

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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CAPSIZING/SINKING OF THE *GOLDEN*
RAY IN THE BRUNSWICK RIVER,
GEORGIA, ON SEPTEMBER 8, 2019

Accident No.: DCA19FM048

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Interview of: [REDACTED] IMD Chief
U.S. Coast Guard

Military Safety Unit
Savannah, Georgia

Wednesday,
January 29, 2020

APPEARANCES:

LT [REDACTED], Investigator
U.S. Coast Guard

I N D E X

ITEM

PAGE

Interview of [REDACTED]:

By Lt. [REDACTED]

4

I N T E R V I E W

(12:54 p.m.)

1
2
3 LT [REDACTED] Good afternoon. This is Lieutenant [REDACTED]
4 on January 29th, 2020, at 12:54. My name is spelled [REDACTED],
5 [REDACTED]. And I'm the District 8 Response Advisory supervisor,
6 and I've been asked as part of the *Golden Ray* investigation to
7 look into all things pertaining to the pollution response and
8 salvage activities.

9 And I'm here with:

10 MS. [REDACTED]: [REDACTED], first name spelled [REDACTED],
11 last name [REDACTED]. And I'm the Chief of IMD at MSU
12 Savannah and at the St. Simon Sound Response. I was primarily
13 Coast Guard SCAT coordinator.

14 LT [REDACTED]: And do you consent to this interview being
15 recorded?

16 MS. [REDACTED]: Yes.

INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]

18 BY LT [REDACTED]:

19 Q. All right. And is that the official name of the response,
20 the St. Simons Response?

21 A. Yeah, St. Simons --

22 Q. All right, I'll start referring to --

23 A. -- Sound Response.

24 Q. -- St. Simons Sound Response.

25 A. Yeah; it's a lot of Ss.

1 Q. Okay, got it. Yeah, that's a tongue twister and a half. So
2 start off with when and how you were first notified of the event.

3 A. I was notified probably mid-morning September 8th, which was
4 Sunday. I was on leave, so I did not show up for the response
5 until the following Monday, so the next Monday on the 9th. So I
6 got a picture of the vessel on its side.

7 And I actually thought it was -- we had just got done with
8 hurricane operations, and I thought it was a different vessel that
9 we were dealing with for the hurricane operations. But then
10 talking with my boss, our response department head, he told me
11 that it was a ro-ro that was -- had been capsized.

12 So I showed up Monday, 7 o'clock Monday, down in Brunswick at
13 the ICP, entered the ICP, trying to figure out where I needed to
14 go, waiting to talk with my boss to see where I was being -- what
15 position I was filling.

16 It was a little -- it was very organized by Gallagher, but
17 the -- I don't think Coast Guard ourselves had been quite
18 organized. When I showed up, I did a bunch of jobs the first
19 week. I started off as -- they were thinking they wanted me to be
20 PIO, and then as the SAR Ops were still going on, we had a D7
21 PADET there to kind of field the questions from the media that
22 they were getting.

23 So I was filling more of a safety zone manager role for the
24 next couple days, and then once strike team had showed up, and we
25 were a little bit more organized, they were kind of directing who

1 was filling Ops positions and what not.

2 So I shifted from the safety zone manager to -- in the
3 planning section, where I filled the -- one of the SCAT
4 coordinator role from there on out.

5 Q. Okay. So you worked primarily in the incident command post
6 then?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. In just different capacities?

9 A. Yes. And I would go out with the SCAT teams as well, if we
10 needed to supplement the teams, depending on operations for the
11 day.

12 Q. Okay. About when were you moved to the SCAT team
13 coordinator?

14 A. Probably the end of the first week.

15 Q. End of the first week?

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. Okay, so like somewhere around like the Friday the 13th-ish,
18 or was it end of the Monday timeframe?

19 A. Let's see. It was probably around -- yeah, Friday the 13th,
20 the end of -- yeah, probably that day. And I was that for a
21 couple days. And then they were like -- the PIAT showed up the
22 following week, and they were like, no, we want you to be PIO. So
23 I was PIO for a day.

24 We got the JIC set up, got -- ordered new personnel to come
25 in and fill the JIC, because we were trying to utilize the locals

1 from the local emergency and management agency from Franklin
2 County. But with civilians and their schedules, they weren't --
3 we wouldn't be able to staff the JIC as long as -- for 12 hours
4 for the day.

5 So we had to order new people; helped out with that,
6 organizing the JIC, making sure we had people in certain
7 positions. Went to the meetings for the day. And then the
8 following day, our response department had Lieutenant Commander
9 [REDACTED] took over the PIO job. And then I went back to being SCAT
10 coordinator for the -- from there on out.

11 Q. Okay. Until when did you demob?

12 A. The 30th of September.

13 Q. 30th of September?

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. And did you go back at all for any other durations?

16 A. To?

17 Q. To the response?

18 A. Yeah, not really, not officially.

19 Q. Not officially?

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. More as just to kind of see --

22 A. More as picking up oil samples, driving them back here.

23 Q. Okay. For your MSU Savannah day-to-day role?

24 A. Right. Correct.

25 Q. Got it. Now, initially when you, you started off kind of as

1 a safety zone manager, correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Kind of walk me through what your daily activities were in
4 that role.

5 A. So we set up the zone, but we were trying to figure out a
6 long-term plan to staff -- to have someone out on a security boat
7 around the R and A zone. Pretty sure -- I think I recommended
8 employing the MSST, and I filled out -- someone filled out the
9 213. I don't know if it was myself or what, because there was a
10 lot of discussion on whether or not that was the most financially
11 appropriate action to take. But we ended up employing the MSST,
12 and then soon after, I was rotated out of that position. And
13 yeah, that's all I can remember about that.

14 Q. Were there issues with people entering the safety zone that
15 were not authorized to do so?

16 A. Not that I can remember. I think the first couple days,
17 there was some media boats getting in close up -- up and close to
18 the vessel and we had to -- yeah, we had to have Station roll out
19 there and tell them not to -- to exit the zone. Because Station
20 was filling the zone at the beginning, but because they're the
21 only SAR asset down in Brunswick, they needed to rotate crews and
22 all that, so --

23 Q. Oh, so they weren't always consistently on scene. So then
24 you had to get someone to chase a --

25 A. You'd have to come from Station out.

1 Q. -- media boat out --

2 A. Right, exactly.

3 Q. -- and stuff like that. Okay.

4 A. Until we could get a permanent solution.

5 Q. Which the MSST --

6 A. Which was the MSST, and then it evolved into the RP supplying
7 a security boat. We didn't have a Coast Guard member on there,
8 but they would -- they could rove the perimeter, and then if there
9 was anyone trying to get in, they would call Station, and Station
10 would come back out.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. That's pretty -- that worked pretty much.

13 Q. So after the MSST took over, there was really no incidents
14 though for the most part with that --

15 A. Correct. Yeah.

16 Q. -- 24/7 presence out there?

17 A. Right, yeah.

18 Q. Okay. And then after that, you transitioned to --

19 A. SCAT coordinator.

20 Q. -- SCAT coordinator. So can you describe kind of your daily
21 role in that job to me?

22 A. The beginning of that job was more about kind of herding
23 cats, like making sure we had people identified to fill the teams,
24 to fill the federal role of the SCAT team, making sure that we
25 coordinated with the state on when to show up, because we were

1 utilizing the state's -- their boats, their small boats, to access
2 certain areas that we needed to SCAT.

3 So yeah, making sure people got from point A to point B and
4 met up with the right people, got their safety briefs. And that's
5 pretty much -- that took the big -- that was like the biggest
6 coordination part of it, the beginning. And then after that we
7 were getting NRC reports, and we didn't really have a mechanism to
8 check those out, so I created them kind of a QRC, NRC/QRC, that we
9 used to track NRC reports. And then we would have the SCAT teams
10 go out and take a look at those areas that were being reported.

11 And then later -- yeah, later on that week, I think the
12 Unified Command made NRC reports a CIR. So that's why that was a
13 really important, I think, process to -- that played out. So then
14 after that it was pretty streamlined, just making sure I met up
15 with the environmental leader to figure out what their plan was
16 for the day on terms of what areas they were going to go SCAT
17 based on the tides and the weather.

18 Q. What did the environmental unit inside the incident command
19 post look like?

20 A. They were part of planning, so they had an environmental unit
21 leader, which was filled by a Gallagher representative. I think
22 mostly it was Scott Jackson. Sometimes, it was -- I think his
23 name is John Maddox; I can't remember.

24 But they had them, and then NOAA also sat at the table, the
25 environmental kind of table, providing scientific support. And

1 then NOAA also had a couple other folks, one guy doing GIS,
2 another guy kind of analyzing that data and then working on some
3 more admin stuff, and then they had a couple NOAA folks that would
4 help go out on the SCAT teams as well.

5 Q. Okay. Anybody from the state of Georgia?

6 A. Oh, Georgia, yeah. So I think her name is -- first name's
7 Jan, I think the last name starts with an M. She was part --
8 she's from the Coastal Resources Division. She was in there as
9 well. She was offering guidance on -- she kind of helped
10 coordinate what times we would be going out, the state's
11 personnel, who would be driving the boats for the day, that kind
12 of thing.

13 Q. And anyone from US Fish & Wildlife, the environmental unit?

14 A. They weren't there, but they -- I remember them being --
15 coming to the response when we did a demonstration, the Sphag
16 Sorb. They were on one of the boats.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. That's the only time I specifically remember seeing them.

21 Q. Okay. Now, what was the makeup of the SCAT teams?

22 A. So SCAT teams, you had a federal, state, and RP
23 representative. So for the most part it was a Coastie or NOAA
24 person, state from -- a state person from the Coastal Resources
25 Division, and then a Gallagher representative.

1 Q. And how many SCAT teams approximately were there?

2 A. I was managing three to four --

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. -- for my month. And then at the turnover -- on September
5 30th when the personnel had a changeover, I know they bumped it up
6 to more, I think like five or seven teams.

7 Q. Okay. And so you would basically coordinate with the
8 environmental unit leader of where to send those teams to get
9 their resources?

10 A. Right.

11 Q. And then what direction would you give those teams from
12 there?

13 A. Oh, we would tell them where to meet up at the boat dock down
14 at the Georgia DNR, Coastal Resources Building, that facility, of
15 what time the segments that they were going to be doing that day.
16 And then if we had gotten any NRC reports over the night, we would
17 have them go check out that area as well.

18 Q. Okay, so basically had things set up in a grid system
19 essentially?

20 A. Yeah, so each -- we had our SCAT segments all along like
21 here, pretty much on this whole vicinity, we had SCATS in there.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And then Jekyll Island --

24 Q. Just for the recording, she circled the entire land base
25 around St. Simons Sound.

1 A. There wasn't really a method to the madness. We kind of
2 just -- we -- it depended a lot on the tides, because the tide'll
3 fluctuate. We only had 3 to 6 hours of time that we could
4 actually conduct work depending on the tides and where the boats
5 could access the certain areas, so we were limited. And wherever
6 we could get is kind of where we would hit essentially, and if we
7 had a burp and the Ops guys had told us, hey, we're seeing a slick
8 this way or we're seeing a slick this way, we would try and send
9 out the teams in those areas the next day.

10 Q. And was there certain areas that were given priority?

11 A. I think up in this area.

12 Q. Like Lanier Island?

13 A. Yeah, Lanier Island near the staging area over there.

14 Q. The marina?

15 A. Yeah. Because there's a big marina right there, some nice
16 houses and what not. So I think these three rivers were trying to
17 take precedent.

18 Q. So the Back River, the Mackay River, and the Frederica River?

19 A. Frederica, yeah. For the most part. And then -- yeah.

20 Q. Bird Island --

21 A. Bird Island.

22 Q. -- which was the number one priority, I think, because it's
23 the --

24 A. Yeah, I mean, that was the number one priority booming-wise.
25 We never actually did SCAT on the island, because we were told not

1 to go -- not to step foot on the island basically, because of the
2 bird.

3 Q. Okay. And we're more worried about the damage that being on
4 the island would do versus the actual oil, correct?

5 A. Right.

6 Q. Was the ACP consulted as part of this process?

7 A. I'd like to say yes, but I don't specifically remember it
8 being.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Gallagher had already created their own SCAT segments. They
11 did not utilize the ones that were in the ACP as part of the GRSs.
12 So yeah, they had kind of already divvied up each segment based on
13 a 500-yard segment, not based -- not necessarily based on zones
14 that the ACP had already mapped out.

15 Q. Okay. And you don't -- you're not familiar with what
16 methodology Gallagher used?

17 A. No. All I remember is once I -- a couple days later, once I
18 had actually kind of gotten more into that role, they had already
19 had it all segmented out, and they just said each segment was 500
20 yards.

21 Q. Okay. Were there -- what would you do when you found out an
22 area was oiled?

23 A. We would send teams there, and they would figure out how much
24 was oiled based on the SCAT process. And then they would bring
25 their -- they'd come back. Each Gallagher person had a -- I

1 forgot what the device is called -- a device that tracked the
2 locations and where they had gone for the day. They were able to
3 take pictures with geo-reference pictures off of that.

4 Q. So like a GPS Waypoints and stuff --

5 A. Yeah, exactly.

6 Q. And then they take pictures so they knew exactly where they
7 were --

8 A. Right, exactly.

9 Q. -- and where things had been? Okay.

10 A. Yeah, and then they would come back and fill out their SCAT
11 forms. And then that would get processed, and then the -- yeah,
12 it would get processed, and the GIS guy would upload it into
13 ArcGIS so we could see it visually.

14 Q. So you could see visually exactly where the oil --

15 A. Yeah, it'd be like --

16 Q. -- and things like that?

17 A. -- light oil, moderate oil, heavy oil. It was mostly light
18 oil, a couple moderates, nothing really heavy.

19 Q. And then were there any other remediation strategies employed
20 other than natural remediation?

21 A. Yeah. They -- Gallagher had suggested using Sphag Sorb; it's
22 basically like peat moss. And the idea behind that was to spray
23 it on oiled marsh grass, and that would prevent it from
24 transferring -- the sticky oil from transferring to birds in the
25 area.

1 They were expecting an influx of birds due to, I think it was
2 mating season. So that was a big thing that Gallagher was trying
3 to do, and the state was behind them in that. I mean, state was a
4 little reluctant, but once they conducted the demo and they saw
5 how it works, they were able -- they were much more comfortable
6 with it. They had consulted -- they had also consulted the RT4
7 before conducting the demo.

8 Q. Okay. And that's a binding agent, I think --

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. -- classified as a binding agent. Now, was that successful,
11 undetermined, or how do you feel about the use of Sphag Sorb?

12 A. I think somewhat successful. You applied it, and then it
13 would stick, it would adhere; I saw that. But then once the tidal
14 cycle came, the tidal cycle would rise, the water level would
15 rise, and then once it came back down, you could see where a lot
16 of the Sphag Sorb had washed off.

17 Q. The oil remained, but the Sphag Sorb would -- washed off?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. I mean, and over time, like by the end of the week, a lot of
21 the oil had degraded too. So that's why --

22 Q. Natural weathering.

23 A. -- a natural was preferred. But they were just trying to
24 prepare for that, the influx of birds coming in to the area.

25 Q. Did that influx of birds come?

- 1 A. I think eventually. I'm not a bird expert, so I don't
2 remember. We did have Tri-State Bird come out, and she conducted
3 some surveys and she -- I remember her commenting that there was a
4 lot of birds in the area, but no more than I can say.
- 5 Q. Okay. And were there oiled birds?
- 6 A. I don't think while I was there.
- 7 Q. Okay.
- 8 A. I think maybe later on.
- 9 Q. Later on?
- 10 A. Yeah, they had gotten reports.
- 11 Q. What would've been your process if there was oiled birds?
- 12 A. We would've called Tri-State. The -- Carli was her name; she
13 had already been down there. So she had gone out to Jekyll Island
14 and then -- I think there was another place she had gone to. But
15 Jekyll Island has a turtle rehabilitation center there. And so
16 she had already spoken with them, and they were able to take birds
17 there if we needed to.
- 18 Q. Okay. So that was going to be your wildlife --
- 19 A. Our contingency.
- 20 Q. -- area setup --
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. -- for rehabilitation?
- 23 A. Um-hmm.
- 24 Q. Okay. Do you know if they ended up employing that when they
25 did start to get oiled birds?

1 A. I do not know.

2 Q. Okay. Did -- was there any other reports of any other oiled
3 wildlife?

4 A. Not that I'm aware of.

5 Q. Okay. And in your -- do you know of any other reports of
6 oiled sea turtles?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Okay. I don't know if this came across you or your role as
9 the one day that you were PIO, but it had been kind of reported to
10 me that there was a lot of extra media around the --

11 A. The staging area?

12 Q. -- the staging area.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Was there -- was that ever discussed on how to kind of --

15 A. Mitigate that?

16 Q. -- mitigate that?

17 A. Yes. I think the influx was there like the very first week,
18 because the SAR was still going on.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And I think the first step in trying to mitigate that was
21 establish -- trying to really establish that safety zone around
22 the vessel. They had talked about providing the responders with
23 cards, like little verbiage to say, to tell the media to kind of
24 keep them at bay a little bit while they're trying -- while the
25 operational guys are trying to get in the boats and get out for

1 the day.

2 But I don't think actually got to the responders until later
3 on, once the JIC had been established like a week later. So --
4 but after that first week, the media presence had died down. We
5 were getting into the rhythm of doing press conferences every so
6 often, so I think that helped as well.

7 Q. NSR was over and so it changes --

8 A. Right, NSR was over, yeah.

9 Q. -- changes the complexity of the response quite a bit.

10 A. Right.

11 Q. Yeah. How were you receiving information from people in the
12 field?

13 A. Primarily through text. We had a bunch of text strings,
14 group text messages going on. The first week, when we were still
15 trying to get organized, I was keeping tabs on the MSU FOSCRs,
16 which were an Ops, and that's how we were communicating. And that
17 worked really well, so when I transitioned over to the SCAT
18 coordinator role, that's all that I used.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. I mean, we would call each other if we had something really
21 important or like an NRC popped off or something like that.

22 Q. So it helped you to have more eyes in the field outside of
23 what was traditionally SCAT, because you had some Ops reporting to
24 you things they were seeing as well.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Yeah, in the beginning. And then once, like I said, that
3 structural organization kind of got better, they were primarily --
4 the Ops folks were primarily reporting to the Ops, Deputy Ops
5 section chief and that whole --

6 Q. Did you have good communication with Ops inside the incident
7 command post so they knew what was going on with your folks?

8 A. Sort of. I did with the Coast Guard Deputy Ops, but Ops and
9 planning in the very beginning did not have good communications.
10 It took us a while to be able to go out, do SCAT, and then pass
11 that information to Ops and let them know where they should be
12 directing folks to go -- send folks to go clean up areas. It
13 wasn't probably until the second -- or into the second week that,
14 that was actually starting to flow better.

15 Q. Through that whole planning process and getting the
16 information out?

17 A. Yeah. Right.

18 Q. So you all -- were you developing 204s for your SCAT teams or
19 just giving direction?

20 A. No, they were just blanket --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Yeah. Gallagher had been running more of the IP paperwork
23 stuff through their online program, and they had done blanket 204s
24 for each group.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. So each day we were doing something different, but it was all
2 by word of mouth, not really specifically written in the 204s.

3 Q. Okay. And was that pretty typical for the first few weeks?

4 A. For the first 3 weeks in ACS.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Same for the 207, which was, I think Coast -- I mean, my --
7 that's what I thought was the hardest thing, is Gallagher had done
8 their 207, but we didn't really get -- Coast Guard didn't really
9 get integrated into positions until second week.

10 Q. Yeah, that makes it challenging.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. And that's always a difficult thing, is to get ourselves in
13 the 207s.

14 A. Right.

15 Q. And once you do that, it changes everything, so -- which I'm
16 sure you saw.

17 A. Yeah. By the second week it was starting to flow a lot
18 better.

19 Q. And then people -- once you're on that 207, you're official,
20 so you get more information. So it helps a lot, so that's good.
21 Anything else that you can think of that might be helpful?

22 A. There was -- State had a couple drones that they had flying
23 to do kind of aerial assessments for SCAT, but we never really got
24 to utilize that information because we didn't, A, have anyone to
25 process that data, and then make it user friendly so that we could

1 use it in the moment kind of thing.

2 It was all -- we had -- they had data from the first week,
3 but by the second week that was all obsolete because we had had a
4 couple burps here and there.

5 Q. Okay. And there was other overflights going on as well. Was
6 it --

7 A. Right.

8 Q. Did you get that data a little bit better, or was it all
9 aerial observation data was hard to process?

10 A. A little bit, because it was a lot easier I think to -- so
11 someone would go up in the plane, and they'd come back and they
12 would be able to share pictures from their phone. And we could be
13 like, oh, that was taken by the bridge, we can go there tomorrow
14 and take a look at it. So that was definitely a lot easier.

15 Q. A little bit easier.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. But none of the resources had good GPS connectivity to the
18 photographs; is that correct?

19 A. Correct. Unless you had -- I mean, there was -- we ended
20 up -- I ended up downloading a GPS app. So whenever I took a
21 picture I would screenshot my GPS location, and I could correlate
22 the two.

23 Q. And it makes it a lot more helpful. Would you think that
24 having good aerial imagery that was more usable would've helped
25 your process for planning SCAT?

1 A. I think so. I think so in the beginning for sure. That
2 would've kind of directed where we started a little bit better. I
3 think we were just trying to hit areas that we could get to based
4 on the tides. It might not have -- there might've been a more
5 oiled area that we could've gotten to just as easily, but just not
6 having that information, we don't know. So --

7 Q. Okay. And who was your boss I guess at the response?

8 A. I guess technically it would've been planning, but I
9 definitely coordinated with the Deputy Ops strike team folks a
10 little bit more.

11 Q. Okay. So there's a little bit of --

12 A. Outside of the --

13 Q. -- agency stove-piping going on?

14 A. Yeah, a little bit.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Yes, definitely.

17 Q. All right. Other than that, I guess what would be the thing
18 that you are most satisfied with for the response?

19 A. I would say everyone's hard work. I think the first month,
20 we were kind of in triage and needed more people, and it just took
21 a while for people to get there. And I think the people that were
22 there dealing with the first month of it did a really good job for
23 what we had people-wise and everything.

24 Q. And then what would you like to see go better, or what were
25 you most frustrated with?

1 A. I guess areas for improvement would be, I guess for myself,
2 just not having the expectation that things are running smoothly
3 right off the bat. I think I learned that for sure, was that it
4 takes a while for it to get organized, for people to figure what
5 positions they need to fill and what actually needs to get done.
6 I think having patience to integrate with the RP and the State is
7 another -- is a good thing as well.

8 Q. And so I think now in the response, you'd probably describe
9 it as completely integrated?

10 A. Um-hmm.

11 Q. Completely integrated Unified Command?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Early on, not so much?

14 A. Yeah, I mean, I think the Unified Command was definitely
15 integrated, but --

16 Q. At the UC level, correct?

17 A. At the UC level, but at the boots-on-the-ground level, not so
18 much.

19 Q. And then even in the Section chief, not so much?

20 A. Yeah. And definitely in the ICP, yeah.

21 Q. And that's where it probably could've been improved earlier
22 on?

23 A. Yeah, definitely like the Ops and Deputy Ops section level.
24 That was a lot of -- took a lot of growing to get there.

25 Q. Was the resistance from the RP and that integration, or was

1 it just kind of natural slowing due to the response?

2 A. I would say probably a little bit from the RP, from what I
3 saw in Ops, not so much in planning. Planning seemed to be easily
4 integratable. The Ops took a little bit longer than everyone
5 else.

6 Q. Okay. Anything else you want to add?

7 A. No. I think I'm good.

8 Q. All right. Well, that concludes this interview. Thank you.

9 (Whereupon, at 1.23 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: CAPSIZING/SINKING OF THE *GOLDEN*
 RAY IN THE BRUNSWICK RIVER,
 GEORGIA, ON SEPTEMBER 8, 2019
 Interview of [REDACTED]

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA19FM048

PLACE: Savannah, Georgia

DATE: January 29, 2020

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Jeff [REDACTED]
Transcriber