

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of:

*
*

GROUNDING OF BULK SHIP *AMERICAN*
MARINER IN SAULT STE MARIE,
ONTARIO, CANADA ON JANUARY 7, 2023

Accident No.: DCA23FM013

*
*
*

* * * * *

Interview of: GARY MILLER, Chief Engineer
Grand River Navigation

via telephone

Thursday,
February 9, 2023

APPEARANCES:

MARCEL MUISE, Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

████████████████████
United States Coast Guard

ADAM ZWICKER, Counsel
Gallagher Sharp LLP

BRIAN PETERSON
Grand River Navigation

JEFF LAYTON, Captain
Grand River Navigation

████████████████████ SPOTTS, Counsel

I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Gary Miller	
By Mr. [REDACTED]	5
By Mr. Muise	27
By Mr. Spotts	28
By Mr. Zwicker	34
By Mr. Spotts	41
By Mr. Zwicker	44

I N T E R V I E W

(1:02 p.m.)

1
2
3 MR. MUISE: This is Marcel Muise. It's 1302 on Thursday,
4 February 9th. We are interviewing Mr. Miller, the chief engineer
5 of the American Mariner regarding an incident on the vessel from a
6 couple weeks ago.

7 If I could everybody introduce themselves again, please, for
8 the record and so the transcriptionist can recognize your voice.

9 Mr. [REDACTED] first, please.

10 MR. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with the Coast Guard
11 Sector Sault Sainte Marie.

12 MR. MUISE: And Mr. Peterson?

13 MR. PETERSON: Good afternoon, everybody. This is Brian
14 Peterson with Grand River Navigation.

15 MR. MUISE: Mr. Zwicker.

16 MR. ZWICKER: Adam Zwicker, Gallagher Sharp LLP, outside
17 retained counsel for Grand River Navigation.

18 MR. MUISE: And Mr. Spotts.

19 MR. SPOTTS: Good morning. It's David Spotts and I represent
20 Captain Layton.

21 MR. MUISE: Captain Layton?

22 MR. LAYTON: Good afternoon, everyone. Jeff Layton, captain
23 on the American Mariner.

24 MR. MUISE: And Chief Miller, could you spell your name for
25 us, as well, please?

1 MR. MILLER: G-a-r-y M-i-l-l-e-r.

2 MR. MUISE: And for -- did I miss anybody? Chief Miller, do
3 you mind -- do you consent to us recording this? We'll produce a
4 transcript and we'll get it to you to proofread at some point.

5 MR. MILLER: Yes, that's fine.

6 MR. MUISE: [REDACTED] it's yours.

7 INTERVIEW OF GARY MILLER

8 BY MR. [REDACTED]

9 Q. Good afternoon, Chief Miller. And thank you for making time
10 today for an interview. The Coast Guard's primary objective this
11 investigation in accidents and casualties under 46 CFR Part 4 is
12 to determine their causes and provide the necessary feedback
13 primarily through its conclusions and recommendations to prevent
14 similar accidents and casualties from occurring in the future.

15 So I'd like to start the interview -- Chief, could you
16 provide your current address, please?

17 A. It's [REDACTED]. That's [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
18 all three separate words, [REDACTED].

19 Q. And is that the address that's on your merchant mariner
20 credentials, Chief?

21 A. It is.

22 Q. And a good cellphone number to reach you at, sir?

23 A. [REDACTED].

24 Q. So Chief, how long have you been with the maritime industry?

25 A. Since May of '89?

1 MR. MUISE: Can I stop everyone real quick? There's a
2 background noise that's kind of repetitive and maybe sounds like
3 some paper shuffling. I don't know where it's coming from but
4 it's a little bit distracting.

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, I can hear that, as well.

6 MR. MILLER: Yeah, I can hear it, too.

7 MR. [REDACTED] Are we clear now?

8 MR. MUISE: Yeah, I'm not hearing it now so if somebody did
9 something to clear that up, I appreciate it. Thank you.

10 BY MR. [REDACTED]

11 Q. Yep. So Chief, so you said May of 1989?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Did you attend Maritime Academy, Chief?

14 A. I did. Maine Maritime Academy.

15 Q. And if you could just talk me through after graduation what
16 companies -- probably not all of the vessels but what companies
17 you've worked with and up to present.

18 A. I started out my career mostly on the Great Lakes for -- or
19 most of my career has been on the Great Lakes but about the first
20 nine-and-a-half years, I worked similar vessels to the Mariner. I
21 worked for Inland Steel it was called at the time. I think it's
22 called Central Marine Logistics now. But I worked there for nine-
23 and-a-half years.

24 Then I worked a casino ship for 12 years. And then I've
25 worked a river boat, a couple of different boat ships for two,

1 three years -- probably two years I mean. And then, I worked on a
2 fish processing vessel up -- out of Seattle up on the Bering Sea
3 and around that area off the coast of Washington and Oregon. Did
4 that for about a year-and-a-half. And I've done a few odd trips
5 here and there but that's the bulk of my -- and then of course
6 with Grand River for the last year-and-a-half. That's pretty much
7 it.

8 Q. How long have you been sailing as chief?

9 A. I believe first time I sailed chief was back when I worked
10 for inland. I did a little bit of relief work. That would've
11 been in the late '90s. And I was -- ever since then I've sailed
12 chief.

13 Q. For 20 plus years as a chief engineer?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. So in familiarity with -- since you've been with Grand River,
16 what different ships have you been assigned to with Grand River?

17 A. Just the Mariner is the only ship I've been on.

18 Q. And all of your time on board the Mariner has been with -- as
19 chief engineer?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. You said you had about nine-and-a-half years with Inland
22 Steel or Central Logistics.

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Go ahead.

25 A. No, I said that's correct. Yes.

1 Q. Sorry. I got a little bit of overage. So on the class of
2 vessels similar to the Mariner or on lakers, how much time would
3 you say that you have?

4 A. Well, the whole nine-and-a-half years I sailed for Inland
5 Steel, I sailed on lakers. One of the -- they had three different
6 ships that I sailed on. Two of them were steam ships. One was
7 the Wilfred Sykes that's still in use today, still in service.
8 The (indiscernible) which is right there in Superior. I think
9 they may be fitting it out but -- and then I was on the Joseph
10 Block which is a very -- almost identical ship to the Mariner.

11 And I don't know -- I wouldn't be able to tell you how much
12 time I spent on each one because I moved around to upgrade my
13 license in both steam and diesel.

14 Q. So how long have you had steam and diesel?

15 A. The steam and diesel license or chief's license?

16 Q. The steam and diesel.

17 A. Steam and diesel, I graduated from Maine Maritime. And I've
18 upgraded both licenses or ratings each time that I've upgraded.

19 Q. So familiarity with the American Mariner, very familiar?

20 A. Yes. With that style of ship and yes, with the Mariner since
21 I've been on it. It's -- I'm very comfortable with it.

22 Q. In your own words, can you please walk me through from the
23 time you came on watch on January 7th, through your trip over to
24 Whitefish, and just generally the casualty that occurred and what
25 kind of things that you witnessed and did the troubleshoot?

1 A. I mean, I'll -- essentially, my written statement is to the
2 best of my knowledge or memory of how it went down. I was on
3 watch because we were leaving port. So I was down there on watch.
4 The second assistant was just finishing up his watch. First
5 assistant was coming on watch. And like I say, we were already --
6 we had left the dock and were getting underway.

7 I was doing some stuff on the computer. And the first and
8 second assistant were standing by the ballast control board and
9 they were doing a turnover because there was still a little bit of
10 ballasting going on, just topping off, I think, some of the tanks.

11 And we felt a movement of the ship and at the time I hadn't
12 looked outside. So I thought maybe we might have bumped some
13 ices. When there's ice up there, it's -- that's common to feel
14 movement of the ship bumping or whatever. So at first, I -- my
15 assumption was we just bumped some ice.

16 And then, as the guys were talking about the tank levels, I
17 think it was -- I first asked him, you know, what level should the
18 sixes be at. And Mike said well, he had topped them to, I
19 believe, it was 25 (indiscernible) well, there's not 25 in the six
20 port. And again, they were just talking. And I don't know the
21 time-wise how long it was before he said well, it looks like the
22 level is dropping. I believe it was the first assistant said
23 looks like the level is dropping.

24 And when I heard that, I got up on over to where the -- to
25 see what -- if there was a problem or what's going on. And it

1 appeared to be dropping. The first grabbed the phone and called
2 the pilothouse. I was not -- I couldn't hear the conversation
3 because the engine room is loud.

4 But afterwards, he said I asked the captain if he could have
5 possibly bumped or hit bottom or something. And he said -- and
6 this is secondhand because I'm just getting it from him.
7 Something -- the captain essentially said why do you think that or
8 something along that lines is what he relayed to me.

9 So he explained that we -- I think we were losing water in
10 the tank. And that -- I said well, let's do a check on a few
11 things to make sure we don't have any flooding if that's the case.
12 And verify that it's not a gauge problem because you're relying on
13 gauges to give you the depths at that -- the tank levels.

14 We sent -- I forget now. I have to look. But one of them
15 went down in the tunnel to make sure there was no flooding. He
16 didn't see anything. I think the first went down. And then, I
17 asked Mike to verify by sounding the tanks with the sounding tape.
18 And he verified we were -- the readings were right and that we had
19 lost water.

20 I talked to the captain briefly. Just explaining to him what
21 we thought. That we had a ruptured tank and that we were going to
22 perform a couple of tests. But we didn't see any indication of
23 flooding into the vessel where -- in the tunnel area. We also
24 went back down and checked the double bottoms of the -- because we
25 don't have gauges on those.

1 So we checked the double bottom spaces to make sure we
2 weren't gaining water in there and we weren't. And we just
3 started doing some pumping first to see if it would hold water and
4 it didn't. Then we tried pumping the water down to see if we
5 could empty the tank. If it was a small puncture or something, we
6 could have emptied the tank and verify it or something like that.
7 But we couldn't get the tank level down past, I think it was 16
8 foot 8, I think it was.

9 Then at that point, the water pressure was putting it in as
10 fast as we could take it out. So we just let it equalize and
11 leveled the -- kept the ship trim level by putting the same amount
12 of water in the (indiscernible) tank. And that's pretty much it
13 from there. I mean, we notified the captain of what we found out
14 and we definitely had some sort of leak in the tank.

15 Q. So you mentioned when you were getting underway that you were
16 -- that the first and the second may have been finishing up
17 ballasting operations. Is that correct?

18 A. Yeah, they were just topping up the last couple of feet or
19 whatever it was in a couple of the tanks.

20 Q. And how do you get those ballast tank levels -- who gives you
21 those ballast tank levels that you need to accomplish?

22 A. The mate usually is the one that calls down and tells us how
23 much he wants in each tank or he'll say a standard ballast which
24 we have a chart that tells us how much you're going to put in for
25 a standard ballast or a heavy weather ballast. Couple of

1 different variances there. But the mate calls that down.

2 Q. And is that coming from the captain, the ordered ballast for
3 departure?

4 A. I wouldn't know if the captain orders that or if the mate
5 makes that decision. You'd have to ask him.

6 Q. So what time did you arrive in the engine room?

7 A. I had been down there for, I don't know, 30 minutes or more
8 while we were -- because I don't know the exact time I went down.
9 I'd have to -- well, I can't look from here. But --

10 Q. Yeah.

11 A. I get called when we -- about 30 minutes before we're getting
12 ready to leave the dock and I go down. So I'm down there the
13 whole time that they're leaving the dock and getting underway.

14 Q. So roughly, like 7:00 or something like that, you were down
15 there. And that's required for departure? Is that right?

16 A. Yeah. For coming in and out of ports and certain -- in the
17 rivers. Where you -- maneuvering and stuff.

18 Q. So that morning, do you remember what equipment was ordered
19 online?

20 A. Well, the both engines were both online. We had three
21 generators online. Because we run three generators for the
22 operation of the thrusters. We can -- the ship can operate on one
23 generator if there's just normal underway traveling. But the
24 power load required to run both the electric thruster, the stern
25 and bow thruster, that takes three generators. So we had the

1 three generators that we had operated (indiscernible) online.

2 Q. And both the bow and stern thruster were operational and
3 online?

4 A. I couldn't tell you for sure. I don't remember if the
5 captain had secured them yet or not. I don't remember. But they
6 had been operating when we left the port.

7 Q. So when you came off of the dock, the bow and stern thruster
8 were both operational.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Is that something that you would log in your engineering log?

11 A. Yeah, they'll often -- yes, often will log thrusters online
12 and then thrusters secured.

13 Q. Can you tell when those thrusters are operating other than
14 the change in electrical demand? Can you -- is there anything
15 that would indicate whether the thrusters were operating or not?

16 A. Well, you have meters, electric meter for each thruster that
17 monitors the electrical load. The stern one is located -- the
18 motor for it is located right there in the engine room so you know
19 when that's running because you can hear it. The bow thruster you
20 can't hear from the engine room, of course, so you watch your
21 electrical meter.

22 Q. And so when you were outbound, there were a few turns which
23 were made. Could you hear the stern thruster operating throughout
24 the outbound transit?

25 A. You can hear it operating. I --

1 Q. (Indiscernible).

2 A. It's one of those noises as an engineer, you hear it so much
3 when you're operating, you're not focused on exactly when he's
4 thrusting, when he isn't thrusting, other than watching your
5 electrical load and the watch engineer is usually watching that
6 closely. More than I would be doing.

7 Q. Right. So is it typical to be continuing ballast operations
8 while you're departing the port?

9 A. Sometimes -- yeah, sometimes you're just topping off a little
10 bit. You still have another foot or two or something to go in one
11 or two tanks. Something like that. But you don't usually -- I
12 mean, you wouldn't leave port unless you were safely ballasted.
13 So I don't know what else to say. Just a little bit left to go,
14 something like that. You can't --

15 Q. So if you were still ballasting while you were departing,
16 could that change your draft levels (indiscernible) aft?

17 A. By -- yes, it of course would change it a little bit.

18 Q. Do you know if drafts were recorded for aft and mid-ship
19 prior to departure?

20 A. That's not something that we generally do. That's done by
21 the mate.

22 Q. So that's deck side?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. So in your statement, you mentioned there was a period of
25 time during the transit somewhere around when the ship -- after

1 the ship had shuddered where the engines were revved up and you
2 didn't appear to be moving. Do you recall that --

3 A. Yes, I -- that was -- like I say, right around the time the
4 ship shuddered that -- I think it was the second assistant said
5 well, we're -- the engines are revved up but we're not -- we don't
6 appear to be moving.

7 We have a screen down there that reflects the ship's speed,
8 position, and stuff like that. And -- but right about the time he
9 said that it wasn't just a few seconds later, he goes, oh, there
10 we go; we're moving. And that's about the time that I -- that's
11 about the time I assumed that we maybe had bumped some ice at that
12 point.

13 Q. But you weren't -- so with that shudder you described, that
14 was -- was that a feeling or anything additional? Did you hear
15 anything?

16 A. No, I didn't hear -- there was no noises that we heard or
17 that I heard down there.

18 Q. So within the -- while the engines were revved up, did you
19 notice what the RPMs were?

20 A. I didn't take notice at that point yet. It's not unusual for
21 the engine -- they weren't like revved up more than you would
22 normal rev leaving a port. It was just a normal -- as you're
23 trying to get underway and build up some speed, it brought up
24 (indiscernible) but normally, you start moving some. I think that
25 was what he was -- I believe that's what he was referring to was

1 we had brought the -- the captain had brought the engine speeds up
2 but we didn't seem to be moving.

3 Q. And where is the listometer within the control room or the
4 engine room?

5 A. The listometer -- it -- well, right on the ballast board is
6 where we read the list. The lights. The green or red lights and
7 the white light for center.

8 Q. At any time during that outbound transit, were there some
9 discussion over the listometer lights?

10 A. Yeah. There was -- that was brought up at the point where --
11 somewhere where we noticed that the tank levels were off. Again,
12 the first and second were standing there in front of the board
13 which would be partially blocked from my view by them when I'm at
14 the desk. But they were discussing, at that time, the lights and
15 the board because of -- that's when they noticed the variance in
16 the number six port level.

17 Q. So would that time that they were having that discussion, was
18 that at the time of the shudder or shortly thereafter on that
19 outbound transit? Do you recall?

20 A. I couldn't tell you. It -- all that happened that within
21 just a couple of minutes of each other as far as the shudder and
22 them talking and -- it was -- again, I --

23 Q. What -- was it before you had sent the first to the tunnel
24 and the second up on deck to where that listometer was -- it
25 sounds like it went double green and then double red.

1 A. I didn't see that.

2 Q. At any time while you were down in the engine room, did you
3 witness the mate come down to the engine room?

4 A. I'm trying to think. I don't remember. I don't recall.

5 Q. When you sent the first assistant to the tunnel, and what was
6 the report that he gave when he came back, or did he call you on
7 the radio?

8 A. I believe it -- I believe it was when he came back. He said
9 there was no signs of any flooding in the tunnel.

10 Q. And the second assistant engineer, did he call you or did he
11 come back to the engine room with his report from south side?

12 A. Again, I don't remember exactly. I just remember getting the
13 report.

14 Q. And that report -- was that in relation to the tank levels to
15 the king-gage?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. And what was the report that was given?

18 A. That the level that he found was in line with the level that
19 we were reading on the gauges.

20 Q. So at that point, you dispatched someone to check the double
21 bottoms. Is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And who ended up checking the double bottoms?

24 A. I believe Mike and I both went down. We went down -- we went
25 down more than once but the very first time, Mike and I went down.

1 Q. And what were your --

2 A. And then I had --

3 (Crosstalk)

4 A. No leakage there found. But I wanted to be cautious so I
5 know I had him go down probably Mike by himself with the first. I
6 can't remember which one went down again though and checked a
7 little later to make sure nothing had changed.

8 Q. And what relation to the double bottoms to the six port and
9 starboard tanks, where would that tie in?

10 A. The --

11 Q. What were you ruling out?

12 A. -- double bottom is -- I was ruling out a puncture further --
13 the ballast tank -- I'd have to look in the drawings but they're a
14 certain width, we'll say, of the ship. They're from the --
15 essentially the side of the tunnel out to the side of the ship.
16 And then they go down all the way to the bottom of the ship in
17 that area. But then the tunnel -- the width of the tunnel has
18 separate tanks underneath it that go -- they're probably like
19 three-foot roughly. Three-foot deep.

20 And those are a void that -- they're not used for ballasts or
21 anything. It's -- I guess probably for safety so I got an extra
22 -- if you had a puncture in one of them, the water would only come
23 up to the bottom of the tunnel we'll say. Whereas a puncture in
24 the ballast tank, it's able to fill the whole side if it was bad
25 enough. I don't know how else -- double bottom is just exactly

1 that. It's a false -- or a void in between the bottom of the
2 tunnel and the bottom of the ship.

3 Q. So it shares that inboard bulkhead with the ballast tank.
4 Would that be correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And that being dry led you to believe that any damage to the
7 ballast tank would have been within the tank itself?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. So after you had confirmed the soundings within the ballast
10 tank and verified the king-gage was essentially reading the same
11 or similar to what you had within the ballast tank, did you make
12 any notifications to the bridge or the captain?

13 A. Yes, I notified the captain that we had confirmed or verified
14 the soundings were correct and that we or that I felt that we had
15 some sort of a breach in that tank.

16 Q. What was the captain's response?

17 A. I -- only thing I can remember is he's like, oh, that's not
18 good. Let me know -- keep an eye on it, let me know if it gets
19 worse and if you find out anything else. Along that lines.
20 That's not verbatim but that's in the general sense of what he was
21 speaking.

22 Q. Was there any discussion as to whether the vessel had run
23 aground or not?

24 A. I don't recall personally -- I mean, we -- I guess it was
25 just assumed that we had hit something. I don't remember him or I

1 saying anything specific other than we have a breach there.

2 Somehow, we punctured a tank.

3 Q. And was there any discussion at that point when you had
4 determined or believed that you had the tank punctured, was there
5 any discussion as to what actions were next or should you continue
6 transit or et cetera?

7 A. Captain said he was going to speak with -- I believe he said
8 he was going to call the office or someone and follow up as to
9 what -- how to proceed. I know that we said we would keep -- I
10 told him we would keep an eye on it and make sure it was -- that
11 we didn't think anything was getting worse. It was quite
12 manageable at that point -- the way it was, it was manageable as
13 far as the amount of water because it would just equalize and that
14 was it.

15 We weren't gaining any other -- or losing in any other tanks.
16 So that it -- the amount of damage it was hard -- you are just
17 guessing because you don't -- you can't see it. But it seemed
18 like whatever damage there was it wasn't indicating any immediate
19 catastrophic threat.

20 Q. So given -- so at some point, did you use multiple ballast
21 pumps in an attempt to dewater or bring that water level down?

22 A. We did. We tried just pumping it with one pump. There's two
23 pumps. And we tried pumping it with one pump on the port tank and
24 one pump on the starboard -- just the number sixes were the only
25 ones we were doing. And we did it evenly to keep the ship

1 ballast. So we tried -- once -- We initially tried to just pump
2 that tank up to keep the ship trim. But then, every time we shut
3 the pump off, the levels started dropping.

4 So then we thought well, we'll try pumping them down
5 together. And we were pumping one pump on each side. And we got
6 to the point where we couldn't go any further. We couldn't get
7 number six port to come down any further with one pump.

8 So we secured the pump to the starboard side and lined it up
9 to help pump on the port tank to see if we could pull it down
10 using two pumps. And that's where we got to the -- I believe it
11 was 16 foot .8 and it just held there.

12 Q. And so the fact that that -- using two ballast pumps and you
13 were unable to make any progress with deballasting or -- it would
14 simply find its level. Did that indicate any level of damage to
15 the vessel?

16 A. Just to that -- it just indicates that the hole is -- you
17 know, I'm not -- I don't know how to calculate how fast that water
18 was coming in but it would indicate that -- like I say, you would
19 assume it had a decent sized hole in it but if it was a gigantic
20 hole or whatever, you wouldn't even be able to bring it down with
21 the pumps at all. So I couldn't estimate how big it was now.

22 Q. At any point, did you have any concern with regard to
23 structural failure or anything like that?

24 A. Personally, no. I felt that whatever damage was done it
25 seemed confined to that tank. It's not -- I don't know how to say

1 it. I was on a similar ship many years ago and they punched a
2 hole in the bow so it's not the first time I've been on a ship
3 that something -- the ship had hit something. And at that time,
4 we were loaded and we ended up proceeding after permission from
5 the Coast Guard. No, I -- just to answer it, I didn't feel that
6 it was unsafe unless we were told not to proceed.

7 Q. So within the vessel's safety management system, it discusses
8 ballast verification and entry when minimum ballast taken on for
9 safety of port departure. Can you explain that or was this one of
10 those instances?

11 A. Well, to my -- the mate is aware of how much water is in the
12 boat. And they manage the drafts and the -- what ballast to put
13 in where. If -- unless we were sitting unusually high in the
14 water or anything, I didn't have -- feel there was a reason to
15 question it. We weren't -- they were almost done. There was very
16 little water left to be put in. It was close to the normal
17 ballast that it didn't seem unusual.

18 Q. So the ballast that you had was fairly close to your normal
19 ballast plan?

20 A. Correct. It wasn't like there was a lot left to go. There
21 was very little.

22 Q. So at any time was there a hazard or risk assessment
23 completed by you and the captain prior to getting underway?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Does that ever happen? Do you meet with the captain and

1 discuss any sort of risk based on available personnel, time of
2 day, weather, et cetera?

3 A. You know, occasionally if -- he might call down and he may
4 verify the -- he may say did you put heavy ballast in if he was
5 wanting heavy ballast or something like that. Or if he -- if say
6 we had been working on something, he might call down and say was
7 that repaired or is that -- are we ready to go or things like
8 that, that type of thing.

9 Q. So -- I guess do you have any meetings prior to entering a
10 port or prior to getting underway where you would look at team
11 selection, you would look at any weather or hazards and look at
12 mitigation areas or aggravating factors?

13 A. No, we don't have a meeting per se. If he has -- if he wants
14 to make aware of -- because he gets the weather reports, he might
15 say we're expecting some weather later on or when we get out past
16 a certain point. So make sure things are secure or things like
17 that but it's not a sit-down type of meeting.

18 Q. So were any of your engineers involved in the workboat
19 recovery or launch?

20 A. No. Not that I was made aware of. Those two guys were right
21 there with me when this happened. I am not aware of anybody being
22 asked to work on the workboat or get it in or anything.

23 Q. So were you aware when the workboat was stowed or is there
24 any equipment that needs to be turned off or anything like that?

25 A. I don't handle that. They take care of it. So I'm not aware

1 of what they did after that.

2 Q. So are there any times when the off-watch crew who may be
3 sleeping would get up for restricted waters, mooring, or to get
4 under way?

5 A. I'm not -- I don't follow that -- as far as down in the
6 engine room, I would get called if it was going to go to anchor or
7 something like that. And for -- especially maneuvering in and out
8 of port. I'm always down there. Or restricted waters, I'm down
9 there. But --

10 Q. But you're not --

11 A. I don't know what the deck (indiscernible).

12 Q. Right, right. Are you on a regular watch routine, Chief?

13 A. No.

14 Q. You're just --

15 A. No.

16 (Crosstalk)

17 Q. As needed?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. At approximately 7:40, there was an entry made in the
20 engineering logbook that the vessel appears to have scrubbed
21 bottom putting a hole in the number six port tank. Captain and
22 chief engineer notified shoreside. Do you know who made the
23 entry?

24 A. That probably was the first assistant. He would've been on
25 watch.

1 Q. And at 7:40, was that -- that determination was made that
2 there was damage and you had likely ran aground or grounded on the
3 way out?

4 A. That was what we -- that's what we assumed. Yes.

5 Q. And it mentions, captain and chief engineer notified
6 shoreside. Who did you notify?

7 A. I did not notify. That was -- the captain handled that. The
8 first engineer wrote that but I did not call anyone because I know
9 the captain was doing it. So I don't know how many phone calls
10 the office would need.

11 Q. Did you contact -- who was the first person you contacted
12 after the event?

13 A. Captain is the first person I spoke to other than the guys
14 and the two engineers on watch.

15 Q. What about shoreside support?

16 A. When we were underway, I'm trying to think -- I think
17 Mr. Peterson would've been the first person I spoke with about
18 that.

19 Q. Do you recall when you spoke to Mr. Peterson?

20 A. When --

21 Q. Was it during the incident?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Go ahead.

24 A. No. It would've been when he came to visit the vessel.

25 Q. Were any emails sent regarding the incident?

1 A. I'd have to look back in my email folder. At some point, I
2 know I talked to the -- or emailed the -- I believe I emailed the
3 vessel manager. I can't remember if I emailed him or called him.
4 Bob Lynn (ph.).

5 Q. Who is Vladimir Postnikov (ph.)?

6 A. Oh, Vladimir -- yes, he's the -- he's also one of the vessel
7 managers but -- yes, I did. I emailed Vladimir, too, I believe.
8 Yep.

9 Q. What was the -- do you remember the content of that email?

10 A. I think I just gave him a rough estimate of what we thought
11 happened. He asked me -- I'm trying to think. I believe he asked
12 me what happened or something to that effect. And I just gave him
13 a brief rundown of what I thought happened. I don't have a copy
14 of that email but it's in there.

15 Q. Did he give you any recommendations or actions to take?

16 A. I don't recall any.

17 Q. According to the Grand River ops and SMS manual, any
18 significant change in ballast tank levels shall be reported
19 immediately, an immediate calculation of estimated new drafts
20 shall be taken. Do you know if that was completed?

21 A. That would've been done by the deck department.

22 Q. That's within the engine room?

23 A. No, we don't do the drafts. Like I say, we verified the tank
24 level. That was it.

25 Q. So prior to the incident, Chief, you feel like you were well

1 rested?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And final -- so who completed the chemical testing onboard,
4 the alcohol --

5 A. Chemical?

6 Q. -- and the drug test?

7 A. (Indiscernible) on the bridge -- oh, first mate. First mate
8 did that.

9 Q. Did you take an alcohol and a drug test?

10 A. Took -- they took a urine sample. Yes.

11 Q. Did you do an alcohol test, as well?

12 A. You mean like a breathalyzer?

13 Q. Yeah.

14 A. No. There was no breathalyzer. No, no, no. Wait a minute.
15 Shoot. I'm forgetting stuff. There was a breathalyzer. What the
16 heck was that -- I'm trying to think if that was the first that
17 did them. Who did that? I think it was the first did that, too.
18 Yeah, there was one done.

19 MR. [REDACTED] All right. Chief, I really appreciate your
20 time. I'll open it up to additional questions from first NTSB and
21 the anyone else who has questions.

22 BY MR. MUISE:

23 Q. Good afternoon, Chief. My name is Marcel Muise. We're --
24 the NTSB is doing a parallel investigation with the Coast Guard in
25 this case just because of the dollar amount of the damage here. I

1 just have a couple of follow-ups. Are the engineers are there,
2 are they MEBA or some other organization?

3 A. MMP, master, mates, and pilots.

4 Q. Same as deck officers?

5 A. Yes.

6 MR. MUISE: That's the only question I had for you. Thank
7 you for all the detailed information and I do appreciate that.

8 MR. SPOTTS: This is Dave Spotts. I have some questions when
9 it's my turn.

10 MR. MUISE: Go ahead, Mr. Spotts.

11 BY MR. SPOTTS:

12 Q. Thank you. Chief, I'm Dave Spotts and I represent Captain
13 Layton in these proceedings. And first of all, congratulations,
14 Maine Maritime is a great school and I have a lot of respect for
15 their graduates. You mentioned in your answering the questions
16 that there's a standard order or a regular order for ballasting a
17 vessel at the time of departure after unloading, is that in
18 writing someplace?

19 A. Yes, it's posted in the engine room. There's a chart.

20 Q. Right. And that can be modified by the mate or the captain.
21 Is that true?

22 A. Sure. If they felt they wanted like a heavy draft or
23 sometimes if they wanted a little bit more than the standard, they
24 can tell us what they want.

25 Q. And they can also tell you that they want less. Is that

1 true?

2 A. They could tell us. I've never really seen them do that, I
3 guess.

4 Q. In this case, are you aware that the captain ordered number
5 seven tank to be reduced to five feet so that he could have less
6 draft on departure?

7 A. I don't recall. I don't recall if that was -- I'd have to go
8 back and look at the draft log.

9 Q. But reducing number seven tank from fifteen feet to five feet
10 would decrease the draft. Is that correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Were you present in the engine room when Mr. Besko called the
13 captain to inquire if he could begin pumping ballast in number
14 eight tank from 17 feet to 20 feet and number seven tank from five
15 feet to fifteen feet after departure?

16 A. I probably was because I was down there the whole time we
17 were departing.

18 Q. But did you hear Mr. Besko talk to the captain?

19 A. I don't recall hearing it. But I was on -- I was doing some
20 stuff on the computer. Probably putting in the fuel usage and
21 different things like that. And these guys have been doing -- our
22 engineers are pretty familiar with the plant and the depth of
23 doing things. So I'm not listening in -- tuned in, I should say,
24 with -- the engines are running. It's noisy. So I just don't
25 recall -- I'm not going to say I recall something I don't.

1 Q. Chief, I'm not picking on you if you don't remember hearing
2 it. I'm just trying to --

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. -- gather the facts of the call. Because -- do you know
5 whether the -- at the time of departure, the water level of tank
6 number seven was five feet?

7 A. I don't recall.

8 Q. But if the captain wanted to be safer and reduce the draft on
9 departure from this port, that would be a commendable thing to do
10 is to reduce the water level in number seven. Is that correct?

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. And Mr. Besko, fulfilling his responsibility to get the
13 vessel to regular draft, would communicate with the captain to
14 find out how soon he could start pumping to get to regular ballast
15 condition. True?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. Thank you --

18 A. We don't --

19 Q. -- very much for those --

20 A. I was going to say we don't add or subtract ballast without
21 direction from either the mate or the captain.

22 Q. Right. Is there some record of where the captain would've
23 made those orders about the five feet in number seven and -- I
24 think it's just a small difference in number eight. But do you
25 keep a record of those orders?

1 A. Standard procedure is to write down every order as it comes
2 down. What the order was, what time it was, when they started
3 pumping, when they stopped pumping. All that. That's standard.
4 There's a sheet there they keep right by the -- right on the
5 ballast control station. And then they're supposed to be
6 recording that.

7 Q. And if the water level in number seven was five feet just at
8 the time unloading was finished, is there a record of that?

9 A. There should be.

10 Q. If the captain agreed with Mr. Besko that he could start
11 adding water to number seven and number eight, how long would it
12 take to go from five feet to fifteen feet in number seven
13 considering that he has to line up the pumps and start pumping?
14 Number seven is a big tank. Correct?

15 A. Yeah, it's a good-size tank. Yes. I --

16 Q. So the answer --

17 A. -- couldn't --

18 Q. -- to the question is -- oh, I'm sorry. I don't mean to
19 interrupt you. Go ahead, Chief.

20 A. I couldn't give you an estimate because it would depend on
21 whether they were using one pump or two pumps. If a captain is
22 maneuvering with thrusters and we have a heavy load on the
23 electrical system, we'd probably use one pump because those are
24 big motors, big electric motors that drive those. We wouldn't
25 want to risk overloading the system. So we'd probably use one.

1 And so it varies whether you're using one pump or two pumps to
2 fill those tanks. Keep in mind, I haven't personally pumped those
3 tanks myself. It's not something the chief -- I've worked on --
4 filled in now and then. But to give you a time estimate is not
5 something I'm generally doing.

6 Q. But -- and I appreciate that. Thank you very much for your
7 limitation. But you would agree with me that it would take a
8 substantial amount of time to --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- take the vessel's water level from five to -- fifteen feet
11 in number seven tank.

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. It would've been well into the Sainte Marie's River.

14 Correct?

15 A. Yeah, we would be well off the dock. Yeah.

16 Q. Right. And at what time was regular ballast reached on this
17 vessel on this trip?

18 A. Again, you'd have to refer to the ballast sheet. I don't
19 have that.

20 Q. At what time did the captain order number six starboard tank
21 from 25 feet to 20 feet?

22 A. I -- you would have to look at the ballast sheet, sir. I
23 don't have that information.

24 Q. Did you make a recommendation to the captain in order to have
25 a balance in the vessel that number six starboard tank be reduced

1 to 20 feet?

2 A. I'm sure there was some discussion at some point. If we
3 didn't do that, we would've had a list.

4 Q. Right. It was a very prudent thing to do.

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. But you don't know -- this was well after you'd conducted
9 your investigation and you were trying to come up with a solution.
10 And one of the solutions was dealing with number six starboard
11 tank. Correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. But you don't know where you were in the river or you don't
14 know what time that was done?

15 A. No, I do not.

16 Q. Correct?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. When you talked about the speed when you were answering Mr.
19 [REDACTED]'s questions, is there any time that the vessel went
20 below 1.5 miles per hour in terms of its speed?

21 A. I don't know exactly the speed.

22 Q. When you said before that it appeared that the vessel
23 stopped, it could've been that it just slowed down. True?

24 A. It could've been. Yes.

25 MR. SPOTTS: Thank you so much, Chief. And thank you,

1 Mr. [REDACTED] but those are the only questions I have.

2 MR. [REDACTED] (Indiscernible).

3 MR. ZWICKER: [REDACTED] this is -- yes, I just have a few.

4 BY MR. ZWICKER:

5 Q. Chief, this is Adam Zwicker, the outside counsel for the
6 company Grand River. I just have a few lines of questioning for
7 you. When Mr. [REDACTED] was questioning you, I think at one
8 point he asked if he and the captain talked about doing a risk
9 assessment or that kind of thing while you were getting underway
10 or before you were getting underway. And I wasn't clear on that.
11 I know you answered no, we didn't.

12 But I wasn't clear on whether the question referred to as you
13 were leaving the dock or after the bump and noticing number six
14 port losing water. So I guess, can you clarify that for me. Was
15 -- when you said no, we didn't do a risk assessment, was -- did
16 you do one before you guys left the dock?

17 A. There was no formal -- I don't know -- we didn't take a
18 spreadsheet and do a formal type of risk assessment. I mean, I
19 know the captain and I -- we spoke two or three times briefly.
20 But we were running around trying to verify things and stuff. So
21 my memory is a little cloudy but I know we spoke about whether --
22 briefly whether we thought there was any concern for danger or
23 whatever.

24 And I'm sure I told him that from my point of view, I didn't
25 see any reason to be -- I didn't feel there was any extreme

1 danger. But he -- like I say, he was going to -- he handled
2 contacting the company and Coast Guard and all that. So I was not
3 part of that conversation afterwards.

4 Q. Just -- and just, I guess, kind of listen to my question
5 here. And I'm trying to focus in -- the answer that you just gave
6 when you were talking about speaking with the captain about danger
7 and that kind of thing and you guys were running around, are you
8 referring to your actions and the engineering department actions
9 after you guys felt the bump and noticed six port losing water?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And just to kind of recap, you guys took soundings of the
12 tanks after you felt the bump and noticed the loss of water.

13 Correct?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. And at a certain point when you figured out or you came to
16 the belief that there was a hole in the tank, six port tank, you
17 were trying to pump water to other tanks to make sure the vessel
18 wouldn't list. Is that fair?

19 A. We took some out of just the number six starboard to keep the
20 ship level. Yes.

21 Q. And that's a poorly-phrased question on my part. You were
22 shifting water -- either putting into various tanks or taking out
23 of various tanks to make sure that the vessel would not list. Is
24 that a fair question or a fair thing to say?

25 A. Not various tanks. If I -- once the ballast that had been

1 called for was breached, the only tanks we did anything with was
2 six port and six starboard. Trying to adjust the -- just to keep
3 us level.

4 Q. But after you noticed the bump and the loss of water in six
5 port, when you were adjusting the levels in six port and six
6 starboard, that was done with an eye, you know, to keep the vessel
7 from listing. Is that fair?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you also checked the double bottom, as well. Correct?
10 You and your department.

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Was all that done not only just to figure out what was going
13 on and why you couldn't either pump the six port down or it
14 wouldn't hold water? Was that also done, all those things, to
15 assess whether or not there was any danger or outsize risk of
16 danger to the vessel?

17 A. Correct. It was -- yes.

18 Q. And while you and your department were doing that, were you
19 also being assisted by various personnel from the deck department?

20 A. I don't remember them going down there but I wasn't in charge
21 of them. Whether they took -- if the captain or somebody went
22 down there, I don't know. I was just -- my guys that I was
23 keeping track of.

24 Q. And while this assessment was going on, were you staying in
25 contact with the captain?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So understanding that you guys didn't sit down with a
3 spreadsheet and calculate anything about ingress or egress of
4 water, would you say that you were assessing the risk to the
5 vessel as part of this process after you felt the bump and noticed
6 the loss of water in six port, six --

7 A. Yes.

8 (Crosstalk)

9 Q. Thank you. So in that sense, you guys did do a risk
10 assessment after the bump. Is that fair?

11 A. Yes, it is.

12 Q. I just wanted to clarify that. This entire process where
13 you're engaging in, I'll call it the investigation and the risk
14 assessment to the vessel, can you give us an estimate of how long
15 it took in terms of time? Was it minutes, an hour, a couple
16 hours, longer, shorter?

17 A. Well, maybe within an hour we had done most of the assessment
18 as far as pumping water in and out of six trying to see if it
19 would hold water first and then see if we could pump it down
20 secondly. Checking the tunnel, checking the double bottoms. We
21 even went up with the second assistant on deck. We popped the
22 vent covers.

23 You have pipes that are vents for the tank. They're probably
24 -- I don't know. A foot or so in diameter, a round pipe. We
25 popped the vent covers off and tried to look down in to see if we

1 could see water movement. Like if there was a huge hole and you
2 could water sloshing in and out or something. We didn't see any
3 indication of that.

4 So I mean, that went on -- that was pretty specific things
5 being done right away to find out -- to assess would be a good
6 term. To assess how bad of a hole might be there. But even after
7 that, for two to three hours after that, I would have somebody
8 just reverify the double bottoms for safety precaution sake. And
9 we kept a close eye, of course, on all the tanks to see if we had
10 any other leaking and there was no other indication of other tanks
11 leaking.

12 Q. Can you give us -- I know you just said every couple hours or
13 two or three hours, you would ask your crew or your personnel to
14 check the double bottom again. But that initial assessment, can
15 you give us an estimate -- if you can, you can. If you can't, you
16 can't, and I'm not trying to trip you up or --

17 A. Right.

18 Q. -- pick on you or anything. But can you give us an estimate
19 of how much time that took?

20 A. Forty-five minutes that we spent overall doing the -- pumping
21 the water up and down the level and things like that. Maybe 45
22 minutes if that.

23 Q. Does that amount of time include popping the covers off the
24 tanks on the deck all that and manually sounding everything?

25 A. I would say it covers most of that. Yes.

1 Q. Are you -- Chief, as you join us here today, are you on a
2 telephone or are you in front of your computer?

3 A. I'm on a telephone. I have a computer.

4 Q. I was just wondering because I was going to -- I know that
5 Mr. ██████████ referenced an email that you sent to Vladimir with
6 the company. I was just going to show it to you on the screen if
7 you could confirm --

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. -- this is what you're talking about. But yeah, I can't
10 share my screen with you if you're on the phone so it's okay.

11 A. No. You could email it to me if you want me to verify it.

12 MR. ZWICKER: Well, I don't know if I'm going to hold up the
13 proceedings here today to do that. So let me check my notes here.

14 MR. SPOTTS: Adam, can I go ahead? I had two questions while
15 you're checking your notes.

16 MR. ZWICKER: Yeah, go ahead, David.

17 MR. MILLER: Now that you mention the email again, I'm pretty
18 sure I put Mr. Peterson on that email, too.

19 MR. ZWICKER: Well, David, just let me -- if I could ask him
20 just --

21 MR. SPOTTS: Yeah, go ahead. Sorry. No, go ahead.

22 BY MR. ZWICKER:

23 Q. Chief, I understand I can't show you my screen but I'm
24 looking at an email that's timestamped 9:31 a.m. Does not give
25 the time zone that it's timestamped. On Saturday, January 7th,

1 2023, from -- and it says from American Mariner, Chief, to
2 Vladimir American -- and then it's cc'ed, American Mariner
3 Captain, Daniel Hutchinson, Brian Peterson, and Donald Ray Tanner
4 (ph.). And then an A.J. Brouss, B-r-o-u-s-s. And the subject --
5 I'm sorry, go ahead.

6 A. No, that's right. That would be correct. I'd forgotten who
7 all I had put on there but yes, it's correct. The other gentleman
8 and the other chief engineer, I just wanted him to be aware of
9 what was going on.

10 Q. The subject is possible hole in number six port ballast tank.
11 And then in general, it talks about the belief that you poked a
12 hole leaving -- in the number six port tank leaving Sawmill Bay.
13 And then it kind of -- the last -- second to last paragraph,
14 there's a one-line sentence that says levels in the other tanks
15 appear stable so no additional concerns at this time. Does that
16 kind of comport with your recollection of the email that you sent
17 to Vladimir?

18 A. It does.

19 Q. Now, you -- Mr. [REDACTED] asked you a couple of questions
20 about whether or not -- I believe it was if you saw the first mate
21 in the engine room. Chief, again, this is only if you know. If
22 you don't, you don't. That's fine. I'm not insinuating that you
23 should know the answer to this. But the outboard motor for the
24 workboat, do you know where it is stored in the engine room?

25 A. Yes. They bring it -- yeah.

1 Q. When all -- in the moments shortly before you guys felt the
2 bump, where were you in the engine room?

3 A. I was in -- right at the control room at the desk in the
4 control room.

5 Q. Is the outboard motor stored somewhere in or near the control
6 room?

7 A. It's the next deck up.

8 Q. So if deck personnel were moving the outboard motor from the
9 top deck to its storage spot and you were in the control room,
10 would you necessarily see them putting the outboard motor away?

11 A. No.

12 Q. So you can't say one way or the other if Mr. -- well, scratch
13 that. Let me rephrase that. That's a bad question. Because you
14 wouldn't have seen them storing the outboard motor, you can't say
15 one way or the other if they were actually in the engine room
16 putting it away or not. Is that a fair thing to say?

17 A. It is.

18 MR. ZWICKER: I will pass the witness.

19 MR. SPOTTS: May I go again, Mr. [REDACTED] It's

20 [REDACTED] Spotts.

21 MR. [REDACTED] Of course. Go ahead, sir.

22 BY MR. SPOTTS:

23 Q. Chief, are you familiar with the letter of transit?

24 A. No, I'm not familiar with it. I assume it's a letter to
25 approve -- to continue on.

1 Q. And in this incident, did you have anything to do with the
2 letter of transit being sent to the United States Coast Guard?

3 A. No, I did not.

4 Q. But you were in constant consultation with the captain
5 regarding the condition of the vessel. True?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And that included a risk assessment for continuing the
8 voyage. True?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And at any time after you felt the bump, did you receive any
11 communication from the United States Coast Guard inquiring about
12 the condition of the vessel?

13 A. Not personally, no.

14 Q. Did someone under your command?

15 A. I assumed the captain but I don't know that.

16 Q. Well, you're not going to say the captain is under your
17 command. Are you, Chief?

18 A. No, no. Not under my command. No. But I'm just saying the
19 only person that would've got it that I know of would've been him.
20 But I don't know.

21 Q. But you don't know of any --

22 A. No, I --

23 Q. -- communication. True?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Right. So this -- and this includes you didn't get any

1 communication from the United States Coast Guard from the bump --

2 MR. [REDACTED] Mr. Spotts?

3 Q. -- until you were --

4 MR. [REDACTED] Mr. Spotts?

5 MR. SPOTTS: Yes, sir.

6 MR. [REDACTED] This is fact finding based on the grounding
7 of the vessel. Will you please keep your questions to the -- to
8 that line of questioning?

9 MR. MUISE: Well, I will disagree with that, Mr. [REDACTED]
10 In prior -- I'm sorry, the word is escaping me. Prior interviews
11 of other witnesses, you have indicated to us that the reporting of
12 this casualty is also part of this investigation. So I think to
13 arbitrarily limit lines of questioning only to striking of the
14 bottom or whatever else, why the hole was put in the vessel is
15 inappropriate given that there has been indication that the
16 reporting of the casualty is also part of this investigation.

17 MR. [REDACTED] I'll allow the line of questioning.

18 MR. SPOTTS: It's going to be very brief, Mr. [REDACTED] I
19 promise. It's just one more question and I won't beat it up, if
20 you know what I mean.

21 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

22 BY MR. SPOTTS:

23 Q. Chief, as far as getting any communication from the United
24 States Coast Guard after the bump, you did not receive any
25 communication until you were tied up at the shipyard. Is that

1 correct?

2 A. That would be -- yes, to the best of my knowledge, I do not
3 recall getting any.

4 Q. And you remained at the shipyard because you were going to do
5 the winter work. Is that correct?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. And when is the first time the Coast Guard ever approached
8 you about this incident?

9 A. I don't remember the date.

10 MR. [REDACTED] These questions are irrelevant with regard
11 to the chief engineer being contacted by the Coast Guard.

12 MR. SPOTTS: I'm finished. I don't want to offend you,

13 Mr. [REDACTED]

14 MR. [REDACTED] Anything else?

15 MR. ZWICKER: I just have one brief line of questioning.

16 MR. [REDACTED] Go ahead, sir.

17 BY MR. ZWICKER:

18 Q. Chief, I know that you indicated that -- to paraphrase --
19 that you would assume that the captain was in contact with the
20 Coast Guard about the condition of the vessel and proceeding on to
21 eventually Fraser Shipyards in Superior. Is that a good way to
22 paraphrase what you just spoke about?

23 A. Yes, that's -- would be a fair assessment. Yes.

24 Q. My specific question is -- and you may know the answer to
25 this, you may not. Did the captain ever tell you what the

1 contents of his conversations were with the Coast Guard about that
2 topic?

3 A. No. Not that I recall. No.

4 MR. MUISE: That's all. I'll pass the witness.

5 MR. [REDACTED] Are there any further questions?

6 MR. SPOTTS: I have none. Mr. Spotts.

7 MR. [REDACTED] Thank you. Marcel, I think that concludes
8 unless you have anything further.

9 MR. MUISE: I have nothing further.

10 MR. [REDACTED] Thank you so much, Chief. Appreciate your
11 time today.

12 MR. MILLER: Thank you.

13 MR. ZWICKER: Thank you.

14 MR. SPOTTS: Mr. [REDACTED] is there anything currently
15 scheduled?

16 MR. [REDACTED] Not currently, no. We'll be in touch.

17 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: GROUNDING OF BULK SHIP *AMERICAN
MARINER* IN SAULT STE MARIE,
ONTARIO, CANADA ON JANUARY 7, 2023
Interview of Gary Miller

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA23FM013

PLACE: via telephone

DATE: February 9, 2023

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Katie Leach
Transcriber



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

Chief Engineer G. Miller

Interview Transcript

Grounding of the M/V American Mariner
DCA23FM013

Page/ Line	Original	NTSB Correction
6/1	Mr. Muise	Mr. Zwicker
9/19	25 (indiscernible)	25 feet, he said
11/12	the (indiscernible) tank	the opposite tank
14/16	(indiscernible) aft	fore and aft
15/24	(indiscernible)	RPMs
17/11	south side	topside
27/7	(Indiscernible) on the bridge	Someone on the bridge
28/10	Mr. Muise	Mr. [REDACTED]
34/2	(Indiscernible)	Mr. Zwicker
43/9	Mr. Muise	Mr. Zwicker
45/4	Mr. Muise	Mr. Zwicker