

## **Internal Memorandum**

**Date:** 4 /23/2018

**To:** Captain Wayne Cochran, Director & Chief Pilot - ATL

From: Captain Daniel D. Hancock, ATL A-330 AIRBUS

Subject: II18-066 Flight Safety/NTSB - Engine Fire Event: DAL30 18-APR-18 ATL-ATL A-330-323

N806NW (3306)

CAP1: MILLER, J.A. (NYC); CAP2: HANCOCK, D.D. (ATL); FO1: MAKONNEN, I. (ATL);

FO2: PRENDERGAST, J.M. (ATL)

This statement is provided at the request of the ATL Chief Pilot's Office.

I was the Captain of DAL Flight 30 departing Atlanta for London on April 18, 2018. I was the pilot flying receiving a line check at my first six months in type.

Takeoff was on 26L for the PLMMR departure. Following gear up and between 500 to 1000 AGL I was anticipating the climb annunciation to continue the clean-up and adjust thrust, however, we received the ECAM message ENG FIRE 2 along with the associated warnings and cautions. We had no airframe vibrations or other felt indicators. Sometime during the first minute of the ECAM messages all of the non-normal messages disappeared for 2-3 seconds and then the ECAM returned to the engine fire and associated checklists for the remainder of the flight. The interruption caused me to consider the possibility that we were receiving false indications.

I transferred aircraft control to First Officer (F/O) Prendergast so I could run the ECAM checklists. I asked F/O Makonnen to declare an emergency and begin coordination with ATC, F/A's, Company and passengers. Captain Miller assisted with these tasks.

I waited for the F/O to get comfortable flying the aircraft and climbing us up and on vectors before we continued the checklists. We ran the engine fire checklist shutting down number 2 and discharged both fire bottles into the engine. The fire indication remained on for some time after that. We started the APU and reviewed the overweight landing procedure verifying all of our procedures with the QRH. We noted the overweight procedure recommended an autoland and we checked the landing distance required and selected MED autobrakes.

We then briefed the ILS 27R approach procedure and accomplished the descent & approach checklists while ATC vectored us for the approach. Based on the runway being CAT I we planned on the F/O landing the aircraft, but on final with stronger crosswinds than expected and the urgency of the fire we elected to perform an autoland. I took control of the aircraft and we landed on autopilot. The autobrakes were left on until about 40 kts and we stopped on the runway and set the parking brake.

We coordinated with the Fire Rescue team and operations from that point on. We told them we also had hot brakes and they said the engine was still smoking so they would work on extinguishing the engine first and then address the brakes. After a few minutes we recognized a single engine taxi was not an option, so we shut down number 1. Once the ground crews were assured the aircraft was safe they towed us to gate E12.

We deplaned the passengers normally onto the jetway.

I acknowledge release of this statement to <u>Delta Flight Safety</u> and the <u>National Transportation Safety</u> <u>Board (NTSB)</u>.

Regards,

Captain Daniel D. Hancock Employee # (Signature on file)