, you can close them manually or
13 you can -- locally or you can close them from the bridge by
14 automatic.

15 MR. YOUNG: And did that happen on the day of the fire? Were
16 they closed as well?

17 MR. ENE: The fire screen doors, because of the affected area
18 was in the main engine room, we have only the watertight doors
19 over there, which they were closed. The fire doors were closed
20 manually locally because they were in no-go area and they were
21 just closing that day.

22 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

23 MR. GILES: I'd like to add that the fire screen doors are
24 really a judgment call because it impedes evacuation --

25 MR. YOUNG: Got it.

1 MR. GILES: -- as well because all the doors close.
2 MR. YOUNG: Oh, throughout the entire vessel?
3 MR. GILES: Yes.
4 MR. YOUNG: Okay.
5 MR. GILES: If you hit the button in the bridge, they all
6 close. So --
7 MR. YOUNG: Got it. So it sounds like by closing the
8 watertight doors, which are closed already, and the dampers, the
9 engine room is completely isolated.
10 MR. ENE: Isolated, ~~yeah~~ ^{YES}.
11 MR. YOUNG: Okay.
12 MR. GILES: When they made entry into the engine room, they
13 did it through a watertight door, but they isolated the fire doors
14 behind them so they created a no-go boundary. So should
15 things -- the smoke come in, which it did, it wouldn't go anywhere
16 else, you know, so --
17 MR. YOUNG: Right. And I know you've talked a lot about
18 evacuation drills with the passengers. Do you -- can you talk
19 about some of the firefighting drill you do with your crew? Do
20 you do frequent firefighting drills?
21 MR. ENE: Weekly.
22 MR. YOUNG: Weekly?
23 MR. ENE: Fire and emergency drills.
24 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And have you ever done an engine room fire
25 drill?

1 MR. ENE: Yes. Like maybe two times a month in the engine,
2 in the engine room.

3 MR. YOUNG: And do people get suited up and charge hoses and
4 everything, that kind of a drill where you have a scenario?

5 MR. ENE: I have a scenario, I did it, but it's not a weekly
6 to charge these hoses.

7 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

8 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah~~ ^{YES}.

9 MR. YOUNG: Good. I don't have any more questions for you,
10 Captain. You answered most of my questions by one giant answer,
11 so I appreciate it.

12 MR. ENE: ~~Yeah~~ ^{YES}. Thank you.

13 MR. [REDACTED] My only question -- this is Steve Siler, Coast
14 Guard. Who is the sister ship to this vessel?

15 MR. GILES: Ocean Voyager.

16 MR. [REDACTED] Is she the same configuration?

17 MR. GILES: Yes.

18 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Have you guys talked to them about this
19 and are they doing anything to kind of look at that generator on
20 board that vessel to make sure -- I mean, are they on the same
21 schedule as far as maintenance or are they totally different?

22 MR. GILES: They're a little bit different, but we've
23 notified them of it. The nature of this is not something that you
24 can really look at and say, oh, there's a problem --

25 MR. [REDACTED] Yeah.

1 MR. GILES: -- without tearing into it.

2 MR. [REDACTED]: Okay.

3 MR. GILES: What happened here, whether it was a piston
4 failure or a head failure or a rod -- a bearing failure, is
5 something you could only know by opening up the engine and really
6 looking at it. So --

7 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. I was just wondering if this engine had
8 more hours on it than the other vessel or if it's -- or if they
9 have --

10 MR. GILES: It had less.

11 MR. [REDACTED] This had less than -- okay. So, for the record,
12 the Ocean Voyager has more hours on its generator than the
13 Ocean -- than this one.

14 MR. GILES: Since it -- since they had the in-frame overhaul,
15 yes.

16 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Yeah. All right. That's all the
17 questions I had.

18 MR. YOUNG: Do you have any?

19 MR. ROSEN: Yeah. I just had a general question about --
20 you said that you put on another generator when you came into
21 port. Was the starboard generator -- which one did you put on?
22 Did you put on the port or the starboard?

23 MR. ENE: When we came to port we used both generators.

24 MR. ROSEN: Right. Were you running one coming -- when you
25 were out in blue water were you running on one generator?

1 MR. ENE: Yes. ~~Out in~~ ^{YES} ~~yeah~~, at sea we run one.

2 MR. ROSEN: Okay. So which one did you turn on coming into
3 Portland? Do you remember? Do you recall?

4 MR. ENE: ^{YES} ~~Yeah~~, the 2, the number 2.

5 MR. ROSEN: The number 2?

6 MR. ENE: Usually run number 2.

7 MR. ROSEN: Okay.

8 MR. YOUNG: That's -- number 2 is the starboard?

9 MR. ENE: Yes, starboard side.

10 MR. YOUNG: We can shift our gears to the chief and ask some
11 engineering questions now, if you're prepared. Or if you need a
12 break or some water or --

13 MR. ENE: No, no, no.

14 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you guys need some water or
16 something?

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm okay.

18 MR. GELLGAF: Okay, I (indiscernible).

19 MR. YOUNG: So this is Brian Young with the NTSB again,
20 speaking with the chief. Chief, can you talk to us about how many
21 years you have been sailing as a chief engineer?

22 MR. GELLGAF: I started as work as engineer in 1992 and as
23 chief engineer 2004, 2006, I don't remember exactly. And this
24 is -- I see my ISP, ISPC my report, and since 2010.

25 MR. YOUNG: 2010?

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

██████ FIRE ABOARD OCEAN *

NAVIGATOR IN PORTLAND, MAINE *

Accident No.: DCA24FM004

ON OCTOBER 18, 2023 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: VLAD ENE, Captain

ALEXANDER GELLGAF, Chief Engineer
~~OCEAN NAVIGATOR~~

DIETRICH GILES, Marine Superintendent
American Queen Voyages

Aboard the Ocean Navigator

Wednesday,
October 25, 2023

I N D E X

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By Mr. [REDACTED]	59
By Mr. Rosen	60

I N T E R V I E W

(1:15 p.m.)

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay. The recording is on. This is Brian Young
2
3 aboard the *Ocean Navigator*. It is 1:15. It is October 25th,
4 2023. My last name is Young, Y-o-u-n-g. We're conducting an
5 interview of the captain, the chief engineer, and a company
6 representative aboard the *Ocean Navigator*. And with us today
7 is --

8
9 MS. JESCHELNIK: Kristyn Jeschelnik, K-r-i-s-t-y-n;
10 Jeschelnik, J-e-s-c-h-e-l-n-i-k. NTSB.

11 MR. [REDACTED] Coast Guard
12 Investigations.

13 MR. ROSEN: Dan Rosen, R-o-s-e-n, Marine Safety Consultants,
14 insurance investigation.

15 MR. GILES: Dietrich Giles, marine superintendent for
16 American Queen Voyages, G-i-l-e-s.

17 MR. ENE: Vlad Ene, V-l-a-d, E-n-e, the captain of *Ocean*
18 *Navigator*.

19 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~ ^{GERLIGA} *Alexander Gerliga*, chief engineer,
20 ~~G-e-l-l-g-a-f.~~ ^{G-E-R-L-I-G-A}

21 MR. YOUNG: Thank you. Thank you.

22 INTERVIEW OF VLAD ENE, ALEXANDER GELLGAF, AND DIETRICH GILES

23 MR. YOUNG: Let's just start, Dietrich, with if you could
24 just give us a history of this vessel, maybe as to when it was
25 built and when your company had taken possession of it. Do you

1 to the narrow channel, entrance to the river, entrance to the
2 port, we start the bow thruster a half hour prior.

3 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And does that have its own engine or is it
4 electric --

5 *Gerlaga*
MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Only electrical.

6 MR. ENE: It's electric engine powered.

7 MR. YOUNG: So do you have to start two diesel generators?

8 *Gerlaga*
MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: We have to start two diesel and we power up the
9 bow thruster.

10 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then on your entrance in was there any
11 excessive use of power that may have --

12 MR. ENE: No.

13 MR. YOUNG: -- increased the electrical load on the ship?

14 MR. ENE: No.

15 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And while you are maneuvering you have two
16 main engines that have shafts coming out and what do they -- what
17 do you use for propulsion on the ship? Do you have Azipod?

18 MR. ENE: Azipods, yeah. Yeah.

19 MR. YOUNG: So two Azipods?

20 MR. ENE: Two Azipods and one bow thruster.

21 MR. YOUNG: And one bow thruster?

22 MR. ENE: Yeah.

23 MR. YOUNG: At the -- and this is more for my report, but at
24 the time of the incident do you know what the draft was of this
25 vessel?

1 MR. ENE: Correct.

2 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

3 MR. ENE: And in case of that one will not start, then I have
4 the emergency fire pump which I can start it from the bridge.

5 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Interesting.

6 MR. GILES: And the fire pumps constantly charge.

7 MR. ENE: Yeah.

8 MR. GILES: The fire system is always charged, so --

9 MR. YOUNG: How is that being charged?

10 MR. ENE: It's under pressure all the time.

11 *Berliga*
MR. ~~CELLGAP~~: Under pressure all the time.

12 MR. GILES: Yeah, the pump, when it -- if it leaks down, the
13 pump will come on and pump it back out.

14 MR. YOUNG: So as soon as you open up a nozzle, it's on?

15 *Berliga*
MR. ~~CELLGAP~~: It's on, yeah.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. How about ventilation? Had that been
17 secured, the engine room ventilation?

18 MR. ENE: Due to the blackout, I think already all the
19 dampers been closed.

20 *Berliga*
MR. ~~CELLGAP~~: The damper been closed and the guys should
21 *close the manual dampers*
check and (indiscernible) -- if there's some leak from one
22 *manual dampers should be*
(~~indiscernible~~), the dampers ~~are~~ tightened.

23 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So electrically, when you lose electrical
24 power, the fans electrically stop. Are the dampers held open
25 electrically as well?

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25 electrically as well?

Gerliga

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2 they're closed by springs.

3 MR. YOUNG: Springs.

Gerliga

4 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: When we lose the power, they're closing by
5 springs.

6 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

7 MR. GILES: They only close.

8 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And watertight doors, are they typically
9 closed underway?

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20 manually locally because they were in no-go area and they were
21 just closing that day.

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24 really a judgment call because it impedes evacuation --

25 MR. YOUNG: Got it.

1 MR. ENE: Yes. Out in -- yeah, at sea we run one.

2 MR. ROSEN: Okay. So which one did you turn on coming into
3 Portland? Do you remember? Do you recall?

4 MR. ENE: Yeah, the 2, the number 2.

5 MR. ROSEN: The number 2?

6 MR. ENE: Usually run number 2.

7 MR. ROSEN: Okay.

8 MR. YOUNG: That's -- number 2 is the starboard?

9 MR. ENE: Yes, starboard side.

10 MR. YOUNG: We can shift our gears to the chief and ask some
11 engineering questions now, if you're prepared. Or if you need a
12 break or some water or --

13 MR. ENE: No, no, no.

14 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you guys need some water or
16 something?

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm okay.

18 *Gerliga*
MR. ~~GELLGAT~~: Okay, I *am okay thank you* (indiscernible).

19 MR. YOUNG: So this is Brian Young with the NTSB again,
20 speaking with the chief. Chief, can you talk to us about how many
21 years you have been sailing as a chief engineer?

22 *Gerliga*
MR. ~~GELLGAT~~: I started as work as engineer in 1992 and as
23 chief engineer 2004, 2006, I don't remember exactly. And this
24 *here started with ISP*
is -- I ~~see my ISP, ISPC my report,~~ and since 2010.

25 MR. YOUNG: 2010?

Gertiga

1 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah.

2 MR. YOUNG: And how long have you been working on these
3 vessels?

Gertiga

4 MR. GELLGAF: On this vessels I came in 2019.

5 MR. YOUNG: 2019?

Gertiga

6 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah.

7 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And with your engine crew on this ship do
8 you have manned watches in the engine room or do you go unmanned?

Gertiga

9 MR. GELLGAF: We have manned watches, one duty engineer and
10 one motorman.

11 MR. YOUNG: And they're on watch all the time you're on
12 board?

Gertiga

13 MR. GELLGAF: They're all the time on watch, yeah, 24 hours.

14 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And do they do 4 hour watch, *after 8*

Gertiga

15 MR. GELLGAF: Four, that's usually the standard. Four hour
16 watch is *standard*

17 MR. YOUNG: And when you're maneuvering --

Gertiga

we have a maneuvering

18 MR. GELLGAF: When -- I am ~~up~~ me and chief electrician, we
19 are always in engine room for maneuvering.

20 MR. YOUNG: In the control --

in the

21 MR. GELLGAF: ~~And~~ control room for maneuvering and also for
22 the locks for rivers.

23 MR. YOUNG: Right. Okay. And when your crews do a
24 changeover of watch, say, at the 8 o'clock or the noon, do they do
25 a checklist?

1 MR. GELLGAF: They ^{have to complete the} complete (indiscernible) ^{also the} checklist. And
2 ~~my~~ (indiscernible) engine logbook.

3 MR. YOUNG: In the logbook, too. Okay. And I think we had
4 talked a little bit about as you are at sea typically you'll run
5 two main engines?

6 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~ ^{Gexliga}: We're at sea, yes, typically we run two main
7 engine and one DG.

8 MR. YOUNG: One DG. And what's your -- and this might be
9 more for the captain, but what's your normal cruising speed?

10 MR. ENE: Ten knots.

11 MR. YOUNG: Ten knots? And what kind of an engine load does
12 that have for the mains?

13 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~ ^{Gexliga}: For the mains, ^{Engines} the main engine has around 65
14 percent -- 65, 70 percent of load. It depends (indiscernible) ^{of sailing conditions}

15 MR. YOUNG: And when you're at sea at 10 knots and you have a
16 hotel load of crew and passengers, is it okay to run one
17 generator?

18 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~ ^{Gexliga}: Yes. It's more than enough. The generator is
19 designed for 1 mega and our maximum load is 400, 450 kilowatts;
20 600 in summertime when AC ^{are running with} ~~line is~~ full power.

21 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And the two mains and the two auxiliaries,
22 are they all the same 35/16 engines?

23 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~ ^{Gexliga}: 35/16 engines, exactly same.

24 MR. YOUNG: Right. And the generators run at constant speed?

25 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~ ^{Gexliga}: Generator ^{are running with} ~~run~~ at constant speed and main engine

1 *with*
Variable speeds.

2 MR. YOUNG: Variable speed, yeah. And did you have any
3 excessive load on the way into Portland before the incident with
4 the generator?

5 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLGAF: No.

6 MR. YOUNG: No?

7 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLGAF: No, just everything as usual, the bow
8 thruster and -- *AC were in operation*

9 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then when you do run the bow thruster
10 for maneuvering, you do start a second engine typically?

11 *GERLIGA* *should start DG Bow Thruster*
MR. GELLGAF: Yeah. Also we ~~do~~ -- we can start only with
12 *DG. we should started*
two ~~start~~ bow thruster with two DG online.

13 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then after you arrive in port, the bow
14 thruster shuts down and you can shut down the main engines and go
15 to one --

16 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLGAF: When we arrive in port, yeah, we shut down main
17 *two DG online*
engines. Usually we have ~~to~~, we shut down bow thruster, main
18 engine. After, shut down one DG.

19 MR. YOUNG: One DG. And then for a hotel load sitting in
20 port one DG is okay?

21 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLGAF: One is okay because we have in port 400
22 kilowatts.

23 MR. YOUNG: So about 400 kilowatts is a normal load?

24 *GERLIGA* *enough for everything*
MR. GELLGAF: Yes. It's ~~every, every~~ (indiscernible)

25 MR. YOUNG: And about what percent is that? Maybe --

GERLIGA

1 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: It's 40 percent.

2 MR. YOUNG: Forty percent load on the engine?

3 *GERLIGA*
MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Forty percent ^{of} load.

4 MR. YOUNG: And was that about the load at the time of the
5 incident?

6 *GERLIGA*
MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Yes.

7 MR. YOUNG: Nothing excessive?

8 *GERLIGA*
MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Nothing excessive, no.

9 MR. YOUNG: Do the DGs put out 450 volt? Are they 450 volt
10 generators or how high?

11 *GERLIGA*
MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: 480.

12 MR. YOUNG: 480?

13 *GERLIGA*
MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Yeah.

14 MR. YOUNG: And then the morning after arriving and singling
15 up on the one DG, were there any alarms leading up to the
16 incident?

17 *GERLIGA* *alarm on DG #1*
MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: In the morning we have ^{high} during maneuvering, we
18 *exhaust gas temperatures* have high ^{gas temperature} we seen an alarm because we have exhaust gets alarm
19 *have* on starboard side DG.

20 MR. YOUNG: Starboard DG?

21 *GERLIGA*
MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Oh, sorry, not starboard. Port side DG.

22 MR. YOUNG: Port side DG.

23 *GERLIGA*
MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: On port side DG. When we finish with the
24 *have inspected* engine at 6:30, after that I ~~inspect~~ both generator myself just to
25 *going on* see what ~~it~~ is and to compare parameters between DG generator I

1 | couldn't see any abnormality. The temperature on exhaust gas,
2 | yes, on the port side exhaust gas was higher than the ones on
3 | starboard side.

4 MR. YOUNG: So the port generator had a high exhaust
5 temperature? *all cylinders had high exhaust*

6 MR. GELLGAF: (Indiscernible), yeah, one cylinder *had a difference*

7 MR. YOUNG: On one cylinder?

8 MR. GELLGAF: One cylinder was low, another one was high.

9 After we do, I decide to stop the port side DG and start to
10 investigate what is the reason.

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay. But no problems on the starboard
12 generator? *Is there any abnormal parameters*

13 MR. GELLGAF: ~~Was~~ on the starboard ^{DB} ~~was~~ -- starboard ^{in limits} ~~was~~ at a ^{1/e} ~~range~~.
14 normally The DG parameters were here ^{1/e} and ^{1/e} compared it with this port
15 side.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

17 MR. GELLGAF: All exhaust was around 300, 320 degrees.

18 MR. YOUNG: Is that normal?

19 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: It's normal.

20 MR. YOUNG: Do you know what the normal bearing temperatures
21 are underway for a generator running?

22 MR. ~~CELLGAT~~: Well, generator running the temperature should
23 be around 186 Fahrenheit.

24 || MR. YOUNG: 180-?

25 MR. GELLGAF: 186.

1 MR. YOUNG: And did you see any elevated bearing temperatures
2 on the starboard generator?

3 *GERLIGA* All temperatures were
MR. GELLGAF: On the starboard generator ~~is~~ bearing *-- same*
4 actually we don't have bearing reading. We have general lube oil
5 temperature.

6 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So you don't -- you can't see each
7 individual bearing?

8 *GERLIGA* temperature
MR. GELLGAF: You cannot see individual bearing because they
9 *don't have a sensors choice for manual*
~~are just~~ have just (indiscernible) checking, we're checking it
10 *infrared thermometer gun There were them*
with (indiscernible) ~~(was some)~~ -- no any division between ✓

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And was the lube oil temperature, the
12 general lube oil temperature --

13 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLGAF: Then the general lube oil temperature was a
14 little bit high. It was something 190, 192 degrees, but it's
15 *in working range*
(indiscernible) ~~clean~~ it.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And was that different than any other day
17 or is it --

18 MR. GELLGAF: It always, it always has difference with lube
19 *between D6*
oil temperature ✓ On the starboard side usually it's
20 (indiscernible). *few degrees higher compare with port side*

21 MR. YOUNG: Okay.
22 *GERLIGA* have cleaned the coolers *of it*

MR. GELLGAF: We ~~clean~~ *inspected* coolants and everything because ✓ to
23 make a judgment, you know, of the bearing *condition*. But it was still safe
24 in the limit, safe limit.

25 MR. YOUNG: Okay, still within the limit?

GERLIGA

1 MR. GELLGAF: Still within the limit.

2 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then after arriving in port the ship's
3 electrical load is on the starboard generator.

GERLIGA

4 MR. GELLGAF: Yes.

5 MR. YOUNG: The port generator was secured.

GERLIGA The generator disconnected from switch board

6 MR. GELLGAF: (Indiscernible) was just -- yes, we put ^{should} the
Engine to cool down mode after disconnection
7 oil on the -- disconnect generator from the bus bar. I sent
8 motorman, my engineer to put it to cool down ^{mode} load. And just went ^{up}
9 to also open deck when ^I just went out from engine room to open
10 deck ^{before} because captain called me. After this, ^{to the bridge} this is, yes, some
11 ship preparation and look out ^{engine room myself} at same time.

12 I just ran back when ^{he met duty engineer in bunker} (indiscernible) station, I have ^{met}
13 third engineer, he ^{reported to me} report (indiscernible) engineer at the fire. I
14 just went, same time I ^{have} went down to control room to check the
15 security ^{of the dred WTD} and close -- to check security because to be sure the
16 area is isolated, I close main engine watertight doors same ^{door}
17 between the engine control room and ^{AC room} I ^{have} seen the, I ^{have} seen it was -- the
18 engine room ^{has} zero visibility. You know, some smoke was coming, was
19 coming ^{to ECR of fire} because ^{but we have smoke in} this was a very little bit to the control room.

20 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right.

GERLIGA

21 MR. GELLGAF: After, went up, check the shutdown of -- we ^{quick closing valves} are
22 closing ^{WTD stop} #12 and the engine fans. And then we ^{have ER to realise CO2} had to prepare --
23 check evacuation of engine personnel, and ^{then I have reported} they report to command
24 center that engine, that engine space has evacuated and CO2
25 ^{I preped the CO2 system} have -- they are ready to release.

1 MR. YOUNG: Ready to release?

2 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLGAF: Yes.

3 MR. YOUNG: And so you did activate the quick closing valves
4 for the fuel system?

5 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLGAF: For the fuel system, actually, yes. But
6 actually they was closed automatically when ^{he} went down.

7 MR. YOUNG: They do automatically close?

8 *GERLIGA* *I've switched of manually from local panels*
MR. GELLGAF: Yeah, but just to be sure, ~~I was a manual,~~
9 *he check*
~~manual~~ -- check the manual activation of all engine room system.

10 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And is that activated from the control
11 room?

12 *GERLIGA* *of the ship*
MR. GELLGAF: No. We have emergency station on port side ✓
13 *stair casing on the way to bunker. It's on the way to ER*
~~to~~ -- inside ~~muster~~ station ~~was a way~~ -- after the weather door to
14 control room.

15 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And so the quick closing valves had
16 automatically closed?

17 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLGAF: Everything. Everything. Yeah, quick closing
18 *fuel oil* *fuel oil* *fans*
valve, all engine pumps -- all engine pumps, and also the zone for
19 *fire which* *activation*
zone of ~~what~~ will be the response for all ships, ~~evacuation~~ will
20 be started from there.

21 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then the CO2, you said you had prepare
22 to go, right?

23 MR. GELLGAF: It depends, I open the door to CO2 room and
24 *have access* *CO2 cylinders*
keep it open to ✓- if in case it needed to dump faster.

25 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

master station. He received the order from captain to start 47
ventilation for ER.

1 MR. GELLGAF: We were at 19 to 20 percent (indiscernible) and
2 put the ER fans in operation. The order was given from
3 we can pull the (indiscernible) in command center, command
center has given the order.

4 MR. YOUNG: Understood. Understood.
GERLIGA to open the door from STB'd bunker station to ER

5 MR. GELLGAF: But, yes, we all try ✓ when fire team told us
6 ventilation restricted access door. When
7 that we need to start evacuation, it was ✓ to open the ✓ -- the door
8 was open, and door from starboard side ✓ bunker
main station. I was
9 trying to put emergency DG generator on the ✓ bus bar but load was
too high.

10 MR. YOUNG: Um-hum. You're trying to back feed the emergency
11 generator?

GERLIGA to Main switch board from

12 MR. GELLGAF: Back feed ✓ the emergency DG.

13 MR. YOUNG: To provide power to the ship's (indiscernible)

14 GERLIGA The
MR. GELLGAF: To provide power. This was, yes, ✓ result
15 was unsuccessful (indiscernible). Because later when we have chance to enter to

16 control room, I switch off all breakers which remains on and we
17 provide power to main switchboard and we ✓ started electrical supply for lighting
18 start establish it and
engine fans.

19 MR. YOUNG: Okay. The starboard generator, we understand
20 that a connecting rod exited the crank case and --

GERLIGA
21 MR. GELLGAF: Yes.

22 MR. YOUNG: -- damaged the block. What cylinder area was it?

23 GERLIGA
MR. GELLGAF: Cylinder number 13, and it's exactly we should
24 could see (indiscernible), it's in number 13.

25 MR. YOUNG: Thirteen?

GERLIGA

1 MR. GELLGAF: Thirteen. And the crank case door broken.
crank case door and #13 cylinders on same crankpin journal
 2 This is same *Y* is considered the number 14 (indiscernible)

3 MR. YOUNG: The crank case door was --
GERLIGA was broken

4 MR. GELLGAF: Crank case door *Y* yeah.

5 MR. YOUNG: And can you recall the last time that any work
 6 had been done on the main bearings?

7 *GERLIGA we running hours for last month*
 MR. GELLGAF: On the main bearings *you have* -- I have *it in report for* -- of
 8 running hours, they came just last month. It's around

9 ~~90,000~~ -- 13,900 plus 400. Last month it was 13,900 plus 400.

10 From this month's it will be 14,300 running hours.

11 MR. YOUNG: So about 14,300 hours since the last time the
 12 bearings were --

GERLIGA
 13 MR. GELLGAF: Yes.

14 MR. YOUNG: -- inspected or --

GERLIGA
 15 MR. GELLGAF: Inspected (indiscernible) *by CAT technicians*

16 MR. YOUNG: And how many hours are on the engines now? Or
 17 the generators, the --

GERLIGA we
 18 MR. GELLGAF: Generator *you* used to run about -- something
or no 3000 running hours since last top end overhaul
 19 like 2,000 -- (indiscernible) this is 3,000 running hours.

20 MR. GILES: In 2019, a main in-frame overhaul was done and
 21 that's where that 13 hour -- 13,000 hours, since that in-frame.

GERLIGA still
 22 MR. GELLGAF: *Since the* in-frame.

23 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

24 MR. GILES: And then we did -- the beginning of this year, we
 25 did a top end.

1 *6001148*
 MR. GELLGAF: Top end.
 2 MR. GILES: Which has got like 3500 hours on it.
 3 MR. YOUNG: Since the top end?
 4 MR. GILES: Since the top end.
 5 *6001148*
 MR. GELLGAF: One half of estimated service period for
 6 (indiscernible) *top end over overhaul*
 7 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And during the top end overhaul were any
 8 of the conrod bearings or main bearings opened or inspected
 9 whatsoever? They don't --
 10 *6001148*
 MR. GELLGAF: No.
 11 MR. YOUNG: -- touch them for that --
 12 *6001148*
 MR. GELLGAF: Usually no.
 13 MR. YOUNG: And do you base your maintenance, engine
 14 maintenance on engine hours or fuel consumption?
 15 *6001148*
 MR. GELLGAF: Fuel consumption.
 16 MR. YOUNG: Fuel consumption.
 17 *6001148* *maintenance intervals*
 MR. GELLGAF: But actually we do have between (indiscernible)
 18 *limits running hours and fuel consumption*
 MR. GILES: It's (indiscernible)
 19 *6001148* *average value for service intervals*
 MR. GELLGAF: We have thousand, a thousand (indiscernible)
 20 between fuel consumption *and running hours.*
 21 MR. GILES: We're less than what fuel consumption says, but a
 22 little bit more than the hours, so --
 23 *6001148*
 MR. GELLGAF: Yes.
 24 MR. YOUNG: Okay.
 25 MR. GILES: But the --

GERLIGA Service according the

1 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: *GERLIGA* Something, something manual.

2 MR. YOUNG: Some things. So when would the bearings be due
3 next to have inspection on the main bearings?

4 MR. GILES: Next? They're -- from around 30,000 hours.

5 MR. YOUNG: Thirty. So you're about halfway to any bearing
6 maintenance?

7 MR. GILES: Yeah.

8 MR. YOUNG: And the in-frame in 19- -- do you have the
9 service records from it, history?

10 MR. GILES: (Indiscernible)

11 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

12 MR. GILES: It's in that file that I --

13 MR. YOUNG: And was that done by ship's crew or by some sort
14 of service type --

15 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: *GERLIGA* No, it was -- *done by CAT technician*

16 MR. GILES: Force Power out of Houma, Louisiana.

17 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: *GERLIGA* Force Power in Louisiana.

18 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And then the top end, how about that?

19 MR. GILES: Blanchard Machinery out of Sellersberg [sic],
20 South Carolina. Sellersberg.

21 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: *GERLIGA* I don't think -- *It was in Charleston*

22 MR. GILES: Charleston.

23 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: *GERLIGA* Charleston.

24 MR. YOUNG: I think we talked the other day, but you do a
25 regular lube oil analysis?

GERLIGA

1 MR. GELLGAP: Yes. By a monthly basis.

2 MR. YOUNG: Every -- monthly?

GERLIGA

3 MR. GELLGAP: Every month.

4 MR. YOUNG: And I think you had shown me the most recent and
5 there were --

GERLIGA The lube oil samples have sent regularly

6 MR. GELLGAP: (Indiscernible) but the results -- let me see.

7 Oh, for the meters, the (indiscernible) is contaminated ^{debris} ^{are good} ^{the oil, we} have one
8 contamination going down.

9 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And I think it came back as good or no
10 issues on the last one. Have you had any issues with any lube oil
11 reports that you can remember?

GERLIGA

12 MR. GELLGAP: No. Never. Two years ago, we have high copper
13 ^{contents} ^{cooler} contained in oil because we put new coolant.

14 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

GERLIGA

15 MR. GELLGAP: We cannot found what it is the reason ^{of it} after.
16 ^{cooler} ^{the oil has started copper} ^{coolers} If we put new coolant, then we have to wash ^{cap} from the coolant
17 pipe.

18 MR. YOUNG: Yeah. Okay. That makes sense.

19 MR. GILES: I will add, too, these engines have a Alfa Laval
20 bowl centrifuge that's tied to all the engines, and you can select
21 one at a time. So we run that all day for 2 or 3 days, and then
22 we go to another engine and then another. So that lube oil is
23 constantly getting purified.

24 MR. YOUNG: Purified. Okay. And that's running whether the
25 engine is running or not --

1 MR. GILES: Right.

2 MR. YOUNG: -- the purifier? So the main engines and the
3 generators --

4 *Gerliga per change them.*
MR. GELLGAF: Once a day we --

5 MR. YOUNG: -- are purified?

6 *Gerliga*
MR. GELLGAF: Once a day we put one of main engines and --
7 *another day*
port or starboard, and one of auxiliary engines.

8 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

9 MR. GILES: And the generators, too, are fitted with pretty
10 good pumps.

11 MR. YOUNG: They are?
GERLIGA with prelubrication started without oil

12 MR. GELLGAF: Yes. It fitted to a pumps, so it cannot -- in
13 automatic mode you cannot start the engines before putting the
14 *in operation and bring the oil*
pump ~~brings the~~ pressure up.

15 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So when you hit the start sequence, the
16 pre-lube comes on?

17 *GERLIGA manually*
MR. GELLGAF: Pre-lube pump, right. We pre-lube ~~before~~ --
18 before start the engine, we run pre-lube pump in manual mode.

19 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

20 *GERLIGA pre-lub pump runs*
MR. GELLGAF: One minute, 2 minutes, (indiscernible) to after
21 *in auto mod*
start, and ~~it's~~ -- it's starting for 5 seconds and after because
22 *oil in system*
already it has pressure and it's easy, you know, to start.

23 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay. That's good. And how often would
24 you say the engines get purified? Is it every few days?

25 *GERLIGA a procedure for oil contaminations*
MR. GELLGAF: Every few days. This was -- ~~this is~~ already

1 *down. We analysis reports. Oil*
 are falling ~~It~~ can -- was getting better and better.
 2 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right. *situation*
 ~~GERLIGA~~
 3 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Usually you have opposite ~~like~~.
 4 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right.
 ~~GERLIGA~~ *We oil analysis reports*
 5 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: You have ~~to repair it~~.
 6 MR. YOUNG: And on the fuel, do you burn like diesel fuel?
 ~~GERLIGA~~ *ultra low sulfur* *ME*
 7 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Diesel (indiscernible) also for --
 8 MR. YOUNG: MDO or MGO or something?
 9 MR. GILES: MDO.
 10 MR. YOUNG: MDO. Do you have any records of any of the -- on
 11 the starboard generator of the journals on the crank shaft being
 12 cut down?
 ~~GERLIGA~~
 13 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: No. Unfortunately, no.
 14 MR. YOUNG: You don't know? *records*
 15 MR. GELLGAF: We don't have any measurement ~~position~~.
 16 MR. YOUNG: Okay.
 17 MR. GILES: I have a note to request that from the firm that
 18 did the in-frame.
 19 MR. YOUNG: Okay.
 20 MR. GILES: They can provide that information.
 21 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Just one of the things to check off to
 22 rule out.
 23 MR. GILES: That was prior to us taking over technical
 24 management, so we're able to deal with the previous company and
 25 that firm to get that.

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Great.

2 MR. GILES: Hopefully they have it.

3 MR. YOUNG: And your engine monitoring system down in the
4 control room, I think it was called IMax?

5 ~~MR. GELLGAF:~~ ^{GERLIGA} ^{IMACS} It was ~~EMax~~.

6 MR. YOUNG: EMax. Does that have the ability to graph or
7 trend any temperatures or -- of the engines?

8 ~~MR. GELLGAF:~~ ^{GERLIGA} Yeah, but they need to do it with it running.

9 MR. YOUNG: With it running. Okay.

10 MR. GILES: No, we can pull history.

11 ~~MR. GELLGAF:~~ ^{GERLIGA} We have a list of (indiscernible) ^{alarms in history files}

12 MR. YOUNG: And you can do exhaust temperatures, right, on
13 each cylinder?

14 ~~MR. GELLGAF:~~ ^{GERLIGA} No, exhaust to temperature not connected to
15 ^{IMACS} ~~EMax~~.

16 MR. GILES: Oh, it's not?

17 ~~MR. GELLGAF:~~ ^{GERLIGA} It's not.

18 MR. YOUNG: And you said for bearings there were no sensors
19 on the bearings?

20 ~~MR. GELLGAF:~~ ^{GERLIGA} No sensors on the bearings. Noise, we don't
21 ^{any abnormal sound from the engine any abnormal noise} have (indiscernible), we don't have ~~noise~~ detector.

22 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

23 MR. GILES: There's a common exhaust temperature that we can
24 trend and then there's the, you know, the whole temperature we can
25 trend, but the pyrometers are restricted to the LOPE.

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And did these have any ECMs on it that
2 might have recorded any abnormalities within the engines?

3 MR. GILES: We -- maybe the Cat guys downloaded those reports
4 and I put them in that folder. But yeah, so whatever's in
5 there -- whatever it picked up is in that report, so --

6 MR. YOUNG: And were you or was the service tech able to look
7 at them and say they noticed anything or have they not yet been
8 accessed?

9 MR. GILES: We haven't got that far.

10 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay.

11 MR. GILES: Maybe he did. He didn't share it with me. But I
12 didn't see -- nothing jumped out at me on a quick review.

13 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

14 MR. GILES: But I haven't had a chance to really dive in.

15 MR. YOUNG: Right. Right. And do you have a port engineer
16 that you work with, someone shore side?

17 MR. GILES: Here he is.

18 ~~MR. GELLGAF~~ ^{GERLIBA} He's --

19 MR. YOUNG: So if you need maintenance on the engine and if
20 it's coming due for, say, some maintenance that requires shoreside
21 assistance, how would you --

22 ~~MR. GELLGAF~~ ^{GERLIBA} Well, if ^{we} ^{any assistance} you need (indiscernible) from
^{we request}
23 Dietrich, ~~you~~ can (indiscernible) shoreside assistance.

24 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And you usually send an email or does your
25 maintenance system automatically --

GERLIGA e-mail and communicate

1 MR. GELLGAF: No, send in ~~command~~.

2 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And do you have a computerized maintenance
3 system?

GERLIGA

4 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: No.

5 MR. YOUNG: No. So how do you know when it's time to --

GERLIGA

6 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Oh, the Excel tables.

7 MR. YOUNG: Excel?

GERLIGA

8 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Excel tables.

9 MR. YOUNG: Based on running hours, maybe it's time to check
10 the filters or --

GERLIGA

11 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: The running hours. The filter is, yes, yes,
filters checked
12 but ~~covered~~ also by pressure differential.

13 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay. *filters have replaced*

14 MR. GELLGAF: I think that ~~was in place 10 -- 10, 12 days ago~~
any fouling particles
15 and was inspected. Was no way knowing if crack of (indiscernible)
16 metal or something.

17 MR. YOUNG: Right.

GERLIGA

18 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: But usually before ~~--~~ if you have bearing
damage *oil filters*
19 (indiscernible) first to track its pressure differentials on
20 computer, have to go ^{up} (indiscernible). It was ^{not} in the morning, ~~11~~
pressure difference was 16 psi
21 or (indiscernible) or 20 percent. I don't remember.

22 MR. YOUNG: Okay. I think just -- when the engine failed,
23 you said you were out of the engine room getting coffee, maybe.

GERLIGA

24 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Yeah.

25 MR. YOUNG: Other than the sound of the connecting rods

1 leaving the engine, were there any other sounds that people

2 reported that they heard prior to the incident?

3 *GERLIGA any sound* *coming back from ER* *Engine Room. I*
MR. GELLIGAF: No! It was just -- I was came from -- was

4 *inspected* *he*
~~called to~~ the engine room. *he* Came to control room, switch off from
5 the generator *to duty engineer* from the generator panels. *stop it* Told (indiscernible) put

6 the engine to cool down to *DB* ~~see~~ (indiscernible) number 2 has

7 *run* (indiscernible). Put it to cool down and went *up* -- I went exactly,
8 *for* it was 4 minutes or something. I say, okay, (indiscernible) stop *stop DB for maintenens*

9 it, stop engine number 1. And after *suddenly in few minutes* ~~sudden~~ -- ~~1 minute~~, I can see

10 on the alarm, *history* it is very close.

11 MR. YOUNG: And the two -- the engineer and the motorman were
12 in the engine room.

13 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLIGAF: Yes.

14 MR. YOUNG: What was their job?

15 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLIGAF: Prior to the explosion, they start preparing
16 tools for number 1, *DB* and at that time they observe smell of oil and
17 leaks from crank case door of cylinder number 12.

18 MR. YOUNG: A smell of fuel and?

19 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLIGAF: Oil.

20 MR. YOUNG: Oil. They smelled oil?

21 *GERLIGA*
MR. GELLIGAF: Smell oil and found the bolts from
22 *crankcase door* (indiscernible) was come out. And they start to tighten the bolts
23 so don't have oil leak.

24 MR. YOUNG: On the starboard engine? On the starboard
25 generator?

GERLIGA

1 MR. GELLGAF: Starboard generator, yeah.

2 MR. YOUNG: And is that --

GERLIGA

3 MR. GELLGAF: One of -- the motorman which has injury, *He* ~~she~~
staging *crankcase door*
 4 was to ~~to~~ stay exactly on the front of -- on the number 14
close to
 5 cylinder. And the engineer, he was ~~on~~ the number 12 cylinder
crankcase door
 6 (indiscernible).

7 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And it might have been lube oil that was
 8 leaking out of the crank case door?

GERLIGA

9 MR. GELLGAF: It was *loosen* bolt -- yes, crank case door was
 10 spraying lube oil.

11 MR. YOUNG: And has that -- is that a new leak that has
 12 suddenly come or how --

GERLIGA

13 MR. GELLGAF: No, *It suddenly happened doesn't have any before* just sudden this door (indiscernible) leak.

14 MR. YOUNG: It just started --

GERLIGA *suddenly*

15 MR. GELLGAF: ~~Sudden~~, just suddenly appear.

16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And was that the only place it was leaking
 17 or there were other places where there was oil?

GERLIGA

18 MR. GELLGAF: No. Only here.

19 MR. YOUNG: Okay. And was it spraying out or just dripping?

GERLIGA

20 MR. GELLGAF: It just was a drip, dripping.

21 MR. YOUNG: Dripping. But they initially had gone to the
 22 engine room to prepare to work on the port generator?

GERLIGA

23 MR. GELLGAF: Yes, yes.

24 MR. YOUNG: But while they were down there, they noticed --

GERLIGA

25 MR. GELLGAF: Yes. So *They should prepared the tools properly* ~~prepare two~~ -- priority, of course we

investigate the *DG*
 1 need to ~~explain~~ this starboard side *Y*-- or, sorry, this port side. *DG*

2 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

GERLIGA
 3 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: This point *was* is number 1 and we need to see
 4 what's happened.

5 MR. YOUNG: Understood. And it was at that time when they
 6 were changing or --

GERLIGA *They were*
 7 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Yeah, yeah, *ect* starting looking for the tools, for
 8 the spare parts, and --.

9 MR. YOUNG: Okay. I have all my questions. Thank you.
 10 Thank you for your time.

11 MR. [REDACTED] Just two questions for me, Chief. What was the
 12 motorman working on the number 1 generator, what was he doing to
 13 that? Planning to do to that?

GERLIGA *were* *work on DG*
 14 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: We ~~was~~ planning to *Y*-- number 1, I was planning
 15 to open the charger unit, open one already. *filter*

16 MR. [REDACTED] Yeah.

GERLIGA
 17 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: To check the condition, to check
 18 *gas side on turbochargers and* (indiscernible) ~~the charger~~ condition of the compressor.

19 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Checking the compressors?

GERLIGA
 20 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Checking the condition of the compressor part.

21 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. So there was nothing wrong that you knew
 22 of on that generator?

GERLIGA
 23 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: No.

24 MR. [REDACTED] They were just checking it?

GERLIGA
 25 MR. ~~GELLGAF~~: Just checking it to found what the

reason of high exhaust temperature temperatures on engine were
 1 (indiscernible) and the other one to -- because all ~~engines~~ was
 2 higher.

3 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

GERLIGA I planing coolers
 4 MR. GELLGAF: The was to open the ~~cooler~~ to check condition
 5 of air ~~coolant~~. *coolers*

6 MR. [REDACTED] Air coolant.

GERLIGA with
 7 MR. GELLGAF: After proceed to this -- if don't succeed to
 8 this one, proceed to cut out (indiscernible). But it was not
 9 reusable. *the cylinders and inspect injectors*

10 MR. [REDACTED]: Okay. And the last question is, you said the
 11 starboard generator is running in port. Is that always the
 12 generator that used when it's in port or do you alternate?

GERLIGA Any of them
 13 MR. GELLGAF: Some -- mostly we use to run starboard side to
 14 bring the running hours to (indiscernible) *next overhaule*

15 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. So you do alternate generators in port?

16 MR. GELLGAF: Yeah. Mostly we use to run starboard, yeah.

17 MR. [REDACTED] But mostly the starboard?

18 MR. GELLGAF: Mostly the starboard.

19 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. Okay.

20 MR. GELLGAF: We change it, sometimes we change it to do
 21 maintenance on the -- *STB'd side D6*

22 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. That's all I have.

23 MR. ROSEN: Yeah, I just have one. I didn't see it down
 24 there, but there's no oil mist detector on --

GERLIGA
 25 MR. GELLGAF: No oil mist detector on this kind of engine and