

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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QUEEN CITY BARGE BREAKAWAY
ON THE OHIO RIVER IN LOUISVILLE,
KENTUCKY, ON MARCH 28, 2023

Accident No.: DCA23FM025

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Interview of: JEREMIAH KIPP, Pilot
C&B Marine

Thursday,
March 30, 2023

APPEARANCES:

CWO4 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Lead Investigator
U.S. Coast Guard Sector Ohio Valley

MICHAEL KARR, Investigator in Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

CWO3 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
U.S. Coast Guard Sector Ohio Valley

LT [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
U.S. Coast Guard Sector Ohio Valley

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U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

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On behalf of Ingram Barge Company

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On behalf of C&B Marine

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I N T E R V I E W

1
2 CWO [REDACTED] Good morning, I'm Chief Warrant Officer
3 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I'll be the lead investigator from the Coast Guard
4 for the incident that occurred on March 28th with the towing
5 vessel *Queen City*. I'd like everybody to go around the room and
6 introduce themselves so you'll know who's here and then we'll
7 start with some questions.

8 MR. KIPP: Okay.

9 MR. BARBIERE: Jim Barbieri, I'm here for Ingram.

10 MR. FORRESTER: Dennis Forrester on behalf of Ingram.

11 MR. KARR: I'm Mike Karr with the NTSB and I'm out of
12 Washington, D.C.

13 MR. FERRIS: Thomas Ferris (ph.), Army Corps of Engineers.

14 MR. BELCHER: Tyler Belcher, Army Corps of Engineers.

15 MR. STOUT: Brad Stout, Army Corps of Engineers.

16 (Pause.)

17 MR. MILLIGAN: Oh, John Milligan on behalf of C&B Marine. He
18 knows me.

19 CWO [REDACTED] I would assume as much, but --

20 MR. KIPP: Yeah.

INTERVIEW OF JEREMIAH KIPP

21 BY CWO [REDACTED]

22 Q. Anyway, what we'd like to do is have you just discuss the
23 incident starting with your experience, your levels of experience
24 in the towboat industry, your background, how long you've been
25

1 doing it, you know, that sort of stuff. And then afterwards, if
2 you could just describe what happened, you know, in your words and
3 we may interject from time to time --

4 A. Okay.

5 Q. -- with some questions and follow-up, but first of all, we'd
6 like to know more about you, as the pilot.

7 A. All right, my name is Jeremiah Kipp, I've been employed with
8 C&B for 2 years running a boat for them, or coming up on 2 years,
9 I'm sorry. Been running a boat for them, the *Queen City*, for a
10 year and a half. I spent 7 years on the river all together. Two
11 and a half years was started on the cleaning crew, switched to
12 decking, and then moved up and got my steersman and I got my
13 license, that's when I came to C&B.

14 Q. So where are you from originally?

15 A. Oh, South Point, Ohio.

16 Q. South Point, Ohio. Okay. Okay, and if you could just, at
17 this point, talk about the incident leading up to the allision?

18 A. Just coming down, you know, normally, how I do. I've been
19 there a handful of times, you know, 15-ish, give or take, just
20 depending on what watch it falls on. Approached it how I believed
21 would be successful, cleared the bridges, current ended up
22 grabbing me. I hooked it up to draw it towards the canal, which
23 ended up setting the boat closer to the cell. Once my head
24 cleared, I all-stopped on the starboard and full asterned it --
25 you know, I was hard down to the port to twist it. Slightly

1 bumped it at the 400-foot mark on my tow and created a notch
2 between the third barge out and the second barge out, and that's
3 where the initial blow was. It split my starboard face and the
4 one end off from that. It automatically started going on the back
5 side of the dam. Then the head five, the very head two, and then
6 the three behind it abreast, they were swinging to the port
7 because I still had a four, inside port, four and a half on it.

8 At that time, the captain was already up there with me, he
9 wanted me to attempt to pin the remainder five due to the tank
10 barge being in that five. In an attempt to pin them, I ended up
11 breaking my port face wire and the capstan line, as well. At that
12 point, all my guys were already out on the tow, I called them all
13 back to be with the boat. I got everybody back on the boat, the
14 captain was still on the radio and on phone calls, helping me with
15 that, he told me to go retrieve what I could, so in an attempt to
16 go --

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER 1: You're fine.

18 CWO [REDACTED] No, take your time.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER 2: Want some water?

20 CWO [REDACTED] Yeah, we got Diet Coke, too, if you need it.

21 MR. KIPP: In attempt to save the barge, my deckhand got me a
22 capstan. Could not save it, realized the -- that the vessel was
23 going to go under the bridge, so we cut the line loose, I had it
24 hooked up full astern with the flanking rudders hard down. It was
25 still sitting there, I couldn't --

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Can we go off the record for a minute?

2 CWO [REDACTED] Sure.

3 (Off the record.)

4 (On the record at 1:21 p.m.)

5 MR. KARR: All right, 13:21.

6 MR. KIPP: I had it fully hooked up full astern, the flanking
7 rudders hard down to the port and the boat was (indiscernible),
8 I'd say I was around 5 feet above the bridge, it finally hooked
9 up, started slowly getting away, flipped around out of there and
10 drove out. Captain said let's go get the one tank empty that
11 remained on the point, went and grabbed it, and I set it into the
12 fleet there, CGB lot, right there at Towhead Island. And then
13 after that, I just, you know, started writing down statements, you
14 know, internal documents, and really just breaking down everything
15 that happened, I was writing my statement and all that, so --

16 BY CWO [REDACTED]

17 Q. I had a follow-up question, with the initial impact, do you
18 think it was both the second barge and the third barge in the
19 starboard string that impacted the light?

20 A. It was give or take --

21 Q. Right there?

22 A. Yeah, right there at the -- like, as soon as I touched, it
23 sling-shotted those two back, it was, you know, right there at
24 that coupling.

25 Q. So it may have been the IB1938 or it could've been the

1 IN005477 or literally right there.

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. Okay, okay.

4 A. It was the initial first impact to the cell.

5 Q. And the tank barge that you retrieved, as I understand, it
6 was the tank barge IB1961?

7 A. Yes.

8 CWO ██████████ Okay. Do you have some questions, Mr. Karr?

9 MR. KARR: Sure. I'm Mike Karr with the NTSB, I'll ask some
10 follow-up questions.

11 BY MR. KARR:

12 Q. In as much detail, give me -- describe the approach as you
13 were coming, let's say approaching the Second Street Bridge?

14 A. Yeah, Second Street --

15 Q. Second Street Bridge, you know, you're thinking about going
16 into the lock, so tell me, in your mind, what you wanted to do and
17 then tell me what happened as things were going.

18 A. Okay, yes, I was coming down through the bridges, I call it
19 green light, it's the center light from the next bridges. Had a
20 center string jackstaffing all the green lights, you know, my Rose
21 Point was saying I was right on the sailing line, you know,
22 looking good on the approach on everything to come into the canal,
23 you know. My speed was, I believe, 5.7 to 5.8. Once I started
24 getting through the bridges, started slowly picking up some speed,
25 I believe I was around 6 to 6.1 when I cleared them and then

1 that's when the set had grabbed my tow and that's when I picked it
2 up to drive down to the canal.

3 Q. So when you were -- so what was your plan, with regard to the
4 -- was the sailing line involved in your plan at all as far as
5 helping --

6 A. Yeah, to get me an ideal --

7 Q. -- me understand --

8 A. -- point where to go down through there, yes.

9 Q. So your intent was to stay on the sailing line, above the
10 sailing line?

11 A. To stay in the vicinity of the sailing line, yes, to go down
12 through there.

13 Q. All right. Was there any particular risk that you knew of or
14 that you -- you know, when you were thinking about going into the
15 canal, was there anything that -- any particular risk that you
16 thought about needed addressing?

17 A. No, sir. Coming down in there, I believed fully in myself
18 and my crew, we was going to be able to make that approach in that
19 lock correctly and safely, and coming into it, I was fully
20 confident in myself --

21 Q. All right.

22 A. -- coming down there.

23 Q. So I understand the river was in high water.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. All right. Tell me what that means to you, as a pilot of a

1 towboat.

2 A. It definitely changed the factors of the game a little bit.
3 It's nothing I couldn't handle, I've been in high water before,
4 not necessarily that area, but I knew high water and the effects
5 that it has on the tow and on the boat.

6 Q. What are those effects on high water on the tow?

7 A. Just the current, you know, pushing, you know, I did
8 anticipate a little bit, but I didn't know it was going to grab me
9 as much as it did that day.

10 Q. And what do you know -- can you -- I'm not from this area,
11 can you describe to me how the currents act at that point of
12 approaching the locks after you come through the Second Street
13 bridge?

14 A. Each of them are different. That one, particular, has a set
15 out, so once you cleared the bridges, there's the set towards the
16 outer and of course, you have to make the canal.

17 Q. All right. Can you help me understand why does that set
18 occur?

19 A. Just the shape of the river, really.

20 Q. Okay.

21 CWO [REDACTED] I have a follow-up question on -- you said
22 we're making roughly 6 miles an hour --

23 MR. KIPP: Um-hum.

24 CWO [REDACTED] -- right as you were approaching the Portland
25 Canal, what would have been the current behind you?

1 MR. KIPP: Hard to judge. I didn't really -- I didn't really
2 stop to think about -- I don't know what the current should be --

3 CWO [REDACTED] But I mean, obviously, you have to go faster --

4 MR. KIPP: Yeah, to out run the --

5 (Crosstalk)

6 CWO [REDACTED] -- to steer, yeah.

7 BY MR. KARR:

8 Q. All right, Mike Karr with the NTSB. After you came through
9 the Second Street Bridge, who else was on watch with you and what
10 were they doing?

11 A. Now, the Second Street -- that's the first one I come to when
12 I'm southbound, I'm sorry.

13 CWO [REDACTED] Are you talking about the big --

14 (Crosstalk)

15 MR. KIPP: I just know there's four of them. There's one and
16 then there's two together and then there's one last one kind of --

17 CWO [REDACTED] It's the 265 bridge up further north and then
18 that dual bridge is I-65 north --

19 MR. KARR: Okay.

20 CWO [REDACTED] -- and southbound and then there's that Second
21 Street Bridge.

22 MR. KIPP: Okay, then. All right. My crew on watch was
23 Teven Clark and Rowan Beavis. At the time, Teven had just come up
24 as he usually does to check, you know, they do their thing
25 downstairs on cleanup and, you know, make sure the boat looks

1 good. But they -- he came up to see if we have any, you know,
2 delays or if we're going straight through and at that time when he
3 came up, I instructed him to go downstairs to get Dave, the
4 captain, because I figured it was a bad situation and when he went
5 downstairs to get him, I realized that all hope, like I guess it's
6 going to be bad than what I figured, you know, there's no saving
7 it, that's when I hit the general alarm and woke everybody on the
8 boat up, so --

9 BY MR. KARR:

10 Q. So let me go -- let me ask some follow-up questions to what
11 you just described. So the deckhand came up as part of his normal
12 watch or did --

13 A. No, he came up due to -- he knew around what time we
14 should've been at the lock, had just a slight little bit of
15 traffic delay, you know, a boat coming up, it took a little longer
16 than I expected. So when we wasn't at the lock at the approximate
17 time, he was coming up to check to see when that time was.

18 Q. All right. And then you said you had a conversation with him
19 and --

20 A. To go down and get Dave.

21 Q. All right.

22 A. When he came up, I would've said go back down and get Dave.

23 Q. All right. And why did you ask -- why did you ask for Dave
24 to come up?

25 A. Being the captain and knowing I was going to need help, not

1 really making decisions but to be on the radio with the guys,
2 Coast Guard on 16, to just help me really like take control of the
3 situation where I don't have my hands full and where someone would
4 get hurt or anything else would get damaged.

5 Q. And what situation was that, entering the lock?

6 A. No, at that point where I made the decision to get Dave and
7 hit the general alarm, I realized that the current had already had
8 the tow and that it was going to be an allision with the cell.

9 Q. Oh, so ahead of the allision, you called for Dave?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay, all right. Could you estimate about what time, you
12 know, how many -- the minutes, seconds?

13 A. No, I was well over 900 feet, I'd say about as soon as I
14 cleared the bridge, it started grabbing me, it wasn't looking
15 good. I'd say from the time I ordered Teven to go get Dave and
16 the time I hit, 2 minutes, two and a half minutes.

17 Q. All right. And you said 900 feet, what was -- that's even
18 better than a time if you knew what position.

19 A. Oh, my boat, that's how long -- my tow was 800 feet and then
20 my boat's about 112 to 115 feet.

21 Q. Okay. And you use that in your description here, I didn't
22 catch why that was --

23 A. Because once my tow cleared the bridge, that's when it
24 started grabbing.

25 Q. All right. All right, I've got some more questions. Did you

1 interact with VTS that evening before you went under the bridge
2 and you felt the current push you?

3 A. Yes. I came on watch at 11:00, called them on Twelve Mile,
4 they said call back at Six, and I called at Towhead and then at
5 that point was when we lost everything, so --

6 Q. So here's a question for you as a mariner, what's the value
7 of the Coast Guard VTS to you, as the pilot of a tow?

8 A. The value --

9 Q. Or you know, what do -- here's background. So at high
10 water --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- the Coast Guard stands up the Vessel Traffic Services --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- only during high water.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So there's -- you know, they've got a guy on watch, so what
17 does he provide you that's useful to you?

18 A. Lets me know, you know, if I'm clear to come, if there's
19 other vessels in the area trying to travel through the passageway.

20 Q. All right.

21 CWO [REDACTED] And just for your information, that's Towhead
22 Island there. That's the twin I-65 bridges and that's the Second
23 Street Bridge.

24 MR. KARR: All right, got it.

25 CWO [REDACTED] So he made a geographic, just thought I'd

1 mention it.

2 MR. KARR: Oh, he made a -- oh, he talked about Towhead
3 Island.

4 CWO [REDACTED] Yes, Towhead Island.

5 MR. KARR: Okay, just --

6 MR. KIPP: That's where we put that tanker that I recovered
7 from the point of the canal.

8 BY MR. KARR:

9 Q. All right. Steersman training and any other training you've
10 had, what wisdom have you received from other people or formal
11 training programs about operating in high water?

12 A. Just, you know --

13 Q. Well, let me ask, did they specifically talk about high
14 water?

15 A. I mean, yeah, high water is one of the categories of your
16 steersman book, that you have to have training in and you have to
17 be signed off by the DE on that, so yeah, high water is taken
18 pretty serious on the training.

19 Q. All right. Do you know of any other, with regard to the
20 night of this contact, any other things that you would've been
21 concerned about?

22 A. No, not really. Just really, like I said, Rose Point says
23 there's a set, I crept up for what I thought the set would be and
24 did just -- it was more than expected.

25 Q. Rose Point, tell me about Rose Point telling you there'd be a

1 set.

2 A. It has a -- it has like these little arrows that are pointing
3 at -- you know, and then there's a little yellow bar that says
4 high water will be -- will set you, so it tells you that there is
5 a set there.

6 Q. All right, thanks for telling me, but -- telling me that
7 about Rose Point. How was the vessel -- how was the vessel
8 behaving that -- let me put it this way. Were the engines working
9 okay?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. All right. Steering?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. All right.

14 CWO [REDACTED] And the horsepower of the vessel is --
15 MR. KIPP: I believe around 3,000.

16 CWO [REDACTED] Three thousand?

17 MR. KIPP: I believe.

18 CWO [REDACTED] Okay.

19 BY MR. KARR:

20 Q. And what's the largest number of barges you've operated in a
21 tow?

22 A. At once?

23 Q. At once.

24 A. Twenty.

25 Q. With regard to this operation, this voyage, was there any --

1 was there any restrictions on the number of barges you were
2 supposed to carry?

3 A. No. There was not restrictions on anything that -- we were,
4 you know -- we actually put the rakes back onto base up (ph.) just
5 to give us that little advantage of being able to stop, but no,
6 we -- we were fine on the vessel.

7 Q. And for my knowledge, this has come up before in other
8 investigations, what does a sailing line mean to you?

9 A. Just gives you a general idea of where you want to be on the
10 river, where the most safest place to be is.

11 Q. All right. I'm just curious, do you know who generates that
12 sailing line?

13 A. No, sir.

14 Q. All right. It's the Army Corps of Engineers.

15 A. Oh. I just --

16 MR. KARR: All right. No, I have -- I have no more
17 questions.

18 CWO [REDACTED] Anyone have any more questions? I have no
19 more, does anyone else?

20 CWO [REDACTED] I have some.

21 BY CWO [REDACTED]

22 Q. From the Coast Guard, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Can you tell us, back --
23 about you checking in to VTS, can you tell us, was there any
24 information provided to you by the VTS radio watchstander or did
25 you look online or on a computer for sensors in the details for

1 approaching the VTS system?

2 A. The only thing I really checked before entering was the water
3 stage, the river stage level.

4 Q. Um-hum.

5 A. It was 17 and a half, I believe the lower was around 40 -- I
6 want to say 43 --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- or 47, one of those two, but that's the only thing I
9 checked.

10 Q. Yeah. And I just -- what about the VTS checking, was there
11 any data provided to you that you can recall?

12 A. I'm not sure, just that there was a boat shoving out of the
13 lock making his way through the bridges and for me to check back
14 in at the Six Mile Island, called (indiscernible).

15 Q. That's it for me. Oh, sorry. When the allision occurred, do
16 you recall any damage to the light structure or do you -- you all
17 laid there for a minute, I guess, do you recall any damages to
18 that light structure at the cell?

19 A. No, there was -- it was -- the initial contact was a soft
20 slap (ph.).

21 Q. Um-hum.

22 A. And then the second contact was immediately after, which
23 would -- the two (indiscernible). So no, I believe all the impact
24 and damage was down there by the barges.

25 Q. But the light, did you see anything, did it sway back and

1 forth or anything?

2 A. I don't recall.

3 CWO [REDACTED] Okay.

4 CWO [REDACTED] All right, Mr. Karr, I believe, has --

5 MR. KARR: Couple more follow-up questions.

6 MR. KIPP: Okay.

7 BY MR. KARR:

8 Q. I forgot to ask you about your work schedule.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. How often are you off the boat, how often are you on the
11 boat?

12 A. I work 14 and 14, I do 600 watches, currently back watch. We
13 like to do crew change or watch change, I should say, 11:00 to
14 5:00.

15 Q. And then when did you join the vessel?

16 A. I got --

17 Q. What's the most recent, you know, when you were off 14 days
18 and you came back?

19 A. I got on the *Queen City* Thursday morning around 10:00 a.m.

20 Q. Can you tell me if you've received any high water guidance in
21 e-mails or anything from your company?

22 A. Yeah, we get quite a few e-mails, there's different orders
23 but there's -- it's usually an e-mail to, pertaining, you know,
24 the conditions, you know, high winds or high water, you know, if
25 it's raining or snowing, you know, make sure we take care of our

1 crew and our guys, make sure we take proper dehydration breaks
2 when it's hot, make sure we bring them in to warm up when it's
3 cold. So yeah, there's an e-mail received on there about the
4 conditions of the river.

5 Q. Can you recall what the advice was with regard to the --

6 A. I can't recall it, but there always is one pertaining to the
7 river conditions.

8 Q. Since you've been an employee of C&B Marine, have you gone to
9 any training programs?

10 A. Training programs, no.

11 Q. Training seminars, bring the captains in or anything?

12 A. No, not really. There's not much -- no, I haven't been to
13 any other seminars.

14 Q. I never asked this question before. When you're at home, do
15 you get -- when you're off on your 14 days, do you get e-mails
16 from the company with policies or information they want you to
17 know about?

18 A. We have the -- we used to have an old app that was called
19 Paycom, we used to do -- make little assessments on there, but now
20 we got this new app and I haven't really got on that one yet.

21 Q. All right. And during your previous trips through, you know,
22 coming down river --

23 A. Um-hum.

24 Q. -- through Louisville, have any -- can you recall if any of
25 those have been during high water?

1 A. Not as high water as this, maybe about a foot or two, you
2 know, no more than five, but not to this level.

3 Q. I was going to ask you and here's a follow-up question is,
4 you know, so what was different about this trip from the previous
5 ones?

6 A. The high water was the only really different factor between
7 any other time I made it through there.

8 MR. KARR: All right. Thanks, that's all the questions I
9 have.

10 CWO [REDACTED] Does anyone else have anything to ask him?

11 MR. BARBIERE: I have a question, Jim Barbieri for Ingram.

12 BY MR. BARBIERE:

13 Q. You mentioned Teven Clark was with you during all this, do
14 you remember if anybody else was around or -- at the time?

15 A. Teven came up, like I said, when I ordered him away, then
16 Dave came up and Dave really helped out with the phone calls and
17 the radios while I was, you know, trying to focus on the barges
18 and my deck crew.

19 Q. Okay, so just Teven and Dave were --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- the only people out there with you?

22 A. Yes.

23 MR. BARBIERE: Okay.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Real quick. You successfully
25 navigated this lock before, correct?

1 MR. KIPP: Yes, sir.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How many times?

3 MR. KIPP: I'd say 15, at least, no problems, no issues.

4 MR. KARR: I know, I have another one

5 CWO [REDACTED] Oh, oh, another question.

6 (Crosstalk)

7 BY MR. KARR:

8 Q. The deckhands, I think you talked about -- were the deckhands
9 ever on the tow after the contact was made?

10 A. Yes, when the initial contact was made, my two guys, Teven
11 and Rowan, immediately went out after waking, you know, general
12 alarm woke people up, the engineer went around waking the other
13 two deckhands up. They quickly responded, put their boots on,
14 their jackets on, their gloves, took off. And then, like I said,
15 when I went to -- when I lost my port face wire and my capstan
16 line, is when I called everybody back.

17 Dave's two guys, which is Coby, Coby his brother, and then
18 Nate, they stayed on the boat and was giving me more capstan lines
19 to it and then my two guys was about, one was about 200 feet out
20 and Teven was about three and I called them back, to get with the
21 boat because the whole tow was separating and I didn't want to
22 lose a guy on a barge that I wasn't connected to.

23 Q. Yeah. Well, that's part of the story that I'd like to tell,
24 so with regard to, you know, the guys were -- so they were on some
25 of the barges that were still attached to the *Queen City* --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- at the same time other barges had been separated?

3 A. They were -- okay, it was the original block of four, which
4 is my port face and my center face, and the two end on from there,
5 they were on that original four.

6 Q. All right, so I'm going to -- so either Chief Warrant Officer
7 here will help me or you can, so which are the original four?

8 A. Okay, the bottom center one, the 99 --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. -- that is what I call my center face.

11 Q. All right.

12 A. And the one to the left of it is what I call my port face.
13 The two on above it, so it goes to that T barge and that one,
14 that's the original four that I was pertaining to.

15 Q. All right. And your deckhands were on these --

16 A. Yes, they didn't get off those four.

17 Q. They were on these four barges?

18 A. Yes, when they first went out and then, when I went to pin
19 the top five, which is the very top two, yeah, those --

20 Q. Yeah, um-hum.

21 A. -- the top five, when I went to pin those is when I broke my
22 port face and my capstan and back there, back there where your pen
23 is, we call that like -- there is a wire there that held together
24 and that's where all of them came to get to the boat because I was
25 still touching up to the center face.

1 Q. All right. So these barges were all still attached --

2 A. Yes, until --

3 Q. -- and you were trying to push --

4 A. -- I pinned those and --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Yeah. So when you were trying to pin --

8 A. Um-hum.

9 Q. -- these five barges --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- were they still attached to one another? You know --

12 A. They was and they wasn't, it was hard to see at night

13 because --

14 Q. As best you remember.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Yeah.

17 A. That five had turned, so I actually touched up in the notch

18 on the 1928.

19 MR. KARR: All right, so -- and let's see, I think the

20 captain said they turned to starboard. Huh?

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They turned to port.

22 MR. KARR: Oh, they turned to port.

23 MR. KIPP: Well, they -- the starboard came around and then I

24 touched up in the notch.

25 BY MR. KARR:

1 Q. But it would've been twisted like that, yeah.

2 A. Yes, like that, yes.

3 Q. Okay. And I'm twisting it counterclockwise, let the record
4 show.

5 A. Yes, because the 1961 is the one that ended up sticking on
6 the point.

7 MR. KARR: All right, good. Thanks for that.

8 CWO [REDACTED] Thank you. I believe no one else has any
9 questions. We will need information for the previous 96 hours of
10 your work/rest history.

11 MR. KIPP: Okay.

12 CWO [REDACTED] I believe you're going to handle that. It's
13 part of the company report.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER 1: Okay, that's fine.

15 CWO [REDACTED] Anybody --

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER 2: Can I (indiscernible)?

17 CWO [REDACTED] Sure.

18 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

19 Q. Jeremiah, what can the Coast Guard do better at the VTS to
20 provide you all what information you think we can provide you at
21 all to prevent this from reoccurring?

22 A. I don't think it was necessarily the VTS.

23 Q. I'm not looking for -- I'm just saying what can we do -- what
24 can we provide to the mariner to help out these transits down-
25 bound at high water? Because you're -- this is not the first.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay, and it won't be the -- it probably won't be the last,
3 or I'd like to make it the last.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So what -- and I'm talking if you had unlimited tax dollars
6 to spend, I don't care what you say, I mean, you say sell that
7 whatever, you know, I'm asking for --

8 A. I think the situation we got now with us, my boat being the
9 helper boat, I think that's a good system. I would like to
10 believe that I can now navigate with the information we know now,
11 I believe I can navigate through that passage without a helper
12 boat, though.

13 Q. What do you think they could do better?

14 A. Build technology. I don't know what all you would build
15 there that wouldn't mess with the water levels of this area. So
16 like I said, it's just, you know, I had the information, it just
17 -- it was more than what I expected with regard to the information
18 that we obtained that morning.

19 BY MR. KARR:

20 Q. I'll follow up on that. Would having any -- would knowing
21 what the current was in many locations help you?

22 A. Knowing now how quickly that current there grabs now with the
23 information after the fact, yes, I believe I would be okay to
24 travel through there further on.

25 CWO [REDACTED] Okay, if there are no more questions, we

1 appreciate your time, and thank you.

2 MR. KIPP: Sorry we met like this.

3 MR. KARR: All right, we'll stop recording at 2:50.

4 (Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the interview concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the


NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: QUEEN CITY BARGE BREAKAWAY
 ON THE OHIO RIVER IN LOUISVILLE,
 KENTUCKY, ON MARCH 28, 2023
 Interview of Jeremiah Kipp

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA23FM025

DATE: March 30, 2023

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Karen D. Martini
Transcriber