

DCA23LA125

**OPERATIONAL FACTORS/HUMAN PERFORMANCE**

Group Chair's Factual Report - Attachment 3

American Airlines Pilots' statements

May 25, 2023

TO: Jim VanDerKamp, Air Safety Investigator  
NTSB

FROM: Captain Michael Graber

DATE: 1/19/2023

RE: AA Flight 106 1/13/2023

I met both the First Officers in ops. We did all the required preflight flows and checklists upon arrival at the aircraft. The first ATIS we received stated runway 31L was in use and winds were 330/20 kt. We briefed the taxi route for 31L and discussed potential threats and engine out 31L procedures. Once the departure clearance was received, I was aware of a runway change to 4L and requested a new ATIS. We discussed the winds at 330/20 kt which is about a 5 kt headwind, and 15 kt left cross. I briefed the taxi route and the engine out procedure for 4L. While I was giving the welcome aboard PA to passengers, the dangerous goods form (NOTOC) was passed up with batteries circled (not received). I could not discuss the dangerous goods slip with the ground personnel who delivered this paperwork. We finished the before-start checklist and received the pushback clearance and engine start. While waiting for the engines to warm up, we discussed if engine anti-ice was required. Requested and received taxi clearance (Tango, Alpha left on Bravo hold short of K). Did not receive close out at this point and asked the First Officer to request a close out with a stand-by response. Dispatcher started sending numerous weather sigmets and First Officer was acknowledging sigmet's. I asked the First Officer (B) to tell the flight attendants to stay seated during the climb, I also asked the First Officer (B) to call load close out on radio frequency. Instructed the First Officer to make the prepare for takeoff PA in reference to the new Fleet Harmonization procedures. I looked left out the side cockpit window to clear left, cleared right, and proceeded across the runway. Crossing the centerline of the runway, I saw red lights illuminate. The First Officer called the tower which advised of a possible pilot deviation. I parked the brakes and attempted but could not talk with the supervisor by phone. We re-briefed the takeoff, departure, and engine-out procedures and proceeded to LHR.

TO: Jim VanDerKamp, Air Safety Investigator  
NTSB

FROM: First Officer Traci Gonzalez

DATE: 1/19/2023

RE: AA Flight 106 1/13/2023

I met the First Officer (B) at the flight planning room. We discussed experience level and recency in the aircraft and LHR operations. The Captain arrived and informed us that he was very familiar with LHR flights as he does them regularly. I explained that I was new to this seat and aircraft and was not yet consolidated and unfamiliar with LHR. We began to plan and chart the flight. We covered all preflight information and started filling out the crossing guide. The First Officer (B) left to do the exterior preflight and the Captain, and I proceeded to the flight deck to do the interior preflight inspection and flight plan entry. The flight plan was loaded, route verified, and the ATIS was received as we planned for Runway 31L. We entered all information and briefed the 10-7 and takeoff/sid information. The Notice to Captain (NOTOC) was received but had a missing item.

The company was sending weather updates every few minutes which I read and printed. We confirmed the route of flight and legs and then received the clearance. We changed the departure Runway to 4L in the box and briefed the SID and taxi as well as the Takeoff Performance System (TPS) and runway data. The NOTOC was still a concern as an item was missing from the final closeout. The weather from the company was still coming in, and we were discussing the new procedures.

We closed the door and pushed back. We still had not received the closeout and were concerned it had something to do with the NOTOC issue. We completed all flows and checklists. I called ATC for taxi clearance and were told to taxi "Bravo short of Kilo". We were still waiting for the load closeout and the Captain asked the First Officer (B) to call load planning. The CA asked me per the new AOM procedures to make "the prepare to take off PA." The weather from the company regarding turbulence was still coming in. The load closeout arrived, and we confirmed the data. Upon reaching the intersection, we cleared both directions and started across as the red lights came on. On the other side of the runway, I switched to tower frequency as we had not heard anything on ground control. The tower was in conversation with Delta asking about their intentions. The tower told us about possible pilot deviation and gave us a number to call. The Captain called the phone number, and no one answered. We coordinated on tower frequency to call upon return to the United States. I requested a new departure clearance and pulled up the performance data and ATIS. We confirmed all data and were given a new takeoff clearance. We departed to LHR.

TO: Jim VanDerKamp, Air Safety Investigator

FROM: First Officer (B) Jeff Wagner

DATE: 1/19/2023

RE: Flight 106 Submission 1/13/2022

I'd arrived early and collected the normal documents. As the Captain and First Officer showed up, we did the usual get-to-know-each-other chat. I'd learned that the Captain did the London flights regularly, and the First Officer was experienced on several aircraft, had been Captain on a different AA fleet, but was new in the right seat of the 777. As the sign-in time approached and flight docs began to arrive electronically, we began to formally review the information for the flight and check off items on the Atlantic Guide planning sheet. Shortly after that, I left to begin the preflight of the aircraft. I did the exterior preflight while the Captain and First Officer did the flight deck. I returned to the flight deck; reviewed the paperwork, clearance, weather, and backed up their route and legs review as they went through a normal preflight as well as the required briefings for departure. Runway 31L was discussed for departure along with the engine out procedure. Everything proceeded normally except for a discrepancy in the Notice to Captain (NOTOC) paperwork. This caught our attention because we hadn't encountered something like this before and didn't know if it would affect our close-out process. The aircraft boarding door was closed, and we pushed back and started normally. Our initial taxi out of the ramp was taxiway B hold short of K, a very standard taxi instruction out of the ramp for either runway 31L or 04L. Near the Bravo & Mike taxiway intersection, the Captain asked the First Officer to send a load closeout prompt via ACARS to get the closeout going but then decided it would be quicker if I called ops directly. I switched my audio panel to use the First Officers radio and tried to contact operations, but they were very busy with other departing flights. I was "heads down" during this time waiting for a gap to talk and waiting for JFK ops to check on the closeout. After I'd requested the information from ops, I relayed that to Captain. During this time, we received more printed weather information and the closeout. I provided the turbulence report and closeout to the Captain, and he asked me to call the #1 Flight Attendant to request them to remain seated after departure for their safety. I was heads down again with my headset aside and ATC volume down to make the call. When I brought my attention back, we were past a hold-short line on a runway. I heard the Captain and First Officer call clear right/left but could not see down to the runway departure end from my seat and the aircraft angle. At no point had we heard anything from JFK ground, so the First Officer switched to the tower frequency to clarify the taxi instructions. They told us about a "possible pilot deviation" and gave us taxi instructions to hold short and a phone number to call. We were not aware we'd caused a rejected takeoff. We parked the aircraft and tried to call the tower on the telephone, the tower manager told was he was not ready for our call. JFK tower told the Captain on frequency to call upon return to the US and gave us further taxi instructions to the runway to depart. We made sure we had the correct runway information, the Captain & First Officer reviewed the departure, and the rest of the flight was conducted normally.