



## NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

### Eastern Region – Ashburn, Virginia

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#### Record of Conversation

**Who:** First Officer Michael O'Reilly, Talon Air Services

**Witness:** Knut Finnevolden, Director of Operations, Talon Air Services

**When:** December 29, 2020

First Officer (FO) O'Reilly was interviewed via the telephone. He confirmed that he was aware that he could have a witness present for the interview and that Mr. Finnevolden was his chosen witness.

FO O'Reilly stated the following:

He was a pilot for Talon's sister-company before going to work for Talon in November 2020. He is type-rated in the Hawker 800; and had a total of 10,000 hours with about 2,500 hours in the 800.

He had only been "on the line" for two weeks when the accident happened. This was his first trip with Captain Yakubov and they got along well.

He sustained two fractures in his lower spine and another fracture in his mid-spine, along with three broken ribs and a collapsed lung in the accident.

The accident flight was the final leg of a trip that started on December 18, 2020. Came on duty at noon on the 20<sup>th</sup>. Got a good night's sleep and he felt good. He took a daily blood pressure medicine and was not sick and feeling healthy.

The flight on the 20<sup>th</sup> originated in White Plains, NY to Ocean Reef, FL with 6 passengers. Then flew from Ocean Reef to Opa Locka for fuel. The Captain then got all the weather, calculated the performance data for the flight to Farmingdale, and filed an IFR flight plan. They both reviewed the flight plan. The weather was not VFR in Farmingdale, but it was not hard IFR either. He thought it was 1000 overcast and 6 miles visibility at the time they departed.

They departed with 7,000 lbs of fuel and the ETE was 2 hrs and 40 minutes. He was the pilot flying and the Captain was the PM.

The flight to Farmingdale was uneventful, and ATC put them on an arrival before vectoring them onto the ILS 14 approach. He had done this approach several times before and was

familiar with it. He knew the weather was down to minimums before they started the approach.

FO O-Reilly said he and the Captain briefed the approach and he felt that they were “both on the same page.”

The ILS 14 approach was normal. When they intercepted the localizer, he called for flaps 15. As the glideslope came alive, he called for the gear to be extended and conducted the “before” landing checklist. Then called for flaps 25. When they intercepted the glideslope, he called for full flaps.

When they were inside the FAF, ATC told them that the weather had deteriorated to 200 ft and a ¼-mile visibility, which was below minimums. The Captain asked him if he wanted to continue with the approach, and he said yes.

The Captain made the standard 500, 400, 300, 200 altitude call outs. At 200 ft, the Captain called out “minimums” and then “lights.” The airspeed was Vref +10, about 130 knots.

FO O-Reilly said he yelled out “continuing” and looked up and saw “lights.” He then went back on to the instruments as they descended to 100 ft. During this time the Captain stayed focused on looking outside. The approach speed was about 130 knots.

As they approached 100 ft, he thinks the Captain said the runway was to the left. The FO said he looked out and saw REIL lights and thought the weather was below what was forecasted. It was “not as advertised.” He said it was worse than he expected, and it was not “good enough for him” to continue the approach and he hit the TOGA button. He only saw the end of the runway, but not much else. It was like there was a black cloud sitting at the end of the runway. He did not verbally announce that he was going-around, but the Captain said, “Go-Around.” The FO said he responded by saying “Go Around” twice, called for flaps 15, and added full power. Just as he started to pull up, the airplane landed on the runway “on the hard side.” They never got to a positive rate of climb. He was still trying to get the airplane to climb, as the airplane began spinning on the ground. It seemed like “they were crashing forever.”

FO O-Reilly does not recall much after the impact but thinks he may have reached up and reduced the power.

FO O-Reilly said he was wearing his 5-point shoulder harness/seat belt system.

FO O'Reilly used the autopilot for the approach but did not recall if or when he may have disconnected it. Once he hit the TOGA button, the autopilot would automatically disengage.

FO O-Reilly said that there were no mechanical issues with the airplane. The accident all happened very quickly.

**Leah D. Read, Sr. ASI**