



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594
Office of Marine Safety

Interview Summary – DCA22FM005

Interview with: Cecil Frye – Engineer *Marquette Warrior*

Date/Time: December 14, 2021, at 0830 CST

Location: *Telephonic*

Interviewed by: [REDACTED] - USCG, Bart Barnum - NTSB

In attendance: Adam Davis – Council for Marquette Transportation Company

Case: *Marquette Warrior* – DCA22FM005

Mr. Frye was re-interviewed in conjunction with the investigation into the loss of steering and subsequent grounding of the towing vessel *Marquette Warrior* at mile marker 538 on the lower Mississippi River near Greenville, MS on November 21, 2021, at 1215 in the afternoon. The interview was not recorded. Below is a summary of notes taken by investigators during the interview. Quotes by the interviewee during the interview were captured by investigators and are identified using quotations in this summary.

- Said he conducted “unexpected repairs” on the port generator on 11/7/21.
- He replaced an electrical 5 pin relay and 10-amp fuse on the on/off 12-volt circuit for the generator.
- He indicated that the relay failed at about 0200 on the 7th while the generator was online supplying power to the vessel. The vessel blacked out when this occurred.
- He indicated that the vessel was tied off to a fleet in Convent, LA when the vessel blacked out.
- He was asleep at the time and was woken by the engineering alarm panel in his cabin.
- Reported to the engine room, started, and connected starboard generator. Notified wheelhouse of port generator failure.
- Stated that “company rules” require company personal to be notified if critical equipment is down for more than two hours (later in the interview indicated that this was more of a spoken rule rather than a written policy).
- He said that he troubleshot and made repairs to the port generator within 1 hour.
- Indicated that he notified port engineer later in the morning and that the port engineer was not concerned with any other undying issues that may have contributed to the relay and fuse failure. The port engineer was satisfied with his repairs and the submittal of a Critical Equipment Failure Form.
- Any time you lose “power, steering or propulsion” he said that he needed to fill out a Critical Equipment Failure Form. He did this and filed it in the V365 maintenance system.
- He was not aware if the relay and fuse he changed out was also replaced during the vessel refit period when the generator hot end was changed out.
- “In no way” did he feel like the relay and fuse failure on the 7th were related to the hot end failure on the 21st.
- Did not consult an electrical schematic for the generator while troubleshooting and making repairs.

- Before any critical equipment servicing or repairs, he must fill out a permit to work and complete a lock out tag out if warranted.
 - Critical equipment identification is listed in V365.
- USCG did not come onboard and was not notified following the vessel blackout on the 7th. His reason for this was because they were not underway and tied off to the fleet.
- Indicated that anytime he makes repairs or conducts servicing to equipment, he takes a video of the repair and the testing of the equipment.
- Said that the pilot or captain can give authorization to preform work on critical equipment (authorize a permit to work).