

NTSB *USS Fitzgerald/ACX Crystal* Draft Factual Report Technical Review

Page/Line	PARTY COMMENTS	NTSB – Disposition of Party Comments
<p>Page 4</p> <p>Line 3-4</p>	<p>“The only reported equipment malfunctions in the bridge or combat information center 3 (CIC) was an inoperative radar repeater (the SPA-25) in the CIC.2 It was shut down completely”</p> <p>Does the failure of the said navigational equipment facilitated an adverse effect on the other navigational equipment onboard USS FITZGERALD?</p> <p>Would this be considered causative and/or an intermediate underlying factor to the casualty?</p>	<p>Thank you for your comments, however, they appear to be analysis and, as such, would be treated in the analysis section.</p>
<p>Page 7</p> <p>Line 5-8</p>	<p>According to the Fitzgerald’s voyage management system (VMS), between 2340 and 0025, the destroyer overtook contacts both to port and starboard. At 0033, VMS showed five vessels heading in a general northeasterly direction, crossing from starboard to port relative to the Fitzgerald, and two vessels heading in the same general direction as the Fitzgerald (on the starboard</p> <p>USS FITZGERALD was the give-way vessel considering that she was exhibiting green side light on certain occasions with other vessels prior to the casualty event. Consequently, as the give-way vessel, the US Naval Warship should have avoided crossing ahead and kept out of the way of the other vessel as far as practicable and have taken early and substantial action consistent with Rule 16 of COLREGS (<i>Actions of Give-way Ship</i>).</p> <p>Rule 22 of the 1972 Collision Regulations requires that every give-way vessel should avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel if the circumstances permit. This provision applies to all power- driven ships required to keep clear of another power-driven vessel on her starboard side (Rule 15 of COLREGS “Crossing Situation”).</p>	<p>Further down page 7, at lines 10-13, we state: “to negotiate around these vessels, the “<i>Fitzgerald</i> deviated from the planned trackline” and that the <i>Fitzgerald</i> “proceeded to transit astern of the five northeastbound vessels...”</p> <p>We treat a number of COLREGS in analysis.</p>
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<p>Line 5-6</p>	<p>The Fitzgerald OOD told investigators that at about that distance, she first noticed two vessels on the bridge SPS-73 6 radar. She said she tried to “hook” or electronically acquire the vessels but had trouble doing so.</p> <p>Has the OOD provided an explanation on the difficulty acquiring the targets or verifying the targets? Did the inoperative radar repeater (the SPA-25) post implications on validating the target?</p>	<p>OOD did not provided explanation. As per above, the repeater issue is treated in analysis.</p>
<p>Page 10 Line 8-9</p>	<p>According to the Fitzgerald’s deck log, at 0122, a course change was it ordered to 200 (from 185).</p> <p>Was the course change in accordance with the voyage plan? Or was it taken as a preventive measure?</p>	<p>We could find no record relating to why the course change took place and this is addressed in analysis</p>
<p>Page 11 Line 2-6</p>	<p>The junior OOD said she told the OOD to slow the destroyer’s speed, but that the OOD replied that a slowdown would make the situation worse. The OOD told investigators that she thought about turning to starboard and going astern of both vessels but decided against this maneuver because that course would take the destroyer closer toward land</p> <p>Under Rule 8 of COLREGS, “Action to Avoid Collision,” alterations of speed take longer to put into effect than alterations to course, so they are less likely to be readily observed. If a reduction of speed is to be made, it should be taken off as rapidly as possible by putting the engines on slow ahead or dead slow. Alteration of course of less than 10° is unlikely to be accepted to satisfy this requirement. In the case of USS FITZGERALD, her appropriate action should have been to alter her course to starboard in order to pass astern of MV ACX CRYSTAL instead of continuing on her original heading.</p>	<p>Thank you for your recitation of the rules. We include this in analysis. As for your comment starting with: “Alteration of course of less than 10 ° is unlikely to be accepted to satisfy this requirement....”, this is analysis.</p>
<p>Page 15 Line 9-11</p>	<p>The Fitzgerald’s AIS could be configured in broadcast or receive-only modes.; It was set to receive-only during the accident voyage. In this mode, the destroyer received information about other vessels in the area, on a dedicated laptop computer, but it did not transmit its own data.</p>	

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	<p>It was stipulated under Navy policy that at the time of the accident, naval vessels were not permitted to broadcast AIS information to other vessels but could receive information from other vessels. Would this constitute a safety issue, especially during transit on a high density area which would create confusion with other merchant ships? In this view, has the Navy revised its policy on AIS operation after the accident?</p>	<p>These are all good questions, but again, analysis. Also, there will be a treatment of post-accident action by the Navy.</p>
<p>Page 19</p>	<p>TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION</p> <p>Does the Navy conduct Navigational Audits to its OOD to determine their competency?</p>	<p>This does not seem to be a technical review of anything in the factual section of our report.</p>

