

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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ALLISION BETWEEN THE ITV *JOHN 3:16* \*  
AND THE IMTT ST. ROSE DOCK IN \*  
ST. ROSE, LA ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2023 \*

Accident No.: DCA23FM049

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\* \* \* \* \*

Interview of: ANDREW McINTYRE, Vice President, Operations  
Marquette Transportation

New Orleans, Louisiana

Tuesday,  
September 19, 2023

APPEARANCES:

DEREK JOHNSTON, Marine Accident Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board

  
United States Coast Guard

MARTY McLEOD, Esq., Representative  
(On behalf of Marquette Transportation)

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I N T E R V I E W

(1:07 p.m.)

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2  
3 [REDACTED] It's 1:07 on 19 September 2023. We're going  
4 to be conducting an interview with Andrew McIntyre, Marquette Vice  
5 President of Operations, and this is concerning the *John 3:16's*  
6 contact with the IMTT St. Rose dock on 12 September 2023.

7 [REDACTED], [REDACTED].

8 MR. McINTYRE: Andrew McIntyre, M-c-I-n-t-y-r-e, Marquette.

9 MR. McLEOD: Martin McLeod for Marquette and Captain David  
10 Boudreaux.

11 MR. JOHNSTON: Derek Johnston, J-o-h-n-s-t-o-n, Marine  
12 Accident Investigator, National Transportation Safety Board.

## INTERVIEW OF ANDREW McINTYRE

13  
14 BY [REDACTED]

15 Q. Okay, so if you could just start out and just talk a little  
16 bit about your background, how long you've been working for  
17 Marquette, and then just your roles and responsibilities with the  
18 company.

19 A. Yeah. I joined Marquette spring of 2019 as a port captain  
20 out of our Houston office. Around spring, summer of 2020,  
21 transferred to New Orleans as director of operations and this past  
22 year promoted to vice president of operations. Before Marquette,  
23 I was -- I went to New York Maritime College, graduated, worked a  
24 year at Kirby, steersman, went to supply boat business, GulfMark  
25 Offshore, from third mate to captain at GulfMark and then ran

1 relief captain and captain at Jackson Offshore before coming to  
2 Marquette.

3 Q. Okay. And what are your responsibilities at the company,  
4 what do you do?

5 A. General day-to-day operations of, you know, all the  
6 horsepower that we have in the Gulf-Inland division, crewing and,  
7 you know, satisfying in-house customers or liaison between  
8 in-house customers or charter customers.

9 Q. Okay. And related to the vessels and the crewing of the  
10 vessels, how do you -- what's your role in that?

11 A. Repeat it again.

12 Q. So related to the vessels and how they're crewed, the work  
13 hours, how are you related to that?

14 A. I do not directly crew or monitor work hours, so the vessel  
15 itself, but I work with the team of port captains that will work  
16 with the vessels on crewing and crew needs and adhering to all  
17 policies and procedures.

18 Q. Okay. And the team of port captains, how many port captains  
19 do you have?

20 A. Six today.

21 Q. Six today?

22 A. Or six last week.

23 Q. Okay. And that varies?

24 A. Yeah. So yeah, yeah, depending on need or how many vessels  
25 we have operating, but yes, it can vary.

1 Q. And when you say six last week, is that six that are like  
2 actively working at that time or that are just on payroll or how  
3 does that work?

4 A. Yeah, port captains are salaried employees, so six employed  
5 as port captains during the time of the incident.

6 Q. And we're just talking about kind of daily operations. What  
7 are they -- do they work just normal business hours or are they on  
8 call or what are their working hours?

9 A. Port captains are responsible for a certain set of boats and  
10 they are on call for those boats during the week and we do a  
11 weekend rotation of on-call duties.

12 Q. And so you said that each port captain is designated specific  
13 vessels?

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. Okay. And how many vessels total are those port captains  
16 responsible for?

17 A. It varies.

18 Q. Okay. It varies on -- based on what?

19 A. Multiple things, scope, work, region.

20 Q. And so we're just talking about last week, how many vessels  
21 would you say that they were responsible for?

22 A. So the port captain responsible for this boat had 8 to 10.

23 Q. And 8 to 10 --

24 (Crosstalk)

25 MR. McINTYRE: -- we do that, but it's in between.

1 BY [REDACTED]

2 Q. And these are all towing vessels?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. Okay. And who was the port captain responsible for the *John*  
5 *3:16*?

6 A. Harvey Mabile.

7 Q. Harvey -- can you spell his last name?

8 A. M-a-b-i-l-e.

9 Q. Okay. And so can you just describe again, what are his  
10 responsibilities as a port captain?

11 A. General overseeing operation of the boat, making sure the --  
12 the wheelmen have a liaison resource they can directly call if  
13 needed, you know, to help enforce all the policies and procedures  
14 with the vessels, assist with the crew team while crewing the  
15 vessels, liaison with the charter customers on any issues,  
16 breakdowns, time frames to return back to service.

17 Q. Okay. And then as the VP of operations, do you have any role  
18 in establishing company policy?

19 A. I would be a part of that team that crafts company policy.

20 Q. And is there a company policy that speaks to the crewing of  
21 the vessels, how many hours the crew is to work, how long the  
22 hitches are, something like that? Is there a specific policy  
23 detailing that?

24 A. I don't know the specific policies off the top of my head,  
25 but there is policies regarding time limits on, you know,

1 work/rest hours for captains and deck crew.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. I can't recite it for you, though.

4 Q. And in your role as VP of operations, were you -- did you  
5 have any hand in crafting those policies or did they exist  
6 already?

7 A. I have reviewed when we -- I don't know if it was a policy  
8 that we changed in the SMS, but I've, you know, reviewed it and  
9 put it on most of the safety management system. But very  
10 straightforward policies there.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Universal throughout (indiscernible) maritime business.

13 Q. Okay. So the *John 3:16*, when we were speaking with the crew,  
14 they described that they had 28-day hitches, they work 12 on and  
15 12 off. Is that typical for all of the towing vessels?

16 A. It's one of the many schedules that we have at Marquette.

17 Q. Okay. So with *John 3:16*, they were on that schedule. What  
18 in particular about that vessel -- you know, why were they on an  
19 -- why were they on that schedule? Is there something specific  
20 about the vessel or its operation?

21 A. On the 28/14?

22 Q. Yeah, the 28/14.

23 A. It's just what the crew likes or, you know, it could be  
24 multiple reasons, but a 28/4 -- yeah, a 28/14 schedule or a 20/10  
25 or a 30/15 is typically, you know, what -- it's what the vessel's



1 been doing and we have all of those different schedules.

2 Q. Now, do you know -- is there -- is there any reason why they  
3 would be on a 12 on/12 off and not like, you know, a 6 hours on  
4 and 6 hours off rotation?

5 A. I can't -- I don't know exactly why. I can hypothesize,  
6 but --

7 Q. And how would you describe the operation that the *John 3:16*  
8 does? Like, what is their main -- you, as your role as the VP of  
9 operations, how do you see -- how would you describe the  
10 operations of that vessel? Like, what is their main  
11 responsibility or operations that they do?

12 A. They're chartered to a fleet, our fleet customers, they  
13 do fleet and shuttle work in, you know, Baton Rouge south or live-  
14 on fleets, primarily shuttle and then do fleet work.

15 Q. And what do you mean shuttle, what do you mean by that?

16 A. They will just do shifts in the harbor region, they're not  
17 making long-haul journeys.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. So a lot of up and down, stopping and going, which --

20 Q. Okay. And then do you -- as far as work/rest policy, what  
21 does the company policy say specifically about what's expected  
22 from the crew members in terms of work and work/rest?

23 A. Standing watch for 12 hours, they have 12 hours off for rest.  
24 Any time for wheelhouse, for anybody, but wheelhouse personnel  
25 especially, you know, if they feel that they're not -- they didn't

1 get adequate rest or maybe not following or adhering to this  
2 policy, which is a law instead of policy, it's a law, then they  
3 need to elevate that need and we make arrangements.

4 Q. Do you have anything in the policy that lays out expectations  
5 for what they should be doing on their off time?

6 A. No, I'm not sure.

7 Q. Does the company policy set expectations for the amount of  
8 rest that they should be getting?

9 A. Twelve hours rest.

10 Q. And does the company policy set expectations for how long  
11 they should be actually getting sleep at night or sleep during  
12 their off time?

13 A. I'm not really sure on that.

14 Q. Are you aware of any instances where mariners have reported  
15 back to the company that they aren't getting adequate rest?

16 A. Not to my knowledge.

17 Q. And how are the crews of the vessels, how are they -- do they  
18 -- are they assigned to a specific boat, normally, or do they  
19 frequently rotate between boats or what's kind of the general  
20 operation for crewing the vessels? Is it the same crew normally  
21 or --

22 A. Yeah, I mean, it's, you know --

23 Q. It varies?

24 A. Typically, they're assigned to a vessel, but there are cases  
25 where there are new crew members to a vessel or they do get

1 shifted in the middle of their hitch to another vessel. So I'm  
2 not saying that there's a yes or no, but yeah, to go with -- you  
3 come to the boat, your assignment is *John 3:16* or whatever vessel  
4 and that's your vessel for that hitch. And typically, returning  
5 crew members are, you know, the norm. Not in all cases, but the  
6 norm.

7 Q. And the port captains, do they normally -- are they normally  
8 also assigned to a vessel that they stay with for a prolonged  
9 period of time?

10 A. Yeah, (indiscernible).

11 [REDACTED] Do you have any questions?

12 MR. JOHNSTON: Yeah.

13 BY MR. JOHNSTON:

14 Q. So the company's fatigue policy, is that -- is that part of  
15 the TIZMIS (ph.) that you guys have?

16 A. I believe it does reference TIZMIS. I don't know to what  
17 level.

18 Q. Okay. So it's contained in that higher level of all the  
19 different operating procedures and all that?

20 A. Yeah, it's in the vessel operating manual.

21 Q. Yeah, okay. And is that -- as part of the TIZMIS, that's  
22 reviewed by a third party?

23 A. Yeah, Sue-bean (ph.).

24 Q. Sue-bean, so Sue-bean surveyors?

25 A. Surveyors.

1 Q. Yeah, okay.

2 A. Yeah, TBM (ph.).

3 Q. When was it last certified or reviewed?

4 A. I'm not a hundred percent sure.

5 Q. Okay, yeah, I can find that out.

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. How are the crews --

8 A. Recently.

9 Q. Yeah. When a crew comes on board, a new employee comes on  
10 board, there's training they have to do before they can get on  
11 board?

12 A. Yeah, deckhands do a deckhand DHT training and --

13 Q. Right.

14 A. -- it covers, I think, 3 days now, you know, in today's  
15 world, it's 3 days in the wheelhouse doing orientation, all the  
16 stuff is mentioned to them.

17 Q. How are the crew members trained on the fatigue policy?

18 A. I don't know off the top of my head.

19 Q. Are they given a packet with all the different -- like the  
20 VOM, the vessel operating manual and all that to review or is it  
21 like -- you know, are they sat down and told hey, this is our  
22 fatigue policy?

23 A. I would be guessing if I told you how it was delivered --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. -- a hundred percent.

1 Q. All right. Is there any kind of in-house, like a -- the  
2 classroom style training that they do before they get on board?

3 A. Yeah, there's classroom, the DHT class is classroom style  
4 training.

5 Q. What's DHT stand for?

6 A. Deckhand training.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. So that's where they mostly all start.

9 Q. Right.

10 A. Any new hire deckhand will come through that, even if they  
11 have experience --

12 Q. Right.

13 A. -- they'll still come through that orientation course.

14 (Indiscernible) DHT course is most of our DHTs, but --

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. -- it's really an orientation, deckhand orientation course.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. And then also, they have access on the boat computer to the  
19 vessel operations manual and all the manuals regularly in the  
20 galley.

21 Q. Okay. And then that DHT, they kind of --

22 A. They're trained, they're trained to go and that's where all  
23 the policies are.

24 Q. And they're directed to it during the DHT, they know where  
25 all the procedures are in the VOM?

- 1 A. Correct.
- 2 Q. Okay. Are work/rest hours tracked formally on board?
- 3 A. It's through the vessel log.
- 4 Q. What do they record?
- 5 A. They record when they come on or off watch.
- 6 Q. Do they record how much sleep they've received in --
- 7 A. Not to my knowledge.
- 8 Q. -- before watch?
- 9 A. Not to my knowledge.
- 10 Q. So the fatigue policy that's in the VOM, is that policy
- 11 companywide or does the fatigue policy vary based on the vessel or
- 12 the operation?
- 13 A. Companywide, Gulf-Inland line, I can't speak to river safety
- 14 hazard system.
- 15 Q. Does Marquette operate like day boats?
- 16 A. We do.
- 17 Q. What's the fatigue policy for the day boats, is it the same?
- 18 A. It will still be the 12.
- 19 Q. It will still be the same, okay. If you were to be notified
- 20 by an operator that they're too fatigued to continue driving a
- 21 boat, what would happen?
- 22 A. It depends on the case, but generally, immediately find a
- 23 place to stop. If we had to get -- somehow get to safer water, a
- 24 lot of things could be done --
- 25 Q. Right.

1 A. -- whether it be I remain on the phone with him or the port  
2 captain will remain on the phone with him and bring a lookout,  
3 make sure they have somebody in the wheelhouse, like they have a  
4 wheelman up to get the boat to a safe operation. But generally,  
5 the story is stop the boat, get to a safe location --

6 Q. Yeah.

7 A. -- and we just sort out everything else --

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. -- whether that's we just stop the boat --

10 Q. Right.

11 A. -- and rest, we have somebody in the wheelhouse for a safe  
12 enough area or we replace the wheelman, somehow.

13 Q. Okay. Has that ever happened before, have you ever been  
14 notified of someone being too fatigued?

15 A. We have stopped the boat for fatigue.

16 Q. You have?

17 A. I don't know how many times or none of that.

18 Q. Right.

19 A. I don't have it recorded or knowledge --

20 Q. Right.

21 A. -- off the top of my head, but I have stopped the boat or  
22 getting calls that said hey, we have to stop because, you know, we  
23 have fatigue of some sort, not that we had a call but maybe the  
24 crew change got late and they showed up to the boat late and they  
25 just logged out that way.

1 Q. Right.

2 A. They get on the boat and said hey, you know, I've been  
3 driving for this long, I got to get -- I got to go to sleep before  
4 I can stand a watch.

5 Q. Right.

6 A. And the other guy's already been up.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Simply that's usually (indiscernible) and the crew change  
9 days.

10 Q. Right, right.

11 A. If we see that.

12 Q. And then what is the company's policy on cell phone use when  
13 on navigation watch?

14 A. Not to be used.

15 Q. Is there any instance where they're used for work-related  
16 purposes?

17 A. Yes. I mean, the company -- the boat phones. It's, you  
18 know, distracting operations, I mean, you know, I don't know  
19 exactly what the policy says, but you know, you got to navigate  
20 first.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. And that's the expectation.

23 Q. So the expectation is that whoever's in command of the boat  
24 doesn't have their personal cell phone with them on the bridge?

25 A. I can't speak to exactly what the policy says.



1 Q. Okay. And --

2 MR. McLEOD: I think Boudreaux was kind of messed up, in  
3 thinking about it, I think he was talking about the deckhands, so  
4 if you all want to -- I was just thinking about that, when you all  
5 were asking him about towing and stuff like that, you're not  
6 supposed to have it. It's just so -- I mean, not messing this up,  
7 but we had a chance to talk about it, but he's talking about tow  
8 or whatever. I think he's been talking about hey, my deckhands  
9 aren't supposed to be doing that. He was a little bit confused.

10 MR. McINTYRE: Yeah. So obviously --

11 (Crosstalk)

12 MR. McLEOD: So I mean, if you want to ask him, I don't --

13 MR. McINTYRE: -- we have our safety action plan, right,  
14 distraction of operations currently, right now --

15 MR. JOHNSTON: Right.

16 MR. McINTYRE: -- talking about cell phone use. So  
17 Boudreaux, he has a lot of talking points in his head from  
18 different safety visits, right, so obviously a big problem is  
19 deckhands, you know, want to do stuff until tow, so we always go  
20 back to that and --

21 MR. JOHNSTON: I see.

22 MR. McINTYRE: And then obviously, you know, distracted  
23 operation is another one of our things and, you know, no  
24 distracted operations in the wheelhouse, no -- you know, no cell  
25 phone if you're doing a critical maneuver, no cell phone use.

1 MR. JOHNSTON: Right.

2 MR. McLEOD: I've tried two cases in federal court in the  
3 last 5 years and two of them involved people who were using a cell  
4 phone at the time, a pilot.

5 MR. JOHNSTON: Yeah.

6 MR. McLEOD: You know, he turned out in front of a Marquette  
7 vessel, the *Strongia* (ph.), about -- down by General anchorage and  
8 then a Cenac pilot who was on his cell phone and, you know -- so I  
9 think cell phones is a serious business, they cause --

10 MR. McINTYRE: I don't know exactly --

11 MR. McLEOD: They cause --

12 (Crosstalk)

13 MR. McLEOD: They cause distraction, in my opinion.

14 MR. McINTYRE: But the expectation is --

15 MR. McLEOD: I mean, I'm not a witness here, I'm just  
16 saying --

17 MR. McINTYRE: -- you shouldn't be using them.

18 MR. McLEOD: Yeah, right. Anyway, sorry.

19 BY MR. JOHNSTON:

20 Q. Have you had any previous -- let me back up, I'm sorry. How  
21 were you notified of the contact, the allision?

22 A. Port Captain Harvey called me early, 7 o'clock-ish.

23 Q. Okay. Do you know how he was notified?

24 A. I'm not sure, but typically, you know, the boat would call  
25 him or they're saying, Boudreaux's saying he talked to the

1 engineer, Steve Richoux would be the port engineer.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. But I think he just called whatever last number was in his  
4 phone.

5 Q. Right.

6 A. But shortly after, you know, either -- I'm not sure. Harvey  
7 called me.

8 Q. Right, okay.

9 A. And then he said he talked to Boudreaux and I said, you know,  
10 obviously, anybody hurt, is the vessel stable, anything in the  
11 water, any immediate emergency at this -- you know, do we have to  
12 triage anything right now.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. The vessel's -- you know, the vessel's okay, not sinking,  
15 everybody's okay. Non-emergency, you know.

16 Q. When we received initial notification of it from the Coast  
17 Guard, it said that the watchstander was distracted. Do you have  
18 any insight into why it was initially reported that he was  
19 distracted?

20 A. Possibly, the first indication I -- you know, of course, I  
21 asked Harvey what happened or I'm not sure if I asked Harvey to  
22 provide it, but that he spilt his milk and was distracted, so --  
23 but honestly, you know, it's -- I'm not working -- typically, when  
24 I get a report of an incident like that, I'm not --

25 Q. Yeah.

1 A. -- I don't give -- I don't really care about the why or how  
2 at that point in time.

3 Q. Right.

4 A. It's more about getting everything lined up to respond or get  
5 the boat in a safe position. And then I think it came out later  
6 and I said okay, well, you know, he spilled some milk. I didn't  
7 really -- it's not what I'm going for at the time and then it came  
8 out --

9 Q. Yeah, I understand.

10 A. -- you know, maybe a little later, Harvey said that, he told  
11 him that he fell asleep.

12 [REDACTED] So when you first spoke to Harvey, what did he  
13 say the reason why he allided with the dock was?

14 MR. McINTYRE: He spilled milk.

15 BY MR. JOHNSTON:

16 Q. And is that what Captain Boudreaux told Harvey?

17 A. I'm not sure.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. (Indiscernible) followed up and called Harvey, you know,  
20 Harvey told me that Boudreaux told him that he fell asleep.

21 Q. And that was after the initial notification of it?

22 A. Right.

23 Q. Okay. Have you had any other previous incidents with Captain  
24 Boudreaux?

25 A. Not regarding sleep.

1 Q. What were they regarding?

2 A. I think -- I don't know, something, I would be guessing.

3 Q. Was it related to vessel operation and navigation?

4 A. It would be -- I'm not sure.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. I'd have to pull up the --

7 Q. Okay. Has Marquette had any previous incidents with problems  
8 with fatigue?

9 A. No, not to my knowledge.

10 Q. No, okay. And where's the vessel being repaired?

11 A. It's not selected yet.

12 Q. Okay. And I understand you don't know this, but after the  
13 contact with the pier, where did the vessel go?

14 A. It's at Bollinger Quick Repair.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. It stayed on the scene until we got it --

17 Q. Right.

18 A. -- released from GPO (ph.), then she's at Bollinger Quick  
19 Repair.

20 Q. It went right back to the --

21 A. Harvey Canal.

22 MR. JOHNSTON: Right, okay. All right.

23 [REDACTED] I guess I just --

24 (Pause.)

25 BY [REDACTED]

1 Q. Going back to the initial notification, so when instances of  
2 marine casualties happen like this, what is the normal  
3 notification chain that happens?

4 A. Typically, the vessel calls the port captain to let him know  
5 whatever incident that may have occurred or somebody did to them.  
6 Then at that point, you know, I get a call and then we branch it  
7 out from there, see the severity, emergency, sinking, you know,  
8 she's got to be able to pivot to whatever direction.

9 Q. And then as far as notification to the Coast Guard, who's  
10 typically responsible for doing that?

11 A. It will either be the vessel or the -- somebody in our safety  
12 and compliance department.

13 Q. Okay. And then in this instance do you know how the  
14 notification was made to the Coast Guard initially?

15 A. I believe IMTT called them.

16 Q. Okay. So then IMTT called and then the command center called  
17 you, correct?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. And did they -- who did they call, the command center?

20 A. I believe I got the first call.

21 Q. Okay, so you got the first call and then --

22 A. They got my number from somebody.

23 Q. And so in that instance, so even though the command center  
24 got the first notification around 7:30, the incident happened at  
25 6:40, so what was -- I mean, there was a period of time, 50

1 minutes. Why was there no notification made to the Coast Guard  
2 within that time?

3 A. I'm not sure.

4 Q. And who's responsible -- I'm sorry, can you repeat, who  
5 within your company is responsible for making notifications to the  
6 Coast Guard?

7 A. Typically, it's the vessel or safety, somebody in our safety  
8 and compliance department.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. It's been done both ways.

11 Q. So by that time had you spoken to Harvey the second time, by  
12 like 7:30 or was it --

13 A. I'm sure I spoke to Harvey several times that morning.

14 Q. Okay. I'm trying to get all the players right. So Boudreaux  
15 said that he first contacted Steve Richoux and he's a port  
16 engineer, you said.

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Harvey is the port captain for the vessel.

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. And then Doug Trent, I know that he was who I initially spoke  
21 to from Marquette, what role does he serve?

22 A. He is manager of safety and compliance.

23 Q. Okay. And do you know, how was he notified of the incident?

24 A. I believe I called him sometime after I was notified. I just  
25 let him know, you know, what occurred but everything's stable

1 right now, getting more information.

2 Q. Okay. And so at what -- at what point did Boudreaux explain  
3 that he had fallen asleep? I'm still trying to figure out how  
4 that initial notification came in to you all, at like Marquette,  
5 and understand that.

6 A. Harvey called me, he said the *John 3:16* hit a dock at IMTT  
7 St. Rose, I said okay. Is everybody stable, any sinking,  
8 collision, hurt, injuries, fire, nothing, no, no, no, no. Okay.  
9 We had a stable situation, we can all think now and calm down.  
10 All right, so get some information for me and call me back and,  
11 you know, I think initially, in passing, you know, he talked to  
12 Boudreaux and he said yeah, I think he said he spilled milk on his  
13 lap.

14 I said all right, well, let's get the information, let's  
15 figure out what we got and give me some pictures so I understand  
16 how -- what the situation is. And then, you know, he touched back  
17 with me, you know, 15, 20 minutes later to kind of update me on  
18 where they're at and then he tells me, he said, you know -- you  
19 know, Boudreaux mentioned to him that he fell asleep.

20 Q. Okay. And was this before -- so 15 to 20 minutes later, I  
21 mean, was this before you talked -- spoke with the Coast Guard?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay. So then did you pass to the Coast Guard, in that  
24 initial notification, that he had fallen asleep?

25 A. No.



1 Q. Okay. Why? Did you know that information?

2 A. We were still investigating and I was triaging, it was  
3 hearsay at that point.

4 Q. And Harvey's really -- is he the only person that you had  
5 talked to?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. Okay. And then Doug, did you speak with Doug Trent?

8 A. I can't remember.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I mean, there was a lot of phone calls going around.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. If, you know, you're looking -- we're talking 30 minutes  
13 after the incident and I could care less how it happened.  
14 Obviously, I'm just trying to stabilize the situation, so that's  
15 why milk or falling asleep, it's like not registering at that  
16 time, like, you know, because we're getting to the investigation  
17 part, you know, to make sure everything's safe right now.

18 Q. Right. I guess even from our side, when the initial  
19 notification comes in, you know, initially it was reported that he  
20 was distracted, but then, you know, later on it was that he fell  
21 asleep, so that -- I mean, those are kind of two distinct things  
22 and so I'm just trying to understand why.

23 MR. McLEOD: You know, I'm just curious, just out of  
24 curiosity, who said that he was initially distracted? Because my  
25 understanding is -- and I don't know how you all were notified,

1 I'm learning this right now, but you know, I think from my  
2 understanding, you know, Marquette knew that the Coast Guard was  
3 already out there pretty quickly, and then I think maybe you  
4 talked to Doug and Doug gave you the captain's cell phone number  
5 so that you could call him directly to find out what happened and  
6 it's my understanding you called him and he told you what  
7 happened. So I don't -- I guess I don't understand the initial  
8 distraction notification, who that came from, do you know? Just  
9 out of curiosity so we can get to the bottom of this.

10 [REDACTED] Yeah, I had spoken to Doug shortly thereafter.  
11 I was notified by our command center --

12 MR. McLEOD: Okay.

13 [REDACTED] -- because it gets filtered, the command  
14 center gets notified and then it comes down to us.

15 MR. McLEOD: Sure.

16 [REDACTED] And he had indicated to me that -- something  
17 about him being distracted.

18 MR. McLEOD: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] And he didn't say much more about that, he  
20 just kind of talked --

21 MR. McLEOD: So it was from Doug?

22 [REDACTED] It was from Doug.

23 MR. McLEOD: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] But the initial notification was made to the  
25 command center, which I believe that was you, or the initial phone

1 call between Marquette and the command center --

2 MR. McLEOD: Yeah.

3 [REDACTED] -- had indicated that the captain had spilled  
4 milk and bent down --

5 MR. McLEOD: Was distracted, yeah.

6 [REDACTED] -- and something to that effect, nothing about  
7 falling asleep.

8 MR. McLEOD: Got you.

9 [REDACTED] And it wasn't until, you know, I spoke with  
10 the captain directly was the first time I was hearing that he had  
11 fallen asleep, and I believe I had spoken to Doug Trent because I  
12 had reached out that following morning to try to just get --

13 MR. McLEOD: Yeah.

14 [REDACTED] -- an update and then I had asked him and he  
15 said, you know, again with the distracted part.

16 MR. McLEOD: Got you.

17 [REDACTED] And so I guess, you know, as far as, you know,  
18 the Coast Guard is concerned -- because, you know, we rely on  
19 those initial -- that initial information to make an assessment  
20 about what's going on --

21 MR. McLEOD: Yeah.

22 [REDACTED] -- for the vessel side and for the  
23 investigation side, so it's concerning to me that there's kind of  
24 two different stories. I'm just trying to figure out --

25 MR. McLEOD: Yeah, I understand that and that's why -- I

1 mean, that's something that you got to talk to Captain Boudreaux  
2 about, do you know what I mean?

3 [REDACTED] Right.

4 MR. McLEOD: I think, you know, I think there's some  
5 confusion to what happened because that was -- yeah, I understand  
6 what you're saying.

7 [REDACTED] And I don't --

8 MR. McLEOD: And you know, Marquette wasn't there, you know,  
9 they can only rely upon what --

10 MR. McINTYRE: Yeah, just --

11 [REDACTED] Right. And I guess, you know, just to kind of  
12 -- you know, speaking to the captain, you know, it's kind of  
13 unclear what he did in -- I mean, he said -- when we interviewed  
14 him, he said that he had contacted, you know, the engineer, Steve,  
15 and told him he had fallen asleep, so I'm just trying to figure  
16 out --

17 MR. McLEOD: Oh, when he first told him that, yeah, well.

18 MR. McINTYRE: Yeah, Harvey called me early, 7 o'clock-ish or  
19 late 6 o'clock-ish and informed me and then the ball started  
20 rolling. And the key for the operation department at Marquette  
21 was to make sure, you know, stabilize the vessel and respond. The  
22 how and the why is not necessarily important at the time.

23 BY [REDACTED]

24 Q. Do you know -- I'm just trying to understand why, from your  
25 perspective, do you not think it's important to understand why he

1 allided with the dock, the reason why?

2 A. (Indiscernible).

3 MR. McLEOD: That's not what he said.

4 MR. McINTYRE: I don't think -- yeah, it's -- you know, in  
5 the 30 minutes to an hour after it happened, it doesn't really  
6 matter. When we're trying to respond and make sure the boat's  
7 stable and no injuries.

8 [REDACTED] Yeah, I understand that part. I think, I  
9 guess, you know, the initial call with the Coast Guard and what  
10 was passed to the Coast Guard was that he was distracted and he  
11 spilled milk. That was, you know, a statement that was made, so I  
12 think, you know, it would be important to have that be accurate.

13 (Crosstalk)

14 MR. McLEOD: I mean, Marquette can only give you the  
15 information that it had at the time, so I think that's what the  
16 issue is. I mean, Marquette gave you the information that it had,  
17 it had no other information.

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 MR. McLEOD: So I mean, that kind of is what it is.

20 [REDACTED] Yes, understood on that.

21 MR. McLEOD: Anything else?

22 [REDACTED] Let me see my notes.

23 BY [REDACTED]

24 Q. Do you have posted in the wheelhouse or part of the company  
25 policy, kind of who the captains should contact in an instance

1 like a marine casualty, anything that happens?

2 A. I'm not a hundred percent sure.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. But the numbers are provided, there's an on-call sheet,  
5 right, numbers are provided everywhere and there's a company cell  
6 phone and every number plugged in.

7 Q. And then going back to David Boudreaux specifically, has he  
8 been on -- can you just recap again, did you say that he was  
9 involved with any other incident recently?

10 A. I can't name it and I can't recall off the top of my head.

11 Q. Okay. And do you know if he received -- like, was he -- did  
12 he receive any sort of -- like just his record with your company,  
13 has he ever received any sort of remedial or disciplinary  
14 additional training or anything that you know of?

15 A. Well, there's --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. There's the normal trainings that every pilot has.

18 BY MR. JOHNSTON:

19 Q. To what you said earlier, there was something that you  
20 couldn't remember, there's no record of that?

21 A. Yeah, I don't know off the top of my head, you know.

22 MR. McLEOD: I think one thing that did come up is safety,  
23 they do the -- you know, Marquette has a calendar, right, a safety  
24 calendar and on every Sunday, that's when they -- you may have  
25 noticed from other investigations, every Sunday, you know, it's

1 preplanned what they're going to cover from a safety perspective  
2 and it's done every Sunday and it includes like, you know,  
3 collisions, allisions.

4 MR. JOHNSTON: Drills?

5 MR. McLEOD: Drills, all that kind of stuff. So that's done  
6 and that's documented, if you want the calendar, if you want the  
7 records, that's how it's done across the fleet every -- you know,  
8 it's a safety calendar and it implements the system. And that's  
9 when they do the safety meetings. And then depending upon the  
10 case, you know, they may have a -- if they're going on a voyage,  
11 per se, then they have the pre-job voyage things, but just for  
12 fleet work, they're not, they're not really even doing that.

13 But they do have some of that for -- because I wasn't clear,  
14 yeah, I think you asked some questions about safety, I just wanted  
15 to understand those topics and I don't know what the topics are in  
16 each one of them, but that's -- so every week, the longer you work  
17 for Marquette, obviously, the more it's reinforced because every  
18 week you're going over a new topic.

19 [REDACTED] So these are things that happen on the vessels  
20 with the crew?

21 MR. McLEOD: Yeah.

22 MR. McINTYRE: Yeah, yeah, safety meetings, yeah.

23 [REDACTED] They go over safety stuff? Okay.

24 MR. McLEOD: Yeah.

25 [REDACTED] Okay. And every Sunday. And then you said

1 they also have -- they have it on the fleet boats?

2 MR. McLEOD: Yeah.

3 MR. McINTYRE: Yeah.

4 MR. McLEOD: Yeah, the other --

5 (Crosstalk)

6 MR. McINTYRE: You know, they consider it a live-on vessel,

7 but --

8 MR. McLEOD: Yeah.

9 MR. McINTYRE: -- doing fleeting --

10 MR. McLEOD: Yeah, some of the fleet boats, they just do

11 their hitch and then they go home at night.

12 MR. McINTYRE: Yeah.

13 MR. McLEOD: But these guys actually, this particular one,

14 they live on it.

15 [REDACTED] Okay.

16 BY MR. JOHNSTON:

17 Q. An unrelated question. When the vessel's engines are off, is  
18 there still power on the boat?

19 A. Yeah, generators.

20 Q. Does the watch alarm or the dead man switch, whatever you  
21 call it, does that still -- does that still work when the engines  
22 are off?

23 A. I do not know that question a hundred percent.

24 MR. JOHNSTON: Okay.

25 MR. McLEOD: That's a good question, I don't know. If you



1 all want to go and look at, you know, the wheelhouse or something,  
2 let us know.

3 BY [REDACTED]

4 Q. Kind of along the same question with the dead man alarm, that  
5 2 minutes, is that something -- how is that manipulated, do you  
6 know?

7 A. I don't know.

8 Q. Or how is that --

9 A. I'm not sure.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. I'm not sure.

12 BY MR. JOHNSTON:

13 Q. Is there a company policy for the use of that alarm?

14 A. Yeah, I mean, it has to be active at all times, which it's  
15 tested and verified at siren inspections and customer inspections  
16 and so the thing gets tested a lot.

17 Q. Is the crew able to turn it off?

18 A. Not to my knowledge. I know it's not, you know, not an AWOS  
19 system.

20 Q. Does it alarm in the -- in like the galley or something, if  
21 it goes off and it's not acknowledged in a certain amount of time?

22 A. I can't speak to this particular model and what it does --

23 Q. Right, okay.

24 A. -- or doesn't do.

25 BY [REDACTED]

1 Q. Is 2 minutes standard time, like is that what's set for all  
2 the vessels? Do you know?

3 A. I'm not sure if that's even what it's set at.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. It's reasonable to think that's pretty standard from hearsay,  
6 but I'm not -- I can't speak to what the Marquette boats are set  
7 to or how they're set or who sets them.

8 [REDACTED] Did you have anything else?

9 MR. JOHNSTON: No.

10 [REDACTED] No, okay. Did you have anything else that you  
11 wanted to add or anything?

12 MR. McINTYRE: No, we're good.

13 [REDACTED] All right. So we'll conclude the interview,  
14 it is 11:49.

15 (Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the interview concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the  
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: ALLISION BETWEEN ITV *JOHN 3:16* AND THE  
IMTT ST. ROSE DOCK IN ST. ROSE, LA  
ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2023  
Interview of Andrew McIntyre

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA23FM049

PLACE: New Orleans, Louisiana

DATE: September 19, 2023

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed  
to the best of my skill and ability.

A black rectangular redaction box covering the handwritten signature of the transcriber.

---

David A. Martini  
Transcriber