

## National Transportation Safety Board Washington, D.C. 20594 Office of Marine Safety

## **Interview Summary**

1	
2	Meeting with: Captain Richard Gurry
3	Date/time: July 14, 2022 1445 EDT
4	Location: By phone conference
5	Interviewed by: LT USCG and Marcel Muise, NTSB
6 7	In attendance: None Case: DCA22FM018
	Case. DCA221 100 10
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9	OVERVIEW
10	LT and I met with Captain Gurry by phone conference to discuss Radiance of the Seas' June 9th
11	allision with a Sitka pier. LT is the USCG Senior Investigating Officer assigned to investigate the
12	casualty. Captain Gurry was the Southeast Alaska Pilots' Association pilot on the bridge at the time of
13	the accident.
14	Unless specifically delineated by quotes, the text that follows is not a verbatim record of the
15	conversation. It has been developed from notes taken of the online conversation.
16	CONVERSATION SUMMARY
17	Captain Gurry had piloted ships for 37 years. He previously sailed on west coast tankers with some
18	container and bulk ship experience. He has pilotage endorsements for Southeast and Southcentral
19	Alaska. He previously worked as a submarine pilot in Puget Sound, held endorsements for Southwest
20	Alaska, and worked as an ice navigator. He teaches ice navigation and emergency shiphandling for pilots.
21	Captain Gurry boarded the vessel in Ketchikan. He was one of two pilots onboard, the other being off
22	watch for <i>Radiance of the Seas'</i> arrival in Sitka. Two pilots usually sail with the vessel on voyages 8 hours
23	greater than 8 hours. He used SEAiq software with their PPU.
24	There were also two piloy trainees aboard. The trainee on watch was a limited tonnage licensed pilot
25	but was ready to be assessed with this size vessel to upgrade his pilotage endorsement. The ship's
26	master however stated he or his crew would be mooring and unmooring the ship so as to refamiliarize
27	themselves with Alaskan ports, having not been there during the COVID pandemic. Captain Gurry stated
28	he had seen this request in writing from RCCL.
29	The pilot trainee conned from Cape Edgecumbe and around Big Gavanski Island. The Master stepped in
30	on approach approximately 0.5 mile from the pier. The trainee stayed with the Master who conned from
31	the port bridgewing as they were mooring port side to. From there they could not see the starboard
32	quarter and there was an unknown problem with the stern camera used to watch the stern clearance.
33	There were two ratings on the stern with non-VHF radios. The Master also had a handheld radio.
34	Everyone on the bridge heard "50 meters clear", then five seconds later "we're going to hit."

- 1 Regarding maneuvering, Captain Gurry stated he preferred to start to turn in this scenario 4 to 5 cables
- 2 away and swing away from danger, in this case to port as the Master did. Mooring starboard or port side
- to the pier should ideally be up to the ship according to Captain Gurry and most will prefer stern in to
- 4 get away easier. Following this incident, the terminal does not allow ships to back in.
- 5 Following the allision, the Master told the Pilot that the chart was not updated with the new pier
- 6 extension. Captain Gurry stated however that his PPU did show it. The dolphin had no fender protection
- 7 and two of four stiff legs were damaged. The ship sustained only paint damage.
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## END SUMMARY