

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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FIRE ON THE *PRESIDENT EISENHOWER*  
SOUTHWEST OF SANTA BARBARA  
HARBOR, ON APRIL 28, 2021

Accident No.: DCA21FM026

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Interview of: THOMAS POVALEC, Chief Engineer  
(APL President Eisenhower)

Los Angeles, California

Friday,  
April 30, 2021

APPEARANCES:

BART BARNUM, Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board

LCDR [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
U.S. Coast Guard

LT [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
U.S. Coast Guard

ENSIGN [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
U.S. Coast Guard

CHIEF FOREIGN OFFICER [REDACTED]  
U.S. Coast Guard

JOE WALSH, Attorney  
Collier Walsh Nakazawa  
(On behalf of the vessel owners)

ANTOINE LETOURNEL  
APL Maritime

RICHARD DOHERTY  
MEBA Branch Agent

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I N T E R V I E W

(16:32 p.m.)

1  
2  
3 LT. [REDACTED] Good afternoon. This -- excuse me. Good  
4 afternoon, this is Lieutenant [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with the United States  
5 Coast Guard. Today is April 30, 2021. The time is 16:32. We are  
6 on board the motor vessel President Eisenhower at berth LA 46 to  
7 investigate the engine room fire that occurred on board the vessel  
8 on the morning of April 28, 2021. In the room with me are the  
9 following individuals:

10 LT. [REDACTED] Lieutenant Commander [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IO.

11 MR. BARNUM: Bart Barnum, NTSB, Office of Marine Safety.

12 MR. [REDACTED] Ensign [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Inspections  
13 Division.

14 MR. [REDACTED] Chief Foreign Officer [REDACTED] [REDACTED] U.S. Coast  
15 Guard, Sector Los Angeles, Long Beach.

16 MR. LETOURNEL: Antoine Letournel, APL Maritime.

17 MR. DOHERTY: Richard Doherty with the Marine Engineers  
18 Beneficial Association.

19 MR. POVALEC: Thomas Povalec, chief engineer, President  
20 Eisenhower.

21 MR. WALSH: Joe Walsh, Collier Walsh Nakazawa, counsel to  
22 real party's interest, AML.

23 LT. [REDACTED] And Mr. Doherty, do you consent to this interview  
24 being recorded?

25 MR. DOHERTY: Yes, sir, I do.

1 LT. [REDACTED] And Mr. Pov -- is it Povalec?

2 MR. POVALEC: Povalec, yes.

3 LT. [REDACTED] Mr. Povalec, do you consent to us recording this  
4 interview?

5 MR. POVALEC: Yes.

6 LT. [REDACTED] Great. Thank you very much.

7 INTERVIEW OF MR. POVALEC

8 BY LT. [REDACTED]

9 Q. So, Chief, if you could go ahead and start, we've -- we'd  
10 like to hear a little bit of your background, your maritime  
11 experience and history and we'll go from there.

12 A. Well, I graduated from (indiscernible) and Merchant Academy  
13 in 1978, and I've been working since then. (Indiscernible) I  
14 don't know, 30 plus years. Before that it's what you call 40  
15 flag. And that's what I do for a living, is a marine engineer.  
16 We've been -- I've been with APL since '93, which is 28 years,  
17 sailing chief -- permanently as chief 2007. Before that, I was  
18 permanent first assistant. Sail all the class of vessels the  
19 American President lines had, C9, C10, C11s. Every single class,  
20 J10s, S12s. Now I'm in this class what has no name and that's  
21 basically my experience.

22 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, if we could go ahead and just --  
23 if you could go ahead and start from when you were aware of the  
24 fire and kind of go through the process, the steps, and things  
25 that happened on board -- on board the vessel.

1 A. Okay. When a general -- I was in my bed when the general  
2 alarm went off. I was getting into my clothes when they called  
3 me. I think my second assistant called me and said it is a fire.  
4 And I just continued putting my clothes on and went down. And the  
5 muster by my -- I think on the starboard side, and my first and my  
6 second were already in the turnout gear and I can't recall what  
7 this -- it's pretty blurry what took place. But at that point in  
8 time, whatever they told me, I decided to put the emergency  
9 generator on right away because it was serious. I put the  
10 emergency generator on boss (ph.) in order to split the boss to be  
11 able to control whatever is going down there.

12 At that point of time, I went one deck up and looked at the  
13 monitors. And what you were watching this morning, I saw some of  
14 it. I don't recall what part of it. I came back, they were  
15 already having the fire hoses, they were already -- my first  
16 reacted pretty quick. He had a team already, you know, pulling  
17 the boundaries. The hatch they opened to see what's going on, but  
18 it was coming from there straight up. At that point of time, I  
19 told the captain that I will cut the flames off because in my  
20 head, what I -- what I saw on camera, I only saw the boiler  
21 pictures. The main engine was already gone. I couldn't see that.  
22 But it was serious, so I told the captain that I will cut off the  
23 power and we'll be without lights. So I have the emergency  
24 generator running, everything is split, and I went to the -- what  
25 do you call that cubicle there? Fire control room. And I

1 initiate the shut-down of the fuel shutdowns, electrical --  
2 there's one button there, electrical, pumps and everything, and  
3 then manually I shut down the dampers. So the space is -- okay.

4 At that point of time, my first comes and says that it's too  
5 serious, that I should introduce CO2, but I stopped him because I  
6 knew the mist that action -- since the fire alarm went off, it was  
7 engaged. But I still opened everything up and pushed my buttons  
8 because I didn't trust that -- I don't trust information that  
9 much. So I pushed all the mist spaces regardless, main engine,  
10 generators, you name it, that's a whole bank of that, just to make  
11 sure that it's going. And I paused and I wanted to see what is  
12 going to take place with the mist. I came out and start feeling  
13 the bulkheads. That means one aft. When I came out of that  
14 cubicle there, first I went to the door to the main engine space.  
15 I opened the door, the other door is closed, I put my hand to  
16 that. It's hot. I closed the door. Okay. Went back where the  
17 hatch is and they were cooling already, boundary cooling all that  
18 space. It was still hot already. I paused about five minutes. I  
19 don't know, it's hard to tell. Whatever the time is. And then in  
20 the end, I don't know how to tell you this, but it's just  
21 instinctively I had no -- any other choices. I send the mate,  
22 chief mate to check all the dampers, okay? I'm ready to introduce  
23 CO2, but I don't trust nobody, including myself. And I sent the  
24 chief mate to go all the way up to the stack and make sure that  
25 everything is down. Okay. He comes back and says that

1 everything's closed, so I'm ready to introduce CO2. We mustered  
2 everybody, everybody's accounted for. I just took the hammer, get  
3 the key out, open the door to the CO2, the fire -- the CO2 horn  
4 goes off and it says there -- you've got two propellant bottles  
5 there. It says use one.

6 Like I said, I don't trust many things, so I open both  
7 propellant bottles and told the captain I'm going to do the CO2.  
8 He agreed with me. We already discussed this over the radio, and  
9 I pulled both handles. That means I've released the whole thing  
10 of CO2. That's what basically -- when I look at the video, it  
11 probably took all together 15, 20 minutes, I don't know, 18  
12 minutes. You'll see that on the timeline. I cannot tell you any  
13 timeline because it's the middle of the night and I don't carry a  
14 watch. And from that point on, we're calling -- it's pretty  
15 intense, sorry. We just were monitoring, feeling the bulkheads,  
16 we're cooling the boundary cooling and hoping for the best. And  
17 that's basically what's that.

18 Q. After you released the CO2, did you -- and the -- continued  
19 the boundary cooling, did you notice that the temperature was  
20 dropping off or did it stay -- did it stay consistent?

21 A. It stayed consistent. It was not dropping off.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. That was a -- a big deal.

24 Q. All right. If you could con -- go from there and kind of  
25 tell us your interaction with the TNT Salvage and how they



1 assisted with the recovery?

2 A. Okay. So that being said, nobody was going to open any  
3 access, so everybody was aware engine-space wise and the deck  
4 would not do -- personnel wouldn't do it. So we made sure that  
5 nobody will open anything because the CO2 was introduced. I mean,  
6 in this kind of mayhem in a sense, you know, a lot of people would  
7 react differently, but kind of -- I don't know who I had out there  
8 to make sure nothing gets opened. But everybody's aware of this,  
9 you understand? I made the round of the emergency generator, make  
10 sure it's running, left the door open in a -- because I don't want  
11 the emergency generator to maybe overheat or something, because  
12 normally the door could be closed and there's a damper is -- I  
13 mean, the damper is open but hey, I don't know what's taking  
14 place. So I left the door to the emergency generator open but my  
15 watch, whoever it was, second or the first, in a case there was  
16 something going to come out of the engine space, we would have  
17 closed that door and had the emergency generator running as long  
18 as it could.

19 What else? TNT. I think they showed up the next day, or the  
20 same day in the afternoon. At that time, we're cooling off. By  
21 that time -- by the time they show up, it was under control, but  
22 the first four or five hours, it was really kind of -- I couldn't  
23 make a -- I couldn't tell you that it was taken care of or not.  
24 We're just hoping for that. But after that, in the morning, it  
25 started cooling off. So we're observing these bulkheads. We keep

1 the boundary coolings, a couple of hoses were just flooding the  
2 top of the -- where the hatch is at, and TNT showed up, very  
3 professional. I'm glad they came because they went by the book.  
4 We waited 24 hours and we made an access -- I looked at -- I  
5 finally opened the -- I finally looked at the video recording  
6 because I finally looked at the recording. And I get the real-  
7 time camera and I'm so fortunate that there's one camera that's  
8 alive and it's in the starboard generator room, and it's showing  
9 nothing, no smoke, nothing. In the left upper corner, there's a  
10 flickering on this -- on this picture and I'm thinking maybe it's  
11 still burning in -- where the main engine is. I don't see no  
12 smoke. Okay.

13 That being said, they agreed with me that we should go access  
14 this, if we stick the sensor in there to see VOC -- volatile  
15 organic compound level, the CO level is. So about -- after 24  
16 hours, it was safe to enter with an SCVA. So my first and one of  
17 the lead guys from the salvage, they are suited up. We have  
18 backup with a couple of turn-out gears with the bottles and  
19 everything, and the staging area was outside of the control room  
20 where we were coming from the starboard tunnel -- you know, the  
21 starboard tunnel with the tide door, and there's like a space  
22 before you walk into the control room. And there's another door  
23 to the main engine. So we staged there, tested atmosphere and  
24 deemed it was safe to enter, and we entered there. We're in --  
25 had the radios and as soon as they came down, they could see there

1 was nothing going on anymore that was a big, great -- you know,  
2 what to say. So my idea of looking at this picture where it was  
3 flickering, it was the beacon. It was a beacon of the -- of the  
4 alarm going off continuously, because we had an alarm going off  
5 continuously down there, because there's no way of stopping it.  
6 So that's what the -- what did I do? The bigger issue was the  
7 alarms, a general alarm in the -- I know, I backtracked what I did  
8 here. Alarms were going off, the communication on the radio is  
9 more than troublesome. So what I did, I took out the fire  
10 detection. I went to the bridge and disabled because it was  
11 continuously going. There was nothing telling me nothing new, so  
12 I disabled that. After I released CO2, I disabled the CO2 alarm  
13 also because it's going also. And the general alarm. So we can  
14 actually communicate now. That was the biggest stumbling block.  
15 And basically, there's nothing we can do about this, but it's very  
16 disturbing because it's hard to talk, it's hard to communicate  
17 when you have a phone right here and I have to have a headset on  
18 my head because I cannot hear, you know, and then I -- it's  
19 continuous.

20       Anyway, so TNT, they went in there, we find out there's no  
21 more fire. VOCs are still hot. That being said, we went up and  
22 manually opened the dampers because I didn't have no control there  
23 anymore. I lost all of it. So all my dampers are closed with a  
24 weight, so we went up there and manually lift them up and tie them  
25 up so the dampers will be closed so we can have natural

1 ventilation to get the VOCs out of the engine space. I think it  
2 took us six hours -- no, more. From 10:00 at night on the -- I  
3 don't know the date. So today's Friday, yesterday -- I don't  
4 know. 10:00 at night until 6:00 in the morning yesterday. Okay.  
5 We ventilated for eight hours naturally through the -- through the  
6 fan space. And then when the level came down, then we could  
7 actually enter it without breathing, you know, (indiscernible).  
8 And then from that point on, it was just (indiscernible) mopping  
9 up and looking what's wrong, what's right. In the meantime, we  
10 are running the emergency generator. We have just lights and the  
11 fire pump, emergency fire pump running continuously. At that  
12 point in time, the office is asking me how much time that we have  
13 and I figured it out, about 90 hours with a minimal load. So that  
14 was actually pretty safe. And in the meantime, the towing and  
15 everything was arranged. So -- so yesterday, since we are getting  
16 towed, I tried to establish the plant again, and I was successful  
17 to do that. I bypassed some stuff, but it's basically alarms that  
18 were burned up, the sensors. There was some question about  
19 sensors and stuff, and I went one by one and made sure everything  
20 was good. TNT helped me with that. It's great. They have this  
21 heat-seeking camera. It saved me with some problems with the  
22 generators where -- where my bearings were showing up, I'm too  
23 hot, duh, duh, duh, but I have this nice camera and I just go  
24 straight to it and I see what is going on. That was a great help.  
25 I had the gun, but that camera is a lot more of a -- of the better

1 tool then I could manage it. And that allowed me to put my  
2 generator online. I reset everything, put on the breakers, they  
3 only needed to be put on. That means anything electrical that is  
4 not going to run, it was not on yet. It's still off. Okay.  
5 General running, powering -- powering the main boss, we were able  
6 to establish the ventilation in the engine room, services, that  
7 people can take a shower or go to the bathroom. It's critical,  
8 there were more like almost 30 hours without bathrooms, okay. No  
9 food and no kitchen, nothing. So it was imperative to get this  
10 going. And to set up for the watch, because we have no monitoring  
11 whatsoever in a sense, so set up a watch with the engineer, one  
12 engineer. Everybody was tired so I did not get an unlicensed guy  
13 to stay with it because it's one generator running. There's not  
14 much going on in a sense. That's my thinking. You might  
15 disagree, but the people are really tired.

16 So anyway -- so we are watching the generator and that's how  
17 we made it here. And once -- once we made it here, that's --  
18 everything's okay as far as I'm concerned, because it was pretty  
19 touchy in that point in time. I hope I answered your questions.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I don't know. I'm a little emotional, I'm sorry. I -- I  
22 just --

23 Q. It's --

24 A. It's -- I'm living this again, okay?

25 Q. Yeah.

- 1 A. (Indiscernible) goosebumps, it's not --
- 2 Q. Absolutely Chief, we completely understand and we appreciate  
3 your working with us.
- 4 A. It's not --
- 5 Q. Yeah. No -- and you're doing a great job so thank you very  
6 much.
- 7 A. Yeah.
- 8 Q. So right now, I had -- I had just a couple questions. Our  
9 initial report stated that you had two generators running, but it  
10 sounds like you had one. Do you recall whether --
- 11 A. I -- no, no. I established two generators.
- 12 Q. Uh-huh.
- 13 A. Originally, yes, at 10:00, I -- I split -- there are two  
14 generators. The port generator room and starboard generator room.
- 15 Q. Uh-huh.
- 16 A. I don't know what's going on. I established to run two  
17 generators in the case something goes wrong, that one generator  
18 will take the load of the other one because it's still  
19 questionable what's going on. I'm running them on a low load.
- 20 Q. Uh-huh.
- 21 A. Both of them.
- 22 Q. Yeah.
- 23 A. In the case something goes haywire, I've got to make it to  
24 the dock. I'm being pulled by the tug. So I ran two generators  
25 until I -- this morning.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. 0800 and I'm -- I'm happy what's going on, everything's  
3 stable, so I take number three generator off, put it to the  
4 standby for myself and I'm on one generator now.

5 Q. Okay. So initially, you had two generators doing  
6 (indiscernible).

7 A. Oh, yes, from the start.

8 Q. And then -- and then --

9 A. As a backup.

10 Q. Roughly around what time did you go down to just one  
11 generator?

12 A. This morning, 8:00.

13 Q. Okay. This morning.

14 A. Before you showed up.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. I mean, I still have a -- the one that saved us which is  
17 called the emergency generator.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And it's worked wonders. It worked pretty well for 32 hours.  
20 No hiccups whatsoever.

21 BY MR. BARNUM:

22 Q. Thanks, Chief. Bart Barnum at TSB. Speaking of the e-gen,  
23 32 hours, did you have to fill up the fuel tank a couple times?

24 A. No, sir. There was no way for me to fill it up because the  
25 way to fill it up would be to run the pump from the engine space.

1 No way. I had a 2700 liters, 2.7 cubic meters of diesel in there,  
2 which is -- the max is like 2800. So I ran the generator in San  
3 Pedro for two hours, a monthly check, and so I had basically a  
4 full tank. I figured out, in 32 -- right now, I have 1700 liters  
5 in there. In 32 hours, I burned about 1,000 meters, one cubic  
6 meter of NDO. When you calculate, it's about 31 liters an hour.  
7 So I kind of conserved, I did not put any fans because the fans  
8 will increase my KW load and I stayed at 90K (indiscernible).  
9 That means I had only emergency lights and I had an emergency fire  
10 pump running. I could -- had to put a fan somewhere like to the  
11 house, but that's -- that's not the way it works. I made  
12 everybody open the doors, so we had a cross-ventilation. I did  
13 that right off the bat after we stabilized the situation.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Because after I cut everything off, all the fans are off,  
16 everything's off. And I have no power to power that. I could,  
17 but I didn't -- decided not to because I need to conserve my fuel.

18 Q. Chief, you and your engine department are all day workers, is  
19 that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Yeah. How many unlicensed do you have?

22 A. Three.

23 Q. Three unlicensed?

24 A. No, four.

25 Q. Four?



1 A. Four. I have an electrician, reefer, wiper and junior.

2 Four. Sorry.

3 Q. Who's -- who's doing your engine room rounds for you? You  
4 know, you're getting your --

5 A. Junior.

6 Q. The junior?

7 A. He's doing my numbers, yes.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. And he's doing -- he assists the engineer as needed. Like  
10 he's doing 11:00 numbers, he's doing my arrival, departure  
11 numbers, and he's specially trained because the numbers need to be  
12 right.

13 Q. Yeah. So he -- he's doing the engine room rounds, getting  
14 your numbers --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Your -- what are your engineers doing? Are they doing  
17 maintenance during the day or do they do rounds as well?

18 A. Twenty-four hours, there's one engineer doing rounds. The  
19 other two engineers are maintenance.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. So basically, from 0800 to 0800 the next morning, there's one  
22 engineer does rounds. He is actually doing the rounds. The  
23 junior is actually doing just checking -- like a waiter, he's just  
24 taking numbers.

25 Q. Okay. So the engineer rounds isn't -- they aren't a written

1 round, it's more of a visual round or (indiscernible).

2 A. No, no, an engineer round is with that sheet. I have that  
3 sheet, the check-off sheet --

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. That somebody looked.

6 Q. Yeah, the -- I think the --

7 A. There's a check-off sheet which is a daily round for the duty  
8 engineers.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. And they do that sheet plus assigned jobs for a certain  
11 position, like second assistant would take care of the fuel, the  
12 third assistant would take care of the low boil, you know, that is  
13 on their duty days.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. So that basically carried the plan of all 24 hours.

16 Q. Okay. Thank you. That duty engineer, do they have any other  
17 responsibilities during that duty day? At night, they're  
18 sleeping, right? Are they required to do a round at night?

19 A. No. They're answering the alarms.

20 Q. When's their last round at night?

21 A. 1700 was the last round. So 0800 to 1700 is a regular day  
22 work and then after that, we are on (indiscernible).

23 Q. Okay. So they're not going down at 10:00 or --

24 A. No, they don't have to do that, but some of them do that.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. There's some good ones, they do that.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. And I really appreciate that. And I -- I'll do that quite a  
4 bit, it's off the list, but I do that. Before I go to sleep, I'll  
5 go make a round myself, just to look.

6 Q. Did any -- the night before the fire, did you have a good one  
7 on or did you go down -- did anybody -- when was the last walk-  
8 through of the engine room?

9 A. Well, I left the engine room about 10:00 at night. We left  
10 San Pedro at 1800, and we were maneuvering out for an hour and  
11 then we went into the 12-mile zone, which is a slow zone until we  
12 get out and I was out there with the -- with my second, okay, and  
13 first. Then I knocked off and I left the first and the second to  
14 -- when we get out of the zone to load up to whatever the speed  
15 was, the captain was saying about 80 rpms. Okay. And it's got to  
16 be in the log up there. I think around midnight they left.

17 Q. Okay. And --

18 A. So when they made the rounds, they check everything, they're  
19 trained to do that, especially my first. It was -- we just left  
20 San Pedro and we did some maintenance, this and that, you know, so  
21 we did check everything.

22 Q. You mentioned it and the captain mentioned as well, your  
23 maintenance that you performed while on San Pedro, any -- what  
24 kind of engine maintenance was that?

25 A. I better think about this one.

1 Q. Yeah, please -- just take your time. I know it's been a long  
2 few days for you. And you probably answered it already to three  
3 other people and I apologize --

4 A. Yeah, I know.

5 Q. For asking you again.

6 A. It's a big blur for me. Hold on. Main engine. We did some  
7 piping that was on the main engine. Hold on. Yeah, it was some  
8 piping we did on the main engine. We replaced some piping.

9 Q. Okay. And that's you doing the work or is there --

10 A. No, no (indiscernible).

11 Q. A third party ashore? Who --

12 A. Oh, we went ashore to get this piping, yes.

13 Q. So the shipboard crew is doing the maintenance, not a third  
14 party?

15 A. No, we -- the shipboard crew was doing the work, right? But  
16 we had some pipe made ashore.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And that's --

19 Q. Was that water pipe or was it the fuel pipe?

20 A. No, no, that's the fuel pipe. Yes.

21 Q. Fuel pipe. Okay.

22 A. And I don't think we did anymore. We did some filters.

23 Yeah, basically, there was not any other engine room maintenance  
24 that we did. We did other stuff around, you know, so --

25 Q. Obviously, we're -- we walked the engine room with you

1 earlier and your major point of concern here is the fuel oil  
2 piping, the leaking. You said you did the piping maintenance.  
3 Was it the same piping that we looked at earlier?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. It was?

6 A. Yes. Sure.

7 Q. Was it on that same cylinder? Cylinder five?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. So that line that we looked at that was disconnected,  
10 the return line --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Had the -- the loose nut and the -- the farrel, is you will  
13 --

14 A. Uh-huh. Yeah.

15 Q. Was loose. Was that the line that you replaced?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. That same line?

18 A. Yes.

19 MR. BARNUM: Okay.

20 LT. [REDACTED] What was that line for?

21 MR. POVALEC: It's a return line for a number five cylinder,  
22 yes.

23 BY MR. BARNUM:

24 Q. Do you remember who performed that replacement?

25 A. Second and first.

1 Q. Okay. Thank you. I think I probably know the answer, but is  
2 there a torque value on those nuts when you put them back on?

3 A. Yeah, there's one turn after you meet the end.

4 Q. After you snug it up and --

5 A. Yes, and then one turn after that. Yeah, that would be a  
6 torque.

7 Q. Okay. But it's -- it's not something you get a torque wrench  
8 down there and --

9 A. No, no. No. You don't torque that.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. But in -- in a nutshell, it is a one turn --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. To crush the farrel -- I mean the crush.

14 Q. To seat it?

15 A. Seat it, right. Yes.

16 Q. The -- I know your first was doing the maintenance. Did you  
17 oversee it at all? Did you see him doing it? Did --

18 A. No.

19 Q. Were you satisfied? Did you inspect it after?

20 A. I did not inspect it after because he's done that before, so  
21 I have full faith that what he did, it was fine. So --

22 Q. Why -- why was it being changed?

23 A. Because we had an issue with that pipe before and it cracked  
24 before, and I wanted a new pipe in there. So --

25 Q. When it cracked before --

- 1 A. We weld it off --
- 2 Q. How was it fixed? You welded it?
- 3 A. It was welded off, but that's not the way it's supposed to be  
4 because it has to be from the fitting to fitting, no welds on it.
- 5 Q. Right.
- 6 A. So that being said, I had a new pipe made.
- 7 Q. So someone -- an outfit ashore --
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. Bent it for you --
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And did it on the --
- 12 A. Yes, they did -- I supplied the original piping from a man  
13 because it's a special metric size, 17.3 to be precise,  
14 millimeters. It's not 18, which is a U.S. sizing in millimeters.  
15 So I did supply that piping to them and the farrels we took from  
16 the -- from the injector connections, which is the correct sizing  
17 for that.
- 18 Q. So it was an OEM tubing --
- 19 A. OEM.
- 20 Q. OEM tubing.
- 21 A. OEM pipe and OEM farrels, yes.
- 22 Q. Okay.
- 23 A. By all means.
- 24 Q. And the -- sorry. The farrels and the nuts were OEM, they're  
25 new. But they were for a different part. It wasn't -- they

1 weren't reused from the old pipe?

2 A. No, from the new part.

3 Q. It was a brand new --

4 A. A farrel, after you crush it on the pipe, it can't take it  
5 all, it's over.

6 Q. Right. Yeah.

7 A. So it's got to be a new farrel. We took the farrel outside  
8 of the T that goes to the ejector. It was the same sizing because  
9 on the ejector, you have a return line that connects.

10 Q. Yeah.

11 A. Actually, that return line that you're looking at is  
12 connected to the injector on the other side. So it's the same  
13 farrel and that.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. So we took it out at parts. And my -- I talked to my first  
16 and I -- and he got it from the box.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. I can show you, we've got more of it.

19 Q. So it's a 17.3 millimeter farrel?

20 A. Yeah. Yeah, it's --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. It's a metric tubing to be precise. It's not actually a  
23 pipe, it's a tubing, and it's -- oh, boy, I don't know. It's not  
24 two millimeter thickness. I don't know. I've got to look it up.

25 Q. Okay. After the maintenance was performed by the first and



1 the second, I think --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Did they test the system?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Did they pressurize it?

6 A. Yes. We put a -- I did not observe it, but my first reported  
7 to me that he put and ran a pump for about an hour or something  
8 and then we shut it down. And then he said that -- they made the  
9 rounds and everything, when they made rounds, they looked at it  
10 and it was fine. So there --

11 Q. Did he -- did anybody retighten it or put a wrench on it  
12 after the test?

13 A. I don't know. He didn't tell me that.

14 Q. Okay. We also noticed a pipe bracket that -- that that same  
15 tubing ran through.

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. Do you know if that was loosened and taken off during part of  
18 the maintenance or did they slip the --

19 A. Everything was taken down.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. The whole pipe goes from the top, the two sections, goes down  
22 and goes down all the way out, so that -- I think four points  
23 other than -- that it's actually tied off at.

24 Q. And I -- and I plan to look at it again, but is there -- is  
25 it like three or four bends or is -- where's the next connection

1 down below there? Is there --

2 A. It's about three meters, which is about ten feet long.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. And the two pipes, actually, that's connecting with the --

5 with the one fitting in the middle. Okay. And the brackets that

6 hold it in two place, okay?

7 Q. Okay. I didn't see any down there, I don't know if it --

8 A. You've got to look for it.

9 Q. For the --

10 A. It's hard to see now.

11 Q. Did -- was there any splash guard tape on any of that return

12 line tubing? I didn't see any.

13 A. There's no splash guard.

14 Q. There's no --

15 A. It's just the (indiscernible) tubing.

16 Q. No tape on it.

17 A. I don't -- what would you call the splash guard on it?

18 Q. I call it ABS tape. I don't know, it's just like an adhesive

19 take that you wrap around a fuel fitting.

20 A. No.

21 Q. (Indiscernible) spray.

22 A. No, we don't do that.

23 Q. You don't use it? Okay.

24 A. Not on the engine space. Maybe outside on a -- on a

25 machinery that will be exposed to the weather.

1 Q. Yeah.

2 A. But in an engine space, you would not use that. I mean, the  
3 fittings should be tight and there shouldn't be no leak, that's  
4 for sure.

5 Q. Yeah.

6 A. And there's no requirement for that.

7 Q. Well, I thank you for your clarity there on that topic very  
8 much.

9 A. Yes. Yes.

10 Q. I really appreciate that.

11 A. Yes, by all means.

12 Q. Thank you. I just had a couple follow-ups on my earlier  
13 questions. Just for clarification, when you got awoken in your  
14 room, was it your alarm panel, an all-call alarm or was it the  
15 general alarm going off?

16 A. I --

17 Q. Okay. Yeah, understood.

18 A. It's trivial. When an alarm goes off, I go.

19 Q. Yeah. We're just trying to figure out which -- which one  
20 went off first.

21 A. By the time I dressed up, they called me already.

22 Q. Yeah. We talked a little bit at the captain about disabled  
23 alarms or inhibited alarms. Do you have some sort of tracking for  
24 that? Or how would --

25 A. Oh, we're looking for a -- you mean monitoring, engine

1 monitoring?

2 Q. Yeah. Do you -- if --

3 A. We looked at that with the -- I don't know who was with me.

4 Q. Yeah, I think the inspection team might --

5 A. Yes. Yes.

6 Q. Have went and looked at that.

7 A. We keep a log what we take out --

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. I sign for that.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. So I'm aware of what's going on, and we attend to that as  
12 soon as possible and then I sign it off. The log that we put the  
13 alarms was basically we were all clear until we have the situation  
14 and we put some alarms on because it was continuously -- after the  
15 accident it was continuously, you know, messing with us, which was  
16 false alarms like, you know, exhaust temperature, engine is not  
17 running, you know, stuff like that.

18 Q. Uh-huh.

19 A. The false alarms.

20 Q. Uh-huh.

21 A. And there's a log down there in -- and I think you looked.

22 Did you take pictures of that?

23 MR. BARNUM: I did.

24 MR. POVALEC: I think you did. You have that.

25 MR. [REDACTED] Of the enabled list?

1 MR. POVALEC: Yeah. So it's -- we don't take them off that  
2 easily.

3 BY MR. BARNUM:

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. It's got to be a good reason.

6 Q. The TNT folks were talking about -- they were talking through  
7 -- talking to the captain about some contingencies if there was a  
8 reflash and they were talking about crossing over the CO2 system.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Was that finalized or was -- did you have a final problem --

11 A. I wouldn't do it.

12 Q. You wouldn't do it?

13 A. I -- I could not chance them going down there and then things  
14 -- the CO2 going off somehow.

15 Q. Yeah.

16 A. Regardless what I do, I don't trust it.

17 Q. Yeah.

18 A. So I did not cross over. And we went in there when  
19 everything was safe in a sense, so there was no need for CO2. And  
20 that being said, I would not let them go in there unless it was  
21 safe for them to enter. The CO2 would be crossed over only if we  
22 didn't have any other choices.

23 Q. And how would you do that? Would you have to unbolt flanges  
24 and put a hose or was -- is there just a valve thing?

25 A. Just the valves down in there, the CO2 room. But that's only

1 50 bottles, not enough really for the engine space. It would be  
2 just (indiscernible) -- it wouldn't be enough.

3 Q. Gotcha.

4 A. You know, I'm (indiscernible).

5 Q. Yes, I do.

6 A. It's over. We already discharged everything. I -- I  
7 disabled the fine mist as soon as we got there. I just say -- I  
8 disabled because I didn't want to chance fine mist go off because  
9 I don't know the situation now because everything is burned up,  
10 the wiring. Who knows what -- what happened down there. So I did  
11 disable the fine mist when we entered there.

12 Q. Is that -- is that fire -- that high fog or that water mist,  
13 is that like a -- how long can that run for? Does it have a salt-  
14 water crossover? Is it just a potable water tank?

15 A. No, it comes -- it comes from the bottled water tank. It can  
16 run forever. I mean --

17 Q. So was there -- you obviously made a decision to stop that  
18 and then CO2 or did you just run it the whole time?

19 A. I ran as long as it did until the CO2 came to the place  
20 because it was not stopping it.

21 Q. It wasn't working?

22 A. It wasn't working. It was steaming out from the vent but it  
23 wasn't stopping it.

24 Q. Understood.

25 A. I waited for ten minutes plus. I don't know how long.

- 1 Q. Okay.
- 2 A. I -- I gave it a chance.
- 3 Q. One last question, Chief. I think everybody would be in  
4 agreement here, the crew acted extremely efficient to this  
5 emergency. I'm just curious, how did you know how to do this?  
6 The -- obviously, you've been sailing forever, but have you  
7 received any specialized training? What would you -- would you  
8 account that from?
- 9 A. I take firefighting, I like firefighting.
- 10 Q. Yeah.
- 11 A. I'm sorry. I take those courses and I like firefighting.
- 12 Q. Yeah.
- 13 A. I like walking in those dark spaces and you know, I think  
14 it's challenging for me and I like it.
- 15 Q. But for you to know to -- all right, I know I have to shut  
16 the fuel, I know I have to shut the dampers, I know --
- 17 A. I just know it.
- 18 Q. You just know it.
- 19 A. I don't know how to answer that.
- 20 Q. Okay.
- 21 A. It's been many years under my belt. I --
- 22 Q. Right.
- 23 A. I just know it. The way I act is the way I know how to do  
24 it. It's beyond -- how do I explain this?
- 25 Q. And obviously, hindsight is 20/20; I think that's most of our

1 job, though --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. If you had to do it again, obviously anything different you  
4 would have done with the tubing, the fuel fitting? How would have  
5 you --

6 A. The fuel fitting? I think there was done -- due diligence  
7 was done and my first looked, they checked it out, we put the pump  
8 on, we ran it. We ran for what -- we ran what, eight -- six hours  
9 under the pressure and everything was fine. And then we left the  
10 engine space. And two hours later, it went off. It's hard to  
11 explain, but we made the rounds before we knocked off. And as far  
12 as I'm concerned, that was everything done by the book there.

13 Q. Yeah.

14 A. I mean, we fixed these lines before. We done them and we  
15 done them the same way.

16 Q. Is it because they cracked before? Is it the same problem?

17 A. No, they don't crack. They just -- especially like high-  
18 pressure lines, they will get loose, you know. They get old, they  
19 get tired.

20 Q. Yeah.

21 A. So we're changing the high-pressure lines on the -- not a  
22 regular basis, but as they get loose and they get tired, we take  
23 them out, but they start leaking a little bit. I didn't -- I  
24 guess (indiscernible). I think --

25 Q. But this return line, you said it cracked and you had



1 temporary welded it.

2 A. We -- we welded it, yes, and then we repaired it.

3 Q. Is there other ones that also would crack?

4 A. No, I did no work on any other line, but --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. But as far as the fuel system, we are continuously at it in a  
7 sense.

8 BY LT. [REDACTED]

9 Q. Question. When -- for the -- for the lines that you did weld  
10 up, you said that was taken ashore or was that done by the crew?

11 A. We did it.

12 Q. So you welded up the pipes?

13 A. Yes, yes.

14 Q. And then you said you -- you tested it. Did you pressure  
15 test it?

16 A. I put it on -- fuel on it and I watched it for a week.

17 Q. Gotcha. Okay. Did you --

18 A. Until I make it to the west coast --

19 Q. All right.

20 A. Because I had that happen last trip. So welded off and we --  
21 we made rounds of this continuously. As a matter of fact, I  
22 slowed the vessel down because I didn't feel comfortable going the  
23 full output. I slowed it down about four or five days before LA,  
24 you know, to make it right, okay, in a sense, because I didn't  
25 trust it.

1 BY MR. BARNUM:

2 Q. When was that repair made? In the middle of the Pacific  
3 somewhere or where did --

4 A. Yes. In the Pacific, yes.

5 Q. And how did you notice it was leaking?

6 A. Oh, I just (indiscernible). We make rounds.

7 Q. Just -- so someone noticed it on their round?

8 A. Somebody noticed, yeah.

9 Q. Yeah. Yeah.

10 A. We make rounds, we look at this stuff. The duty engineer in  
11 the morning takes a flashlight and walks every cylinder.

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. He looks at every pipe. If there's something odd, we will  
14 attend to that because this is critical, really. And as you see,  
15 it's critical.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So -- so you said that you -- you did  
17 a temporary weld on the pipe before --

18 MR. POVALEC: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Before you made LA and then when it  
20 made LA, you said you took -- you went ashore with the port --

21 MR. POVALEC: Yeah, send it ashore, right.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. Who did you send it ashore  
23 with?

24 MR. POVALEC: Ocean -- Oceanwide.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oceanwide?

1 MR. POVALEC: Yes.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. And --

3 MR. POVALEC: No, no, no, sorry. Dockside, sorry.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

5 MR. POVALEC: They pick up.

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And what did Dockside do with it?

7 MR. POVALEC: They -- I just send it to somebody else to bend  
8 it.

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

10 MR. POVALEC: I don't know if -- I don't think they did it,  
11 they'd send somebody to the professional shop to bend it and do  
12 everything.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. And then they sent back up --

14 MR. POVALEC: They send the finished product back.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. Did -- did they send -- did --  
16 were you, the crew, or did Clasko (ph.) go witness the hydro test  
17 of that new pipe?

18 MR. POVALEC: There's no magic testing for this.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

20 MR. POVALEC: It's only a (indiscernible) return line.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. So -- okay.

22 MR. POVALEC: The pipe is intact. It wa -- that's a new  
23 pipe. It's a brand new pipe from the manufacturer that I had two  
24 sections of as a spare. I think I've got some pictures somewhere  
25 on this. So by bending the pipe -- it's not a pipe, actually it's

1 a tubing. There's a different between pipe and tubing. So this  
2 is actually tubing and that's basically that.

3 MR. BARNUM: Thank you, Chief, that's all the questions I  
4 have.

5 MR. POVALEC: Yeah.

6 BY CHIEF FOREIGN OFFICER [REDACTED]

7 Q. So this is Chief Foreign Officer [REDACTED] [REDACTED] speaking.  
8 Chief, so -- I'm so sorry, I might have to back up a little bit  
9 because I'm kind of waiting. The -- when you first met with the  
10 fire team before they actually entered into the -- the engine  
11 space, did you happen to notice, was the engine room hatch open or  
12 closed at that time?

13 A. We closed that hatch when -- before we introduced CO2.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. How are we going to --

16 Q. Was the hatch closed before the fire -- the fire team  
17 entered?

18 A. Everything was buttoned up before the CO2 was introduced.

19 Q. Oh, I understand, before the CO2 --

20 A. After that, everything is closed.

21 Q. Oh, yeah. No, I certainly understand, but -- but the -- you  
22 mentioned that your first and your second were dressed out in fire  
23 suits. They attempted entry to go in and then they -- they had to  
24 retreat because of the heat, is that correct?

25 A. Yeah, but that was -- everything was closed. We opened the

1 hatch later to see what was going on.

2 Q. Okay. So at the time the fire team tried to go in --

3 A. That was -- everything was closed.

4 Q. Everything was closed at that time?

5 A. Sure. Because (indiscernible) status, all the -- all the  
6 tide doors and everything has to be closed.

7 Q. Okay. And I understand that, you know, for the suit, too,  
8 but for the fire team.

9 A. No, no. When they went unmanned -- when you're unmanned,  
10 everything has to be closed because they will check all the -- the  
11 tide doors, the bridge will check and everything is closed.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. So when they left at midnight or whatever the -- it says in  
14 the log on the bridge, 12:30, whenever they left, everything is  
15 closed.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. So when the fire alarm went off, everything was closed. We  
18 opened the hatch later to inspect to see what's going on down  
19 there.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. They tried to get into the space through the door on the main  
22 deck.

23 Q. Uh-huh.

24 A. But it was too hot for them to proceed, that's why they  
25 retreated. That's why I went out there and opened the hatch to

1 see what's going on.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. And after -- and nothing's happened so we closed it. So if  
4 TNT showed up, everything is still buttoned up. We did not open  
5 anything.

6 Q. Oh, yeah. No, just -- just to clarify, I'm not referring to  
7 TNT, I'm referring to your -- your ship's crew.

8 A. Oh.

9 Q. When they dressed out in their fire-fighting gear.

10 A. Oh. Okay.

11 Q. Yes, I apologize.

12 A. Okay. Everything was -- yeah, sure. They ac -- tried to  
13 access on the main deck.

14 Q. Okay. And was that hatch open at the time that they tried to  
15 enter with the fire hoses?

16 A. No.

17 Q. No? It was open at that time?

18 A. We opened later.

19 Q. Oh, okay.

20 A. Just to in -- just to see what's going on.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Okay. So the other thing, you mentioned that the -- you  
24 allowed the water mist system to run for approximately ten  
25 minutes, it wasn't being effective at that time.

1 A. Uh-huh.

2 Q. When you discharged the CO2, was the water mist system still  
3 engaged or did you secure it prior to?

4 A. I -- I -- after I push it, how do I disengage it?

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. It's going on.

7 Q. All right. So the C --

8 A. It keeps going -- it keeps going as long as there's water on  
9 the other end and just --

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. A potable tank there. So --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. That's --

14 Q. So CO2 entered the space simultaneously --

15 A. Right.

16 Q. With the water mist system?

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. Okay. And then -- and then (indiscernible) is, you know,  
19 what are your thoughts as to what caused this fire? You know,  
20 what was the -- the source of this?

21 A. I don't know. I looked with the -- what did I look today  
22 with? I don't know. I really -- I'm perplexed. I don't know.

23 CHIEF FOREIGN OFFICER [REDACTED] Okay. That's all I have.

24 That's all the questions I have.

25 BY LT. [REDACTED]

1 Q. Chief, this is Lieutenant [REDACTED] Just one follow-up question  
2 on the fuel return lines. What do you suspect had been causing,  
3 you know, the issue with the -- you say that you had to weld one  
4 of the pipes because it had cracked. Have you noticed like  
5 excessive vibration or anything on those lines and like on  
6 different cylinders, or --

7 A. They all vibrate one way or another because the pump is  
8 called jerk and it just keeps pumping. So -- no I have not.

9 Q. And then besides that, now you pointed out that return line  
10 to us today when we were in the engine room. Have you identified  
11 any fuel lines or piping that may look suspect to you?

12 A. We haven't changed any piping in a while so we've been slowly  
13 going -- changing the high-pressure pipes because there was the  
14 old style there and they were kind of iffy and they were failing.  
15 So we'd been introducing the new piping as -- as the old piping is  
16 getting tired. So -- but not this -- I've been here now for four  
17 months. We haven't done anything except this one return line. So  
18 I think it's been under control pretty good. See, with the heavy  
19 fuel, you can see it and it will not (indiscernible) that much.  
20 It's the diesel that is very iffy. We do make rounds when we  
21 switch over to these. We pay attention to this. We came 200  
22 miles. We came out of Pedro for six hours or whatever and we had  
23 not seen any leaks. We do attend to those leaks, that's for sure,  
24 because diesel is dangerous and it's -- you can see that.

25 BY MR. [REDACTED]



1 Q. Chief, Ensign [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I know that you just noted  
2 that for a diesel you pay close attention. In the past few months  
3 on your voyages, have you noticed whether -- versus heavy die --  
4 heavy fuel versus diesel that --

5 A. No, we didn't have any issues.

6 Q. No?

7 A. No, we did not. In a pre -- my career, I've seen a lot of  
8 things, but for this last time for -- I've been here, not really.  
9 So it's been under control pretty good. But in the past in my  
10 career, yes, I see. I see lines getting loose and injectors  
11 leaking and -- and the fittings leaking and everything -- you  
12 know, it's just -- it's happening, it's not like it doesn't exist,  
13 it's just all the time. So the -- the gaskets get tired, you  
14 know, the -- the fittings get loose and you get seep a little bit,  
15 but when you go to diesel, you make sure you make your rounds,  
16 make sure you look. And then you can attend to it when you get to  
17 the port unless it's a serious leak. But when I look at this  
18 video, it was not -- it wasn't long that (indiscernible) that's --  
19 there was no way we could catch up with that one. I -- could I  
20 have a look at the exhaust manifold? There's only one circle  
21 that's not insulated. I think it's by the design the way it is  
22 because the long sections are insulated so the piping exhaust  
23 manifold, it has one section, and then it expands to the bigger  
24 section and there's a little slit around it, and I think it was  
25 ignited on that because everything else is -- is insulated.

1 BY MR. BARNUM:

2 Q. Chief, this is Bart, NTSB again. I know you tried to explain  
3 to me down below but I couldn't hear you too well. When you  
4 secure -- when you secure the fuel, fuel shut-down, what does --  
5 what does that do? Does it shut a valve? Does it shut off a  
6 pump? Does it do both?

7 A. It does both. It shuts off the fuel on the fuel tank, the  
8 shut-down valves and cuts the power to the pumps. So it basically  
9 cuts everything off.

10 Q. So your fuel --

11 A. There's no more -- there's no more feed whatsoever.

12 Q. So your fuel pumps are electric, they're not engine driven,  
13 they're electric?

14 A. No, they're electric pumps.

15 Q. Yeah.

16 A. Yes, so that -- there's one button there on that panel, it  
17 cuts off the electricity to the pumps and releases the pneumatic  
18 for the shut-downs for the -- in this case, the NDO (ph.) service  
19 tank suction valve.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. The main one.

22 Q. Okay. What --

23 A. Because everything feeds from there for the generators, for  
24 the main engine.

25 Q. That was my next question. If --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So the generator also went black then?

3 A. Everything goes.

4 Q. Yeah. Okay.

5 A. So until it was serious, I was reluctant to do that because I  
6 knew I will be without power. I won't be able to do anything.

7 MR. BARNUM: That's all the questions I have, thank you.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. So I'm going to open the floor  
9 for any last questions? Okay. All right. Well, Chief Engineer,  
10 we appreciate your time and thank you very much.

11 MR. POVALEC: I hope -- I hope I answered your questions. If  
12 you guys need anything else, you can -- I don't know, talk to me.  
13 I don't -- you know, it's just -- I'm still really kind of upset  
14 by all of this. It's very upsetting to get this and to be in this  
15 situation. It's not -- I won't say it's a bad mark on my career,  
16 but it's upsetting that this takes place. But what I'm thinking  
17 is I've seen this many times before and this time, it got where it  
18 didn't supposed to go. But the fact is, the fuel is leaking and  
19 the oil is leaking in a -- in a course of the big picture of the  
20 whole operation, you know. Machinery fails. So -- anyway --

21 LT. ██████ Thank you, Chief. This is Lt. ██████ We have just  
22 finished the interview with Chief Engineer Mr. Povalec. The time  
23 is 17:29.

24 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: FIRE ON THE *PRESIDENT EISENHOWER*  
SOUTHWEST OF SANTA BARBARA  
HARBOR, ON APRIL 28, 2021  
Interview of Chief Engineer Povalec

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FM026

PLACE: Los Angeles, CA

DATE: April 30, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed  
to the best of my skill and ability.

  
Nancy Ankenbrandt  
Transcriber