



**National Transportation Safety Board**  
Washington, D.C. 20594  
Office of Marine Safety

**Interview Summary**

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2 **Meeting with:** LCDR [REDACTED]  
3 **Date/time:** September 15, 2022  
4 **Location:** Via Microsoft Teams  
5 **Interviewed by:** Mr. Marcel L. Muise, NSTB; Mr. [REDACTED] USCG  
6 **Case:** DCA22PM034  
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8 **OVERVIEW**

9 I met with LCDR [REDACTED] by online meeting at about 1430 EDT. LCDR [REDACTED] has  
10 experience as Commanding Officer of a Sentinel class fast rescue boat and was interviewed  
11 as part of the investigation into an August 8 collision involving USCGC *Winslow Griesser* and  
12 the fishing vessel *Desakata*.

13 Mr. [REDACTED], the Coast Guard Investigating Officer assigned to investigation, led the  
14 interview.

15 **CONVERSATION SUMMARY**

16 LCDR [REDACTED] had underway experience as deck watch officer aboard USCGC *Steadfast*,  
17 Executive Officer of USCGC *Cushing* (a formerly San Juan based Island Class patrol boat),  
18 and Commanding Officer of USCGC *Richard Dixon*, a San Juan based Sentinel class fast  
19 rescue cutter (FRC). He was the Administration Officer at Sector San Juan when the *Key Largo*  
20 collision occurred.

21 LCDR [REDACTED] attended the Coast Guard's Prospective Executive Officer/Prospective  
22 Commanding Officer course at the Coast Guard Academy on assignment to *Cushing* and  
23 again on assignment to *Richard Dixon*. The Coast Guard offers additional training for Sea  
24 Watch in Portsmouth, Virginia.

25 The San Juan based patrol boats and FRCs report to the Sector Response Department Head.  
26 Crew assessments are completed biannually by CG-751. The FRCs are underway about 2500  
27 hours a year and may hold up to 30 migrants at a time. Regarding watch details, LCDR Van  
28 Sickle stated that the FRC bridge team consisted of, at a minimum, an Officer of the Deck  
29 (OOD) and Quartermaster of the Watch (QMOW). There were no requirements for specific  
30 billets though typically GMs, ETs, and non-rates stood the QMOW watch. OODs were at least  
31 BM2.

32 Leaving port, the Special Sea Detail, the anchor, and decks would be secured 1 NM from any  
33 navigation hazard. He stated his preference was to use the centerline SeaWatch display as an  
34 ECDIS and the chat on the port display. Either radar can be used for collision avoidance. He  
35 didn't routinely use the radar overlay on the SeaWatch. The starboard radar was "not well" at

1 finding targets and the BMs preferred to use the smaller port radar which is similar to the  
2 Coast Guard small boats' radars. The FLIR and the gun mounted camera were not routinely  
3 used for collision avoidance. Should the OODs who conn the vessel have to turn their  
4 attention away from forward then the QMOW will lookout. "Someone should always be  
5 looking forward."

6 Regarding the FRC performance, LCDR [REDACTED] stated the vessel handled fine down swell  
7 at high speed. The north shore of Puerto Rico did not have very much traffic. The cutter  
8 would transit between San Juan and the Mona Pass closer to shore than the FAD buoys, now  
9 7 NM offshore. The FRC did not come up on a plane enough to impede his visibility.

10 Regarding medical capabilities, LCDR [REDACTED] stated his BM1 was the assigned EMT on  
11 *Richard Dixon*. The FRC training allowance included one EMT billet though the course is long  
12 with minimal seats available for the crew which transfer every two years. The FRC had  
13 adequate medical supplies to meet their needs during his tour.

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**END SUMMARY**

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