

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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QUEEN CITY BARGE BREAKAWAY
ON THE OHIO RIVER IN LOUISVILLE,
KENTUCKY, ON MARCH 28, 2023

Accident No.: DCA23FM025

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Interview of: DAVID SUPPLE, Captain
C&B Marine

Thursday,
March 30, 2023

APPEARANCES:

CWO4 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Lead Investigator
U.S. Coast Guard Sector Ohio Valley

MICHAEL KARR, Investigator in Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

CWO3 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
U.S. Coast Guard Sector Ohio Valley

LT [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
U.S. Coast Guard Sector Ohio Valley

BRAD STOUT
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

DENNIS FORRESTER
Ingram Barge Company

JAMES BARBIERE, Esq.
On behalf of Ingram Barge Company

JOHN MILLIGAN, Esq.
On behalf of C&B Marine

I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of David Supple:	
By CWO [REDACTED]	6
By Mr. Karr	11
By CWO [REDACTED]	13
By Mr. Karr	14
By CWO [REDACTED]	21
By Mr. Karr	22

I N T E R V I E W

1
2 CWO [REDACTED] -- lead investigator for the Coast Guard. This
3 gentleman here is Michael Karr, the investigator for NTSB. We are
4 here today to interview parties involved in the inspected towing
5 vessel *Queen City* allision and barge breakaway that occurred on
6 March 28th of 2023.

7 The Coast Guard and NTSB are conducting a joint investigation
8 with the Coast Guard as the lead investigative agency. We also
9 have representatives for the parties in interest present, Army
10 Corps of Engineers, Ingram Barge Company, and C&B Marine. The
11 U.S. Coast Guard is conducting an investigation into the marine
12 casualty, *ITB Queen City* allision with the Coast Guard Memorial
13 Light at the entrance to Portland Canal and the 11-barge breakaway
14 that occurred on 28 March 2023.

15 This investigation is being conducted per Title 46 U.S. Code
16 6301 and in accordance with Title 46 C.F.R. Part 4. The purpose,
17 (1) identify the cause of the casualty; (2) whether an act of
18 misconduct, incompetence, negligence, un-skillfulness or willful
19 violation evolved by a Coast Guard credentialed individual or any
20 person, including members of the Coast Guard; whether act
21 subjecting offenders to civil penalty or criminal penalty under
22 the laws of the United States, and whether there's a need for new
23 laws or regulation or repeal of laws or regulations to prevent
24 reoccurrence. The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency in this
25 investigation convened by Captain Heather Mattern, Coast Guard

1 Sector Ohio Valley commander, and the National Transportation
2 Safety Board is the assisting agency in the investigation in
3 accordance with the U.S. Coast Guard-NTSB memorandum of
4 understanding. The lead investigating officer, once again, me,
5 Chief Warrant Officer [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Accordingly, I represent the
6 Coast Guard authority over all parties during the interviews,
7 investigation, and possess discretionary control over all parties
8 in determinations of proper and relevant questions presented
9 during the interview. This marine casualty investigation is
10 classified as a non-judicial proceeding.

11 Parties in interest are designated to help assure the Coast
12 Guard investigation has the fullest possible accounting of the
13 circumstances surrounding an incident while providing certain
14 procedural rights and protections. Ultimately, the role of the
15 parties in interest is to serve the purposes of the investigation.
16 To that end, the procedural rules will be used to ensure an
17 efficient and orderly interview that meets the ultimate goals of
18 the investigation while maintaining appropriate decorum
19 commensurate with the serious significant nature of the events
20 being investigated.

21 While the investigation is non-judicial, the Coast Guard is
22 free to make referrals for civil, criminal, or administrative
23 enforcement when an apparent violation is detected and any
24 decision to take one type of action does not preclude another type
25 of action. The designated representative from the NTSB may make

1 recommendations to the Coast Guard, call and examine witnesses,
2 and submit or request additional evidence subject to the
3 discretion of the Coast Guard. Okay, we'll continue, is AV all
4 set up and would you -- [REDACTED] would you prefer to watch these
5 videos while the master is present or do that later?

6 CWO [REDACTED] Yeah.

7 CWO [REDACTED] Later, okay. We have a gentleman here today,
8 Mr. David Supple?

9 MR. SUPPLE: Yes.

10 INTERVIEW OF CAPT DAVID SUPPLE

11 BY CWO [REDACTED]

12 Q. He was the master of the towing vessel *Queen City* and what we
13 would like you to do today, start off by just talking about
14 yourself, your qualifications, your experience, and then after
15 that just feel free to talk about what happened, when you became
16 aware of the event, what you did after the incident happened.

17 A. Been on the river since 1989, third generation river guy, X
18 for years, it's too long. Finally got my license and I've been a
19 pilot for -- I had the restricted master's and then I had my
20 master's for 4 years. Just became captain, finally, back in
21 August for C&B Marine. Was that good enough about me?

22 Q. I was curious, this restricted license you had originally,
23 was that for a particular company that only operated in a certain
24 area of the river?

25 A. Well, as far -- the way I understand it, you have most

1 people, when they get their license now, you know, years ago you
2 didn't have to be a steersman or, you know, you had -- you just
3 took the test and you kind of got turned loose if somebody thought
4 you could. Nowadays, you have to go through more steps to be a
5 steersman, have so many hours, get signed off on a tour book, and
6 then you're issued a restricted master's where you can't run the
7 front, you have to be on the boat with the pilot unless you --
8 like my mileage was from 441 to Ghent power plant, whatever mile
9 that is, 540, 541, somewhere, I had a couple miles on the licking
10 (ph.), as well.

11 So if you was in that hundred-mile span, you could run the
12 boat by yourself, like a tug pilot or whatever. As far as line
13 haul, you had to be on the boat with the master, so I had the
14 restricted license and then upgraded to the master's, took the
15 steps you have to take nowadays.

16 Q. And as I understand, you're endorsed for western rivers --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- which would include the Mississippi, Ohio, Missouri, and
19 some sort of tributaries?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. All right, if you'd just talk about the incident, you know.

22 A. Well, that night I went to bed 11:30 at night. I just
23 happened to get up because I have to pee around 2 o'clock in the
24 morning and as I come out of my room, somebody -- oh, or come out
25 of the bathroom, somebody opened the door and said you might maybe

1 go upstairs. And then before I got to the top of the stairs, I
2 think I felt the hit on the cell. After that, tried to give
3 instruction to the crew, was going to have the starboard string
4 ripped off first, the face wire broke, we still had hold of four.
5 The head valve kind of broke off, we had the port face wire and
6 the capstan line on the block of four, and I told the pilot see if
7 you can pin the headboard that had broke loose against the -- the
8 point there where -- the sign that says entrance to canal and as
9 he tried that, he kind of hit them a little too hard and then the
10 port string ripped off and lost the other face wire.

11 So all we had was the line and it's like turn me loose, I
12 said well, let's see if we can get around here and get some, see
13 if we can save anything, pin it against the -- whatever, like I
14 said, we didn't have face wires, all we could've done was catch
15 the lines on it. Attempted to save one, the boat was getting in
16 bad shape, to turn it loose, get out of here, save the boat and
17 the crew.

18 Q. For the benefit of anyone in the room that doesn't know the
19 watch system for towing vessels, could you explain that? Why the
20 pilot was on at certain hours and you, as the master --

21 A. I wake up at 5:00 twice a day and relieve the pilot by 5:30.
22 I'm on watch until he wakes up at 11:00, he relieves me by 11:30
23 twice a day, so six on and six off.

24 Q. And your job, as I understand it, when you're not on watch,
25 is to be asleep?

1 A. Yes. Eat, sleep, that's pretty much it.

2 Q. I have an additional follow-up question about the arrangement
3 of the barges in the tow. The tank barges, three of them were on
4 the head of the tug --

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. -- Row 1 and 2, and the fourth tank barge was Row 2 on the
7 starboard side, but basically you had all the tank barges ahead of
8 the tows, any particular reason?

9 A. (Indiscernible) you can't face up on the empties and have
10 them -- the empties go on the head of the loads.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. And then we have rakes. In high water, you want to back on
13 rakes, raking, you don't want to back on boxes, and the two tank
14 loads were boxes. So I had the rakes placed and then the anchor
15 drop purposes, we had gotten rid of one, we had nine and we got
16 rid of one back at North American Stainless, and then the head
17 empty was pushed back in its spot, that's why we had a notch on
18 the port head.

19 CWO MAUDLIN: Okay. Does anyone in the room need an
20 explanation of a box barge and a rake barge? Okay, not knowing
21 the --

22 MR. KARR: But I'd like -- Mike Karr with the NTSB. I'd like
23 an explanation of how each of these barges were -- you know,
24 whether it was a box end or a rake end.

25 CAPT SUPPLE: Can you see the lines on the barges themselves?

1 See on the very stern, the lower barges, it's got lines --

2 MR. KARR: Oh.

3 CAPT SUPPLE: -- to indicate rate.

4 CWO MAUDLIN: Oh, right here on the bottom where there's a
5 line in each corner versus --

6 (Crosstalk)

7 MR. SUPPLE: Yes.

8 CWO MAUDLIN: Or sometimes it's the lines in the front bow.

9 CAPT SUPPLE: If the rake was --

10 (Crosstalk)

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There's no lines at the box end.

12 MR. KARR: This is Mike Karr, the NTSB, I do see the lines on
13 the diagram. All right. Thank you, Captain.

14 CWO [REDACTED] And I learned something, too, on a tow diagram,
15 because I was wondering what those were, myself. So the rake end
16 is on your last row.

17 MR. SUPPLE: Yes, definitely --

18 CWO [REDACTED] Or rake end to the stern, rake end to the back
19 end of the tow.

20 MR. SUPPLE: Yes, you want to back on rakes.

21 CWO [REDACTED] Even though that's actually the stern of the
22 barge forward in the tow, right?

23 CAPT SUPPLE: Correct.

24 CWO MAUDLIN: Okay. Thank you, sir. Do you have any
25 questions, Mr. Karr?

1 MR. KARR: No, that -- oh, based on this or --

2 CWO ██████ Oh, based on anything in the interview so far,
3 yeah.

4 MR. KARR: Oh, yeah, yeah. Sure.

5 BY MR. KARR:

6 Q. So Mike Karr with the NTSB. I'll ask some follow-up
7 questions. What was your last stop before the contact occurred?

8 A. North American Stainless, we dropped another tank barge, tank
9 load of methanol.

10 Q. And how far up were -- you know, just roughly, how many --
11 how long was that or --

12 A. It's 439, the incident was six-oh --

13 Q. Oh, so mile marker 439?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. All right.

16 A. Or 539, excuse me. Five thirty nine.

17 Q. And what was that called, North American --

18 A. North American Stainless.

19 Q. Do you remember what town that's in?

20 A. It's around Ghent, Kentucky.

21 Q. And then what was going to be the next stop for the tug and
22 barge?

23 A. (Indiscernible) right below the lock at 612.

24 Q. Tell me about when you came up to the bridge, what was some
25 of the first things that the pilot told you?

1 A. I don't really know if he -- I asked if he hollered for help
2 to the tugs in the vicinity, let people know, but I don't really
3 remember him saying anything, I mean, he was kind of focused on
4 what was going on.

5 Q. Did he have any conversation with you in the first minute, 3
6 minutes, 5 minutes?

7 A. Not that I can remember. I mean, it was kind of like just
8 trying to assess the situation, see what we could do. He didn't
9 -- I kind of had to start making phone calls, alert the Coast
10 Guard, company official. I can't really remember a conversation
11 between me and him.

12 Q. No, that's fine, I was just, you know, seeing -- and that
13 question was specifically to see if there was a conversation and
14 what --

15 A. No.

16 Q. -- he might have said. You did describe this, but could you
17 do it a little more slower, do it more slowly, describe the action
18 that you and the pilot did in maneuvering the barge. You know,
19 one of the things I heard was the port string was still attached
20 and then when you did something else, then that -- you know, if
21 you could walk me through how the barge broke, how the barge tow
22 broke up.

23 A. I said the port string was gone, that this is the hill (ph.)
24 at the entrance and there's a -- there's the cell that he actually
25 hit, there's a dike and then there's land and another cell. And

1 once it hit, the starboard string went back this way, it broke the
2 face wire.

3 Q. So the starboard's -- what you're describing is the starboard
4 string started falling back, falling back?

5 A. Yes. Coming back, it broke the face wire, and the head
6 barges had kind of started going this way.

7 Q. Head barges -- I'm repeating this for the recorder, so the
8 head barges started twisting to the right.

9 A. And we had the four left and I wanted him to ease down and
10 try and pin the four, or the head barges, with the four that we
11 had with the port face wire and the capstan line and just pin them
12 against the hill so we didn't lose anything until a tug or
13 somebody come to assist.

14 Q. All right, keep going. You're doing a great job at
15 describing it.

16 A. Once he did that, it hit too hard and it ripped the port
17 string, the two left of four, ripped the port string off and broke
18 the port face wire, so we really didn't have anything but a line,
19 I think it was a two-part capstan line, I'm not positive, but it
20 just -- there was nothing you could do with the chaos that was
21 going on.

22 BY CWO [REDACTED]

23 Q. If I can interject two questions. Do you have an idea of
24 which barge initially hit that cell with the light?

25 A. I think it was the second barge out, the coal (ph.) load.

1 Q. Second barge out from the towboat, not the second row?

2 A. Right.

3 Q. Second barge out being the IN005477?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. Okay. Looking at the barge tow, that would be the third row
6 as we, the Coast Guard, counts rows from the back. Okay. But
7 that's your best --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- opinion based on everything? Okay. And can you explain
10 how you retrieved the IB1961? If I understand it, your vessel did
11 retrieve that one?

12 A. Yeah, it was laying on the land right where the sign of the
13 entrance to the canal is and once we had no success saving
14 anything on the bad side of the dike, we went back around, grabbed
15 the empty with a capstan line, backed up, shoved to our bow
16 rigging, tied it off in the fleet.

17 Q. Okay. And that fleet being --

18 A. CGB Jeff fleet.

19 Q. The line across from old Jeffboat?

20 A. Yes.

21 CWO [REDACTED] Okay, old Jeffboat.

22 (Crosstalk)

23 CWO [REDACTED] Okay. Does anyone else have any questions?

24 BY MR. KARR:

25 Q. I have some. Was anyone else in the wheelhouse with the

1 pilot that night? Or should I say when the contact was made.

2 A. No.

3 Q. All right. Is there anyone else awake during that watch?

4 A. Yes, there's two deckhands on watch with him.

5 Q. All right. Do those deckhands, can you describe to me what
6 role they play when they are on watch --

7 A. Well, at that time --

8 Q. -- at that time?

9 A. -- they would've been getting ready, once you get through the
10 canal, the lock's right down around the corner, so they would've
11 been ready to make the lock.

12 Q. And what might that include? So if you could, you know --
13 and what might that include as they're getting ready for the lock,
14 where would they be on the boat, what would they be doing? Or
15 where would they be, on the tow?

16 A. They wouldn't -- I mean, there's cleanup duties, different
17 things you do inside the boat and stuff, it's whenever the pilot,
18 captain, whichever, says we're about to head for the lock, they
19 get ready, get their lifejackets on, make sure they got their
20 boots on and go whenever you get closer, I mean.

21 Q. And that order had not been given?

22 A. No, you have to make it down in the canal first and through
23 the L&I Railroad Bridge, so they still had time before they
24 actually had to go out on the tow.

25 Q. And Captain, what's your rotation, your schedule, how many

1 days had you been on the boat at this time?

2 A. I just got on Thursday the 23rd. We do 2 weeks on, 2 weeks
3 off.

4 Q. And where do you reside?

5 A. Where do I live?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. West Virginia. Gallipolis Ferry, West Virginia.

8 Q. Just curious, where did you join the boat? Where did you --
9 beyond the 23rd, where did you go to join the boat?

10 A. Oh, where did I get on? Nucor, right below Markland Lock,
11 mile 535.

12 Q. You've been working with C&D Marine --

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: C&B.

14 MR. KARR: C&B. I could be 50 percent right.

15 BY MR. KARR:

16 Q. -- since August of '22. What kind of training and
17 indoctrination did they -- what kind of indoctrination did they
18 give you, what kind of training and if they --

19 A. This is actually my third time back. I was there when I was
20 a deckhand, got steersman, the port captain is actually the one
21 who trained me. Once I got my license, back at that time they
22 didn't have the one bigger boat and I ended up leaving there for a
23 couple years, a few years, 2 or 3 years, came back, worked another
24 2-year stint, left again, went somewhere else for 8, 9 months, and
25 come back. And I just been back here since August again.

1 Q. All right. So have you personally ever taken a vessel
2 through the canals that we're talking --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- talking about? And who were you -- what organization were
5 you working for at that time?

6 A. I've done it for C&B, Excel (ph.) Marine, Borgeezi (ph.)
7 (indiscernible), Campbell's Transportation.

8 Q. All right. And in all those passages and training, can you
9 tell me, can you give me -- can you give us local knowledge of
10 what it is like to take a tow and how to take a tow through --

11 A. It's a challenging spot, one of the most challenging spots,
12 especially in high water.

13 Q. Can you describe what the challenges -- can you describe
14 those challenges?

15 A. Just once you come through the bridges, it's a narrow bridge,
16 if the water's running, it pushes you out toward the dike, it's
17 very challenging.

18 Q. And can you describe how the water pushes you out to the
19 dike?

20 A. Once you get below that last bridge, it is the current, the
21 force of it, wants to push you out toward the cell that we had
22 impacted and that dike, that's under water, all the water shoots
23 out that way toward the dam.

24 Q. Is there any -- you know, if you know or based on your own
25 conclusions of what you've observed, what is it that causes the

1 current to act that way at that point?

2 A. Just the flow of the river.

3 Q. All right. When it comes to high water, what -- as the
4 captain -- well, let me ask you this, describe your role as the
5 captain, the master, the captain --

6 A. Overseeing the entire vessel, paperwork, the crew. You're in
7 charge, you're kind of the boss of the boat.

8 Q. All right. As the boss of the boat, have you provided or did
9 you provide this pilot, you know, specifically, can you tell us
10 about any information you provided, advice, for him to consider in
11 operating in high water in general or at this place in particular?

12 A. Before I went off watch, we had discussed the transit and how
13 -- I told him how it would do, what it would do, once he got past
14 the bridge the current was going to want to push him that way.

15 Q. Can you describe any more discussion you had, was there any
16 follow up to after you talked about the current pushing him this
17 way?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Can't remember what his reaction was?

20 A. Not really.

21 Q. Was there any specific discussion on how to best approach
22 that -- I'll call it a turn, you know, after you come through the
23 -- after you come through the L&I Railroad Bridge and then you
24 have to make the turn to starboard.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's Second Street Bridge.

1 MR. KARR: Pardon?

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The Second Street Bridge, here.

3 MR. KARR: Yeah, oh.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And then -- and then they entered the
5 canal.

6 MR. KARR: Oh, yeah. Right.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, then they entered the canal then
8 it's the L&I bridge.

9 BY MR. KARR:

10 Q. All right, so -- well, let me ask you this, was there any
11 specific discussion about coming through the Second Street Bridge?

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Second Street bridge.

13 BY MR. KARR:

14 Q. And then, you know, coming along the cells and then passing
15 under the L&I Railroad Bridge.

16 A. I just told him to be careful, try and keep it above the
17 sailing line, not to get below it.

18 Q. Thanks for mentioning the sailing line. So the sailing line,
19 is that -- how do you look at the sailing line, is that the line
20 you should be on or is that --

21 A. Not necessarily all the time. It's the channel, that's the
22 -- the sailing line is the channel most people follow.

23 Q. So you just mentioned something about stay above the sailing
24 line?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Can you remember exactly what you said, giving him advice?

2 A. No, just kind of told him to stay that way, drop in a little
3 bit, don't -- stay to the left of the sailing line as much as
4 possible. Somebody once told me if you got the balls to drop it
5 in there deep enough, it's kind of a straight shot through the
6 railroad bridge, if not, it's kind of more of a turn. It's --

7 Q. All right. Now, describe to me -- describe to me the -- if
8 you had the balls, what does that mean? I mean --

9 (Laughter.)

10 BY MR. KARR:

11 Q. Specifically, what would I have to do to demonstrate that?

12 A. Like I said, it's challenging, it's -- you have to worry when
13 you do that, you have to worry about sliding the boat into the
14 left descending bank, it's, I mean, dropping in there as far as
15 you can without sliding too far and hitting the hill.

16 Q. But how would you drop it in there, that's what I'm talking
17 about, would you speed up or --

18 A. It depends on -- I mean, it just depends. I mean, it's
19 mainly by steering. If you need to goose it up a little bit, you
20 goose it up or if you think you're going too fast, you slow down.

21 Q. All right.

22 A. Or not really -- well, pull back, I should say.

23 Q. Yeah. And here's a question to help you -- to help us with
24 the investigation, if you reviewed the Rose Point afterwards, was
25 there anything that you saw from the data telling or interesting,

1 you know, with regard to the current or the --

2 (Crosstalk)

3 A. -- you got -- it started, the current started pushing him and
4 he got below it.

5 BY CWO [REDACTED]

6 Q. By below, you mean on the Indiana side?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Oh, okay, just clarifying that. Are there any -- prior to
9 just possibly back down, backing down was achieved, trying not to
10 hit the light at the last minute, but any part of that approach to
11 the Portland Canal require backing down?

12 A. Normally, I wouldn't suggest trying to back up there, no, I
13 mean, once you start backing, your head's going to take up -- I
14 mean, you back -- you wouldn't back this way.

15 Q. Yeah.

16 A. You would back this way and then your head goes and usually
17 most people say it would be better to come ahead and try and drive
18 out of it than to try and back up because then you have no
19 control, you're losing speed. The faster you go, the more control
20 you have.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I know this is kind of an open
22 investigation, not as formal as like a court or deposition, but in
23 an objection, where it can be made, but I think I just want to
24 note for the record this is very speculative, everything that
25 we're kind of discussing right now.

1 CWO ██████ Oh, yeah.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'll put that out there.

3 MR. KARR: I'm going to stop the -- I'm going to stop the
4 recording at 12:52 and we'll rejoin shortly.

5 (Off the record at 12:52 p.m.)

6 (On the record at 12:53 p.m.)

7 MR. KARR: Twelve fifty three, we weren't off -- we weren't
8 off the line long.

9 CWO ██████ Oh, I'm good with my questions.

10 MR. KARR: All right, let me see if I got another one. Yes.

11 BY MR. KARR:

12 Q. Since you've been back on this shift, as you were coming down
13 the Ohio River, had you had any other -- had you personally had
14 any experience with Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Services?

15 A. Oh, yeah.

16 Q. From what I understand, on the Ohio River they're only set up
17 when there's high water?

18 A. Yes, 13 feet and above, I believe.

19 Q. All right. As a captain, and this is for my knowledge, what
20 service do they provide the mariners, what service do they provide
21 you?

22 A. Pass along information, keep track of all the boats and in
23 case something would happen, they would know and they have certain
24 check-in points, once you get to Twelve Mile Island, they check
25 you into the system. You check in at Six Mile Island and nothing

1 happened between there. And you check in at Waterworth,
2 everything's good, nothing happened there. They let you know if
3 somebody's coming down the river, coming up, they can hold you up
4 if somebody's coming out of the bridges or if you're northbound,
5 they can hold you up for a southbound vessel coming down through
6 the bridges.

7 Q. Thanks for that explanation. While you were at the wheel,
8 did the VTS give you any orders to hold up at any time?

9 A. I was off watch. You don't check in until Twelve Mile, I was
10 off watch before we got to Twelve Mile Island.

11 Q. How about any other time in the previous week? You know,
12 since you joined the vessel on the 23rd.

13 A. Well, after the incident, the next day, I would have to tell
14 them I'm going -- we was going to retrieve the barge that we got
15 off yesterday, back to the fleet. Any time we move it from one
16 spot to the other in that area of McAlpine and Twelve Mile Island,
17 you have to check in with Vessel Traffic.

18 MR. KARR: All right, thank you. I have no more questions.

19 CWO [REDACTED] I have no more questions. Does anybody else
20 have any more questions?

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No, thank you.

22 MR. KARR: Now, before he goes, this is Mike Karr with the
23 NTSB, now remember, everybody's supposed to help us --

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, yes.

25 MR. KARR: -- so if you have anything that you think we

1 should've asked, let us know. And Captain, is there anything
2 that, you know, that we didn't ask that could help in our
3 investigation?

4 CAPT SUPPLE: Not that I know of.

5 CWO [REDACTED] Okay, well, thank you.

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Are you guys good with releasing him,
7 because I'm going to have Randy pick him up and take him back.

8 CWO [REDACTED] Oh, sure.

9 MR. KARR: All right. And I will stop the recording at
10 12:55.

11 (Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the interview concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: QUEEN CITY BARGE BREAKAWAY
 ON THE OHIO RIVER IN LOUISVILLE,
 KENTUCKY, ON MARCH 28, 2023
 Interview of David Supple

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA23FM025

DATE: March 30, 2023

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

A thick black horizontal line redacting a signature.

Karen D. Martini
Transcriber