



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Investigative Hearing

Norfolk Southern Railway general merchandise freight train 32N
derailment with subsequent hazardous material release and fires,
in East Palestine, Ohio, on February 3, 2023

GROUP	G
EXHIBIT	
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Agency / Organization

NTSB

Title

**Interview Transcript – Charles
Day, Senior Project Manager,
Specialized Response Solutions,
March 1, 2023**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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NORFOLK SOUTHERN TRAIN DERAILMENT
IN EAST PALESTINE, OHIO
ON FEBRUARY 3, 2023

Accident No.: RRD23MR005

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Interview of: CHIP DAY, Senior Project Manager
Specialized Response Solutions

via Microsoft Teams

Wednesday,
March 1, 2023

APPEARANCES:

MARK DOUGHERTY, Hazardous Materials
Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

PAUL STANCIL, Senior Hazardous Materials
Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

PAUL CAREY, Retired Fire HAZMAT Chief
International Association of Firefighters

TERRY HEIDKAMP, Vice President
GATX Corporation

RON LAWLER, Senior Director Mechanical Services
Trinity Leasing

RANDY KELTZ, Manager of Tank Car Safety Programs
Federal Railroad Administration

ROBERT WOOD, System Manager Hazardous Materials
Norfolk Southern Railway

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:01 a.m.)

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3 MR. DOUGHERTY: Well, good morning. Today is March 1st,
4 2023. The time is 10:01 Eastern Time. This is a Microsoft Teams
5 interview that is being conducted in connection with the Norfolk
6 Southern Railway train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, on
7 February 3rd, 2023. The NTSB number is RRD23MR005. My name is
8 Mark Dougherty, that's D-o-u-g-h-e-r-t-y, and I'm a Hazardous
9 Materials Accident Investigator with the NTSB. This is an
10 interview of Mr. Chip Day of Specialized Response Solutions or
11 SRS.

12 And we'll now go around and do introductions. If you could
13 state your name, spelling of your last name, and company name and
14 position? And we'll start with Mr. Stancil.

15 MR. STANCIL: Yes, my name is Paul Stancil, spelled S-t-a-n-
16 c-i-l. I'm a Senior Hazardous Materials Accident Investigator
17 with the National Transportation Safety Board.

18 MR. DOUGHERTY: Chief Carey?

19 MR. CAREY: Good morning. My name is Paul Carey, last name
20 C-a-r-e-y. I'm a retired Boston Fire HAZMAT Chief. I'm here
21 representing the International Association of Firefighters.

22 MR. DOUGHERTY: Okay, great. Mr. Heidkamp?

23 MR. HEIDKAMP: Good morning. This is Terry Heidkamp, H-e-i-
24 d-k-a-m-p. I'm Vice President at GATX Corporation.

25 MR. DOUGHERTY: Thank you. And Mr. Lawler?

1 MR. LAWLER: Ron Lawler, L-a-w-l-e-r. Trinity Leasing,
2 Senior Director Mechanical Services.

3 MR. DOUGHERTY: Okay. Mr. Keltz?

4 MR. KELTZ: Yes, Randy Keltz, K-e-l-t-z. I'm FRA's Manager
5 of Tank Car Safety Programs.

6 MR. DOUGHERTY: Mr. Wood?

7 MR. WOOD: Robert Wood, W-o-o-d, System Manager Hazardous
8 Materials, Norfolk Southern Railway.

9 MR. DOUGHERTY: And Mr. Day?

10 MR. DAY: My name is Chip Day, last name D-a-y. Legal name
11 Charles Day. I'm the Senior Project Manager for Specialized
12 Response Solutions out of Fort Worth, Texas.

13 MR. DOUGHERTY: All right. Thank you for that.

14 So for the interview and recording, it is very important that
15 we all speak loudly and clearly.

16 BY MR. DOUGHERTY:

17 Q. Okay, Mr. Day, are you aware that this interview is being
18 recorded?

19 A. Yes, sir, I am.

20 Q. Okay. If any question is unclear or you don't understand the
21 question, please ask the questioner to clarify or restate the
22 question. And if you don't know the answer to any questions, it's
23 okay to tell us that you don't know. We don't want you to
24 speculate or if you don't know the answer to a question.

25 The sole purpose of this investigation is to improve safety,

1 not to assign fault, blame, or liability. Our mission is to
2 improve transportation safety and prevent accidents. As such, the
3 NTSB cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality, immunity from
4 any legal proceedings by any other agency, whether it's state,
5 local, or federal.

6 A transcript of this interview will be placed in the public
7 docket for this investigation, which will be available via the
8 NTSB website.

9 So, Mr. Day, just to start, first, I'd like to thank you for
10 agreeing to speak with us today and any information that you can
11 give us.

12 If we could start off if you could tell us about your
13 background, education, and expertise?

14 A. Okay. Again, I'm Chip Day, Senior Project Manager for
15 Specialized Response Solutions, a HAZMAT response organization
16 based in Fort Worth, Texas. Been in this business for coming up
17 on 42 years as commercial (indiscernible) response with a
18 background in fire service. I grew up in the fire service as a
19 volunteer, became a paid firefighter in Arlington, Texas for about
20 seven years, and the whole time I was still -- my dad and I
21 started our own emergency response company based in Keller, Texas,
22 back in '81. And I've always loved my chosen career path, and
23 firefighting just wasn't everything it was cracked up to be, so I
24 decided that I needed a little more excitement and became a -- got
25 into hazardous materials. And I've worked for several different

1 companies from owning my own business to working for some of the
2 fastest growing first response companies, always based in Fort
3 Worth or Houston, Texas. And that's pretty much it. I spent
4 almost ten years with Holcher (ph.) Services as a Senior Director
5 of Operations for their HAZMAT group and that's where I really got
6 into train wrecking and understanding the ins and outs and ups and
7 down of all that stuff. And that's it.

8 Q. All right, perfect. Thank you for that. And so what all
9 positions have you held with SRS?

10 A. With SRS I've always been a Senior Project Manager, a/k/a a
11 Response Manager.

12 Q. And can you repeat for how long have you been --

13 A. I've been with, I've been with SRS for five years, coming up
14 on six years in August.

15 Q. And so what are your duties as a Senior Project Manager for
16 SRS?

17 A. Emergency response projects as they come in. We've got a
18 large list of clients that rely on us for helping, assisting,
19 troubleshooting, HAZMAT incidents, containers, and providing both
20 internal and external training for tank car loaders, tank car
21 unloaders, responders, first responders, and planned response,
22 planned response teams.

23 Q. All right. And then so who do you currently report to?

24 A. I report to a gentleman named Bobby Breed, last name Breed,
25 B-r-e-e-d.

1 Q. Okay. All right, thank you. So if we could start -- if you
2 could explain what your role was in the East Palestine train
3 derailment?

4 A. I -- the times and stuff I'm kind of off on. But on Saturday
5 following the incident, obviously it was a, it was a big incident,
6 so I was watching it pretty closely, listening to what was going
7 on. I have a lot of friends in the industry that were calling,
8 going, hey, are you going to this thing? And I hadn't gotten any
9 calls -- I received a phone call -- I sent a text to
10 Mr. Schoendorfer with the NS and asking what was actually on fire,
11 and he replied back VCM. And within a minute or so, he called me
12 and said we need some -- we possibly need some assistance if
13 you're available in East Palestine. And he connected up Mr. Wood
14 with the NS and I. We spoke about the VCM that was on fire and
15 the -- what they were needing assistance-wise from SRS.

16 We put a -- put four guys on the road with our big response
17 truck heading to East Palestine, and then myself, Terry Rockwell
18 (ph.), and Kent Farcar (ph.), our Safety Officer, boarded a jet
19 and we flew to Pittsburgh.

20 We got there late, late, late Saturday night. We were told
21 to go to bed and be on site bright and early Sunday morning. We
22 arrived in East Palestine Sunday morning, went to the command
23 center for additional safety briefing, and met up with several
24 folks from the NS and then wound up going down to the site and
25 beginning a damage assessment of the VCM cars and the other cars

1 that were (indiscernible).

2 There was, there was a lot going on, so I don't remember all
3 the different things and different directions that we went. But
4 we started talking about what had been seen, what the responders
5 saw, what the SPSI guy saw, what the NS guys saw, and we started
6 formulating plans on beginning some offensive operations or
7 figuring out could we get in and do some offensive operations to
8 begin clearing the wreck and identifying loads versus empties and
9 such to start -- to really continue the initial response to the
10 derailment.

11 Once -- that just kind of went on throughout the day. Lots
12 of meetings, lots of discussions coming up with plans to present
13 to incident command because the incident command -- the state IMT
14 was coming in -- was being brought in to, I guess, start the true
15 incident command system for the city and all the resources that
16 were destined for it. So that's kind of what transpired on most
17 of Sunday.

18 Q. Okay. Anything else? How about into Monday?

19 A. Well, one of the things that we got -- we brought in when
20 Mr. Wood and I originally spoke with Mr. Schoendorfer -- we
21 were -- I was advised that some acrylates had been spilled,
22 unknown the volume, but butyl acrylate and ethylhexyl acrylate
23 were involved and we've got a material that is available at a
24 manufacturer in Houston that kills acrylates and helps neutralize
25 some of the odor. And we got that stuff blended and loaded and

1 shipped up to the SPSI warehouse in Washington, Pennsylvania. So
2 as the, you know, the day progressed, we were watching the fires
3 pretty closely. We studied the video that was caught on the PRD
4 that did operate for 70 minutes.

5 And just based on previous training with monomers and
6 polymers from the manufacturers of those two products, one of the
7 things that we all teach first responders is that you're dealing
8 with a stabilized product, being a monomer or polymer, i.e. vinyl
9 chloride monomer, styrene monomer, that if you -- if your PRD is
10 going off and it's cycling like it should, and then everything
11 stops, the PRDs stop operating, that is a really bad sign that
12 polymer could be being formed inside the tank if nothing has
13 changed on the outside. If you're not super cooling and taking
14 all the heat away, you can start forming polymers inside. Those
15 polymers can feed on themselves and exponentially increase
16 pressure and basically pop open the car if the PRD operates and
17 then stops.

18 So we looked very closely at the timeline between the
19 operating of the PRDs -- and I have my directions all messed up on
20 this incident for some reason. So there were four cars to the
21 west and there was one car to the east end. So we're watching the
22 lazy fires on the two cars to the west end and they were
23 operating -- I'm being told they were operating about every two
24 minutes for about 30 seconds. They relieve pressure, they reseal
25 (ph.), everything keep on going. They'd relieve pressure, they'd

1 reseat, and then keep on going.

2 And then I think, I think the timing was somewhere around six
3 hours the one that was cycling really, really well stopped
4 cycling. Some people think, hey, that's a really good sign.
5 Because nothing was done, the car wasn't in the clear, there
6 wasn't massive amounts of water applied, to a train response
7 manager that indicates that we've got problems. We could
8 seriously have a plugged PRD. When the PRD went off for 70
9 minutes, the response managers, Mr. Wood and Dave Schoendorfer,
10 both said we need some more help because this was becoming a lot
11 bigger incident.

12 So with that being said, we knew we were forming polymer --
13 we believed we were forming polymer in the cars, so the decision
14 was made to at least seriously entertain the idea, look at the
15 idea of venting and burning the VCM cars. The car to the -- the
16 individual car to the east, the single car to the east, was -- we
17 went in several times taking pressures, taking temperatures, doing
18 assessments. We found that the temperature in the eastern car,
19 because the jacket was well -- pretty well removed in a couple
20 areas, they could get contact thermometer temperatures of the
21 shell of the car and it was in the 100- to 130-degree range both
22 on the heads and the side. The temperature, at times, seemed to
23 be going up; at other times it was -- seemed like it was just kind
24 of maintaining.

25 So that led some discussion thinking that there's a

1 possibility that the hot ground was actually being absorbed by the
2 car. That's why it was in the 130 range and not much, much
3 higher. We still had some ground fires around that car, some
4 product fires on the back side of a hopper car, and we were, you
5 know, considering or thinking about possibly the plastic pellets,
6 PVC resin, whatever was in that covered hopper car, was acting as
7 a heat (indiscernible) transferring heat to the tank car.

8 There was some pretty short discussions but it happened
9 multiple times about could the individual car on the east end of
10 the derailment actually be empty or almost empty? Because the
11 fire had gone out I believe -- I don't know the exact time, but I
12 believe it had been out for probably around 12 to 18 hours. There
13 had been no fire in the protective housing.

14 The crew went up on -- one of the assessment crews went up on
15 the covered hopper car, got within a few feet of the protective
16 housing with a photo ionization device, and they were getting
17 elevated readings of VOCs. If I remember correctly, it was around
18 135 ppm of VOCs, which could have been almost anything because of
19 the acrylates and other organic materials that had been spilled
20 and burned, but 135. They couldn't hear any hissing or whistling,
21 but they did observe a lot of damage to the protective housing of
22 that individual car.

23 So we were starting to get into Monday night. You know,
24 crews were getting tired. So some of the fires in the plastic
25 pellet cars were dying down on the west end, so the decision was

1 made to start getting -- working through incident command, get
2 approval to start bringing some heavy equipment in to start
3 pulling, you know, the covered hopper cars off the west end, get
4 them into the clear so we could possibly upright and move one of
5 the VCM cars, the first car in line -- I don't know which car that
6 was -- the first one that was pretty much still perpendicular to
7 the tracks that we had been taking pressure readings on. We felt
8 that car was fairly stable, so we worked closely with the wrecking
9 contractor, pulled the, pulled the plastic pellet cars into the
10 clear, and we were sent to bed because it was getting, it was
11 getting late and we had been up in PPE for an extended period of
12 time. So the plan was we gave a good safety briefing to the
13 wrecking operations crews to clear the plastic pellet cars and, if
14 possible, upright and clear the first VCM car that is still
15 perpendicular to the tracks. So the -- we were sent to bed.

16 I got a phone call several hours later and they said that the
17 car, the first VCM car, was -- which they couldn't move it because
18 of -- they couldn't move that car because of damage to the bolster
19 assemblies on both sides of the car, so they chose to leave that
20 car in place for the next phase of the operation.

21 Previous to actually starting the train wrecking operation,
22 we had several meetings with incident command and we, as a -- I
23 guess if you want to call us a technical group -- myself, Drew
24 McCarty (ph.), Robert Wood, and several other folks agreed to then
25 burn what was going to be the chosen method for taking care of

1 these VCM cars because of the (indiscernible) nature of the
2 product and the reason -- and the PRDs had operated but had since
3 ceased operations.

4 So the phone call was made to Explosive Service International
5 in Baton Rouge. They had been notified early on in the incident
6 that it was going down and there was a possibility they were going
7 to be needed. So the call was placed to Jason Poe (ph.) and he
8 started gathering his supplies, and we planned on five cars
9 additionally. He brought enough material for -- to make six cars
10 if we had to or if we had a shot go bad.

11 So overnight they couldn't move the VCM car that was at 60
12 psi, so the decision was made to go ahead and take them all out at
13 the exact same time, take out the five VCM cars, and then there
14 was a lot of dirt work, a lot of prep work for ground to contain
15 the total volume of liquid in all five cars. The western cars we
16 had a pit that was about -- I think we measured it, figured it
17 about 158,000 gallons capacity. And the eastern car we channeled
18 it -- the product flow away from the car because there was
19 isobutylene car in somewhat close proximity. So we channeled it
20 to the drainage ditch and along the north edge of the derailment
21 and prepared for the vent and burn operation.

22 I'm going to hold right there because you probably have
23 questions.

24 Q. So just to clarify, what day did the vent and burn actually
25 happen?

1 A. Vent and burn, if my memory is correct, I believe it was
2 Monday. We got there on Saturday night, Sunday for prep, and the
3 vent and burn occurred, I believe, on Monday.

4 Q. Okay. So can we go into the discussion that led up to the
5 vent and burn? Were there other options aside from the, from the
6 vent and burn that were discussed?

7 A. So vent and burn is the final option. All the training
8 classes that I put on, that Explosive Service International puts
9 on, SCRTC (ph.) out at Pueblo puts on, vent and burn is the last
10 option. So there's basically re-rail, transfer, hot tap, followed
11 by vent and burn. Those are, kind of, the four top. You can
12 break each one of those down into individuals and stuff like that.
13 But vent and burn is not something we, as a response community, a
14 contractor community or HAZMAT specialist group, go at lightly.
15 It is literally the final option. We have no other options.
16 There's -- we've tried everything else and we can't. When you
17 look at a risk-based management structure, the risk that we were
18 going to expose was just to step back one step from the, from the
19 vent and burn; the hot tap.

20 The hot tap operation was underway. They were planned,
21 cocked, locked, and ready to go do the work when the PRD of
22 the -- of one of -- of the one car went off for 70 minutes. They
23 were planning on, they had the equipment on site, they had the
24 personnel on site. I heard Drew talking to his welder several
25 times during our assessment going, hey, just stand by; we may

1 still do this, we may still do this.

2 So transfer, we could have transferred it. Yeah, not a
3 problem. Transfer is one of the first options. Obviously, we
4 couldn't re-rail it because they were very heat-damaged. We had
5 two cars that were -- we had active lazy fires in the protective
6 housing. We had one that had a fire and went out. So now you
7 start -- you look at that and you go, okay, all the valves and
8 fittings, gaskets on those cars are heat-damaged, so we're not
9 going to be able to seal this stuff up. We're not going to be
10 able to seal up and facilitate a transfer.

11 VCM is a compressed flammable gas. A compressed flammable
12 gas -- this type of compressed flammable gas you can transfer by
13 pump, but the boiling point is so low that you're flashing at the
14 same time you're pumping, and you get a very, very slow transfer,
15 if at all. If everything was burned out in the protective
16 housing, there's no way you could actually have any kind of
17 pressure inside that car, so transfer is kicked out.

18 Another part of the transfer -- because you've got to have a
19 place to go with that material, transfer it into another vessel.
20 Now you have a un-stabilized material that you're going to put on
21 the road, on the railroad, and ship to another facility. Nobody's
22 going to take a potentially reactive, un-stabilized material, so
23 transfer is literally out the window.

24 Hot tap, hot tap is a transfer to a -- or pump to an open
25 pit. Great, fine and dandy. Great thought process. Let's go

1 through the steps: You've got to get down very, very low in the
2 liquid phase. These cars have been exposed to lots and lots of
3 heat for extended periods of time. We have active fires inside
4 the protective housing of a couple of the cars. We don't know
5 where the liquid level is in the car. So now we have to dig into
6 the ground, create an almost-confined space to allow the welder to
7 weld a fitting on the bottom of the car to allow us to tap through
8 to the inside and have an operational valve on the bottom of the
9 car at the lowest point. The volume of fire water, the volume of
10 flammable liquids that were released, we don't know what's there.
11 We -- if we don't have a fire at the west end and dig a hole,
12 throw somebody down in there to start welding, he strikes an arc
13 (ph.) and could light up the whole -- relight the entire
14 derailment site. We have running fires up and down the ballast
15 rock while we're walking around doing our assessment.

16 So now hot tap -- and one of the last steps of hot tap is
17 once you break through -- let's just say we're in the liquid
18 phase. You break through that car, we don't know what's on the
19 back side. Are we into polymer? Are we into something that's
20 going to be just like plastic? Is that going to plug the hole
21 bringing liquid out? Or are we going to get the hot tap machine
22 closed or caught inside with the polymer inside the car where we
23 couldn't break it loose? Now we have to put it -- make another
24 hot tap. All these steps, the risk is too great to individuals.
25 Now we've been through transfers -- or re-railing. We've been

1 through transfers. We've been through hot tapping. Now we're
2 literally at the final step which is a vent and burn.

3 Nobody in all the people that were on site wanted to do it,
4 but we all knew based off experience that this was, this was the
5 last step. This was the -- we had no other options available to
6 us.

7 Q. Okay. Well, I appreciate that information. So how many cars
8 were in question as far as the heat rising out of the VCM cars?
9 Were they all in question or was it --

10 A. The heat?

11 Q. Um-hmm.

12 A. Go ahead. I started to answer before you were finished the
13 question.

14 Q. So out of the VCM cars -- so let me ask -- let me kind of
15 rephrase this a little bit. Out of the five VCM cars, let's
16 start: Were they all venting from the PRDs?

17 A. I do not know if the PRDs operated on the two westernmost
18 cars initially. Once the operation was done, we had the cars in
19 the clear and we were actually able to get up and spend time on
20 all five of the cars. Yes, all the PRDs operated at some time.
21 The cars that were laid over on their side with the protective
22 housing down at the 2, 3, 4, 5 o'clock position, they all showed
23 evidence of the PRDs operating. The ones that we know that they
24 were laid over and the PRDs operated in the liquid phase, there
25 was a lot more heat damage to those cars than there was the cars

1 that were still somewhat upright like the easternmost cars.

2 So the -- we looked at the car that we knew had 60 psi on it,
3 on the west end, the first one that we seriously considered
4 getting into the clear so we only had to take out four cars rather
5 than five, after looking at the heat signature on the car, the
6 heat damage to that car, just based on risk, we didn't feel
7 comfortable saying we're going to take out these four and we'll
8 transfer this one, because there -- again, you're with a -- you've
9 got materials that if exposed to extremely high heat and based on
10 experience and based on training that we continuously do with
11 people in the monomer and polymer business, you've got PRDs
12 operating that are -- you've got material that is -- has been
13 exposed to elevated heat, so the potential for forming polymers is
14 greatly enhanced, if you will, so the decision was made that based
15 on damage we're not going to be able to ship this stuff down the
16 road so we might as well just -- we might as well, based on a risk
17 management scenario, vent and burn all five cars at one time.

18 Q. Okay. Do you know what the highest reading was on the
19 temperature readings when you were -- the car -- the highest
20 reading on any of the cars?

21 A. There were a lot of different heat guns used, temperature
22 guns used. We were never able to put a thermometer, a drop-in
23 thermometer down the thermometer well of any of those cars.
24 The -- we did a pretty detailed assessment of all of the -- all
25 the SRS guys, Drew's initial response team, and one other

1 gentleman from another response organization, we all went in at
2 different times to gather that information so that the highest
3 temperature I remember was somewhere in the 140-, 150-degree range
4 on the easternmost car. That temperature, over time, the first
5 night, was actually starting to go down, but it also started to
6 come back up the closer you got to the bottom, so it was still
7 absorbing heat from the, from the ground and from the covered
8 hopper car to the -- just west of it.

9 So I believe either an SPSI or incident command actually may
10 have the temperature readings, because I know it was -- that
11 information was gathered. But 140, 150 was the highest I remember
12 hearing.

13 Q. Okay. That was going to be one of my questions, if there is
14 a record or timeline somewhere of the temperature readings or
15 thermal imaging, if someone has it. Do you happen to have a copy
16 of those?

17 A. I do not.

18 MR. DOUGHERTY: Okay. All right. So let's open it up for
19 some questions, if we could. Let's start with Paul Stancil.

20 BY MR. STANCIL:

21 Q. Okay, sir, thank you very much for that detailed narrative as
22 to what you observed out there. I do have a couple more follow-up
23 questions about these VCM cars. First of all, when you say east
24 versus west cars, you mentioned the car that had the highest
25 temperature was in the eastern car or the western car?

1 A. The highest temperature that I remember hearing was on the
2 eastern car, the individual car, which is what we called car 5.

3 Q. Okay. So is that the east-west? So is west the direction
4 that the train was traveling or east the direction the train was
5 traveling? Do you know?

6 A. I can tell you that the one closest to the blue building, the
7 individual car closest to the blue building or Brave (ph.)
8 Industries was what we considered the fifth car. The two covered
9 hopper cars followed by four VCM cars is what I am considering --
10 that was right behind Leake Oil. That is the western car.

11 Q. Okay, okay. So for you, west was --

12 A. If I'm, if I'm turned --

13 Q. For you, west is the head of the train and east is the rear
14 of the train, correct?

15 A. Sure. I really don't know. I don't -- I know that north
16 side of the tracks -- if you're, if you're standing on Leake Oil
17 property looking at the derailment, directly across from you is
18 north. If you're on -- if you're at Leake Oil, you're on the
19 south side of the tracks. To the right would be what I'd consider
20 the west, and to the left would be considered east.

21 Q. Okay. I'm not sure, but I --

22 A. I've been screwed, I've been screwed up this entire
23 derailment on east and west.

24 Q. Okay. So when you're talking about the single car to itself,
25 that's the number 5 car, the fifth one, the fifth vinyl chloride

1 car back in the derailment, correct?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. Okay. I think we understand the meaning there. Some of us
4 are calling that the west side, but we'll continue with your
5 direction there for the purpose of this conversation.

6 When you -- you mentioned you did a damage assessment of the
7 vinyl chloride cars. Can you tell us a little bit more about
8 that? What exactly did you look at and what did you see?

9 A. Well, the assessment was the condition of the protective
10 housing because, you know, that would be our only way of getting
11 access to the product, and two of the five cars were still
12 actively burning. That was on the -- that was the pile of four.
13 The individual car that was still parallel with the tracks hooked
14 up to the -- or in close proximity to the two covered hopper cars
15 was -- the protective housing was in -- it was in okay condition
16 if it allowed us to install -- allowed SPSI to install a
17 (indiscernible) and pressure gauge to be able to monitor internal
18 pressure. And then the pressure, if my memory is correct,
19 internal pressure was somewhere in the 60 psi range. It may have
20 gotten up, you know, up into the 65, almost 70, but I remember the
21 60 psi range.

22 We were looking at -- obviously looking for jacket damage to
23 get temperatures to the -- of the shell, and several cars had some
24 decent-sized rips that we could pull insulation back and get up
25 against the shell. There weren't a lot of -- it didn't appear to

1 be a lot of dents, scores and gouges. Dents, yes. Scores and
2 gouges, not as much. But just the heat effect, the flame
3 impingement, if you will, to those tanks was significant. There
4 was some dents where the -- in between the second and third VCM
5 cars there was a pretty good V pattern, so we got a good,
6 broadside view of what we would -- I would consider car number 2
7 and 3. There was some significant denting around the bolster
8 assembly. The bolsters of pretty much all the cars were twisted
9 or bent away, so wrecking operations were going to be hampered
10 considerably if we were going to try to move those cars
11 whatsoever.

12 One of the other concerns that led us to finally choosing the
13 final option was just wrecking operations in general. It's not,
14 it's not finite. It's not gentle and easy, no matter how much
15 emphasis you put on equipment operators. You can't move cars that
16 way very easily. So had we had -- we would have had to have
17 rolled several of these cars a considerable amount, twisted them
18 to get them off the pile. The derailment occurred with, you know,
19 a decent amount of force, so there was a lot of compression and
20 the cars were going to have to be forced apart pretty hard. So
21 that, coupled with the existing damage to the protective housings,
22 just the twisting action, we could have -- you know, had we -- we
23 know we had at least two cars that were somewhat whole but they
24 were heat impinged, heat damaged, which could have created a lot
25 of issue if we had twisted something and sprung a leak and had all

1 those ignition sources of heavy equipment and personnel exposure
2 in the, in the immediate area.

3 So we did the -- did as detailed a damage assessment as we
4 possibly could moving, you know, ballast rocks and stuff like that
5 to get up close and personal to the -- to all these cars. And we
6 found that the damage was pretty severe and -- but not so severe
7 had it been a non-polymerizable (ph.) product, we may have chosen
8 to go a different direction. But based on the assessment and the
9 product itself, we all agreed and felt that vent and burn was the
10 correct choice.

11 Q. Okay. When you talked about the car that had the 70-minute
12 PRD release, first of all, what day was that?

13 A. I believe the PRD operated for 70 minutes on Saturday.

14 Q. And after that it closed and did not reopen; is that correct?

15 A. It closed. It did not reopen even though there continued to
16 be a (indiscernible) in the protective housing.

17 Q. Okay. And do you remember which car that was? Was it the
18 first, second, third, fourth, fifth car?

19 A. I don't -- I think it was the two cars that were on fire was
20 3 and 4. No, hang on. Yeah, 3 and 4.

21 Q. Okay. Which one was it; do you remember?

22 A. Which one? We had fire in the protective housing of both 3
23 and 4.

24 Q. Okay. Which one vented for 70 minutes? Was it 3 or 4?

25 A. I believe it was 3.

1 Q. And then regarding the VCM cars, was there any evidence of
2 breaching damage other than the PRD releases?

3 A. Ask that question again?

4 Q. Regarding the vinyl chloride cars, was there any evidence of
5 breaching damage to the car? Were there any leaks or releases of
6 material other than through the pressure relief device?

7 A. Not that I noticed, no, sir.

8 Q. Okay. What was burning around those cars? You mentioned
9 that they were exposed to fire. What was the source of that fire?

10 A. Well, everything wooden, plastic pellets, railroad cross
11 ties, flammable liquids that were released, I'm guessing the butyl
12 acrylate, the ethylhexyl acrylate, because we continuously had
13 ignition shooting back and forth in the ballast rock going through
14 the derailment site while we were setting up for the operation.

15 Q. Okay. With regard to the other tank cars and other materials
16 on side, did you do an assessment as to what was breached?

17 A. We did. We -- because of us thinking that the vent and burn
18 was the option we were going to have to go with to handle the VCM,
19 we went through and did as good a detailed assessment as we
20 possibly could of everything around it, and that's when we found
21 the breaches in the ethylhexyl acrylate car, the butyl acrylate
22 car. We had a continuous fire from I believe it was the luboil
23 (ph.) car. I don't know that for a fact. There was just, you
24 know, a pile of cars and there was still some active fires, some
25 of the -- possibly the glycols in some of that area between the

1 fifth VCM car, the plastic pellet car, and the isobutylene car, in
2 that general vicinity. In the center of the tracks there were,
3 there were still some active fires from released commodities.

4 Q. Did you record any of that information anywhere?

5 A. Record? No, I did not. I'm pretty positive the information
6 that was gathered of the assessment I didn't keep track of notes,
7 but I believe SPSI would have some of those notes.

8 Q. Okay. Tell us --

9 A. But I don't know that for fact.

10 Q. Tell us a little bit how you worked with SPSI. What were the
11 two roles and how did you interact with them?

12 A. Oh, we worked -- I mean, you couldn't tell where one ended
13 and the other started. We were -- you know, we're professional
14 contractors. We're friends. And we're fierce competitors until
15 you have a major incident and then we work very, very well
16 together. Our crews work together and we train together at
17 different times of the year at different training events across
18 the country. So we do -- you never know where one ends and the
19 other begins because of that. So we work very, very well.
20 Everybody had a say in the, in the direction. Drew was in charge
21 of the SPSI guys. Myself and my -- one of my coworkers, Terry
22 Rockwell, we swapped back and forth. There were times that Terry
23 went in, there was times that I went in, and whenever we decided
24 that there was an operation needed to occur, we took what we
25 considered at the time the best of the best, whether it was from

1 SPSI or SRS to go in and address the -- whatever the task is.

2 Q. Okay. So from what I'm hearing, then, is you guys were
3 basically doing the same role out there, fulfilling the same need
4 for the railroad; is that correct?

5 A. We were working as a team. When something needed to be done,
6 we put together the best crew to be able to take care of it,
7 whether it was an SPSI crew, a SRS crew, or a combination thereof.

8 Q. Okay, understood. So with respect to the temperature
9 monitoring, who was actually doing that and how were they doing
10 it?

11 A. There was one person that was in charge of taking
12 temperatures and communicating back to a central person. When we
13 sent the -- when we did the last very detailed assessment and
14 temperatures, one crew went in to the individual car, car number
15 5, and did those cars. And then two other groups went in on what
16 I consider the west end and did two cars apiece. And each group
17 had an infrared temperature gun, laser pointer temperature gun,
18 and just called back and said, you know, this car number, this is
19 the temperature.

20 Q. Okay. So they were measuring the temperature of the shell,
21 the exposed shell where the jackets were torn; is that right?

22 A. That is correct, yeah. None of the temperatures that were
23 taken that were relayed were from a jacket. It would have been
24 bolstered up against the shell of a car or a ripped-open part of
25 the jacket so we could get to the shell with the insulation

1 removed.

2 Q. Okay. And who was that one person that was in charge of
3 keeping track of the temperatures?

4 A. I don't remember. There was a lot going on. I don't
5 remember who was copying that information down.

6 Q. Was it someone at SPSI or SRS?

7 A. Like I said, I do not remember. There was a lot going on. I
8 just know that we -- there were calls on the radio that, hey, this
9 is the temperature of this car. I don't remember where it went.

10 Q. So you all were communicating the temperatures via radio?

11 A. Or telephone, yes, sir.

12 Q. To whomever this one person was?

13 A. I do not know, sir.

14 Q. Okay. You personally weren't involved in that or were you?

15 A. I was involved, but I didn't -- I wasn't copying that
16 information.

17 Q. All right. So you mentioned there was evidence of
18 polymerization. If I understood you correct, it was because the
19 valve had stopped operating. Was -- how many of the cars would
20 you say had evidence that polymerization was occurring?

21 A. Okay. So before the vent and burn operation, there was
22 not -- the only (indiscernible). You have to understand the
23 chemistry side of VCM and what we're taught in HAZMAT schools
24 that -- for people that are dealing with monomers and polymers.
25 So a very brief chemistry class, basically styrene monomer, vinyl

1 chloride, butadiene, they all have either on the side of the car
2 either inhibited or stabilized, which basically means the exact
3 same thing. They're -- the inhibitor prevents any kind of runaway
4 reaction from occurring. Once the cars get to -- once the product
5 gets to an end user, that inhibitor is taken away, it's taken out,
6 to allow it to become a, become a material that, when added to
7 catalysts, when added to having pressure or temperature increased,
8 will make something else like vinyl chloride is used to make PVC,
9 PVC resin.

10 From the early days of me going to the HAZMAT schools, they
11 always said -- the instructors have always preached that the
12 inhibitor can go away. You never know where it goes; it just goes
13 away with pressure, with heat, and when in contact with a catalyst
14 will do it in a lot faster rate. So you learn that. You get it
15 beat into your head enough times you finally start believing that
16 that -- any time you're dealing with a monomer or a polymer
17 material, you can have a reaction, a runaway reaction,
18 polymerization, if you have excessive heat and pressure applied to
19 it. So we learned it early on and we still live by it. And
20 anybody that goes to HAZMAT schools for these materials will
21 agree.

22 So based on what we were seeing, excessive heat, high
23 temperatures, unable to get good pressures on the cars, we had to
24 make a judgment call that a reaction, a polymerization potential
25 was extremely elevated. So that was the decision that was made

1 based on those facts.

2 Q. Okay. Have there been any other incidents that you've been
3 involved in where a vent and burn was necessary on a monomer?

4 A. We've done a lot of -- we've done a lot -- I've worked with
5 ESI a lot on different products. There's materials, acrylic acid,
6 it is a polymerizable material. We vent and burned that at
7 Eunice, Louisiana. We've done butadiene cars. We've had runaway
8 reactions in cars. We've had runaway reactions in plants. The
9 cause of the plant explosion in Fort Neches, Texas, just before
10 Thanksgiving 2019, was a butadiene plant that had a runaway
11 polymerization forming polymer in the plant, in the plant. So
12 that was not a, not a vent and burn operation. That plant just
13 blew up.

14 Q. Any other incidents that come to mind?

15 A. Those are the ones that are fresh to my mind.

16 Q. Okay, all right. Just shift gears just a little bit.

17 A. Oh, let me -- hang on, hang on, hang on just one second.
18 Shepherdsville, Kentucky. We didn't vent and burn but we liquid
19 flared four or five butadiene cars on the CSX because that was a
20 polymerizable material.

21 Q. Okay. The difference there was? What was the difference
22 there that it made those available for vent and -- you said, I'm
23 sorry, you said flaring?

24 A. We flared those two. We liquid flared those. And the reason
25 we chose to liquid flare those cars was we had, we had fire -- we

1 had heat on the cars but the protective housings were at the 12
2 o'clock position and they were in excellent shape.

3 Q. Okay, very good. Just to shift gears a little bit. You
4 mentioned that you had some chemical to neutralize the acrylates
5 ordered and was brought to Washington, PA. Was that ever used?
6 And how did that work out?

7 A. The acronyl (ph.) was brought to Washington and we have since
8 started using it. We got it in scrubbers. They're on site. I
9 don't -- there was -- there's a plan after we got released to come
10 home to do some testing to see if they could kill some of the
11 odor, but initially the -- because of the caustic nature of the
12 material, it was used for odor control and scrubbing of some of
13 the, some of the pick-up points where water -- wastewater is being
14 recovered.

15 Q. Oh, I see. So this wouldn't be something that would have
16 been used during the fire or the initial response?

17 A. No, that would not have been used for the fire.

18 MR. STANCIL: Okay. Well, that's all I have. Appreciate it.
19 Appreciate it very much, sir.

20 And I'm going to pass it on to the next person here.

21 MR. DOUGHERTY: Let's pass it off to Chief Carey, please.
22 You're muted, Chief.

23 BY MR. CAREY:

24 Q. How you doing, Chip?

25 A. I'm doing good, sir. How about you?

1 Q. Good. It was nice to meet you last week at the site.
2 Appreciate all your help that day.

3 A. Not a problem, sir.

4 Q. And thank you, thank you for your service.

5 So, yeah, nice description of the whole monomer/polymer
6 thing. I used to teach chemistry HAZMAT at the National Fire
7 Academy. I don't know if you ever took that class. Maybe we
8 crossed paths. I don't know.

9 But anyways, so just a couple of questions. Actually, I had
10 a bunch of notes I was taking. Very nice description of the
11 incident and the tactics and operations. Paul actually hit on a
12 lot of things I was going to ask, so I crossed them out, but just
13 a few things. What was the -- you said -- you mentioned the use
14 of PPE when they were going in with the, with the meters and stuff
15 like that. What kind of PPE were you guys dressed in?

16 A. We were in -- let's see. We were in basically bunker gear.
17 Some people were in SCBAs. Other people were in full-face
18 respirators.

19 Q. Okay, 10-4. And the -- as far as the assessments that were
20 done and things like that, and you talked about getting pressure
21 readings on the cars, can you just kind of walk us through that
22 briefly as far as how many cars they were able to get pressure
23 readings from and what was the actual method they used to do that?

24 A. There were only pressures -- pressure taken on the
25 isobutylene car and the first VCM car to the west end. There was

1 a stub (ph.) out. We call them stub outs. Basically, a piece of
2 pipe, two by one, reducing (indiscernible) piece of pipe.

3 Q. Yeah.

4 A. Teed off. Gauge goes one direction, a block valve goes on
5 the opposite direction.

6 Q. Right.

7 A. So you can hook it up, open the valve, take your pressure
8 reading, close the car valve off, and then bleed the pressure
9 through your block valve on the outside. So basically it's a T-
10 assembly stub out.

11 Q. Yeah. And where on the car was that placed?

12 A. On the isobutylene car it was put on the vapor valve. On
13 the -- actually, on both cars, both the isobutylene car and the
14 one VCM car it was put on the vapor valve because of --

15 Q. Okay, and --

16 A. -- heat damage -- excuse me.

17 Q. Yeah. So the, so the damage on the other cars, on the other
18 VCM cars negated the ability to be able to do that on them, right?

19 A. That is correct. We had -- three of the cars had impinging
20 fire. The fourth -- or the third car, the third car we had -- we
21 put the pressure gauge on. Excuse me, the third car I believe the
22 protective housing was buried to a point we couldn't get the --
23 they couldn't get the lid open. And the last VCM car is the one
24 they put the pressure gauge on. We considered that the
25 (indiscernible).

1 Q. 10-4, okay. Excellent, great. And who actually was moving
2 the tank cars? You talked about making a decision early on to get
3 some of the other cars out of the way, maybe some of the hopper
4 cars and things like that. Who actually moved those cars and who
5 dug the trench and the containment area where the material was
6 burned off?

7 A. So the east end of the derailment they had three wrecking
8 contractors on site. They had Holcher Services, Crane Masters,
9 and Corman (ph.). Those are the three big ones. Crane Masters
10 and Holcher was set up on the west end and -- hang with me just
11 one second. Traffic is getting a little to be a pain in the
12 posterior here. Excuse me just one second.

13 So Holcher and Crane Masters were on the west end. Corman
14 was on the east end. Crane Masters pulled the plastic pellet cars
15 out because they had the right type of equipment, the cranes, to
16 pull that -- move those cars. And then Holcher was going to be
17 the ones that were assigned the operation of moving the VCM car if
18 it was feasible. And then both contractors, both Holcher and
19 Corman, actually built the containment areas for the vent and burn
20 operation.

21 Q. 10-4, good. I don't think I have any other questions for
22 you, Chip. Appreciate everything you've done and appreciate your
23 being here today and giving us all this information.

24 A. No problem.

25 MR. DOUGHERTY: All right, great.

1 MR. DAY: Hey, and thank you for your service.

2 MR. DOUGHERTY: All right. If we could move on to
3 Mr. Heidkamp?

4 MR. HEIDKAMP: Chip, thanks for walking us through. That was
5 a very valuable description. I don't have any questions --
6 additional questions.

7 MR. DOUGHERTY: All right, Mr. Keltz?

8 BY MR. KELTZ:

9 Q. Yeah, hi, Chip. It's Randy. Hey, yeah, thanks for the
10 assist out on site there last week. I think it was last week. I
11 don't even know what day it is anymore. And, yeah, for the
12 description. Yeah, we were reviewing some of the footage while we
13 were on site together there in the fire hall. So, yeah, thanks
14 for all the effort and working with Drew and the crew.

15 So, yeah, Paul's going to make my job easy. I only have the
16 one question because Paul -- he must have been reading everybody's
17 mind this morning. But early on you mentioned the single car, the
18 car that was up against the hopper, that there was damage to that
19 protective housing. Do you recall what that damage was to that
20 protective housing? And was that protective housing opened or was
21 it in a closed -- was it enclosed when this observation was made?
22 What's your, what's your intel on this?

23 A. The protective housing of the individual car --

24 MR. DAY: Something's going on. Can I put, can I put you on
25 hold for just one second? I've got to take a phone call. I have

1 to.

2 MR. DOUGHERTY: Sure.

3 MR. DAY: It's my wonderful wife.

4 MR. DOUGHERTY: No problem.

5 MR. DAY: Can you guys hang on just one second?

6 MR. DOUGHERTY: Sure, go ahead.

7 (Pause)

8 MR. DAY: Okay, I'm back.

9 MR. DOUGHERTY: Okay.

10 MR. DAY: Life is good again.

11 MR. DOUGHERTY: Appreciate it.

12 MR. DAY: And if you could ask that question one more time,

13 I'll answer it.

14 BY MR. KELTZ:

15 Q. Yeah. The -- I guess it's car number 5 as you're referring
16 to it, the single car that was up against the hopper car, you
17 mentioned early on in your description that there was some damage
18 observed to that protective housing. What type of damage was that
19 and was that -- do you know if that protective housing cover was
20 opened or was it in a closed position when that damage was
21 observed?

22 A. I do not know. I don't remember the condition of the
23 protective housing. But I do know that there was excessive heat
24 to that car and that we had elevated VCM -- or, excuse me,
25 elevated VOC readings when the crew climbed on top of the plastic

1 pellet car and walked down to within a few feet of the protective
2 housing because the fire had observed in that protective housing
3 but the fire had gone out.

4 Q. Okay. Do you know if that housing cover was open or closed?

5 A. I do not know that for a fact.

6 Q. Okay, all right. Yeah, that's all I had. And again, thanks
7 for, thanks for everything.

8 A. Not a problem, sir.

9 MR. DOUGHERTY: All right, Mr. Lawler?

10 BY MR. LAWLER:

11 Q. I've just got one question. The thermal imaging that you
12 were using, was that, like, a flare gun? And does that --

13 A. We had --

14 Q. Does that model have recording slash history capabilities?

15 A. We had, we had several different kinds of temperature guns,
16 laser pointer-style and contact. I did -- I never saw a Tic (ph.)
17 or a Fleer (ph.) type gun used on any of the entries for the
18 assessment.

19 Q. All right. Appreciate your efforts. Thanks.

20 A. No problem.

21 MR. DOUGHERTY: Any additional questions for Mr. Day?

22 MR. STANCIL: Yeah, Paul Stancil here once again.

23 BY MR. STANCIL:

24 Q. Yes, Chip, thank you so much again. That's been some
25 excellent information that's been conveyed here. And just to

1 follow up with what Ron asked, were any of those instruments that
2 were used to monitor temperature, was any of that data recorded at
3 all on the instrument itself?

4 A. I'm talking away and you guys are not making any, not making
5 any noise.

6 Hey, so none of the instruments that we used have recording
7 capabilities. They're just the standard go to Home Depot type
8 temperature guns with a laser pointer that have really good
9 accuracy as long as you're within 3 feet of the source.

10 Q. Okay, very good. Well, thank you, sir. That's all the
11 questions I have, Mr. Day. Thank you very much again.

12 A. No problem.

13 MR. DOUGHERTY: All right, great. So we've gone over,
14 obviously, a lot of information today, a lot of questions. I
15 appreciate your time and everything that you've given us.

16 So just one final question for you. Is there anything that
17 we didn't ask today or any additional information that you may
18 have that you could give us that would be helpful in our
19 investigation?

20 MR. DAY: No, not really. I think -- I mean, the facts are
21 the facts, and the good part about it is you've got some of the
22 best folks, the NS sent some of the best folks to the site to help
23 get this thing resolved. And, you know, if you guys have
24 questions while you're doing this investigation, you know, feel
25 free to reach out and say, hey, what about this? What about this?

1 Because, you know, we've seen, we've seen a lot of, a lot of
2 stuff. Then you guys walking around looking at all of those cars,
3 looking at the vent and burn holes that were blown in, you took
4 some, you know, thickness measurements. I'd like to know, you
5 know, what kind of thickness we had. I never heard that because I
6 was too busy doing other things trying to take care of you guys
7 while you were there, but, you know, I'd like to read the final
8 report and figure out, you know, is there a way to make these cars
9 safer? Because I think that the cars did their job and it's the
10 product that we had concerns with. It wasn't so much the car.

11 MR. DOUGHERTY: Yeah, absolutely. And, yeah, the information
12 will be available once the final report comes out here sometime in
13 the future, and so I appreciate it.

14 And likewise, if you can think of anything throughout the
15 course of the investigation or you happen to have a question or
16 have any additional information for us that would help us out,
17 feel free to reach out.

18 And thanks again for your time. Go ahead.

19 MR. DAY: No, I was going to say thanks. You know, you guys
20 be careful and let me know if there's anything else you need.

21 MR. DOUGHERTY: Yeah, absolutely. And this will terminate
22 the interview. And I will stop recording. The time is 11:18 a.m.

23 (Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the interview was concluded.)
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: NORFOLK SOUTHERN TRAIN DERAILMENT
IN EAST PALESTINE, OHIO
ON FEBRUARY 3, 2023
Interview of Chip Day

ACCIDENT NO.: RRD23MR005

PLACE: via Microsoft Teams

DATE: March 1, 2023

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Angie Duray
Transcriber



National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594

Transcript Errata

**TABLE OF CORRECTIONS FOR TRANSCRIPT INTERVIEW WITH: Charles "Chip" Day
RECORDED ON March 1, 2023**


PAGE NUMBER	LINE NUMBER	CURRENT WORDING	CORRECTED WORDING
6	17	(indiscernible)	emergency
7	4	Holcher	Hulcher
8	18	Farcar	Farquhar
9	1	(indiscernible)	involved
12	7	(indiscernible)	Heat sink
15	9	SCRTC	SERTC
20	25	Eastern car	Western car
20	25	Western car	Eastern car
21	10	Western car	Eastern car
22	17	(indiscernible)	Stub out
24	16	(indiscernible)	Lazy fire
25	22	luboil	Lube oil
27	16	West	East
30	9	Fort	Port
31	7	acronyl	Acronel
32	25	west	east

If, to the best of your knowledge, no corrections are needed kindly circle the statement "no corrections needed" and initial in the space provided.

NO CORRECTIONS NEEDED. _____
Initials

Charles Day

Printed Name of Person providing the above information



Signature of Person providing the above information

4/20/23

Date



National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594

Transcript Errata

**TABLE OF CORRECTIONS FOR TRANSCRIPT INTERVIEW WITH: Charles "Chip" Day
RECORDED ON March 1, 2023**

PAGE NUMBER	LINE NUMBER	CURRENT WORDING	CORRECTED WORDING
33	2	(indiscernible)	bushing
33	25	(indiscernible)	West car
34	8	Holcher	Hulcher
34	10	Holcher	Hulcher
34	10	West end	East end
34	13	Holcher	Hulcher
34	14	east	west
34	16	Holcher	Hulcher
34	18	Holcher	Hulcher
37	17	Fleer	FLIR

If, to the best of your knowledge, no corrections are needed kindly circle the statement "no corrections needed" and initial in the space provided.

NO CORRECTIONS NEED. _____
Initials

Charles Day
Printed Name of Person providing the above information

[Redacted Signature]

Signature of Person providing the above information

4/20/23
Date