

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

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PSC GROUP EMPLOYEE FATALITY AT *

THE EXXON MOBIL LUBE PLANT IN *

BEAUMONT, TEXAS ON OCTOBER 28, 2022 * Accident No.: RRD23FR002

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Interview of: TRACY DOUCET, "A" Operator
Exxon Mobil

Hilton Garden Inn
Beaumont, Texas

Sunday,
October 30, 2022

APPEARANCES:

MICHAEL BACHMEIER, Operations Group Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board

STACY CHAVEZ, Operating Practices Inspector
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

BRIAN CAMP, Vice President of Operations
PSC Group

JAMES RITCHIE, Aromatics, Catalyst & Licensing Vice
President
Exxon Mobil

BRYAN BOAZ, Rail Operations and Planning Field
Supervisor
Exxon Mobil

MEEKIE MOSELEY, President
United Steel Workers, Beaumont, Texas
(On behalf of Mr. Doucet)

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:17 a.m.)

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2
3 MR. BACHMEIER: Good morning. My name is Michael Bachmeier
4 and I am the NTSB operations group chairman for this accident. We
5 are here today, on October 30th at 10:17 in the morning at the
6 Hilton Garden Inn in Beaumont, Texas, to conduct an interview with
7 Tracy Doucet, operator, lube manufacturing with Exxon Mobil. This
8 interview is in conjunction with NTSB's investigation of the
9 accident near Exxon Mobil lube plant here in Beaumont, Texas. The
10 NTSB accident reference number is RRD23FR002. The purpose of the
11 investigation is to increase safety, not to assign, fault, blame
12 or liability.

13 Before we begin our interview and questions, let's go around
14 the table and introduce ourselves. Please spell your last name,
15 who you're a representative, and your title. I'd like to remind
16 everyone to speak clearly so we can get an accurate recording.
17 I'll start off and then pass it off to my right.

18 Again, my name is Mike Bachmeier. Spelling of my last name
19 is B-a-c-h-m-e-i-e-r, and I am the NTSB operations group chairman
20 for this accident.

21 MR. CAMP: My name is Brian Camp -- last name spelled
22 C-a-m-p -- with PSC Group. I'm a vice president of operations.

23 MR. RITCHIE: James Ritchie, R-i-t-c-h-i-e, with Exxon Mobil.
24 I'm the aromatics, catalyst and licensing vice president.

25 MR. BOAZ: Bryan Boaz, B-o-a-z, with Exxon Mobil. I am the

1 rail operations and planning field supervisor.

2 MR. CHAVEZ: Stacy Chavez, Federal Railroad Administration,
3 operating practices inspector -- sorry -- C-h-a-v-e-z, FRA
4 operating practices inspector, Houston, Texas.

5 MR. MOSELEY: Meekie Moseley, "A" operator for Exxon Mobil
6 and president of the USW here in Beaumont. M-o-s-e-l-e-y.

7 MR. DOUCET: Tracy Doucet, "A" operator Exxon Mobil lube
8 manufacturing, D-o-u-c-e-t, last name.

9 MR. BACHMEIER: Thank you, Tracy.

10 Tracy, do we have your permission to record our discussion
11 with you today?

12 MR. DOUCET: Yes, sir.

13 MR. BACHMEIER: Do you understand the transcription will be
14 part of the public docket; as such, we cannot guarantee any
15 confidentiality?

16 MR. DOUCET: Yes.

17 MR. BACHMEIER: As we discussed, you have a representative
18 with you today, Mr. Moseley; is that correct?

19 MR. DOUCET: Yes.

20 MR. BACHMEIER: I'd like everyone -- I'd like to ask everyone
21 to clearly announce your name and title before questioning.

22 With that, let's proceed.

23 INTERVIEW OF TRACY DOUCET

24 BY MR. BACHMEIER:

25 Q. Tracy, could you give us a synopsis of your work experience

1 taking us up to your present job?

2 A. Yes. I worked for Exxon -- I worked for Austin Industrial
3 for 9 years. Seven of the 9 years was in Exxon Mobil facilities.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Highway 90, I worked 2½ years, and approximately 4½ years at
6 the present site, the B&P lube plant, switching. So I've been
7 switching in both facilities working for TGS, Trans-Global
8 Solutions, Econo-Rail.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Then I got hired on with the company in 2002 from that. So
11 partly -- with Austin Industrial I also worked on the construction
12 side. I was an electrician journeyman. So I did work
13 construction. So I've been inside of refinery facilities since
14 '92.

15 Q. Thirty years. Okay. So you've been in your present position
16 since --

17 A. So I've been in the present position with Exxon Mobil for 20
18 years. March of -- 18, 2002 was my hire date.

19 Q. Okay. And then as you're working over there in the pig --
20 what is that called? They call it --

21 A. Yeah, they call it a pig track. It's bulk receiving. We
22 receive additives based off railcars and trucks.

23 Q. Okay. And you've been that for the last 20 years?

24 A. I've been doing that present job for approximately 18½ of the
25 20 years. I worked in the warehouse for about a year and a half

1 before I was promoted to manufacturing.

2 Q. Okay. Perfect. Thank you. So what is your typical time
3 that you start work?

4 A. So typically we get in -- our shift is -- our shift hours is
5 from 5 to 5. So typically, we typically come in about 4:20, 4:25,
6 to make proper shift relief. So shift relief lasts us maybe 15 to
7 25 minutes. Depends on the course of the day, any instructions
8 that need to be given that was passed down from previous managers,
9 things that we need to accomplish in the night to get them set up
10 for the next day. So it typically takes 15 to 25 minutes or so to
11 get proper relief.

12 Q. Okay. So you come in about a half hour early to do your
13 turnover and go to work. Take me through a --

14 A. Okay.

15 Q. -- regular night for like --

16 Q. Okay. So typically on a regular night at pig track, at bulk
17 receiving, after relief is made, then we have to walk the tracks
18 to make sure there's no obstruction on either side. We work off
19 of SRL and we have to climb up and down cars. So we make sure
20 those are clear on one side, make sure no hoses was left, steam
21 hose or anything left, that would interfere with switching. Of
22 course my relief, he does that, so we have to double check each
23 other. You know, at times we have missed -- you know, chocks have
24 been left on, like I said. But that's typically, that's our first
25 order of business, and then we drop the derails.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Once we drop the derails and the "Men at Work" sign, once we
3 bring those down, the switch crew now has complete authority to
4 enter the track at any time.

5 Q. So when you drop that flag, the derail, do you report that to
6 a rail supervisor for Exxon Mobil or do you just drop it?

7 A. We just drop it.

8 Q. So you don't talk to anyone after you drop it?

9 A. No. If the flag is still up in position we'll get a call
10 from the PSC Group and they'll ask us what -- you know, if we have
11 anything going on, what kind of situation we have going on. And
12 then we'll relay that -- we may have a truck we offloading hose
13 across the track, it maybe take several hours to offload. So at
14 that point, that's when we get back with them, tell them we'll
15 call you when the track is clear again.

16 Q. Okay. So let's get back, so we're dropping flag. You do
17 your safety check, top, bottom, everything looks good, drop the
18 flags. Then what's going to happen?

19 A. Okay. So they've given them complete authority to come in
20 the track. So at that point, now it's a matter of getting all the
21 paperwork, all the -- we have to sample certain cars, make sure
22 all the documents and stuff is in line with what we have coming
23 in. So we have to check bill of ladings. It's a lot of paperwork
24 we have to check.

25 So once that's done, we get all that (indiscernible). Any

1 changes we need to make with the switch crew, then we have to
2 contact them directly. So if we have to move cars in certain
3 positions, control room tell us they need a particular product
4 offloaded that we have to move, then we contact the switch crew to
5 make the changes. Then we fax them those changes so they have a
6 record of it.

7 Q. And you try to do that by -- what time does --

8 A. So --

9 Q. I think they start at, what, 1800?

10 A. So normally they come in somewhere -- they get in there --
11 the foremans, they normally come in -- I know when I worked the
12 job it was 6 to 6. So the foremans try to get in there about 5:15
13 or so, so they can make proper relief. They have their own safety
14 meetings prior to any movements or anything. So we know that --
15 so we know in that timeframe, that hour, that they doing their
16 safety protocols, too, so -- so typically it's better for me to
17 just fax any information to them and if they have any questions
18 they'll call me.

19 Q. Okay. So after the bill of lading, after you look at your
20 stuff, send the stuff, whatever, what happens after you fax and --

21 A. So after everything's ready to go, all my paperwork is ready,
22 everything is ready to set, then I'm just waiting for them to come
23 in.

24 Q. Okay. And what -- typical night, what time -- I know because
25 they probably have to go switch out a train, build up their --

1 A. Yeah, it depends on what they have going on. I know Tuesday
2 and Wednesday of this past week, Tuesday they came in around 8, a
3 little bit after 8, and then Wednesday was around 8:30. So on the
4 particular night in question when the incident, they didn't come
5 in till -- it was about 11:20 or so when they came in. So I
6 looked out and seen it. They made all the necessary couples and
7 they was lacing up and airing up the cars. So I could hear them
8 doing that process, getting all the cars aired up. So it takes a
9 few minutes.

10 And then once they pull out, then they have to cut in, they
11 have to cut in several cars from the (indiscernible) for that
12 night. So, you know, as I was sitting there waiting -- and a lot
13 of times we don't know what they have going on. Sometime they
14 have to go down to BCSP Mobil Chem and do a switch soon as the get
15 here. So I was assuming that's probably what they -- what took
16 place. They probably have some things in the refinery they needed
17 to do coming in at that time, so --

18 Yeah, they approach -- they came back in with those cars at
19 exactly midnight. I looked up at the clock because I had a lot of
20 work detail to do that night and it was exactly midnight. I was
21 like, man, I got basically 3 hours to get all of my stuff set up,
22 sampled and everything. So I knew I was going, you know, I was
23 going --

24 Q. It was going to be a busy night. Yeah.

25 A. Yeah. So --

1 Q. Okay. So at midnight. Did you -- was there anything out of
2 the ordinary just -- I mean because they don't come in and it's
3 not a set schedule, it just depends on the switching and all that.
4 So anything out of the ordinary that you --

5 A. Well, when they came in, I heard the cars come in across the
6 breezeway. It was right at midnight. So typically -- that
7 particular night we had a car on one spot, the spot where the
8 incident happened. Normally they spot that car. So during the
9 spotting of that car, then we proceed down because we have to give
10 them directions on spotting all the rest of the cars up and down
11 the track.

12 Q. So you're out there actually physically just --

13 A. Yeah. Yeah.

14 Q. And are you on the top of the rack? Is there a walkway on
15 the top or --

16 A. We don't have one.

17 Q. Okay. So you're on the bottom --

18 A. We're on the bottom.

19 Q. -- with the conductor?

20 A. Um-hum. So, yeah, by the time he spots that first car, I'm
21 normally in position for all the other cars. So after they pull
22 all the cars out initially, that's when we pull all the fittings
23 off the track and get them all staged up where we're going to need
24 the cars, whether it's the steam track fittings, the offloading
25 fittings. We put them -- so he pretty much knows when he's

1 working with most of us, is that where the fittings is at is where
2 he needs to spot the cars. So we confirm that, that, yeah, that's
3 a good spot. We relay that information to each other. We talking
4 the whole time. So, you know, if I have to move it down certain
5 feet as far as that, so we position the cars as needed.

6 Q. Okay. So that night --

7 A. So this particular night, when I came out -- so I'm headed
8 down. The cars are approaching two spot. And I could see the
9 cars rolling down to two spot. So I'm headed down. I'm halfway
10 down that section from breezeway to breezeway.

11 Q. Yep.

12 A. And then I heard the emergency, the emergency kill on the air
13 on the cars. That's when I took off.

14 Q. When you were walking, what side of the --

15 A. So we walk on the right side, on the right side of the --

16 Q. So that'd be the west side?

17 A. Yeah. So typically when the switchman comes down, he walks
18 in the main breezeway, he crosses over because it's too tight on
19 that walkway.

20 Q. Okay. So there's two breezeways. The further south
21 breezeway?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. He crosses over to the west side?

24 A. No. He crosses over on the first breezeway.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. The one prior to that one. And then he walks down to the
2 next breezeway, which is the breezeway where the incident
3 occurred.

4 Q. Okay. So right where -- that is what they call a breezeway,
5 right there?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Very good. Okay. So I gotcha.

10 A. So, yeah, he typically walks down at the breezeway.

11 Q. So you're walking -- okay, so you're walking --

12 A. So normally when I'm walking on that side, normally we have
13 visual of each other. Because when I was the foreman at night
14 working for Econo-Rail, we always stayed on the same side.
15 Typically we had a switchman at the first breezeway and he would
16 cross over. We had to man the breezeways because at the time when
17 I was working for Econo-Rail we didn't have lighting on any of the
18 crossings. So we got that -- I'm the one got that put in. I got
19 the lighting put in. It was supposed to be lights and bells. The
20 company fought us on who's going to pay for the lights. So, you
21 know, I'm talking '98.

22 Q. Yep.

23 A. So we still don't have bells on the crossing. The lights --
24 when we brought that up to them, the lights was for recognition
25 that switching is potentially going to be in progress.

1 Q. Yep.

2 A. People get complacent with the lights. They see flashing
3 lights, they get complacent. But when people hear bells, that's
4 letting them know that switching is actually in progress. So that
5 was the intent of when we presented of having the lights and bells
6 on that track to protect the workers. We have operators, field
7 (indiscernible) operators going out there continuously having to
8 line up tanks to come in -- go in and come out of. So that was to
9 protect them. So, you know, we fought that issue trying to get
10 the bells also on all the crossings.

11 Q. So take me back to this night. So you're walking down.
12 You're on the right-hand side.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Was the conductor on the right-hand side or was he --

15 A. I didn't see him.

16 Q. Didn't see him. Okay.

17 A. No. He was not on the right-hand side.

18 Q. So normally would he be on the right-hand side?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. Normally he'd be on the right-hand side. Okay. So
21 you heard the train go in emergency.

22 A. Yeah. When the --

23 Q. You knew something was going on.

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. You've worked in a -- you've been around here for 30 years.

1 So what did you do after the train went into emergency?

2 A. When the train went into emergency brakes, I took off as fast
3 as I could because it was either one of two things: Either he
4 lost radio communication -- I always kept an extra battery on me.
5 At that time we had Nextels just in case we lost communication
6 with the radio, the battery went out while we was doing the
7 countdown. We was able to use Nextel.

8 But standard protocol is, during the countdown, if you don't
9 hear anything after -- if it's a three-car countdown and we get to
10 two and you don't hear nothing else, you automatically stop. You
11 put it into emergency stop. Yeah, it's going to take a few
12 minutes to air everything up to get everything back, but it's
13 better to be safe than sorry.

14 So I took off down there because I knew it was one of two
15 things, either he lost communication -- the switch engine driver
16 lost communication with the switchman or they were going to go
17 through the bumper and take out our infrastructure, which was the
18 pipe rack --

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. -- setting there. So I wanted to make sure he was okay, he
21 was out the way.

22 Q. Yep.

23 A. I much rather we deal with that issue than, you know, him
24 trying to jump on a car, set a brake or something like that, so --

25 Q. Yep. No.

1 A. And then when I did get to that point, I seen his hardhat in
2 the tracks. I didn't initially see him. I seen his hardhat in
3 the tracks with the light still on.

4 Q. Was the hardhat in the middle of the track?

5 A. Yeah. And then I seen his radio next. And that's when I ran
6 around to the point trying to find him. And that's when I
7 discovered --

8 Q. And what radio did you see? Did you see the --

9 A. I had a radio in my -- a radio was in my -- it was laying in
10 the tracks --

11 Q. Between the rail?

12 A. -- right behind his hardhat. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay. Right behind the hardhat. Okay.

14 MR. BACHMEIER: With that, Brian, I'm going to pass it off to
15 you.

16 BY MR. CAMP:

17 Q. Brian Camp, PSC Group. Just a couple questions. And also,
18 Tracy, appreciate you coming in as well, and Meekie as well.

19 Just, can you tell me the normal process, the PSC person for
20 spot one? I'm assuming it's a routine and it's probably always
21 repeated. When they spot one are they normally on the other side?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Which side are they on?

24 A. When they spot one spot, they're normally on the right side.

25 I normally have visual contact -- I mean, visual with them at all

1 times when I'm walking down the track.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. That's why I couldn't figure out what prompt him to be on the
4 opposite side. Maybe poor lighting. We have a little poor
5 lighting in that area that we have addressed, so -- we have better
6 lighting on the other side, so maybe that's the reason. I'm -- I
7 don't want to speculate, but maybe that's the reason why he
8 crossed over to the other side. I don't know.

9 Q. Okay. And then, so he's on the right side normally --

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. -- and you can see each other and you all spot -- well, they
12 spot it on their own. I think they know where to spot --

13 A. Yeah, they know how to spot that.

14 Q. And then for two, three, as you go down the line, it's always
15 on the right side?

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. So you're together --

18 A. Yeah, we're together the rest of the way down, so --

19 Q. And your role is just to say, yeah, a little bit further;
20 yeah, that's good, just so you can connect to it --

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. -- and things work out? That night -- so from what you're
23 saying is, that night you didn't really have any communication
24 with the crew. You knew they were coming in.

25 A. Yeah. I mean --

1 Q. On the shove, you were just headed down there but haven't
2 actually talked to anybody?

3 A. Yeah. No. They don't let us know that they are getting
4 ready to come in to actually do the switching until we hear the
5 coupling, the cars coupling up or we see the lights on at the
6 crossings. Then we know they're getting ready to start the
7 switching process.

8 Q. And just one other one. Whenever you -- I appreciate you
9 taking off knowing something's wrong. When you got there and
10 discovered the person, the injured person, how fast before someone
11 else showed up? Did the other switchman show up about the same
12 time or --

13 A. No.

14 Q. -- quickly thereafter?

15 A. Well, I -- of course I contacted control room to call the
16 emergency response team immediately; we had a man down, stop all
17 production, get everybody to the assembly point. And then I --
18 the next call was -- he concurred. The next call was to the shift
19 supervisor. And I told him I needed him in spot one immediately.
20 So he got there pretty quick.

21 The switch engine driver -- of course it was a long string of
22 cars. I imagine it's over 20 cars they had behind the engine. So
23 he came down, switch engine driver came down. And I asked him --
24 we was at two spot where we met. I was trying to keep him from
25 the spot. And I asked him, did you lose radio communication? He

1 said, yes, and I hit emergency stop, the emergency air. I said
2 okay. He say, where is Chico? And I'm like, just hold tight
3 right here. So when he looked over my shoulder, he seen the
4 hardhat in the tracks. And he walked towards, you know -- you
5 know, it wasn't good. I mean, of course, losing one of your own,
6 that's a hard deal. It's a hard situation for anybody.

7 Q. I hear you.

8 MR. CAMP: Thank you. That's all I have.

9 MR. BACHMEIER: James?

10 BY MR. RITCHIE:

11 Q. James Ritchie, Exxon Mobil. Hi, Tracy. Thanks for joining,
12 and Meekie, thanks as well. When you're walking down, Tracy, and
13 you walk -- when you normally come out of your area, do you walk
14 in parallel, like the -- is the PSC operator walking down along
15 where the hoses are and --

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. -- they're on a different path and you guys meet up like once
18 you get to that area, or do you go in where the hoses are as well
19 and walk down?

20 A. Yeah, I'm walking in -- I'm down where the hoses are --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. -- walking -- I'm walking on the same path that he took.

23 Q. Okay. And you say in the past you normally --

24 A. So, yeah, normally I can see whatever operator is -- whatever
25 switchman it is that's at the point. Normally I can see him.

1 Q. Even when they're spotting spot one?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. And when you had walked -- like after the emergency
4 you had run down there. Did you see -- you saw Chico from the
5 right side or you went around and you actually saw --

6 A. I went around and seen him from the other side.

7 Q. And then came back around when you met up with Travis then?
8 You met the next brakeman?

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Okay. And but when you met -- I guess you met the shift
11 super first and then Travis or was it Travis first and then the
12 shift supervisor?

13 A. The shift supervisor got out there pretty quick. He was on
14 the opposite side because, you know, I told -- showed him what was
15 going on and then I walked around the other side --

16 Q. Uh-huh, back around.

17 A. -- and then that's when I seen PSC coming up.

18 Q. I gotcha.

19 A. That's when I asked him about radio communication, did they
20 lose --

21 (Crosstalk)

22 A. Yeah. The cars wasn't going too fast. I mean, it was going
23 at a creep. So, I mean, when he kill -- when he hit the emergency
24 stop, I think the cars maybe went maybe 10, 15 from the stop, when
25 it came to a complete stop, maybe 10 or 15 feet.

1 Q. So the shift super met you on the right side or the left
2 side?

3 A. The shift supe came in -- he came in from the left side.

4 Q. Okay. So he was on the side with Chico?

5 A. Yeah. I mean, on that side.

6 Q. Okay. So you had walked around the front and then when you
7 did your call he met you there?

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Okay. And then you walked back around and you met Travis
10 back on the other side?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. Just piecing together where, that's where -- okay.

13 That helps.

14 MR. RITCHIE: Okay. Thank you.

15 MR. BOAZ: Bryan Boaz, Exxon Mobil. No questions.

16 BY MR. CHAVEZ:

17 Q. Stacy Chavez, FRA. Again, thanks for being here. I can hear
18 in your voice, you know, what you're going through and it's hard.

19 So, you know, EAP's here, Exxon Mobil has the assistance, so reach
20 out to them, family and friends, talk about what you're going
21 through, get it off your chest.

22 So do you -- in the course of your workday, do you have a lot
23 of interactions -- not just work, but like personal interaction
24 with these train crew guys, such as the conductor (indiscernible)?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Not until we actually, actually going through the switching
3 process.

4 Q. So it's only professional and no personal conversation?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Do you -- you said that they're always on -- and I'm going to
7 use the west side, the west side or the east side --

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. -- on the west side you said that they never -- that's where
10 they're spotting, you can always see. But that's not -- that's
11 what you're saying that they normally do, correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Do you know if this conductor ever vary from this typical
14 situation? Could there be a possibility that at times he's on the
15 east side because where the angle cock is to close it's easier?
16 Is there -- or are you for sure 100 percent that --

17 A. The only time I ever see them go on the other side is -- a
18 lot of times when they on the lift lever, they can't get it to
19 engage. I've seen him go around to get the lift lever off on the
20 other car, so -- for the disconnect.

21 Q. The lever (indiscernible).

22 A. Yeah. I've always heard them -- communication going in
23 between to shut both air valves before they break lose.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. So they shut both air valves. Sometime they can't get the

1 lift lever on that side and, radio communication again, I'm having
2 to go to the other side to pull the lift lever on the other side
3 to disconnect. That's the only time I've ever seen him go on the
4 other side, to do that particular task. And even when I was doing
5 that job, that's the only time I ever went on the other side at
6 that particular spot was when I couldn't get the lift lever to
7 engage on that side to disconnect.

8 So, I mean, that's what I was telling him, that we -- it's
9 kind of hard. You can't speculate --

10 Q. Right.

11 A. -- why he went on that side. I mean -- or what he was even
12 doing that side at the time. Maybe it was that, you know -- he
13 probably, you know, thought after the spot, I'll get on that side
14 so that I can -- be easy for me to shut both air valves and use
15 that lift lever on that side for the brake. I'm not going to
16 speculate on why.

17 Q. Yeah, I appreciate -- we all appreciate that.

18 A. We don't know what transpired at that time. You know, I
19 don't know if he fought a heart attack or what. We -- you know, I
20 don't know what transpired for him to be in that position where he
21 fell. It's just unfortunate that this occurred, you know. But
22 normally I normally have visual with any one of the switchman,
23 especially him because he's on our crew. He's normally switching
24 on our crew when we come in on nights.

25 So the night prior to that he was training a guy on the

1 process of spotting cars. That was Tuesday night. So he was
2 training a guy on the process for spotting cars. They have to
3 spot one spot the same spot they did. Both of them was on that
4 side. And then he told him, you know, that the operator normally
5 assist -- he normally dictate where the other cars are going to be
6 spotted all down the track. So he wasn't actually doing the work,
7 he was just standing there -- the guy he was training was standing
8 there as he go down and spot.

9 Because I know when I was with Econo-Rail we always had
10 somebody on that crossing. The breezeway crossing, we always have
11 somebody because we kept -- we tried to do the buddy system at
12 nighttime. So as they spot them, the other switchman set the
13 brakes. So as the cars were spotted, the other switchman -- and
14 they worked -- we worked our way down back to the crossing, the
15 main crossing down by the switch. Just in case radio
16 communication is lost you had another switchman close by that
17 could tell him to stop and then go check out the situation. But,
18 I mean, everybody does it different. Everybody has different
19 protocols on switching.

20 MR. CHAVEZ: Okay. Thank you very much.

21 BY MR. BACHMEIER:

22 Q. Mike Bachmeier, NTSB. Tracy, do you guys have -- do you guys
23 carry a radio? Do you guys -- are you on the switching channel or
24 do you don't --

25 A. Our radios are not intertwined with the switch crew.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And it's a reason behind that. Because working for
3 Econo-Rail, especially during the countdown and switching, you
4 don't want any other communication cutting in. Because we had an
5 incident similar to that when I was switching, where somebody cut
6 in and we had a switchman in between lacing up and all the switch
7 engineer heard was take it ahead.

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. And he started pulling the cars while -- and that's the
10 reason why you don't want --

11 Q. Yep.

12 A. So I don't know if they carry a radio that they can interact
13 with us at times. I don't know if a radio was provided to them
14 that they can -- but no. No, you never want that.

15 Q. Yep. Nope. I agree.

16 MR. BACHMEIER: Brian, that's all I got. Do you --

17 MR. CAMP: No. No more questions for me.

18 MR. BACHMEIER: James?

19 MR. RITCHIE: No questions for me.

20 MR. BACHMEIER: Bryan?

21 MR. BOAZ: No, sir. Thank you.

22 MR. CHAVEZ: No questions.

23 MR. BACHMEIER: No questions.

24 BY MR. BACHMEIER:

25 Q. You did a great job there, Tracy. Do you have anything you

1 would like to add to your interview?

2 A. No. I mean, I'll address some things with our management and
3 hopefully we get some things in place. You know, I talked about
4 the bells, how it was supposed to be, you know, back in '98. So,
5 hopefully, we can get some bells on the crossing also where, you
6 know --

7 Q. Yep.

8 A. That'll get somebody's attention. You know, we have people
9 crossing those tracks all the time, so I know what they -- what
10 those guys are dealing with. A lot of times -- I told the
11 supervisor a lot of times I see people coming across the track,
12 even supervisors, and I'm sitting there at the breezeway crossing
13 and I'm like -- and they look to the right -- they never look to
14 the right. And they look to the right, and they're like, oh,
15 shit. And I said, you know, those lights become complacent to
16 people they see lights. But we have to get some other device on
17 the crossing. So, hopefully, we can get that installed.

18 Q. Yep. Appreciate that. If we have any follow-up questions,
19 would you mind if we contacted you?

20 A. No. That's fine.

21 MR. BACHMEIER: Okay. On behalf of the NTSB and our group
22 here, thank you for taking time and your cooperation. Thank you.

23 And that concludes our interview.

24 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: PSC GROUP EMPLOYEE FATALITY AT
THE EXXON MOBIL LUBE PLANT IN
BEAUMONT, TEXAS ON OCTOBER 28, 2022
Interview of Tracy Doucet

ACCIDENT NO.: RRD23FR002

PLACE: Beaumont, Texas

DATE: October 30, 2022

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Kay Maurer
Transcriber